Cutting the Diamonds

A first look at the quantitative data of the
CIVICUS Civil Society Index, 2008-2011

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Executive summary

The Civil Society Index (CSI) is a participatory action-research project which aims to assess the state of civil society in a range of different countries and create a knowledge base and momentum for strengthening civil society in those countries. The CSI is initiated and implemented by civil society organisations (CSOs) at the country level, in partnership with CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation (CIVICUS).

The CSI applies a broad and functional approach to civil society in order to capture its diverse structural and cultural (normative) features in different national settings. The research design combines quantitative and qualitative elements to elaborate the current status, strengths and weaknesses of civil society and to identify the needs for future action to enhance effective civic participation. The research analyses five dimensions to describe civil society and its environment: civic engagement, level of organisation, practice of values, perception of impact and external environment. By collecting and generating quantitative and qualitative data in close cooperation with local partners, CIVICUS is able to draw on the asset of a unique compilation of information for reinforcing its work through a comparative approach.

This publication provides the first description of the quantitative data from the second implementation phase (2008 to 2011), bringing together the information from a set of 25 countries for which the data was finalised at the time of writing. This presentation of the data intends to invite an interested audience of academics and practitioners alike to work further with the data in order to deepen the understanding of civil society around the world and thus to enhance the potential for citizens' participation for positive social change.

This report makes use of simple statistical tools which allow the identification of general tendencies, special cases and counter-intuitive relations among indicators. Mainly correlations are used which, taken by themselves, do not allow for conclusions on causal relationships, but which provide impulses for further reflection and identification of factors that influence the formation, activities and capacities of civil society.

Some of the more interesting preliminary findings can be formulated as follows:

■ Civil society is varied from country to country, and countries can be distinguished, for example by the degree to which advocacy groups versus service organisations are represented, or by which types of CSOs are most prominent or powerful (e.g. NGOs, trade unions, faith groups).

■ State institutions remain a main reference point for CSOs.

■ People's engagement in social organisations does not substitute for engagement in political organisations (and vice versa); instead, both types of commitment tend to be either strong or weak in a country.

■ An individualistic sort of participation, i.e. presence in more occasional events or activities rather than in the form of stable membership of CSOs, also appears as an alternative mode of participation, and this needs more theoretical and empirical attention.

■ Networking between CSOs is practised widely, but does not always take the form of established federations or participation in umbrella bodies.

■ Interactions among single indicators describe the factors that characterise a culture of participation, made up of higher levels of civic engagement, a wider diffusion of positive attitudes (such as trust, tolerance) and a noteworthy perception of civil society impact.

■ Levels of civic engagement are closely related to the perception of civil society impact. However, the level of organisation of civil society and the external environment for civil society in a country are less clearly connected to the perception of impact.

■ The extent and especially the diversity of participation (the representation of more marginalised groups in civil society) are related to the perceived impact of civil society, but the depth of participation (which measures the multiple and frequent involvement of individuals) is not.

■ While the measurement of impact through the perceptions of internal and external experts, as conducted in the CSI, appears as a valid approximation, work on measuring impact could benefit from more objective indicators.

■ Some counter-intuitive links between indicators also appear. For example, civic engagement is negatively related to public spiritedness, and political engagement to levels of trust and tolerance.

■ Further investigations in cause-effect mechanisms and differentiations according to countries are needed. A more detailed, contextualised comparison of groups of countries, possibly making good use of the CSI country reports, the case studies and other background material is a possible strategy.

■ Possibly the most interesting findings which promise to trigger further research are related to the practice of values dimension: for example, the discrepancies revealed between the promotion of values and CSO internal practices, or the inconsistency which seems to appear between the defence of democratic space for the expression of interests and the opening up of the arena for potentially non-democratic groups. These inherent contradictions set impulses for more empirical work, but also suggest a need for a refinement of the theoretical foundations of civil society and civic participation.

Introduction

This publication provides a first glance at the quantitative data gathered in 25 countries which took part in the CSI implementation that started in 2008 and concluded in 2011.[1] The countries are: Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Georgia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Russia, Slovenia, South Korea, Togo, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zambia.[2] The report intends to provide an introduction and a brief overview of the quantitative data from those 25 countries, and necessarily for reasons of space remains at a general level. The intention is to stimulate the interest of practitioners and academics alike to take a closer look at the data. They are invited to make good use of the outputs of the CSI research, checking ideas and hypotheses, discovering relationships between dimensions and indicators, explaining the trends or exceptional cases and finally using the evidence.

In this spirit, this publication seeks to kick-start the analyses and discussions. It is one of many outputs of the 2008-2011 CSI. Other outputs include the Analytical Country Reports (ACR), comprehensive country-level civil society self-assessments, some 29of which were published by CIVICUS and its national CSI partners in the first half of 2011, and these were often accompanied by a recommendations-focussed Policy Action Brief, specially commissioned case studies and other nationally specific outputs. CIVICUS has also produced an overview and synthesis of some of the key findings of the ACRs, *Bridging the Gaps: Citizens, Organisations and Dissociation*, published in September 2011 and available from CIVICUS. As the next step in this process of elaboration of the CSI data, thematic books will be prepared by CIVICUS in collaboration with the 2008-2011 CSI research partners, the Centre for Social Investment of the University of Heidelberg, and published by Bloomsbury Academic from 2012 onwards. The quantitative dataset will also be made available online to enable independent analysis and application of the CSI data.

As an introduction and overview of selected aspects of the CSI research, this report is structured as follows: the first sections briefly recall the basic elements of the CSI, i.e. the central concepts (section I) and the major outputs from the research design (section II). A short reminder then follows of the caveats which have to be kept in mind when using the data (section III). The analytical description of the quantitative material then starts with a brief sketch of some aspects of the landscape of CSOs in the different countries and of the types of external stakeholders which have been considered relevant by the national implementing partners (sections IV.1 and IV.2). The following elaborations turn to the data in its most concentrated form: the international indicator database. After a brief picture of the five dimensions, which describe the features of civil society, their socio-political, socio-economic and socio-cultural context and the perceived impact (section IV.3.1), the following sections proceed to examine each dimension more closely (sections IV.3.2 to IV.3.6). Each of these parts starts with an overview of how the countries score with respect to the respective dimension (in the format of histograms) and proceeds to a representation of the distributions of scores for the single indicators which together form a dimension (in the format of boxplots). Short interpretative descriptions of these graphical representations are offered along with simple correlations calculated between the indicators. Section IV.4 examines certain correlations among the indicators across the diverse dimensions, following the loose causal model

[1] For a list of countries which had finished the process of data collection by the end of 2010 and the data of which have therefore been included in the analyses for this publication see Annex 1. For a brief overview of the various types of research outputs see below, section II, A multi-method approach generating various research outputs, page 10. For a complete description of the research process see Mati, J M, Silva, F and Anderson, T (2010), *Assessing and Strengthening Civil Society Worldwide – an updated programme description of the CIVICUS Civil Society Index: Phase 2008 – 2010* accessible online: http://www.civicus.org/media/Assessing%20and_Strengthening_Civil_Society%20Worldwide2008-10.pdf [accessed 25 July 2011].

[2] Some countries which participated in the 2008-2011 CSI project are not included in this analysis, for three reasons: some African partners were part of a special set which applied a previous methodology and thus produced quantitative results which are not comparable; some countries started the implementation later and so did not have the results finalised at the time of writing this overview; and some countries did not acquire adequate financial resources after the start of the project to collect sufficient data. Further, some other countries completed the quantitative data collection but did not go on to produce a final Analytical Country Report; where data collection was completed, these countries have been included in this analysis. See Annex 1 for a full list of countries.

around which the research design is built (introduced in section I), with the external environment possibly influencing the features of civil society as well as the perceived impact of civil society, and the structural and cultural features of civil society possibly also influencing the perceived impact. For reasons of space only the most interesting and promising findings can be reported here. The outlook (section V) summarises these key points. The most clear tendencies and regularities are reported, but generally less emphasis is laid on drawing conclusions. According to the overall rationale for this publication, the last chapter gathers the most interesting, surprising and promising findings with the intention of identifying open questions, and pointing towards the possibilities for future research, which can be based on the rich material gathered and made available through the CIVICUS CSI project.[3]

[3] Many thanks to CIVICUS colleagues Tracy Anderson and Olga Kononykhina for their support and most helpful comments, to Andrew Firmin for a profound review of the final draft and to Jessica Hume for her work on the layout.

I. Civil Society Index - its scope and the basic definition of civil society / civic participation

In accordance with CIVICUS' mission, the main objective of the CSI research is to strengthen civil society and civic participation. The generation of knowledge is considered as one of the means to work towards this goal. At the same time, CIVICUS - as an international, global civil society alliance - draws its strength from the variety of its members, partners and networks. With respect to its research agenda this translates into a unique possibility to compare situations in different countries. The discovery of commonalities and general tendencies, but also of the specificities of certain situations, fosters learning and produces insights that can enable improvement of activities, which feed back into work at the local level. The two objectives (empowerment at the local level and international comparison) of course contradict each other at times. In these instances CIVICUS in the CSI sets a clear priority on local needs and the support for action to advance local situations.[4] Thus, the research is closely connected to drawing practical conclusions, developing implementable recommendations and preparing policy actions.[5] The comparative aspect of the research, while important, comes secondary to this objective.

• Priority of immediate and locally relevant impulses

but at the same time:

• Making use of the comparison across borders

At the same time, the international and comparative feature of the CSI is a key asset and sets conditions for the theoretical framework of the research:[6] the CSI is implemented in a few situations where the phenomenon of civil society is rather well studied, but it mainly tries to reach out into areas where comparatively few facts are known about civil society and civic participation. Due to these pioneering efforts the concrete forms of civil society and civic participation in a particular country can hardly be foreseen and determined at the outset of the research. Consequentially, the research project needs a wide definition to capture those formations of civil society which do not necessarily follow the Western model best established in academic studies. Under these conditions, the employment of a broad and fuzzy definition is seen not only as an advantage, but as a necessity. Accordingly, the CIVICUS framework settles on a wide and functional definition of civil society:[7]

A broad, functional definition in order to be able to capture diverse features of civil society, which are not known at the outset of the research

Civil society:

The arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market, which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations and institutions to advance shared interests.

[4] Heinrich, V. F. (2005), Studying Civil Society Across the World: Exploring the Thorny Issues of Conceptualization and Measurement, *Journal of Civil Society*, 1: 211 – 227.
[5] Anheier, H. (2005), Measure for Measure: A Commentary on Heinrich and the State of Civil Society Indicators Research, *Journal of Civil Society*, 1: 241 - 246.
[6] For a detailed explanation of the concepts which are contained in this definition see *Assessing the State of Civil Society* pp. 17 – 20.
[7] The working definition from the previous implementation phase differs slightly and reads: 'The arena outside of the family, the state, and the market where people associate to advance common interests.'

Furthermore, the CSI's broad and functional concept of civil society allows it to bring into the picture an aspect which can easily be neglected in the research on civil society, i.e. the normative or cultural dimensions of civil society. In order to do so, the CSI definition of civil society abstains from assuming normative qualities and practices which are often silently taken as the common traits of all the elements which make up civil society.[8] The CIVICUS concept can best be labelled as a 'non-exclusive' definition. It does not limit civil society only to those organisations which adhere to certain standards, for example, which practise democracy internally, or a 'progressive' mission. Instead, the CSI approach checks how far the actors within civil society actually practise values such as democracy, equality and justice.

This does not mean that CIVICUS' approach to civil society is neutral or non-normative. CIVICUS takes a clear stand that civic participation is a value in itself, but it also acknowledges the existence of tensions:

> "CIVICUS seeks to amplify the voices and opinions of ordinary citizens. It recognises that for effective and sustainable civic participation to occur, citizens must enjoy rights of free association and be able to engage all sectors of society," and, "CIVICUS is realistic about conflict in today's world, but remains optimistic that most people, organisations, governments and businesses will work together for the benefit of all." This vision is based on the belief that "citizen's participation is a germ for the change to the better".[9]

The promotion of issues (which could also be called interests) which are not generally recognised and which are not supported by the majority is a very basic trait of civil society. A cause which one person judges as worth advocating for might not be important or even acceptable to others. As a consequence of this understanding, particular elements which constitute civil society might endorse and enact values which are not considered positive by the majority of persons. The CIVICUS perspective implies that only the interplay of diverse interests and deliberation about different opinions is able to bring about positive change and development. The expression of interests and engagement for specific causes generates overall beneficial effects – if the conditions for this interplay are set in a fair way and when the actors within civil society adhere to the principles of deliberation, mediation, negotiation and compromise.

An approach that allows the capture of the normative orientations and practice of values within civil society (cultural aspects of civil society)

With its broad and functional definition, the CSI opens up possibilities to perceive and measure the practice of certain values within civil society. The CSI approach enables a critical check on how far the high expectations inherently assumed when talking about civil society are actually materialising in the activities of CSOs in particular situations.

The CSI approach is committed to translating these basic assumptions into the research methodology. The following section briefly shows how the CSI attempts to use these basic understandings as a basis for indicators for the quantitative measurement of civil society. In his discussion of the CSI approach, Heinrich proposes to distinguish between the structural and

[8] In their framework for the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, Sokolowski and Salamon propose a different concept for capturing parts of the cultural or normative aspects of civil society indirectly: for "gauging the normative dimension of civil society" their approach uses the 'proxies' of membership and volunteering. "Thus, the evidence that a civil society sector is pursuing public purposes as conceived by local citizens is that these citizens voluntarily chose to take part in, and volunteer for, these organisations without the incentive of monetary return for their efforts" (Sokolowski, S. W. and Salamon, M. L., (2005) Mirror, Mirror on the Wall? Commentary on Heinrich, *Journal of Civil Society*, 1: 238).

[9] CIVICUS vision and mission statement, accessible at www.civicus.org/about-us [accessed 23 May 2011]. The last sentence is cited from the previous vision statement.

cultural features of civil society.[10] The structural aspects of civic engagement include "the extent and forms of collective citizen action performed in civil society, such as organisational membership, volunteering, or attending a demonstration," but also the aspects of "its overall size and vibrancy (structure)." This category also includes "civil society's infrastructure, such as the existence of networks, quality of cooperation among organisations and their resource base." Following this classification, the structural indicators are sub-divided into "...two distinct forms of civic action - individual (e.g. volunteering, giving, joining a demonstration or organisation)" and "organisational (e.g. organisational activities, network, and resources)…" also called the "organisational infrastructure of civil society."[11]

Figure 1: Cultural and structural features of civil society in the CSI model



The distinction between civic engagement and level of organisation highlights the link between organised civil society and its embeddedness in society through the engagement of individuals.[12]

The culturally-oriented aspects in the CSI design look at "...the specific motivations and norms guiding the actions of its members (culture)…" This side of the CSI is oriented essentially at democratic and general human rights values, and examining how "civil society's norms relate to a society's underlying principles of public life, such as tolerance, social justice, or equity." The selection of values is "derived from universal documents." The respective items distinguish between internal practice of values and their external promotion. "Indicators under CSI's values

[10] Heinrich's article was written at the time when the revision of the methodology was under way. Therefore, he refers to the previous set of indicators. However, the structure he proposes can be applied to the reworked list of indicators used in the 2008-2011 phase as the basic understanding of measuring civil society / civic participation did not change.
[11] Heinrich, V. F. (2005) *Studying Civil Society Across the World*, 218.
[12] This way of thinking stands in sympathy with Howard's comment that, "the focus on organisations misses the crucial role played by people, by ordinary citizens, who form the heart and soul of civil society." Howard repeatedly points at the possibility of measuring the support or anchorage of civil society in the population through baseline surveys – a suggestion that was taken into consideration in the adjustment of the methodology after the first CSI phase. Howard, M. M. (2005) Conceptual and Methodological Suggestions for Improving Cross National Measures of Civil Society: Commentary on Heinrich, *Journal of Civil Society*, 1: 231.

dimension cover the internal practice of certain values, as well as the external promotion of these very values …in society."[13]

II. A multi-method approach generating various research outputs

The above introduction to the basic fundamentals of the CSI highlights three major challenges for the CSI methodology:

- partly contradictory expectations, i.e. gathering of information that meets local specificities and enables local action, and yet that allows for meaningful comparison across countries;
- the need to operate with an adaptable concept; and
- the measurement of normative standards within civil society.

At the very practical level of the research design, the CSI methodology addresses these issues by combining quantitative and qualitative research methods.

Figure 2 illustrates how the research elements are intertwined, contributing to the production of the three major research outputs: the Analytical Country Reports (ACR), the Policy Action Briefs (PAB) and the International Indicator Database.

Figure 2: Intertwined research elements and research outputs



The qualitative elements of the research process at the national level are marked in red in Figure 2. The **Advisory Committee** (AC) composed of local experts from civil society but also from outside the sector discusses the working definition of civil society provided by CIVICUS and

[13] As Heinrich points out in his discussion of the theoretical frameworks for the measurement of civil society, the operationalisation of the cultural aspects needs to be developed further: "However, this operationalisation of civil society's values lacks firm grounding in normative civil society theory. Further conceptual efforts are therefore required to develop operational concepts of civil society's values and norms, which, by drawing on the work by the theoretical normative school of civil society, could also improve the nexus between empirical and theoretical strands of civil society research." Heinrich, *Studying Civil Society Across the World,* 219.

eventually adjusts it to the local understanding. Undertaking a Social Forces Analysis, the experts list the actors which constitute the most important parts of civil society in the national environment and thus help draw the country specific boundaries of civil society, as well as the relations between civil society and other important actors in a country.[14] Thus, at an early stage of the process, the implementers of the methodology at the national level check the relevance of the concepts for their context.

A number of specific **Case Studies** are commissioned (ideally five, one for each dimension), which provide national partners an opportunity to "conduct an in-depth, systematic analysis of specific issues or aspects that might not be captured adequately by the quantitative data. It also allows them to draw out and explore the strengths and weaknesses of civil society."[15] The topics for these studies are chosen by the AC. A series of events then provides the occasions for collecting and validating information: **Focus Groups** usually take place in different regions of a country, and in the closing **National Workshop** the final findings are presented and discussed with a large audience, which also finalises the recommendations.

The collection of the statistical, highly standardised data (quantitative elements marked with blue in Figure 2 begins at the national level with three distinct surveys, yielding three distinct datasets. The **Population Survey**[16] aims at capturing the features of civil society as they are reflected in the behaviour and attitudes of 'the average citizen' (e.g. membership and volunteering, attitudes such as trust and tolerance in fellow citizens and societal institutions); the **Organisational Survey** captures characteristics of CSOs in the given country (e.g. resources of the organisations, interaction among CSOs and the practice of values within CSOs);[17] and the **External Perceptions Survey** mainly asks about the perception of civil society from the point of view of persons who are outside the sector but have a good knowledge of CSOs (specifically on the perceived impact of CSOs).[18] At the national level, these three datasets have to remain separated and cannot be collapsed into one comprehensive national dataset, because each questionnaire contains different (though sometimes overlapping) items addressing different groups of persons.

For the cross-country comparison the single datasets are merged into three international datasets: an **International Population Survey**, an **International Organisational Survey** and an **International External Perceptions Survey**. Also at the international level, the three datasets remain separated as they contain different questions addressing different groups.

A final step of aggregation brings together all the quantitative information from the national level combining the three international datasets and adds information for the description of the external environment of the countries from external datasets (e.g. country scores from the Freedom House and Transparency International indexes, and key figures for the characterisation of economic performance, in Figure 2 represented through the blue box 'external data sources'). This step of data processing calculates one value per indicator per country. As a result of this aggregation of information the **International Indicator Database** briefly summarises the situations at the national level in a very limited number of figures. It thus allows for a parsimonious description of the national situations and a first (but somewhat rough) comparison across boundaries. The **Civil Society Diamond** calculated for each country offers a compact visual representation (a so called radar graph) of the national situation by presenting the highly aggregated values of the five dimensions.

[14] For a short description of the Social Forces Analysis see Mati, J.M., Silva, F and Anderson, T (2010) *Assessing and Strengthening Civil Society Worldwide*, p 36.
[15] Mati, Silva, Anderson, *Assessing and Strengthening Civil Society Worldwide*, p. 38.
[16] For the exact number of cases per survey per country see Annex 2.
[17] The Organisational Survey is not to be understood as an attempt at a census aiming at capturing the situation of organisations in any given country. The CSI methodology provides guidelines for the selection of interviewees, but the actual choices have been left to the partners. Therefore, the question of representivity has to be handled with care.
[18] The methodology of the CSI is designed in such a way that data from the World Values Survey can be substituted for the Population Survey in order to facilitate the process of data collection and save resources. Many countries were able to take advantage of this. In contrast, the Organisational Survey and the External Perception Survey were conducted in all the countries that completed the CSI process under the current methodology.

The **Analytical Country Report (ACR)** is published at the end of the research process and embodies the principal output at the national level. It provides an overall summary of the entire set of research endeavours which has been undertaken in a country, benefiting from qualitative and quantitative tools of research. Often the individual **Case Studies** are also published. The **Policy Action Brief (PAB)** complements the ACR and translates the main findings into practical recommendations for government, civil society and other actors.[19] These two final products (ACRs and PABs) depict the national situations and suggest what needs to be done to build on the strengths and address the challenges of civil society identified in the national level research.

This publication turns to the distinctively comparative aspect of the CSI and represents one of the first steps of the comparative analysis. It focuses on the quantitative elements of the research in its most aggregated and abstract form: the International Indicator Database. Therefore, the following section provides some more information about the structure of the datasets and the items which are contained in them.

The broad definition of civil society combined with the intention to capture as many aspects of the local situation as possible, including some normative traits and some characteristics of the national environments, results in a rather long list of indicators.



The **indicator matrix**,[20] describing the structure of the International Indicator Database, gives the comprehensive overview of all the aspects which intend to capture the structural and cultural features of civil society. It thus assembles all the items which are contained in the three separate surveys and datasets, plus several indicators which characterise the socio-economic, socio-political and socio-cultural conditions in the participating countries. According to this structure the 65 single **indicators** are aggregated into values for the 27 **sub-dimensions**, which then again are collapsed into values for the five main **dimensions**:

- **Civic Engagement**
- **Level of Organisation**
- **Practice of Values**
- **Perception of Impact**
- **External environment**

The data is ordered according to the five dimensions, which allows for "comparing and analysing their relationships rather than combining them,"[21] with the intention of measuring different facets of civil society. The CSI, despite its name, is not conceived as an index, which would result in a final evaluation of the situations under study, and in a ranking of the cases, with the possibility of observing changes from year to year (compared, for example, to the index published by Freedom House). Accordingly, the final, most concentrated result appears in the form of the five dimensions, represented graphically in the **Civil Society Diamond**.



[19] For all published Analytical Country Reports and Policy Action Briefs see: http://www.civicus.org/news-and-resources/reports-and-publications/csi-reports [accessed 25 July 2011].
[20] For a brief overview of the indicator matrix see Mati, J., Silva, F. and Anderson, T., *Assessing and Strengthening Civil Society*, (Annex 1), pp 42 – 48, and a more detailed description ibid. pp. 26 -31.
[21] Anheier, H. (2005), *Measure for Measure*, p. 242.

As already mentioned above, the set of indicators and dimensions is not built around a specific causal model,[22] and it does not set out to prove specific theories or to test certain hypotheses. The intention of the CSI is to capture a wide variety of aspects of civil society. However, the way in which the dimensions are conceptualised suggests a loose causal order: One could assume that the key conditions (captured in the external environment dimension) influence the possibilities of individual citizens to participate (civic engagement) as well as the structure for civic participation (level of organisation), which then determine the outcomes of civic engagement (operationalised in the perception of impact dimension).[23] The dimension of values might be seen as a complementing or intervening factor, which also influences the achievement of impact.

A thorough and facetted description
for a multiple use
instead of
one theory or
a causal model;
but a loose causal order

However, the relationships between dimensions and between indicators can be thought of in different ways. For example, the aspects of level of organisation, practice of values and civic engagement can be seen as influencing the external environment rather than merely depending on it. Such a perspective might even examine how far the impact of civil society changes the legal context under which it operates. Or: the structure of civil society (level of organisation) can be seen as an outcome of civic engagement, as well as the condition which enables or hinders individuals' activities.

Figure 3: The five dimensions in a loose causal model



According to this 'loose causal order' and to an inductive and explorative approach to the data, the statistical tools which are applied remain at a rather simple level: visualisations of the scores (with histograms for the scores per country and boxplots for the distributions of scores per indicator) and correlations.[24] The analysis abstains from classifying indicators as independent variables and dependent variables, which would correspond to the assumptions of causes and effects. Though in some cases a causal relationship between dimensions and indicators can be theoretically assumed (e.g. political rights influencing CSOs rather than vice versa) the correlations alone hardly suffice to claim a causal explanation. Further research, based on more in-depth analysis of cases and observations over time and checks on possible alternative intervening factors are needed to continue this initial analysis.

[22] ibid. p 245.
[23] Anheier, H.. (2006), *The CIVICUS Civil Society Index: Proposals for Future Directions*, (Bloomfield: Kumarian Press), p. 29.
[24] Due to the small number of cases, non-parametric techniques are applied (Wilcoxon signed rank test and Spearman's rho correlation), which do not base on the assumption of a normal distribution.

III. Specific characteristics of the datasets

Before taking a closer look at the data in the next sections, it is important to point out that when comparing indicators derived from different surveys - and sometimes from within the same survey - the data has to be handled with care. As explained on the previous pages, the data has been gathered through three separate surveys in each country, with each survey targeting a different group of respondents and capturing diverse aspects of civil society and civic participation. The three datasets cannot be merged immediately, which puts some very practical restrictions on the analysis. Statistical tools can only set those indicators in relation to each other which are part of the same type of survey. The relations among variables which are part of different surveys can be examined only at the aggregated level of the International Indicator Database. Here the analyses are restricted by two factors: firstly, the aggregation of the data yields a small dataset with a low number of cases (25 countries for the purpose of this report).

Figure 4: Loss of information during the process of aggregation (using the data from Turkey for demonstration)



Secondly, the process of aggregation concentrates a massive amount of information into a few key figures. This process of collapsing and concentrating the data into one single figure per country and per indicator carries with it a loss of detail. Just as with any description, the briefer the information is re-formulated, the less detail is contained. This loss of information can be demonstrated with the following example: in the initial Organisational Survey conducted at the national level, one of the questions asked the representatives of CSOs how they estimated the impact of civil society on the most important social concern in the country. The respondents had the choice between four different options: 'no impact', 'limited impact', 'some tangible impact' and 'high level of impact'. For the aggregation in the indicator dataset (containing only one value per indicator per country) the entire number of answers in that country has been collapsed into one figure: the percentage of representatives of CSOs in the country who indicate that the impact of civil society is at least 'tangible in some way' including those who perceive the 'impact on a high level' (Figure 4 visualises this process). For a deeper analysis of the variables it is always possible to go back to the dataset at the national level to retrieve the information, and use the information that contains the finer distinction.[25]

Additionally, it has to be pointed out that the interpretation of the scores becomes less straightforward and more complicated at the higher levels of data aggregation, that is at the levels of sub-dimensions and dimensions. At the first and most simple level, the level of the indicators, the percentage scores are easily understandable. For example, they may be calculated by combining two possible answer categories, in the way which has just been explained above.

[25] The CSI data will be made available online to encourage independent investigation and analysis at http://www.civicus.org.

Therefore, this first kind of aggregated value is simply based on the merging of two groups of respondents. For the interpretation the message can simply be re-phrased: for the example cited above, the score corresponds to the groups of persons who perceive at least some tangible impact with respect to social concerns and policies.

The scores at the higher levels of aggregation, that is the scores for the sub-dimensions and for the dimensions that are the result of combinations of indicators, are often combined from different scales of measurement.[26] The mathematical process of merging the indicators still yields scores which remain in the range between 0 and 100. But these values are not easily and directly interpretable any more. While the format of the measurement still alludes to percentages and thus to a rational scale, the measurement has actually turned into an ordinal scale, providing a ranking of the countries. For this reason, the interpretation of the scores makes sense only for the comparison of countries with respect to the same sub-dimension or dimension. Remaining with the example of the impact dimension, one can say that the impact is perceived as stronger or weaker but formulations such as 'the perceived impact is twice as strong' cannot be used at the levels of sub-dimensions and dimensions.

Finally, the quantitative research elements are influenced by the distinctively participatory approach of the CSI. CIVICUS is committed to maintaining high standards of research in order to guarantee valid outputs of high quality, which then also allow for international comparison. At the same time, as part of the empowering approach, the implementation of the methodology is entrusted to the national partners. On some occasions, these partners faced difficulties and were forced to adjust the mode of data collection. As a consequence there may be questions with high rates of non-responses and the use of different coding for some questions in some countries. The data collection is not always homogenous and therefore a few of the indicators have to be treated with special care.

These caveats related to the use of the quantitative material of the CSI hint at the logic which guided the conceptualisation of the research design. Aiming at capturing a phenomenon which has common features around the world, but which has idiosyncratic expressions in each society, the research combines the quantitative measurement of selected traits of civic participation with a rich contextualisation through case studies, focus groups and workshops, which in turn inform the Analytical Country Reports. The most can be made of the data when taking both quantitative and qualitative outputs from the research process together. However, this publication takes a first glance only at the quantitative parts of the research, in order to identify tendencies, regularities and interesting questions. Future works should make use of the full range of the results, taking into consideration both the quantitative and the qualitative research outputs, to help check, refine and explain the findings.

IV. A first glance at the quantitative data

The following sections turn to the core of this publication: a first glance at the quantitative data. The next two sections (section IV.1 and section IV.2) provide background information about the two more specific surveys which have been conducted by national partners. The following two central parts of the publication (section IV.3 and section IV.4) elaborate on the data in the format of the International Indicator Database.

[26] For example, the dimension of perceived impact combines the diverse perceptions of impact on social concerns and policies (using the scale which is also reported in the example) with the levels of trust in civil society, which is measured with a scale composed of four categories: 'great deal of confidence', 'quite a lot of confidence', 'not very much confidence' and 'none at all'.

IV.1. The Organisational Survey

Figure 5 gives an overview of the types of organisations that have been chosen as relevant interviewees in the International Organisational Survey. Assuming that the samples of organisations mirror those characteristics of civil society which are considered most important by the national partners in the given countries, the following section briefly outlines some specific traits of the national situations, i.e. mainly the cases where certain types of organisations prevail in the sample. This background information can support the interpretations of details regarding certain cases which emerge on the following pages.[27]

Figure 5: Types of organisations represented in the Organisational Survey



At the level of the entire sample of interviewees (all national cases taken together), most representatives who took part in the Organisational Survey belong to **NGOs / civic groups / human rights organisations** (20% across all countries). In 14 out of 25 countries this category provides the largest share of the sample (Kosovo 68%, Kazakhstan 51%, Zambia 40%, Chile 37%,

[27] When having a look at the distribution of types of organisations per country it has to be kept in mind that the category 'others' takes the largest share in 7 out of 24 countries (Albania 49%, Venezuela 41%, Bulgaria, Croatia and Italy 32%, Slovenia 27% and Chile 26%, and the second largest share in Uruguay with 19%) and remains considerably high (12 to 18%) in several more countries. Furthermore, checking for missing values shows that there is no information available regarding the classification of organisations for Russia. In Jordan 41% of the interviewees did not answer the respective question (for 50 out of 121 interviews no value has been assigned), along with 9% in the Philippines, 7% in Albania, 5% in Liberia, 4% in Slovenia, 2% in Kazakhstan and 1% in Bulgaria and Croatia.

Argentina 36%, Togo 35%, Georgia 31%, South Korea 30%, Japan 28%, Albania 24%, Liberia 23%, Uruguay 20%, Armenia 18%).[28]

The category which is represented second most at the international level is composed of **health groups / social service associations** (12% of the organisations in the merged international dataset). This type of organisation dominates the scene in 5 out of the 25 countries (Jordan 30%, Belarus 27%, Mexico 26%, Croatia and Italy 18%) and takes second place in Japan (15%) and Georgia (11%).

Other categories that appear comparatively often in certain countries are: **youth groups** in Liberia (18%, second strongest category), Slovenia (14%, strongest category) and Kazakhstan (12%, second strongest category); **sports associations** in Bulgaria (16%, strongest category) and in Belarus (12%, third strongest category); **ethnic based community groups** in Belarus (with 16% the second strongest category);and **women's groups** in Turkey and in Jordan (in both countries, 13% of the interviewed organisations, and in Turkey the second strongest category).

Types of organisations which are found to a considerable extent only in certain countries and which appear as idiosyncratic elements here are: **cooperative and savings groups** in Nicaragua and the Philippines (in both cases with 19% the strongest category); **religious or spiritual groups** in Nicaragua (15%); and **neighbourhood / village committees**, mainly in Venezuela (with 11% the strongest category), Uruguay (with 11% the second strongest category) and Turkey (10%). **Burial societies** are a special feature of civil society in Nicaragua (5%), Slovenia (2%), Argentina and Togo (in both cases equal or below 1%), not mentioned in any other country.

The technique of hierarchical clustering is used to provide a comprehensive overview of all countries with respect to the mixture of organisations represented.[29] The outcome of this analysis can be understood best in the graphical representation in Figure 6, called a dendogram. The cases are ordered in the column on the left side, with the most similar countries located next to each other. The structure of lines on the right side illustrates how relatively different the cases are from each other: the shorter the connection through the lines, the more similar is the mix of types of organisations in those countries. The vertical dotted lines in the figure indicate which possible combinations have been chosen for forming the clusters.[30] The right vertical dotted line indicates a clustering of the countries into three groups and the left vertical dotted line (grey) a clustering into five groups. The hierarchical grouping of countries has additionally been highlighted in Figure 6 through a circling of the countries: black circles for the clustering into three groups and the grey circles for a clustering into five groups.

[28] Percentages based on the cross-tabulation of types of organisations per country.
[29] This method calculates the similarities of values for all theoretical possible pairs of cases and orders the cases according to the resulting relative (dis-)similarities. For reasons of space the values assembled in a dissimilarity matrix are not reported here. The between groups linkages method has been used for the clustering, meaning that in a step-wise process firstly the cases and then the groups of cases with the least distance between them are grouped together.
[30] When moving the dotted vertical line to the left the number of intersections with horizontal lines increases. This corresponds to the diverse possibilities to group the cases: the clusters are stepwise sub-divided in smaller clusters, in which the cases are more similar to each other.

Figure 6: Clustering of cases based on the types of organisations represented in the Organisational Survey[31]



The countries of the upper group in the diagram are more similar to each other than the group at the bottom end. This can be seen from the structure of lines on the right side: the connections of countries in the upper group are shorter and less spread out towards the right side.

Linking the clustering with the distribution of types of organisations that have been involved in the survey shows that, for the upper group, engagement for civic and human rights has a greater weight (Argentina, Chile, Togo, Zambia, Georgia, Uruguay, South Korea, Turkey, Japan, Armenia, Liberia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo). Civil society in the countries of the lower group is oriented more towards service provision (Belarus, Jordan, Croatia, Mexico, Italy, Bulgaria, Venezuela, Slovenia, Albania). Two countries distinguish themselves through an uncommon composition of their civil society: Nicaragua and the Philippines. Here cooperatives, a category which hardly appears in the

[31] As the data for Russia is not available it is not included in this dendogram, or in the brief description of the possible clusters.

survey in the other countries, are the largest share of the organisations that have been interviewed (almost 20%).

IV.2. The External Perceptions Survey

Figure 7 shows the kinds of organisations and institutions to which the informants for the External Perceptions Survey were affiliated. The selection of interviewees was left to the national partners which implemented the CSI. Therefore, it can be assumed that the composition of the sample reports which types of organisations and institutions are considered the most important points of reference in the specific national context.

Figure 7: Affiliation of interviewees in the External Perceptions Survey



Most of the interviewees in the External Perceptions Survey filled positions in governmental institutions (17% executive branch, 6% legislative branch, 4% judiciary branch, amounting to 27% of all interviewees in governmental institutions). A category combining all national governmental institutions appears as the strongest in 18 out of the 25 countries and second strongest in another 5.

In 8 out of 25 countries the executive branch was the largest group of the sample (Kazakhstan 37%, Argentina 32%, Zambia 31%, the Philippines and Slovenia 23%, South Korea 20%, Kosovo 18% and Croatia 15%). In Belarus the share of respondents from the executive branch equalled the share from international donor organisations (13%), while this was the second most represented type of organisation in Togo (24%), Mexico and Turkey (21%), Nicaragua (16%) and Armenia (16%).[32]

For the External Perceptions Survey governmental institutions (mainly the executive branch) have generally been considered as main reference points

[32] Percentages based on the cross-tabulation of types of organisations / institutions to which the external stakeholders were affiliated.

The two second strongest affiliations in the samples were the private sector and academia (both 15% of respondents' affiliations). The private sector was represented strongest in Italy (37%), Togo (34%), Japan (33%) and Liberia (31%, the same as the share of respondents coming from academia). Most respondents were affiliated to academic institutions in Venezuela (42%), Chile (35%), Mexico (28%), Georgia (23%) and Uruguay (19%), in the latter two cases with the same share of respondents coming from the media. The media was also comparatively strongly represented in the sample in Jordan (18%, same share as respondents from the legislative branch), Slovenia (17%, same share as from academia), Armenia (16%), and Bulgaria (12%, the most represented category).[33]

IV.3. A description of civil society in 25 countries with the dimensions, sub-dimensions and indicators

The description of the data from the International Indicator Database starts at the most aggregated level, examining the scores for the five dimensions (IV.3.1). The following sections (IV.3.2 to IV.3.6) focus on each of these dimensions, firstly displaying the respective distribution of scores across the countries (histogram), secondly disentangling the aggregated values into the single indicators from which the dimension is constructed (boxplots) and finally briefly examining the relations among these single indicators (correlations of indicators within the dimension and occasionally collapsing indicators into new sub-dimensions). Where interesting incidents are spotted, such as general tendencies, clear relations among indicators, irregularities and exceptional cases, and counter-intuitive facts, these are briefly highlighted.

IV.3.1. Brief overview of the five dimensions

The graphical representation (boxplot) in Figure 8 provides the shortest and most concentrated overview of the five dimensions across the 25 countries.[34] The boxes with their 'whiskers' attached represent the distribution of values across the countries: the entire range of values (between the upper and lower thin lines), the median value (the thick horizontal line within the box, with 50% of cases falling above and 50% of the cases below) and the quartiles (upper and lower end of the boxes, with 25% of cases falling beyond these). the small circles with the country labels attached indicate outliers (stars for extreme outliers): These cases have mathematically been defined as falling significantly outside the group of countries with respect to that specific dimension.[35] Such an uncommon value occurs twice at this level of the highly aggregated five dimensions: for the dimension of civic engagement Georgia scores low and Zambia scores high in comparison to all the other countries.

[33] In the External Perceptions Survey the proportions of 'other' organisations received the highest scores in 9 out of 25 countries: Croatia (63%), Belarus (58%), Bulgaria (50%), Italy (40%), Kosovo (38%), Albania (34%), Nicaragua (32%), Russia (31%) and Jordan (20%). In 5 countries values were missing: Jordan (20%), Liberia (14%), Kazakhstan (7%), Bulgaria (3%) and Croatia (2%).

[34] It cannot be excluded that some of the countries with missing values would actually take the positions of outliers if the data were available.

[35] Outliers are defined in the usual way as values with a difference of at least three standard deviations from the mean of the sample.

Figure 8: Boxplot summarising the distribution of scores across the countries for the five dimensions



From this first visual inspection, the external environment and level of organisation dimensions score comparatively high.[36] The countries score comparatively similarly with respect to the dimensions of perception of impact, level of organisation and practice of values,[37] and rather differently when it comes to civic engagement[38] and external environment.[39]

The calculation of simple correlations (Spearman's rho) checks for connections between the dimensions. Among all the ten possible combinations of the five dimensions, only one pair is significantly correlated: civic engagement relates to the perception of impact.[40] This means where

[36] The mean of the external environment dimension is 59.7, and the mean of level of organisation dimension is 57.4 (mean values for other three dimensions: civic engagement: 43.6, practice of values 49.1, perception of impact 46.1). However, at this aggregated level of dimensions the scores are abstract summaries of the indicators and do not easily translate into statements, although they do serve for the comparison across countries (as explained above, section III, Specific characteristics of the datasets).
[37] The ranges between the highest and the lowest scores stay around 25 points.
[38] The range between the highest and the lowest score yields 29.4 points, excluding the outlier, and rises to 43.6 when including the outlier.
[39] The range between the highest and the lowest score is about 30 points.
[40] Due to the small size of the sample (25 cases), only non-parametric statistical methods, mainly Spearman's rho correlation, are applied throughout this paper. The values for the only significant correlation, civic engagement and perception of impact, Spearman's $r_s = .58$, $p < 0.01$.

a country scores high with respect to the level of civic engagement it also has a high value for the perception of impact (and vice versa).

Countries that score high on the dimension civic engagement also score high on the dimension perception of impact (and vice versa)

Hierarchical clustering of variables is a different way to check and illustrate associations among the five dimensions.[41] The dendogram (Figure 9)[42] illustrates the similarities of the dimensions. The variables are listed in the column on the left side and the most similar ones are placed closest to each other.

Figure 9: Hierarchical clustering of the five dimensions (dendogram)



The strong correlation between civic engagement and perception of impact is clearly visible; these two dimensions appear in the dendogram as the most similar ones. The practice of values dimension is somewhat more similar to the dimensions of civic engagement and perception of impact.

The external environment is most closely related to the level of organisation dimension

Correlations and similarities on their own do not suffice for claiming clear causal mechanisms. However, following the loose causal order of the dimensions laid out in the model above (section I) a first interpretation at this very abstract level of highly aggregated data would read the facts as follows: civic engagement is the most decisive factor for the perception of impact of civil society – the more pronounced civic engagement is in a country, the more impact is perceived (and supposedly, actually achieved). The level of organisation is related to the external environment, but these latter two dimensions are rather weakly related to civic engagement and perception of impact. The practice of values appears as a feature of civil society which is not clearly associated with the other dimensions. However, it is comparatively closer to the civic engagement and perception of impact dimensions, rather than to the level of organisation and external environment.

The dimension of practice of values is related to the dimensions of civic engagement and perception of impact rather than to the dimensions of level of organisation and the external environment

Summing up in an extremely shortened (and somewhat daring) statement: for the impact of civil society, civic engagement and – to a lesser extent – the practice of values are the more important factors. The socio-economic, socio-political, legal and socio-cultural environment is decisive for the organisational set-up of civil society, but these two aspects of civil society interfere only weakly with its impact.

[41] Hierarchical clustering is based only on the similarity of values, and therefore it does not allow for formulating tendencies based on correlations, i.e. an increase of values for one dimension means automatically an increase / decrease in the values of another dimension.
[42] The dissimilarity matrix has been calculated with the between-group linkages method, as described earlier in footnote 29.

Considering all the rich material that has been gathered in the CSI, these assertions are only first and rather rough, simplifying interpretations. The following sections examine the five main dimensions in more detail, searching for hints in the data which can lead to better and more specific explanations of the interplay among the diverse aspects, conditions and effects of civil society. Due to constraints of space, only the most noteworthy and especially telling facts are reported here: those that might allude to promising directions for future, more thorough investigations.

IV.3.2. Civic engagement dimension

The histogram (Figure 10) allows an examination of how each country performed with respect to the civic engagement dimension. This dimension mainly summarises the situation with respect to membership and volunteering in social and political organisations, and political activism at the individual level[43] and is based exclusively on data from the population survey or its World Values Survey substitutes (for the elements of the research see section II). It thus focuses on the connections between individuals and membership organisations, as well as alternative ways to get involved in public affairs.

Figure 10: Distribution of scores for the civic engagement dimension[44]



Groups of countries with comparatively similar scores are discernable through 'jumps' in the line of gradually increasing values[45]: Five groups appear, with one of these composed of only one country (Georgia – green bar in Figure 10) and another one of only two countries (Turkey and Russia – black bars) at the lower end of the scale for civic engagement, followed by a group of six countries with values below the average (Jordan, Armenia, Venezuela, Argentina, Croatia and Bulgaria – red bars). The group with the highest values comprises Zambia, Liberia, the Philippines and Nicaragua (yellow bars). The largest group of countries has values slightly above the average (Belarus,

[43] For the complete list of indicators which are contained in each of the five dimensions see Annex 3. See also Mati, J. M., Silva, F. and Anderson, T. (2010), *Assessing and Strengthening Civil Society Worldwide*, pp 42 – 48 (Annex 1), and a more detailed description ibid. pp 26 -31.

[44] The distanced columns at the right end of the graphs and the horizontal line are added to demonstrate the mean value. The black arrows on the right side of the graphs indicate the dispersion or range of values.

[45] The grouping has been confirmed with a hierarchical cluster analysis using the method of between group linkages.

Kosovo, South Korea, Japan, Uruguay, Mexico, Slovenia, Kazakhstan, Chile, Togo, Albania and Italy – blue bars). Georgia stands out with a remarkable distance from all the other countries, and also Zambia shows an unusual high score, which could be seen already from the boxplot above (Georgia and Zambia were marked as outliers in the boxplot).

IV.3.2.1. Civic engagement dimension indicators

The analytical description proceeds by disaggregating the dimension into the components from which it was calculated. The civic engagement dimension is a summary of six sub-dimensions, which can be divided into two groups: those which assess individuals' activities in social organisations and those which refer to individuals' activities in political organisations. Both types of engagement are further investigated as to the extent, depth and diversity of engagement (Figure 11). The extent of engagement in both social and political organisations[46] refers to membership, voluntary work in at least one organisation and simple or occasional participation; the depth of engagement means membership, voluntary work or participating in more than one organisation, more regular participation in social activities and undertaking political activities more often. The diversity of engagement denotes the share of participation by normally marginalised or otherwise non-mainstream groups.

[46] The 2008-2011 CSI methodology makes a distinction between socially-based CSOs, such as cultural, religious or sports associations, and politically-oriented CSOs, such as advocacy groups, NGOs and trade unions, although each country partner is allowed to define the detail of these two categories according to national context.

Figure 11: Civic engagement dimension indicators, ordered by sub-dimensions (boxplot) [47]



Examining the single indicators and comparing this graphical representation with the previous one, (the smooth distribution of values at the aggregated level, Figure 10), the situation appears even more heterogeneous. Remarkable are the comparatively high scores for the diversity of activities in social as well as in political organisations (indicators 1.3.1 and 1.6.1, respectively the 7th and 14th indicator of this dimension).[48] This appears to show that social and political organisations around the world are performing well on including marginalised groups of society.[49] Participation in events

[47] For the generation of this and the following boxplots (at the level of indicators), missing values have been substituted with the median of the distribution. While this manipulation of the data has no effect on the shape of the boxes and whiskers, it avoids cases being excluded from the picture due to missing values for a single indicator.

[48] Values are missing for Jordan with respect to volunteering in social as well as political organisations (indicators 1.1.2, 1.2.2, 1.4.2, and 1.5.2). The scores measuring community engagement in social organisations are lacking for Croatia (indicators 1.1.3 and 1.2.3). Most probably this lack of information influences the measurements of the central tendencies (mean and median) only slightly; more important is that it cannot be excluded that these cases might score unusually, appearing as outliers in the distribution.

[49] For this interpretation it has to be kept in mind that the understanding of which organisations qualify as social and which as political, and which ones represent marginalised groups in society depend on the country-specific understanding of 'political', 'social', 'mainstream' and 'marginalised'. The different views might explain the comparatively

at the community level (indicator 1.2.3, the 6th indicator of this dimension) also commonly scores high.

Liberia, Togo and Zambia show rates of membership and volunteering in social organisations which are significantly above the bulk of cases, (indicators 1.1.1 and 1.1.2, the 1st and 2nd indicator of this dimension). Togo, Albania and Zambia also score surprisingly high when it comes to volunteering in political organisations (indicator 1.4.2, the 9th indicator of this dimension) and Liberia has also comparatively high rates of membership in political organisations (indicator 1.4.1, the 8th indicator of this dimension).

Kazakhstan scores above the greater part of countries when it comes to the depth of political membership and volunteering (working voluntarily and being a member of more than one organisation, indicators 1.5.1 and 1.5.2, the 11th and 12th indicator of this dimension). Georgia falls below the larger part of countries with respect to diversity of social activities (indicator 1.3.1, the 7th indicator) and the depth of membership in political organisations (being a member of more than one political organisation, 1.5.2, the 12th indicator).

Calculating the correlations among the indicators shows that most of the indictors are positively related to each other.[50] Countries with a comparatively broad engagement in social organisations (active membership, volunteering) also figure high on the indicators which measure engagement in political organisations (and vice versa).

A few indicators break this pattern. These indicators deal with social and political engagement beyond membership and volunteering in organisations: community engagement in sports clubs or voluntary / service organisations at least once a month, the percentage of persons undertaking individual political activism and the percentage of persons engaging very actively in political activism (indicators 1.2.3, 1.4.3 and 1.5.3, the 6th, 10th and 13th indicators of this dimension) are not related clearly to the indicators of membership and volunteering in social and political engagement.[51] This alludes to the existence of two types of engagement, which are not clearly linked to each other: the first one occurs within organisations (membership, volunteering) and the second one rests on activities which are undertaken on a more individual basis.

Civic engagement as members of social and political organisations and civic engagement on a more sporadic, individual basis represent alternative forms of engagement

Two more indicators break the general pattern of the clear correlations within the civic engagement dimension: the two items describing the diversity of engagement in social and political organisations. Diversity is comparatively strongly related to extent of engagement in social organisations, as well as political organisations.[52] But the fact that people from marginalised groups are engaged in organisations is not correlated to being a member and volunteer in more than one organisation (the depth of engagement).[53]

high scores for the indicators dealing with diversity, without allowing for a direct comparison across countries. Many countries, in their Analytical Country Reports, critique the diversity indicators as being higher than the national Advisory Committee's knowledge of the real situation of the representation of marginalised groups in mainstream CSOs.

[50] A matrix with the values of correlations between the 14 indicators within this dimension shows that 41 out of 91 possible pairs of indicators have a significant correlation (Spearman's rho (r_s) between .41 and .85, $p < 0.05$, the majority even with $p < 0.01$).

[51] Spearman's rho (r_s) remains around the 0 in any case below 0.4 and lacks a p value which would indicate significance.

[52] 6 pairs of indicators out of the possible 8 combinations show statistically significant correlations with Spearman's rho (r_s) between .48 and .66 ($p < 0.05$).

[53] Only 1 pair of indicators out of the possible 8 combinations shows a significant and distinct correlation with Spearman's rho of $r_s = .66 (p < 0.05)$: the diversity of political engagement and the depth of political membership (being a member of more than one political organisation - indicators 1.6.1 and 1.5.1, the 11th and 14th indicator of this dimension).

These findings suggest that countries which are characterised by a comparatively more diverse civil society also enjoy a greater participation, but in only one organisation. More diversity does not relate clearly to a deeper engagement, i.e. to being a member and volunteer in more than one organisation. One could conclude that a more diverse civic society leads to a more specialised commitment of citizens. The wider the variety of civil society groups, the more people tend to commit themselves to specific interests, which - it could be conjectured, but cannot be proven from the CSI data - coincide with their identities and interests as members of marginalised groups.

The more civic engagement is characterised by diversity (civil society comprising organisations of marginalised segments of society) the more citizens engage in a 'specialised' and exclusive manner

IV.3.2.2. Civic engagement in social and political organisations

A different way of looking at the elements of this dimension distinguishes between two types of engagement: social and political. Accordingly, the indicators are merged into two composed dimensions: social engagement (the first seven indicators in the boxplot, Figure 10) and political engagement (the remaining latter seven indicators in the boxplot).

Figure 12: Sub-dimensions composed from indicators for social and political engagement



Based on this operation, the histogram of Figure 12 juxtaposes all kinds of engagement in social organisations with all kinds of engagement in political organisations in the 25 countries of this publication's dataset. As a general tendency, both sub-dimensions are strongly correlated:[54] more engagement in social organisations usually coincides with more engagement in political organisations. But activities related to social organisations (red bars in Figure 12) generally score higher than activities related to political

Engagement in social organisations is generally stronger than engagement in political organisations (however, both are strongly related)

[54] Spearman's rho: $r_s = 68$, $p < 0.001$.

organisations (blue bars).[55] The only exceptions are Georgia, Croatia, Bulgaria and Albania: the figure for activities in political organisations is higher than the one for activities in social organisations. The difference is less pronounced in Armenia.

Especially noteworthy is the group of countries in which social engagement appears considerably stronger than political engagement: this group comprises three countries from sub-Saharan Africa (Togo, Zambia and Liberia, already mentioned as outliers above in Figure 8), plus Chile, the Philippines, Mexico and Nicaragua.

Noteworthy: the engagement in social organisations is comparatively very strong in Togo, Zambia and Liberia, and also in Philippines, Chile, Mexico and Nicaragua

IV.3.3. Level of organisation dimension

The level of organisation dimension portrays some of the organisational internal features of the interviewee's CSO, such as the presence of a body of management in an organisation, and its human, financial and technological resources, as well as some aspects of organisational interaction with other actors of national and international civil society. It contains mainly items which were collected through the Organisational Survey (for an overview of research elements see section II).

Figure 13: Distribution of scores for the level of organisation dimension (histogram)



The countries score comparatively high and comparatively alike with respect to this dimension (Figure 12) - as could be seen already from the boxplot above (overview of all the five dimensions Figure 8).

[55] The Wilcoxon signed rank test yields a z value of -4.02, $p < 0.001$, $r = -.80$, meaning that engagement in social organisations (median 39.2) is significantly higher than engagement in political organisations (29.4).

IV.3.3.1. Level of organisation

Figure 14 separates out the indicators from which the level of organisation dimension has been calculated. Generally, all countries achieve comparatively high values for the first indicator regarding the existence of a board (indicator 2.1.1, the 1st indicator of this dimension), and also for networking activities (indicators 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, the 3rd and 4th indicators), and financial and technical resources (indicators 2.5.2 and 2.5.2, the 6th and 7th indicators).

The countries are more diverse regarding membership in umbrella bodies (indicator 2.2.1, the 2nd indicator of this dimension). Jordan and Russia score comparatively low on the indicator for exchange of information with other organisations (indicator 2.3.2, the 4th indicator) and Liberia lags behind when it comes to access to technical utilities (indicator 2.5.2, the 7th indicator). International non-governmental organisations are present in Italy in a comparatively uncommonly high concentration (indicator 2.6.1, the 8th indicator).[56]

Figure 14: Level of organisation dimension indicators (boxplot)



[56] In this dimension two values are missing: the score for the sustainability of human resources for Nicaragua and the score indicating the presence of international non-governmental organisations in Kosovo.

There are comparatively few significant correlations between the indicators within this dimension.[57] Positively related are the activities of networking of CSOs (indicators 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, the 3rd and 4th indicators of this dimension),[58] which are also related to the presence of support organisations (indicator 2.2.1, the 2nd indicator)[59] and access to technical resources (2.5.2, the 7th indicator).[60] These relationships seem to be easily explained: activities of networking (peer-to-peer communication) are facilitated by the existence of support organisations and the access to means of communication, while access to means of communication makes cooperation with other organisations easier,[61] and a formalised and professional civil sector is related to access to resources.

Activities of networking among CSOs are very common in all the countries, independent from the formalised existence of federations and umbrella bodies.

Noteworthy is that there is no inverse correlation between networking activities and support organisations indicators. This means that a more formalised cooperation among CSOs does not substitute for the everyday activities of meeting and exchanging information between CSOs.

An indicator within this dimension which stands out, because countries score uniformly low, regards the relation between paid staff and volunteers (indicator 2.4.1, the 5th indicator of this dimension).

Figure 15 shows the distribution of values across the countries regarding this. The percentages refer to the share of CSOs in the country in which at least 75% of the staff is regularly paid. Formulated 'the other way around', in all countries for the majority of CSOs (from 56% in Japan to 94% in Croatia) volunteers supply more than 25% of CSOs' staff base.

[57] For 6 out of the 28 possible pairs of indicators the Spearman rho (r_s) correlation yields values between .41 and 0.85 (absolute values), $p < 0.05$.
[58] Spearman rho for the two indicators: $r_s = .85$, $p < 0.001$.
[59] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .43$ and $r_s = .51$, both $p < 0.05$.
[60] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .41$ and $r_s = .48$, both $p < 0.05$.
[61] The only negative correlation within this dimension appears between the existence of support organisations and the presence of international organisations (indicator 2.2.1 and indicator 2.6.1; Spearman's rho: $r_s = -.47$, $p < 0.05$). At first sight, one might conclude that a stronger presence of international NGOs goes together with lower rates of CSO membership of support organisations. However, the indicator 2.2.6 (presence of international NGOs) is calculated from a secondary source (Union of International Associations Yearbook of International Organisations) and does not really say anything about activities which local organisations might undertake and maintain in order to stay connected with organisations and actors on the international scene and in other countries.

Figure 15: Human resources – percentage of CSOs with at least 75% paid staff (under 25% volunteers in the organisations' staff base)



Remarkable is the group at the right end of the chart, i.e. the countries with a high share of CSOs which can rely on a stable base of human resources (right end of Figure 15). Japan reports the most established human resource base. This might not come as a great revelation, because the country is industrialised with a strong service industry and a highly professionalised third sector can be expected. Georgia surprises as it follows in second position. Keeping in mind its low value for civic engagement, its civil society seems to consist of a considerable share of paid staff, presumably reflecting low rates of volunteerism. This situation contrasts with the four cases which follow in the list of countries with a comparatively stable CSO human resource base. The Philippines, Togo, Zambia and Liberia report a stable base of human resources but they also score high with respect to the sub-dimension of social engagement: Here, an effect of paid staff having a negative effect on civic engagement (substituting or 'crowding out' voluntary commitment) does not occur.

The cases of the Philippines, Togo, Zambia and Liberia show most clearly that a 'crowding out' effect is not the rule: a comparatively high share of paid staff in CSOs (considered as a stable human resource base) does not necessarily coincide with lower rates of social engagement

IV.3.4. Practice of values dimension

The practice of values dimension captures several facets within CSOs regarding labour rights, equal opportunities, transparency and environmental standards, and adds a general evaluation of civil society based on the interviewee's perceptions of the use of violence as a means to achieve goals, the promotion of non-violence by CSOs, democratic practices within CSOs, the presence and weight of intolerant groups in civil society and the occurrences of corruption within civil society. It is built completely from items of the Organisational Survey (for an overview of elements in the research design see section II).

Figure 16: Distribution of values for the practice of values dimension (histogram)



At this most aggregated level, the countries are distributed across the range of values and no distinct clusters emerge.

IV.3.4.1. Practice of values dimension indicators

At the level of the single indicators of the practice of values dimension the situation looks much more diverse (Figure 17).[62] Countries score quite diversely when it comes to organisational internal policies for equal opportunities (indicator 3.2.1, the 2nd indicator of this dimension), policies on labour standards (indicator 3.2.4, the 5th indicator), existence of a publicly available code of conduct and practices related to the transparency of finances (indicators 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, the 6th and 7th indicators), existence of organisational environmental standards (indicator 3.4.1, the 8th indicator), perceived violence (indicators 3.5.1, the 9th indicator), perceived internal democracy (indicator 3.5.2, the 10th indicator) and perceived intolerance (indicator 3.5.4, the 12th indicator). In Jordan an unusually high percentage of CSO staff are members of labour unions (indicator 3.2.2, the 3rd indicator).Albania, Turkey, Mexico and Nicaragua are noteworthy exceptions when it comes to the training in labour rights of new CSO staff members, scoring above the bulk of countries (indicator 3.2.3, the 4th indicator). Three countries score comparatively high regarding different indicators under the sub-dimension of perception of values in civil society as a whole: Zambia with respect to perceived non-violence, Bulgaria when it comes to perceived internal practice of democratic decision-making and South Korea regarding the perception of corruption within the sector (indicators 3.5.1, 3.5.2 and 3.5.3, the 9th, 10th and 11th indicators of this dimension).

[62] There are two values missing in this dimension: the percentage of CSO staff who are members in labour unions in Nicaragua (indicator 3.2.2) and perceived violence within civil society for Togo (indicator 3.5.1).

Figure 17: Practice of values dimensions indicators (boxplot)



A correlation matrix shows that most indicators are not related to each other:[63] comparatively high scores in one field do not necessarily lead to higher values of another indicator of this dimension, as is also the case with lower scores. The few exceptions are: the publication of both a code of conduct and the existence of labour standards are related (indicators 3.2.4 and 3.3.1, the 5th and 6th indicators);[64] publicly available environmental standards (indicator 3.4.1, the 8th indicator) are linked to a written policy on equal opportunities(indicator 3.2.1),[65] to labour rights training (indicator 3.2.3),[66] to publicly available labour standards (indicator 3.2.4),[67] and to a publicly available code of conduct (indicator 3.3.1),[68] the 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th indicators.

[63] In the correlation matrix, 13 out of 91 possible combinations of indicators yield a significant correlation.
[64] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .47$, $p < 0.01$.
[65] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .29$, $p < 0.05$
[66] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .31$, $p < 0.05$.
[67] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .45$, $p < 0.01$.
[68] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .52$, $p < 0.001$.

Having a publicly available policy on equal opportunities (indicator 3.2.1, the 2nd indicator) is positively related to the provision of labour right trainings (indicator 3.2.3, the 4th indicator),[69] to the publicly available policy for labour standards (indicator 3.2.4, the 5th indicator)[70] as well as to the perceived promotion of non-violence and peace (indicator 3.5.6, the 14th indicator)[71] – but it is negatively related to the practice of democratic decision making.[72]

Only a few indicators of the perceived practice of values in civil society as a whole (the last six indicators on the right side of Figure 17, the 9th to 14th indicators) are related to each other: perceived internal democratic decision-making (indicator 3.5.2, the 10th indicator) is related to the perceived promotion of non-violence and peace (indicator 3.5.6, the 14th indicator);[73] perceived intolerance (indicator 3.5.4, the 12th indicator), is related tithe perceived weight of intolerant groups (indicator 3.5.5, the 13th indicator),[74] as well as to perceived non-violence (indicator 3.5.1, the 9th indicator).[75]

The first descriptive analysis of the dimension practice of values yields hardly any clear patterns.

A deeper research, bringing more context, making use of background information from country reports and case studies, seems promising for capturing the characteristics of civil society

A few of these relations are rather intuitive, for example the link between perceived intolerant elements within civil society and the weight of these elements, as well as the tendency to have various kinds of standards and policies publicly available, mirroring the presence or absence of a certain kind of organisational culture.[76] This first glance at the quantitative data suggests that in the values dimension lie telling differences among civil society, which are hardly captured through the measurements of structural features alone. But some of the less intuitive correlations, and more so the lack of clear links among most indicators, suggests this dimension is a fruitful field for further investigation, including through making use of the country reports and case studies.

With respect to the sub-dimension of perception of values in civil society as a whole (six indicators on the right side of the boxplot, Figure 17), two items deserve special attention, as on average they score comparatively diversely across the countries or comparatively low: perceived non-violence and perceived corruption in national civil society as a whole. Figure 18 reports the distribution of values for the indicator for perceived non-violence across countries. The percentages refer to those respondents who say that the 'use of violence by civil society groups is extremely rare'.[77]

The question about the perceived use of violence within civil society relates to the salience of the issue of violence rather than actually gauging the presence of violent attitudes within civil society

The sequence of countries in Figure 18 does not show a clear pattern, but certain countries can be found on one side of the scale, for example those countries where violent incidents do not occur frequently or those countries in which the presence of internal tensions is known, or which have overcome violent phases in their history rather recently. This suggests that this

[69] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .37$, $p < 0.01$.
[70] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .29$, $p < 0.05$.
[71] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .31$, $p < 0.05$.
[72] Spearman's rho: $r_s = -.44$, $p < 0.01$.
[73] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .49$, $p < 0.001$.
[74] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .31$, $p < 0.05$.
[75] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .47$, $p < 0.01$.
[76] In order to provide the complete picture, the negative correlation between two indicators, the publicly available policy for environmental standards (indicator 3.4.1) and the perceived weight of intolerant groups (indicator 3.5.5), is mentioned in this footnote: Spearman's rho: $r_s = .-37$, $p < 0.01$. However, these values are obviously due to a casual coincidence.
[77] The other possible answers in the questionnaire are: 'significant mass based groups using violence', 'isolated groups regularly using violence' and 'isolated groups occasionally resorting to violence'. For an explanation of the process for the calculation of scores for the International Indicator Database and the loss of information related to it see the user's guide to the CSI International Indicator Database, forthcoming from CIVICUS.

indicator is best interpreted as a measure for the salience of the issue of violence rather than gauging the actual situation with respect to the acceptance of violence. Also at this point, a combination of qualitative and quantitative research tools would promise further insights. The contextualisation offered by the Analytical Country Reports can provide additional information for an interpretation and for a better understanding of the role that CSOs play in different situations of violence.

Figure 18: Distribution of scores for the perceived non-violence indicator



The second indicator within the dimension of perceived practice of values with comparatively unusual scores examines the perceived levels of corruption. In this case, the International Indicator Database reports only those answers which consider corruption within civil society as 'very rare'.[78] Figure 19 sets perceived corruption within civil society (blue bars) as measured in the Organisational Survey (indicator 3.5.3) against perceived corruption in the public sector as measured by Transparency International (red bars, indicator 5.2.1). There is no clear correlation between the two indicators.[79] The two scores are close to each other in six cases (a difference of a maximum of 10 percentage points): Zambia, Venezuela (both 3 points of difference), Russia and Liberia (both about 5 points of difference), the Philippines (7.9 points of difference) and Belarus (9.8 points of difference).

In four of these countries corruption in civil society is estimated higher than perceived corruption in the public sector (Belarus, the Philippines, Zambia and Venezuela). In all the other countries perceived corruption in the public sector shows higher scores than the corruption perceived within civil society (between 5.2 and 70.2 points).[80] Assuming that levels of corruption do not strongly depend on the sector (public sector or civil society), the interpretation would hint in the same direction as the one above regarding the indicator of perceived non-violence, suggesting that the indicator of perceived corruption within civil society mirrors the salience of the topic and its importance in public discourses, rather than the actual persistence of corruption (for which the

[78] The alternative options for answers in the questionnaire are: corruption within civil society is 'very frequent', 'frequent' or 'occasional'. For an explanation regarding the process for the calculation of scores for the International Indicator Database and the loss of information related to it see the forthcoming user's guide.
[79] The Spearman's rho does not yield significant values: Spearman's rho: r_s = -.11, p = .60.
[80] Kosovo cannot be included in one of these groups as the score for perceived corruption in the public sector is missing.

Transparency International approach can be supposed to be a more accurate measurement). Accordingly, the latter group would represent countries in which civil society takes over the function of a very sensitive whistle blower, while in the first group of countries civil society can be said to be not paying special attention to the issue. From the juxtaposition of the two indicators a trend seems to appear, according to which corruption is perceived to be generally higher in the public sector as compared to the sphere of civil society. However, this claim (together with all the statements of this section) would need to be treated with care and need further checks, because this comparison of the public sector and civil society is based on two different data sources. Furthermore, it has to be kept in mind that the scores for the perceived corruption within civil society originates from a survey of CSO representatives, who might be tempted to paint a rather optimistic picture of civil society, because they understand themselves as part of it.

Figure 19: Distributions of scores for the perceived levels of corruption within civil society indicator (blue bars) as measured by CSI and corruption within the public sector as measured by Transparency International (red bars)



Practice and promotion of democratic decision-making

The following paragraph touches on the issue of democratic governance within civil society, looking into the relation between two indicators. The first indicator of the practice of values dimension inquires into a CSO's internal practice of democracy (indicator 3.1.1, the 1st indicator of this dimension). It distinguishes whether appointed leaders (or an appointed board) take the decisions in the respondents' organisations or whether the staff, elected persons and members determine the course of actions. The management indicator in the level of organisation dimension (already mentioned above IV.3.3) simply scrutinises the presence of a board in the CSOs (indicator 2.1.1, the first indicator of the level of organisation dimension). The examination of the relationships between these two indicators does not yield a clear positive correlation (Figure 20).[81]

[81] The Spearman's rho does not yield significant values (r_s = .20, p = 0.33).

Figure 20: Distributions of scores for the presence of a board or formal steering committee (blue bars) and internal democratic decision-making (red bars)



This leads to the conclusion that the countries in which the existence of a board in CSOs is widely diffused are not the ones in which a more democratic organisational culture prevails within civil society (and vice versa). The internal practice of democracy is not clearly related to formal established institutions within the CSOs. Generalising from this finding one might assume that a higher level of organisation of civil society (a more professional civil society) does not automatically go together with a civil society that practises the standards of democratic governance.

A higher level of organisation of civil society (organisational internal structures) does not necessarily coincide with more democratic practices

IV.3.5. Perception of impact dimension

The perception of impact dimension estimates civil society's responsiveness to social concerns and the impact of civil society in general, as well as its impact on policies. This dimension also takes into consideration the differences of levels of trust and tolerance between members and non-members of CSOs, assuming that civic engagement produces an effect with respect to these attitudes. It draws on all the three questionnaires (Population Survey, Organisational Survey and External Perceptions Survey; for an overview of the elements of the research see section II).

Figure 21: Distribution of scores for the perception of impact dimension (histogram)



The distribution of values for perceived impact is 'rugged' (see Figure 21) and the cases can be differentiated into three groups: countries for which the overall value for impact is reported as distinctively above the average (the Philippines, Zambia, Uruguay, Nicaragua, Japan and Liberia- red bars), countries where the overall impact is perceived as distinctively below the average (Georgia, Slovenia, Kosovo, Russia and Armenia – green bars) and a large group of countries where the impact is perceived as comparatively close to the mean value (blue bars).[82]

[82] In order to identify the cut-off points in mathematical procedure a hierarchical clustering has been run, (method applied: between-group-linkages, briefly explained in footnote 29)

IV.3.5.1. Perception of impact dimension indicators

Figure 22: Distribution of scores for the perception of impact dimension indicators[83]



The countries which stand out from the greater part of cases with considerably higher scores are the Philippines and Japan, when external stakeholders judge the impact of civil society on specific policy fields (indicator 4.6.2, the 13th indicator of this dimension). In Armenia, CSO representatives evaluate the impact of their own organisation as distinctively lower compared to their colleagues in other countries (indicator 4.2.2, the 4th indicator).

[83] In this dimension there were two values missing: the policy impact of the respondent's own organisation (4.3.3) for Belarus and the differences in tolerance levels between civil society members and non-members (4.7.2) for Japan.

The differences in levels of public spiritedness between members and non-members of CSOs in Georgia, Japan and Mexico lie remarkably above the scores for the other countries (Figure 22).

Striking is the general picture which is drawn by the three indicators which measure the impact that membership of CSOs has on the attitudes of members. It is assumed that people who are active in civil society would espouse higher levels of trust in other persons, higher levels of tolerance towards marginalised and stigmatised groups and higher levels of public spiritedness (respecting the rules of public life, such as paying tax, refusal to 'free-ride' on common goods and refusing bribes). The data show that the relations between these attitudes and CSO membership are generally very low - indeed, close to zero (indicators 4.7.1, 4.7.2 and 4.7.3, the 14th to 16th indicators of this dimension). Though there is actually a difference between members and non-members, one could expect positive attitudes of members to be more pronounced.

There is hardly any difference in the attitudes of CSO members compared to non-members:
a higher share of members of CSOs in the population does not relate to higher levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness

Even the level of trust in civil society is not clearly higher in countries with higher rates of membership in CSOs

The last indicator of this dimension (4.7.4, the 17th indicator) can be read as a somewhat indirect and global evaluation of civil society, showing the percentage of all interviewees who have trust in more than two of the typical categories of CSOs (Figure 23). [84] In about two thirds of the countries (green bars in the chart) less than half of the public have a high level of trust when it comes to civil society. The levels of trust are extremely low in Russia, Croatia, Japan, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan and Argentina.

Only in about a third of the countries (blue bars in the chart) do more than 50% of the public have higher levels of trust in civil society. It should, however, also be noted here that levels of trust in CSOs are generally higher than levels of trust in other public bodies.[85]

[84] Six categories of CSOs were taken into consideration: religious institutions (according to the national context), labour unions, political parties, environmental organisations, women's organisations and charitable or humanitarian organisations.

[85] This has repeatedly been highlighted in CSI Analytical Country Reports and is supported clearly by the questions of the Population Survey, which deal with the confidence in various organisations and institutions. Across all countries, those categories which are considered part of civil society are comparatively often seen as deserving quite a lot or even a great deal of trust: religious bodies (69%), charitable and humanitarian organisations (60%), women's organisations (56%) and environmental organisations (53%). The tendency is different for two categories: trade unions, with only 34% of interviewees trusting them quite a lot or a great deal, and 66% of the population having not very much confidence or none at all, and political parties (which might as well be considered as outside of the civil society sector by many), with 77% distrust. Continuing this type of analysis, specific traits at the national level can be observed: for example, confidence in religious bodies is especially high in Georgia, Jordan, the Philippines and Zambia (between 90 and 95% of interviewees expressing at least quite a lot of confidence). Low trust in trade unions appears especially pronounced in several post-communist societies (presumably due to recent history and the trade unions' functions as part of a rather repressive governmental apparatus). The scores for confidence in governmental bodies show the opposite tendency: the percentages of persons who have no or little trust amount to 70% for parliaments, 66% for the legal system, about 62% for national governments and for the civil service and 61% for the police. Here, too, certain countries stand out with extreme high or low values. The respective data provide interesting impulses for further investigation. However, this publication focuses on the International Indicator Database and - for reasons of space - cannot go into detail.

Figure 23: Distribution of scores for the levels of trust in civil society



Checking for correlations among the indicators shows that these latter four indicators (differences in levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness as well as trust in civil society) are also hardly related to the other indicators for impact measurement.[86]

From these first observations it remains difficult to spot tendencies. Therefore, in the following two sections, indicators are collapsed into new sub-dimensions.

IV.3.5.2. Internal and external perception of impact

For the histogram in Figure 24 the indicators for the internal perception of impact and those for the external perception of impact have been merged into two new sub-dimensions. A few countries stand out for internal and external experts evaluating the impact of civil society in different ways: in Albania, Georgia and Croatia CSO representatives perceived the impact of civil society as stronger than external stakeholders (a difference of 16, 15 and 14 points on the scale); in Jordan, Belarus and the Philippines, instead, the external evaluation yields higher scores than the internal perception (14, 13 and 10 points). There also seems to appear a tendency according to which, in those situations where impact is generally estimated as weaker, CSO representatives evaluate the impact of civil society (internal perception, red bars) as stronger than external stakeholders (in Figure 24, the red bars which exceed the blue bars are concentrated on the left side, where external perceptions rate impact as lower).

The evaluation of impact from CSO representatives (internal perception) coincides largely with the evaluation of external stakeholders (external perception) – strengthening the assumption that perceptions of impact are a useful proxy for the measurement of impact itself

However, in general, the two perspectives on impact do not differ in a significant way and are correlated strongly.[87] The strong coincidence supports the fact that the two sub-dimensions

[86] From the 52 possible combinations of indicators only 4 correlated at a significant level (Spearman's rho (r_s) between .41 and .47 (absolute values), $p < 0.05$).

measure the same thing, and thus strengthens the assumption that the evaluations based on perceptions offer a useful proxy to measure impact.

Figure 24: Distribution of the scores per country for the newly merged sub-dimensions of internal perception and external perception (internal perception in red, external perception in blue)



IV.3.5.3. Impact on social concerns versus impact on policies

An alternative way of forming sub-dimensions collapses the evaluations of impact on social concerns, both from internal and external stakeholders, and the estimations of impact on policies into two new sub-dimensions (see Figure 25). Generally the impact of CSOs on social concerns (red bars in the figure) is perceived as higher than on policies (blue bars).[88] The only clear exceptions are South Korea and Albania (with differences of 9 and 7 points on the scale) and, to a much lesser extent, Liberia, Georgia, Argentina, Kosovo and Turkey (below 2 points of difference on the scale).

[87] The Wilcoxon signed rank test yields a z-score of -1.05 (p = .29), meaning there is no statistically significant difference between the two measurements; instead the correlation is rather pronounced with Spearman's rho: r_s = .78, p < 0.001.
[88] The perceptions of impact on social concerns more in general and on policies are significantly correlated (Spearman's rho: r_s = .52, p < 0.01). The Wilcoxon sign rank test yields a Z-score of -3.47 (p< 0.001), meaning that the difference is statistically significant, with the impact on social concerns scoring higher than the impact on policies.

Figure 25: Distribution of scores per country of the merged sub-dimensions of impact on social concerns (red bars) and impact on policies (blue bars)



IV.3.5.4. Impact of civil society in general and impact of own organisation

The questionnaire for CSO representatives (internal perspective, reported in the first seven indicators of the boxplot, Figure 22) also distinguishes between an evaluation of the impact of civil society in general and the impact of the respondent's own organisation.

The representatives of CSOs assess the impact of their own organisation as slightly higher than they assess the impact of civil society in general when referring to social concerns more in general (indicators 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, the 4th and 3rd indicators of this dimension).[89] This difference is especially pronounced in Georgia, Turkey and Russia (with 32, 30 and 20 percentage points of difference in favour of the impact of CSO representatives' own organisations).[90] Only in Japan, Liberia, Croatia and Chile do the CSO representatives perceive the impact of civil society on social concerns in general as higher than the impact of their own organisation (differences of 10, 8 and 3 percentage points).

The picture changes (see Figure 26) when juxtaposing the perceived impact of civil society in general on policies and the perceived impact of the interviewee's own organisation on policies (indicators 4.3.3 and 4.3.1, the 7th and 5th indicators).[91] The mean values are slightly lower (on average about 10 percentage points), indicating an overall lower perception of

> The evaluation of impact is lower when it comes to influence on concrete policies – compared to the impact on social concerns 'more in general'

[89] The mean value for perceived impact on social concerns of civil society in general is 59.3 points, and for the scores of CSO representatives' own organisations' impact on social concerns 68.2 points. For reasons of space restrictions no figure is reported for the comparison of these indicators.

[90] The perceptions of impact on social concerns of civil society in general and the impact on social concern by own organisation are significantly correlated (Spearman's rho: r_s = .62, p < 0.01; Wilcoxon sign rank test: Z-score of -3.65 (p< 0.001)),

[91] Belarus is not included in this analysis and has been moved to the left end of the graph in Figure 26, because no value for the perceived impact of interviewee's own organisation was available.

impact regarding influence on concrete policies.[92] Second, the number of countries in which internal experts evaluate the impact of their own organisation as lower than the impact of civil society in general increases slightly.[93]

Figure 26: Distribution of scores per country of the merged sub-dimensions of impact on policies of civil society in general (red bars) and successful engagement by an organisation in policy-making in the last two years (blue bars)



But more telling is the fact that the two ways of evaluating impact are not clearly correlated any more.[94] In the following countries there is a difference of at least 20 and up to 54 percentage points between the evaluation of the impact of civil society in general by CSO representatives (red bars in Figure 26) and the scores for successful engagement with policy-making (blue bars): Armenia (53.9 percentage points), Togo (53.3 percentage points), Kosovo (38.5 percentage points), Russia (28.3 percentage points), Jordan 25.6 percentage points), Georgia (22.2 percentage points) and Bulgaria (21.3 percentage points). It is striking that in some countries where CSO representatives have reported success with at least one policy initiative in the last two years (indicator 4.3.3) the same group of persons evaluates the sector's impact on policies in general (indicator 4.3.1) distinctively negative. Further investigation is needed, possibly making use of Analytical Country Reports and case studies, in order to find out what the respective countries have in common and for which reasons this divergence between reported success and the more subjective evaluations occurs.

IV.3.6. External environment dimension

The external environment dimension characterises the national context for civil society, combining elements from diverse external sources, such as Social Watch, Transparency International,

[92] The mean value for perceived impact of civil society in general is 40.6 percentage points and for the impact of CSO representatives' own organisations is 51.6 percentage points.
[93] There are six countries (instead of four as compared to the impact on social concerns mentioned above) in which the score for impact on policies of CSO representatives' own organisation remains below the score for impact on policies of civil society in general. These countries are (with the respective differences in percentage points): Japan (13.1), Albania (8.2), Chile (7.6), Venezuela (5.2), Nicaragua (4.9) and Zambia (3.4).
[94] Spearman's rho: r_s = .26, p = 0.216.

Freedom House and the World Bank, as well as elements of the Organisational Survey and Population Survey.

Figure 27: Distribution of scores for the external environment dimension (histogram)



With respect to the external environment the countries can be divided into four groups. The first group comprises cases with comparatively less favourable conditions (Togo, Kazakhstan and Belarus – green bars in Figure 27). On the other side of the graph, there is the group of countries which score rather high (Japan, Slovenia, Uruguay, Italy and Chile – blue bars), and a group with slightly lower scores (South Korea, Mexico, Argentina, Croatia and Bulgaria – red bars). The remaining countries form the largest group in the middle, with slightly unfavourable external environments (black bars).[95]

[95] The cut off points are based on hierarchical clustering (method applied: between groups linkages, briefly explained above in footnote 29).

IV.3.6.1. External environment dimension indicators

Figure 28: Distribution of the scores for the external environment indicators



The distribution of values for indicators of the external environment strikes the eye for their diversity (see Figure 28).[96] The countries score comparatively uniformly and high with respect to two of the indicators. The first is the Basic Capabilities Index (indicator 5.1.1, the 1st indicator of this dimension). The exceptional cases, which fall significantly below the majority of countries, are

[96] For this dimension the following values are missing: all the indicators for the economic sub-dimension (indicators 5.1.1 through to 5.1.4) for Kosovo, that is the Basic Capabilities Index, corruption within the public sector, the level of inequality in society and the ratio of external debt to GNI. The data indicating the level of inequality in society (indicator 5.1.3) is also missing for Liberia and Togo, and the ratio for external debt over GNI (indicator 5.1.4) for Italy, Japan, Liberia, Slovenia and South Korea. Furthermore, data is lacking for the indicator on associational and organisational rights (5.2.3) for Belarus, for the levels of tolerance in society (5.3.2) for Japan and for the levels of public spiritedness (5.3.3) for Nicaragua.

Liberia and Togo (extreme outliers), Nicaragua, Zambia and the Philippines. The second indicator, which yields high values for the majority of countries, is the level of public spiritedness (indicator 5.3.3, the12th indicator) with the Philippines lagging behind. Other countries which perform below the bulk of cases are South Korea and Venezuela when it comes to the subjective evaluation of the legal framework (by the CSO representatives interviewed in the Organisational Survey; indicator 5.2.4, the 8th indicator of this dimension).

The countries achieve relatively uniform and low values for the level of trust in society (indicator 5.3.1, the 10th indicator), while the indicators for political rights and freedom (indicator 5.2.1, the 5th indicator) and associational and organisational rights (indicator 5.2.3, the 7th indicator) are the ones with the values spread over an extremely wide range, meaning that the situations with respect to these rights are extremely diverse. Also, the indicators for the economic context (indicator 5.4.1, the 4th indicator), the rule of law and personal freedoms (indicator 5.2.2. the 6th indicator) and the level of tolerance in society (indicator 5.3.2, the 11th indicator) are rather diverse across the countries.

The correlations among the indicators show that those indicators which measure the socio-political context are generally strongly related to each other (indicators 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.3 and 5.2.5, the 5th, 6th, 7th and 9th indicators).[97]

There are strong relationships between perceived corruption in the public sector (as measured by Transparency International) and political rights and freedoms (indicators, 5.1.2 and 5.2.1, the 2nd and 5th indicator of this dimension),[98] the rule of law and personal freedoms (indicator 5.2.2, the 6th indicator),[99] associational and organisational rights (5.2.3, the 7th indicator)[100] and the state's effectiveness (indicator 5.2.5, the 9th indicator).[101] The relation between perceived corruption in the public sector is lower when it comes to the Basic Capabilities Index (indicator 5.1.1, the 1st indicator).[102]

Perceived corruption in the public sector is strongly related to political rights, associational rights and the rule of law

Probably most remarkable is that CSO representatives' subjective experience of the legal framework (based on the Organisational Survey) is not related to political rights and freedoms and the rule of law and associational rights, as evaluated by Freedom House. This means that with respect to the legal environment, subjective opinions do not coincide with the apparently more objective ratings.

Regarding the socio-cultural indicators, it is worth mentioning that the level of tolerance is positively related to political rights and freedoms (indicator 5.2.1),[103] the rule of law (indicator 5.2.2) [104] and to associational and organisational rights (indicator 5.2.3 – these are the 5th, 6th and 7th indicators of this dimension).[105] Furthermore the level of trust in society (indicator 5.3.1, the 10th indicator) is related positively to the level of inequality (indicator 5.1.3, the 3rd indicator), which means that there are higher levels of trust where income is distributed more equally.[106] Surprisingly, the level of tolerance (indicator 5.3.2, the 11th indicator) is related negatively to the inequality index (5.1.3, the 3rd indicator): higher inequality coincides with more tolerance towards marginalised and stigmatised groups of society.[107]

[97] All 6 possible combinations of indicators with Spearman rho (r_s) between .71 and .97, with a level of significance clearly below 0.001.
[98] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .77$, $p < 0.001$.
[99] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .81$, $p < 0.001$.
[100] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .70$, $p < 0.001$.
[101] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .90$, $p < 0.001$.
[102] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .49$, $p < 0.05$.
[103] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .51$, $p < 0.05$.
[104] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .44$, $p < 0.05$.
[105] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .51$, $p < 0.05$.
[106] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .54$, $p< 0.01$.
[107] Spearman's rho: $r_s = -.47$, $p < 0.05$.

IV.4. Relations among indicators across the five dimensions: the influence of the external environment and the influence of the perceived impact

After a detailed inspection of the structural and cultural features of civil society, the contexts in which civil society operates and the perceptions of its impact, the examination turns to the possible interactions of indicators across dimensions. Following the loose causal model outlined above (see section I) an analysis should be able to reveal relations across the indicators of the five dimensions. The next section examines how far indicators of the external environment, which describe the general conditions under which civil society operates, relate to the structural and cultural features of civil society (from section IV.4.1 to section IV.4.3). Sections IV.4.4 to IV.4.7 look into the relations between the indicators of perceived impact and the indicators of the external environment as well as the structural and cultural make-up of civil society. The calculations of correlations only show that an effect of interaction appears. Whether causal relationships actually exist needs to be elaborated with further investigations and theoretical explanations. For reasons of space, the following sections report only the most significant and interesting relations among indicators.

Following the description of each dimension with the indicators from which it has been composed, the remaining pages examine the interactions of indicators across the dimensions

IV.4.1. The external environment and civic engagement

The absence of a close relation between the external environment and civic engagement has already been mentioned above, when correlating the two dimensions at the most aggregated level (section IV.3.1). The following section has a closer look at the single indicators from which the dimensions are calculated. Figure 29 illustrates the relationships between dimensions which are explored in this section.

Figure 29: Dimensions for which correlations of indicators are discussed in this section[108]



Only a limited number of the possible pairs of indicators show a significant correlation and these are only of moderate strength.[109] Most correlations are positive: a higher level of public spiritedness in countries (indicator 5.3.3) relates positively to a higher rate of people who are very active politically on an individual basis (indicator 1.5.3),[110] while a higher level of tolerance in the population (indicator 5.3.2) is linked to higher rates of social membership (indicator 1.1.1)[111] as well as to higher rates of individual political activism (indicator 1.1.3).[112] Political activism on an individual basis in a

At first sight, no clear relationship emerges between the indicators of the external environment and the indicators of civic engagement

[108] Please note that the arrows pointing in one direction in Figure 3, which strongly allude to causal relationships, have been substituted with arrows pointing in both directions; the relationships remain open for interpretation.
[109] Combining the external environment (12 indicators) and civic engagement dimensions (14 indicators) yields 168 pairs of indicators. Taking into consideration Spearman rho, the correlation for 11 pairs of indicators are significant (at the level of $p<0.05$). Generally the relationships remain modest (r_s in absolute values between .40 and .49).
[110] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .45$, $p < 0.05$.
[111] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .41$, $p < 0.05$.
[112] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .47$, $p < 0.05$.

slightly less committed form (indicator 1.4.3) is positively related to associational and organisational rights (indicator 5.2.3)[113] as well as to political rights and freedoms (indicator 5.2.1).[114] Positive relationships also appear between associational rights and freedoms (indicator 5.2.3) and social membership in social organisations (indicators 1.1.1)[115] as well as occasional social activism (indicator 1.1.3).[116] These correlations hint at the fact that a positive situation regarding political and associational rights goes together with more individualistic activism. These correlations seem to confirm the positive synergies between civic engagement and socio-cultural conditions.

Noteworthy too are the negative correlations, which seem to document the reverse effects: higher levels of public spiritedness (indicator 5.3.3) go together with lower levels of volunteering in social organisations (indicator 1.1.2),[117] less occasional social activism (indicator 1.1.3)[118] and less formalised engagement of non-mainstream groups (indicator 1.3.1).[119] This means that where there is a tendency of higher social engagement (volunteering, occasional participation in social activity and more non-mainstream groups organised for action), there is also a drift towards an inclination not to play entirely by the formal rules (e.g. occasionally wrongly claiming benefits, evading taxes, accepting bribes). Another negative link materialises between levels of tolerance in society (indicator 5.3.2) and the rates of citizen volunteering in political organisations (indicator 1.5.2).[120] However, as outlined above, simple correlations on their own do not support causal relations. Therefore, it is open to interpretation and further investigation whether lower levels of public spiritedness are an outcome of civic engagement or whether a wide diffusion of negative attitudes in society provokes civic engagement as a reaction and as an attempt to improve the situation. Equally the connection between higher levels of trust and tolerance and the subjective evaluation of the legal situation on the one side and incidents of political engagement on the other might be a result as well as a counter-action.

IV.4.2. The external environment and level of organisation

Cross-relating the external environment with the level of organisation dimension, the proportion of pairs of indicators with significant correlations is higher and the correlations are generally stronger,[121] when compared to the correlations of the previous section between the external environment and civic engagement.

[113] Spearman's rho: r_s= .47, p < 0.05
[114] Spearman's rho: r_s = .46, p < 0.05
[115] Spearman's rho: r_s = .40, p < 0.05.
[116] Spearman's rho: r_s = .42, p < 0.05.
[117] Spearman's rho: r_s = -.49, p < 0.05.
[118] Spearman's rho: r_s = -.45, p < 0.05.
[119] Spearman's rho: r_s = -.46,p < 0.05.
[120] Spearman's rho: r_s = -.43, p < 0.05.
[121] Combining the external environment (12 indicators) and level of organisation dimensions (8 indicators) yields 96 pairs of indicators. Taking into consideration Spearman rho, the correlation for 11 pairs is significant (at the level of at least p>0.05). Generally the relationships are slightly stronger than in the previous section (r_s in absolute values between.41 and .59).

Figure 30: Dimensions for which correlations of indicators are discussed in this section



Most of the correlations show that organisational features of CSOs are positively related to certain socio-economic, socio-political and socio-cultural aspects. The percentage of organisations that have regular access to technical devices (such as computer, telephone and internet, indicator 2.5.2) is linked to the Basic Capabilities Index (indicator 5.1.1),[122] to the levels of perceived public sector corruption (indicator 5.2.1)[123] and to state effectiveness (indicator 5.2.5).[124] The financial stability of CSOs (indicator 2.5.1) is related to levels of inequality (indicator 5.1.3).[125] Holding meetings with other CSOs (indicator 2.3.1) is related to public spiritedness (indicator 5.3.3).[126] The ratio of international NGOs (INGOs) present in a country, in relation to the number of INGOs worldwide, is positively related to the Basic Capabilities Index (indicator 5.1.1),[127] to political rights and freedoms (indicator 5.2.2)[128] and to state effectiveness (5.2.5).[129] Negative links appear between the financial sustainability of CSOs (indicators 2.5.1) and the level of tolerance in society (indicator 5.3.1),[130] between the subjective evaluation of the legal framework in a country (indicator 5.2.4), the technical resources of CSOs (indicator 2.5.2)[131] and between the subjective evaluation of the legal situation and the presence of international organisations (indicator 2.6.1).[132]

The indicators for the external environment and for the level of organisation dimension hint at those elements which make up a favourable administrative – organisational culture, either resulting from or fostering the activities of CSOs – mainly state effectiveness, low levels of corruption and the presence of international linkages

In general these results might be summed up as describing the features of an administrative – organisational culture, with higher financial stability, a better access to infrastructure and the presence of international organisations, linked to higher standards of state effectiveness, lower levels of perceived corruption and higher levels of public spiritedness. Surprising is that a better technical resource base of CSOs goes together with a less positive evaluation of the legal situation, and a better financial base of CSOs goes together with lower levels of tolerance in a country. These findings allude again to the fact that the external environment hardly relates to the non-structural aspects of civil society, that is, the perception of the environment and the cultural features of civil society and the society in general.

IV.4.3. The external environment and practice of values

Correlations between indicators from the external environment and practice of values dimensions appear as still comparatively high (contrasting with the previous relations between the external

[122] Spearman's rho: r_s =.56, p< 0.01.
[123] Spearman's rho: r_s =.44, p<0.05.
[124] Spearman's rho: r_s =.50, p <0.05.
[125] Spearman's rho: r_s =.52, p <0.05.
[126] Spearman's rho: r_s = .41, p <, 0.05.
[127] Spearman's rho: r_s =.57, p < 0.01.
[128] Spearman's rho: r_s =.45, p < 0.05.
[129] Spearman's rho: r_s =.59, p < 0.01.
[130] Spearman's rho: r_s = -.58, p < 0.01.
[131] Spearman's rho: r_s = -.44, p < 0.05.
[132] Spearman's rho: r_s = -.43, p <, 0.05.

environment and level of organisation dimensions).[133] Negative correlations are found more often than positive correlations.[134]

Figure 31: Dimensions for which correlations of indicators are discussed in this section



Links exist between the subjectively experienced legal framework (indicator 5.2.4) and the perceived presence of intolerant groups within civil society (indicator 3.5.4),[135] as well as - very strongly - the perceived use of violence within civil society (indicator 3.5.1).[136] This means that where the legal environment is evaluated more positively by CSO interviewees, respondents perceive groups in national civil society as less intolerant and less violent. The practice of making financial information of CSOs publicly available (indicator 3.3.2) corresponds to levels of public spiritedness in society (indicator 5.3.3),[137] as well as to positive values regarding perceived levels of corruption in the public sector (indicator 5.1.2).[138] The level of membership in labour unions of CSO staff (indicator 3.2.2) is positively related to the levels of trust in a society (indicator 5.3.1).[139]

Tolerance might open up space for intolerant groups.

This suggests an impulse for reflecting on the definition of civil society and what are the roles of the authorities in relation to the arena where interests are expressed

At first sight, surprising area number of negative connections between the perceived weight of groups in civil society which are ready to use violence (indicator 3.5.1) and political rights and freedoms (indicator 5.2.1),[140] as well as the rule of law (indicator 5.2.2).[141]

It seems from this that the more the state is evaluated as working well, the more groups within civil society are ready to use violence. As an explanation one might assume that democratic regimes permit many kinds of organisations and this means they also offer space and opportunities for those CSOs which are more inclined to resort to violent means. Repressive regimes, instead, inhibit not only positive values-based civil society, but also the potentially violent elements.

This might also hint at an explanation regarding the apparently contradictory relationship between the levels of tolerance in societies (indicator 5.3.2) and the perceived readiness of groups within civil society to use violent means (indicator 3.5.1).[142] More tolerance also opens up space for intolerant groups. These findings lead to the question of what regulation of the activities of civil society by governmental actors is legitimate and necessary.

[133] Combining the external environment (12 indicators) and the practice of values dimensions (14 indicators) yields 168 pairs of indicators. Taking into consideration Spearman rho (r_s), the correlation for 1 pair is significant (at the level of p<0.05). Generally the relationships are in tendency stronger than in the previous section (r_s in absolute values between .41 and .72).
[134] For 9 out of 14 pairs of indicators the calculation yields a negative value, meaning that if the value for one indicator increases the score for the other indicator decreases – and vice versa.
[135] Spearman's rho: r_s =.41, p <0.05.
[136] Spearman's rho: r_s =.72, p <0.001.
[137] Spearman's rho: r_s = .61p <0.01.
[138] Spearman's rho: r_s = .47, p <0.05.
[139] Spearman's rho: r_s = .42, p <0.05.
[140] Spearman's rho: r_s = -.47, p < 0.05.
[141] Spearman's rho: r_s = -.46, p < 0.05.
[142] Spearman's rho: r_s = -.46, p < 0.05.

Another possibility to explain the links previously highlighted, as well as the negative correlation between the levels of tolerance in societies (indicator 5.3.2) and the diffusion within civil society of the practice of financial transparency (indicator 3.3.2),[143] and the negative relationship between a more democratic culture within civil society (indicator 3.1.1) and the levels of tolerance in society (indicator 5.3.1)[144] would state that CSOs distinguish themselves from their environment, trying to counteract and to improve the situation.

The values dimension appears to be a most promising area for further reflections on and inquiries into the characteristics of civil society in diverse countries

The negative relationship between membership in labour unions (indicator 3.2.1) and the economic context, measured through the ratio of external debt to GNI (indicator 5.1.4)[145] hints at the disengagement of citizens from commitment to labour organisations in economically advanced countries. In a more peaceful, prosperous and regulated society, it can be assumed that the urge to engage and change the situation decreases.

The - at least at first sight - partially counter-intuitive and sometimes seemingly contradictory findings of this section hint at the fact that the dimension of the perception of values represents probably one of the most interesting elements of the research project. It provides a rich contribution to the description and measurement of civil society, and promises interesting insights. This dimension deserves special attention and should be developed and explored further.

IV.4.4. Perception of impact and the external environment

Figure 32: Dimensions for which correlations of indicators are discussed in this section



Favourable legal situations go together with higher levels of perceived impact

While at the most aggregated level the analysis showed a rather limited connectedness between the external environment and the perception of impact dimension(see section IV.3.1) there are some pronounced correlations between the single indicators.[146] The links between indicators are stronger when it comes to the external perception of impact (compared to the internal perception by CSO representatives). The external perception of impact on an important social issue (indicator 4.5.1) is positively related to four indicators of the external environment: the existence of political rights and freedoms (indicator 5.2.1),[147] the rule of law (indicator 5.2.2),[148] associational and organisational rights (indicator 5.2.3)[149] and the level of tolerance in society.[150] This could be summed up as: external stakeholders tend to acknowledge the impact of CSOs on social concerns where basic rights are guaranteed.

Noteworthy is that these relationships do not emerge from the calculations when taking into consideration the perception of the representatives from CSOs (internal perception of impact, indicators 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.2.1 and 4.2.2), nor when talking about more concrete effects on specific

[143] Spearman's rho: r_s = -.47, p < 0.05.
[144] Spearman's rho: r_s = -.42, p < 0.05.
[145] Spearman's rho: r_s = -.50, p < 0.05.
[146] 23 out of the 204 possible combinations of indicators cross-relating the two dimensions demonstrate a significant relationship, of which 7 are negative.
[147] Spearman's rho: rs = .501 p < 0.01.
[148] Spearman's rho: r_s = .50, p < 0.05.
[149] Spearman's rho: r_s = .48, p < 0.05.
[150] Spearman's rho: r_s = .45, p < 0.05.

policies (indicators 4.3.1 and 4.3.3. for the internal perception of impact and 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 for the external perception of impact). The level of tolerance in society (indicator 5.3.2) is also related positively to the internal perception of impact on one of the most important social concerns (indicator 1.2.2).[151]

The level of trust in society in general (indicator 5.3.1) is related to the differences in the levels of trust between members of CSOs and non-members (indicator 4.7.1):[152] where citizens tend to trust each other already, this tendency is even stronger within the group of persons who are active in CSOs.

The differences in levels of public spiritedness between CSO members and non-members (indicator 4.7.3) are also related positively to political rights and freedoms (indicator 5.2.1) and to the rule of law (indicator 5.2.2).[153]

The national level of inequality (indicator 5.1.3) is negatively related to the external perception of impact on a major social issue (indicator 4.4.1),[154] and the external perception of impact of CSOs on a specific policy (indicator 4.6.1).[155] The level of inequality is also related negatively to the difference in levels of trust in civil society (indicator 4.7.4).[156] In a society which is rated as more equal, the impact of civil society is perceived by external stakeholders as low and the population has less trust in civil society.

Furthermore, the levels of inequality relate to the differences in levels of trust between members and non-members of CSOs (indicator 4.7.1) in the following way: the more wealth is distributed equally, the higher are the differences in levels of trust between those persons who are members of CSOs and those who are not.[157] The phenomenon of higher levels of trust for members of CSOs (as compared to non-members) is also related to state effectiveness (indicators 5.2.5).[158] Bringing these findings together one might conclude that while assuming that engagement in CSOs has positive effects on the trust which people show towards fellow citizens, this effect is significantly stronger where the wealth is distributed more equally and the state functions better.

Finally, the activities of the interviewee's own CSO in a policy field (indicator 4.2.2) negatively relates to the difference in levels of trust in society.[159] At the same time, the fact of CSOs having lobbied for a policy in the last two years (indicator 4.2.2) is positively related to political rights and freedoms as well as to associational and organisational rights (indicator 5.2.1 and 5.2.3).[160] Taking these findings together one might conclude that lower levels of trust in society as well as established political and associational rights are characteristic of situations in which CSOs take more initiative to influence policies.

In countries where levels of inequality are higher the impact of civil society is perceived as higher: are unfair conditions a spur to greater activities of civil society?

A few of these correlations would be expected: political rights and rule of law are beneficial for public spiritedness (or vice versa), while a greater impact of civil society on social concerns in general is perceived where political rights and freedoms as well as associational and organisational rights are more in place and where there are higher levels of tolerance within society

[151] Spearman's rho: r_s = .43, p < 0.05.
[152] Spearman's rho: rs = .77, p < 0.001.
[153] Spearman's rho: r_s = .42 and r_s =.45, both with p < 0.05.
[154] Spearman's rho: r_s = -.57, p <0.01.
[155] Spearman's rho: r_s = -.45, p <0.05.
[156] Spearman's rho: r_s = -.51, p < 0.05.
[157] Spearman's rho: r_s = .45 p < 0.05.
[158] Spearman's rho: r_s = .41, p < 0.05.
[159] Spearman's rho: r_s = -.45, p < 0.05.
[160] Spearman's rho: r_s = .41 and .43 with, p < 0.05 for both.

at large. Where levels of trust are comparatively high, the positive attitude towards others is even stronger amongst the members of CSOs.[161]

Slightly surprising, instead, might be the negative relationships between levels of inequality and external perceptions of impact on social concerns and on policies. Higher levels of inequality in a society go together with stronger perceptions of impact. This could be interpreted as telling us that unfavourable social conditions stimulate and even improve the performance of civil society.

Remarkable also is the fact that trust in civil society is not related positively to any of the indicators for the external environment (with its socio-economic, socio-political and socio-cultural aspects).

IV.4.5. Perception of impact and civic engagement

Figure 33: Dimensions for which correlations of indicators are discussed in this section



The indicators of the civic engagement and perception of impact dimensions are related rather strongly,[162] as was to be expected according to the previous checks at the more aggregate level of the dimensions (section IV.3.1).

When indicators of perception of impact are formulated more specifically, the correlations with indicators of the dimension civic engagement appear less clearly
-
general diffuse evaluations are more easily related to civic engagement

Impact on social concerns

The indicators under the extent of social engagement sub-dimension (indicators 1.1.1. to 1.1.3) are often related positively to the perception of impact on social concerns in general by CSO representatives (indicators 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.2.1, and 4.2.2)[163] as well as to the same perceptions of impact by external stakeholders (indicators 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.5.1, and 4.5.2).[164]

Less strongly related are the indicators for the extent of political engagement (indicators 1.4.1 to 1.4.3) with impact on social concerns as perceived by CSO representatives (indicators 4.1.1 to 4.2.2)[165] as well as with the impact on social concerns as perceived by external stakeholders (indicators 4.4.1 to 4.5.2).[166]

[161] 4 more pairs of indicators yield negative correlations:
the levels of trust in society in general (indicator 5.3.1) and the impact of the CSO representatives' own organisations (indicator 4.2.2) with Spearman's rho: r_s = -.40, and p < 0.05;
the levels of tolerance in society (indicator 5.3.2) and the perceived impact on policies (as perceived by CSO representatives, indicator 4.3.3) with Spearman's rho: r_s = -.43 and p < 0.05;
the level of public spiritedness in society (indicator 5.3.3) and the impact of civil society on policies as perceived by external stakeholders (indicator 4.4.1) with Spearman's rho: r_s = -.46, p < 0.05; and
the subjective evaluation of the legal framework (indicator 5.2.4) and the differences of levels of tolerance between members and non-members of CSOs, with Spearman's rho: r_s = -.47, and p < 0.05.
However, no clear pattern emerges from these findings.
[162] Calculating the correlations between the indicators from the perception of impact and civic engagement dimensions yields 42 out of 238 possible pairs of indicators with significant values.
[163] 7 out of 12 possible pairs of indicators with Spearman's rho: (r_s) between .41 and .61, p < 0.05 and four pairs of indicators even at the level of p < 0.01.
[164] 6 out of 12 possible pairs of indicators with Spearman's rho (r_s) between .41 and .72, p < 0.05 and four pairs of indicators even at the level of p < 0.01.
[165] 3 out of 12 possible pairs of indicators with Spearman's rho (r_s) between .42 and .60, p < 0.05.

The depth of social engagement (being a member of more than one social organisation) is hardly related to the perception of impact on social concerns; only when taking into consideration the external stakeholders' views do links appear.[167] The depth of political engagement (being a member of or volunteer in more than one political organisation) does not show any correlation with the perception of impact on social concerns.[168] To sum up: levels of membership, especially in social organisations, are related to perceived impact, but the rate of citizens being a member in more than one organisation is hardly related in the same way.

Perceived impact is related to the extent of civic engagement
-
but hardly to the depth of engagement
(being member in more than one organisation / cross-cutting memberships)

Remarkable is the almost complete absence of any significant correlation between the various indicators for civic engagement (both social and political) and the perceived impact of a CSO representative's own organisation on social concerns (indicator 4.2.2).[169] More engagement does not go together with a higher perception of impact of the CSO representatives' own organisations.

Impact on policies

The indicators of social engagement (its extent and depth, indicators 1.1.1 to 1.2.3) in general relate rarely to impact on policies as perceived by both internal and external experts (indicators 4.3.1, 4.3.3, 4.6.1 and 4.6.2).[170]

Surprisingly, also the relation between political engagement (indicators 1.4.1 to 1.5.3) and policy impact as perceived by CSO representatives (indicators 4.3.1 and 4.3.3) and by external stakeholders (indicators 4.6.1 and 4.6.2) is rather weak.[171]

Remarkable further is that no clear connection appears between engagement of citizens (both social and political) and perceived impact on policies (indicator 4.3.3).[172]

Diversity of engagement

The noteworthy exceptions are the indicators for diversity of engagement. The diversity of social engagement (indicator 1.3.1) relates positively to the perception of impact on social concerns from the perspective of CSO representatives

The diversity of civil society is related to a higher perceived impact.

[166] 2 out of 12 possible pairs of indicators with Spearman's rho: (r_s) = .57 and p < 0.01 and Spearman's rho: (r_s) = .46 and p < 0.05:
[167] 2 out of 12 possible pairs of indicators, both with Spearman's rho: r_s =.42, p < 0.05.
[168] There are 24 combinations of indicators with no significant correlation.
[169] The only exception is a correlation between the diversity of political engagement and the perceived impact of CSO representatives' own organisation (Spearman's rho: (rs) = .40 and p < 0.05), which is also covered in the discussion of diversity of engagement below.
[170] From the 24 pairs of indicators only 3 are significant: 2 correlations link the membership in social organisations (indicator 1.1.1) with the impact of civil society on policies in general as evaluated by CSO representatives (indicator 4.4.1), with Spearman's' rho (r_s) = .53 and p < 0.01; and with the impact on policies in general as assessed by the external stakeholders (indicator 4.6.2), with Spearman's rho: (r_s) = .50 and p < 0.05. The third correlation appears between and the depth of social membership (being a member in more than one social organisation (indicator 1.2.1) and the impact of civil society on policies in general as perceived by CSO representatives (indicator 4.3.1), with Spearman's rho: (r_s) = .41 and p < 0.05.
[171] Only 2 out of 24 pairs of indicators yield a significant correlation: between the extent of political membership (indicator 1.4.1) and the policy impact in general as perceived by CSO representatives, with Spearman's rho: r_s = .42 p < 0.05, and the depth of political engagement (indicator 1.5.1) and the policy impact in general as perceived by external experts (indicator 4.6.2), with Spearman's rho: r_s = .40 p < 0.05.
[172] There is no significant correlation for the 14 combinations of indicators.

(indicators 4.1.1 to 4.2.2)[173] and external stakeholders (indicators 4.4.1 to 4.5.2).[174]

An even stronger relationship emerges between the diversity of political engagement (indicator 1.6.1) and the perception of impact on social concerns by CSO representatives (indicators 4.1.1 to 4.4.2)[175] and, to a lesser extent, by external stakeholders (indicators 4.4.1 to 4.5.2).[176]

Both types of diversity, i.e. the diversity of political engagement and the diversity of social engagement, are related to the impact on policies as evaluated by the external stakeholders.[177]

Differences in levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness and trust in civil society

This section turns to the more indirect effects one might expect from civic engagement: differences between levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness between members of CSOs and non-members as well as the trust in civil society by citizens in general.[178]

It is remarkable that civic engagement does not relate to changes in the levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness and - most surprising - hardly relate to levels of trust in civil society (indicators 4.7.1 to 4.7.4). The only exceptions are the positive correlation between levels of trust in civil society (indicator 4.7.4) and volunteering in social organisations (indicator 1.1.2),[179] extent of political volunteering (indicator 1.4.2)[180] and the depth of political volunteering (doing volunteering in more than one political organisation, indicator 1.5.2).[181] Furthermore, a correlation appears between the differences in levels of tolerance between CSO members and non-members (indicator 4.7.2) and the more regular but still occasional participation in social events (indicator 1.2.3).[182]

Summarising this rather complex situation across the countries, it can be said that evaluations of impact are more positive when the question is less concrete. When asked for perceptions of the impact on social concerns in general, the impact is rated higher than in comparison to the question about impact on actual policies (the results of lobbying activities).

The perception of impact is also stronger when asked about the general social impact and the responsiveness of civil society as a whole, compared to the perception of impact of the respondent's own organisation and its concrete outcomes.

Diversity in the area of social organisations and of political organisations appears to have a strong relation to the perception of impact by both groups consulted, internal as well as external stakeholders. Thus, the organised presence of diverse and marginalised groups is positively related to the impact of civil society.

[173] 2 out of the 4 pairs of indicators show a significant correlation with Spearman's rho (r_s) of .56 and .69, both with $p < 0.01$.
[174] 2 out of the 4 pairs of indicators show a significant correlation with Spearman's rho (r_s) of .44 and .62, $p < 0.05$.
[175] All 4 pairs of indicators show a significant correlation, with Spearman's rho (r_s) between .40 and .51, $p < 0.05$.
[176] 1 out of the 4 pairs of indicators shows a significant correlation, with Spearman's rho: $r_s = .51$ $p < 0.01$.
[177] Diversity of social engagement (indicator 1.3.1) and impact on specific policies as perceived by external stakeholders (indicator 4.6.1): Spearman's rho: $r_s = .46$, with $p < 0.05$; and depth of political membership (indicator 1.5.1) and impact on policies in general as perceived by external experts (indicator 4.6.2): Spearman's rho: rs = .41, $p < 0.05$.
[178] Within the 56 possible combinations of indicators there are only 4 pairs with significant correlations.
[179] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .51$, $p < 0.05$.
[180] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .53$ and $p < 0.01$.
[181] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .41$ and $p < 0.05$.
[182] Spearman's r rho: $r_s = .58$, $p < 0.01$

IV.4.6. Perception of impact and the level of organisation

Figure 34: Dimensions for which correlations of indicators are discussed in this section

The correlations between the indicators of the level of organisation and the perception of impact dimensions concentrate on two issues: membership in networks and support organisations and the financial and technical resources of CSOs.[183]

> Perceived impact is related to a stable human resource base (share of paid staff) within CSOs
> -
> rather than to the availability of financial and technical resources

Most striking are the many negative relationships between the financial situation of CSOs (indicator 2.5.1) as well as the access to communication technology (indicator 2.5.2) on the one side and the evaluation of impact on the other. The financial stability of CSOs is related negatively to the perceptions of impact on social concerns, mainly by CSO representatives (indicators 4.1.1 to 4.2.2),[184] but also by external stakeholders (indicators 4.4.1 to 4.5.2).[185] A connection between finances and policy impact seems absent.

Negative correlations also appear between the technical capacities of CSOs (indicator 2.5.2) and evaluation of impact on social concerns (indicators 4.4.1 to 4.5.2),[186] and on policies as evaluated by external stakeholders (indicators 4.6.1 and 4.6.2).[187]

Cooperation with other organisations (indicators 2.3.1 and 2.3.2) and membership in umbrella organisations, federations and other such networks (indicator 2.2.1) are strongly related to CSOs getting involved in lobbying activities.[188] However, the positive outcome of these activities, i.e. the impact on policies as perceived by CSO representatives, coincides with a higher percentage of paid staff as compared to the share of work done by volunteers (indicator 2.4.1).[189] These two findings could be interpreted as telling us that networking is important for getting involved in the process of lobbying to influence policies, but the success of these activities is related to an organisation having a higher share of paid staff (compared to volunteers).

At first sight this tendency seems to contrast with the negative correlations between the perception of impact and the access of CSOs to financial and technological resources. The respective figures suggest that impact is not related to these kinds of resources and that, instead, more impact is achieved where material support is scarcer.

[183] For the combination of indicators from the two dimensions, 15 out of the 136 pairs of indicators showed a significant correlation, 10 of which were negative.
[184] 3 out of 4 combinations of indicators show significant negative correlations, with Spearman's rho between r_s = -.40 and r_s = -50, and p < 05.
[185] 2 out of 4 pairs of combinations of indicators show a significant correlation, with Spearman's rho: r_s = -.62 with p < 0.001 and Spearman's rho: r_s = -.49 with p < 0.05.
[186] 2 out of 4 combinations of indicators show a negative correlation, with Spearman's rho between r_s = -.43, and r_s = -.56, with p < 0.05.
[187] The values for the two correlations are Spearman's rho: r_s = -.45, and -40 both with p < 0.05.
[188] The two indicators for networking relate to the indicator for taking initiative in a policy field, with a Spearman's rho (r_s) of .76 and .66, both with p< 0.001; the correlation between membership in umbrella organisations and taking initiatives in a policy field yields Spearman's rho: r_s = .51, p < 05.
[189] Spearman's rho: r_s = .47, p < 0.05.

A different interpretation reconciles these findings: for being able to successfully influence policies, CSOs need the security of a stable human resource base, rather than sophisticated organisations.[190]

IV.4.7. Perception of impact and the practice of values

Figure 35: Dimensions for which correlations of indicators are discussed in this section



Calculating the correlations between the indicators of the practice of values and the perceived impact dimensions yields some significant relations.[191] The share of CSOs having a policy for equal opportunities (indicator 3.2.1) corresponds to the impact of civil society on the most important social concern in the country (indicator 4.1.1)[192] and to the impact of the CSO representatives' own organisation on policies (indicator 4.3.3).[193] Where CSO representatives see the practice of democracy within civil society as stronger (indicator 3.5.2) they also perceive more impact of CSOs on policies in general (indicator 4.3.1),[194] while a civil society that is assessed as less violent (indicator 3.5.1) relates to better results from the policy initiatives of CSO representatives' own organisations (indicator 4.3.3).[195]

In relation to the perception of impact, a distinction appears between the promotion of values of civil society as a whole and the organisational internal practice of standards.

The attention paid to environmental standards in CSOs (indicator 3.4.1) relates to higher levels of trust in civil society (indicator 4.7.4).[196]

At first sight, surprising are the negative links: the diffusion of more democratic decision-making among CSOs (indicator 3.1.1) is negatively related to responsiveness to important social concerns (4.1.1 and 4.1.2) and to the perceived overall impact of civil society on social concerns (indicator 4.2.1).[197] The impact of civil society on key social concerns as evaluated by external stakeholders relates inversely to the diffusion of labour rights training within CSOs (3.2.3) and having a publicly available policy for labour standards (indicator 3.2.4).[198]

These figures stand in contrast to the series of significant positive relations, which appear comparatively frequent and strong, between the indicators measuring perceived internal

[190] Two more correlations appear in this section which, however, are not considered relevant: access to technology (indicator 2.5.2) and the difference of levels of trust between CSO members and non-members (indicator 4.7.1) are positively related (Spearman's rho: $r_s = .48$, $p < 0.05$) and the presence of international NGOs in country (indicator 2.6.1) is negatively related to perception of impact on a specific social concern by external stakeholders (indicator 4.4.1): Spearman's rho: $r_s = -.42$, $p < 0.05$.
[191] Combining the two dimensions yields 238 pairs of indicators, of which 21 are significantly correlated, 4 of these inversely.
[192] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .52$, $p < 0.01$.
[193] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .56$, $p < 0.01$.
[194] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .68$, $p < 0.001$.
[195] Spearman's rho: $r_s = -.43$, $p < 0.05$.
[196] Spearman's rho: $r_s = .48$, $p < 0.05$.
[197] Spearman's rho for correlation between democratic decision-making (3.1.1) and perception of impact of civil society on the most important social concern by CSO representatives (indicator 4.1.1): $r_s = -.42$, $p < 0.05$, and on the second most important social concern (indicator 4.1.2) $r_s = -.41$, $p < 0.01$; and Spearman's rho for correlation between democratic decision-making and perception of impact of civil society in general by CSO representatives (indicator 4.2.1): $r_s = -.41$, $p < 0.05$.
[198] Spearman's rho: $r_s = -.44$, with $p < 0.05$ and Spearman's rho: $r_s = -.39$, $p < 0.05$.

democratic decision-making and several indicators for impact, as well as between civil society's perceived role in promoting non-violence and peace and diverse indicators measuring impact.[199]

The perception of impact is not related to the other expressions of values covered in the surveys, especially the perceived level of corruption within civil society (indicator 3.5.3).

Noteworthy too is that perceived impact is also not related to the perceived presence and weight of violent (indicator 3.5.1) and intolerant forces within civil society (indicator 3.5.4 for the presence of intolerant groups and 3.5.5 for their weight within civil society).

The perception of impact of CSOs is related to the extent to which civil society promotes the values of democratic decision-making and non-violence

(and less to the extent to which CSOs actually practise democratic decision-making internally)

Apart from the positive relationship between environmental standards and levels of trust in civil society, the only correlation that appears between the sub-dimension 'impact on attitudes' (indicators 4.7.1 to 4.7.4) and the practice of values dimension of civil society is a negative link between the differences in level of public spiritedness between CSO members and non-members (indicator 4.7.3) and perceived corruption within civil society (indicator 3.5.3).[200] The differences of levels of trust between CSO members and non-members are more pronounced (with members of CSOs showing higher levels of trust than non-members), where corruption within civil society is perceived as higher. This finding is in line with a logical explanation that corruption is more often found within civil society where members of CSOs do not display a greater readiness to 'play by the rules' than the other citizens. Therefore these figures indirectly confirm the rationales for the construction of the questionnaires.

Examining the set of correlations between the practice of values and the perceived impact dimension more closely has helped to refine the finding mentioned above, according to which at the most aggregated level there is no strong link between the practice of values and perceived impact (see section IV.3.1).

Cross-relating the indicators from the two dimensions suggests a distinction between the internal practice of values (indicator 3.1.1) and the external promotion of values, especially the promotion of the two values of democratic decision-making (indicator 3.5.2) and non-violence (indicator 3.5.6). To roughly sum up: perceived impact is hardly related to what CSOs practise internally, but rather to the extent to which civil society as a whole promotes democratic decision-making and non-violence.

[199] Spearman's rho for perceived internal democratic decision-making (indicator 3.5.2) and:
- perceived impact on most important social concern as evaluated by CSO representatives (indicator 4.1.1): r_s = .41, p <0.05;
- perceived general impact of civil society as evaluated by CSO representatives (indicator 4.2.1): r_s = .62, p < 0.01;
- perceived impact on policies in general as evaluated by CSO representatives (indicator 4.3.1): r_s = .69, p < 0.001;
- perceived impact on most important social concern as evaluated by external stakeholders (indicator 4.5.1): r_s = .50, p < 0.05;
- perceived general impact of civil society on policies in general as evaluated by external stakeholders (indicator 4.6.2): r_s = .44, p <0.05;

Spearman's rho for perceived role of civil society in promoting non-violence and peace (indicator 4.5.6) and:
- perceived impact on most important social concerns as evaluated by CSO representatives (indicator 4.1.1 and 4.1.2): r_s = .51, p < 0.01, and r_s = .46, p<0.05;
- perceived general social impact of civil society as evaluated by CSO representatives (indicator 4.2.1): r_s = .56, p <0.01;
- perceived general impact of civil society on policies as evaluated by CSO representatives (indicator 4.3.1): r_s = .67, p < 0.001;
- perceived general impact of civil society on policies as evaluated by external stakeholders (indicator 4.6.2): r_s = .43, p < 0.05.

[200] The only correlation in this group of 56 pairs of indicators shows a Spearman's rho of r_s = -.61 p < 0.01.

V. Outlook: general tendencies and open questions

As outlined in the first chapter (chapter I), the CSI does not impose a specific theory and does not follow one causal model. Hence, the objective of this descriptive and explorative study is not the testing of hypotheses and thereby the proving of theories. Instead, this publication follows an inductive approach. This final chapter concludes the analytical description of the quantitative data from the CSI implementation phase 2008–2011 with a brief summary of the most noteworthy elements from the previous sections.

●Countries can be distinguished through the composition of their civil society, as mirrored in the samples of organisations which were contacted for the surveys.

From a first rough overview two types of civil society landscapes emerge. In one group of countries civil society seems to be oriented mainly at advocacy and lobbying work and in another group service delivery plays a larger role.

However, high rates of choices for the residual category 'other' when asking to characterise the CSO representatives' own organisation, a few cases which suggest different idiosyncratic characteristics, as well as considerable shares of non-responses in certain countries hint at a need for future CSI phases to refine categories, standardise the selection criteria for sampling and to inquire into the reasons for indefinite answers.

●Governmental institutions are generally considered the most important reference point when asking for an external evaluation of civil society's impact. (Though, here also, future data collection could be improved in order to provide more precise and reliable results.)

This suggests that - as a general tendency - CSOs define themselves primarily in relation to the state.

● Several relations among indicators confirm positive links between the various expressions of civic engagement, the socio-political and socio-cultural framework in a society and the perceived impact of CSOs on social concerns and policies. For example, positive correlations emerge between indicators on levels of public spiritedness, political engagement, levels of tolerance and diversity of engagement (presence of marginalised groups on the political scene); generally better ratings of the legal context in a country correspond to a more favourable evaluation of impact. CSOs appear more organised in situations where the socio-economic, socio-political and socio-cultural conditions score higher.

These findings substantiate the picture of a culture of participation and of administrative effectiveness. Though causal relationships cannot be proved unambiguously with the empirical material at hand, the figures confirm that civic participation plays a notable role in governance and that it is related to a more successful way of dealing with common affairs.

● Counter-intuitive, instead, are findings -for example on levels of trust and levels of tolerance in society -which do not correspond positively to several indicators measuring political engagement. Higher levels of trust and tolerance do not necessarily go together with higher levels of political engagement.

However, which is the cause and which is the effect cannot be concluded from this first look at the quantitative data: political engagement might increase as a response to low levels of trust and tolerance - or trust and tolerance might decline in an overly politicised climate. Further discussion and investigation is needed. Here the more qualitative elements of the methodology as captured in particular in the Analytical Country Reports can be of great use as they provide valuable additional information, which might help to explain national situations.

● At the most aggregated and general level of the five dimensions, the perceived impact of civil society is related closest to the levels of civic engagement. The environmental conditions of a

country (the socio-economic, socio-political, legal and socio-cultural context) are more closely related to the level of organisation.

Therefore, civic engagement seems to play a more important role in perceptions of impact than in the organisational features of civil society and the conditions of the external environment. Once again a cause-effect statement cannot be made here, but an examination of relations among single indicators can help to refine the picture.

● Examining more closely the forms of civic engagement, participation in social organisations scores generally higher than engagement in political organisations. Across the countries the levels of engagement vary considerably, but the two types of engagement (social and political) do not substitute each other and do not compete with each other. Instead, where there is a comparatively high level of social engagement there is also a comparatively high political engagement (and vice versa).

This alludes to the fact that civil society does not stand in a competitive relationship to the political system, in the sense of undermining it and creating parallel and concurrent institutions. Instead the two spheres seem to coexist or complement each other. A somewhat bold interpretation of this finding would state that a vibrant civil society is not only complementary, but a necessary part of the political system.

● A more individualistic type of involvement, based on individual or sporadic participation in activities and events (in contrast to more stable engagement as a member in an organisation), seems to present an alternative way of getting involved for citizens. Where sporadic participation is higher, CSO membership rates are lower (and vice versa); this is valid for both social and political CSOs.

This tendency calls for a refinement of the concept of civic engagement and for more research which looks beyond participation based on the classical idea of organisational membership, including more individualistic forms of engagement.

● Where civic engagement is more diffuse in society, representation is also more diverse, i.e. it includes more groups of marginalised factions within society, incorporating elements beyond the organisations of the mainstream. At the same time the depth of participation (being a member of more than one organisation) does not correspond to an overall increase of commitment.

This leads to the conclusion that more engagement goes together with more specific commitment. A civil society which comprises more distinct groups and also represents more specific interests and parts of society does not necessarily show an enhanced occurrence of overlapping memberships. This suggests that improving connections between different aspects of civil society could be an area of focus in follow-up to the CSI findings.

● The above finding gains more significance if setting the diverse characteristics of engagement against the perceived impact of civil society. Comparing the relations between extent, depth and diversity of participation in social and political organisations shows that the depth of engagement (being a member of more than one organisation) appears as hardly related to perceived impact. Instead, the extent of engagement, both in the social and political sphere, is positively related to the perception of impact. Not only does more civic engagement coincide with more perceived impact, but also the diversity of engagement (the share of engagement for marginalised groups in society) correlates to the perception of impact. Where more marginalised groups appear as part of organised civil society, the impact of civil society is perceived as stronger.

However, once again it should be reminded that conclusions regarding cause and effect cannot be definitely drawn on the basis of the empirical material at hand. At this point, the dimensions aiming to capture the normative aspects of civil society might have to be taken into consideration for answering the question as to how far a potential fragmentation of civil society and civic commitment can be said to have an overall advantageous effect on society at large.

● Networking, through holding meetings and exchange of information, is widely practised among CSOs, but it is not always established in more institutionalised forms, such as federations or umbrella organisations.

● With respect to the other indicators of the level of organisation dimension, all countries score comparatively high. The noteworthy exception is the indicator on sustainability of human resources, which generally receives low values.[201] Setting the presence of paid staff in CSOs in relation to the levels of social engagement checks whether there is a 'crowding out' effect, with paid personnel substituting for volunteers. At this level of international comparison such an effect does not appear. More professionalisation does not have negative effects on volunteering and other aspects of civic engagement.

While civic engagement - and especially the extent and diversity of engagement - is related to perceived impact more in general terms, as mentioned above, the share of paid staff in organisations is correlated with the impact of civil society on concrete policies. Furthermore, networking activities of CSOs (peer-to-peer communication) are positively related to the extent of lobbying activities. However, the positive outcome of these activities goes together with a more stable human resource base. One could interpret this as saying: for CSOs, being in a network helps them to get involved in lobbying activities or organise these activities. A successful outcome, however, is related to the presence of paid, professional staff.

Bringing together the findings relating to civic engagement (and its rather limited link to impact on policies) with the only clear connection between an indicator from the level of organisation dimension and the perceived impact, leads to the following possible interpretation: while civic engagement might benefit from a broad voluntary base, the concrete success of lobbying activities is dependent rather on the presence of paid, permanent and professional CSO staff, who have to develop expertise and capacities in complex situations of policy-making, providing a more enduring base to see lengthy policy processed through than the sporadic commitment volunteers can offer.

● Measurement of the impact of civil society poses a special challenge for research on civil society. The method for the measurement of impact proposed by CSI, which examines perceptions of impact, yields some findings which indicate that the approach is a sensible tool and represents a feasible option for tackling this complex issue. Though an overall tendency reveals that the perception of impact is evaluated less positively the more questions during interviews refer to very concrete effects (i.e. the impact on specific policies and the impact of the interviewee's own organisation), the combination of indicators for perceived impact seem to provide a working proxy for measuring impact per se. In general, the perception of impact as perceived by representatives of CSOs does not differ significantly from the ratings of impact by external stakeholders.[202]

● Probably the most interesting and inspiring findings are related to the practice of values dimension. For example, it might come as a surprise that the correlations between levels of public spiritedness are negatively related to social engagement: the more citizens engage in social organisations, the stronger appears a tendency not to play entirely by the rules (e.g. higher support for tax evasion, undue claiming of benefits). These correlations might challenge the thesis of CSOs functioning as 'schools of democracy'. But as an alternative interpretation, the members of CSOs might learn to handle rules in society in a more creative way, flexibility with rules being a sign of emancipation, identification with social struggle and responsible application of norms.

Noteworthy also are the tendencies related to the perceived diffusion of elements within civil society which accept violent activities. State effectiveness is related reversely to the perceived acceptance of violent means within civil society: the more effective the governmental institutions,

[201] The sustainability of human resources is measured as the ratio between volunteers and paid staff in a CSO. It is expressed as the percentage of CSOs in a country with at least 25% of the staff regularly paid.
[202] The exceptional cases here are Jordan (external interviewees perceiving impact as considerably higher than CSO representatives) and Albania, Georgia, Croatia and Russia (CSO representatives evaluating impact significantly higher than external stakeholders).

the higher the levels of groups in civil society ready to resort to violence. As an explanation, one might argue that violent activities are born from the non-responsiveness of the governmental sector. The state might formally work well, but does not react to the urgent needs of some parts of the population. But on the other hand, higher levels of basic political and associational rights, which are enabling for citizens' participation, also go together with higher levels of potentially violent activities in the realm of civil society. A possible explanation here is provided by Reichardt,[203] who argues that opening up spaces for collective action also allows non-democratic forces to take advantage of the right to organise.

These empirical findings lead to the need for more discussions about the concept of civil society itself and the dynamics of non-democratic elements in society, as well as to the question about the legitimate extent of regulation of civil society.

● The practice of values dimension is especially promising for future elaborations in the context of comparative research. It brings in the more subjective and normative aspects of civil society, which depict important differences and add nuances to the formal measures of participation, such as the number of CSOs, membership rates and the extent and depths of volunteering. In particular, in combination with the qualitative elements of the research methodology, amongst others, the discussion of the concept of civil society, which eventually leads to an adjustment according to the local context, has the capacity to go beyond the 'traditional Western' understanding of civil society, while keeping some standardised core elements, which are necessary for comparative research.

● Another check of indicators related to the normative or cultural features of civil society reveals that a higher level of organisation within CSOs (designated by the extent to which CSOs have a board) does not coincide with higher levels of internal democratic decision-making. At the same time, perceived impact is related to the levels of CSOs promoting democratic values in society, and not to the actual internal practice of democratic decision-making.

Furthermore, a noteworthy peculiarity within the dimension of practice of values is found when examining the value of the promotion of non-violent behaviour. No clear pattern emerges of peaceful countries obtaining low values in this regard and countries where aggression and tensions are present or have been overcome only recently, giving more emphasis to the non-violent aspects of civil society's activities. Findings like this allude to the fact that the salience of the issues is more important here than the actual practices and deeds of CSOs. Thus it can be understood that civil society has a vital function of awareness-raising, of framing the discourse and of amplifying the issues which are relevant for citizens and society in a given situation. This again suggests a refinement of the fundamental concepts of civil society. The beneficial effect of civil society for society at large may not be in offering activities as good-doers, but in their participation in debate and the creation of an arena in which values are discussed and formed.

This summary of the analytical description lists the findings in a form of intentionally provocative statements. In doing so, it intends to stimulate discussion, inviting interpretations from different points of view and encouraging further use of the empirical material in order to discuss and test various complementary or alternative statements, models and explanations, possibly combining with different data sources for future investigations.

[203] Reichardt, S (2006) Civility, Violence and Civil Society, in: Keane, J. (Ed.) Civil Society – Berlin Perspectives, New York, Oxford, Berghahn, pp 139 – 167.

Annex 1: List of countries that produced outputs from CSI 2008-2011

Country	Quantitative data included in this publication	Quantitative data produced subsequently	Analytical Country Report produced	CSI still in progress at time of writing
Albania	X		X	
Argentina	X		X	
Armenia	X		X	
Belarus	X			
Bulgaria	X		X	
Chile	X		X	
Croatia	X		X	
Cyprus – Greek Cypriot Community		X	X	
Cyprus – Turkish Cypriot Community		X	X	
Georgia	X		X	
Ghana		X		
Guinea			X	
Italy	X		X	
Japan	X		X	
Jordan	X		X	
Kazakhstan	X		X	
Kosovo	X		X	
Liberia	X		X	
Macedonia		X	X	
Madagascar				X
Malta				X
Mexico	X		X	
Morocco		X	X	
Nicaragua	X		X	
Philippines	X		X	
Russia	X		X	
Rwanda			X	
Senegal			X	
Serbia		X		
Slovenia	X		X	
South Korea	X			
Tanzania			X	
Togo	X			
Turkey	X		X	
Uganda				X
Uruguay	X		X	
Venezuela	X		X	
Zambia	X		X	

In the 2008-2011 CSI phase, 25 countries produced quantitative datasets by the time of writing of this publication, with a further six finalised subsequently, with three CSI implementations still in progress at time of going to print. Four countries in Africa applied a different methodology which meant that they produced Analytical Country Reports but not comparable data. Four countries finalised quantitative data but did not go on to produce Analytical Country Reports.

Annex 2: Sample sizes per country

	Country	Population Survey	Data source for the population survey (with respective sample sizes in parenthesis)	Organis-ational Survey	External Perceptions Survey
1	Albania	1,100	CSI Pop	90	32
2	Argentina	3,282	WVS 2000 (1,002) and WVS 2005 (1,280)	212	73
3	Armenia	1,674	CSI Pop	113	63
4	Belarus	1,101	CSI Pop	122	48
5	Bulgaria	3,717	CSI Pop (1,217) and EVS 2008 (1,500)	156	35
6	Chile	1,000	WVS 2005	90	40
7	Croatia	1,525	EVS 2008	210	63
8	Georgia	3,700	CSI Pop (1,200) and EVS 2008 (1,500)	101	30
9	Italy	3,012	WVS 2005 (1,012) and EVS 1999 (2,000)	90	30
10	Japan	2,458	WVS 2005 (1,096) and WVS 2000 (1,362)	85	27
11	Jordan	1,423	WVS 2005 (1,200) and WVS 2000 (1,223)	121	50
12	Kazakhstan	542	CSI Pop	170	41
13	Kosovo	1,296	CSI Pop	99	40
14	Liberia	1,843	CSI Pop	102	52
15	Mexico	1,200	CSI Pop	349	47
16	Nicaragua	630	CSI Pop	141	31
17	Philippines	2,400	CSI Pop (1,200) and WVS 2000 (1,200)	109	53
18	Russia	2,000	CSI Pop	1,002	136
19	Slovenia	2,043	WVS 2005 (1,037) and EVS 1999 (1,006)	94	30
20	South Korea	2,400	WVS 2005 (1,200) and WVS 2000 (1,200)	100	30
21	Togo	1,100	CSI Pop	100	50
22	Turkey	2,552	WVS 2005 (1,346) and EVS 1999 (1,206)	142	38
23	Uruguay	1,121	CSI Pop	116	31
24	Venezuela	1,000	CSI Pop	113	43
25	Zambia	3,501	CSI Pop	90	45
	Total	45,620	21,725 generated by national partners and 23,895 from other sources	4,117	1,158
	Average sample sizes	1,825		165	45

Note: This is for the 25 country datasets used for analysis of this volume and does not include countries which completed their datasets subsequently.

Data sources for the CSI Population Survey:

CSI Pop = CSI Population Survey

EVS 1999 = EVS (2006): European Values Study 1999, 3rd Wave, Integrated Dataset. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne, Germany, ZA3811 Data File Version 2.0.0 (May 2006), doi:10.4232/1.3811.

EVS 2008 = EVS (2010): European Values Study 2008, 4th wave, Integrated Dataset. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne, Germany, ZA4800 Data File Version 2.0.0 (2010-11-30), doi:10.4232/1.10188.

WVS 2000 = WORLD VALUES SURVEY 2000 OFFICIAL DATAFILE v.20090914 World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org) Aggregate File Producer: ASEP/JDS, Madrid.

WVS 2005 = WORLD VALUES SURVEY 2005 OFFICIAL DATAFILE v.20090901, 2009. World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: ASEP/JDS, Madrid.

Annex 3: CSI International Database: dimensions, sub-dimensions, indicators, sources and description

Sub-dimen-sion	Indicator	Name	Source	Description
1) Dimension: Civic Engagement				
1.1		Extent of socially-based engagement		
	1.1.1	Social membership 1	Population Survey	Active members of social organisations (such as church or religious organisations, sport or recreational organisations, art, cultural or educational organisations, consumer organisations)
	1.1.2	Social volunteering 1	Population Survey	Percentage of the population that does voluntary work for at least one social organisation (as defined above)
	1.1.3	Community engagement 1	Population Survey	Percentage of the population that engage several times a year in social activities with other people at sports clubs or voluntary/service organisations
1.2		Depth of socially-based engagement		
	1.2.1	Social membership 2	Population Survey	Percentage of population that are active in more than one social organisation
	1.2.2	Social volunteering 2	Population Survey	Percentage of the population that does voluntary work for more than one social organisation
	1.2.3	Community engagement 2	Population Survey	Percentage of the population that engage at least once a month in social activities with other people at sports clubs or voluntary/service organisations
1.3		Diversity of socially-based engagement		
	1.3.1	Diversity of socially-based engagement	Population Survey	Percentage of members of organisations belonging to social groups such as women, indigenous people or people of a minority ethnicity, low income groups and people from rural and remote areas, in social groups or activities

1.4		Extent of political engagement		
	1.4.1	Political membership 1	Population Survey	Percentage of the population that are active members of politically-oriented organisations (such as labour unions, political parties, environmental organisations, professional associations, humanitarian or charitable organisations and NGOs)
	1.4.2	Political volunteering 1	Population Survey	Percentage of the population that does voluntary work for at least one politically-oriented organisation (as defined above)
	1.4.3	Individual activism 1	Population Survey	Percentage of the population that have undertaken political activism in the past five years (such as signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending peaceful demonstrations)
1.5		Depth of political engagement		
	1.5.1	Political membership 2	Population Survey	Percentage of population that are active in more than one politically-oriented organisation
	1.5.2	Political volunteering 2	Population Survey	Percentage of the population that does voluntary work for more than one politically-oriented organisation
	1.5.3	Individual activism 2	Population Survey	Percentage of the population that engage in more than one type of individual activism of political orientation
1.6		Diversity of political engagement		
	1.6.1	Diversity of political engagement	Population Survey	Percentage of members of organisations belonging to social groups such as women, indigenous people or people of a minority ethnicity, low income groups and people from rural and remote areas, in politically-oriented groups or activities
2) Dimension: Level of Organisation				
2.1		Internal governance		

	2.1.1	Management	Organisational Survey	Percentage of organisations that have a board of directors or a formal steering committee
2.2		Infrastructure		
	2.2.1	Support organisations	Organisational Survey	Percentage of organisations that are formal members of any federation, umbrella group or support network
2.3		Sectoral communication		
	2.3.1	Peer-to-peer communication 1	Organisational Survey	Percentage of organisations that have recently (within the past three months) held meetings with other organisations working on similar issues
	2.3.2	Peer-to-peer communication 2	Organisational Survey	Percentage of organisations that have recently (within the past three months) exchanged information (e.g. documents, reports, data) with another organisation
2.4		Human resources		
	2.4.1	Sustainability of human resources	Organisational Survey	Percentage of organisations with sustainable human resource base (defined as volunteers composing 25% or less of the organisation's staff base)
2.5		Financial and technological resources		
	2.5.1	Financial sustainability	Organisational Survey	Percentage of organisations with a stable financial resource basis (defined as the percentage of respondents who perceived that their organisation’s expenses had decreased and revenues had stayed the same or increased, or their expenses had stayed the same and their revenues had increased between two years.
	2.5.2	Technological resources	Organisational Survey	Percentage of organisations that have regular access to technologies such as computers, telephones, email and fax machines
2.6		International linkages		

	2.6.1	International linkages	Union of International Associations (Database)	International non-governmental organisations (INGOs) present in the country as a ratio to the total number of known INGOs in the database
3) Dimension: Practice of Values				
3.1		Democratic decision-making governance		
	3.1.1	Decision-making	Organisational Survey	Percentage of organisations that practise democratic decision-making internally, i.e. decisions are made by elected leader or board, or staff, or members
3.2		Labour regulations		
	3.2.1	Equal opportunities	Organisational Survey	Percentage of organisations that have written policies in place regarding equal opportunity and/or equal pay for equal work for women
	3.2.2	Members of labour unions	Organisational Survey	Percentage of paid staff within organisations that are members of labour unions
	3.2.3	Labour rights trainings	Organisational Survey	Percentage of organisations that conduct specific training on labour rights for new staff members
	3.2.4	Publicly available policy for labour standards	Organisational Survey	Percentage of organisations that have a publicly available policy for labour standards
3.3		Code of conduct and transparency		
	3.3.1	Publicly available code of conduct	Organisational Survey	Percentage of organisations that have a publicly available code of conduct for their staff
	3.3.2	Transparency	Organisational Survey	Percentage of organisations that make their financial information publicly available
3.4		Environmental standards		

	3.4.1	Environmental standards	Organisational Survey	Percentage of organisations that have a publicly available policy for environmental standards
3.5		Perception of values in civil society as a whole		
	3.5.1	Perceived non-violence	Organisational Survey	Perceived level of use of violence by civil society groups
	3.5.2	Perceived internal democracy	Organisational Survey	Civil society's perceived role in promoting democratic decision-making
	3.5.3	Perceived levels of corruption	Organisational Survey	Perceived level of corrupt practices within civil society
	3.5.4	Perceived intolerance	Organisational Survey	Perceived level of racist and discriminatory forces within civil society
	3.5.5	Perceived weight of intolerant groups	Organisational Survey	Perceived isolation and willingness to denounce violent practices and groups within civil society
	3.5.6	Perceived promotion of non-violence and peace	Organisational Survey	Civil society's perceived role in promoting non-violence and peace
4) Dimension: Perception of Impact				
4.1		Responsiveness (internal perception)		
	4.1.1	Impact on social concern 1	Organisational Survey	Perceived effectiveness of civil society response to the most important social concern in the country as shown by the WVS, assessed by CSO representatives
	4.1.2	Impact on social concern 2	Organisational Survey	Perceived effectiveness of civil society response to the second most important social concern in the country as shown by the WVS, assessed by CSO representatives
4.2		Social impact (internal perception)		

	4.2.1	General social impact	Organisational Survey	Perceived social impact of the sector as a whole on the two social fields identified as most important, assessed by CSO representatives
	4.2.2	Social impact of own organisation	Organisational Survey	Self perception of the social impact of the CSO representative's own organisation
4.3		Policy impact (internal perception)		
	4.3.1	General policy impact	Organisational Survey	Perceived policy impact of the sector as a whole, assessed by CSO representatives
	4.3.2	Policy activity of own organisation	Organisational Survey	Self perception of the level of attempts to undertake policy advocacy of the CSO representative's own organisation
	4.3.3	Policy impact of own organisation	Organisational Survey	Self perception of the success of attempts to undertake policy activity of the CSO representative's own organisation
4.4		Responsiveness (external perception)		
	4.4.1	Impact on social concern 1	External Perceptions Survey	Perceived effectiveness of civil society response to the most important social concern in the country as shown by the WVS, assessed by external stakeholders
	4.4.2	Impact on social concern 2	External Perceptions Survey	Perceived effectiveness of civil society response to the second most important social concern in the country as shown by the WVS, assessed by external stakeholders
4.5		Social impact (external perception)		
	4.5.1	Social impact selected concerns	External Perceptions Survey	Perceived impact on key social concerns, assessed by external stakeholders
	4.5.2	Social impact general	External Perceptions Survey	Perceived social impact of the sector as a whole, assessed by external stakeholders
4.6		Policy impact (external perception)		

	4.6.1	Policy impact specific fields 1-3	External Perceptions Survey	Perceived impact on key policy areas, assessed by external stakeholders
	4.6.2	Policy impact general	External Perceptions Survey	Perceived policy impact of the sector as a whole, assessed by external stakeholders
4.7		Impact of CS on attitudes		
	4.7.1	Difference in trust between civil society members and non-members	Population Survey	The extent to which being active in civil society goes with increased levels of interpersonal trust
	4.7.2	Difference in tolerance levels between civil society members and non-members	Population Survey	The extent to which being active in civil society goes with increased levels of tolerance
	4.7.3	Difference in public spiritedness between civil society members and non-members	Population Survey	The extent to which being active in civil society goes with increased levels of public spiritedness
	4.7.4	Trust in civil society	Population Survey	Levels of public trust in civil society
5) Dimension: External Environment				
5.1		Socio-economic context		How favourable the socio-economic context is for the development of civil society
	5.1.1	Basic Capabilities Index	Social Watch	The BCI is the simple average (mean) of three criteria: the percentage of children who reach fifth grade at school, the percentage of children who survive until at least their fifth year and the percentage of births attended by health professionals; it has a possible range of 0–100, where higher values indicate higher levels of human capabilities
	5.1.2	Corruption	Transparency International (Corruption Perception	Perception of corruption levels in the public sector

			Index)	
	5.1.3	Inequality	World Bank, National Statistics Bureau (Gini Coefficient)	Income inequality assessed on a 0-100 scale (reversed for CSI, such that 0 equals perfect income inequality and 100 perfect income equality)
	5.1.4	Economic context	World Bank Development Indicators	Ratio of external debt to GNI as a measure of macro-economic health
5.2		Socio-political context		How favourable the socio-political context is for the development of civil society
	5.2.1	Political rights and freedoms	Freedom House	Freedom House's Index of Political Rights, looking at election processes, political freedoms and participation (the 40-point scale is used, recalculated as a 0-100 scale)
	5.2.2	Rule of law and personal freedoms	Freedom House	Three of the four indicators which form the Freedom House Index of Civil Liberties: • Rule of law • Personal autonomy and individual rights • Freedom of expression and belief
	5.2.3	Associational and organisational rights	Freedom House	One of the four indicators which form the Freedom House Index of Civil Liberties: • Freedom of associational and organisational rights
	5.2.4	Experience of legal framework	Organisational survey	CSO representatives' subjective experience of legal regulations for CSOs and level of government attacks on CSOs
	5.2.5	State effectiveness	World Bank Governance Dataset: World Governance Survey)	The extent to which the state is understood to be able to carry out its core functions
5.3		Socio-cultural context		How favourable the socio-cultural context is for the development of civil society
	5.3.1	Trust	Population Survey	Level of interpersonal trust
	5.3.2	Tolerance	Population Survey	Level of tolerance for distinct social groups

	5.3.3	Public spiritedness	Population Survey	Level of condemnation of anti-social behaviours

Annex 4: CSI International Database: overview of the scores for main dimensions and sub-dimensions

25 county dataset used in this publication:

Dimensions	Albania	Argentina	Armenia	Belarus	Bulgaria	Chile	Croatia	Georgia	Italy	Japan	Jordan
1	47.6	38.8	37.4	43.6	39.6	47.3	39.4	17.6	48.3	44.5	36.8
1.1	22	25	1.9	19.5	15.9	44.1	14.8	4.6	30.3	27.7	9.3
1.2	29.5	37.9	31.3	33.2	29.9	34.2	25.6	17.8	41.4	33.9	32.6
1.3	91.7	59.3	70.1	82.3	69.7	89.9	79.9	35.8	79.5	78.6	85.6
1.4	27.3	16.4	12	16.4	17.4	18.6	19.3	6.1	30.1	22	6.5
1.5	35.1	27.1	25.8	20.9	32.3	25.7	18.2	13	33	18.4	27.1
1.6	80	67.2	73.5	87.8	72.4	71.3	78.9	28.5	75.2	86.3	59.8
2	57.9	52.6	54.9	50	56.1	52.3	60	64.5	63.2	62.3	55.3
2.1	85.2	92.9	91.1	82.8	93.5	81.2	95.2	94.1	83.3	95.3	95.8
2.2	72.7	46.5	39.1	53.3	54.9	44.3	75.7	69.3	71.1	35.4	80.2
2.3	87.6	76.8	67.5	77.1	71.1	79.7	82.3	83.7	84.5	82.9	59.4
2.4	16.1	8.6	19.1	8.3	30.6	14.1	6.6	43	20.5	44	9.1
2.5	79.7	69.9	80.6	72.2	69.7	79.1	84.5	91.1	80.9	90	78.8
2.6	6	20.8	31.9	6.1	16.8	15.7	15.7	6.1	40.8	36.4	8.3
3	60.7	39.6	51.1	46	45	42.6	41.1	63.7	45.8	41.3	57.2
3.1	52.9	74.8	62.8	78.7	71.7	69.7	63.3	82.2	82.2	55.4	84.9
3.2	53.1	23.1	41.9	27.6	27.1	22	26.6	31.5	26.6	28.4	40.7
3.3	71.8	44.2	62.1	38.6	54.3	42.6	46.2	87.7	54.8	61	72.9
3.4	57.1	13.1	29.2	23	20.6	31	13.4	80.2	28.1	11.8	36.4
3.5	68.8	42.6	59.4	62.2	51.4	47.9	56.2	37	37.5	49.8	51.2
4	50.2	47.6	32.8	41.5	43.6	46.4	41.4	30.2	42.1	55.2	47
4.1	50.9	41.9	37.1	41	29.6	47.2	43.2	33	39	72.8	45.7
4.2	79.9	62.6	42.5	62.3	67.8	67.2	75.2	49.5	58.8	70.4	63.3
4.3	59.3	50.8	25.5	29.1	43.5	31.7	38.4	40.7	41.8	46.9	19.3
4.4	45.2	45.6	23.5	43	35.6	45	34.9	20.3	43.4	44.5	51.5
4.5	50.3	50.3	47.6	57	71.7	72.3	62.4	25	61.2	76.9	75.6
4.6	53.2	53.2	38	42.1	48.6	47.8	28.6	23.3	31	54.9	52
4.7	12.5	10.5	15.2	16.3	8.5	13.4	7.3	19.7	19.6	20	21.3
5	59.8	64.4	54.1	47.4	61.3	69.6	61.9	56.6	71.8	75.8	55.3
5.1	68.1	56.5	65.1	67	55.3	68.4	54.1	66.5	70.5	82.4	64.8
5.2	59.7	71.1	46.8	22.6	70.5	81.8	73.1	50.6	77.7	79.2	51.2
5.3	51.6	65.7	50.4	52.6	58.2	58.5	58.6	52.7	67.1	65.9	49.9

Dimensions	Kazakhstan	Kosovo	Liberia	Mexico	Nicaragua	Philippines	Russia	Slovenia	South Korea	Togo	Turkey
1	47.2	44	55.6	44.7	53	54.7	33.7	46.5	44.4	47.5	31
1.1	28	21.6	66	32.7	32.8	47.6	13.9	33.9	39.7	51.4	6.2
1.2	53.7	40.5	53.6	35.7	45.9	43.7	35.9	38.5	34.1	33.9	41.1
1.3	70.6	80.9	85.2	86.9	95.1	95.7	81.3	81	76	89.4	63.9
1.4	18.2	21.6	33	17.7	25.6	21.5	6.8	20.7	21.2	27.5	7
1.5	39.9	32.5	31.6	14.6	28	32.2	8.6	26.6	30.8	21.7	23.5
1.6	72.9	67.1	63.9	80.7	90.7	87.7	55.8	78	64.6	61	44.4
2	48.4	58.9	50.5	45.9	57.2	57.9	51.4	60.2	64.8	58.1	54.6
2.1	73	89.9	86.9	72	92.9	94.4	87.4	96.8	94	87	95.1
2.2	50.9	69.7	58.3	41.1	76.6	63.3	32.2	69.2	76.8	73	41.1
2.3	70.1	88.4	68.5	63.9	82.6	67.3	54.8	80.2	91.8	72.6	79.2
2.4	14.4	18.3	28.3	12.4	11.3	38.9	27.3	12.5	19	33	8
2.5	77.7	87.4	58.6	65.9	74.5	69.3	83.1	85.5	89.7	78.5	85.3
2.6	4.4	.	2.7	20.3	5.5	14.5	23.4	16.9	17.2	4.6	18.8
3	47.5	59.4	54.1	50.6	61.5	48.7	39.8	42.3	54.3	51	48.9
3.1	65.9	61.6	53	44.5	53.6	69.7	61.2	61.3	69.7	55	94.4
3.2	35.9	42.3	48.1	45.1	64.5	28.2	45.3	25.3	44.6	45.8	34.1
3.3	55.8	74.2	51.3	64.7	63.9	45.7	34.1	49.8	64.5	70.6	50.5
3.4	21.5	57.7	55.6	50.4	69.5	30.8	18.1	27.1	36.8	46	30.3
3.5	58.4	61.4	62.3	48.5	56.2	69.1	40.2	47.9	55.8	37.5	35.6
4	40	31.8	53.4	45.4	59.8	62.8	34.4	31.9	46.2	45.7	39.2
4.1	50.5	26.8	62.7	71.7	69.5	62	35.2	23.1	36.3	49.5	38.7
4.2	52.3	47.6	68.8	60.8	82.1	78.5	54.2	60.5	63.4	64.3	51.3
4.3	28.6	39.4	39.1	28	54.4	55	42.8	35.5	56.2	35.5	32.2
4.4	52.7	23.8	37.7	34.1	70	73	36.2	18.4	34.5	47	41
4.5	53.3	41.5	68.6	58.9	72.6	83	36.1	50	63.6	62.6	44.8
4.6	30.1	31.7	75	46.8	56.7	66.6	31.9	28.4	52.7	46.6	50.2
4.7	12.8	12	21.9	17.5	13.3	21.4	4.6	7.4	17	14.4	16.4
5	46.5	51.3	52.5	65.6	52.7	53	53.3	72	67.6	42.6	57.5
5.1	46.5	.	44.4	66.7	48.4	53.5	62.6	79.3	74.6	39.3	64
5.2	39.1	46.6	57.1	67.4	54.2	62	39.7	77.5	73.9	35.1	59
5.3	53.9	56.1	55.9	62.8	55.6	43.7	57.6	59.3	54.3	53.4	49.4

Dimensions	Uruguay	Venezuela	Zambia
1	44.8	37.5	60.8
1.1	24	24.4	66.6
1.2	40.1	37.8	47.9
1.3	86.1	59.9	95.7
1.4	13.9	16.6	28.7
1.5	21.8	24.8	36.3
1.6	82.6	61.7	89.5
2	59.5	56.6	58.3
2.1	90.4	84.7	88.9
2.2	71.3	67.6	72.7
2.3	85.3	84	89.4
2.4	24.1	22.9	30.7
2.5	74.9	67.4	62
2.6	10.9	13.3	6.4
3	43	37.8	59.3
3.1	42.1	51.4	73.3
3.2	34.2	24.8	34.3
3.3	42.5	38	81.2
3.4	40	29	35.7
3.5	56	45.8	71.8
4	59.8	46.5	60.3
4.1	78.1	42.4	72.6
4.2	74.9	73.2	69.9
4.3	47.3	42.9	53.7
4.4	54.2	51.2	71.9
4.5	78.1	67.9	67.5
4.6	70	27.5	69.6
4.7	16.2	20.7	17.2
5	72.8	54.5	57.1
5.1	66.5	61.7	55.6
5.2	84.2	43.7	60.8
5.3	67.7	58.1	54.9

Countries subsequently added to the dataset:

Dimensions	Cyprus – GCC*	Cyrus TCC*	Ghana	Macedonia	Morocco	Serbia
1	43.6	43.6	52.8	45.0	39.9	42.8
1.1	24.1	21.1	78.0	25.3	23.3	24.0
1.2	30.4	70.4	36.5	27.1	40.0	33.9
1.3	77.2	34.3	88.0	77.5	87.3	87.4
1.4	23.5	21.1	21.9	30.8	13.8	19.3
1.5	23.8	62.5	28.1	22.1	18.5	24.7
1.6	82.5	51.9	64.6	87.2	56.3	67.2
2	59.8	50.5	62.1	59.8	50.5	59.2
2.1	98.9	96.6	100	88.1	100	90.3
2.2	80.7	37.9	81.8	67.5	50.7	79.6
2.3	77.4	74.3	76.5	92.5	64.3	86.6
2.4	16.5	8.3	17.6	21.0	8.3	12.2
2.5	74.8	75.6	88.3	83.7	70.3	81.7
2.6	10.6	10.6	8.3	6.2	9.6	4.7
3	46.1	50.9	55.4	57.7	59.2	44.6
3.1	92.9	43.2	26.7	76.4	87.7	55.9
3.2	28.4	38.4	45.5	37.3	40.5	26.3
3.3	44.1	76.3	82.8	81.9	55.3	54.3
3.4	22.2	45.5	46.0	40.5	49.8	31.2
3.5	43.1	51.1	75.7	52.6	62.9	55.3
4	53.3	49.8	68.7	45.7	61.8	38.8
4.1	51.6	57.1	75.8	54.1	78.3	45.2
4.2	78.0	72.3	88.6	42.9	75.2	37.0
4.3	48.6	42.6	51.1	51.6	65.0	37.2
4.4	45.7	56.9	65.0	45.8	66.4	55.0
4.5	76.9	73.4	84.1	60.4	64.0	38.3
4.6	52.2	30.4	77.3	55.5	67.6	37.1
4.7	20.2	16.2	39.4	9.4	16.4	21.7
5	77.1	70.3	63.5	56.5	57.0	52.3
5.1	81.6	81.6	58.6	61.0	61.9	32.9
5.2	91.0	78.0	79.7	59.0	51.4	65.5
5.3	58.7	51.5	52.1	49.6	57.8	58.4

* There are two datasets from Cyprus, for the Greek Cypriot Community and Turkish Cypriot Community.

At the time of publication, data were also expected for Madagascar, Malta and Uganda.

Annex 5: List of available Analytical Country Reports (ACRs)

Country	Coordinating organisation	Year	Title
Albania	Institute for Democracy and Mediation	2010	Civil Society Index for Albania: In Search of Citizens and Impact
Argentina	GADIS (Grupo de Análisis y Desarrollo Institucional y Social) / UCA (Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina)	2011	Civil Society in Argentina at the Bicentennial
Armenia	Counterpart International	2010	Armenian Civil Society: from Transition to Consolidation
Bulgaria	Open Society Institute - Sofia	2011	Civil Society in Bulgaria: Citizen Actions without Engagement
Chile	Fundación Soles	2011	Deepening democracy: Civil Society in Chile
Croatia	CERANEO – Centre for Development of Nonprofit Organizations	2011	Building Identity: Future Challenges for CSOs as Professionals in the Societal Arena
Cyprus	The Management Centre of the Mediterranean / The NGO Support Centre	2011	An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus – A Map for the Future 2011
Georgia	Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (CIPDD)	2011	An Assessment of Georgian Civil Society
Guinea	National Council for Guinean Civil Society Organisations (CNOSCG – Conseil National des Organisations de la Societe Civile Guineenne)	2011	Guinean Civil Society: Between Activity and Impact
Italy	Cittadinanzattiva (Active Citizenship) / FONDACA (Active Citizenship Foundation)	2011	Italian Civil Society: Facing New Challenges
Japan	Centre for Nonprofit Research and Information, Osaka School of International Public Policy Osaka University	2011	Japanese Civil Society at a Crossroad
Jordan	Al Urdun Al Jadid Research Centre	2011	The Contemporary Jordanian Civil Society: Characteristics, Challenges and Tasks
Kazakhstan	Public Policy Research Centre	2011	Civil Society Index in Kazakhstan: Strengthening Civil Society
Kosovo	Kosovar Civil Society Foundation	2011	Better Governance for a Greater Impact: A Call for Citizens
Liberia	AGENDA	2011	Beyond Numbers: An Assessment of the Liberian Civil Society: A Report on the Civil Society Index 2010
Macedonia	Macedonian Center for International Cooperation	2011	Civic Engagement - Long Road to Go
Mexico	Mexican Centre for Philanthropy (Cemefi) / Citizens' Initiative for the Promotion of Culture of Dialogue (ICPCD)	2011	A Snapshot of Civil Society in Mexico
Morocco	L'Espace Associatif	2011	Civil Society Index for Morocco: Analytical Country Report: International Version

Nicaragua	Red Nicaraguènse por la Democracia y el Desarrollo Local (RNDDL) (Nicaraguan Network for Democracy and Local Development)	2011	Civil Society Index for Nicaragua: Restrictions and the Politicisation of Civic Space: Challenges for Civil Society in Nicaragua
Philippines	Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE - NGO)	2011	Civil Society Index Philippines: An Assessment of Philippine Civil Society
Rwanda	Conseil de Concertation des Organisations d'Appui aux Initiatives de Base (CCOAIB)	2011	The State of Civil Society in Rwanda in National Development
Russia	Centre for Study of Civil Society and the Non-Profit Sector	2011	Civil Society in Modernising Russia
Senegal	Forum Civil	2011	Engaging Together for Real Change
Slovenia	Social Protection Institute of the Republic of Slovenia	2011	Towards Maturity: Challenges for Slovenian Civil Society
Tanzania	Concern for Development Initiatives in Africa (ForDIA)	2011	Civil Society Index (CSI) Project Tanzania Country Report 2011
Turkey	Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (TUSEV)	2011	Civil Society in Turkey: at a Turning Point
Uruguay	Institute for Communication and Development	2010	From Project Implementation to Influencing Policies: Challenges of Civil Society in Uruguay
Venezuela	Sinergia	2011	Coding and Decoding Civil Society: CIVICUS Civil Society Index for Venezuela 2009-2010
Zambia	Zambia Council for Social Development	2011	The Status of Civil Society in Zambia: Challenges and Future Prospects

As at the time of writing, reports from Madagascar, Malta and Uganda were also expected.