CIVIL SOCIETY
IN A CHANGING GHANA

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT STATE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN GHANA

Akosua Darkwa, Nicholas Amponsah and Evans Gyampoh

An Initiative of CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation with Support from The World Bank Coordinated in Ghana by GAPVOD

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FOREWORD

The Ghana Association of Private Voluntary Organisations in Development (GAPVOD) was established in 1980 as an umbrella body for non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It has under its canopy about 450 members, both national and international, spread across the country, and operating in all sectors of the economy to promote social development, human rights and good governance.

The mission of GAPVOD is to seek the sustainable growth and development of NGOs and their active participation in the process of national development for the improved well-being of all Ghanaians, particularly the poor, marginalised and vulnerable.

Its vision is to evolve into a leading organisation of NGOs and a centre of excellence offering high quality training in all aspects of NGO development, with the aim of creating a strong, disciplined and self-supporting NGO sector that is able to develop sustainable partnership with government at all levels, the private sector and development partners in order to improve the livelihoods of the poor and deprived communities in Ghana.

In November 2002, CIVICUS sent out a request for statements of interest to participate in the CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI) project as a “National Coordinating Organisation” (NCO). The goals of the CSI project were very much in line with the vision and mission of GAPVOD and the project held great potential to strengthen civil society in Ghana. After a rigorous review process, GAPVOD was appointed as NCO in April 2003.

As in other countries where the project has been undertaken, the Ghana project involved a wide range of stakeholders from business, academia, government, grassroots, women and youth organisations. This proactive multi-stakeholder involvement in the CSI is done to ensure country ownership and a shared commitment by all towards building on the successes of civil society and addressing the inherent weaknesses.

Kofi Adu
Executive Director
The publication of this report has been an arduous task. When GAPVOD agreed to coordinate a study to assess the current state of civil society in Ghana, it was aware of the challenges that lay ahead. The extent of the challenge was probably underestimated, and it is therefore appropriate that we recognise the contributions of individuals, institutions and organisations that have made it possible for us to be part of the 53 countries in which the research was undertaken.

First, special appreciation goes to CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation which coordinated the Civil Society Index project worldwide and provided the needed guidance throughout the period of the research. Our thanks also go to the World Bank, which provided the financial support for the project.

We are grateful to all the members of the National Advisory Group which comprised representatives from government, academia, women’s groups, grassroots NGOs, donors and international organisations who provided guidance for the research team. To all those who were consulted during the research phase, we express our gratitude for your contributions. We are also grateful to Dr Akosua Darkwa of the Sociology Department, University of Ghana Legon, who played the role of Participatory Researcher, and Dr Nicholas Amponsah of the Political Science Department of the same University who also played the role of Civil Society Expert. Equally deserving of our appreciation and commendation is Mr. Evans Gyampoh who went beyond assisting in the coordination of the project to gather research material and put reports together. We are also very grateful to Mr. Frank Boakye Dankwa, Business Manager of GAPVOD, who assisted in seeing the project through over and above his regular duties of managing GAPVOD affairs. We also thank Mr. Charles Abbey, Chairman, and the entire GAPVOD Council for their support.

Finally we wish to express our appreciation to the entire membership of GAPVOD and also civil society organisations including NGOs who participated in diverse ways in the research. To those who did not directly or indirectly participate in the research, but supported our efforts with prayers and words of encouragement as we went through challenging times, we say thank you.

We share the joy of all those who may find the publication useful, for it is gratifying to be of service to you.

Kofi Adu
Executive Director, GAPVOD
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDD Ghana</td>
<td>Ghana Center for Democratic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Corruption Perception Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSI</td>
<td>Civil Society Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>GAPVOD</td>
<td>Ghana Association of Private Voluntary Organisations in Development</td>
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<td>GCSS</td>
<td>Ghana Community Sample Survey</td>
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<td>GLSS</td>
<td>Ghana Living Standards Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>GONGO</td>
<td>Government Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPRS I</td>
<td>Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPRS II</td>
<td>Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
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<td>NAG</td>
<td>National Advisory Group</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
<td>National Coordinating Organisation</td>
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<td>NDPC</td>
<td>National Development Planning Commission</td>
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<td>NIT</td>
<td>National Index Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUANGO</td>
<td>Quasi Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSC</td>
<td>Regional Stakeholder Consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
<td>Regional Stakeholder Survey</td>
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<td>SEND</td>
<td>Social Enterprise Development Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTUC</td>
<td>Ghana Trade Union Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRINPAG</td>
<td>Private Newspaper Publishers Association of Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEWU</td>
<td>Teachers and Educational Workers Union</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report is the outcome of a research project to assess the current state of civil society in Ghana. The study evolved out of the crucial lack of a body of knowledge about the characteristics, roles and impact of civil society regarding positive social change and poverty reduction. The CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI), as the worldwide research is known, is an innovative action research approach initiated and implemented by, and for, civil society organisations. It actively involved a broad range of stakeholders including governments, academics and the community at large, in all phases of the project.

The CSI project collected information from a wide range of civil society stakeholders: citizens, civil society organisations (CSOs), experts and researchers. The main data sources are secondary data, a population survey, a regional stakeholder survey, policy case studies, interviews with key informants and a media analysis. Using a comprehensive framework of 74 indicators and four dimensions, as well as a wide range of data, the National Advisory Group assessed the overall state of civil society in the country, which is visually presented in the Civil Society Diamond (see Figure 1 below).

On the Civil Society Diamond, the score for STRUCTURE is 1.3, for ENVIRONMENT 1.5, VALUES 2.0 and IMPACT 2.0. As indicated by the Diamond, civil society has weak structures and operates within a somewhat disabling environment, but has rather strong impact on policy and especially on the lives of Ghanaians.

Figure 1: Civil Society Diamond for Ghana

(Scores range from a low of 0 through a high of 3)

The following are the main issues in Ghanaian civil society:
Structure

Ghanaian civil society presents a structure characterised by widespread citizen participation at the community level, although non-partisan political involvement is sporadic. Financial resources are limited and heavily dependent on foreign funding, while most CSOs are concentrated in urban areas, mainly due to infrastructural needs.

The CSI found a significant degree of citizen involvement in civil society activities in Ghana. For instance, slightly more than half the respondents to the community survey (51%) are members of CSOs and 80% of them have participated in community activities or meetings. Additionally, 57% of respondents carried out voluntary work for their communities (especially in faith-based organisations or associations) during the year preceding the survey.

By contrast, Ghanaian CSOs have not been very active in non-partisan political action, since only 15% of CSO members have engaged in some form of non-partisan political action. In a context marked by widespread poverty, it is not surprising that contributions to charitable giving average only $0.50 (about 0.05% of the average annual income).

The CSI found that most CSOs in Ghana are based in urban areas, and the organisations that possess the highest level of technological and financial resources are operating in the main cities. In general, CSOs tend to gravitate around urban settlements in order to access basic facilities, such as electricity and telephone lines. Additionally, women and the rural population are under-represented in the membership of most CSOs and almost completely excluded from leadership roles.

Given the lack of a strong infrastructure for civil society, it is not surprising that the level of organisation is possibly the area where Ghanaian CSOs are most vulnerable. First, only a minority of CSOs belong to umbrella organisations and the regional stakeholders involved in the CSI assessment specifically pointed out that the adage of “united we stand, divided we fall” has not taken root in Ghanaian civil society.

Among the weaknesses of CSOs in Ghana, the CSI highlighted the low level of financial and technological resources. The stakeholders involved in the CSI assessment mentioned that financial and technological resources are inadequate for most CSOs operating in the country. As a consequence, the CSO sector is marked by a significant dependence on foreign donors and many organisations spend most of their time applying for additional funding or renewing current grants, rather than focusing more effectively on activities at the grassroots. Interestingly, the lack of technological and financial resources does seem to affect the human resources of CSOs, which by contrast are an asset of Ghanaian civil society, mainly through volunteers.

In short, Ghanaian civil society is characterised by a significant level of human resources (mainly volunteers) that work for CSOs operating at different levels, in both urban and rural settings. While community activism is significant, non-partisan political action is rather low and the lack of financial and technological resources make many CSOs dependent on foreign funding, which in turn favours organisations operating in the main cities.
Environment

The environment within which Ghanaian CSOs operate is somewhat disabling, mainly due to poverty and illiteracy, socio-economic problems (such as poor health care and lack of service delivery) as well as corruption in public institutions and an ineffective decentralised system of governance.

Despite the government’s claim to be a champion of civil liberties, there are several examples of official and unofficial acts that call into question its true commitment to these freedoms.

Ghanaians enjoy a wide range of political rights, with no noticeable restrictions on participation in political activities such as the right to vote and be voted for. Although the government generally upholds freedom of the press, the CSI registered some instances of state control and harassment. As far as the legal environment is concerned, the CSI stakeholders agree that the registration procedures for CSOs are undermined by inconsistencies that make the whole process cumbersome, time-consuming and drain the already limited financial resources of most organisations.

In general, macro indicators in Ghana point to a rather difficult socio-economic situation, in spite of the fact that Ghana has been one of the most stable countries on the continent. Opinion surveys (Afrobarometer 2002) indicate that basic necessities such as food and medical care are not secure for all Ghanaians (for instance, 40% of citizens reported having gone without food at least once), while poverty and illiteracy are still very widespread, with peaks in rural communities that create a further divide between the urban and rural population.

The limited resources available to state institutions and the private sector reduces the opportunities for CSOs to receive financial support from public sources or business. At the same time, the stakeholders involved in the CSI maintained that both the state and the private sector have a limited understanding and appreciation of the contributions that civil society can make towards social and economic development.

The relationship between CSOs and government has evolved from limited interaction and discord during the early days of the 1992 Constitution to increasing engagement (through the insistence of the World Bank) over the past decade. Although CSOs enjoy autonomy under the law, certain remarks voiced by state authorities still undermine this autonomy in practice. Indeed, a reasonably large number (44%) of RSS respondents were of the view that the state sometimes interfered with CSOs.

Finally, the relationship between CSOs and private business is generally marked by indifference. The majority (71%) of RSS respondents saw relations with the private sector as either indifferent or suspicious, a situation informed by low levels of perception about corporate responsibility.

Corruption is a major problem in Ghana. In a report on political party financing released in September 2004, the CDD found that 42 percent of those surveyed cited kickbacks as the strongest manifestation of political corruption, followed by political appointments and extortion.
Values

In Ghana, the score for the values promoted and practised by civil society is quite high and encouraging overall. Particularly significant is the practice of internal democracy within CSOs and the commitment to eradicate poverty. Although non-violence is widely promoted, some groups still resort to violent means to pursue their agendas and gender equity is yet to take root in the practices of many CSOs.

In general, decision-making processes in Ghanaian CSOs are characterised by a significant level of democratic participation and contribution from members. The stakeholders interviewed for the CSI assessment maintained that members had a substantial influence on the agenda of their CSOs, although they admitted that internal democratic practices were much less common for the selection of CSO leaders.

Civil society’s activities to eradicate poverty in Ghana enjoy broad-based support and are carried out throughout the country. Local NGOs have joined forces with international organisations (i.e. Oxfam) in areas such as fair trade and have conducted campaigns to support local peasants and their products vis-à-vis the competition of agricultural products imported from abroad. In some cases, CSOs’ activities have complemented government’s policies aimed at reducing poverty and many CSOs have been quite active in the most poverty-stricken areas of the country.

As far as non-violence is concerned, the stakeholders involved in the CSI admitted that violent actions (e.g. damage to property or people) are relatively frequent within civil society, especially among the youth leagues of the main political parties, even though most CSOs are very quick to condemn acts of violence.

Gender equity and transparency are scarcely practiced by Ghanaian CSOs. Many organisations do not have internal policies on gender equity, even though they implement numerous activities to promote gender equity in society. At the same time, financial information pertaining to CSO donations and investments are rarely made public and are only shared with senior management within the organisations themselves. Such a lack of transparency aggravates the perception that CSOs (and particularly NGOs) are ‘rich’, as several stakeholders pointed out. Due to excessive spending on hotels, meals, transport allowances and per diems, many local communities see CSOs as money-making entities and ‘Santa Clauses’. This perception greatly affects the impact of CSO activities and the extent of community involvement.

Although the values dimension was assessed by the CSI as the most developed, CSI stakeholders admitted that the sector is seriously challenged by issues around transparency and accountability. According to some of them, while there is nothing wrong with the establishment of NGOs to assist the state to secure better living conditions for the people, the lack of a regulatory framework for CSOs’ conduct is not conducive for the healthy and qualitative growth of the sector.

Impact

The impact section presents the results of the CSI assessment regarding civil society’s influence on governance and society at large. The CSI findings show that civil society in Ghana has contributed towards women’s empowerment and provided basic services to local
communities, while its impact on policy and state or private sector accountability has been very limited.

In the view of many community residents, CSOs have been generally more effective than the state in assisting marginalised groups such as women, children and the disabled. For example, civil society in Ghana has significantly contributed to the economic and social empowerment of women. Moreover, CSOs have been successful in providing rural communities with basic services such as education, water and health care, especially, in the fight against the guinea worm infection.

Ghanaian civil society has been particularly active and successful in providing a range of services to marginalised groups, but not as successful in lobbying activities and influencing policies in general. According to the CSI stakeholders, the overall policy impact of Ghanaian civil society is limited. In spite of the formally conducive political environment created by the 1992 constitution, active policy engagement by CSOs is limited. The advent of democratic government has created new channels for CSOs to influence policy through mechanisms established by law, such as advocacy in the media, parliamentary lobbying or stakeholder sensitisation. However, civil society is yet to take advantage of this new opportunity and mainly resorts to confrontational strategies.

Nevertheless, the CSI noted some signs of success in specific policy sectors. For instance, in 2004, a coalition of CSOs strongly opposed a water privatisation programme implemented by government (and endorsed by the World Bank) and succeeded in modifying the state’s approach to the matter. Similarly, in 2005, human rights NGOs formed a coalition to educate citizens about domestic violence and organised seminars and marches that eventually led to the development of a bill by the organisations themselves.

In general, civil society has not been particularly successful in holding private corporations accountable, although there are exceptions. The CSI registered some cases in which environmental organisations were capable of holding foreign corporations accountable, especially in the mining sector, and advocated for the rights of local communities and villages affected by the extraction of natural resources.

**Recommendations**

The following recommendations were discussed in a CSI national workshop held on the 19th and 20th of April 2006 at the Coconut Grove Regency Hotel in Accra. The theme for the workshop was: “Civil Society in a changing Socio-Economic and Political Context” and was attended by more than 140 participants from civil society, government, academia, business, the donor community and the media.

- **Capacity building and infrastructure:** Many of the structural deficiencies of civil society relate to limited capacity within the whole sector. In order to address this problem, CSOs should improve their financial management and reporting, strengthen the role of umbrella organisations and improve networking and information exchange among CSOs and with other sectors, such as the media.
- **Clarify registration and reporting procedures:** It is important that the registration process be decentralised and made simpler. In addition, the reporting procedures and channels must be made simple, clearly defined and devoid of ambiguities to encourage civil society to regularly report on its activities, projects and programmes.
- **Resource mobilisation:** Ghanaian CSOs must adopt innovative methods of fund-raising and resource mobilisation to supplement what they receive from their traditional donors.

- **Self-regulation and code of ethics for civil society:** It is important for civil society as a group to self-regulate and develop a code of conduct which clearly spells out methods of sanction for those who do not comply. This will enhance their image (and the perception that NGOs are ‘rich’) and prevent the public from viewing all CSOs as bad.

- **Advocacy and policy impact:** CSOs should improve their capacity to make use of existing institutional channels to influence policy-making and hold government accountable. Stronger advocacy commitment can help CSOs succeed in convincing government that civil society’s involvement is crucial to ensure equitable development.
INTRODUCTION

This report is the outcome of a research project to assess the current state of civil society in Ghana conducted between January and November 2005. It was commissioned by CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation based in South Africa, an international alliance of more than 800 civil society organisations in more than 100 countries which aims to strengthen citizen participation and civil society globally. In Ghana, this study received funding from a World Bank-administered Trust Fund.

Project Overview

Despite the increasing role of civil society in development initiatives, especially poverty reduction in Ghana, there is a crucial lack of a body of knowledge about the characteristics, roles and impact of civil society towards positive social change. This knowledge is necessary to inform the strategies and activities of the national and international community in advancing sustainable development and good governance. Additionally, there are few opportunities for civil society actors to come together to discuss and reflect on the current state of civil society and the challenges it faces. These knowledge-based learning activities can make a substantive contribution to empowering civil society stakeholders to play a more effective role in governance and development.

The Civil Society Index (CSI) is an innovative, participatory action research project that aims to assess the state of civil society in countries around the world. The project links the assessment exercise with stakeholders’ reflections and the development of an action plan, aimed at strengthening civil society in the areas where weaknesses or challenges have been identified. By seeking to combine the results of a participatory assessment with joint actions by relevant stakeholders, the CSI hopes to contribute to the development of knowledge-based policies and practices in civil society. The CSI is initiated and implemented by, and for, civil society organisations, but actively involves a broad range of stakeholders including governments, academics and the community at large, in all phases of the project.

In Ghana, it was undertaken to assess the current state of civil society in the country as well as to reflect on the potential of civil society to impact on the nation and the possible limitations to this. Undertaking the study also provided civil society stakeholders with an opportunity to reflect on the ways in which identified strengths could be maintained and weaknesses addressed.

CIVICUS coordinates the CSI project in the 53 participating countries, providing each country team with a comprehensive toolkit that includes the research methodology and conceptual framework to guide them in their implementation of the project. Using a structured methodology, civil society stakeholders assess the state of civil society and its role in governance and development in their national context. The project places primary emphasis in assessing the whole ambit of CSOs, including trade unions, social movements, professional associations and faith-based organisations, amongst others. In this respect, the CSI is a pioneering effort. Based on this assessment, they are then able to develop action plans to strengthen civil society. Thus the comprehensive and participatory assessment of civil society is seen as a necessary prerequisite for any meaningful dialogue and effective action planning.
**Structure of the Publication**

This publication is structured as follows:

**Section I: Civil Society Index Project and Approach**, provides a detailed history of the CSI, its conceptual framework and its research methodology.

**Section II: Putting Civil Society in Context** gives an historical overview of civil society in Ghana and highlights the key features of Ghanaian civil society. It also gives an overview of the concept of civil society as used in this report and the key distinguishing socio-political/socio-economic features of Ghana.

**Section III: Analysis of Civil Society** presents the findings of the civil society index in detail. It is divided into four parts – Structure, Environment, Values and Impact – to correspond with the four dimensions of the CSI.

**Section IV: Strengths and Weaknesses of Ghanaian Civil Society** touches on the identified strengths and weaknesses of civil society in Ghana.

**Section V: Recommendations** puts forward suggestions to address the identified weaknesses.

**Section VI: Conclusions** talks about the most important and/or interesting findings that emerged from the CSI analysis, the particular strengths and weaknesses of civil society in the country, and how the process of implementing the CSI has contributed to strengthening civil society in Ghana.
I CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX PROJECT & APPROACH

1. PROJECT BACKGROUND

The idea of a Civil Society Index (CSI) originated in 1997, when the international non-governmental organisation CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation published the *New Civic Atlas* containing profiles of civil society in 60 countries around the world (CIVICUS 1997). To improve the comparability and quality of the information contained in the *New Civic Atlas*, CIVICUS decided to embark on the development of a comprehensive assessment tool for civil society, the Civil Society Index (Heinrich/Naidoo 2001; Holloway 2001). In 1999, Helmut Anheier, then the Director of the Centre for Civil Society at the London School of Economics at the time, played a significant role in the creation of the CSI (Anheier 2004). The CSI concept was tested in 14 countries during a pilot phase lasting from 2000 to 2002. Upon completion of the pilot phase, the project approach was thoroughly evaluated and refined. In its current implementation phase (2003-2005), CIVICUS and its country partners are implementing the project in more than fifty countries (see Table I below).

| Table I: Countries participating in the CSI implementation phase 2003-2005\(^1\) |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Argentina | 19. Germany | 37. Palestinian |
| 6. Burkina Faso | 24. Hong Kong (VR China) | 42. Serbia |
| 7. Chile | 25. Indonesia | 43. Sierra Leone |
| 8. China | 26. Italy | 44. Slovenia |
| 9. Costa Rica | 27. Jamaica | 45. South Korea |
| 10. Croatia | 28. Lebanon | 46. Taiwan |
| 11. Cyprus\(^2\) | 29. Macedonia | 47. Togo |
| 15. Egypt | 33. Nepal | 51. Uruguay |
| 16. Fiji | 34. Nigeria | 52. Vietnam |
| 18. Georgia | 36. Orissa (India) | |

In November 2002, CIVICUS sent out a request for statements of interest to participate in the CIVICUS Civil Society Index project as a “National Coordinating Organisation” (NCO). The goals of the CSI project are very much in line with GAPVOD’s vision and mission and the project held great potential to strengthen civil society in Ghana.

\(^1\) This list encompasses independent countries as well as other territories in which the CSI has been conducted, as of January 2006.

\(^2\) The CSI assessment was carried out simultaneously in the northern and southern parts of Cyprus due to the de facto division of the island; however, the CSI findings were published in a single report as a symbolic gesture for a unified Cyprus.
In April 2003 the project commenced, and CIVICUS provided the Ghana team with a comprehensive toolkit describing in detail the implementation process. The contents of this toolkit were discussed and clarified in a global learning workshop organised by CIVICUS.

2. PROJECT APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

The CSI is based on a broad definition of civil society and uses a comprehensive implementation approach which utilises various research methods. In order to obtain a picture of the overall state of civil society, the CSI assesses and scores four different dimensions of civil society:

(a) The **STRUCTURE** of civil society
(b) The external **ENVIRONMENT** in which civil society exists and functions
(c) The **VALUES** practised and promoted in the civil society arena, and
(d) The **IMPACT** of activities pursued by civil society actors.

Each dimension comprises several subdimensions, which in turn are composed of a number of individual indicators. The CSI uses a range of participatory and innovative research methods (stakeholder consultations, media review, community surveys) to collect the data for the indicators. Individual indicators are scored from 0 to 3 and these scores are then aggregated into subdimensions and dimension scores.

The CSI uses an innovative analytical tool called the Civil Society Diamond (CSD). This graphical tool, designed to provide an overview of the state of civil society at a glance, provides a useful starting point for interpretations and discussions about civil society in a given country. The following graphic provides a visual example of a possible Civil Society Diamond, which represents a rather vibrant and structured civil society with a very weak impact, whereas its values are very strong.

**Figure 2: Example of Civil Society Diamond**

![Civil Society Diamond](image)

2.1. Conceptual framework

*Definition of the concept of Civil Society*

The CSI defines civil society as *the arena, outside of the family, the state and the market where people associate to advance common interests.*
One of the key features of this definition is the concept of civil society being an arena. The term ‘arena’ is used to describe the particular space in a society where people come together to debate, discuss, associate, and seek to influence broader society. Another key feature is the acknowledgement of the ‘fuzziness’ of the boundaries between the spheres of civil society, the state, the market and family since, in practice, many forms of collective citizen action are difficult to categorise into a specific sphere. Here, the CSI emphasises the function, namely, collective citizen action to advance common interests over the specific organisational form in which the action takes place (Heinrich 2005, Uphoff/Krishna 2004). Based on the CSI’s practical interest in strengthening civil society, the project also conceptualises civil society as a political rather than an economic term, which would be synonymous with the non-profit sector. The CSI focuses on collective public action in the broader context of governance and development, rather than on the economic role of nonprofit organisations in society. This political perspective leads the CSI to focus on issues of power within the civil society arena and between civil society actors and institutions of the state and the private sector.

**Analytical Framework**

The CSI examines civil society along four main dimensions:

- The **structure** of civil society (e.g. number of members, extent of giving and volunteering, number and features of umbrella organisations and civil society infrastructure, human and financial resources);
- The external **environment** in which civil society exists and functions (e.g. legislative, political, cultural and economic context, relationship between civil society and the state, as well as the private sector);
- The **values** practiced and promoted within the civil society arena (e.g. democracy, tolerance or protection of the environment) and
- The **impact** of activities pursued by civil society actors (e.g. public policy impact, empowerment of people, meeting societal needs).

Each of these four dimensions is divided into a number of subdimensions which contain various indicators, in total 74. These indicators are at the heart of the CSI and form the basis of the data presented in this report.

**Figure 3: CSI analytical framework**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>CSI Analytical Framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subdimensions</td>
<td>Dimensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society Diamond</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This framework (indicators $\rightarrow$ subdimensions $\rightarrow$ dimensions) and the NAG’s scoring process which culminates in the Civil Society Diamond (see Fig. 3 above), forms the basic structure of the whole research exercise.

**2.2 CSI Research Mix and Scoring Process**

The project utilises a mix of the following data collection methods and instruments to obtain information on the indicator set:

1. Secondary data review
2. Regional stakeholder consultations (focus group discussions)
3. Population surveys
4. Media review
5. Fact-finding studies.

Together, these instruments collect the data required for preparing a narrative report on the state of civil society and scoring the indicators. Most indicators rely on more than one instrument, making it possible to apply methods of triangulation and cross-checks.

As in the other countries where the project has been undertaken, the Ghana project was implemented by a National Coordinating Organisation (NCO), which in Ghana’s case was GAPVOD. The work of the GAPVOD research team was guided by the project team at CIVICUS, and a multi-stakeholder group, the National Advisory Group (NAG) comprising representatives from government, academia, women’s groups, grassroots NGOs and the donor and international communities. The researchers collected and synthesized data and information on civil society from a variety of secondary and primary sources. There have been a number of studies conducted both nationally and globally on civil society in Ghana, and these were drawn upon in the assessment of civil society. The annual reports of the top five companies listed among the Club 100 in the year 2004 were also accessed to gauge the level of corporate social responsibility in the country. Primary data sources included the following:

- A regional survey: CSO representatives were surveyed in all ten regions of the country. Two hundred surveys were distributed and one hundred completed in four selected regions. In this report, the findings from the regional stakeholder survey are referred to as the GRSS.
- Regional consultations: Three regional consultations were held and respondents to the regional surveys were invited to participate in discussions about the results of the survey.
- Community sample survey: Three hundred surveys were sent out to respondents in three different communities; 100 rural respondents in the northern part of the country, 100 peri-urban respondents in the southern part of the country and 100 urban respondents in the central region. In this report, the findings from the community sample survey are referred to as the GCSS.
- Media monitoring: Two media sources, a national and a regional newspaper were monitored over a period of three months regarding their coverage of civil society actors
- Key informant interviews: Interviews were conducted with three key informants to ascertain the impact of civil society advocacy in three major areas; domestic violence, water privatisation and the government budget.
- Civil Society Mapping Exercise: The National Advisory Group charted the key components of civil society (represented by circles) and arranged them in a two-dimensional space. The distance of organisations from the centre represents their position within civil society and indicates how strongly they belong to civil society.

The outcomes of the research and assessments were discussed by representatives of key stakeholders at a National Workshop held in Accra. The task at the National Workshop was to identify the specific strengths and weaknesses and to provide recommendations for actions aimed at strengthening civil society.
In Ghana, as in the other countries where the CSI was implemented, the 74 indicators were scored by the NAG using a ‘citizen jury’ approach (Jefferson Center 2002), in which a group of citizens come together to deliberate and take decisions on a public issue based on presented facts. In the case of the CSI, the NAG’s role is to give a score (similar to passing judgement) on each indicator based on the evidence presented by the CSI country team. Figure 4 depicts the process and data sources used for scoring the indicators.

Figure 4: The CSI scoring process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reg. Stakeholder Consultations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fact - Finding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Sample</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3 Project outputs
The CSI implementation in Ghana delivered several products, including:
- A comprehensive report on the state of civil society in Ghana
- A list of recommendations, strategies and priority actions developed by various stakeholders, aimed at strengthening civil society in Ghana
- A press conference on key findings
- Consultations with more than 90 stakeholders discussing the status of civil society.
II CIVIL SOCIETY IN GHANA

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Prior to independence, under British rule, Ghana was perhaps Africa’s most prosperous colonial economy, with the best schools and civil service, a cadre of enlightened lawyers and a thriving press. Popular pressure on the colonial administration led to political concessions, and then to Ghanaian independence in 1957 – the first colony to gain post-colonial independence in Sub-Saharan Africa. In common with many other countries in the region, Ghana experienced serious post-colonial political instability, which saw nine changes of government and four military coups in the 26 years between 1957 and 1983 (Freeman 2005). The history of Ghana’s civil society is closely linked and shaped by the country’s political developments from the pre-colonial era to the present.

As far back as 1781, CSOs have been in existence in Ghana (then known as the Gold Coast). Amongst such community-based organisations were the Fante Confederacy and the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS). These CSOs comprised a broad membership including chiefs, elders, the intelligentsia, professional lawyers, the youth and the ordinary people. They were established to champion the cause of the indigenous people against any possible encroachments on the rights and properties of the people by the British colonial authorities (Gyimah-Boadi et al. 2000: 7). The interwar years saw an increase in the rise and vibrancy of civil society activities as a result of increasing urbanisation and expansion in economic activity, which also resulted from increased cocoa production (Gyimah-Boadi et al: ibid). In 1938, associations of indigenous cocoa producers organised a successful protest against the monopoly of the commodity market by the expatriate-controlled Association of West African Merchants. There are thus a large number of independent voluntary self-help associations, going as far back as the interwar period and expanding rapidly in the period after World War II and Independence in 1957.

Constitutional reforms initiated by the British Colonial Governor in the 1940s towards self-government provided an opportunity for the ‘intelligentsia’ to acquire a degree of political authority. With the restructuring of the colonial state towards a more liberal representative government, a group of intelligentsia created the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) in 1947. However, the UGCC lacked legitimacy as a nationwide movement and sought to take on board the grievances of other groups in society through forming a coalition with the ‘young men’ (the commoners) and cocoa farmers. Nkrumah led the mobilisation of the ‘young men’ and their alliance with the UGCC (Whitfield 2002).

The cocoa farmers objected to cocoa price policies, the surplus extracted by the cocoa marketing board and the policy of compulsory removal of cocoa trees infected with swollen shoot disease. In particular, their objection to the removal of their cocoa trees had a significant impact on strengthening the anti-colonial movement. Nationalist leaders supported the demands of farmers and attempts were made to bring the various existing farmers’ organisations together into an anti-colonial front. The 1937/38 cocoa hold-up demonstrated the organising potential of the cocoa farmers and their ability to threaten colonial interests (Beckman 1976: 52).

Riots in 1948 caused a shifting of alliances in the indigenous society as a result of differences between the intelligentsia and the ‘young men’ over the strategy and tactics of the nationalist movement. Having been provided with an opportunity by the colonial government to participate in the constitutional reform process, the intelligentsia embraced a reformist stance.
The nationalist movement then split. Nkrumah formed the Convention People’s Party (CPP), taking most of the coalition support with him under the slogan ‘Self-government Now’, and the intelligentsia realigned with the chiefs against the CPP and Nkrumah. Nkrumah won all three elections between 1951 and 1956 and formed the first government of independent Ghana.

After 1960, the TUC (having been coopted) and the cooperatives became important auxiliary organisations of the CPP, even though some unions resisted incorporation into the framework of the party, as illustrated by the general strike in Sekondi-Takoradi (Ghana’s third largest city) in September 1961 by the Sekondi-Takoradi Railway and Harbour Workers Union. The strike was partly in response to the passage of the Industrial Relations Act which placed the entire trade union movement under one umbrella, the TUC (this structure exists till today) and required the most influential posts to be filled by individuals with CPP approval. The Act also made strikes illegal.

The CPP effectively smashed all independent organisations, increasing the state’s control over society and targeted cocoa, the mainstay of the economy, as a vehicle for political mobilisation and control (Beckman 1976). In 1953, the CPP created the United Ghana Farmers’ Council (UGFC). State control of the Cocoa Marketing Board fund allowed the CPP to monopolise the financial resources available to cocoa farmers and to eliminate cocoa trading as a platform for organised opposition. The UGFC increased in importance after 1961 with the structural changes within the party (Apter 1966).

By 1962, the United Ghana Farmers’ Council, the National Cooperative Council, the Council of Ghana Women and the Ghana Trade Union Congress were ‘integral wings’ of the party, with CPP leaders in control of key posts (Drake and Lacy 1966:72). This was done for two reasons. First, voluntary associations or occupational groupings under party supervision indirectly linked the individual to the party and the state. Second, such organisations cut across geographical boundaries and other affiliated bases of association, reducing the significance of ethnic and religious groups.

With the CPP covering farmers, trade unions, women, students and youth, and with the government controlling the appointment and dismissal of chiefs, the ability of sections of society to articulate public opinion or to influence the government appeared extremely limited (Pinkeny 1972:18). Organised social forces not affiliated to the party, such as churches and businesses, found it increasingly difficult to be heard.

In February 1966, a military coup ousted Nkrumah and his CPP government, establishing the National Liberation Council (NLC) which in 1972 transferred power back to a democratically elected government, the Popular Party (PP) led by Dr. K.A Busia.

Under the PP, politicisation of the National Union of Ghanaian Students (NUGS), TUC, the civil service and the military occurred in response to policy measures as well as their perception of being excluded from the party’s ruling coalition. The government reacted to criticism of its policies and the political action of opposition groups by breaking up student demonstrations, quelling workers’ strikes, regulating the press and using the armed forces to detain opponents of the regime. These repressive reactions contradicted its liberal democratic image and constitutional commitment. The poor performance of Busia’s government eventually led to the disaffection of segments of those social forces that had supported its rise to power.
The PP was overthrown in 1972 by Colonel Acheampong who headed the National Redemption Council, later the Supreme Military Council (SMC)). In reaction to the growing popular unrest against its rule, the SMC in October 1976 announced the Union Government proposal (Unigov), an arrangement in which major social groups, the police and the military would share power on a non-partisan basis. Support for Unigov became an indicator for determining which individuals and social groups would be included in the network of state and regime (Gyimah-Boadi 1994:127). Institutions such as the army, the police and a wide range of associations were mobilised in support of Unigov. For these associations and their leadership, affiliation with the state and regime brought greater opportunities to be officially consulted or participate on some level in national decision-making. As under previous regimes, affiliation was the only way social groups could have access to policymaking (Whitfield, 2002).

Opposition to Unigov and the SMC coalesced into three main organisations: the People’s Movement for Freedom and Justice, the Prevention of Dictatorship and the Third Force, all of which included a large number of major politicians from previous regimes.

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings, seized power from the SMC in 1979, restored the country to constitutional rule with Dr. Hilla Limann as the elected head, but seized power again in 1981. His government, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), which ruled until 1992 when the Constitution was restored, was to be Ghana’s last military regime.

Under the AFRC, a new radical movement had emerged with the objective of promoting political education and organisational programmes among the urban poor, students, and in the rural areas. The actions of progressive organisations such as the June Fourth Movement (JFM), New Democratic Movement (NDM) and Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG) transformed the political arena. By 1980, political opposition and activism was no longer dominated by the professional associations, trade unions and political parties, as the militant style of political agitation employed by the progressive organisations challenged these functional groups and the agencies of state power (Akwetey 1994:82).

Under PNDC rule, NGOs and other social organisations operated in a generally repressive political climate which left them little room to organise and act on their own initiative. Even in the early stages of the ‘revolution’, Rawlings viewed NGOs and other independent bodies like the churches and trade unions as a potential threat to a regime struggling to secure power (Hutchful 2002:185). This initial hostility diminished as the social costs of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) became more visible and the protests against Rawlings’ regime became more vocal.

Ghana, ahead of most African countries, began in early 1983 the pursuit of an ERP based on the principles of structural adjustment. The World Bank and IMF provided the administrative and analytical resources necessary to make the ERP work, especially given that the state had all but collapsed (Herbst 1993:36). The introduction of the programme was motivated by a number of factors, including the observation of severe distortions in the pricing and exchange systems following a regime of poorly executed controls.

The introduction of the ERP brought much hardship as public sector workers were laid off and the state drastically reduced its range of services to the people. The reforms contributed
to a rise in informal sector employment and increased the number of impoverished people, changing the country’s social structure at both the lower and middle class levels (see Ninsin 1991). Thus, as part of a strategy to quell growing opposition, Rawlings’ regime encouraged NGOs to fill the service delivery gap created as a result of cuts in government expenditure. However, the real impetus behind creating a greater role for NGOs in ‘development’ came not from the PNDC but from donors (Hutchful 2002). At a donors’ conference in 1987, the Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) was approved and attached to Ghana’s Structural Adjustment Programme (Brydon and Legge 1996). The World Bank, United Nations and bilateral donors contributed over US$80 million for poverty alleviation programmes, but they requested that NGOs assist in service delivery because the “Government of Ghana” did not have the “institutional capacity” to implement such a large programme (Gary 1996:157).

This increased interest in NGOs as participants in ‘development’, with its attendant increase in available international aid, affected the nature of NGO and state relations. For example, the PNDC government and the United Nations Development Programme decided to use GAPVOD as the vehicle for enlisting NGOs in PAMSCAD. GAPVOD had only seventeen members in 1987, but through PAMSCAD it received over US$600,000 from 1990-92 and membership in GAPVOD became a de facto criterion for local NGOs to receive external funding. As a result, GAPVOD no longer existed as a collective voice for NGO members, but as a tool of control by government and donors (Gary 1996).

The PNDC drastically reordered the relative positions of social groups to resources and the terms of access to resources of the state. In the process, it dispersed opposition from both the Left and the Right, destroying the possibility of opposition movements emerging from either direction. By the late 1980s, Rawlings’ regime had combined its focus on economic reform with the depoliticisation of the popular organs, termination of autonomous organisations, and general repression.

Opposition to Rawlings’ regime, the ‘pro-democracy movement’ was a fusion of several distinct groups and political agendas. In August 1990, “a loose alliance of all the former political groupings of the first, second and third Republics” formed the Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ) (Ayee 1999:321). The MFJ found a common platform among functional organisations such as GBA, NUGS, TUC, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference and the Christian Council. Together, they demanded democratic reforms from Rawlings and the PNDC.

Ninsin (1998) describes the ‘transition to democracy’ as a struggle between ‘pro-democracy civil society’ and ‘alternative civil society’, where the pro-democracy group struggled for the liberalisation of power and the alternative forces mobilised for the consolidation of the existing power structure. The failure of the pro-democracy movement to undermine the PNDC’s legitimacy in the first period of the PNDC’s reign stemmed mainly from the elite character of the organisations engaged in the movement, such as the ARPB, GBA and the established church councils, vis-à-vis the level of popular and student support for Rawlings. In the second period, the alternative forces challenged the hegemony and monopoly of these pro-democracy groups in various sub-sectors of the economy, administration and politics (see Hansen 1991).

The PNDC became the NDC in the run-up to the 1992 elections, and the NDC secured popular support by creating new organisations financed by, and loyal to, the ruling regime.

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This popular base was sustained under the NDC government and has been identified as a significant factor in Rawlings’ victory in the 1996 elections (see Sandbrook and Oelbaum 1999). In addition to the creation of ‘governmental non-governmental organisations’ (such as the 31st December Women’s Movement) through establishing new organisations to capture a constituency or transforming organs of the revolution into NGOs, the NDC employed various means of co-opting existing organisations, with the result that few organisations created during the P/NDC era have remained entirely outside Rawlings’ influence (see Smith 1998).

In early 1995, the NDC government circulated a draft ‘NGO Bill’. Within a context of increased competition among the state and NGOs for declining levels of external aid, this bill embodied the continued hegemonic ambitions of the state to control NGO activity (Gary 1996:162). An earlier version of this bill had been shelved because of strong pressure from foreign NGOs (Oquaye 1996:23). The 1995 bill also encountered intense resistance on the grounds that it was a direct attack on the autonomy of NGOs. The NGOs which led this resistance perceived it as a mechanism intended to coerce them to comply with government’s designs. The government withdrew the bill, and the successful campaign appeared to reflect the increasing confidence of many NGOs to assert their autonomy from the government.

Civil Society Coordinating Council and SAPRI
The Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) idea was mooted by World Bank President Wolfensohn to improve the Bank’s public relations with working groups comprising NGOs from around the world. In 1997, SAPRI was launched in thirteen countries as a tripartite process between the Bank, governments and civil society to review structural adjustment programmes. Support for the idea of SAPRI in Ghana emerged from diverse sources, particularly organisations and individuals with a history of opposition to some element of structural adjustment and its effects on Ghanaians. ISODEC presented the idea of SAPRI to leaders of other organisations, who then formed the Provisional Working Group with the task of bringing additional groups into the SAPRI exercise. This first outreach effort culminated in a “National Conference on Civil Society” that brought together representatives of organisations from around the country. At this conference, participants established the Civil Society Coordinating Council (CivisoC) for the purpose of representing ‘civil society’ in the SAPRI exercise in conjunction with the World Bank and the NDC government. The membership of CivisoC was structured along the lines of geographical boundaries, organisational typology and the notion of representation.

CivisoC brought out four new qualities in the history of CSO cooperation. Firstly, it involved an unprecedented cooperation among organisations with almost no history of collaboration. Secondly, this network was the first broad structure for institutionalised policy dialogue with government. Thirdly, its geographical breadth of participation was novel, especially in its inclusion of the three northern regions that have tended to be marginalised in most national processes. Fourth, CivisoC provided a holistic challenge to SAPs as a development strategy, in contrast to past sectoral approaches such as criticism of wage freezes or effects on health services.

The changing political context of the Fourth Republic and its concomitant changes in actors and their objectives presented a new landscape of civil society. The continued presence of active organisations such as the TUC and NUGS on the political scene demonstrated the substantial effects of past politicisation, as has been explained above. The exit of other organisations from the political scene such as the GBA and ARPB may be linked to the middle-class base of these organisations and their former advocacy for liberal political rights.
The arrival of new organisations such as ISODEC and the Third World Network (TWN) highlights the contours of current struggles in Ghanaian society. Advocacy around social and economic rights and the civil society discourse have replaced movements for multiparty, constitutional rule and the ‘democracy’ discourse. A significant factor in this shift is the 1992 constitution, which provides both the substance and legitimacy for advocacy in general, and rights-based activism in particular.

The New Patriotic Party’s (NPP) victory at the polls in December 2000, and subsequent handing over of power by the National Democratic Congress (NDC) was a landmark victory for democracy in Ghana. This is because it marked the first time in the country’s history that power had been handed over peacefully from one regime to the other. Leading up to the elections, the NPP enjoyed widespread support from civil society because of the perceived corruption and lack of democratic practices by the then ruling NDC. Civil society joined forces in support of the NPP party to remove the purported “common enemy”. However, the cordial relationship between civil society and the NPP prior to 2000 has soured at some point as civil society and the state have clashed over differing views on important national developmental issues, such as water privatisation (see appendix A for more information), use of funds accruing from the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative and fuel price increases.

The space for civil society activism was expanded with the repeal in July 2001 of the criminal libel and sedition laws under which many journalists had previously been jailed. The NGO Article 19 declared that “…the repeal of criminal libel law puts Ghana at the forefront of African countries when it comes to meeting international standards on free expression”.

2. THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN GHANA

There are various theoretical definitions of civil society. In addition, the nature of civil society differs around the world. In its bid to work with a concept that has universal applicability, the CSI project defines civil society as “the arena outside family, government and market where people voluntarily associate to advance common interests.” This view is shared by Ghanaian scholars of civil society. Drah (2003:118), for example, describes civil society broadly to include “an ensemble of intermediary associations or organisations which operate between the primary units of society in general (like the individual, family or household) and the state and its agencies.” There are two major categories of CSOs. Drah’s characterisation is worth quoting at length:

Two major categories of civil society have been identified: the ‘corporatist’ and ‘voluntary-pluralist’. The corporatist category comprises intermediary groupings which are sponsored and most often sustained by, and hence subservient to, the state …. These are termed Government Non-Governmental Organisations (GONGOss) and Quasi Non-Governmental Organisations (QUANGOs). The voluntarist-pluralist category denotes the presence of an array of strictly non-governmental civil associations voluntarily and interdependently established to pursue their own interests without necessarily ignoring those of society as a whole. Thus, their objectives are at once private and public. They are “essentially voluntary associations of individuals” such that
“people choose the intermediaries that by personal will or interest they prefer” (Drah 2003:119).

We began the CSI project with a meeting where the members of the National Advisory Group (NAG) validated and adopted the CSI definition of civil society. This first meeting of the Ghanaian NAG was held on 18th February 2005. The members of the NAG agreed that there were various definitions of civil society, but that the crucial element of civil society was that “it existed outside the family, state and market forces.” Since this distinction was captured in the definition of civil society utilised in the CSI project, the NAG members were comfortable with validating the definition exactly as it stood. In our context, a caveat was included to emphasise the point that the state in our context included both the traditional state structures (chiefs and queen mothers) and the modern state structures.

The decision to include traditional authority structures in the category of the state was based on three major facts. First is the fact that gazetted chiefs are paid by the government. Second, the Stool Lands Administration Act, a legal document developed by the modern state structure, stipulates clearly that 30% of proceeds of the community should go to the chiefs. Finally, the local government structure operating in the country makes provision for consultation with traditional authorities on major decisions affecting the community. It was also debated whether traditional authority figures govern in their own right on behalf of the state or as part of the state. The consensus was that chieftaincy or traditional authority is a parallel system of government and has to be included in the CSI context as part of the state structure.

However, the kinds of organisations that constituted civil society as provided by the CSI project had to be modified to suit the Ghanaian context. Burial societies, which are very much in evidence in southern Africa, do not exist in Ghana. Instead, the aims of burial societies are fulfilled within the welfare functions of other associations. As such, burial societies were excluded from the list of CSOs. In other cases, for example, ethnic/community-based associations were divided into two different associations to be able to distinguish between associations that are multi-ethnic and those that are mono-ethnic. The full list of the CSOs utilised in the Ghanaian context is reproduced below:

**Table II: List of types of CSOs in Ghana**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic based associations</th>
<th>Education groups</th>
<th>Cooperatives or savings group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Based associations</td>
<td>Sports associations</td>
<td>Cultural groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer/fisherman cooperatives</td>
<td>Youth groups</td>
<td>Religious or spiritual groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traders or business associations</td>
<td>Women’s groups</td>
<td>Political groups or parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional associations</td>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Neighbourhood/village committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Unions</td>
<td>Environmental groups</td>
<td>Hobby organisations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NAG list of CSOs

**3. MAPPING CIVIL SOCIETY**

To identify power blocs within the civil society arena, the NAG conducted a civil society mapping exercise and developed a pictorial presentation of these power relations.
Civil society in Ghana can be grouped into three main groups, based on their influence. The most powerful civil society organisations are the trade union congresses, which include all the specific trade unions, international non-governmental organisations, the political parties, particularly the two major parties (New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress), the media and think-tanks. The next tier of civil society organisations includes faith-based organisations (predominantly the Christian and Muslim faiths), professional bodies such as the Ghana Bar Association and the Ghana National Association of Teachers, local NGOs and community-based organisations. Women’s groups and consumer groups exerted the least influence. Active collaboration only existed between the think-tanks, NGOs, women’s groups and community-based groups.

Civil society, overall, does not have a major influence on Ghanaian society. The most influential actors within the Ghanaian context are the military, the executive and the donor community. The donor community was included as part of state institutions because of the close collaboration between the state and the donor community, particularly with reference to development policies. Political parties were the only civil society organisations that the NAG members identified as having a great deal of influence in the country.

Civil society organisations such as the media, trade unions and international non-governmental organisations, as well as business associations, were identified as those institutions with medium influence on Ghanaian society. State institutions such as the legislature and traditional authorities were also included in this category.

The issue of the influence wielded by traditional authorities generated a lot of discussion. Some NAG members argued that at the village level the chiefs were far more influential than the modern authority structures such as the District Chief Executive. Others also noted that the modern authority structures pay them a lot of respect. For example, when government officials - even the President - visit a community, the first item on their agenda is to visit the chief of the locality in which they find themselves. The decentralised system of operation also makes it technically feasible for local development projects to be implemented in a collaborative manner with traditional authorities. The fact that chiefs wanted to be gazetted by the state also meant that they were cautious in their dealings with the central government, seeking as much as possible not to alienate themselves from the central government. They were therefore unlikely to oppose the decisions of the central government. It was also noted that it was quite unlikely that a particular chief’s viewpoint could lead the modern state structure to override decisions it had taken, hence the decision that the influence of traditional authorities could at best be described as medium.

Finally, other civil society organisations such as local NGOs, think-tanks and professional bodies were identified as the institutions with the least influence in the country. In placing professional bodies in this category, NAG members lamented the fact that this was currently the case in the Ghanaian context.
Figure 5: Map of Civil Society
III ANALYSIS OF GHANA’S CIVIL SOCIETY

Introduction

In this section, we present the analysis of the data collected during the CSI project implementation. Each individual indicator, subdimension and dimension has been analysed and presented below, in the following order: Structure, Environment, Values and Impact.

1. STRUCTURE

This dimension looks at the actors within the civil society arena, their main characteristics and the relationships among them. It is composed of 6 subdimensions: breadth of citizen’s participation; depth of participation; diversity; organisational capacity; interrelations; and resources (and 19 individual indicators).

Figure III.1.1: Subdimension scores in STRUCTURE Dimension

1.1 Breadth of Citizen Participation in Civil Society

As an important basic indication of civil society’s overall size and strength, this subdimension assesses the extent of citizen involvement in civil society. Indicators include the percentage of citizens that: undertake political actions, donate to charity, belong to a CSO, do volunteer work and participate in community activities. The best news about the structure of CSOs in Ghana is obtainable in the breadth of citizens’ participation. The indicators show that the extent of citizens’ participation in CS activities is quite encouraging, with an overall score of 2.0. The various components of the breadth of citizens’ involvement in CS are presented below.

Table III.1.1 Breadth of citizen participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1.1 Non-partisan political action</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.2 Charitable giving</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.3 CSO membership</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.4 Volunteer work</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.5 Community action</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.1.1 Non-partisan political action. Ghana’s legal and constitutional framework for the governance of the nation provides extensive opportunity for people to engage in non-partisan political action. While the constitution (Republic of Ghana, 1992) makes participatory political processes at the local grassroots level non-partisan (Article 248: 1 and 2), civil society in Ghana has yet to seize this opportunity. Drah (2003:117) notes that civil society “has not been that much effective in the rural areas.” This view is corroborated by the Ghana Community Sample Survey (GCSS). The aggregate results for this indicator show that only 15% of the respondents had engaged in some form of non-partisan political action, while the majority of 85% had not. In terms of the kind of non-partisan political action undertaken, 7.4% had written a petition or a complaint to a newspaper; 4.2% had signed a petition to the authorities. Similar results were obtained in a collaborative research project undertaken in 2003 by the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) and the Institute of African Affairs (IAA) in Berlin, based on a representative sample of 1,200 Ghanaians of voting age. The results showed that only 4% had ever written to a newspaper while 8% had signed a petition. These figures are understandable, considering the illiteracy levels of the population. However, even with other forms of civic engagement which required no literacy, such as participation in a demonstration, it was clear from both the CDD-IAA report and the GCSS that direct civic engagement in Ghana is low. Only 6% of respondents in the CDD-IAA report had participated in a demonstration. The equivalent figure from the GCSS was 10.2%. Thus, only a minority of citizens take part in non-partisan political action.

1.1.2 Charitable giving. The GCSS indicates that 57.3% of respondents donated money to charity in the previous year. The percentages varied widely depending on the community, the gender and the income bracket within which the survey was conducted. Respondents in peri-urban communities, females and those in the second highest income quintile were the most likely to have donated to charity in the past year; those in urban areas, men and the lowest income bracket were the least likely to have donated to charity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table III.1.1.2.1: Charitable giving by type of residence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peri-urban residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban residents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table III.1.1.2.2: Charitable giving by gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table III.1.1.2.3: Charitable giving by income bracket</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lowest income bracket</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second highest income quintile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest income</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.1.3 CSO membership. Ghanaians have embraced the spirit of voluntary cooperative self-help, and the rural landscape is dotted with a kaleidoscope of community-based or grassroots organisations (CBOs/GROs). Indeed, most formal sector workers belong to an association of their own choosing. According to the GCSS, 51% of Ghanaians are members
of at least one civic organisation. Both the GCSS and the CDD-IAA report note that Ghanaians are generally very religious. Both surveys found that the one civic organisation that most Ghanaians belonged to is a religious organisation, with the majority of respondents (51.8%) having such ties. Various reasons have been given for the desire of most Ghanaians to belong to a religious organisation, the most likely being the concern to have ‘decent’ rites of passage, particularly funeral rites. The equivalent percentage reported in the CDD-IAA survey was 72%, of which 45% were active members and 12% were official leaders.

Table III.1.3.1: Membership figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Membership Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmer/fisherman</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business association</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional association</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood association</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious association</td>
<td>51.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural group</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education association</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health/social service</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth group</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s group</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights organisation</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethic-based organisation</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental organisation</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hobby organisation</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Very few respondents had membership in other civic organisations; only 10% of respondents in the CDD-IAA survey were members of a business or professional organisation such as the Ghana National Association of Teachers and the Ghana Registered Nurses Association. This can be explained by the fact that the majority of Ghanaians are employed in the informal sector. However, even in this sector, membership in civic organisations was low. For example, only 19% of the respondents were members of farmer organisations even though almost 40% of their respondents described themselves as farmers.

1.1.4 Volunteering. The majority of respondents surveyed in the GCSS (56.5%) volunteered at least once a year. The spirit of voluntarism varies according to the social milieu of individuals. Forty-one percent of respondents in the peri-urban communities volunteered at least once a year, compared to 31.6% in the rural areas and 27% in the urban areas. The likelihood of volunteering also differed depending on the income of respondents. In general, the lower one’s income, the less likely the person was to volunteer. Thus, only 8.5% and 13.5% of respondents in the lowest and second lowest quintile of income respectively had volunteered at least once over the past year as compared to 15.6% of individuals in the highest income bracket. Men were also more likely to volunteer than women were. Fifty-five percent of men had volunteered at least once over the past year as compared to 44% of women.

1.1.5 Collective community action. The recent Afrobarometer indicates that Ghanaians have a strong sense of community relations based on trust, collaboration and reciprocity,
which translates into strong communal action (CDD 2002). Many of the CBOs have been very active in participatory community development in the areas of education, health, water, sanitation and agriculture (Drah 2003), as reflected in the GCSS. The majority of Ghanaians participate in community-organised events. Eighty percent of respondents had participated in a community meeting, community action or both; 77.9% had participated in community action, and 60.1% had participated in a community meeting at least once.

A third of the sample (35.7%) had participated in one community meeting, 16.7% had participated in several community meetings and 7.7% had participated in many community meetings. Respondents in rural communities were the least likely to have participated in community meetings, while those in the urban communities were the most likely to have attended community meetings. Forty-three percent of rural respondents had never attended a community meeting as compared to 26.9% in the peri-urban areas and 29.9% in the urban areas. Similarly, while 17.8% of respondents in the urban area had attended many community meetings, the equivalent figures for the peri-urban and rural respondents were 4.3% and 3.9% respectively. Although women were more likely than men to have attended at least one community meeting (51.5% and 48.5% respectively), men were more likely than women to have attended such meetings on several occasions. Almost a fifth of men (19.6%) had attended several community meetings as compared to 12.9% of women. In addition, 9.3% of men had attended many community meetings as compared to 5.7% of women. The poorer an individual was, the more likely that respondent was to have attended a community meeting. Thus, while 66.7% of respondents in the lowest income quintile had attended a community meeting, the corresponding figure for respondents in the highest income quintile was 59.1%. This could directly relate to the employment status of people, that is, employed persons may have less time than unemployed persons to attend community meetings.

1.2 Depth of Citizen Participation in Civil Society

In assessing the size/strength of civil society, it is also important to know how frequently/extensively people engage in CS activities. This subdimension looks at how much people give to charity, how much volunteer work they do and how many different CSOs they belong to.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1 Charitable giving</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.2 Volunteering</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.3 CSO membership</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.2.1 Charitable giving. Ghanaians in general have a culture of charitable giving and more than three-quarters of Ghana’s population donates resources to others. The amounts involved are, however, quite meagre, even when the average per capita income is taken into consideration, and perhaps a reflection of Ghana as a Highly Indebted and Poor Country (HIPC). According to the GCSS, the majority of charitable givers (82.2%) gave the equivalent of only fifty US cents $0.50 or less, while eight and a half percent gave between US $11 and US $110. According to the fourth Ghana Living Standards Survey, 39.5% of Ghanaians are poor because they make less than the equivalent of US $100 a year. If we take the poverty level of US $100 a year as the average income, then it would mean that the average Ghanaian donates 0.05% of his/her annual income to charity.
1.2.2 Volunteering. The indication from the GCSS is that, on average, Ghanaians spend eleven hours a month doing voluntary work. Half of the GCSS respondents who were volunteers spent ten hours or less each month on their voluntary activities. About a quarter of respondents also spent between ten and twenty-one hours each month on voluntary activities, while the remaining twenty-five percent spent between twenty-one and ninety-six hours each month on their volunteer activities. Considering that most people belong to religious organisations, one can surmise that the majority of voluntary work is related to religious-oriented activities.

1.2.3 CSO Membership. As reported, the GCSS found that the majority of respondents (78.5%) had ties to various CSOs, mostly religious organisations. The CDD-IAA survey reported a comparably similar figure of 72%. The GCSS shows that among CSO members, the majority of 75.5% are members of more than one CSO.

1.3 Diversity of Participants in Civil Society

Since the CSI regards civil society as an arena where conflicting interests and power relations are played out, the equitable representation of different social groups (especially traditionally marginalised groups) within civil society is considered an important feature. This subdimension looks at the participation of women, minorities and other social groups in CSO leadership and membership. It also looks at the geographical representation of CSOs in order to determine if rural populations or specific regions of Ghana are under-represented.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table III.1.3: Diversity within civil society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.1 CSO Membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.2 CSO Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.3 Geographical distribution of CSOs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Diversity in Ghanaian CSOs is not very encouraging and significant social groups (especially women, rural communities and the poor) are under-represented and are largely absent in CSOs’ leadership. Worse still, CSO activity in Ghana is largely concentrated in urban areas to the neglect of the rural areas where it is most needed.

1.3.1 CSO membership. Religious minorities were the only group that regional stakeholder respondents thought were equitably represented in CSO membership. According to respondents in the Regional Stakeholder Survey (RSS), as shown in Table 1.3.1 below, all other minority groups were poorly represented in CSO membership. The extreme measure of this score was reserved for women. Ninety percent of the respondents were of the opinion that women were completely absent or excluded from CSO membership. With respect to the rural population and the poor, the diagnosis was not so severe. While not completely absent from CSO membership, eighty four and eighty one percent thought that the rural population and the poor respectively were severely under-represented in CSO membership. Only 3% went so far as to say that ethnic minorities were severely under-represented. The majority (81%) were of the opinion that ethnic minorities were somewhat under-represented. Similarly, while only 2% were of the opinion that the elite were severely under-represented in CSO membership, 79% believed that they were somewhat under-represented in CSO membership.
Table III.1.3.1: Table showing groups of people represented in CSO membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>% Absent/Excluded</th>
<th>% Severely Under-Represented</th>
<th>% Somewhat Under-Represented</th>
<th>% Equitably Represented</th>
<th>% Don’t Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural communities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minorities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious minorities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor people</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper class groups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly, there cannot be equitable representation of significant social groups because only religious minorities were equitably represented. Furthermore, only women were absent or excluded, which is contradicted by the GCSS survey results that show women as only somewhat under-represented: 47.9% vs. 52.1% men. The rural communities and poor people in general were severely absent, while ethnic minorities and upper classes were also “somewhat” under-represented.

The obvious conclusion is that significant social groups, i.e. rural folk, ethnic minorities, poor people and the upper classes are under-represented (it must be noted that in traditional Ghanaian usage, if something is described as “somewhat present” it is considered “present” in any case though not to an extensive degree).

1.3.2 CSO leadership. As shown in Table 1.3.2, the respondents’ perspectives on the equitable representation of minority groups in leadership positions bore similarities with their views on equitable representation in membership. The majority of the respondents in the RSS (83%) were of the opinion that only religious minorities were equitably represented in leadership positions. Ninety-one percent of the respondents were of the opinion that women were completely absent or excluded from CSO leadership. For both the rural population and the poor, the majority of respondents, (eighty-four percent) thought that significant social groups were severely under-represented, because they are either absent or excluded from CSO leadership. The majority (85% and 82%) were of the opinion that ethnic minorities and the elite respectively were somewhat under-represented in CSO leadership.

Table III.1.3.2: Table showing groups of people represented in CSO leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>% Absent/Excluded</th>
<th>% Severely Under-Represented</th>
<th>% Somewhat Under-Represented</th>
<th>% Equitably Represented</th>
<th>% Don’t Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural communities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minorities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious minorities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor people</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper class groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As Table 1.3.2 indicates, it is clear from the analysis of the indicators that only religious minorities are equitably represented in CS leadership and, further, only one significant social group, i.e. women, is absent or excluded. To be sure, half of the significant social groups listed are severely under-represented in CS leadership. This led to the majority of NAG to conclude that significant social groups are absent/excluded, hence the majority of NAG scored (1).

1.3.3 Distribution of CSOs. According to the respondents to the RSS, CSOs are not fairly evenly distributed across the country. As shown in table 1.3.3 below, only 12% of respondents were of the view that CSOs were present in even the most remote areas of the country, 33% were of the opinion that CSOs were present in all except the most remote areas. More than half of the respondents (53%) were, however, of the opinion that CSOs were restricted to the major cities and urban areas. Thirty-three percent were of the opinion that CSOs are confined to major cities while 20% were of the opinion that CSOs were restricted to urban areas.

Table III.1.3.3: Table showing respondent’s perspectives on distribution of CSOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of CSOs</th>
<th>Percentage of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In all even most remote areas</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In all except most remote areas</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confined to major cities</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confined to urban areas</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These findings reflect the reality on the ground. Though most CSO activities tend to be elitist and urban-centred, reflecting the traditional urban bias of the African political and bureaucratic elite, Ghana’s rural landscape is dotted with several amorphous community-based or grassroots-based organisations (CBOs/GROs), both local and foreign. Most of them engage in participatory development activities in the areas of education, health, water, sanitation and agriculture. The CBOs/GROs are relatively small and closely-knit groupings that often operate at the village level; the members themselves run them; and they are generally dependent on limited local resources. The CBOs/GROs that operate at the village level rarely have organisational links in urban areas, with the exception of those that are foreign based.

The majority of civil society organisations are more visible in the regional/district capitals. However, due to a lack of the necessary communications infrastructure, such as telephones and internet to facilitate quick access to information, and the ease of access to the relevant bodies, such as government agencies and donors (who may not have offices outside Accra), these CSOs have their administrative offices in Accra and maintain their operational offices in the rural areas.

There is an excessively high concentration of development-oriented NGOs in the three northern regions of the country. This is because these three regions have consistently been described in the Ghana Living Standards Survey as having the poorest population of the country. While the average percentage of poor people in the country in 1999 was 39.5%, over 80% of the people who live in this part of the country are defined as poor. The presence of the NGOs in these underdeveloped regions is therefore strategic, in the sense that they serve as rapid response bases to launch their relief services to tackle the insurmountable problems that face the population.
1.4 Level of Organisation

This subdimension looks at features of the infrastructure for civil society, indicating its stability and maturity, as well as its capacity for collective action. Individual indicators assess: the existence and effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies, efforts to self-regulate, the level of support infrastructure and international linkages. Without these, CSOs will be severely limited in their ability to act effectively and achieve their goals.

Table III.1.4: Level of organisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.4.1 Existence of umbrella bodies</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.2 Effectiveness of umbrella organisations</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.3 Self-regulation</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.4 Support infrastructure</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.5 International linkages</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.4.1 Existence of umbrella bodies. CSO umbrella bodies exist at the national and regional level. The umbrella organisations of professional CSOs are generally well-organised. In addition, the profession-based CSOs are the most articulate and vibrant. Among such professional CSOs are the Ghana National Association of Teachers (GNAT), the Ghana Registered Nurses Association (GRNA), University Teachers Association of Ghana (UTAG), the Association of Ghana Industries (AGI) and the Ghana Bar Association (GBA).

Ghana Association of Private Voluntary Organisations in Development (GAPVOD) is the largest umbrella organisation for CSOs in Ghana, with 440 registered members as at 2005. However, only a minority of these members have consistently paid their dues over the last five years. This suggests that commitment to the umbrella organisation is quite low. Furthermore, membership of GAPVOD is low and only a minority of CSOs belong to umbrella organisations. Apart from GAPVOD, which draws its membership from NGOs around the country, the NGO sector also has regional networks such as the Brong Ahafo NGOs (BANGO).

With organised labour, the Ghana Trades Union Congress (GTUC) is the umbrella organisation for seventeen national labour unions in Ghana. These unions, who are all subsidiary CSOs under the GTUC, include the Mines Workers Union (MWU) and Teachers and Educational Workers Union (TEWU). The students’ movements in the country include the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) and the Ghana National Union of Polytechnic Students (GNUPS). The long-established Ghana Journalists’ Association (GJA), the relatively new Private Newspaper Publishers Association of Ghana (PRINPAG) and the Sports Writers Association of Ghana (SWAG), are the main media groupings in the country.

It is, however, difficult to ascertain exactly what percentage of CSOs belong to these networks since data on the exact number of CSOs in the country is difficult to come by. Forty percent of RSS respondents were of the view that only a large minority belong to umbrella bodies. Twenty-one percent thought only a small minority belonged to umbrella bodies. Only 39% of respondents thought that the majority of CSOs belonged to umbrella bodies.

In general, the phenomenon of umbrella organisations is poorly developed within the Ghanaian sector. Most civil society organisations appear to be ‘independent’ of others and have confined their operations to their individual spheres of influence. Little has been done to bring identical CSOs under a common umbrella.
1.4.2 Effectiveness of umbrella organisations. Only a few respondents thought that umbrella organisations of CSOs are effectively managed. In assessing how effective the existing umbrella bodies have been in achieving their defined goals, 45 percent of RSS respondents had a mixed response to this issue. Thirty-three percent thought umbrella bodies are completely or largely ineffective. Only 17% were of the opinion that they are generally effective. Some respondents, in commenting on the ineffectiveness of umbrella bodies, noted that although the NGO community under the leadership of GAPVOD had come together as a unified force to effectively reject the NGO bill unilaterally developed by the government in the 1990s, GAPVOD has not been as effective in pushing for the Bill’s replacement with one that was more reflective of the needs of the NGO community.

1.4.3 Self-regulation. Presently there is no known self-regulation mechanism within the CSO sector, even though attempts are being made by some interest groups to institute self-regulation for the sector. Self-regulation is captured in the Draft National Policy for Strategic Partnership with NGOs. The central focus of this policy is the formation of the National Commission of NGOs (NCNGO), which will, among other things, promote the development of a code of conduct for NGOs by the NGOs themselves to strengthen self-regulation. Nevertheless, efforts by CSOs at self-regulation are encouraging. As shown in Table III.1.4.3 below, 47% of RSS respondents were of the view that some self-regulation mechanisms had been put in place for CSOs but that the impact was limited. Nine percent were of the opinion that effective mechanisms had been put in place which had made an appreciable impact on CSOs. Thirty-six percent of RSS respondents thought that only preliminary attempts had been made at self-regulation, while 4% were of the opinion that no attempt whatsoever had been made at self-regulation.

Table III.1.4.3: Table showing respondents perspectives on self-regulation of CSOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectives on self-regulation</th>
<th>Percentage of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some self-regulation mechanisms but limited impact</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective mechanisms with appreciable impact</td>
<td>09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preliminary attempts at self-regulation</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No attempts at self-regulation</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Regional Stakeholder Consultations, GAPVOD, Ghana

1.4.4 Support infrastructure. Support infrastructure for civil society in Ghana is primarily of two kinds: reading material and technical support. There are many organisations offering support of the former kind rather than of the latter. Organisations which offer technical support include American Geek Corps, which offers training in the use of information and communication technologies. With reference to reading resources, a significant number of resource centres for CSOs exist in Ghana, though most are urban-based. Examples include the ActionAid and the CDD Ghana Resource Centres, which are fully equipped and well-resourced with materials – computers, internet facilities, books, journals, periodicals and well-arranged newspaper publications for easy referencing. The centres provide strong, dynamic and efficiently managed research support. They have also gradually emerged as credible learning centres where students, academics, researchers, policy-makers and politicians undertake their research activities. Although the quality of the resource centres is commendable, more needs to be done to equip the centres to enhance their output. Also, the need to have some of these centres in the rural areas cannot be overemphasised as these are the deprived areas that are most in need of capacity-building. The extent to which the majority of CSOs know of the existence of these centres is reflected in the fact that 57% of RSS respondents thought that there was very limited CSO support
infrastructure. A final source of support to civil society organisations is financial. However, in the Ghanaian context, this is often provided on a very sporadic basis by organisations, many of which have international linkages.

1.4.5 International linkage. Several CSOs in Ghana are affiliated to various internationally renowned CSOs. The International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) - Ghana, for example, is an affiliate member of the world body of women lawyers, the International Federation of Women Lawyers founded in Mexico in 1944. Ghana Integrity Initiative is a member of Transparency International. GAPVOD is also a member of the International Council on Social Welfare (ICSW). Although most members of GAPVOD are also members of the World Association of NGOs (WANGO) based in the United States, 63% of respondents to the RSS thought that very few CSOs had international networks. This may be due to resource constraints, where very few CSOs are able to attend international events unless the international organisations provide funding for such purposes. This fact was highlighted by 73% of RSS respondents who noted that very few CSOs were able to attend international events. In essence then, membership in these international networks was merely ceremonial, and most Ghanaian CSOs cannot actively participate in and thus benefit from such international networks.

1.5 Inter-relations

An important determinant of the strength of civil society is the extent to which diverse actors communicate and cooperate with one another. This subdimension explores examples of information-sharing and alliance-building to assess the extent of linkages and productive relations among civil society actors. While organisational deficiency is perhaps the area where Ghanaian CSOs are most weak, their interrelationship is also poor. The age-old adage of “united we stand, divided we fall” has yet to be embraced by CSOs in Ghana. To make matters worse, interrelations among CSOs is very poor and communication amongst Ghanaian CSOs is only moderate or limited, though they occasionally cooperate.

Table III.1.5: Interrelations among CSOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.5.1 Communication</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5.2 Cooperation</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.5.1 Communication. There are significant problems of communication and coordination within the CSO sector in Ghana. While only 14% of respondents in the RSS were of the opinion that communication levels were significant, 43% assessed them as moderate and as much as 34% considered them to be limited. This was not necessarily because CS actors were unwilling to share information, but rather because the lack of efficient communication facilities such as the telephone, the fax and the internet makes communication between CS actors quite difficult, especially between those in the urban areas and those in the rural areas. During the stakeholder consultations, the real difficulties faced by civil society actors in the northern part of the country were made evident by the respondents. According to them, the lack of effective communication facilities meant that sometimes information had to be hand-delivered. Even road transportation to make this possible was not always easy. Participants in the stakeholder consultations held in the northern part of the country attested to the fact that some roads in certain parts of the Upper West, Upper East and Northern Regions are so bad that distances which could otherwise be traversed in twenty minutes take upwards of an hour. The result is that many civil society actors at the district and village levels are simply cut off
from others, and invitations to events are received late, often close to the actual date of the event. In some cases, according to participants, the invitations get to them after the events have taken place. The experience of organising the stakeholder consultation was itself enough proof of the seriousness and the reality of the situation. Civil society actors from the Upper West Region were underrepresented because they had not received the invitation, which had been sent one month previously. Therefore, an improved communications infrastructure (ENVIRONMENT) will go a long way to improve communication among civil society (STRUCTURE).

1.5.2 Cooperation. As shown in Table 1.5.2, 16% of RSS respondents acknowledged that there were numerous examples of cross-sectoral cooperation in the last decade or so. Thirty nine percent were of the opinion that there were some notable examples of cross-sectoral cooperation while 42% thought that there were few examples of these. Three percent of respondents were also of the view that there were absolutely no examples of cross-sectoral cooperation in the country.

Table III.1.5.2: RSS respondents’ perspectives on cross-sectoral cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of cross-sectoral cooperation</th>
<th>Percentage of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Numerous</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notable</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Few</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two such sectoral alliances have been well-documented in the literature on civil society in Ghana. The first was the alliance created by a number of civil society organisations in 1995 to successfully oppose the government’s unilateral introduction of an NGO bill. Led by GAPVOD, CSOs in Ghana went on to engage in consultations with the government to eventually generate an NGO Policy.3

Second was the emergence of two society-based domestic poll-watching bodies – Ghana Alert and the Network of Domestic Election Observers (NEDEO) to monitor the elections. It comprised 23 national organisations including the Christian Council/Catholic Secretariat (which covers all the mainstream Protestant and Catholic churches), the Ghana Civic Coalition (GHACICO) formed from the Committee on Human and People’s Rights, comprising the Ghana Bar Association (GBA), Civil Servants Association (CSA), Ghana Registered Midwives Association (GRMA), Ghana Registered Nurses Association (GRNA), Ghana Union Traders Association (GUTA), Judicial Service Staff Association of Ghana (JUSSAG), the Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission of Ghana, the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS), the Ghana National Association of Teachers (GNAT) and the Ghana Journalists Association (GJA).4

While the two examples above highlight instances over the past decade where cross-sectoral alliances were formed, during the regional stakeholder consultations more recent examples of cross-sectoral cooperation were provided. The first example was of the five associations of disabled persons that collaborated to push for the passage of the Disability Bill, which

ensures respect for the rights of disabled persons. Second, a coalition of groups concerned with women’s issues in the country came together in 2004 to develop a women’s manifesto.

These examples point to the fact that CSOs in Ghana do indeed cooperate on matters of common concern.

### 1.6 Resources

This subdimension looks at the capacity of civil society regarding the level of resources it wields. It assesses the extent to which CSOs have adequate (financial, human and technological) resources to achieve their goals.

#### Table III.1.6: Civil Society Resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.6.1 Financial resources</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6.2 Human resources</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6.3 Technological and infrastructural resources</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the weakest points of CSOs in Ghana are financial, technological and infrastructural resources. The majority of RSS respondents (53%) indicated that CSOs had inadequate financial resources to achieve their goals, and again the same majority saw their technological infrastructural base as weak. Yet, CSOs were noted to be more resourceful in human resources, and the majority (62.8%) of RSS respondents indicated that CSOs had adequate human resources, although almost a quarter of the respondents to the RSS could not comment on the adequacy of these resources. The rest considered the human resource capabilities of the majority of organisations as far more adequate than the financial and technical resources of civil society actors. Technical resources of civil society actors were also perceived as more adequate than financial resources.

**1.6.1 Financial resources.** Overall, respondents were of the opinion that CSOs lacked financial resources. The majority of 53% of the respondents to the RSS were of the opinion that civil society had inadequate financial resources. On the other hand, only 37% felt that CSOs had adequate financial resources.

The RSC survey provides the following interesting results: 86.5% of CSOs get more than 10% of their income from government and 85.3% of CSOs get more than 10% of their income from indigenous corporate funding.

The following list shows the average of different types of funding for those CSOs that receive them:

- Government funding accounts for 67% on average of the income of those CSOs that receive government funding
- Foreign funding accounts for 56% on average of the income of those CSOs that receive foreign funding
- Membership fees account for 41% on average of the income of those CSOs that expect members to pay
- Corporate funding accounts for 32% on average of the income of those CSOs that receive it
- Individual donations account for 30% on average of the income of those CSOs that receive individual donations
Service fees account for 14% on average of the income of those CSOs that receive service fees.

It must be noted, however, that the high figure of 67% coming from the government does not in any way mean direct government funding for CSO activities. In most cases, like the AIDS fund for example, the government is only one of the contributors (sometimes the lowest contributor) to the fund, which is tapped into by CSOs. Foreign funding for CSO activities still remains a very important source of funding, while social entrepreneurship among CSOs is still undeveloped, accounting for the low 14%.

With the exception of the profession-based CSOs like the Ghana Bar Association and the Ghana National Association of Teachers that finance themselves largely from membership dues, most organisations rely predominantly on external sources of finance. Issue-oriented organisations rely largely on funding from donor agencies and international NGOs. Some organisations depend heavily on one constant source of funding, while others apply to multiple donor agencies on a project-by-project basis. The ‘think tanks’, policy centres and research institutes depend on donor assistance, but they also earn income through consultancy work (Whitfield 2002).

In the discussion at the three regional stakeholder consultations concerning the level of resources available to civil society organisations, it became clear that only a small group of CSOs have the financial resources that make it possible for them to function effectively. These tend to be the think-tanks located in the capital city and the NGOs that receive international funding. The other organisations will have to devise unique fund-raising schemes that will enable them to tap into resources available both locally and internationally. As a result of this disparity in funding available to civil society organisations, some CSOs have state of the art facilities while a fair number work with the barest minimum of equipment.

1.6.2 Human resources. About a third of the respondents (32.6%), were of the opinion that civil society had inadequate human resources while 4.6% felt that they had completely inadequate human resources. On the other hand, 31.5% of the respondents were of the view that civil society actors had adequate human resources while another 31.3% thought that civil society had rather adequate human resources. Thus, comparative to the Ghanaian public sector, CSOs are perceived to be more resourceful in human resources and, indeed, the majority (62.8%) of RSS respondents indicated that CSOs had adequate human resources.

1.6.3 Technological and infrastructural resources. With respect to technological and infrastructural resources, 53.1% of the respondents to the RSS were of the opinion that civil society had inadequate technological and infrastructural resources. None felt that they had completely inadequate technological and infrastructural resources. However, 18.4% of the respondents were of the view that they had adequate technological and infrastructural resources while 28.5% thought that civil society had rather adequate technological and infrastructural resources.

Conclusion

There is extensive civil society activity in Ghana, as Ghanaians seem to have embraced the idea of voluntary cooperative self-help. The Ghana Community Sample Survey (GCSS) found the majority of Ghanaians (51%) are members of at least one CSO; eighty percent
participate in community meetings, while a large number (56.5%) volunteered at least once a year.

Ghanaian CSOs have not been very active in non-partisan political action. Only 15% of CSO members had engaged in some form of non-partisan political action. Contributions to charitable giving by CSO members are very poor as charitable giving averages only $0.50 (about 0.05% of annual income).

Diversity in Ghanaian CSOs is not very encouraging and significant social groups (especially women, rural communities and the poor) are under-represented and are largely absent in CSOs’ leadership. Worse still, CSO activity in Ghana is largely concentrated in urban areas to the neglect of the rural areas where it is most needed.

Civil society’s level of organisation is perhaps the area where Ghanaian CSOs are most vulnerable. First, membership of umbrella organisations such as GAPVOD is low and only a minority of CSOs belong to umbrella organisations. Interrelations among CSOs remain poor. Seventy-seven percent of RSS respondents saw communication amongst CSOs as only moderate or limited, though they occasionally cooperated.

The weakest areas of CSOs in Ghana include the state of financial and technological resources, with 53% of the RSS respondents indicating that CSOs had inadequate financial resources to achieve their goals; the same majority saw their technological infrastructural base as weak. Yet, CSOs were noted to be more resourceful in human resources, and the majority (62.8%) of RSS respondents indicated that CSOs had adequate human resources.
2. ENVIRONMENT

The ENVIRONMENT dimension is divided into 7 subdimensions with a total number of 23 indicators that seek to assess how enabling the external environment is for civil society. It assesses political, constitutional, social, economic, cultural and legal factors as well as the attitudes and behaviour of state and private sector actors towards civil society. The subdimensions are: the general political context; basic freedoms & rights; socio-economic context; socio-cultural context; the legal environment; state-civil society relations; and private sector-civil society relations.

![Figure III.2.1: Subdimension scores in ENVIRONMENT Dimension](image)

2.1 Political Context

The political context in any given country defines the overall backdrop and establishes important parameters for civil society’s activities. This subdimension explores various aspects of the political situation in Ghana, and its impact on Ghanaian civil society. Individual indicators include: citizen’s political rights, the extent of political competition (single v. multi-party systems), rule of law, corruption, state effectiveness and decentralisation.

Ghana is currently seen as one of the most politically stable countries in West Africa and a successful partner and leader in the democratisation of the sub-region, having reaffirmed its commitment to democratic processes after the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2000 which saw an elected government hand over power to another democratically elected government. A wide range of cross-country governance indicators shows that Ghana scores better than the Sub-Saharan African average, often substantially so, including in the following areas: protection against appropriation risk, voice and accountability; political instability and violence; government effectiveness; and rule of law. (Aryeetey/McKay 2004). On the whole, Ghana has the ability to make the democratic process more effective and
vibrant, including a well-balanced parliament, an independent judiciary, a vibrant press, efficient election machinery and a growing and knowledgeable civil society (ibid).

Table III.2.1: CSOs’ political context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1 Political rights</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2 Political competition</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.3 Rule of law</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.4 Corruption</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.5 State effectiveness</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.6 Decentralisation</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1.1 Political rights. Ghanaians enjoy the freedom to participate freely in political processes. The Constitution of Ghana provides for unrestricted opportunities for free political participation, giving every citizen of voting age, sound mind and with no criminal record the right to participate in political activities in Ghana. The Constitution also enjoins the state to provide fair opportunity to all political parties to present their programmes to the public by ensuring equal access to the state-owned media, and gives every candidate for election to Parliament the right to campaign freely and in accordance with the law. With a score of 26, Ghana maintains a ‘Free’ status according to the 2005 Freedom House ratings.

2.1.2 Political competition. There are currently eight registered political parties in Ghana. These are the New Patriotic Party (NPP), which is the party in power, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), the largest opposition party, the People’s National Convention (PNC) and the Convention People’s Party (CPP). Others are the National Reform Party (NRP), Great Consolidated Popular Party (GCPP), Democratic People’s Party (DPP) and the Egle Party. The first four parties have representation in Parliament. However, successive election results indicate that the majority of the Ghanaian electorate (more than 80%) belong to either the NPP or the NDC.

The NPP has a long history, tracing its roots to the Danquah-Busia political tradition which spans the period from pre-independence to the 1970s. The NDC, which won the 1992 elections, was born out of a military regime, the Provincial National Defence Council (PNDC) which seized power through a military coup d’état in December 1981. Currently, the NPP holds the majority of the 230 seats in parliament and, together with the NDC, controls about 90% of the seats in the House. Although both parties believe in the basic tenets of a free market economy, the NPP is perceived to be more pro-local private businesses than the NDC. This may stem from the NDC’s association with the PNDC, whose policies were grounded in socialist idealism and created the image of an anti-private business regime.

Despite the multiplicity of political parties, there is little or no ideological distinction between them, with each party supporting policies of economic liberalisation and taking a pro-private sector position. The NDC, when it was in power, followed the prescriptions of the Bretton Woods institutions and was criticised by the NPP, then in opposition. Now in power, the NPP is following the same direction for which it criticised its predecessor.

Worse still is the situation of women in Ghanaian politics. Women in Ghana hold only 25 of the 230 parliamentary seats, and there are 4 female ministers, 14 deputy ministers and 3 female members of the council of state, out of a total of 112 such positions.
2.1.3 Rule of law. Since Ghana’s return to constitutional rule in 1992, the rule of law has been upheld for the most part. Currently, arbitrary detention is prohibited by law. No one can be lawfully incarcerated without proper trial. This is further reinforced by the constitutional provision that no person can be lawfully detained for more than 48 hours without the person being brought before a magistrate. Not only are the fundamental human rights upheld, they are also entrenched in the constitution of Ghana (Article 290, 1(d)).

In reality, however, what laws exist in theory do not always function in practice. The World Bank Institute’s 2004 governance indicator on the rule of law for Ghana estimated that 49.3% of countries rank below Ghana with a poorer rule of law and 50.7% of countries are said to have a stronger rule of law. In comparison, in 1998, 57.8% of countries ranked worse than Ghana and 42.2% ranked better than Ghana. It is evident from this comparative governance dataset of 1998 and 2004 that Ghana’s rule of law has worsened. The reason appears to be that, like most African regimes, Ghana appears to have taken democracy for granted and emphasises more of its procedural aspects to the neglect of the more functional and substantive aspects.

Nevertheless, more recently, according to the 2005 Freedom House Report, Ghana attained an upward move in political and civil liberties as a result of efforts to improve the rule of law, including the successful conclusion of the National Reconciliation exercise which reported on human rights violations during Ghana’s unconstitutional government since 1957. To date, although the death penalty remains on the statute books, no death sentences have been passed and there were no executions.

As far as the judicial system is concerned, Ghanaian courts have had increased autonomy under the 1992 constitution, but continue to remain subject to occasional corruption. Long pre-trial detention and harsh conditions are realities due to the shortage of judicial resources compromising the judicial system. Traditional courts operating according to local customs also fail on occasion to meet constitutionally guaranteed standards.

2.1.4 Corruption. The general belief is that corruption is widespread in Ghana. In the 2004 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, Ghana received a score of 3.6 on a scale of 0-10, where 0 indicates very widespread corruption, and was ranked 64 out of 146 countries surveyed. Beyond the perception of corruption, Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer for 2005 found that at least 20% of individuals in Ghanaian households surveyed had paid a bribe of an average US $181 over the course of the previous year. According to this survey, half of those who paid the bribe did so because it was solicited directly. The police, according to the Global Corruption Barometer, are the most likely solicitors of bribes.

The Afrobarometer study (CDD-Ghana 2002:53) measures corruption in Ghana from a domestic standpoint. The latter data indicated that “corruption is widespread in Ghana,” with the overwhelming majority of Ghanaians (about 75 percent) perceiving key institutions for the maintenance of law and order, (police 79%; judges and magistrates 70%; customs

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5 Of the over 2,000 testimonies heard, many victims spoke of summary executions, “disappearances”, torture and other ill-treatment.
officials 74%; government officials 62%) as inherently corrupt. Thus, we conclude that corruption is inherently pervasive in Ghana.

In a report on political party financing released in September 2004, the CDD found that 42 percent of those surveyed cited kickbacks as the strongest manifestation of political corruption, followed by political appointments and extortion.

In late 2005, The Enquirer newspaper publicly released secretly recorded tapes in which the then ruling party chairman alleged that government contractors regularly paid money to the president and his staff, either directly or through ministers, some of which went to fund the ruling party. The presidency flatly denied these charges, although there was no official investigation.

2.1.5. State effectiveness. The overall level of state effectiveness in fulfilling its functions can be described as fair. According to the World Bank’s governance data on government effectiveness, Ghana had a percentile rank of 51.4 in 2004 which means that 51.4% of the 136 countries surveyed were rated below Ghana. This is, however, a drop, as in 2002 the same source on government effectiveness ranked Ghana at 60.7. In addition, the majority of the public (62%) generally perceive bureaucrats or public officials as corrupt (CDD, Afrobarometer 2002). In addition, the citizens of Ghana, according to the Afrobarometer (2002), share very low perceptions about key institutions for the management of the country. For example, only 48% of Ghanaians thought that the institution of parliament could be trusted to be effective; only 38% of Ghanaians saw Ghana’s District Assemblies, the fundamental institution of governance, as credible or effective. By 2002, when UNECA gathered its data on governance, Ghana was highly rated in almost all categories when compared to the 23 countries surveyed. From the perspective of UNECA, Ghana represents one of the best-governed countries in sub-Saharan Africa, not only in terms of effectiveness but in terms of transparency and accountability, suggesting that it would fit into the upper right quadrant of an effort to measure both dimensions (Freeman, 2005).

2.1.6 Decentralisation. Although Ghana runs a decentralised system of government with officials in the 138 districts of the country overseeing the day-to-day operations of the districts, financial decentralisation is not as adequate as it could be. Each district is allotted a sum of one billion cedis (approximately $100,000) to run the affairs of the district. The major source of funding for the decentralised local government units is the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF). The constitution of Ghana mandates the government to release 5% of gross national revenue to the districts through the DACF. Decisions as to what activities to spend these monies on are determined by the district officials, but they mostly involve rural development infrastructural projects. However, for the most part, the fundraising efforts of the districts are subject to the consent of national authority figures. The fees for services, facilities and permits issued at the District Assembly level are subject to guidelines that the Minister of Local Government and Rural Development issues. Section 88 of Act 462 also stipulates that District Assemblies need a central government guarantee if they intend to raise loans in excess of twenty million cedis (US $2,200) (Ayee 2003:28).

During discussions at the NAG, it was agreed that the allocation to the districts was too meagre to enable them to realise their mandate. They added that the present situation in which, even with the small sum, the government was almost always in arrears is a disincentive to the development of the districts.
2.2  Basic freedoms and rights

This subdimension looks at those constitutional rights which directly relate to the functioning of civil society in Ghana, namely: basic civil liberties (freedoms of expression, assembly & association), information rights and freedom of the press. It assesses to what extent these freedoms and rights are ensured by law and in practice. Ghanaians are satisfied with their democratic dispensation despite all the socioeconomic deficiencies and they recognise that Ghana is a democracy with minor problems (CDD 2002). The maintenance of basic liberties and freedoms is not in doubt.

Table III.2.2: Basic freedoms and rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1 Civil liberties</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2 Information rights</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.3 Press freedom</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2.1 Civil liberties. The 1992 Constitution provides considerable space and protection for civil society. Provisions conducive to associational life and fostering the vibrancy of civil society in Ghana include: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of the press and other media; freedom of thought, conscience and belief, which includes academic freedom; freedom to practise any religion and to manifest such practice; freedom of assembly, including freedom to participate in demonstrations and processions; freedom of association, including freedom to form or join any trade union or other association, national or international, for the protection of interests; freedom of information, subject to such qualifications and laws as are necessary in a democratic society; and freedom of movement, which means the right to move freely in Ghana, the right to leave and to enter Ghana and immunity from expulsion from Ghana.

In the case of freedom of expression, this is not only constitutionally guaranteed, but is also generally respected. From the national capital in Accra and throughout the districts, numerous private radio stations operate and several independent newspapers and magazines are published. With respect to religious freedom, the government has increased its prosecution of perpetrators of religious violence and, in addition, in regard to academic freedom, the government’s ban on campus demonstrations has not been enforced or challenged, enabling this freedom to be respected. In the case of freedom of assembly, permits are not required for meetings or demonstrations. Workers also have the right to form a trade union under new labour legislation that was signed into law by Kufuor in 2003. The new laws conform to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions. These civil liberties contributed to Ghana receiving a score of 2 for civil liberties, or in other words a freedom rating of “free”, by the 2005 Freedom House report.

To enforce and uphold the respect for human rights, Article 216 of the Constitution calls for the establishment by an Act of Parliament “within six months after Parliament first meets after the coming into force of this Constitution, a Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) which shall consist of a Commissioner for Human Rights and Administrative Justice and two Deputy Commissioners for Human Rights and Administrative Justice”; and the CHRAJ has been established:

(a) to investigate complaints of violations of fundamental rights and freedoms, injustice, corruption, abuse of power and unfair treatment of any person by a public officer in the exercise of official duties;
(b) to investigate complaints concerning the functioning of the Public Services Commission, the administrative organs of the State, the Armed Forces, the Police Service and the Prisons Service insofar as complaints relate to the failure to achieve a balanced structuring of those services or equal access by all to the recruitment of those services or fair administration in relation to those services;
(c) to investigate complaints concerning practices and actions by persons, private enterprises and other institutions where those complaints allege violations of fundamental rights and freedoms under the Constitution.

In addition, the CHRAJ holds workshops to educate the public, traditional leaders, the police and the military on human rights issues. CHRAJ receives an average of 10,000 complaints annually, mostly family-related issues, although the commission investigates some corruption cases, specifically those involving conflicts of interest. Since its inception in 1993, CHRAJ has received over 78,000 petitions and successfully resolved 64,024.

The CHRAJ has operated with no overt interference from the government, although in 2005 some critics questioned its ability to independently investigate alleged high-level corruption within the Kufuor administration. Its biggest obstacle is a lack of adequate funding, which results in low salaries, poor working conditions and the loss of many of its staff to other government and nongovernmental agencies.

2.2.2 Information rights. The right to information is severely curtailed because of the lack of access to information law. There is also the Official Secrets Act which prohibits persons in high official authority from disclosing certain matters considered official secrets. This Act, enacted during the colonial period, is still on the books. The Ghanaian parliament is currently reviewing for possible passage the “whistle-blowers’ law” which will encourage people to provide information regarding corruption. There are severe limits imposed on citizens who seek access to government documents of various kinds. Although an information bill has been drafted by civil society organisations, it is yet to be redrafted by the Attorney-General and must then be submitted to Parliament, where it will eventually be passed into law.

2.2.3 Press freedom. Freedom House (2005) describes Ghana, with a press freedom score of 26 (out of 100, 0 indicating free press, 100 indicating non-free press) as a country with a free press.

Taking advantage of the various Constitutional Provisions (1992 Constitution: Chapter 12) that guarantee freedom of expression, a large number of independent newspapers and private radio stations have emerged, with few restrictions on what they can publish or broadcast. In July 2001, the Ghanaian parliament repealed the criminal libel and sedition laws under which many journalists had previously been jailed. The NGO Article 19 declared that “The repeal of criminal libel law puts Ghana at the forefront of African countries when it comes to meeting international standards on free expression.”

More than 70 newspapers, including three state-owned dailies and four state-owned weeklies, exist in the country. Two of the state-owned dailies have national circulation. Most newspapers circulate only in regional capitals and many of the smaller privately owned newspapers are available only in Accra.

Accra alone has one state-owned and 17 privately owned FM radio stations, and there are approximately 11 state-owned and 100 privately owned FM stations across the country.
Stations are independent and air a wide range of viewpoints. There is one state-owned television station that broadcasts nationwide; three privately owned television stations that broadcast in the Greater Accra, Eastern and Ashanti regions; and three cable networks broadcasting in the Greater Accra Region, two of which also broadcast in Kumasi, Ghana’s second largest city.

Foreign media operate freely in the country, including the BBC, Radio France International and Voice of America. Foreign periodicals are available in major cities and circulated freely, even when they contain articles critical of the government.

The state-owned media reported extensively on charges of corruption or mismanagement by both current and past government officials. The state-owned media also gave some coverage to opposition politicians and printed occasional editorials critical of government policies, even though the opposition NDC has claimed that government media denied it equal access and coverage on numerous occasions. In practice, the state-controlled media gives greater exposure to government officials.

The National Media Commission (NMC) is a regulatory constitutional body set up to ensure the freedom and independence of the media and serve as an independent moderator of media-government relations. It is also charged with the responsibility of ensuring the establishment and maintenance of the highest journalistic standards in the mass media, including investigation and settlement of complaints made by or against the media. However, the NMC has had only limited effectiveness so far in playing the latter role. The challenge of disciplining errant journalists without inviting state control of the media remains unresolved, notwithstanding the adoption of a seventeen-point Code of Ethics by the Ghana Journalists Association as a way of ensuring the highest standards of discipline among its members.

At the same time, though the government generally upholds freedom in the press, there are instances of state control and harassment. On occasion, the government has blamed media personnel for inciting violence and, in April 2004, President Kufuor’s brother, together with a number of other politicians, sued a newspaper for libel. In another incident in August 2004, the independence of the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC) was called into question after it suspended journalists and the director of Ghana Television (GTV) in connection with a story it had run. The degree of freedom of expression is also tested in Ghana. The media openly criticises government policies and officials, but in October there was a clampdown in the Northern region on radio phone-in shows with so-called inflammatory political content.

### 2.3 Socio-economic context

How many of a range of conditions considered seriously disabling to civil society (e.g. widespread poverty, civil war or conflict, severe economic or social crisis, severe socio-economic inequity, pervasive adult illiteracy) are present in Ghana? The socio-economic context in which civil society exists and functions significantly limits the effective functioning of CS in Ghana, with poverty being endemic and Ghana being given the status of a Highly Indebted and Poor Country (HIPC). Though the situation continues to improve, Ghana is not free from the AIDS pandemic. Other unfavourable socio-economic conditions that persist in Ghana are discussed.

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Table III.2.3: Socio-economic context

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<td>2.3.1 Socio-economic context</td>
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1. Poverty. The 2005 UNDP Human Development Index ranked Ghana 38 out of the 177 countries surveyed. According to the fourth Ghana Living Standards Survey of 1999 (GLSS 4), 39.5% of Ghanaians are poor because they make less than the equivalent of US $100 a year (Ghana Statistical Services). Again, according to the GLSS 4, poverty is localised in the Ghanaian context. An individual residing in the three northern regions of the country is twice as likely to be poor as the average person in the country and sixteen times more likely to be poor than a resident in the Greater Accra Region. The World Bank’s World Development Index of 2004 also notes that 78.5% of Ghanaians live on less than $2 a day. The Afrobarometer report (CDD Ghana 2002) indicates that many Ghanaians are unable to afford the basic necessities of life such as food and medical care, with 40% of respondents saying they had gone without food, and 43% without water at some time during the year prior to the survey.

The current extent and depth of poverty is generally perceived to be derived from the absence of effort to change the structure of the economy since colonial times, leaving the country highly dependent on its geographical characteristics and resources for production. Located in tropical West Africa, Ghana covers a surface area of 238,537 km$^2$, and has annual mean temperatures of between 26°C and 29°C. The economy is basically agricultural with low incomes despite being regarded at Independence in 1957 as a beacon in Africa; “the shining star” on the continent (Aryeetey/McKay 2004).

Agriculture accounts for nearly 40% of GDP and 50% of all employment. Until 2003, agriculture’s growth rate lagged behind the other sectors, largely due to inefficient farming practices, dependence on rain-fed agriculture and poor transport and distribution channels. Besides major agricultural exports (especially cocoa, Ghana’s traditional export product), other major exports are minerals (notably gold, diamonds, bauxite and manganese). The tourism industry is gradually becoming an important foreign exchange earner.

The macroeconomic indicators in the GPRS I (2003-2005) period reveal that targets set by Government have been achieved, thereby leading to a stable economic environment:

- Reduced inflation – from 40.5% in December 2000 to 11.8% in 2004, increasing to 13.5% in 2005 (year-on-year);
- A stable exchange rate regime – depreciating against the dollar by 0.4% in 2005 compared to 49.8% in 2000;
- Lower interest rates – from 24% in 2003 to 15.5% in 2005; and
- An increase in private sector participation.

Analysts believe that this favourable environment has been achieved as a result of improved fiscal management and prudent monetary management (Annual Progress Report 2005:61).

However, weaknesses persist in the economy, presenting civil society organisations with severe financial and logistical challenges. Unemployment is still high and incomes are low (Ghana has one of the lowest income levels in the sub-region), making it difficult, if not impossible, for most civil society organisations to base their funding on membership dues and other internal contributions alone.
2. **Civil war.** With the exception of a few cases of ethnic violence within specific geographical locations, Ghana has not experienced civil war of any magnitude. The country has enjoyed relative peace and stability.

3. **Severe ethnic or religious conflict.** Except for the Dagbon region of northern Ghana, where conflict over succession management led to the death of the Paramount Chief of the Dagbon in the early part of 2002, there has not been any ethnic or religious conflict over the issue of self-determination in the country. Because of this conflict over succession management, a state of emergency and evening curfew was imposed in Tamale and surrounding areas for almost three years. This was done to minimise the possible occurrence of further clashes between the rival houses. The Dagbon conflict, though not completely resolved, has been managed by the national security structures.

In addition, the Centre for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) also scored Ghana with a human security rating of 3 reflecting that Ghana has experienced little or no human security problems in the past ten years.

4. **Severe economic crisis.** Data from the 2005 World Bank Global Development Finance study shows that Ghana’s total external debt/GNP rate was 107% in 2003. According to the *Afrobarometer* (CDD 2002:20), Ghanaians themselves (63%) agree that their living conditions are bad (34% fairly bad; 29% very bad). Despite this debt, Ghana is not in severe economic crisis at the present time. Ghana currently benefits from the HIPC initiative and recently had its debts cancelled as part of the G8 agreement reached at the Gleneagles summit in 2005. The HIPC initiative, in particular, has increased the resources spent on the provision of social services such as schools, hospitals and sanitation facilities.

5. **Severe social crisis.** In the last two years, Ghana has not experienced severe social crisis of any kind, such as famine, the HIV/AIDS pandemic or a natural disaster. There have been intermittent crises in the supply of certain basic utilities such as a severe water shortage in the northern regions of Ghana, but these have not worsened as the authorities manage these problems when they emerge.

6. **Severe socio-economic inequities.** Socio-economic inequity is quite high in Ghana. According to the fourth Ghana Living Standards Survey of 1999, the Gini Index for income is 0.60 while that for expenditure is 0.43. Both of these figures suggest severe socio-economic inequity in the country. Similarly, the 2004 World Development indicators in the survey year 1999 indicate the Gini Index in Ghana was 0.3.

7. **Illiteracy.** Ghana’s estimated adult literacy rate for 2003 is 53.4% (UNDP, CCA-Ghana:13); however, this masks wide variations across gender and regional and urban-rural disparities (*ibid*). For example, in 2003 while the literacy rate for men was 65.8%, that of women was only 42.3%; additionally, the urban literacy rate was 69.6% compared to a rural literacy rate of 39.8%. The lowest female literacy rate for the northern part of Ghana (12.9%) and the lowest male literacy rate (29.5%) were in the Upper East Region.

8. **Lack of Information Technology infrastructure.** According to the 2003 report of the International Telecommunications Union, Ghana has 0.17 internet hosts per 10,000 inhabitants, which is a fairly low figure.
Even though only two of the above characteristics (poverty and inequality) fully exist within the Ghanaian context, NAG members were of the view that current situations were tending towards or bore shades of some of the characteristics. They mentioned specifically the still volatile ethnic and religious hotspots in the country coupled with the numerous chieftaincy conflicts which were before the National House of Chiefs, as well as the increasing gap between the rich and the poor in the country as issues that needed to be addressed.

2.4 Socio-cultural Context

While civic norms (such as trust) are often regarded as a key component of social capital (Putnam 1993) and sometimes as a component of civil society (Bratton 1994:2), the CSI considers these norms as an important social resource for civil society to draw on and, therefore, as part of civil society’s external environment. This subdimension looks at levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness among members of society in order to assess to what extent socio-cultural norms and attitudes are conducive to civil society.

In Ghana, the socio-cultural context in which civil society exists and functions is conducive as the level of interpersonal trust is quite high. In addition, there is a high sense of public spiritedness and tolerance.

Table III.2.4: Socio-cultural context

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<td>2.4.2 Tolerance</td>
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<td>2.4.3 Public spiritedness</td>
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2.4.1 Trust. According to the GCSS, 70.6% believe that most people can be trusted, while 29.4% feel that one needs to be very careful with other people. Of this, the rural respondents were far more willing to trust in other people than peri-urban and urban respondents. While 68.8% of rural respondents shared the belief that most people can be trusted, this was only true of 18.8% of the peri-urban respondents and 12.5% of the urban respondents. Males (52.5%) were also more trusting of others than females (47.5%). Finally, respondents in the second highest quintile income bracket were the most trusting of other Ghanaians. Forty percent held the view that most Ghanaians could be trusted, a belief also shared by 28.6% of respondents in the middle income bracket and 11.7% of respondents in both the highest and second lowest quintile income bracket. Respondents in the lowest income quintile were the least trusting, and only 7.8% believed that most people could be trusted.

2.4.2 Tolerance. The Tolerance Index ranges between 0 (most tolerant attitude) and 5 (most intolerant attitude). According to the GCSS, the tolerance index is 1.8, which, in the CSI approach, would correspond to a society characterised by a moderate level of tolerance. However, it is important to bear in mind that the community survey conducted in Ghana is not a nationally representative survey and therefore it would be inappropriate to say that Ghanaian society is moderately tolerant. It would be more appropriate to say that the GCSS found a moderate level of tolerance in the local communities surveyed for the CSI. According to the GCSS data, Ghanaians are least tolerant of homosexuals (62.5% of respondents to the GCSS would not like them as neighbours), followed by AIDS patients (47.3%). About a fifth of respondents (22%) would not like a foreigner or a person of a different race/religion as their neighbour.
Ghana’s laws are discriminatory toward homosexuals, and homosexuality is criminalised in the country. There is a minimum misdemeanour charge for homosexual activity, and homosexual men are often subjected to abuse in prison. In May 2004 the acting commissioner for CHRAJ publicly suggested that the government consider decriminalising homosexuality to conform to international standards of human rights. In 2005 four male students were dismissed from a boys’ school in Akosombo in the Eastern Region of Ghana for allegedly engaging in homosexual acts. Additionally, gay and lesbian activists report that gay men are particularly vulnerable to extortion by police. A recently announced international meeting of gays and lesbians to be held in the country was called off after the government issued a statement banning the event. The government’s action was hailed by the clergy and members of the Ghanaian public as a step in the right direction.

Discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS is a problem, and the fear of being stigmatised continues to discourage people from being tested. In April 2004, the Inspector General of Police publicly urged all police officers to be tested voluntarily through a free service. Several key government representatives have publicly denounced discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS, and Cabinet has ratified a policy to protect the rights of persons living with HIV/AIDS.

Traditional and religious beliefs partly explain the Ghanaians’ level of tolerance. People frown on extremism, opulence and extravagance and would not want to be associated with persons who exhibit such lifestyles. John Kufuor’s victory at his party’s primary to lead the NPP in 2000, and his subsequent victories at the national elections of 2000 and 2004 are said to be largely due to his calm demeanour and gentleness.

2.4.3 Public spiritedness. There is a fairly strong sense of public spiritedness among Ghanaians in the local communities surveyed. According to the results of the GCSS, the Public Spiritedness Index is 2.5, which means that in the communities surveyed by the GCSS most respondents showed a fairly high level of public spiritedness (given that an index of 3 is the maximum). The majority of Ghanaians (70.9%) do not think that an individual should claim government benefits not due to him/her under any circumstances. Similarly, 70.7% of Ghanaians are of the view that cheating on taxes is unacceptable no matter the circumstances. Regarding avoiding the paying of a fare, 74.8% are of the opinion that under no circumstances are such practices acceptable.

2.5 Legal environment

The legal environment within which civil society operates in Ghana is challenging. Registration procedures for civil society, though fairly easy, are neither unambiguous nor predictable. There is a qualification which makes access dependent on the capacity of particular CSOs. Another major issue raised in the report is that, though tax exemptions exist, “CSOs are concerned that tax exemption policies are inconsistent and tend to make charitable activities unfeasible.”

Table III.2.5: CSOs’ legal environment

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<td>2.5.2 Allowable advocacy activities</td>
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<td>2.5.3 Tax exemption</td>
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<td>2.5.4 Tax benefits for philanthropy</td>
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2.5.1 CSO registration. CSO registration procedures in Ghana are governed by the Companies Code/ct 179 (1963), the Trustees Incorporation/Amendment Law (1962/1963), the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992) and Cabinet directives. The aggregate index for registration procedures ranges from 0 to 5 with an average value for this index of 1.4. According to respondents of the RSS, registration under the current regulatory framework is fairly easy. As shown in Figure 2.5.1, seventy-two percent of respondents in the RSS were of the opinion that registration was quick. However, all of the respondents were of the view that registration was by no means simple or inexpensive. Although all the respondents were of the view that there are legal provisions governing the process of registration, almost no one felt that the process of getting a CSO registered was consistent across the board.

Figure III.2.2: RSS Report on CS’s perception of registration procedures

These were corroborated by NAG members and participants at the National Workshop. They pointed to the numerous unofficial and unaccounted for payments that needed to be made to be registered. Because of the importance of registration issues, the Draft NGO policy has captured it as one of the recommended functions of the NCNGO to set up a one-stop registration point for NGOs and to clearly define the registration process.

2.5.2 Allowable advocacy activities. The legal space within which CSOs are free to operate is broad. The vast majority of respondents in the RSS (79.3%) found no unreasonable restraints on the operation of CSOs and felt that the legal requirements that exist are reasonable. Of this number, nearly half or 48.2% of RSS respondents surveyed do not think that there are any legal restrictions on CSO advocacy. They were of the opinion that a considerable number of CSOs play advocacy roles. Only 20.6% of respondents in the RSS thought that there were unreasonable restrictions on the operations of CSOs.

2.5.3 Tax exemption. The available evidence clearly indicates that though tax exemptions do exist, accessing them is difficult. There is a qualification which makes access dependent on the capacity of particular CSOs. Ghana’s taxation laws exempt organisations whose operations and activities are purely non-profit business. In Ghana, all CSOs which are referred to in official circles as NGOs are classified as non-profit organisations dedicated to providing free services to people. This focus of the NGOs qualifies them for tax exemption. Hence, apart from securing legal status by registering with the Registrar General, they are expected to sign up as non-profit organisations with the Department of Social Welfare in
order to benefit from government tax exemptions. Tax exemption is available for CSOs in Ghana, but they are required to register with the Department of Social Welfare in order to gain such tax exemption benefits. The registration with the Social Welfare Department is intended to clarify and certify whether a CSO is non-profit. However, there have been abuses of the system by certain CSOs. Computers and other relief items, having been imported ostensibly for humanitarian purposes, have ended up on the open market. As a result, the process of acquiring tax exemption has been made more stringent, with the effect that only organisations with a 'good track record' are able to gain approval. Invariably, these organisations are well-resourced and CSOs therefore complains that tax exemption policies are inconsistent and tend to make charitable activities unfeasible.

2.5.4 Tax benefits for philanthropy. There are no tax benefits for acts of individual or corporate philanthropy. Indeed, tax exemptions have not been a popular feature in the Ghanaian tax administration. This has to do with a huge information gap as most of the society is not very conversant with the tax regime. Thus, one cannot identify significant incentive systems that support CSOs.

2.6 State-Civil society relations

This subdimension seeks to assess the nature and quality of state-civil society relations by looking at issues of CSO autonomy, state-civil society dialogue and cooperation/support.

Government-CSO relations in Ghana, like the activities of CSOs, have evolved from limited interaction and discord to greater engagement and accommodation within the past decade. At the district, regional and national levels of governance, Government officials and CSO leaders and activists are interacting more and more, acknowledging the complementary nature of their separate as well as their related roles. Through this interaction, both groups have come to understand their separate concerns and anxieties (CDD-Ghana Research Paper No. 7).

Government concerns about CSOs include the following. First, some CSOs operate without proper registration, making it difficult to monitor their operations as non-profit organisations. Second, CSOs have a tendency to implement projects without prior consultation with district and regional development planning authorities. Apart from problems of duplication, these practices divert attention from official development priorities and make for inefficient allocation and utilisation of limited development resources. Third, rivalry and competition among CSOs fuels the proliferation of CSOs and makes them ‘ungovernable’ and difficult to represent in high-level policy-making. Fourth, allegations of fraudulent practices and violation of rules of non-profit operations makes the identity and credibility of some NGOs questionable. Fifth, the poor discharge of the duty of CSOs in terms of submitting reports on their operations to the appropriate authorities raises questions about their transparency and local accountability. Finally, the general lack of information on the scope of CSO activities in the non-profit sector hinders the measurement of their contributions to economic growth and development (NGO Policy 2004).

Table III.2.6: State-Civil society relations

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<td>2.6.1 Autonomy</td>
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<td>2.6.2 Dialogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.6.3 Cooperation/support</td>
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2.6.1 Autonomy. Information on the extent of the autonomy a CSO enjoys is somewhat mixed. The concern of CSOs is that government officials tend to make statements that question their status as autonomous civil society organisations, their identity as credible actors in the non-profit sector and their right to participate in the formulation of social and economic policies, not merely in the implementation of government programmes. Government takes more interest in regulating them in a manner that controls their operations and undermines their autonomy than it does in promoting their self-regulation and growth (NGO Policy 2004). Official policy indicates that CSOs have autonomy, but in Ghana, as in many Third World countries, certain actions by individual officials in authority may hamper the autonomy that CSOs may enjoy. Thus only 17.7% of RSS respondents were of the view that once CSOs registered with the Attorney General’s Department and submitted their annual accounts, they had complete autonomy. Thirty-eight percent thought that the state rarely interfered with the activities of CSOs, while a reasonably large number, 44%, were of the view that the state sometimes interfered with CSOs.

2.6.2 Dialogue. The majority of RSS respondents (58%) were of the view that dialogue between the state and civil society was moderate. Thirty percent, however, thought it was limited while another 1% thought it was non-existent. On the other hand, 6% thought it was extensive. Five percent of respondents could not judge the level of dialogue between the two actors. The state’s response to the NGOs’ request to withdraw the NGO Bill of 1993 and the subsequent partnership between civil society and the state that culminated in the development of the NGO Policy is a concrete example of the impact of state-civil society dialogue. However, this dialogue was initiated in response to a particular problem. Lately, the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC), the state agency responsible for coordinating Ghana’s Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP equivalent), has been engaging civil society in the development of some of its programmes. The only institutionalised terms and rules of engagement between civil society and the state have reference to CSO representation on statutory bodies such as the newly created Millennium Development Authority (MIDA) Board to oversee the implementation of the Millennium Challenge Account projects. The media review revealed one report of dialogue between civil society and the state where the Concerned Copyright Advocates held a discussion with the President on the contents of the Copyright Bill.

2.6.3 Cooperation/support. There is no formal mechanism for state support to CSOs. According to respondents to the RSS, only 13% of surveyed CSOs receive less than 10% of their funding from the government while 87% received more than 10% of their funding from the government. This high share stems from the fact that funds received through quasi state agencies such as the Ghana AIDS Commission, which is administering a fund jointly contributed to by international agencies such as the World Bank and the government, are perceived as state-related funding or assistance.

The media review highlighted donations by various groups and organisations, particularly NGOs, as well as a few individuals. However, there was no mention of state funding to civil society organisations. Indeed, The Ghana National Trust Fund (GNTF) is one of the main mechanisms through which funding is provided to civil society actors. The GNTF is a quasi-governmental community chest, which pools resources from public-spirited institutions, corporate bodies and individuals to provide subventions to eighteen registered organisations as well as disabled individuals. The government does not contribute to this fund directly, except to hold funds in trust for disbursement to the appropriate CSOs and agencies. It is
difficult to assess the exact contribution of GNTF funds to the total funds of the eighteen organisations because of the lack of access to the total amounts of money these organisations have available.

State resource allocation to CSOs in Ghana is almost non-existent, considering the chronic economic difficulties faced by Third World states. However, as CSOs continue to show superiority to the state’s own structures in the efficient use of resources, it is expected that the state will increasingly involve CSOs in the delivery of services to citizens.

2.7 Private sector-Civil society relations

This subdimension assesses private sector attitudes towards civil society as well as levels of corporate social responsibility and corporate philanthropy. Relations between the private sector and civil society in Ghana are notably poor, characterised either by indifference or suspicion.

Table III.2.7: Private sector-civil society relations

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<td>2.7.1 Private sector attitude</td>
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<td>2.7.2 Corporate social responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.7.3 Corporate philanthropy</td>
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2.7.1 Private sector attitude. RSS respondents were of the view that the attitude of the private sector to CSOs leaves much to be desired. A reasonably large number of respondents to the RSS (40%) thought that private sector actors were suspicious of CSOs, while another large number (32%) thought they were indifferent to CSOs. Only twenty-five percent of respondents thought that the private sector has a favourable attitude towards civil society. This view reflects the fact that there have not been many cooperative or participatory joint endeavours between CSOs and the private sector. Indeed, the RSS respondents indicated that the private sector only sometimes participates in CSO activities, and a reasonably large number (40 percent) said the private sector rarely participates in CSO activities.

In Ghana, the private sector remains weak; a direct cause of civil society’s weak financial resource base, notwithstanding the Government’s avowed aim of making the private sector the “engine of growth”. One of the key objectives of the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I), Ghana’s economic blueprint (2003-2005), was to strengthen the private sector in an active way to ensure that it is capable of acting effectively as the engine of growth and prosperity (GPRS II:29). However, in spite of the considerable efforts made to address the private sector constraints, substantial structural problems exist. Lack of access to finance, especially for women; falling but still fairly high interest rates; weak commercial dispute resolution systems; insecurity and vulnerability in the informal sector where the youth and women predominate; weak linkages between informal sector and formal sector activities; and a weak institutional and regulatory framework for small business administration still remain issues that require some urgent attention. (Annual Progress Report: 107). A weak and struggling private sector is unlikely to assist in any strong measure with the activities of CSOs.

Since the CSO (third) sector is still in its development stages in Ghana, the private sector has yet to come to terms with the operations of CSOs, particularly its “cup-in-hand” mode of generating income which is in sharp contrast to the private sector’s practice of producing
goods or services in order to survive. Without this acceptance, the private sector views CSOs with suspicion. Finally, like the government in some situations, the private sector is yet to see the contributions of civil society towards positive social change and economic development.

**Figure III.2.3: Private sector's attitude towards Civil Society (RSS)**

2.7.2 Corporate social responsibility. Corporate social responsibility is still a largely undeveloped concept within Ghanaian business circles, practised so far by only a few high income corporations. In addition, consumers have not insisted that corporate entities make social responsibility a criterion for their support of goods and services. Sixty-five percent of RSC respondents were of the view that companies exhibited an insignificant or limited degree of corporate social responsibility, and only 10% of the respondents were of the view that the extent of corporate social responsibility was significant.

Discussants in all the regional stakeholder consultations mentioned mining companies as being notorious for failing to take their corporate responsibilities seriously. This was in particular reference to the way they treated the environment, a point noted in all the regional stakeholder consultations. Media reports of oil spillages in mining communities and the reticence of mining officials abound. In the Wassa West District, the district with the highest concentration of mineral resources, a civil society organisation known as the Wass Association of Communities Affected by Mining (WACAM) has been established to counter this threat. WACAM was cited at all three regional stakeholder consultations for their advocacy activities to protect the environment and ensure better living standards for residents of these areas.

The international beverage companies in Ghana, particularly Guinness Ghana Limited and the Coca Cola Bottling Company, have a better track record with regard to their commitment to the protection of the environment in Ghana than the mining companies. In 2004, for example, Guinness Ghana Limited invested 21.2 billion cedis (approximately US $2 million) in the company to ensure that they achieved the highest international environmental standards for the treatment of effluent. This would ensure lower energy consumption and lower rates of waste production. Likewise, the Coca Cola Bottling Company of Ghana Limited has constructed two wastewater facilities in their two plants at a cost of US $1,700,000 to ensure that effluents from the plants is rendered biodegradable before being discharged into natural water sources. The Coca Cola Company also provides funding for the preservation of the Sakumono Ramsar Wetlands.
The financial contributions of five of the top ten companies in the country have been documented (Appendix C), but these contributions are a small percentage of the net profits of these companies. For example, the Produce Buying Company spent only 0.25% of its net profit after tax on donations to CSOs. Four of the five companies studied target their financial contributions at development-related activities such as the provision of water and electricity. The majority of civil society actors that receive these funds are community based organisations and town development councils. The fifth company studied, Nestlé, directs its funds to sports associations. Indeed, the company is the biggest corporate sponsor of sports in the country. According to its annual reports, over the last two years (2003-2005) it has committed well over three billion cedis ($300,000) to various activities like the Milo marathon and school/university tennis, football and volleyball teams.

Large businesses such as the mining companies and financial institutions have mainly engaged the media to do PR for them by broadcasting their philanthropic gestures, which they call corporate social responsibility. But the amounts they spend on these acts are ridiculously low, compared to their huge profit margins.

Corporate Social Responsibility in Ghana is high on the agenda partly because of civil society activism, and partly because of the global move and talk about it. It has thus become a buzzword and fashionable for corporations to claim to be observing their social responsibilities.

However, there are a few issues worth talking about. First is corporate tax: Only a few companies are paying their corporate taxes, and the government is looking at ways to bring a lot more companies into the tax net. The irony of the matter is that these same companies who are not paying their corporate taxes are those championing corporate social responsibility, affirming the notion that the whole issue of corporate social responsibility is a public relations gimmick being played by businesses.

When fully defined, corporate social responsibility means responsibility to all stakeholders, including the community, employees and shareholders. However, a number of these so called champions of corporate social responsibility have issues to settle with their employees in the areas of working conditions, wages, social relations within the work environment, etc. How can they, then say they are socially responsible?

Finally, the private sector in Ghana is yet to see itself as a (corporate) citizen with rights and responsibilities like any other citizen. They have the right to take from the people and a responsibility to return what they take. Unfortunately, private corporations in Ghana rather see themselves as doing the rest of the citizenry a favour by giving back to the community, what they take from them.

2.7.3 Corporate philanthropy. The general view is that, while the private sector provided only a small proportion of civil society funding, the range of CSOs who actually benefit from any such funds is minimal. In Ghana, as in much of Africa (with the exception of South Africa), corporate funding for civil society is severely limited (Gyimah-Boadi 2004:108). Fifteen percent of RSS respondents are of the view that the private sector provided less than 10% of CSO funding while 85% were of the view that private companies provided more than 10% of CSO funding.
Conclusion

The environment within which civil society operates in Ghana has not always been conducive, and civil society has operated sometimes covertly. The situation changed with the decay or near collapse of the Ghanaian state during the 1970s and 1980s when it became apparent that the citizenry was poised to adopt collective measures to manage their situation, while the state took policies of contraction or measures towards shrinking its arena (Gyimah-Boadi et al. 2000:8). Since Ghana’s re-democratisation in the Fourth Republic which began in 1992, the political atmosphere has become friendlier towards civil society.

The overall score for the *environment dimension is 1.4*, indicating that it is only fair and has room for improvement. The perception appears to be that the formal manifestations of a liberal democratic environment are present, but the practice or reality may not always be the same. Ghanaians enjoy extensive political rights under the Fourth Republican dispensation. There are no noticeable restrictions on people’s right to participation in political processes. In the Freedom House Political Rights Index (2004) Ghana scores a 2 (on the 0-7 scale), which reflects a freedom rating of ‘Free’.

Ghana operates a multiparty democracy which appears to be gearing itself towards a two-party system, generally perceived as an advantage for consolidating Ghana’s democracy (Sandbrook and Oelbaum 1999:28). The success of an electoral turnaround from an incumbent party in government (NDC, 1992-2000) to another party (NPP, 2000 to date) is a great manifestation of political contestation and competition. The problem is that political parties are weakly institutionalised and lack distinct philosophies and ideologies. Since Ghana’s return to constitutional rule in 1992, the rule of law has been upheld for the most part and arbitrary political actions have ceased.

Trust and confidence in the predictability of the “rules of the game” is not very strong and there is only a moderate level of confidence in the law, especially law enforcement; covert violations of the rules by citizens and state authorities are not uncommon. Corruption is the most worrisome social challenge and there is a general perception that corruption is widespread. Though its officials and agencies are notably ineffective and corrupt, the Ghanaian state possesses some degree of capacity and is able to implement many of its goals and functions. Ghana’s decentralised local government system under the District Assembly was established to improve governance and state capacity. It aims at democratic decentralisation – ensuring autonomy, authority and accountability and providing resources to the local levels. The constitution of Ghana mandates the government to release 5% of gross national revenue to the districts (District Assemblies Common Fund). The decentralisation programme has yet to prove meaningful.

Basic freedoms of expression, conscience, association and religion are constitutionally guaranteed and generally respected. Press freedom is strongly upheld. However, the general socioeconomic context is unpleasant as the indicators point to widespread poverty. A recent *Afrobarometer* report (CDD-Ghana 2002) indicates that many Ghanaians are unable to afford basic necessities of life such as food and medical care, with 40% of respondents saying they had gone without food. Despite the poor economic conditions, there have not been any noticeable incidents of civil or ethnic strife.

The socio-cultural environment is not very conducive for CSOs. The GCSS indicates a low social capital. The majority of Ghanaians felt there is widespread mistrust. The legal
environment is also not very accommodating. Though a large number of RSS respondents thought registration procedures for CSOs are relatively quick, a significant 99% were concerned that inconsistencies were pervasive in registration formalities and made them cumbersome and costly in time and resources. However, CSOs have abundant space within which to operate and there are no unreasonable restrictions.

Government-CSO relations have evolved from limited interaction and discord to increasing engagement and accommodation over the past decade. Legally, CSOs enjoy autonomy, yet certain surreptitious acts and remarks by some state authorities undermine any perceived autonomy, especially because there are no explicit official policies indicating the range of autonomy that CSOs could enjoy. Indeed, a reasonably large number (44%) of RSS respondents were of the view that the state sometimes interfered with CSOs. While a state-CSO relationship is less sanguine, relations between CSOs and private business are generally indifferent. The majority (71%) of RSS saw relations with the private sector as either indifferent or suspicious, a situation informed by low levels of perception about corporate responsibility.
3. VALUES

This dimension is concerned with the principles and values adhered to, practised and promoted by civil society. The VALUES dimension is composed of seven subdimensions with a total of 14 indicators. The subdimensions reflect a set of universally accepted social and political norms (drawn, for example, from sources such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). Indicators look both at how these values are practised within civil society and civil society efforts to promote the values in society at large.

![Figure III.3.1: Subdimension scores in VALUES Dimension](image)

### 3.1 Democracy

To what extent do civil society organisations practice internal democracy (e.g. in selecting leaders and making decisions) and how actively are they involved in promoting democracy at a societal level?

Largely, civil society in Ghana significantly practises and promotes democracy in several ways, and internal democracy in CS is quite noticeable. Opportunities abound for inclusion of CS members in decision-making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table III.3.1: Democracy</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1 Democratic practices within CSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.2 CS actions to promote democracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**3.1.1 Democratic practices within CSOs.** To measure the level of internal democracy, the extent to which members participated in the selection of leaders and the extent to which members could influence decision-making in the CSOs to which they belonged were assessed. Research conducted by the Institute of Economic Affairs in 1996 reveals a high commitment to internal democracy, where 77.5% of the respondents reported that their officers had been elected. However, the results from the CSI regional stakeholder survey
conducted a decade later show a large deviation from the figure quoted by the Institute of Economic Affairs. In the CSI survey, only 41% of the respondents noted that the leaders in their CSOs were elected through democratic elections. Almost a third (27%) were appointed, and in 7% of the cases, leaders were self-appointed. A full quarter of the sample surveyed did not know what mechanisms had been employed for their leaders to assume office. This is probably due either to the fact that they had not been members long enough to witness succession or that they had missed the meetings when succession had taken place. This large number of respondents affirming a lack of knowledge regarding succession processes partly explains the discrepancy between the RSS results and that of the Institute of Economic Affairs.

Concerning the second measure of internal democracy, 3% of the respondents noted that they had little or no influence on decision-making within the CSOs to which they belonged, 14% had limited influence on decision-making, 41% had moderate influence on decision-making, while 42% had substantial influence on decision-making within the CSOs to which they belonged. On the whole, respondents had much more influence over decision-making than they did over leadership selection.

3.1.2 CS actions to promote democracy. Generally, respondents to the RSS were of the view that CS actions to promote democracy were limited. Six percent of respondents could not think of any examples of CS actions to promote democracy. Fifty-three percent thought that there were only one or two examples of action on the part of civil society to promote democracy. On the other hand, 30% thought that there were several examples of attempts on the part of civil society to promote democracy, while 11% thought that there were many examples of CS action to promote democracy.

The Institute of Economic Affairs Ghana, a public policy think tank, is at the forefront of CSO activities to promote democracy. With support from the Netherlands Institute for Multi-Party Democracy (NIMD), the organisation set up the Chairmen’s Caucus and the Platform of General Secretaries and Policy Analysts as institutionalised dialogue processes for chairmen, general secretaries and policy analysts respectively of the four major political parties in Ghana. In addition, in 2004, the organisation, in collaboration with all the registered political parties, developed the Political Parties Code of Conduct to guide the parties in the conduct of their political campaigns to ensure violence free elections. Finally, in 1996 the organisation, set up the first election observer group, NADEO, to observe general elections in the country. The outcome of all these efforts is that the usual disagreements among political parties have not deteriorated into widespread violence. The public exhibition of friendship and cordiality among leading members of political parties as a result of the creation of the Caucus and Platform has also helped reduce political tensions in the country.

Respondents thought that in spite of civil society’s limited actions to promote democracy, their role in promoting democracy was quite high. With regard to the role that civil society played in promoting democracy, 4% thought that it was insignificant, 18% thought it was limited, 42% thought it was moderate and 36% thought that it was significant.

In terms of local political processes, civil society’s role is central since the constitution of Ghana makes local elections non-partisan. If this aspect of local political processes is brought to bear, the role of CSOs in promoting democracy might be greater than estimated. There was also one report of civil society action to promote democracy in the media review where the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers called on the government to adopt an open
voter registration system.

The general conclusion is that a number of CS actions to promote democracy definitely existed, and that public visibility of such actions is discernible.

### 3.2 Transparency

This subdimension looks at corruption and financial transparency within civil society, as well as civil society actions to promote transparency at a societal level.

The extent to which civil society practises and promotes transparency is very encouraging, although there are occasions when this is less than adequate. This conclusion is drawn from the level of corruption as gathered from RSS reports and media reviews.

**Table III.3.2: Transparency**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1 Corruption within civil society</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2 Financial transparency of CSOs</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.3 CS actions to promote transparency</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.2.1 Corruption within civil society

Government and the donor community have accused civil society organisations of engaging in fraudulent practices and violating rules of non-profit operations. Gyimah-Boadi (2004:111) notes that part of the reason some CSOs are disparaged is because they “are sometimes leading violators of the democratic principles of accountability, transparency and internal democracy. Some civil society actors have been accused of operating without proper registration, making it difficult to monitor their operations as non-profit organisations. This is one of the reasons why they have to register with the Department of Social Welfare”.

This assessment is not very different from the self-assessment provided by respondents to the regional stakeholder questionnaire, which showed that 44% of respondents thought that corruption within civil society was occasional and 11% thought it was very rare. However, a reasonably large number said that corruption was either frequent (34%) or very frequent (8%).

Participants at the regional stakeholder consultations provided two sets of explanations for the discrepancy in perspectives. The first had to do with the fact that, as explained during the regional stakeholder consultations, those who thought it was frequent cited the occasional media reports. The others were of the opinion that since media reports on these issues were infrequent, it meant that corruption within civil society was infrequent. Secondly, discussants at the regional stakeholder consultations were of the opinion that corruption within civil society was largely limited to those small CSOs whose accounting procedures were not scrutinised by either funding agencies or auditors. Corruption was high among this group and low among the others.

In general, there is not much information on the transparent operations of CSOs. Thus, the *Afrobarometer* (CDD 2002) notes that CSOs are perceived as the least corrupt but they also received the highest rate of non-response on that issue. In 2005, for example, the officials of Coalition and Advocacy for Women Empowerment were cited in the Daily Graphic for having defrauded 750 women in the amount of 138,750,000 cedis (US $14,000).
Corruption within civil society is a major concern among civil society practitioners. At the national workshop, a lot of discussion was focused on the issue with participants expressing concern that their hard-won reputation and image was being destroyed by a few unscrupulous individuals. They concluded that the best solution was the passage of the Draft NGO Policy.

3.2.2 Financial transparency of CSOs. Yet another measure of the extent to which CSOs adhere to good governance principles is seen in their members’ knowledge of funds available to the organisations, and the source of these funds. Over 80% of the respondents in the RSS could not tell what proportion of their CSO funds came from the state, foreign donors, the private sector or membership/service fees. The financial books of many civil society organisations are closed to all but a few people within the organisation. Fifty-four percent of respondents noted that their CSOs made their accounts available to members while 46% of the respondents noted that the books were closed to members. To ensure financial transparency, CSOs must open their books to their members and the general public.

3.2.3 CS actions to promote transparency. The overall indication is that there are some CS actions to promote government transparency (65%) and that examples are available, from media houses and the Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII), the Ghana chapter of Transparency International, noted for being at the forefront of CS actions to promote government transparency, and which publishes the Corruption Perception Index. Moreover, a large number of RSS respondents (68%) considered the role of CS in promoting government transparency to be significant or at least moderate.

Eight percent of RSS respondents could not think of any examples of civil society actively promoting government transparency. Sixty-five percent could provide one or two examples of civil society working actively to promote transparency on the part of the government in particular. Twenty-four percent of RSS respondents were of the view that there were several examples of civil society working actively to promote government transparency while 3% were of the view that there were many examples of such attempts on the part of civil society.

The media houses and other organisations such as Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII) were the two kinds of CSOs cited in the RSS as being very much at the forefront of the fight for transparency on the part of government. During the regional stakeholder consultations, mention was also made of Mr. Komla Dumor, the radio broadcaster who broke the news on the misuse of pension funds at the Social Security and National Insurance Trust in 1998, which later earned him the coveted award of Journalist of the Year for 1999.

Table III.3.2.3.1: Civil society role in ensuring government and corporate transparency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role of Civil Society</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Playing a significant role in promoting government transparency</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of Civil Society in promoting government transparency moderate</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of Civil Society in promoting corporate transparency moderate</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of Civil Society in promoting corporate transparency insignificant</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of Civil Society in promoting government transparency insignificant</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of Civil Society in promoting corporate transparency insignificant</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS playing a limited role in ensuring government transparency</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS playing a limited role in ensuring corporate transparency</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3 Tolerance

This subdimension looks at the balance between tolerant and intolerant forces within civil society as well as the extent to which civil society is engaged in promoting tolerance within society at large. Here, the lack of a normative (“civil”) element in the CSI definition of civil society shows its operational relevance as this subdimension looks specifically at the influence of intolerant groups within civil society.

In Ghana, civil society practises and promotes tolerance to a large extent and incidents of racism and blatant discriminatory practices are not common among CSOs.

Table III.3.3: Tolerance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.3.1 Tolerance within the civil society arena</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.2 CS actions to promote tolerance</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3.1 Tolerance within the civil society arena. Intolerance is not a major problem within the civil society arena. Only 2% of RSS respondents thought that there were many examples of intolerance while 10% thought that there were several examples of intolerance within civil society. Fifty-two percent were of the opinion that there were only one or two examples of intolerance, while 36% were of the view that there were no examples of intolerance within the civil society arena.

With regard to dominance within civil society, it became clear that respondents were of the view that only some examples of intolerant actions by civil society actors were enough to declare the civil society arena as a whole as highly intolerant. Thus 53% of respondents thought that intolerant actors were a significant part of civil society, while another 4% of the respondents stated that intolerant civil society actors dominated the civil society arena. Sixteen percent of respondents were of the view that there were only isolated cases of intolerant civil society actors while another 21% were of the view that of the isolated occasions of intolerance being shown, these were strongly denounced.

3.3.2 CS actions to promote tolerance. Regarding efforts on the part of civil society to promote tolerance, 8% of respondents to the RSS could not provide any examples of such efforts. Sixty-two percent could think of one or two examples while 30% knew of several or even many examples of civil society efforts at promoting tolerance. An example of efforts to promote tolerance that came up in the media review was the youth of Dagbon Traditional Area who have been active in promoting peace. The Dagbon Traditional Area is an ethnic and chieftaincy hotspot in the country, which recently experienced violence that claimed several lives.

In terms of the role of civil society in promoting tolerance, RSS respondents were divided. Twenty-eight percent were of the view that civil society had played a significant role in this regard, 31% thought civil society played a moderate role. On the other hand, 34% thought their role was limited while a much smaller percentage of 7% thought civil society played an insignificant role in promoting tolerance.

Regarding the significance of these civil society actions, only 7% thought that the civil society role in promoting tolerance was insignificant, meaning an acceptance of the role of civil society in promoting tolerance in the country.
3.4 Non-violence

While civil society can play an important role in denouncing violence, resolving conflict and building peace, it is also at times an arena where groups use violent means to express their interests. This subdimension assesses the presence of violent forces within civil society as well as civil society efforts to promote non-violence (at the individual, household and/or societal level). The sources of information include media sources and RSS.

Table III.3.4: Non-violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.4.1 Non-violence within the civil society arena</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.2 CS actions to promote non-violence</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.4.1 Non-violence within the civil society arena. RSS respondents viewed the use of violent means, whether damage to property or physical violence among CS actors, as quite pervasive. Forty-four percent of respondents to the RSS were of the view that isolated groups used violence on a regular basis while another 18% held the perception that isolated groups used violence occasionally. An additional 3% of respondents to the RSS went as far as to say that violence was a mass-based effort. Only 35% of respondents were of the opinion that the use of violence among civil society actors was very rare. The youth wings of political groups were mentioned during the regional stakeholder consultations as major culprits in this regard.

Less than half the respondents were of the opinion that civil society’s use of violence was summarily denounced. Twenty-two percent held the view that such behaviour was always denounced, while another twenty-two percent said it was usually denounced. On the other hand, 5% held the view that it was never denounced while 51% were of the opinion that acts of violence on the part of civil society actors were rarely denounced.

3.4.2 CS actions to promote non-violence. Respondents perceived actions on the part of civil society to promote non-violence in the society as not being too widespread. Two percent were of the opinion that there were no such examples. Sixty-three percent thought one could cite only one or two examples of such action. The media’s role in urging unity among Ghanaians during elections was cited in the RSS, likewise the role played by the youth leaders in the Dagbon traditional area in advocating for non-violence in the region. During the regional stakeholder consultations, mention was also made of the role of the Anti-Conflict Foundation and the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) in promoting non-violence in the public sphere. The Ark Foundation was also cited as promoting non-violence in the domestic household setting. For the last few years, a number of organisations, many of which work on women’s issues, have participated in the 16 Days of Activism on Violence Against Women, which is a United Nations-approved activity that takes place worldwide between 25th November and 10th December each year.

Only 23% of respondents to the RSS thought that there were several examples of actions on the part of civil society to promote non-violence while another 12% mentioned that there were many examples of such efforts. In terms of the role they play in this effort, 21% are of the view that it is significant, 35% think that it is moderate, 35% have the perception that it is limited while another 8% think that civil society plays an insignificant role in promoting non-violence.
3.5 Gender Equity

This subdimension assesses gender-equitable practices within CSOs as well as civil society actions to promote gender equity at the societal level.

Table III.3.5: Gender Equity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.5.1 Gender equity within the civil society arena</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.2 Gender-equitable practices within CSOs</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.3 CS actions to promote gender equity at the society level</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.5.1 Gender equity within the civil society arena. With regard to sexist forces within civil society, almost a third of respondents (31%) were of the opinion that there were no examples of such behaviour. Forty-six percent thought that there were only one or two examples of such forces within civil society. Overall as many as 77% of RSS respondents believed that sexist discrimination is not significant within CSOs. On the other hand, almost a fifth of the respondents (17%) thought there were several examples of such forces within civil society while another 6% held the view that there were many examples of such forces within civil society.

Regarding responses to such sexist forces, 7% held the view that civil society in general never denounced such forces while another 48% were of the opinion that civil society rarely denounced such sexist forces. On the other hand, 22% held the view that civil society usually denounced such forces while another 23% thought that civil society always denounced such behaviour. There were no accounts of gender equity within the civil society arena in the media review undertaken.

3.5.2 Gender equitable practices within CSOs. Gender equity within CSOs is not a well-established practice, and in fact almost a third of respondents did not know if such policies existed in the CSOs to which they belonged. Another 31% mentioned that there were no such policies in the organisations to which they belonged. Only 38.7% mentioned that a gender policy existed in the CSOs to which they belonged to ensure gender equitable practices. One such organisation identified during the fact-finding phase of the project was the Ark Foundation, which has both a maternity and paternity leave policy, although the paternity leave is much shorter than the maternity leave. In addition, beyond the maternity leave period, women with young children are allowed to bring the child along with a child-minder to the work place.

3.5.3 CS actions to promote gender equity at the society level. The findings of the RSS indicated that a small majority of RSS respondents (52%) thought that CS is a driving force in promoting gender equity and that there were several examples of such actions. With reference to action on the part of civil society to promote gender equity at the societal level, only 6% of RSS respondents were of the view that there were no examples, and 42% held the opinion that there were one or two examples. Forty percent thought there were several examples of such efforts while 12% thought that there were many efforts on the part of civil society in this regard. As part of the RSS, mention was made of the women’s wings of political parties and other CSOs as an example of such practices. During the regional stakeholder consultations, an organisation such as Women in Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF), for example, was mentioned as occasionally making demands on the government either by pushing it to ratify protocols on the rights of women or to put in place measures that
will make its ratification of other protocols meaningful. This was confirmed in the media review undertaken, which also documented the work of the Ark Foundation in sensitising church leaders to be responsive to the issues of domestic violence.

In terms of the role of civil society actors in such efforts, the majority of respondents thought that civil society played an important role in this regard. Forty-two percent of respondents thought that civil society played a significant role in this regard while 39% were of the opinion that the role civil society played in promoting gender equity was moderate. Only 2% thought their role was insignificant while another 17% held the view that the role of civil society in this regard was limited.

3.6 Poverty eradication

Civil society efforts to address poverty issues and promote pro-poor policies are considered an important indicator of civil society’s values. In a poor country like Ghana, the fight against poverty is a major challenge that faces the government and the people. Fortunately, CS has joined the battle and, clearly, CS in Ghana is a major driving force in the struggle to eradicate poverty. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and strong public visibility.

Table III.3.6: Poverty Eradication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.6.1 CS actions to eradicate poverty</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.6.1 CS actions to eradicate poverty. According to the fourth Ghana Living Standards Survey of 1999, forty percent of Ghana’s total population lives in poverty. More than half of the RSS respondents thought that civil society engaged in numerous poverty eradication activities. Forty-one percent thought that there were several examples of such efforts while another 18% thought that there were many examples of such efforts. Thirty-eight percent held that there were at least one or two examples of such efforts. Only 3% were of the opinion that there were no examples of poverty eradication activities on the part of civil society.

Regarding the role of civil society in this regard, forty percent of respondents to the RSS were of the belief that civil society plays a moderate role in poverty eradication while another 26% thought that civil society plays a significant role in poverty reduction. Twenty-nine percent held the opinion that the role civil society played in eradicating poverty was limited while 5% thought it was insignificant.

Government’s poverty reduction measures, discussants at the regional stakeholder consultations held, have been complemented by the efforts of NGOs. OXFAM was specifically mentioned in this regard for leading a campaign in 2005 for the removal of policies that make locally produced rice very expensive. They have organised forums on the topic and sponsored the creation of a billboard that encourages people to buy locally produced rice as a strategy to reduce poverty amongst Ghanaian rice farmers. Thus, a large number of CSOs exist to fight poverty in Ghana, and this explains their large presence in poverty-stricken areas of the country.

The Ghana National Education Coalition Campaign (GNECC) was also mentioned during the stakeholder consultations as a good example of a civil society actor working to eradicate
poverty. The GNECC has pushed for capitation grants for all children in the forty poorest districts of the country to ensure that these children, although growing up in very poor communities, will not be denied basic education which would be one tool that can help lift them out of the poverty of their environments.

Despite widespread and deepening poverty in the country, especially in the three northern regions, civil society efforts to eradicate poverty have been very significant. NAG members were therefore of the view that perhaps without the various civil society interventions the poverty situation in the country would have been much worse.

### 3.7 Environmental protection

The importance of protecting the environment and promoting sustainable forms of development that meet the needs of both current and future generations is a universally accepted principle. This subdimension assesses the extent to which civil society is actively engaged in promoting environmental sustainability.

Though not very widespread, the role of CS in environmental protection in Ghana is quite laudable. The activities of those few CSOs who advocate environmental protection achieve far-reaching results.

#### Table III.3.7: Environmental protection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Score</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.7.1 CS actions to sustain the environment</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.7.1 **CS actions to sustain the environment.** Regarding examples of civil society actors that work to protect the environment, only 6% of respondents said there were none while 46% held the view that there were at least one or two examples of such action. Thirty-one percent thought that there were several examples of such action while another 17% held the opinion that there were many examples of such action.

The role of civil society in protecting the environment is also generally seen as important. Twenty-two percent of respondents to the RSS were of the view that it was significant while another 43% said it was moderate. On the other hand, 30% said civil society played a limited role in protecting the environment while another 5% were of the opinion that civil society’s role in protecting the environment was insignificant.

During all three regional stakeholder consultations, WACAM was mentioned as an example of CS activity towards environmental sustainability. Formed in October 1998, it currently has a membership of 20,000 spread across 34 communities. WACAM has embarked on providing communities with mobilisation training to enable them to effectively engage with mining companies. They have also entered into partnerships with international advocacy groups for global campaigns on mining and community rights. In this regard, together with a representative from the League of Environmental Journalists, the Executive Director of WACAM joined community leaders from Indonesia, Peru, Romania and the USA at the annual shareholders’ conference of Newmont Mining Company, the world’s largest gold producer, to call on the company to reform its environmental practices at its operational sites throughout the world. With specific reference to Ghana, these two representatives called on the company to refrain from opening open pit mines in the nation’s forest reserves. The role of civil society in ensuring environmental protection in Ghana is significant, but has so far...
been limited to a large extent to mining areas, albeit with a lot of success. As a result, the NAG scored 2 for this indicator.

Conclusion

Ghanaian civil society practices and promotes positive values to quite a significant extent with an overall score of 2.0. The values on which CSOs are assessed are: Democracy, Transparency, Tolerance, Non-Violence, Gender Equity, Poverty Eradication and Environmental Concerns. The scores on these values are provided in Figure 3 above. The overall score for values indicates that CSOs share positive values including fair/democratic internal practices and engaging in activities to promote the respective values in the larger society.

Gender equity within CSOs is not a very well-established practice and almost a third of respondents did not know if such policies existed in the CSOs to which they belonged. In addition, not all CSOs have explicit policies on gender equity. However, civil society actively promotes gender equity in the society and there are numerous examples of such activities.

The use of violence among isolated groups such as youths of political parties is quite worrying. While 44% of respondents to the RSS were of the view that such groups used violence on a regular basis, only 35% of respondents were of the opinion that there was an extremely rare use of violence among isolated civil society groups. Significantly, only 3% of respondents perceived the use of violence to be a mass-based effort. Equally disturbing is the fact that a little less than half of respondents (49%) were of the opinion that acts of violence on the part of civil society actors were hardly denounced. In addition, civil society actions to promote non-violence are not widespread. While 63% thought one could cite only one or two examples of such action, only 23% of respondents to the RSS thought that there were several examples of actions on the part of civil society to promote non-violence.

Civil society’s efforts to eradicate poverty are significant, and received a high score. Perhaps, as noted under the historical overview of civil society, the government and the UNDP’s involvement of civil society to reduce the economic burden of Structural Adjustments on the people in the 1980s accounts for this phenomenon. Whatever the reason, civil society’s involvement in poverty reduction efforts is recognised in Ghanaian society, even though, as compared to the efforts of the state, civil society’s role might not be significant.

Compared to other forms of selecting leaders such as appointment and self-selection, a high proportion of CSOs democratically elect their leaders. Despite this, respondents to the RSS were of the view that civil society actions to promote democracy in society were limited, even though there are a few examples of such efforts. However, respondents believed that civil society has a major role to play in promoting democracy.

In general, there is not much information on the transparent operations of CSOs and further work needs to be done on it. Nevertheless, discussants at the regional stakeholder consultations were of the opinion that corruption within civil society was largely limited to the small one-man CSOs whose accounting procedures were not scrutinised by either funding agencies or auditors. Indeed, such organisations do not have proper accounting and financial systems. Even though CSOs make their accounts available to their members, they do not indicate what proportion of income came from what source, whether membership dues, donors or the state. Interestingly, a large number of RSS respondents (68%) considered the role of civil society in promoting government transparency to be significant.
Intolerance is not a major problem within the civil society arena in Ghana since only a small percentage of RSS respondents thought that there were many examples of intolerant acts on the part of civil society, compared to 52% who were of the opinion that there were only one or two examples of intolerance. 36% were of the view that there were no examples of intolerance within the civil society arena. There is a general acceptance that civil society occupies a unique position to promote tolerance in the society.

4. IMPACT

Drawing on the existing literature, this dimension identifies five subdimensions, each representing an essential civil society “role” or “impact area”. Indicators explore (a) how active and (b) how successful civil society has been in fulfilling each defined role. This dimension, therefore, adopts a broad notion of impact, which refers not only to the end result (i.e. how much influence civil society has had in a particular area), but also to the process (i.e. how actively civil society was engaged in that area). The subdimensions include: General CSOs’ influence on human rights and social policy; holding state and private corporations accountable; responsiveness to societal issues; empowerment; and meeting societal needs.

The overall score is 2.0, indicating that civil society in Ghana has been able to chalk some success in influencing public policy. Figure 4 provides a summary of the subdimensional scores.
4.1 Influencing Public Policy

Table III.4.1: Influencing public policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1.1 Human rights protection</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.2 Social policy impact</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.3 National budget processes</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority (66.7%) of RSS respondents indicated that civil society was indeed active, though limited to some degree in influencing public policy. Of these, 34.4% said they were quite active, and 34.3% said they were active to a limited extent. Specific instances of success include a campaign for the passage of the domestic violence bill and campaign against water privatisation. In the former case, complete success has yet to be achieved, while the latter witnessed complete success.

Respondents to the Regional Stakeholders Survey had quite divergent views on civil society activism on specific issues. The aggregate responses for the RSS on the impact of CSOs on Ghana’s several policy areas are provided in the graph below, and indicate that CSOs actively influence policies. While 33% thought that civil society was active, another 33% thought it was not active at all, while 34% thought it was active to some extent. With regard to the impact of civil society activism, 33% did not think civil society made any impact at all, 35% thought civil society made limited impact while 32% thought they had a moderate impact on policies.

As part of efforts to assess civil society’s impact on public policy, the CSI team conducted specific case studies in three areas a) Human rights protection, b) Social policy, and c) the national budget processes. These case studies are combined with assessments by civil society stakeholders and key informants as well as an overall analysis of the media regarding civil society’s activities in influencing public policy.

The responses obtained from the RSS and provided in the table below indicate that generally CSOs have been quite active in influencing the public policy process in these three areas. An aggregate of more than 66% of respondents agreed that CSOs have been somewhat active on the three issue areas, with 32.4% believing that CSOs have been quite active and 34.3% believing that CSOs were active though limited. Indeed, only a minority of 33.2% thought that CSOs have not been active on human rights policies at all.

4.1.1 Human rights protection. The campaign for the passage of the Domestic Violence Bill was selected as the human rights protection issue. Violence against women, including rape and domestic violence, remains a significant problem in Ghana. The law currently does not prohibit domestic violence, and the criminal code grants husbands spousal immunity from any charges of assault against their wives. According to the Federation of International Women Lawyers (FIDA), one in three women experiences domestic violence, and most abuses went unreported. The police service's Domestic Violence and Victim Support Unit (DOVVISU), formerly the Women and Juvenile Unit (WAJU), handles cases of domestic violence, child abuse, and juvenile offenses, and in 2005 DOVVISU received 13,224 cases, the majority of which involved non-payment of child maintenance (4,266) or failure to provide necessities of life (3,171). There were also 206 rape cases. DOVVISU work closely
with the Department of Social Welfare, FIDA, the Legal Aid Board, and several human rights NGOs to combat domestic violence. To address the issue and seek protection for victims of domestic violence, FIDA and Leadership and Advocacy for Women in Africa (LAWA) introduced the Domestic Violence Bill as a private bill to be presented before Parliament. Following the introduction of the Bill before Parliament, the National Coalition on Domestic Violence Legislation in Ghana was formed, comprising 100 civil society organisations, to lead the advocacy efforts for the passage of the bill. To garner public support for the bill, the Coalition embarked on series of nationwide sensitisation efforts. Campaign methods such as night vigils, street marches and seminars were all used to raise awareness on the need for domestic violence legislation in the country.

This campaign shows that civil society actors are capable of coming together to form a solid coalition on a specific theme. Even though their goal of ensuring the passage of the Bill has not yet been achieved, they have been successful in creating public awareness about the issue of domestic violence. In addition, through their work, the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) which was instituted in 2005, makes provision for the free treatment of victims of domestic violence.

4.1.2 Social policy impact. In the area of social policy, the campaign against water privatisation was selected. The campaign was initiated by the Integrated Social Development Center (ISODEC) which later led to the formation of the Coalition Against Privatisation of Water (CAP-W). At the heart of the privatisation issue were questions of need versus profit, and whether water is a right or a commodity. Until it came to power in 2001, the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) vehemently opposed the privatisation policy. Earlier privatisation plans ran aground in 1999 when it was revealed that Azurix (the water subsidiary of Enron, the scandal-ridden and now bankrupt utility giant), which won the water privatisation bid, may have paid US$ 5 million in bribes to Ghanaian government officials. Despite this, in 2002, the NPP government revisited the privatisation plan. This became a cause of disagreement between civil society and the state. Public mobilisation against the policy provoked intolerant pronouncements by a government that proclaimed itself the guardian of Ghanaian traditions of liberal democracy. However, after relentless advocacy, lobbying and public sensitisation efforts by the CAP-W, the anti-privatisation drive paid off. In February 2004, the Government of Ghana and the World Bank held a meeting to suspend the water privatisation process in favour of a management contract where two foreign firms will manage the state-owned water company for a period of five years.

This case study highlights the ability of local CSOs to liaise with other like-minded organisations, both nationally and internationally, to push for changes in policy. The CSOs achieved their declared goals in this case: government backed down on its decision to sell the Ghana Water Company outright.

4.1.3 National budget processes. The current Budget Process in Ghana is known as the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). The MTEF was introduced as part of the Public Financial Management Reform Programme (PUFMARP) to address the weaknesses within the planning and budgeting system of the Government of Ghana.

The introduction of MTEF in 1999 marked the departure from single-year budgeting to three-year budgeting. Before the introduction of the MTEF, the budgeting process was known as (i) line item budgeting and (ii) incremental budgeting.
The inherent weaknesses within the previous budgeting system were that Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) were getting certain percentage increases in their budget items without due consideration being given to the performance targets for that particular M, D or A. Secondly, these increases were not linked explicitly to the available resources through the Macroeconomic Framework. Thirdly, the Recurrent Budget was prepared separately from the Development Budget. While the Development Budget was linked to the Public Investment Programme (PIP), the Recurrent Budget was purely incremental. As a result, the recurrent cost implications of Development Projects were not catered for. For example, classrooms were completed without provision being made for the payment of teachers’ salaries.

Ghana’s MTEF can be defined as a three-year, integrated, broad-based and performance-oriented budgeting process. The logical framework of the MDA Estimates is the MDA Strategic Plan, which consists of:

- MDA Mission Statement
- MDA set of Objectives
- MDA sets of Outputs for each Objective
- MDA sets of Activities related to each Output.

The activities in the MDA Strategic Plan require Inputs in specific quantities and frequencies. The activities also have Unit Costs needed for costing the MDA Budgets. MTEF can thus be referred to as Activity Based Budgeting (ABB).

The MTEF Process involves iterative top-down and bottom-up interaction between Central Management Agencies (CMA) like the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) on one hand, and the Implementing Agencies, like the MDAs, on the other. Some of the activities include the following:

- GPRS Workshops for MDAs
- Policy Review Workshops for MDAs
- Intra-Sectoral Meetings for MDAs, and
- Strategic Planning and Costing Workshops for MDAs.

The Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) is the current Medium Term Development Plan (MTDP) adopted by Ghana and recognised by all Development Partners, both multilateral and bilateral. During the workshops, MDAs are guided to make their sectoral policies consistent with the national goals as spelt out in the GPRS.

The Constitution of Ghana gives the government the authority to prepare the nation’s budget. Article 179 (1) states: ‘The President shall cause to be prepared and laid before Parliament at least one month before the end of the financial year, estimates of the revenues and expenditure of the Government of Ghana for the following financial year’. The role of civil society then is to function as stakeholders in the whole budget preparation exercise. During the Strategic Planning stages, all MDAs have to undertake Environmental Scans such as SWOT, PEST and Stakeholder Analyses, before developing their Strategic Plans. These Strategic Plans form the logical framework for the preparation of the MDA Budgets. The role of civil society organisations clearly comes during the preparation of the MDA Strategic Plans when these analyses are being undertaken.

In addition to engaging with the MDAs, CSOs influence the budget process through lobbying their elected representatives in Parliament and educating and shedding more light on the
issues at stake. Some budget-focussed CSOs have personnel who are more knowledgeable in the budget process than some MPs (especially new MPs), thus making their inputs very important.

Recent budgets have addressed poverty issues, since they have been based on the GPRS, which is aimed at reducing poverty. In addition, most of the poverty reduction targets in the GPRS agree with the targets in the Millennium Development Goals, as well as NEPAD (Kabo 2004).

The Center for Budget Advocacy (CBA) of the Integrated Social Development Center (ISODEC) is the only notable organisation involved specifically in analysing the budget and making inputs into the National Budget. CBA work aims at ensuring that budget allocations adequately respond to the financial needs of each sector of the economy. They also assess the extent to which revenue-generating mechanisms of the state do not place an undue burden on the poor. In addition, each year, the CBA conducts a child- and gender-sensitive index of the budget. Finally, the organisation undertakes training in budget development, tracking and analysis for CSOs and local government officials.

Despite the achievements of the three case studies above, civil society’s overall impact on public policy has not been strong. The Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) which was drawn up during the mid-1980s, provided the first opportunity for civil society to be actively involved in the development and execution of poverty reduction programmes. However, the model in operation was more of a top-down approach in which CSOs were mainly asked for their views on particular issues and less of a bottom-up approach in which CSOs become initiators of development-related activity. Even though today there is growing dialogue with civil society, the general picture is that neither government nor the donor community has defined and adopted a specific standard of civil society participation in the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programmes which may be considered as adequate or satisfactory. This leaves government free to undertake any kind of consultation or involvement to suit the time available to it and secure its own political convenience. Worse still, civil society in Ghana has not yet been very involved in using its networks to independently monitor the impact on the poor of Government policies and expenditure.

4.2 Holding the state and private corporations accountable

The importance of civil society’s role as “watchdog”, holding the state and private corporations accountable for their decisions and actions, is well-established in the literature (Lanegran 1995, Diamond 1994, Hyden 1995). This subdimension looks at civil society’s activities in monitoring, making transparent and, if appropriate, speaking out against actions undertaken by government and the private sector which are in violation of the stated goals, objectives and tasks of these actors.

Even though, as can be seen below, some CSOs are actively engaged in activities to hold the state and private corporations accountable, overall, CS activity in this area is low, and there is only negligible discernible impact.

| Table III.4.2: Holding the state and private corporations accountable |
|--------------------------|------------------|
| Indicator                | Score |
| 4.2.1 Holding state accountable | 2.0   |
4.2.1 Holding the state accountable. With reference to the role of civil society in holding the state accountable to its citizenry, the respondents were generally of the opinion that civil society played an important role in this regard. Half of the respondents thought that civil society was active to a limited extent; a quarter of the respondents thought that civil society was quite active in holding the state accountable to its citizenry; and 5% thought that civil society was very active in holding the state accountable to the population. Only 20% thought that the state was not active at all. In spite of the generally high levels of activity in this regard, respondents were generally of the opinion that the impact of all of these activities was quite limited. Twenty-two percent did not think that civil society made any impact at all on the state; 63% thought that they made limited impact, 14% thought they made moderate impact while only 1% thought that civil society made a significant impact on the state.

During the regional stakeholder consultations, participants noted the significant role two civil society actors played in holding the state accountable to its citizenry. The first was the Social Enterprise Development (SEND) Foundation which has embarked on a programme to ensure the judicious use of HIPC funds. They have been quite successful in their efforts to hold the government accountable for the use of HIPC funds. They have been successful in relocating all funds that are due to the Upper West Region to an NIB bank in the Region; and in separating HIPC funds from the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF). Each District in the Upper West Region has a district HIPC monitoring committee which monitors the use of the HIPC funds. They also have the HIPC watchdog and HIPC monitoring toolbox in place to check on the distribution of HIPC funds. They have also been successful in getting the government to put inscriptions on HIPC projects throughout the country so as to make it possible to identify the projects for which HIPC funds have been utilised, and have lobbied for the Ministry of Finance to make HIPC funds that are supposed to go to the youth available so that the youth can access these. They have been able to challenge the government on HIPC funds that were allocated for feeding in secondary schools which could not be accounted for by the government, and have challenged government on wrong information about the disbursement of HIPC funds. The success of its efforts is evident in the fact that the government has banned the activities of SEND Foundation in Volta Region because they challenged the government on the use of HIPC funds meant for buildings which have not been constructed.

The Action on Disability and Development (ADD) also works to hold the state accountable to its population of disabled individuals. They have been active in the campaign for the passage of the disability bill which is currently in Parliament. Through the efforts of ADD, the electoral commission trained 410 people with disabilities to be on the election monitoring team. They have been able to press the government to allocate 5% of the District Assembly Common Fund to persons with disabilities and also push for the government to ensure that future public buildings be made accessible to people with disabilities. They are also pushing the government to build a resource center for people with disabilities in Tamale. In advocating for the rights of people with disabilities, ADD has been successful in getting some people with disabilities to be appointed to the district assembly.

According to participants in the regional stakeholder consultations held in the middle belt of the country, civil society actors’ activism has focused mainly on holding the modern state accountable to its citizens while leaving the traditional authority structure unaccountable to its citizens. As a result, some amorphous youth groups have taken on the challenge of
holding the traditional authority structures accountable to the people, although this has not always been successful. At Techiman Hansua, for example, the youth groups led a demonstration against the sale of land in the traditional area because the chief was unwilling to account to the public as to the use of the monies realised from the sale of these lands. This resulted in the arrest of the youth leader who was sent to court and prosecuted for disturbing public peace and causing harm to property, and sentenced to one year in prison. This incident highlights the ways in which in our context, civil society organisations only target the national authorities on issues of accountability, leaving out the traditional authorities which pave the way for youth groups to take them on. In the traditional context, the youth are not given the opportunity to approach the traditional leaders to address accountability issues. This results in the youth adopting unorthodox methods of addressing their accountability problems with the traditional authorities, which sometimes results in chaos and vandalism. In recognition of civil society’s efforts at holding the state accountable, the NAG gave a score of 2.

4.2.2 Holding private corporations accountable. Respondents were generally of the opinion that civil society played a less active role in holding private corporations accountable than was the case with holding the state accountable. However, they also believed that the impact of the few activities aimed at ensuring corporate accountability could be equal to the impact of those holding the state accountable. Almost forty percent (37%) thought that civil society was not active in holding private corporations accountable, and almost half the respondents (49%) thought that civil society was active only to a limited extent in this regard. Thirteen percent thought that civil society was quite active in holding private corporations accountable to the people while 1% thought that civil society was very active in this regard.

In terms of impact, the same percentage of respondents who thought that civil society was very active in holding private corporations accountable thought that it had made a significant impact on corporations. Five percent thought civil society had made moderate impact, 49% thought that they made limited impact, while 45% did not think that civil society had made any impact at all.

Cyanide spillages are regular occurrences in the country, although in the two-month period when the media review was undertaken, no such reports were made. Since 2001, there have been at least four such occurrences. On 16 October 2001, a tailings dam burst at the Tarkwa gold mine, operated by Gold Fields Ghana, a South African gold-mining company. Thousands of cubic metres of mine waste flowed into the River Asuman, the source of drinking water for hundreds of people, contaminating it with cyanide and heavy metals. Life forms in both the river and its tributary were found dead on the banks of the river and its surface. On 23 October 2004, a cyanide spillage occurred at the Bogoso Gold Limited (BGL) mine, which affected the Aprepre in Dumase, a tributary of the river Ankobra. The failure of the company to alert citizens timeously about this occurrence led to citizens becoming ill from drinking the contaminated water. The Environmental Protection Agency and not the BGL provided these citizens with medical care. On 19 January 2005, the Ghana News Agency reported yet another cyanide spillage, this time by Wexford Ghana Limited, a subsidiary of Bogoso Gold Limited, into the River Kubekro in the Western Region.

Efforts to hold private corporations accountable have largely been waged by environmental CSOs such as WACAM. WACAM pushes for the rights of residents in mining communities to be respected. For example, the organisation supported the people of Abeokoase village, which was badly affected during the 2001 cyanide spillage in the River Asuman, to take legal action against Gold Fields Ghana. The matter was settled out of court with a compensation
package by Gold Fields Ghana, which included the establishment of a development fund for the village.

The Concerned Citizens Association of Prestea has also been able to press the Environmental Protection Agency to conduct an environmental audit of Bogoso Gold Limited, which revealed that the company was in violation of some of the conditions of its environmental permit; in October 2005, the company’s operating license was suspended.

Generally, civil society efforts at holding private corporations accountable in Ghana have been low, despite successful efforts in the mining sector. Thus the NAG gave a low score of 1 for this indicator.

### 4.3 Responding to social interests

How well civil society’s positions and priorities mirror the real grievances of the population at large is a crucial indicator of civil society’s ‘grounding’ in society. Civil societies around the world strongly differ on this indicator, and there are “elitist” types of civil society that are ‘out-of-touch’ with citizens as well as “responsive” types of civil society that are effectively taking up and voicing societal concerns. This subdimension analyses civil society’s function as a “representative” of societal interests. In doing so, it looks both at how effectively civil society responds to priority social concerns and the level of public trust in civil society (considered a proxy of responsiveness).

There are only isolated examples of crucial social issues of concern that did not find a voice among existing civil society actors, though the view on the effectiveness of CS in this direction is mixed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.3.1 Responsiveness</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.2 Public trust</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 4.3.1 Responsiveness.
Respondents to the RSS had mixed views on whether or not civil society actors were successful in terms of their responsiveness to the needs of society. One-third of respondents each thought they were not successful at all, not very successful or quite successful. Only 1% thought that they were very successful in this regard.

#### 4.3.2 Public trust.
There is a growing awareness and recognition of the presence of CSOs and especially their role in Ghanaian society and polity. Thus, a reasonably large number of Ghanaians share considerable trust in CSOs. A large majority of respondents to the GCSS (69.7%) indicated that they trust civil society actors while 30.3% said they do not. However, public trust in civil society actors is dependent on the type of civil society actor in question. Among a list of organisations that most Ghanaians trusted (see table below), the church was found to be the most trusted (81.7%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Trust Percentage</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>81.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces</td>
<td>70.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>69.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>62.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The church’s high rating is not surprising, considering the high level of religious activity. Cumulatively, 21 out of Ghana’s 49 years of existence have been under military rule, a fact that might account for 70% of respondents claiming trust in the armed forces. In addition, the armed forces have brought peace and stability to conflict areas in the country, especially the north, which was part of the location for the community sampling exercise. The percentage of workers belonging to unions in Ghana is decreasing as more of the workforce enters the informal sector, where there is no union activity, accounting for the low rating for labour unions. The Ministry of Manpower, Youth and Employment estimated that 80% of the workforce is employed in the informal sector. In addition, labour unions are still seen as extensions of political parties because of their history, and because labour issues take partisan dimensions. Finally, the low score for labour unions is because the Ghana Trades Union Congress (GTUC) has in the past supported some regimes but challenged others, and faced repression and attempts to co-opt its leaders by the state (Gyimah-Boadi et al. 2000).

4.4 Empowering citizens

Another widely recognised function for civil society is its role in contributing to the empowerment of citizens. For the purposes of the CSI, citizen empowerment is defined as contributing to a process whereby citizens have more choice and are able to take more control over decisions that affect their lives. This is supported by Narayan (2002:xviii), who sees empowerment as meaning to expand the range of assets and capabilities of poor people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control and hold accountable institutions that affect them. The importance of the role of civil society in empowering the people, especially in local grassroots communities, cannot be overemphasised. This implies civil society informing and educating citizens on public issues and communicating their messages to them. This subdimension looks at several different elements of empowerment, including civil society’s impact on informing/educating citizens, developing capacity for collective action and building social capital. Additional indicators look specifically at the empowerment of two traditionally marginalised social groups – women and poor people.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table III.4.4: Empowering citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.1 Informing/educating citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.2 Building capacity for collective action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.3 Empowering marginalised people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.4 Empowering women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.5 Building social capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.6 Supporting livelihoods</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4.1 Informing/educating citizens. The importance of information dissemination arises from the lack of available information on a specific topic, such as violence against women, or a limited awareness that such information exists, such as laws and constitutional rights. Information dissemination is linked to mobilisation because information is instrumental in building ‘awareness’ and ‘raising the consciousness of the people’, necessary prerequisites.
for mobilising people around an issue. However, actors in civil society did not rate themselves highly in terms of levels of activity or success at public information activities; 34% of respondents were of the view that civil society actors were quite active in conducting public information activities and 31% were of the view that they were quite successful at doing so. Community respondents also shared similar views on this. Only 35% of respondents in the GCSS knew about activities to inform/educate citizens. High interest on the part of citizens to participate in such educational activities is reflected in the fact that almost as many people who knew about such activities participated in the activity, and 34% percent of respondents had participated in these activities.

| Table III.4.4.1.1: Level of activeness of civil society public information activities |
|---------------------------------|--------|
| Not active at all               | 9%     |
| Active to a limited extent      | 39%    |
| Quite active                    | 36%    |
| Very active                     | 16%    |

| Table III.4.4.1.2: Levels of success of civil society public information activities |
|---------------------------------|--------|
| Very successful                 | 8%     |
| Quite successful                | 33%    |
| Not very successful             | 53%    |
| Not successful at all           | 6%     |

Notable among civil society information/education activities are girl-child education campaigns, civic education, HIV/AIDS campaigns and raising awareness of domestic violence. However, levels of activity do not match perceptions of success; while 16% of respondents thought that civil society actors were very active in public information activities, only 8% were of the opinion that they were very successful.

4.4.2 Building capacity for collective action. Building capacity for collective community action enables development programmes and projects to be tailored to the needs of the people within the community. How active has civil society been in building the collective capacities of local communities and citizens? The RSS provides a mixed picture of stakeholders’ views regarding civil society’s role in building capacity at community level. A majority of 57% considers civil society to be not active or active to a limited extent only, while a substantial minority sees an active role for civil society. A similar division in responses appears also in stakeholders’ assessment of civil society’s level of success: a small majority considers civil society as unsuccessful, while a strong minority sees indications of success.

During the regional stakeholder consultations, the work of development NGOs was mentioned. Many of these agencies such as CARE International and ActionAid insist that beneficiary communities should contribute 5-10% towards development projects. These contributions could be in cash or in kind. However, the evidence proves that most communities are able to provide the latter which includes manual labour. Often, on completion of these projects, the management and maintenance of the facilities are left in the hands of the community. These community development approaches promote and strengthen the spirit of communalism within the people. From the GCSS, we also find that 25% of respondents knew about such community capacity-building activities. Once community members knew of such activities, participation in these activities was quite high, as 88% of the respondents who knew of such activities participated in them.
4.4.3 Empowering marginalised people. In terms of the role of CS in helping to empower marginalised groups, our findings indicate significant achievement and success, especially in the area of Persons Living With HIV/AIDS (PLWHAs), orphans, the aged and poor women. Civil society actors are generally seen as successful in empowering marginalised people because they are responsive to the interests and needs of the marginalised individuals. Sixty-eight percent of respondents to the RSS were of the view that civil society actors targeted poor communities, while 32% were of the view that civil society usually works for the population in general. Seventy percent of respondents in the GCSS knew of efforts aimed at empowering marginalised people, although only 15% ever participated in such activities. The media review highlighted examples of various philanthropic acts on the part of CSOs for such marginalised people, including the blind, the physically challenged and people living with HIV/AIDS.

4.4.4 Empowering women. The role of CSOs in promoting gender equity has been quite significant in Ghana. According to Drah (2003:127-128) civil society performs well in the promotion of gender. The majority of community respondents (83%) were of the opinion that civil society actors worked to empower women economically, socially and politically. However, only a fifth of the respondents had participated in such activities. Examples include the work of the Network of Women in Growth (NEWIG), a small NGO that provides income generation skills training to women, and Abantu for Development, which provides political empowerment to women. The increasing participation of women in local politics, for example, is a manifestation of the activities of these CSOs.

4.4.5 Building social capital. Civil society’s role in contributing towards the building of social capital in terms of trust, reciprocity and tolerance amongst members of society is high. As the results of the GCSS indicate, few respondents (29.4%) believe that there is some trust for people in Ghanaian society. Nevertheless, CSO activities are modestly helping to build social capital in various dimensions as measured by the levels of tolerance in society and the polity.

As shown below, CSO members show higher ratings than non-members for most indicators of tolerance. In addition, on interpersonal trust, CSO members have a higher rating than non-members, indicating that CSOs build social capital.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People of different races</th>
<th>CSO members</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People of different religions</td>
<td>80.3%</td>
<td>74.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People living with HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>66.2%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexuals</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>71.3%</td>
<td>83.9%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People of different races</th>
<th>CSO members</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People of different religions</td>
<td>80.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>71.3%</td>
<td>83.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4.6 Supporting livelihoods. Through the provision – in some cases – of free training in income generating skills such as soap-making, civil society supports livelihoods in Ghana. Drah (2003:127) has documented that CSOs are active in supporting livelihoods of the
population (Drah 2003:127). Data from the RSC confirms this, as the majority of CS respondents (77.6%) indeed knew of such activities. The available evidence paints a picture of an active role by CSOs in supporting socio-economic developmental programmes (ibid). The Community Survey attests to this view. According to the CS results, 77.6% of respondents knew of such activities on the part of civil society actors, but only 19% ever participated in any of them.

4.5 Meeting societal needs

A final essential role of civil society considered in the CSI is to contribute to meeting pressing societal needs, in particular those of poor people and other marginalised groups. This subdimension looks both at civil society’s performance in meeting these needs directly (e.g. through promoting self-help initiatives or delivering services) and in lobbying the state for improved service provision. The subdimension also looks specifically at civil society’s relative effectiveness in meeting the needs of marginalised groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.5.1 Lobbying for state service provision</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.5.2 Meeting pressing societal needs directly</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.3 Meeting needs of marginalised groups</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.5.1 Lobbying for state service provision. A large number of CSOs in Ghana have succeeded in providing useful services such as safe drinking water and healthcare, among others, to deprived communities around the country. However, these are not viable alternatives to the state’s role. Efforts by the state to build a healthy, well-educated workforce have been the building blocks of today’s wealthy societies. It is the duty of the state to provide potable water, electricity, schools, hospitals and other social amenities to ensure adequate living conditions for the people. However, since the state, especially in Third World countries, does not give priority to the living conditions of the people, it is the duty of civil society as representatives of the people to draw the state’s attention to this duty.

However, the findings indicate that only 27% of respondents thought that civil society actors lobbied for state provision. In terms of the success of these efforts, 6% of respondents thought it was unsuccessful, 63% thought it was somewhat successful, and 28% thought it was successful, while 3% thought it was very successful. During the regional stakeholder consultations, mention was made of the work of the Ghana National Education Coalition Campaign which pushed for free education for children in the forty poorest districts in the country. Seventy-three percent of those sampled in the RSS were of the view that civil society has not been active in lobbying for state service provision.

Respondents could not immediately identify any specific issues on which CSOs have engaged in lobbying for state action. Yet, 63% thought that on the few occasions when CSOs have embarked on such lobbying they have been somewhat successful, while 28% thought they were successful in this regard. Three percent of respondents thought they were very successful in this regard. The reference or instance mentioned during the stakeholder consultations in terms of successful lobbying efforts was largely to the CAP-W which grew out of the belief that the state should provide essential social services such as water and not leave these in private hands. The Committee for Joint Action (CJA) was cited as an example
of an unsuccessful lobbying effort. The CJA, which led demonstrations against petroleum price hikes in the country, cannot be described as successful because it was not able to pressurise government to reduce petroleum prices despite its claims of victory after the government removed the 15\% \textit{ad valorem} tax on petroleum products. Not only are the price changes negligible, transport fares still remain the same as before the government scrapped the tax element.

4.5.2 Meeting pressing societal needs directly. The key role that CSOs play as an alternate source for the provision of the material needs of society since colonial times has been duly documented. Gyimah-Boadi (2004:105) notes the contribution of “bands of migrant planters” in the nascent period of Ghana’s cocoa industry as testimony to the efficacy of civil society as a vital agent in private sector-led economic development.

Regarding the ability of civil society actors to meet pressing societal needs directly, 78% of respondents to the RSS believed this to be so. Their basis for this assertion lay in the fact that 68% of them believed that civil society actors targeted poor communities. In terms of their success at doing so, however, more than half of the respondents (54.2\%) were of the view that they were not very successful, and 4\% thought they were not successful at all. However, a reasonably high proportion (46 percent) believed that they were successful, 30\% saying they were quite successful and 16\% believing they were very successful. Civil society has succeeded in the direct provision of social amenities such as schools, toilets, water and guinea worm eradication. For years, organisations like Plan have provided bicycles for schoolchildren who need to cover long distances to go to school. Action Aid has also trained teachers in primary schools.

4.5.3 Meeting needs of marginalised groups. Compared to the state and its agencies, CSOs are considered more effective in assisting in the provision of services to marginalised groups. Respondents to the GCSS (78.6\%) asserted that civil society actors were more effective than the state in delivering services to vulnerable groups and meeting pressing societal needs. In fact, only 21.4\% of respondents to the GCSS felt that the state was effective in delivering services to vulnerable groups.

Conclusion

Despite the importance of civil society in lobbying the state to provide services for the communities, they have not been active in doing so, according to 73\% of respondents to the RSS. In addition, respondents could not immediately identify any specific issues on which CSOs have engaged in active state lobbying.

However, civil society has been both active and successful in meeting societal needs directly, with 78\% of respondents to the RSS supporting this view. In addition, compared to the state and its agencies, CSOs are considered more effective in assisting in the provision of services to marginalised groups such as the disabled, women and children.

The three case studies point to an active civil society. However, on the whole, the impact of civil society on policy-making is limited. Civil society has not taken advantage of the current liberal environment to demand active involvement by government in policy-making, and this has left the government free to undertake any kind of consultation or involvement to suit the time available to it and secure its own political convenience. Worse still, civil society in Ghana has not been able to use its networks to independently monitor and track the impact of
government policies and expenditures on the poor. Therefore, civil society maintained a low score on its ability to hold the state accountable.

Even less active and of limited impact is civil society’s role in holding private corporations accountable. Despite a few notable successes in the mining and environmental sectors, the overall impact on private corporations is limited.

“Information is power”, but the findings indicate that civil society is yet to actively give this power to the communities. Where these public information activities are being undertaken, only a few people are usually aware of them, even though that same number is likely to participate in these educative/informative activities.

Community capacity-building needs to be enhanced, since it enables development programmes and projects to be tailored to the needs of the people within the community. The almost equal split in RSS views about the levels of success of civil society in community capacity-building needs to be examined. However, civil society’s empowerment efforts are highly regarded. Civil society actors are generally seen as successful in empowering marginalised people and RSS respondents said civil society targeted poor communities, and singled out women as the group that civil society particularly worked to empower, both socially and economically.

Even though only a few GCSS respondents believe that people within Ghanaian society trust each other, civil society’s role in contributing towards the building of social capital in terms of trust, reciprocity and tolerance amongst members of society is high. As compared to non-members, CSO members show higher ratings for most indicators of tolerance. In addition, on interpersonal trust, CSO members have a higher rating than non-members, thus CSOs build social capital.

Support for AIDS orphans, women, children and other vulnerable groups is on the agenda of most CSOs, as indicated in both the RSC and the GCSS results, even though the GCSS points to low participation in these efforts.

Civil society has not been successful in responding to social interests, as indicated by the findings. However, there is a growing recognition and trust for the various roles played by civil society, even though this trust is not general but dependent on the type of CSO. Among a list of organisations that most Ghanaians trusted, NGOs were placed second only to the church, performing better than even the presidency.
IV STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF GHANAIAN CIVIL SOCIETY

Comments about the relative strengths and weaknesses of civil society in Ghana were made during the CSI National Workshop held in Accra from 19th to 20th April 2006 under the theme: “Civil Society in a Changing Socio–Economic & Political Context”, attended by more than 90 civil society representatives and others from government, academia, business and the donor community, and chaired by His Excellency Mr. Rapulane Molekane, the South African High Commissioner to Ghana.

IDENTIFIED STRENGTHS

Democratic Values
Civil society organisations in Ghana promote, practise and internalise democratic values. They have not only ‘fought’ for the return of the country to constitutional rule, but have also taken part in monitoring all the general elections held in the country since the return to constitutional rule in 1992. Indeed, with election monitoring, some civil society practitioners in Ghana have even gone to neighbouring countries to monitor their elections. Internally, civil society practises and shows respect for democratic procedures.

Poverty eradication
Civil society’s role in the promotion of pro-poor policies and poverty eradication in Ghana is well-known. Throughout the country, civil society practitioners are equipping poor women and girls with income-generating skills and assisting them to set up and run their own businesses through micro-financing schemes. Rural farmers are also being assisted, not only to add value to their farm products, but also to market them.

Trust
In comparing levels of public trust for eight selected organisations and bodies, civil society comes third after the church and the armed forces, performing better than the President and the central government (see Table V.4.3.2.1 above). This trust is in recognition of civil society’s closeness to the people and its understanding of and solidarity around the problems faced by communities. Furthermore, civil society has sought to provide solutions to some of these problems.

Responding to social interests
There are only a few isolated real grievances of the population that have not found voice among existing civil society actors in Ghana. This partly explains the high public trust for civil society.

Meeting societal needs
Civil society’s contribution to meeting societal needs, especially those of poor people and other marginalised groups, is laudable. In this direction, civil society has been successful in promoting self-help initiatives and delivering services directly to needy beneficiaries. Civil society has also been successful in lobbying the state for improved service provision to their beneficiary communities.
WEAKNESSES

Despite the above successes, participants identified the following weaknesses:

**Diversity within civil society**
The participation of women, minorities and other social groups in CSO leadership and membership in Ghana is low and needs attention. Even though some CSOs encourage and give priority to the participation of women in their activities, the evidence points to a low presence of women relative to men.

Perhaps for genuine reasons, civil society is found mainly in the urban centres to the neglect of the rural populations where they are most needed. Reasons given for this phenomenon include access to basic infrastructure and the relevant government ministries, departments and agencies.

Of greater concern are CSOs’ activities, which are largely concentrated in urban areas to the neglect of the rural areas where they are most needed.

**Level of organisation**
In all, this subdimension received the lowest score (0.8). Umbrella organisations, though present in Ghana, have so far not been able to play their roles of collective action and coordination effectively. GAPVOD, the largest NGO umbrella, remains weak, under-funded, and lacks the requisite human and financial material resources to operate effectively. In addition, there is no self-regulation within the sector, thus creating a free-for-all situation while the level of support infrastructure is low. CSOs also lack international linkages and exposure.

**Socio-economic context**
Economic hardships in Ghana present civil society organisations with a serious challenge, significantly limiting their effective functioning.

**Private sector - civil society relations**
The assessment of private sector attitudes towards civil society is poor. Generally, the private sector’s attitude to civil society is lukewarm and characterised by suspicion.

**Influencing public policy**
Despite the relatively good performance of civil society in Ghana on the three case studies analysed, the overall picture is that active policy engagement by civil society organisations is limited in extent and impact. The advent of democratic government in the early 1990s has created new opportunities for direct policy influence using mechanisms established by law or government action. However, civil society is yet to take advantage of this new opportunity. Overall, the policy impact of civil society organisations is limited. Trade unions and student groups have little direct influence on public policy and have resorted almost exclusively to strikes and demonstrations to press home their demands. Some of these demands include wage increases and a reduction in academic user fees. However, these have been largely ad hoc and their momentum has not been sustained (Gyimah-Boadi et al. 2000).
Perception that NGOs are wealthy
Because of excessive spending on hotels, food, transport allowances and per diems, the general perception among local communities is that NGOs are wealthy, and they are seen as ‘Santa Clauses’ by the local people. This phenomenon greatly affects the impact of CSO activities and the extent of community involvement.

Proliferation of NGOs
While there is nothing wrong with the establishment of NGOs to assist the state to secure better living conditions for the people, the current ad hoc approaches, within a context of limited regulatory frameworks, is not conducive to the healthy and qualitative growth of the sector.
V RECOMMENDATIONS

In this section, we summarise the discussions and recommendations that emerged during the two-day CSI National Workshop held at the Coconut Grove Regency Hotel in Accra on April 19 and 20, 2006.

The CSI National Workshop was held under the theme: “Civil Society in a Changing Socio-Economic & Political Context” and was attended by more than 90 representatives from civil society, government, academia, business and the donor community. The opening session was chaired by His Excellency Mr. Rapulane Molekane, the South African High Commissioner to Ghana. Other notable participants included The Hon. Frema Osei Opare, Member of Parliament and Deputy Minister for Ministry of Manpower Youth and Employment (the Government Ministry that oversees the activities of NGOs), Mr. Kofi Marrah representing the World Bank, Mr. Ozonia Ojielo representing the UNDP and Nii Dr. Tete Tsuru representing the Ga Traditional Council. In addition, there were several representatives from the media.

Participants at the national workshop came up with a number of recommendations to address the weaknesses identified.

Capacity-building
Much of the structural deficiencies of civil society relate to limited capacities. Civil society capacity in financial management and reporting, information technology, advocacy, working with the media and proposal and report-writing, needs to be improved.

Clarify registration and reporting procedures
The registration process for organisations is not clear, and contains many irregularities. It is important that the registration process be decentralised and made simpler. In addition, the reporting procedures and channels must be simplified, clearly defined and devoid of ambiguities to encourage civil society to regularly report on its activities, projects and programmes. Bureaucratic procedures may discourage civil society from undertaking the required registration needed for formal recognition and operation as a civil society organisation.

Resource mobilisation
Even though the findings point to difficulties in mobilising resources locally, civil society must adopt innovative methods of fund-raising and resource mobilisation to supplement what they might be receiving from their traditional funders. Participants at the national workshop were of the view that if civil society managed to effectively market itself and its activities, it should not be difficult to raise funds locally.

Increased networking
There is strength in numbers, and it is with good reason that civil society is strongly encouraged to collaborate and enter into alliances with like-minded organisations. Through networking, civil society voice and advocacy can be enhanced. Examples of networking tools such as a directory, newsletters and websites containing data on the activities of members were mentioned by participants at the national workshop.

Quick passage of the NGO Bill
The Draft NGO Policy contains recommendations for the smooth operations of NGOs and their relations with the government, and also recommendations on NGO self-regulation/code of ethics, registration and reporting procedures. The draft policy touches on all aspects of NGO operations in Ghana to the extent that its passage will go a long way to addressing stakeholder concerns about the activities of NGOs.

**Self-regulation and code of ethics for civil society**
While waiting for the NGO Bill to be passed, it is important for civil society as a sector to self-regulate and develop a code of conduct which clearly spells out sanctions for those who do not comply. This will enhance their image and enable the public to differentiate between the better CSOs and those who are not performing as well.

**Commitment and support for associations/networks**
Civil society must not merely form or join networks; they must be committed to their networks. Commitment can be exhibited through regular payment of dues (if any) and strong participation in the activities of the network.

**State-civil society relations**
It was recommended during the national workshop that civil society should as far as possible ensure good working relations with the state. This, they said, was to be civil society’s contribution to ensuring that the government recognised it as a partner in national development. CSOs should involve the state in some of their activities, especially those related to national development.

**Community involvement**
To enhance the impact of their programmes, CSOs must actively involve the communities in which they operate in their activities, and ensure community ownership of development projects. If this was done, the impact of civil society activities will be much greater.

**Closer working relations with media**
To enhance its image and publicise its activities, civil society must foster closer working relations with the media. The Ghana Journalists Association (GJA) representing the media, and GAPVOD representing NGOs, should jointly develop this relationship. In addition, civil society should cultivate the media and make media personnel a part of their programmes. The latter suggestion came from a participant at the national workshop whose organisation had benefited immensely from making a media representative a member of the board of a project his organisation was implementing.

**Perception that NGOs are wealthy**
CSOs must improve the way they use their resources and ensure that the bulk of their spending goes directly into the projects being undertaken. Seeking their own ‘comfort’ in the eyes of resource-poor communities sends the wrong signals.

**Proliferation of NGOs**
The passage of the NGO Bill and the establishment of the National Commission for NGOs is a good way to address this concern, since the Commission will conduct thorough assessments of NGOs before granting them accreditation.
Strengthening GAPVOD

One issue which ran throughout all the group presentations and which participants were deeply concerned about was the weak capacity of the GAPVOD secretariat, linking the low civil society score on Structure to this weakness. They therefore called for attention and resources from all stakeholders to be directed at strengthening the human and technical competencies of the secretariat so that it can better play its coordination and capacity-building role. They were optimistic about the returns on such a venture, saying that if GAPVOD had been able to undertake the CSI under its current difficult conditions, there was a lot more that the organisation could offer with the minimum of support.
VI CONCLUSIONS

This section draws together the main findings of the Ghana CSI, as visualised by the Civil Society Diamond below.

On the Civil Society Diamond, the score for STRUCTURE is 1.3, for ENVIRONMENT 1.5, VALUES 2.0 and IMPACT 2.0.

The low score for STRUCTURE calls for action on the part of all stakeholders. Of particular concern is the low level of diversity within the civil society arena in Ghana. That is, there is low participation and under-representation of women, minorities, rural populations and other social groups in CSO leadership and membership. Even though these groups, particularly women, play important roles in the civil society arena, the findings indicate their under-representation relative to men. There is also a high predominance of CSOs in the urban areas, to the neglect of the rural areas. As explained in the findings, this predominance in the urban centres may be for reasons of access to basic amenities like electricity and telephones. In addition, certain forms of citizen participation are also found to be limited, such as charitable giving. However, there were high scores for collective community action and volunteering, albeit within the church setting.

Perhaps the worst manifestation of a poor civil society STRUCTURE in Ghana is its low level of organisation. The indicators here assessed the existence and effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies, efforts to self-regulate, the level of support infrastructure and international linkages, most of which recorded low scores.
The ENVIRONMENT within which civil society operates is somewhat disabling, as indicated by the research findings. This is explained below. Corruption is widespread and it has implications for the country, but especially for the poor. Although Ghana runs a decentralised system of government with officials in the 138 districts of the country overseeing the day-to-day operations of the districts, financial allocations to the districts are inadequate. This is exacerbated by delays in the disbursement of these monies. Since salaries of the officials of the districts are paid from these allocations, these inadequacies and delays partly account for the widespread corruption in the districts, and their inability to serve the needs of the communities. Levels of trust within the society are also low, with implications for social cohesion. The registration procedure for CSOs is expensive, cumbersome and inconsistent, even though there are laws governing the registration procedures. Though tax exemptions exist, accessing them is difficult and requires state authorities like the Ministry of Finance and Customs Excise and Preventive Services (CEPS) to clarify the procedures for CSOs. In addition, the absence of tax benefits for philanthropic acts does not encourage acts of philanthropy in the country.

In addition, there is no formal mechanism for state support for CSO activities. Even though some participants at the national workshop called for it, and indeed a large number of civil society actors would welcome state support for their activities, there is a large section of the civil society community that opposes any form of state support for CSO activities, fearing that it might lead to an erosion of civil society autonomy. There is a need therefore to reconcile these two views and measure them against the state’s own ability and willingness to support CSO activities. ‘Indifference’ and ‘suspicion’ are the two words that best describe the attitudes of the private sector towards civil society. Coupled with financial difficulties and lack of understanding about the importance of corporate social responsibility, the private sector offers very little support to civil society.

Economically, Ghana has made significant progress in meeting macroeconomic targets over the past few years. Despite these substantial economic achievements, it ranked 138 out of 177 countries in the 2005 UNDP Human Development Report. Of the current population of 20.5 million, about one-third cannot meet their basic nutritional needs. Improvements in national wealth have not filtered down through the country, and poverty is still a reality for an unfortunately large part of the population. These economic difficulties are partly to blame for the private sector’s unwillingness to support, in any substantial measure, the work of civil society, presenting civil society with real challenges.

In spite of all these negatives on the Environment Dimension, politically, civil society enjoys considerable space and protection under the 1992 Constitution. The Constitution provides for strong political rights and freedoms, giving every citizen of voting age, of sound mind and with no criminal record, the right to participate in political activities in the country. The Constitution also enjoins the state to provide fair opportunity to all political parties to present their programmes to the public by ensuring equal access to the state-owned media, and gives every candidate for election to Parliament the right to campaign freely and in accordance with the law. There is also adequate legal space within which civil society can operate, with no unreasonable restraints.

The VALUES promoted and practised within civil society, as indicated in the findings, is quite high and encouraging. Of particular mention is the practice of internal democracy (e.g. in selecting leaders and making decisions) within civil society, and civil society’s active involvement in the promotion of democracy at the societal level. Perhaps the best measure of
civil society values is their activities towards the eradication of poverty in Ghana which enjoy broad-based support and are evident around the country. However, there are weaknesses. The use of violence to settle scores is common, especially among youth wings of political parties. In addition, gender-equitable practices within civil society are lacking. Most CSOs do not have clear organisational policies on gender equity which relates, for example, to staff recruitment and assignment of responsibilities.

On the IMPACT Dimension, civil society has been successful in providing economic and social empowerment for women. It has also been able to meet pressing societal needs of communities. Civil society has provided social amenities such as schools, toilet facilities and water, and eradicated guinea worm from communities. Compared to the state and its agencies, CSOs are considered more effective in assisting in the provision of services to marginalised groups such as women, children and the disabled.

Despite the relative good performance of civil society in the three case studies analysed, civil society has not been able to take full advantage of the relatively liberal political environment to make a stronger impact on public policy. Active policy engagement by civil society using mechanisms established by law or government action is limited, and consequently the overall policy impact of Ghanaian civil society is limited. Trade unions and student groups have little direct influence on public policy and have resorted almost exclusively to strikes and demonstrations to press home their demands, which include wage increases and a reduction in academic user fees. However, these have been largely ad hoc and their momentum has not been sustained. Civil society has also not been successful in holding private corporations accountable, such efforts largely being waged by environmental CSOs like WACAM against mining companies. Civil society has also largely failed to adequately inform and educate citizens on issues that affect them. Finally, civil society has not succeeded in lobbying the state to provide services to the people.

Finally, conducting the CSI in Ghana provided civil society actors with a rare opportunity to take a critical look at themselves and examine their structure, the environment in which they operate, the values they promote and the impact of their activities on society. The CSI has thus proved to be a very useful activity for CS actors. As noted above, the findings point to a civil society with weak structures and operating within a somewhat disabling environment, but having quite a strong impact on policy and especially on the lives of the people. This outcome, taken superficially, seems paradoxical, but careful consideration proves that against all odds, civil society, empowered by strong values, can achieve considerable feats. Philosophically, this is true of life: most great women and men, having been able to overcome the social, economic and even physical constraints that confronted them, have achieved greatness, supported only by the power of their values and convictions.
### APPENDICES

#### APPENDIX A: INDICATOR SCORE SHEET FOR GHANA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>SCORE</th>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>SCORE</th>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>SCORE</th>
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<td>2.1 Political context</td>
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<td>3.1 Democracy</td>
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<td>4.1 Influencing public policy</td>
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APPENDIX B: POLICY IMPACT STUDIES

1. The Coalition Against Privatisation of Water (CAP-W)

This coalition is made up of a number of civil society organisations such as the Integrated Social Development Center (ISODEC), the Third World Network (TWN), the Trades Union Congress (TUC), Community Partnership for Health Development, the Association of Water and Sanitation Boards, Peoples’ Actions for Community Transformation (PACT), OXFAM Ghana, Action Aid and various community groups.

The emergence of this organisation is linked closely to the activities of Rudolph Amenga-Etego who was hired by ISODEC in September 1999 to run its rights-based advocacy programme. Amenga-Etego hails from the Northern part of the country where access to piped water is poor, and he therefore had a strong interest in water issues and spent a lot of time exploring the feasibility of community-based water programmes. In his search for information, he followed up on a website announcing the privatisation of Ghana’s water company. Officials at both the World Bank office in Ghana and the Ministry of Works and Housing seemed to have no idea about this project, and Amenga-Etego went to the World Bank office seeking clarity. A fellowship provided by the Globalisation Challenge Initiative based in Maryland, United States, made it possible for him to spend January through March of 2000 in the Washington DC area, where he met with various officials such as the Vice President for Africa at the World Bank, the chairman of water privatisation and task officers in charge of the water privatisation project in Ghana. His visit in 2000 made it clear to him that the likelihood that water in Ghana would be privatised was very high. Rudolph resolved to use his position as coordinator of the rights-based advocacy programme at ISODEC to ensure that Ghanaians’ right to water was not compromised.

In May 2001, ISODEC convened a public forum to which a wide range of civil society organisations was invited as well as officials from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Ministry of Works and Housing and two researchers on water privatisation: Sara Grodsky from the United States and Patrick Bond from South Africa. This was a very explosive meeting; the Minister was adamant that privatisation of water was not on the table, yet a confidential feasibility study conducted by Stone and Webster of New Orleans for the Ministry had been made available to the participants. It was clear to all therefore that a discussion on the issue was under way at the highest levels of the state. At this meeting, a list of individuals opposed to the privatisation of water in Ghana was generated, and signed by some of the government officials present.

A two-day strategising session was then held for those individuals who had signed up in opposition, which resulted in the Accra Declaration. This included an agreement to form a coalition, supported by many civil society organisations. FM radio stations also signed on to be part of the coalition. The Public Utilities Workers Union was, however, unsure of what position to take on the issue, so when the coalition was officially launched in August 2001, the Trades Union Congress was not included. Other organisations such as the Christian Council, although not part of the coalition, publicly voiced their opposition to water privatisation. The coalition was launched in all ten regional capitals and a website was created for the coalition. In February 2002, the Trades Union Congress officially joined the coalition, offering office and meeting space with a telephone and a computer. The Secretary General of the TUC also became the chairman of the national Coalition Against Privatisation of Water (CAP-W). At the May Day parade of that year, the coalition led a protest march seen by the President and various foreign dignitaries. State response to the actions of the
CAP-W was to demonise Amenga-Etengo and his organisation, ISODEC. Full-page advertisements with the headline “Ignore ISODEC” were taken out in the Daily Graphic, the highest circulation daily newspaper, actions condemned by academics such as Prof. Kwame Karikari of the School of Communication Studies, who argued that civil society organisations were populated by citizens who had a right to know the uses to which government intended to put citizens’ money. ISODEC was undaunted and continued its sensitisation campaigns.

By May 2003, the United Nations was asking the government if the claims of CAP-W were justified. The CAP-W agenda had thus become an international issue. In April 2003, a fact-finding mission led by the Liberal Leader of the British Parliament, Jenny Tonge, came to Ghana to investigate the issue. To make it clear that ISODEC was not instigating the claims of the CAP-W, the mission was hosted by prominent Ghanaian personalities (the Executive Director of the African Association of Universities, the Secretary General of the Christian Council and the Secretary General of the Trades Union Congress/Chairman of the CAP-W). This missions’ report, which was launched by the Chairman of the CAP-W, validated the claims of CAP-W. The government continued to stand firm that water privatisation was not being considered and that what was planned was private sector participation in the water sector. The mission’s report, which was available online, made it quite clear that private sector participation in the water sector amounted to a privatisation of the water sector.

In February 2004, the Government of Ghana and the World Bank held a meeting to suspend the water privatisation issue and to rethink its plan of action. Instead of selling the water company as was previously envisioned, the water company would be managed by two foreign companies over a five-year period, which would be mandated to decrease unaccounted-for water from its current rate of 55% to 25%. This change in policy shows the extent to which the coalition was able to influence the process, and their success can also be measured in terms of their relationship with government. The hitherto antagonistic relationship is now very cordial. CAP-W now requests the government’s presence at meetings and government officials often participate.

2. National Coalition on Domestic Violence Legislation in Ghana

This coalition, formed in 2003, consists of about one hundred civil society organisations working primarily on gender issues. They include the Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA), Gender and Human Rights Documentation Centre, Women in Self-Empowerment (WISE), the Ark Foundation and Action Aid, as well as individuals who work in contexts where they come into contact with victims of domestic violence, such as counselling psychologists and gynaecologists.

The domestic violence bill in Ghana was initially drafted by FIDA and Leadership and Advocacy for Women in Africa (LAWA) as a private bill to be presented to Parliament. FIDA organised a public consultation on the bill, which brought it to the notice of the then Attorney General. He in turn, recognising government’s commitment to CEDAW as a signatory to the convention, showed interest in pushing for the bill to be passed, and it was redrafted out of the Attorney General’s office. The bill seeks to repeal section 42g of the Criminal Code of 1960 (Act 29) which states that “consent given by a husband or wife at marriage for the purposes of marriage, cannot be revoked until the parties are divorced or separated by a judgment or decree of a competent court.”

Once the state showed interest in the bill, the coalition was set up with a core group of
organisations/individuals to work towards the passage of the bill. Initially the coalition was set up without extensive structure or a strategy to ensure passage of the bill. Past activities have included a night vigil and nationwide sensitisation programmes which were initially run parallel to those organised by the Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs. Currently, these sensitisation workshops are run in collaboration with the Ministry. Presently, with funding from an NGO, Rights and Voice Initiative, the coalition is embarking on the following activities:

- The collection of signatures that are to be sent to the parliamentarians in all 230 constituencies in the country urging them to vote for the passage of the bill when it is presented before them in Parliament.
- Public forums to ensure that the debate on the relevance of the bill continues. Two such forums have been conducted so far.
- A day’s session with allies/parliamentarians facilitated by activists in other African countries, possibly Nigeria, where they have successfully passed the bill.

Currently, the bill has been put before cabinet with the repeal section of the bill deleted under the instruction of the Minister of Women and Children’s Affairs in the hope that this will facilitate acceptance. When presented before cabinet without the repeal, however, cabinet members asked that all references to marriage in the bill be deleted before it was brought before Parliament. Cabinet has asked that the nationwide sensitisation be completed, and a report presented to cabinet before the bill is presented in Parliament.

Although the work of the domestic violence coalition has not resulted in substantive changes in legislation, the coalition has noted successes in terms of sensitisation. First, the national health insurance scheme which was instituted this year makes provision for the free treatment of victims of domestic violence. The impact of the coalition on sensitisation is also noticeable in the fact that the work of the coalition was mentioned in all three regional stakeholder consultations when the discussion on the impact of civil society took place.

3. The Centre for Budget Advocacy (CBA)

This Centre set up in 2001 holds the philosophy that since public money is publicly generated, the public should influence how the money is used to ensure equity in spending. Their long-term goal is to create a moral and legal intolerance for the misuse of the public purse.

The Centre conducts a total analysis of the budget each year to review its fiscal and economic policies, both from a macro and micro perspective as well as a sector-by-sector analysis of the budget. With reference to the latter, they generally look at the following sectors: the private sector, the human resources sector, education and health. For each of these sectors, they look at the promises made in the previous year, the extent to which they were fulfilled and the planning put in place for the following year. They also look at the relationship between policy for each sector and allocations made to ensure that the policies are implemented. In addition, they conduct a revenue analysis to assess the extent to which the revenue mobilisation efforts of the state are progressive and/or provide tax breaks for the poor. Finally, they conduct and develop a gender sensitive index for the budget. Each year, 5% of the country’s total discretionary budget should be dedicated to women’s issues. Ghana falls far short of this international standard. In 2003, only 0.8% of the discretionary budget was allocated for women’s issues, and in 2004 this dropped to 0.1%.
When the budget is released, CBA runs a road show to explain the content of the budget to the populace and seek their reaction. The discussions that ensue at these meetings are then turned into an open letter to the President.

CBA comprises a team of academics who receive funding from Cordaid and the World Bank. Their relationship with the state has improved over the years. Initially, their mandate was questioned: the party in opposition viewed them as an ally of the state. However, that perspective has changed as members of the opposition have realised that budget literacy will provide them with the skills to offer an alternative budget to that presented by the government each year. The current government also appreciates their efforts, with the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs praising their home-grown objective analysis of the 2006 budget. This year, in collaboration with the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD), United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Canadian Parliamentary Center, budget training workshops were run for the leaders of parliament, both those in power and those in opposition, which were well-attended.

The success of the efforts of CBA can be measured in two ways. First is the extent to which this year’s budget was a consultative process. On July 12 2005, there was an advertisement in the newspaper requesting individual input into the budget. The comments were acknowledged in the official budget. Second is the fact that CBA’s call for tax breaks to be extended to a larger group of citizens has been heeded in the 2006 budget.
APPENDIX C: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

1. PRODUCE BUYING COMPANY LIMITED (PBC)

PBC is a Public Limited Liability Company. The company occupied the second best company position in the prestigious Ghana Club 100 ranking in 2003. Its principal activity is to buy, collect, store, transport and otherwise deal in cocoa, coffee and shea nuts produced in Ghana on behalf of the Ghana Cocoa Board.

In the pursuance of their corporate social responsibility and obligations, PBC in 2004 expended €93,710 million which represented 0.25% of their profit. This was used to encourage research institutions to develop technologically improved methods of cocoa production and support various electrification and water projects in selected cocoa-growing communities across the country. Additionally, they supported traditional authorities in developmental projects to improve the living standards of their communities, in addition to usual supplies of cement, roofing sheets and repair of roads and bridges in the rural communities. The company also supported sporting and social activities. Below are details of their corporate social responsibility.

2. NESTLÈ GHANA LIMITED (NGL)

NGL started its operation in Ghana in 1957 with the importation of Nestlè products. Presently it has a factory at Tema. Nestlè Ghana Limited sells a wide range of products both produced locally and imported from other Nestlè operating companies around the world, such as Dairy, Culinary, Beverages and Infant Nutrition products. NGL is a member of the Ghana Club 100 and in 2003 it took the third place in the overall rankings. Its total turnover for 2003 was €750 billion with a net profit of €62.3 billion.

Nestlè believes that its primary social responsibility is to take a long-term approach to strategic decision-making which recognises the interests of shareholders and business partners, as well as of the economies in which they operate. This attitude is reflected in their commitment to environmentally sound business principles. The company monitors that its operations are conducted in the context of environmental best practices and since its operations commenced in Ghana the company has recognised the need to protect the environment in every business activity.

At the community level, NGL supports projects and institutions, particularly in the areas of health and education, and sponsors numerous community activities with prizes to various bodies and organisation.

NGL is committed to the promotion of sports activities through sponsoring and organisation of sport events. Besides the government, NGL remains the biggest corporate sponsor of sports in Ghana. In the last two years the company has committed well over €3 billion to sporting activities like marathons, tennis, school and college football, volleyball and athletics.

3. GUINNESS GHANA LIMITED (GGL)

Guinness Ghana Limited is a subsidiary of Diageo Highlands BV, a company incorporated in Holland. GGL is a member of the Ghana Club 100, and in 2003 it was in fifth position.

The company produces four main brands: Guinness Foreign Extra Stout, Gordon’s Spark,
Malta Guinness and Guinness Extra Smooth.

In the 2004 annual report, it was noted that GGL have focused their efforts on areas where their business has the greatest impact and where their efforts can have the greatest benefit. In 2004, GGL invested significantly to ensure that they achieve the highest international environmental standards for the treatment of effluent which would have a positive impact environmentally; for example, lower energy consumption, lower wastage rate and improved working conditions. The company continues to provide clean drinking water for communities nationwide.

Focusing on health, in line with all Diageo companies across Africa, GGL has in place HIV/AIDS programmes to ensure awareness, provide facilities for voluntary, confidential counselling and the provision of testing and free antiretroviral treatment for all their employees. The company provides support for the cardiothoracic unit at the Korle-Bu Teaching Hospital.

There is also support for education through Otunfu’s Education Fund and the Chevening Scholarship Programme.

GGL continues to play a central role in sports development in Ghana, through sponsorship for the National Soccer Team "The Black Stars", the National Challenge Gold Cup and the Guinness Golf Open.

At a cultural level, GGL sponsored the Asanteman Adae Kese Festival and the 5th Anniversary of the Asantehene Otumfu Osei-Tutu II reign. They believe that culture defines them and is central to the success of their brands. As a result they recognise the important role that they play in supporting cultural festivals and community-related activities.

4. **Coca-Cola Bottling Company Ghana Limited (CCBCGL)**

CCBCGL was established out of a divestiture of the Bottling Division of GNTC in March 1995. Equatorial Coca-Cola Bottling Company owns a 100% share which is in turn owned by the Coca-Cola Company, Atlanta, U.S.A and the Cobega Group of Barcelona, Spain. It produces seven main brands: Coca-Cola, Fanta, Sprite, Schweppes, Krest, Dasani and BonAqua. The Company is a member of the Ghana Club 100, and in 2003 occupied tenth position.

The company supports the environment, education, health, sports and community activities. Environmentally, in line with their policy of providing support for the protection and preservation of the environment, CCBCGL has been engaged in the following activities: constructing a Waste Water Facility at Accra and Kumasi Plant at a cost of US$ 1 million and US$ 700,000 respectively to ensure that effluent from the plant is biodegradable before it is discharged into natural water sources; the sludge serves as manure which is collected freely by farmers and the Tema Municipal Authority. The Company provides financial support for the preservation of the Sakumo Ramsar Wetlands and its natural habitats and processes, which is one of such areas protected by law. CCBCGL also provides support for the activities of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) one of the national bodies which protects the environment. Presently, they are financing the production of a documentary for the EPA toward their campaign for proper waste management. Coca-Cola in 2003 adopted the La-Pleasure Beach as its "Clean Zone", presenting cleaning equipment and general support, which will hopefully serve as a prototype project.
In 2004, CCBCGL supported a photo exhibition to highlight waste water treatment facilities and to create awareness of the need for the treatment of waste water before disposal into natural water bodies. Faced with the problem of plastic waste management, in 2004 it supported the National Plastic Waste Management Committee with a cash donation.

The Company believes that education offers people choices in life and provides a solid platform for development, and has therefore supported the construction of classrooms, provided computers and printers, and other infrastructural needs. The Coca-Cola national essay-writing competition hopes to improve the writing skills of learners in public schools, and financial support is provided through the Otumfu Oseiutu Educational Fund in the Ashanti Region. It also supports a forum in management and marketing by the School of Administration of the University of Ghana.

CCBCGL has joined in the fight against HIV/AIDS through workplace programmes for all employees, which includes voluntary counselling and testing and the provision of antiretroviral treatment. The company carries 90% of the cost and the employee 10%. It also provides support to the Ghana Aids Commission by providing refreshments for their programmes, brochures, together with billboards and T-shirts.

In 2005, the company supported the Komfo Anokye Teaching Hospital infrastructure development programme and, in order to strengthen health care and retain skilled professionals in the health sector, it sponsors post-graduate studies.

There is also support for sports and physical fitness programmes and live coverage of international sports events.

Community support includes the Mother and Child Community Development Foundation’s Early Childhood Development and Nursery Scheme. Contributions in kind include computers and printers, books and products, and blankets and stretchers to the Ghana Red Cross Society.

5. **GHANA NATIONAL TRUST FUND (GNTF)**

GNTF is a quasi-governmental institution, which depends on donations from public-spirited institutions, corporate bodies and individuals, and provides support for the organisations listed below.

1. Leprosy Relief Association
2. Ghana Society For The Socially Disadvantaged
3. St. Joseph's Orphanage, Jirapa
4. St. John's Ambulance Brigade
5. Society For The Prevention Of T.B
6. Society For The Blind
7. Ghana Society For The Physically Disabled
8. Ghana Society For The Blind
9. Help Age Ghana
10. Kumasi Cheshire Village
11. Catholic Youth Organisation, Nsawam
12. YWCA
13. YMCA
14. Boy Scouts Association
15. Ghana Girl Guides Association
16. Boys' Brigade  
17. Girls' Brigade  
18. Voluntary Work Camps Association

**Ghana National Trust Fund**

**List of Donors 2004**

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<th>Eastern Region</th>
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<td>Ghana Oil Palm Development Company</td>
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<td>Cal Merchant Bank Limited</td>
<td>Mrs Lucy Quargaine</td>
<td>Ghana Consolidated Diamonds Ltd</td>
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<td>CEP Operational</td>
<td>Ghana Education Service Ashanti Regional Office School</td>
<td>Cocoa Research Institute Of Ghana</td>
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<td>Cocoa Processing Co. Limited</td>
<td>Ghana Education Service Kumasi Metro Office Schools</td>
<td>Center For Scientific Research Into Plant Medicine</td>
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<td>Asawase Presbyterian Church</td>
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<td>New International School</td>
<td>Trinity Presby Church, Adweso</td>
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<td>Niaciade Limited</td>
<td>Mr &amp; Mrs Osei</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SSB Bank Limited</td>
<td>Ghana National Chamber Of Commerce &amp; Industry</td>
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<td>SSNIT</td>
<td>YWCA Ashanti Councils</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Insurance Co. Limited</td>
<td>Naja David Veneer Plywood</td>
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<tr>
<td>Takoradi Flour mills Limited</td>
<td>A.G Timers Ltd</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tema Lube Oil Co. Limited</td>
<td>Mr Egeh Komla Christain</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Church of Pentecost</td>
<td>Kropo Meb's Club - Yeboah</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Thorpe Road</td>
<td>Ramseyer Presbyterian Men's Fellowship</td>
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<td>Total Ghana Co. Limited</td>
<td>Ghana Veneer Processing Co. Ltd (Mr Yeboah)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Trans Mech Ind. Limited</td>
<td>Dr. &amp; Mrs Augustus Ofori</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unique Trust Financial Services</td>
<td>Mr Owusu Adjei</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Agricare Ltd</td>
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<td>Newtafo Catholic Parish</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX D: NAG MEMBERS

Bernice Sam          Women in Law and Development in Africa
Isaac Yanney        Ghana Trades Union Congress
Harry Tete-Donkor    Department of Social Welfare
Dr. Kojo E. Mensah-Abrampah  SNV
Kofi Marrah          World Bank
Kofi Gbedemah        Community Radio Network
Kirsty Mason         UK Department for International Development
Laurencia Adams      POSDEV
Dr. Lee Tlou         Institute for Democratic Governance
Dr. Osei Boeh-Ocansey Private Enterprises Foundation
Sadaf Lakhani        The European Commission
Sam Ocran            SNV
Victor Mensah        National Union of Ghana Students
Steven Opon          Barclays Bank
Prof. Gyimah Boadi   Ghana CDD
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