

**CIVICUS CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX:
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
PHASE 2003-2005**

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**CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
www.civicus.org**

This paper is based on findings of the CSI implementations at the country level. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are of the CIVICUS CSI team members and do not necessarily represent those of the CSI national partners.

Foreword

This publication presents an important milestone in the rather brief history of the CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI). For the first time, the project can present a rather broad view of the findings on the state of civil society in a range of countries, as well as results of evaluations of the CSI tools at the country level and first signs of impact of the project.

Of course, the number of countries and the range of results analysed in this publication is relatively small. However, we hope it provides the reader with an interesting preview of the upcoming two-volume Global Report on the State of Civil Society, which will include findings from close to 50 countries, as well as analysis of cross cutting themes and regional issues.

This paper seeks to provide some background information for the International CSI workshop taking place in Glasgow, Scotland, from the 19th to 21st of June 2006. It also combines an analysis of research findings with the preliminary results of the project evaluation. Thus, this publication puts into practice the CSI's philosophy of sharing results as quickly and widely as possible and of being open and transparent about the project's challenges.

This publication is the product of a unique collaboration among a wide range of participants. First and foremost, it is important to acknowledge the work of the CIVICUS CSI Team, who worked extremely hard over the last months to drive the project forward and make this publication possible. The CSI team received guidance and advice from the CSI's International Steering Group members: Helmut Anheier, David Bonbright, Ramon Daubon, Alan Fowler, Jude Howell, Thierno Kane, Carmen Malena, Christine Musisi and Saad Eddin Ibrahim.

Of course, this publication would not have been possible without the work undertaken by the national CSI partners, which are implementing the project on the ground and providing CIVICUS with relevant information. It is important to stress that the national partners themselves engaged in a very consultative process to produce the CSI, involving National Advisory Groups, National Workshop participants and many other stakeholders interested in examining the current state of civil society. We estimate that, on average, more than 100 people actively participated in the CSI exercise in each of the 54 countries.

Last, but not least, we would like to take this opportunity to thank those institutions, which have provided financial and other kinds of support to the CSI exercise. The list of CSI supporters in the various countries would be too long for this foreword. We would, however, like to acknowledge the support to CIVICUS provided by the Aga Khan Foundation Canada, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Cordaid, International Development Resource Centre (IDRC), Irish Aid, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA).

We trust that this paper makes for interesting reading and lets you develop an appetite for the forthcoming products of the CSI.

Volkhart Finn Heinrich
Assistant Secretary General Programmes

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List of Acronyms

| | |
|---------|--|
| CIDA | Canadian International Development Agency |
| CEE | Central Eastern European |
| CSI | Civil Society Index |
| CSI-SAT | Civil Society Index Short Assessment Tool |
| CSO | Civil Society Organization |
| CSP | Country Support Person |
| IDRC | International Development Resource Centre |
| INTRAC | International Non-Governmental Organization Training and Research Center |
| NAG | National Advisory Group |
| NCO | National Coordinating Organisation |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| NIT | National Index Team |
| Norad | Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation |
| ODI | Overseas Development Institute |
| PIS | Policy Impact Studies |
| RSC | Regional Stakeholder Consultations |
| SFA | Social Forces Analysis |
| SAG | Stakeholder Assessment Group |

Introduction

This publication presents some preliminary results emerging from the implementation of the CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI). The CSI is a participatory needs assessment and action planning tool for civil society around the world, with the aim of creating a knowledge base and momentum for civil society strengthening initiatives. The CSI is initiated and implemented by, and for, civil society organizations (CSOs) at the country level, and actively involves, and disseminates its findings, to a broad range of stakeholders, including government, donors, academics and the public at large.

The two primary goals of the CSI are: to enhance the strength and sustainability of civil society, and to strengthen civil society's contribution to positive social change. To achieve these goals, civil society stakeholders make use of participatory and other research methods to create an assessment of the state of civil society. This assessment is then used to collectively set goals and create an agenda for strengthening civil society in the future.

In its current implementation phase (2003-2005), the CSI has been implemented by CIVICUS and its country partners in more than 50 countries around the world. The project dates back to 1999, when CIVICUS initiated a consultative process around the idea of developing a Civil Society Index. In close collaboration with Professor Helmut Anheier, CIVICUS developed a conceptual framework and methodology, which was subsequently tested in a pilot phase in 13 countries around the world. Based on the lessons learned from this pilot phase, CIVICUS refined the project approach and developed a comprehensive toolkit which served as a guide for the current implementation phase.

Whereas final project outcomes are still outstanding for a range of countries, there is already a significant body of knowledge on CSI results from a number of countries, which led CIVICUS to produce this publication. This paper will serve as background material for the International CSI Workshop, in June 2006, in Glasgow. This workshop will bring together more than 100 participants from CSI country partners, donors and experts in the field to discuss the emerging findings and their implications for civil society research and practice.

The publication is structured as follows: Part I provides important background information about the project, with an emphasis on describing its conceptual framework and implementation approach. Part II uses a regional comparative approach to engage with the emerging findings from a range of CSI projects at country level. This section identifies a range of interesting hypotheses and findings, which will be further explored once the findings from all participating countries are available. Part III looks at the extent to which the CSI has succeeded in its action-oriented objectives, by providing the preliminary results from the CSI country study evaluations and presenting the first signs of the project's impact for civil society. The publication concludes with a brief overview of the future of the CSI, outlining the various activities and products planned for 2006 and the years to come.

I The CSI Framework

1. Project Background

Civil society is playing an increasingly important role in governance and development around the world. In most countries, however, knowledge about the state and shape of civil society is limited, and there are few opportunities for civil society stakeholders to come together to discuss and reflect on the current state of civil society and the challenges it is facing.

The idea of a Civil Society Index originated in 1997, when the international non-governmental organization CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation published the *New Civic Atlas* containing profiles of civil society in 60 countries around the world (CIVICUS 1997). To improve the comparability and quality of the information contained in the *New Civic Atlas*, CIVICUS decided to embark on the development of a comprehensive assessment tool for civil society, the Civil Society Index (Heinrich/Naidoo 2001; Holloway 2001). In 1999, Helmut Anheier, who, at the time, was the director of the Centre for Civil Society at the London School of Economics, played a significant role in the creation of the CSI concept (Anheier 2004). The concept was tested in thirteen countries during a pilot phase lasting from 2000 to 2002. Upon completion of the pilot phase, the project approach was thoroughly evaluated and refined. In its current implementation phase (2003-2005), CIVICUS and its country partners are implementing the project in more than fifty countries (see table I.1.1).

TABLE I.1.1: Countries participating in the CSI implementation phase 2003-2005¹

| | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|
| 1. Argentina | 19. Germany | 37. Orissa (India) |
| 2. Armenia | 20. Ghana | 38. Palestine |
| 3. Azerbaijan | 21. Greece* | 39. Poland |
| 4. Bolivia | 22. Guatemala | 40. Romania |
| 5. Bulgaria | 23. Honduras | 41. Russia* |
| 6. Burkina Faso | 24. Hong Kong (VR China) | 42. Scotland |
| 7. Chile* | 25. Indonesia | 43. Serbia |
| 8. China | 26. Italy | 44. Sierra Leone |
| 9. Costa Rica | 27. Jamaica | 45. Slovenia |
| 10. Croatia | 28. Lebanon | 46. South Korea |
| 11. Cyprus ² | 29. Macedonia | 47. Taiwan* |
| 12. Czech Republic | 30. Mauritius | 48. Togo* |
| 13. East Timor | 31. Mongolia | 49. Turkey |
| 14. Ecuador | 32. Montenegro* | 50. Uganda |
| 15. Egypt | 33. Nepal | 51. Ukraine |
| 16. Fiji | 34. Netherlands | 52. Uruguay |
| 17. Gambia | 35. Nigeria | 53. Vietnam* |
| 18. Georgia* | 36. Northern Ireland | 54. Wales* |

* Represents the nine countries implementing the CSI-SAT.

¹ This list encompasses independent countries as well as other territories in which the CSI has been implemented as of April 2006.

² The CSI assessment was carried out in parallel in the northern and southern parts of Cyprus due to the de facto division of the island. However, the CSI findings were published in a single report as a symbolic gesture for a unified Cyprus.

During the current implementation phase, and in response to the continuing interest by CSOs from around the world to apply the CSI, CIVICUS developed a shorter, less comprehensive and resource-intensive process to assess the state of civil society—the CIVICUS Civil Society Index Short Assessment Tool (CSI-SAT). Based on the original CSI methodology, the CSI-SAT is applicable in situations where a wealth of secondary information on civil society is available and/or resource mobilisation for primary research proves to be difficult. Also, as participation by national-level organisations in the full CSI is only possible approximately every three years, the CSI-SAT offers a useful tool to prepare for a full CSI and gain knowledge on the state of civil society through an analysis of existing information. In total, nine organisations, who meet the criteria for the CSI-SAT cited above, participated in the CSI implementation phase 2003-2005.

2. Project Methodology

Civil society is a complex concept. The task of defining and operationalizing the concept, identifying civil society's essential features and designing a strategy to assess its state is, in itself, a complex and potentially controversial process. This section describes key features of the CSI's definition of civil society, analytical framework and research methodology.

The following principles guided the design of the CSI methodology:

1. Since the CSI seeks to be able to assess civil society in every country around the world, the project had to design a **globally relevant and applicable framework** without imposing foreign standards on specific countries.
2. Recognizing the immense variety in the forms and activities of civil society around the world, the CSI places strong importance on a **flexible framework** that has to be adapted to fit the country-specific context. However, the international project coordination by CIVICUS ensures that common core standards are adhered to by every participating country.
3. The first and foremost goal for the CSI is to generate a **contextually valid assessment** of the state of civil society in a given country. However, responding to the interests from civil society stakeholders, who see strong benefits in comparing their state of civil society with other countries, the CSI also seeks to achieve **cross-country comparability** of its findings – if only as a secondary goal.
4. Given the current lack of consensus around how to define and assess civil society, the CSI's analytical framework seeks to include a broad range of perspectives, leading to a **multi-disciplinary approach** and a comprehensive assessment framework, based on 74 indicators.
5. Based on the view that civil society includes both, civil as well as uncivil, peaceful as well as violent actors, the CSI does not exclude any form of collective citizen action on the basis of its uncivil content. On the contrary, it seeks to reflect the (potentially uncivil) **reality of civil society**, rather than an ideal version of how we want civil society to look like. However, the CSI assessment is by no means value-free, since it explicitly examines the extent to which civil society actually practices and promotes certain universal values, such as democracy, tolerance or gender equity.

6. As a consequence of its action-research philosophy, the CSI assessment seeks to provide information which can be easily translated, by stakeholders, into **policy recommendations** and other practical actions.

2.1. Civil society definition

The CSI defines civil society as “the arena, outside of the family, the state and the market where people associate to advance common interests”.


One of the key features of this definition is the concept of civil society being an arena. The term ‘arena’ is used to describe the particular space in a society where people come together to debate, discuss, associate and seek to influence broader society. Another key feature is the acknowledgement of the ‘fuzziness’ of the boundaries between the spheres of civil society, the state, the market and family, since, in practice, many forms of collective citizen action are difficult to categorise into a specific sphere. Here, the CSI emphasises the function, namely collective citizen action to advance common interests, over the specific organisational form, in which the action takes place (Heinrich 2005, Uphoff/Krishna 2004). Based on the CSI’s practical interest in strengthening civil society, the project also conceptualises civil society as a political term, rather than an economic one, which would be synonymous to the non-profit sector. The CSI focuses on collective public action in the broader context of governance and development, rather than on the economic role of non-profit organisations in society. This political perspective leads the CSI to focus on issues of power within the civil society arena, and between civil society actors and institutions of the state and the private sector.

2.2. CSI analytical framework: indicators, subdimensions and dimensions

The CSI uses 74 indicators for its civil society assessment, each of which measures an important aspect of the state of civil society.³ These indicators are grouped together into 25 subdimensions, which are grouped into four dimensions: *structure, environment, values and impact*. These four dimensions are graphically represented in the form of a Civil Society Diamond (see figure I.2.1).

- ◆ The **STRUCTURE** dimension looks at civil society’s make-up, size and composition. This dimension examines the actors within the civil society arena, their main characteristics and the relationships among them. It is composed of the following 6 subdimensions and has 21 indicators:
 1. Breadth of citizen participation
 2. Depth of citizen participation
 3. Diversity within civil society
 4. Level of organisation

FIGURE I.2.1: The Civil Society Diamond



³ The CSI scoring matrix is annexed to this paper (Annex 2).

5. Inter-relations

6. Resources

- ◆ The **ENVIRONMENT** dimension examines a variety of factors influencing civil society, including political, legal, institutional, social, cultural and economic factors, as well as the attitudes and behaviour of state and private sector actors towards civil society. Although not part of civil society itself, civil society's environment is nonetheless crucial, as it might point towards root causes of potential problems. This dimension is divided into 7 subdimensions with a total number of 23 indicators.

1. Political context
2. Basic freedoms & rights
3. Socio-economic context
4. Socio-cultural context
5. Legal environment
6. State-civil society relations
7. Private sector-civil society relations

- ◆ The **VALUES** dimension addresses the principles and values adhered to, practised by and promoted by civil society. To date, this aspect of civil society has not received much attention, partly because civil society's values are typically pre-defined as positive, progressive or democratic, due to the civil society definition chosen. The CSI holds that the ratio of tolerant vs. intolerant, progressive vs. fundamentalist, pro-poor vs. anti-poor civil society actors in a country is crucial for judging its overall state. Values, such as democracy and transparency, are also critical measures of civil society's legitimacy and credibility. The VALUES dimension is composed of 7 subdimensions with a total of 14 indicators.

1. Democracy
2. Transparency
3. Tolerance
4. Non-violence
5. Gender equity
6. Poverty eradication
7. Environmental sustainability

- ◆ The **IMPACT** dimension measures the impact civil society has on people's lives and on society as a whole. This dimension, therefore, adopts a broad notion of impact, which refers not only to the end result, or how much influence civil society has had in a particular area, but also to the process, or how actively civil society was engaged in a particular area. This dimension has 5 subdimensions and 16 indicators.


1. Influencing public policy
2. Holding state and private corporations accountable
3. Responding to social interests
4. Empowering citizens
5. Meeting societal needs

3. Implementation Approach

3.1 Actors involved in the CSI implementation

The project is implemented by national-level CSOs, or research institutions that have good research and convening abilities. These CSOs responded to CIVICUS' public call for statements of interest to take part in the project and underwent a thorough desk and peer review process, before they were selected by CIVICUS to play the role of the National Coordinating Organisation (NCO).

FIGURE I.3.1: CSI Actors



In each participating country, the NCO **identifies** a three person National Index Team (NIT), which includes:

- ◆ Project Coordinator from the NCO, which coordinates the overall project implementation and acts as main contact person with CIVICUS;
- ◆ Civil society expert who is responsible for drafting the country report and
- ◆ Participatory researcher who is responsible for conducting primary research activities.

The NIT carries out a preliminary stakeholder analysis and identifies the National Advisory Group (NAG), which is comprised of members drawn from civil society and other stakeholder groups. The NAG's primary role is to provide overall guidance and assistance to the NIT in implementing the CSI, as well as score the CSI indicators. Aside from the NAG, a diverse set of stakeholders are involved in the CSI implementation through the different research activities. The aim here is to be inclusive of as many stakeholders as possible, to guarantee a truly participatory assessment of the state of civil society within a given country. Throughout the implementation process, CIVICUS trains and provides regular technical assistance and support to the NIT to guarantee a successful high quality implementation of the CSI project.

Reflections from Implementation phase 2003 - 2005

CIVICUS suggested that the NAG should be made up of 12 members in order to make the NAG manageable and diverse at the same time. However, some countries opted for slightly larger NAGs in order to achieve greater representativity, such as in Turkey. The majority of CSI partners followed CIVICUS' guidance when it came to diversifying their NAG membership, as they invited at least 2/3 of the members from within civil society while the remaining members were recruited from sectors outside civil society, such as donors, media and individuals from the private sector.

3.2 CSI implementation steps

The implementation approach can be broken down into the following steps, which was followed in the majority of countries that took part in this implementation phase.⁴

1. A **review of secondary data** is conducted by the NIT and an overview report is prepared and distributed to the NAG and CIVICUS for feedback.
2. A NIT representative attends a five-day **training workshop**, conducted by the CIVICUS CSI team, on how to implement the CSI.
3. The **NAG meets** to:
 - ◆ Review the overview report;
 - ◆ Discuss and adapt the project methodology
 - ◆ Discuss the definition of civil society;
 - ◆ Conduct a social forces analysis (SFA) to identify the main actors in society and civil society and to plot the power relations between them and
 - ◆ Assist in identifying participants for the regional stakeholder consultations.
4. **Primary research** is carried out through a mix of the following potential instruments:
 - ◆ Regional stakeholder consultations;
 - ◆ Population survey;
 - ◆ Media review and
 - ◆ Fact finding.
5. Findings are submitted to the civil society expert who **drafts a country report**.
6. The NAG meets to **score indicators**,

Reflections from Implementation phase 2003-2005

- In many countries, NAG members **adapted the methodology** to their own country context. These adaptations ranged from linguistic adaptations to additions of relevant country-specific indicators.
- The **SFA exercises** proved to be a good ice breaker for NAG members to begin reflecting on civil society issues in their country. They also provided a useful cross check for many CSI indicators that examine civil society actors, and also provided background information for the environment dimension.
- In the majority of the countries implementing the CSI, the **definition of civil society** suggested by CIVICUS was not fundamentally altered. There were a few changes in semantics, such as in Latin America, where some countries opted for taking out the word “arena” and replacing it with “space”, due to the negative connotation that the word “arena” has in the Latin American context, which is associated with ‘fighting’. However, there were rather frequent minor changes and exclusions of some associational types from the definition, first and foremost political parties.
- Although CIVICUS initially suggested that NCOs conduct a two day **national workshop**, so far, only one NCO was able to do so. This is mainly due to funding constraints, which forced the great majority of NCOs to conduct one day national workshops. At this one day national workshop a diverse set of stakeholders deliberate about the CSI findings and identify the strengths and weaknesses of civil society. Due to time constraints, stakeholders were challenged in coming up with detailed action plans for strengthening civil society, although they were able to put forward many recommendations.

⁴ Based on the original CSI methodology, the CSI-SAT was developed to respond to situations where a wealth of secondary information on civil society is available and/or resource mobilisation for primary research proves to be difficult. Also, as participation by national-level organisations in the full CSI is only possible approximately every three years, the CSI-SAT offers a useful tool to prepare for a full CSI and gain knowledge on the state of civil society through an analysis of existing information. With regard to the implementation phase, the CSI-SAT does not include step 4 (primary research) and step 8 (national workshop).

- based on the draft country report and according to the project's scoring guidelines.
7. The **country report is updated** with results from the NAG scoring meeting.
 8. A **national workshop** is convened to review and validate findings, to analyse principal strengths and weaknesses of civil society and to identify potential civil society strengthening activities.
 9. Final scores and national workshop results are incorporated into a **final country report**, which is reviewed by CIVICUS.
 10. A **CSI evaluation** is conducted by CIVICUS, based on the project findings and internal project monitoring undertaken by the national CSI partner.

3.3 CSI research mix and scoring process

The project utilizes a mix of the following data collection methods and instruments to collect information on the indicator set:

1. Secondary data review
2. Regional stakeholder consultations
3. Population surveys
4. Media review
5. Fact-finding studies

Together, these instruments collect the data required for preparing a narrative report on the state of civil society and scoring the indicators. Most indicators rely on more than one instrument, making it possible to apply methods of triangulation and cross-checks. The CSI research mix in a given country may include all or some of the methods listed above.

Reflections from Implementation phase 2003-2005


- In some countries, the **regional stakeholder consultations** drew more interest and high levels of participations in regions outside of the capital. This may be attributed to 'consultation fatigue' among civil society stakeholders in the capital.
- The **Population surveys** were either conducted on a national representative sample or on a subset of diverse communities. In Post Communist Countries and the Middle East the majority of CSI partners were able to raise the resources for a national representative population surveys. While in most developing countries CSI partners opted for carrying out community sample surveys, due to limited financial resources and constraints on managing national representative sample surveys in vast territories.
- The CIVICUS guidelines encouraged NCOs to monitor civil society news in all types of **media** (print, TV and radio). However the majority of CSI partners monitored print media only, due to the flexibility that it allows monitors, who unlike TV or radio news are not constrained to a specific time to carry out the monitoring.
- The **fact finding** research activities recommended by CIVICUS focused mainly on the policy impact and corporate social responsibility studies. However, key informant interviews were not fully utilized in many countries.

In order to increase comparability across countries and make the outcomes more easily understandable and communicable, a specific methodology was designed to reduce the

complexity and diversity of the information gathered through the CSI research. The outcomes are indicator scores, ranging from 0 to 3, are aggregated into sub-dimension and dimension scores, and then used to form the Civil Society Diamond for each country.

Indicators are scored by the NAG using a 'citizen jury' approach (Jefferson Center 2002), in which a group of citizens come together to deliberate and take decisions on a public issue, based on presented facts. In the case of the CSI, the NAG's role is to give a score (similar to passing a judgement) on each indicator based on the evidence presented by the CSI country team. Figure I.3.2 depicts the process and data sources used for scoring the indicators.

FIGURE I.3.2: The CSI scoring Process



The scoring exercise and the resulting Civil Society Diamond is only one part of a larger analysis of civil society captured in the comprehensive country reports on the state of civil society. The purpose of the country report is to provide as rich a picture as possible, drawing on all available information without necessarily being constrained by demands for quantifiable information and comparability.

Reflections from implementation phase 2003-2005

The scoring methodology and process often proved to be rather difficult to apply properly for the NCOs. In many cases NAG members found it challenging to score the indicators based on the data presented by the NIT, without being influenced by their own preconceptions and views. CIVICUS institutionalized a set of guidelines to insure that NAG members score according to the data, or that they provide justification for why they chose to disregard the data and provide hard facts to support their own justifications.

4. CSI Outcomes and Outputs

The *outcomes* of the CSI respond to its dual objectives of generating useful knowledge, and building capacity and commitment to strengthen civil society. These outcomes include:

- ◆ A body of relevant and useful knowledge on the state of civil society and civil society strengthening practices at the national and international levels.
- ◆ Increased participation among a broad range of civil society stakeholders in assessing civil society.
- ◆ Improved dialogue among civil society stakeholders on the state of civil society.
- ◆ The promotion of networking among civil society stakeholders.
- ◆ A common understanding of the state of civil society among a broad range of stakeholders.
- ◆ Increased self-awareness of civil society actors.
- ◆ Agreement among civil society stakeholders on strategies for strengthening civil society.
- ◆ Increased capacities of civil society stakeholders in action-research.
- ◆ A methodological contribution to the field of action-research and civil society studies.

The CSI's *outputs* cover project results and products at national, as well as international levels and again respond to its two main objectives. These outputs include:

- ◆ An action agenda for civil society strengthening.
- ◆ Comprehensive and accessible country reports on the state of civil society in individual countries.
- ◆ The identification of specific strengths and weaknesses of civil society in a country.
- ◆ A global publication highlighting cross country comparisons and enumerating best practices.
- ◆ The documentation of methodology and processes of the project implementation.
- ◆ A toolkit that describes the methodology and steps used in undertaking the CSI.
- ◆ A global conference that debates and builds on the findings of the project.
- ◆ Series of analytical papers on the CSI.

5. Linking Research and Action

The CSI does more than generate knowledge. It actively seeks to link knowledge-generation on civil society with reflection and action by civil society stakeholders. To ensure this link, it uses participatory action-research methods and principles (see Freire 1974; Fals-Borda/Rahman 1991; Chambers 1997; Knight/Chigudu et al. 2002:33-36).

At the heart of the CSI's knowledge-action link is the national CSI workshop, which brings together civil society stakeholders, many of which were actively involved in the CSI research process. The goal of the national workshop is to engage stakeholders in a critical discussion of, and reflection on, the results of the CSI initiative, in order to arrive at a common understanding of its current state of civil society and the major challenges it faces. In certain instances the national workshop culminates in the development of a specific action agenda, which is subsequently carried out by the stakeholders. It is this

cycle of assessment, reflection and action, coupled with the general participatory nature of the project, which are at the core of CSI's attempt to successfully link research with action.

How is a participatory cycle relevant to efforts to strengthen civil society in a country? Such a mechanism can foster self-awareness among civil society actors that they are part of something larger - namely, civil society itself. It also broadens the horizon of CSO representatives through a process of reflecting upon, and engaging with, generic civil society issues, which may go beyond the more narrow foci of their respective organisations. A strong collective self-awareness, among civil society actors, can also function as an important catalyst for joint advocacy activities.

It should be kept in mind that in many instances, civil society actors and external stakeholders will not be able to find common ground due to irreconcilable differences in values, interests and strategies. However, even then the relevance of dialogue, constructive engagement and of 'agreeing to disagree' should not be underestimated (Edwards 2004:100). This is especially important where civil society experiences internal fragmentation, parochialism and divisions within the sector and between civil society and government.

There are many ways of strengthening the cohesion and long-term sustainability of civil society. The CSI's unique approach is to combine a *scientific assessment* with a *participatory approach*, to convene, engage and mobilise civil society's diverse actors and external stakeholders. In this sense, CIVICUS believes not only that knowledge holds little value unless put into practice, but also that knowledge is essential for meaningful action. Part II of this paper provides a glimpse of the early signs of impact of the CSI, which have been documented by CIVICUS and the country partners thus far.

II Preliminary CSI Findings - A Regional Analysis

1. Introduction

This section discusses some of the preliminary findings of the CSI project. It is important to remark that not all available CSI findings will be analyzed here, but only those that allow for some generalizations at the regional level.

Findings from the following regions are used in this section:

- ◆ Asia (Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam).
- ◆ Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay).
- ◆ Middle East and the Mediterranean (northern part of Cyprus, Egypt, Lebanon and Turkey).
- ◆ Post-communist Europe and Eurasia (Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Ukraine and Slovenia).
- ◆ Sub-Saharan Africa (Ghana, Sierra Leone and Uganda).
- ◆ Western Europe (southern part of Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Italy, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales).

Some of these countries have completed the CSI project, whereas others have only produced preliminary results thus far. This limitation must be kept in mind when reading the following analysis. Another limitation is due to the regional sampling: many more countries will be included in the analysis at a later stage and, in some cases, the additional data is likely to significantly change the regional findings (especially in the cases of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia). A final note of caution regards important outliers. For instance, the southern part of Cyprus was included in the analysis of Western Europe, since it recently joined the European Union. Nevertheless, this country widely shares cultural and social characteristics with other Mediterranean countries.

This short analytical section seeks to consolidate some of the CSI results with a view to identifying regional commonalities in terms of strengths and weaknesses. The main aim is to spark debate during the ICSI Workshop and point out interesting features of civil society in these six regions. In order to achieve this goal, this analysis necessarily prioritized regional findings over country specific findings. Finally, the generalizations discussed in this section should be seen as 'working hypotheses' that can be proved or disproved by further investigation - once data from all countries is available.

2. Regional Findings

The following section is organized alphabetically and discusses the most interesting findings by region.

2.1 *Asia*

Compared to the other regions analyzed in this paper, Asia is by far the most diverse in terms of political context, history, economic trajectory and culture, making a generalized assessment of the specific strengths and weaknesses particularly difficult. Thus, while still seeking to find commonalities, compared to other regional sections, this section contains

more examples and notes of exceptions. In general, the CSI found that the structure and operating environment of Asian civil society are the weakest dimensions of civil society in the region. Generally speaking, citizen participation remains relatively limited and is characterized by low levels of non-partisan political action, such as participating in demonstrations or writing petitions, limited volunteerism and charitable donations. Moreover, in countries, such as Vietnam and Mongolia, civil society enjoys little autonomy from the state and operates in an environment affected by high levels of corruption and a lack of confidence in the rule of law.

In terms of citizen participation, Vietnam is an exception among the Asian countries, since more than 70% of people are members of an organization and, among them, more than 60% belong to more than one organization. This can be explained by the fact that the Vietnamese CSI study included so-called 'mass organizations' in the definition of civil society, which are closely linked to the Vietnamese state/party system. Thus, the inclusion of these organizations – which is debatable – is likely to inflate the results regarding civil society membership and citizen participation in Vietnam. Membership in other types of civil society organizations in Vietnam, such as Vietnamese non-governmental organizations (NGOs), is particularly low.

Another common feature of civil society in these countries is the lack of institutionalized forms of cooperation and self-regulatory mechanisms within civil society. Furthermore, umbrella organizations, capable of connecting civil society efforts, are very few or ineffective. To a certain extent, South Korea is an exception. In South Korea, hundreds of groups and organizations have united and advocated on social and political issues, such as the *Naksun* movement in 2000, where more than 500 CCOs joined together as a civil disobedience movement to reject corrupt candidates for the general elections.

Values, such as gender equality and environmental sustainability, are widely promoted in Mongolia, South Korea and Taiwan. Many organizations practice (internally) and promote (in society at large) democratic values, non-violence and poverty alleviation. Financial transparency is the only value (among those examined by the CSI) to be infrequently practiced and promoted by CSOs. Taiwan is an interesting case, especially due to the cultural factors (e.g. 'guanxi' familial networks and privacy). In Taiwan financial transparency and, more broadly, the concept of transparency is only beginning to take hold.

In most of these Asian countries, civil society tends to enjoy very limited autonomy from state institutions and governments. The state is particularly centralized and cooptation of civil society is

Main strengths and weaknesses of civil society in Asian countries

Strengths

Values: Civil society promotes and practices a number of progressive values, such as non-violence, poverty eradication, environmental sustainability and gender equality.

Weaknesses

State-civil society: In most of these countries, civil society enjoys little autonomy from the state and civil society's impact on policy remains limited. (To a certain extent, Taiwan and South Korean can be seen as exceptions.)

Financial transparency: is scarcely practiced or promoted. In South Korea, campaigns were conducted against corruption in public institutions.

Private sector-civil society: Corporate philanthropy is still in its infancy and CSOs are not successful in holding corporations accountable.

not infrequent. This lack of autonomy is also brought about by a dearth of financial resources for civil society, aside from state funds. This phenomenon deserves particular attention if one considers that international aid for most of Asia is decreasing, corporate philanthropy is still in its infancy and, by and large, there are no significant legal provisions that encourage private sector donations.

In Mongolia, charitable giving is very low, mainly due to the high poverty rate. Likewise in Taiwan and South Korea, charitable giving is also low, despite better socioeconomic conditions and a high rate of economic growth. With the only exception of Mongolia, the socio-economic context in other countries analysed here does not present significant obstacles for civil society to prosper and operate effectively.

The impact of civil society on policy making, particularly the national budgeting process, remains very limited, with the exception of South Korea and Taiwan. Structural deficiencies, limited autonomy from the state and lack of expertise, as well as limited financial resources, constrain the contribution and ability of civil society groups to affect policy. In contrast, in South Korea, advocacy organizations have regular interaction with state institutions and, to a certain extent, manage to influence policy making and hold government accountable.

As pointed out by these preliminary findings, what remains limited in these Asian countries is the capacity of CSOs to hold private corporations accountable. Even in South Korea and Taiwan, where CSOs have activities and programmes in place to hold corporations accountable, the CSI found that their impact on corporate accountability is very low.

Overall, it appears that political liberalization, as timid as it might be in some of these countries, and widespread socio-economic development have brought about positive consequences for civil society. Thus, although many obstacles remain, the last decades have seen the space for civil society activism widen considerably in much of Asia.

2.2 Latin America

The Latin American countries analyzed by the CSI show relatively high levels of citizen participation in civil society activities. Civil society organizations are particularly active in promoting values, such as non-violence and tolerance, but much less so in practicing transparency and accountability. Many organizations conduct campaigns on human rights issues and have been particularly vocal against abuses committed by previous and current political regimes.

Whereas the most professionalized CSOs are concentrated in urban areas, there are also a wide range of local organizations, especially indigenous and self-help groups, social movements and peasant groups, which are active in most rural areas. According to the CSI data, Ecuador appears to be the only country from this group where CSOs are mostly concentrated in the capital city.

In Latin America, citizen mobilization tends to peak in times of social conflict or socio-economic crises and lower rapidly during phases of political normalization. For instance,

in Argentina popular mobilization reached its peak during the socio-economic crisis that hit the country in 2001, but has significantly decreased in the past few years, as the political system regained its credibility and reasserted itself. In Uruguay, the CSI data suggests that membership of CSOs is moderately widespread within society and mostly concentrated in particular institutions, such as faith-based organizations and trade unions. Bolivia is a particularly interesting case, since continuous and protracted popular unrest brought about the collapse of the two previous governments. Social movements in this country have enjoyed a high level of popular participation and have widely supported the political parties that took power in the last elections. A new political phase, based on close cooperation between government and civil society might ensue, but it is still too early to assess whether the new government's intentions will produce the outcomes that civil society movements have been expecting for years.

Civil society organizations in the Latin American countries, analyzed by the CSI, place the protection/promotion of human rights, the rights of indigenous people and social justice at the heart of their advocacy agenda. Environmental sustainability is also considered as an important value, especially in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay and Argentina, with Bolivia being the sole exception, mainly due to other pressing social needs.

Although civil society groups are extremely vocal in denouncing corruption within the public administration, many stakeholders consulted for the CSI assessment felt that corrupt practices also exist within civil society. In their opinion, corruption in civil society is due to a lack of experience on the part of organizations' leadership and the fact that members are not proactive in holding their leaders accountable. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that very few organizations have specific initiatives in place to ensure their financial transparency and accountability. According to some stakeholders involved in the CSI project, civil society in many Latin American countries is centralized, as is the state apparatus,

Main strengths and weaknesses of civil society in Latin American countries

Strengths

Participation: In general many citizens participate in civil society activities. Popular mobilization tends to increase during social tensions and decreases during phases of political normalization.

Diversity: Although most professionalized NGOs are based in urban areas, social movements and various organizations representing ethnic groups, peasants and marginalized communities are present in rural areas.

Impact on human rights: Many organizations have developed strategies to monitor the respect of human rights and hold the state accountable for human rights violations, especially in Argentina and Chile.

Weaknesses

Centralization: In most Latin American countries, the state is relatively centralized, which is reflected in the structures of civil society. Strong leaders dominate the executive branch of government and are mirrored by strong leaders that dominate the most vocal groups within civil society.

Transparency and accountability: Few CSOs have wholeheartedly embraced the value of transparency and accountability.

Corporate accountability: Very few organizations have the expertise or resources to hold corporations accountable.

and relies on strong leaders, which makes it difficult to ensure substantial levels of transparency and accountability towards society at large.

Many CSOs carry out activities to empower marginalized groups, especially indigenous communities and peasants. Moreover, a number of women's groups promote collective action around gender issues. Due to difficult socio-economic conditions in most of these countries, many CSOs provide services and assistance to poor communities, particularly in the outskirts of the main cities. Overall, financial resources are moderate, but a limited reliance on donor funding renders civil society, in these countries, comparatively more sustainable than in other regions of the world.

The relationship between the state and civil society is somewhat different in each country, although certain similarities can be detected. For instance, in Argentina, many stakeholders involved in the CSI project felt that dialogue and systematic interaction with state institutions, especially bureaucrats in the executive branch of government, is rare. At the same time, the state seems quite proactive in involving CSOs in certain policy sectors, although this does provide an effective role for civil society in the decision-making process overall.

All in all, civil society is active in lobbying the state and does not encounter major difficulties in voicing its concerns towards public authorities. In the past few years, in Argentina and Chile, new models of collaboration and cooperation have been introduced by governments, which might improve the contribution of civil society to policy making, particularly in the area of social policy. On the contrary, up until the last presidential elections, dialogue between a significant segment of Bolivian civil society and government was technically impossible, and grievances could only be channelled through popular unrest. The CSI found a similar, although less negative, situation in Ecuador.

In all of these countries, many organizations conduct campaigns on human rights issues and have been extremely vocal against abuses committed by previous and current political regimes. In Bolivia, civil society movements were able to bring about the downfall of Sanchez de Lozada in 2003 and campaigned to incriminate the former president for human rights violations. In Argentina, a host of organizations joined forces to request the abrogation of the infamous *leyes de l'obediencia debida*, which granted amnesty to many perpetrators that committed human rights violations during the military juntas, and similar initiatives were carried out by Chilean CSOs to disclose human rights abuses committed during the Pinochet government.

Overall, it appears that civil society's contribution to policy making varies from country to country and it is dependent on specific institutional arrangements. Argentina, Chile and Uruguay are the countries where civil society-state dialogue is more advanced, but this does not ensure a significant influence of CSOs on policy making, especially the national budget. The relationship between civil society and the private sector is much less developed. In all of the countries analyzed by the CSI, issues, such as corporate philanthropy and corporate social responsibility, are still in their infancy. Moreover, CSOs do not have programmes to monitor corporations and hold them accountable.

2.3 Middle East and the Mediterranean

The preliminary findings of the CSI from some countries of the Middle East and the Mediterranean region found that civil society is rather weak, particularly due to the rather constraining political context and limited extent of citizen participation in public life. Charity and non-violence are widespread values for civil society and can be considered as strengths of civil society in these countries. Also, many organizations provide various services to citizens and marginalized groups. However, at the same time very few organizations try to influence policy or hold the state and private corporations accountable.

Main strengths and weaknesses of civil society in the Middle East and Mediterranean

Strengths

Charitable giving and non-violence: They are important values for CSOs in these countries.

Service delivery: CSOs are particularly successful when it comes to providing services to citizens and marginalized groups.

Weaknesses

Political context: In spite of laws and regulations that formally allow for some basic freedoms and rights, gross abuses frequently occur.

Citizen Participation: It is low in most countries (the northern part of Cyprus being the sole exception), especially in terms of non-partisan political action and membership of CSOs. Occasional exceptions are present.

Influence on public policy: They are virtually absent, due to restrictive political context and narrow perception of civil society's role in society at large.

With regards to participation in civil society activities, membership in CSOs is low in the CSI countries from this region, the exception being the northern part of Cyprus, where about half of the respondents to the community survey declared being a member of at least one CSO. Likewise, volunteerism is rather low in these countries (especially in Turkey and Egypt). An interesting exception is Lebanon, where the CSI found a significantly higher number of people undertaking voluntary work in their communities, 57% of the respondents declared having undertaken voluntary work in the past year.

Charity is an important aspect of Muslim society and it is a strength of civil society in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region. Due to its specific cultural aspects, charity in Muslim societies, especially religiously motivated charity, or *zakat*, is usually carried out privately, often without the intermediation of CSOs. Although the NAG in the northern part of Cyprus decided not to include *zakat el fitr* in the analysis of charitable giving, it was found that 88% of

community members donate for charitable purposes. It is possible that the level of charity in these societies is sensibly higher than the one detected by the CSI, due to the amount of informal and occasional donations that are specific of Muslim societies.

Women are a minority in CSOs, both at the level of membership and leadership. In this regard, Lebanon presents an interesting exception, since women, as well as other marginalized groups appear to be rather equitably represented in CSOs. This might be due to the internal diversity of Lebanese society and the introduction of quotas for women and various minorities. Interestingly, the CSI found that gender equality is broadly endorsed by CSOs in these countries, including Turkey and Egypt. In spite of operating in societies

that are marked by patriarchal values and hierarchic structures, a growing number of CSOs have been empowering women, mainly through social and economic programmes. In Egypt, for instance, some organizations have been running affordable daycares for working women. In most of these countries, CSOs have carried out initiatives aimed at preventing domestic abuse and making women aware of their civil and political rights.

With regard to civil society's level of organisation, it is worth noting that only a small number of umbrella organizations operate in these countries, although international donors have been supporting the creation of civil society networks. At times, cooperation and common actions among CSOs seem to be undermined by rivalries between different groups.

The CSI's preliminary findings show that the socio-economic context of these countries does not seem to pose any significant challenge to the development and growth of civil society. Egypt would most probably be the only exception, owing to the comparatively higher level of poverty and widening gap between the rich and poor.

The political context is rather negative for civil society in these countries. Despite having laws and regulations that allow for some basic freedoms and rights, governments have only been able and willing to uphold such legal provisions to varying degrees. For instance, in Egypt, the government has been operating under a state of emergency for over 20 years. In Turkey, the tension between the state apparatus and Kurdish movements still affect the practice of human rights and fundamental freedoms for a portion of the population. Nevertheless, in spite of a relatively restrictive political context, several changes have been occurring in the region. For instance, Egypt saw mass demonstrations in the wake of the presidential elections of 2005 and the emergence of the *kifaya* ('enough') movement. In Lebanon, a series of significant popular protests was brought about by the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. In Turkey, the potential accession of the country to the European Union succeeded in putting human rights and fundamental freedoms at the centre of the political agenda.

In this generally constraining political context, it is not surprising that systematic influence, by civil society on public policy, is virtually absent in most of these countries. The northern part of Cyprus is the sole exception, where the CSI found a rather good capacity to influence social and human rights policies, due to a more conducive political context.

The relationship between state and civil society in most of these countries, including Egypt, Lebanon and Turkey, has gone through different phases. Depending on the type of work carried out by CSOs, this relationship varies from close collaboration to outright hostility. A case in point is Egypt, where the CSI found that while government funds and supports many service delivery organizations, it hinders human rights groups and raises numerous objections when these groups try to formally register.

In all of these countries, CSOs are much stronger in their service provision function than in their advocacy role. Overall, it appears that CSOs share a relatively narrow perception of their role in society at large. Many organizations, particularly in Egypt and Turkey, see themselves as service providers that need to cater, in one way or another, to the immediate

practical problems of those in need. A limited number of organizations try to address the structural causes of these problems, and even fewer organizations seek to hold government or private corporations accountable.

2.4 Post-communist Europe and Eurasia

Since the heyday of civil society mobilisation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, most post-communist European countries have seen a decline of citizen participation in civil society activities, in spite of steady economic growth and important events, such as accession to

Main strengths and weaknesses of civil society in post-communist Europe

Strengths

Environmental sustainability: Ecological sustainability is widely promoted by civil society. Environmental organizations have developed a strong expertise and attract visible grassroots support.

Socio-economic context: The socio-economic environment in most of these countries does not pose significant challenges to the strengthening of civil society, and it can be seen as a regional strength, when compared to other newly democratized countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia.

Weaknesses

Participation: Citizen participation in civil society activities is extremely limited, in spite of the high levels of popular mobilization experienced before the fall of communism. In Ukraine and Georgia, where there was recent popular unrest, the CSI found that participation in civil society activities remains occasional.

Mistrust: Opinion polls revealed that all these countries are marked by high levels of interpersonal mistrust, which easily hampers civic engagement and collective activism.

Donor-driven civil society: Most CSOs are significantly dependent on donor funding, especially from international donors. As a consequence, their programmes and activities remain donor-driven, rather than resulting from grassroots' needs.

the European Union. A number of deficiencies affect CSOs in these post-communist countries, including structural problems (e.g. limited citizen participation, dearth of financial resources and donor-driven activities), contextual factors (e.g. a political and cultural environments affected by widespread mistrust in institutions and other citizens), scant promotion of important values (e.g. transparency and social justice) in society at large and a limited capacity to influence policy-making.

The CSI found that one of the major factors affecting participation in CSOs in these post-communist countries is the legacy of communism. Although with some slight differences, the post-communist societies analysed here exhibit a rather negative attitude towards voluntary work, which citizens strongly associate with the communist era, during which people were often 'coerced into volunteering' for state-controlled organisations.

In these countries, few organisations are in close contact with the most disadvantaged groups. The majority of organizations are based in the most developed urban areas, while only a few

groups are active in rural areas. At the same time, organizations' membership is highly correlated to education and socio-economic status. Therefore, important marginalised groups, such as religious minorities, the rural poor or Roma people, remain under-represented in the membership, let alone leadership, of CSOs.

The CSI found that even when donors specifically design programmes to target marginalised groups, the latter seldom become active in these initiatives. The elitist composition of many organizations, and their dependence on foreign donors, inevitably affects their credibility as a voice of the 'people' and tends to negatively impact their public image. Moreover, this dearth of grassroots representativeness is likely to discredit them vis-à-vis democratically-elected public authorities, with negative consequences for civil society's impact on policy-making.

The CSI findings largely confirm that most CSOs operating in these countries remain donor-driven, especially in Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania and Ukraine. State support and other forms of contributions, such as individual donations or corporate social responsibility, are extremely minimal. The CSI observed that civil society stakeholders are generally aware of the risks and challenges that lie ahead, and are conscious of the fact that relying on international donors might seriously jeopardise the sustainability of civil society in the future. For countries, such as Bulgaria and Romania, the common view is that the upcoming accession to the European Union will present both challenges and opportunities for financial sustainability, and these organisations will need to acquire new skills if they intend to survive in the new environment.

In the post-communist countries analysed here, the CSI found rather common features, with regard to socio-cultural attitudes and pointed out similar low levels of public trust and social capital. Citizens' trust in public institutions, such as those representing legislative and executive power, is particularly low. According to the CSI data, mistrust in public institutions must be interpreted as the outcome of a variety of factors pertaining to both past legacies as well as present dynamics. As opinion poles reveal, most citizens in post-communist countries have not only been unhappy with the widespread corruption and ineffectiveness of the previous communist state, but their expectations of radical change after 1989 were frustrated by rising levels of corruption and clientelism in the new democratic institutions.

Not surprisingly, the CSI found that a rather common perception exists among citizens, that CSOs are simply representatives of specific interests and do not address issues that are important to society at large. On a more positive note, the CSI found that, although the majority of citizens think corruption also affects civil society, they believe that instances of corruption in civil society are far rarer than in any other sector.

In terms of the values practised and promoted by civil society, the CSI found that even though most CSOs hold positive values, such as tolerance and non-violence, they often fail to promote these values in society at large. An important exception is environmental sustainability, which is a widely promoted and supported value in post-communist countries. Throughout post-communist Europe, environmental organisations began playing a significant role in the early 1980s, when they managed to channel the growing popular disapproval of communist governments through their campaigns, and acquired international popularity, after the nuclear disaster of Chernobyl. Environmental organisations have been able to attract the attention of the media and are currently the CSOs that, along with the trade unions, receive the most significant media coverage and contribute most to policy-making.

The impact that CSOs exert on society at large and policy making is relatively limited. According to the CSI data, the poor impact on society is mainly due to the fact that most CSOs are not embedded in communities and, therefore, struggle to empower citizens, especially marginalized groups in society. At the political level, the lack of advocacy and research skills further undermines CSOs' contribution to policy making and reduces their capacity to acquire expertise and collect evidence that could be utilised to influence policy.

2.5 Sub-Saharan Africa

The Sub-Saharan countries, studied by the CSI, are characterized by a difficult political context, marked by rather frequent violations of human rights and widespread corruption and a socio-economic context characterized by, among others, severe income inequalities, a rural-urban divide, inadequate basic services and infrastructure, extreme poverty and

illiteracy and the HIV-AIDS pandemic. In some countries, such as Sierra Leone and Uganda, political turmoil and civil war have worsened the socio-economic context even further and led to thousands of internally displaced refugees.

Main strengths and weaknesses of civil society in Sub-Saharan African countries

Strengths

Service delivery: civil society organizations are particularly active in assisting marginalized groups, especially in war-torn societies.

Values: many organizations promote and practice progressive values, particularly poverty eradication and environmental sustainability.

Economic empowerment: a number of organizations and groups implement income-generating activities aimed at empowering poor and marginalized communities.

Weaknesses

Diversity and resources: most organizations are based in large cities. These organizations are often disconnected from the grassroots level and obtain the lion's share of international funds. Those community-based organizations that operate at the grassroots lack financial and technical resources to carry out their activities and achieve significant results.

Environment: civil society operates in an environment marked by high levels of poverty and illiteracy, socio-economic inequality and conflict.

Advocacy: very few organizations conduct advocacy campaigns and their impact on public policy approximates nil (anti-poverty campaigns in Uganda might be seen as an exception).

Within this overall context, citizen participation in civil society activities remains rather low, especially for women and rural dwellers. According to local stakeholders, who were involved in the CSI project, this low participation must be seen against the background of widespread poverty and illiteracy. Moreover, many CSOs, in particular those that enjoy higher levels of financial resources, are based in large cities and are far removed from the majority of citizens, most of which live in rural areas. Nonetheless, many community-based organizations exist, that provide services to rural communities and marginalized groups, but these organizations are often under-resourced and rarely cooperate with one another, mainly due to poor infrastructure.

Civil society's infrastructure is particularly weak in these countries. Few umbrella organizations or civil society support organisations exist and, while some well-resourced NGOs take part in international networks, most local organizations remain disconnected from national networks and even more from initiatives.

Most CSOs operating in these countries promote and practice progressive values. In broad terms, the CSI found that poverty eradication and, to a certain extent, environmental sustainability are the values that civil society promotes more effectively in society at large, although the CSI found that in Ghana CSOs play a less active role on environmental issues. As far as poverty eradication is concerned, many organizations carry out activities aimed at promoting income generation (e.g. micro-finance schemes) or delivering services to poor communities. In war-torn areas, such as some regions of Sierra Leone and northern Uganda, a number of CSOs run programmes to support displaced people and provide healthcare to victims.

Transparency and accountability issues have yet to take hold in sub-Saharan African civil society. The CSI found that the value of financial transparency is hardly upheld by most CSOs. For example, very few, if any, organizations make their financial records publicly available. Moreover, several cases of corruption have hit CSOs in these countries, even though some organizations have been advocating for financial transparency in public institutions.

The impact of civil society on policy making is particularly limited. In Ghana, for instance, CSOs have many activities in place to hold the government accountable, but their capacity to influence policy is extremely limited. Although the national budget drafting process in Uganda is consultative, civil society's participation in this area of policy making is minimal. The few organizations that are involved in the budget process mainly participate in the auditing and implementation stage, but they have little or no input in the drafting process. Overall, civil society operates in a political context where harassment of activists and organizations, by state officials, is not infrequent. Moreover, the relatively weak institutionalization of the state throughout the territory often provides room for abuse by local leaders and strongmen.

In general, subcontracting of CSOs, especially professionalized or semi-skilled NGOs, by local government is seen as attractive by many local organizations. It fits with their self-perception as service providers and with the dominant view among local government officials, that NGOs are mainly service providers that supplement the work of government. Moreover, interaction between civil society and the small private sector is virtually nonexistent.

This in part explains why in these sub-Saharan African countries most CSOs concentrate their efforts on service delivery and hardly engage with advocacy and lobbying, probably with the only exception of a few advocacy networks concerned with poverty relief and the fight against HIV/AIDS. While most organizations lack the capacity to engage in advocacy, those CSOs that conduct advocacy programmes and lobbying are mainly concentrated in large cities and receive the bulk of their funding from international donors.

2.6 Western Europe

In the Western European countries analyzed here, citizen participation is significant, civil society benefits from a benign operating environment and the level of organisation within the sector is particularly strong. Civil society organizations have a large membership,

especially the trade unions, and can draw on a significant amount of charitable giving and volunteerism. Umbrella organizations are widespread and tend to be generally effective. Moreover, a number of coalitions, that have united organizations and groups operating throughout the continent, exist, such as Make Poverty History, G8 Alternatives and anti-Iraq war coalitions.

In these countries, civil society is a driving force in promoting much of society's progressive values. Civil society organizations are active in eradicating poverty in their countries as well as abroad and in redressing social and economic inequalities. Moreover, many CSOs are active in supporting marginalized groups, especially ethnic minorities and (legal or illegal) immigrants. On all these issues many CSOs have been able to play a double role, as vocal advocates and services providers at the same time.

Despite a significant amount of interaction and common causes, the CSI noted that there a relevant disagreement between different groups exists within civil society, which makes it difficult for civil society to speak with one single voice. One case in point is the issue of cooperating with, or confronting, the state amid the restrictive legal provisions introduced after September 11th.

In general, the relationship between state and civil society is characterized by mutual respect and CSOs have several avenues at their disposal to affect policy making, such as the so-called tripartite institutions, where trade unions, business and the state negotiate common agreements, as far as social policy and labour market are concerned, and a myriad of social dialogue forums in which various CSOs participate. Nonetheless, as CSOs become increasingly dependent on state funding, the question of autonomy and independence of civil society acquires specific importance. In this respect, the CSI found that service delivery organizations, which are heavily funded by the state in most of these countries, are the most exposed to the risk of losing their independence and positive standing in society at large.

Main strengths and weaknesses of civil society in Western European countries

Strengths

Environment and participation: The political, socio-economic and cultural contexts are conducive for civil society. Citizen participation in civil society's activities is rather widespread.

Values and support to the marginalized: In most of these countries civil society is a driving force in redressing social and economic inequalities and promoting a wide range of progressive values.

Networks: Civil society organizations cooperate in networks across countries and global alliances.

Advocacy and policy impact: Mutual respect with governments and numerous avenues to conduct advocacy campaigns and affect policy making exist.

Weaknesses

Risk of reliance on state funding: Most organizations operate thanks to state funding. This might undermine their autonomy, particularly with regard to current pressing issues, such as the 'war on terror' and pacifism.

Shrinking space for public debate and engagement: Since 9/11 new reforms have been introduced that curtail fundamental freedoms and limit public debate and mobilization. If these reforms are not challenged and retracted, they might significantly undermine civil society and civic activism at large.

Many organizations conduct campaigns around corporate responsibility, monitor corporations and aim at holding the private sector accountable. The impact of these campaigns varies and mostly depends on the responsiveness of the corporations themselves.

The political, cultural and socio-economic environment in the region is conducive for civil society activities and the sector's growth. By and large, a wide range of civil and political rights are protected/promoted and the rule of law is upheld. Moreover, citizens enjoy a relatively high standard of living.

The preliminary findings of the CSI in this region show that civil society stakeholders are aware that such a conducive environment should not be taken for granted, since a gradual deterioration of longstanding legal provisions aimed at ensuring personal rights has been occurring. For example, the governments in these countries have introduced reforms that are potentially restrictive to personal freedoms, as a consequence of the so-called 'war on terror'. Various attempts have been made at suspending some pillars of the rule of law, such as 'habeas corpus', and have been justified as the only viable strategy to counter international terrorism. Not only have these new provisions curtailed the freedoms and rights of many citizens, especially marginalized groups and immigrants, but they also have progressively shrunk the capacity of citizens and organizations to associate, voice their concerns and advance their common interests. The pressure of civil society on governments and the political debate in these countries will most probably determine whether such a conducive context is preserved in the future, or whether it will be increasingly challenged by international security concerns.

3. Summary of Key Findings and Questions for Discussion

This analysis has highlighted some regional commonalities and pointed out some important differences within each region. Inevitably, the quest for identifying common traits and generalizations has to be balanced with recognizing the special features of each country. As more CSI countries complete their reports, the working hypotheses discussed in this section will be reviewed. One of the main goals of this analysis is to encourage debate around the preliminary CSI findings. Below are some key findings and questions for debate:

- ◆ Citizen participation in civil society activities is rather low. Even in Latin America, where citizen involvement peaks during periods of social and political conflict, it tends to decrease rapidly as the political situation normalizes. In this respect, the only exception seems to be Western Europe where citizen participation is rather high and less volatile.
 - ◇ How can citizen participation in civil society be encouraged? In which way can civil society organizations ensure that citizen engagement becomes more regular and systematic, rather than occasional and volatile?
- ◆ Financial resources for CSOs are limited in most regions, especially in post-communist Europe and sub-Saharan Africa.

- ◊ Can civil society across the world reach a stage in which financial sustainability will be secured or are financial constraints inevitably intertwined with the very principle of civic activism?
- ◆ Civil society organizations are sometimes donor-driven, especially in post-communist Europe and, to a lesser extent, in sub-Saharan Africa. As donor priorities shift or donor commitment declines, civil society's financial sustainability, particularly in post-Communist Europe, will become a major challenge.
 - ◊ Can civil society become financially sustainable, based on the current model of significant external funding mainly by international donors? Are there any 'indigenous' sources that can be exploited to make civil society sustainable in these regions?
- ◆ Civil society's infrastructure is particularly weak in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. In post-communist Europe, where infrastructure has been a focus of donor efforts for the last decade, however, often it did not succeed in linking national-level organizations with groups operating locally.
 - ◊ How can civil society's infrastructure be strengthened? What is the appropriate role of umbrella bodies and civil society support organisations? Can the state or the private sector play any supporting role in this respect?
- ◆ The political context, especially in terms of laws and practices constraining civic activism, hampers the development of civil society in all regions analyzed in this section, although to varying degrees.
 - ◊ How can civil society contribute towards a more conducive political context? Are there any lessons learnt and best practices to draw on? What is the ultimate role of civil society in situations when the space for public activities shrinks? What is the appropriate strategy: oppose or seek to reform abusive states?
- ◆ In all regions, civil society upholds important progressive values, such as non-violence, tolerance and gender equity. However, at the same time internal transparency and accountability mechanisms are scarcely practiced in any region except for Western Europe.
 - ◊ Are CSOs aware of the fact that issues, such as transparency and accountability, are of crucial importance to civil society? How can these issues be given the prominence they deserve in the work done by CSOs?
- ◆ The state is (or will be) the main source of funding for civil society. This provides opportunities and poses challenges for CSOs in all regions. Most probably, only those organizations that succeed in attracting citizen support, will be able to engage the state without the risk of being co-opted.
 - ◊ Will the increasing role of state funding undermine the autonomy of civil society? Which types of organizations are most exposed to the risk of being co-opted? What strategies can be adopted to minimize the risk of civil society losing its ability to be a critical voice?
- ◆ Civil society organizations struggle to influence policy making, especially the national budget process, in most of these regions. This is often due to reluctant

governments, which either feel threatened by or do not recognise the importance of civil society involvement. In many cases, civil society and government see one another suspiciously and do not engage in meaningful dialogue. In some instances, governments see civil society's involvement as merely formal, but helpful in presenting the policy-making process as open and consultative. However, they do not allow for any meaningful input from civil society organizations. Finally, it must be noted that more often than not civil society organizations lack the resources and expertise to influence policy-making, even when governments are open and collaborative.

- ◇ How can civil society' contribution to public policy be improved? What resources are necessary for civil society to play a meaningful role in decision-making processes? How can organizations develop expertise and know-how, so as to propose alternative allocations of state expenditure in the national budget? To what extent can networks and cooperation with other actors, such as academic institutions and the media, to strengthen civil society's influence on policy making?
- ◆ Dialogue between the private sector and civil society is relatively weak in Latin America, Asia and post-communist Europe, and almost nonexistent in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, corporate philanthropy and corporate social responsibility have yet to take hold in these regions.
 - ◇ What role can be played by the private sector? What are the pros and cons of corporate philanthropy? Civil society's capacity to hold corporations and businesses accountable is significantly low in most regions: how will a stronger commitment by the private sector in civil society affect the autonomy and the watchdog role of CSOs?

III Reflections on the CSI Implementation

This section provides some preliminary findings that have emerged from the evaluation studies conducted with CSI country partners. It also examines some effects the project is having on the implementing organisations, civil society at large and external stakeholders.

1. Preliminary Results of the Final Evaluations of the CSI Project

1.1 Introduction

At the end of the project implementation in each country, CIVICUS conducts a participatory evaluation, to assess the extent to which the project's outputs and outcomes, as well as other relevant criteria, have been achieved by the CSI project. The purpose of the evaluation is to provide CIVICUS and the NCOs with an assessment of the implementation of the CSI project at the country level. The findings of the evaluation will be used to generate lessons, which will inform the final external evaluation and potential future project phases. It is hoped that the NCOs will also gain from this evaluation, through the process of self reflection in gauging important lessons learnt.

This section presents the methodology and criteria of the evaluations and the findings of the nine evaluations available to date (May 2006). While these evaluations are clearly not representative of the more than 50 country studies, they nonetheless provide indicative findings of the successes and challenges of implementing the CSI at country level.

1.2 Methodology of the evaluation

The evaluation combines a self-assessment by, and evaluation of, CIVICUS and the NCO. Specifically, the evaluation takes the form of administering short questionnaires to the NCO, specifically to the project coordinator, and civil society expert, and in the case of the full CSI the participatory researcher. Members of the Advisory Group are also requested to assess the project. At the CIVICUS level, both the Country Support Person (CSP) and Programme Manager also fill out evaluation questionnaires. An evaluation report is drafted on the basis of these questionnaires and discussed during a final telephone call with the NCO.

1.3 Evaluation criteria

In 2003, the expected outputs and outcomes of the CSI were developed by the CSI team, which in turn have informed the elaboration of the monitoring and evaluation framework that the NCOs are assessed against. They are as follows⁵:

Outputs

1. A body of knowledge on the state of civil society at national level.
2. Shared understanding of the state of civil society among a broad range of

⁵ The Outputs and Outcomes are similar, but more limited in the case of countries implementing the CSI Shortened Assessment Tool (CSI-SAT). The primary distinction between the full CSI and the CSI-SAT is that the participants in the CSI-SAT relied solely on secondary data collection, whereas in the full version both primary and secondary data collection took place (please see 'CSI Framework' section for more information). This in turn affects the achievable outputs and outcomes of the project.

stakeholders.

3. The development of a set of strategies for strengthening civil society.
4. Forums for sharing knowledge on civil society within participating countries and cross-nationally.

Outcomes

1. Increased knowledge based actions by civil society stakeholders.
2. Increased collective voice of civil society in governance and development.
3. Increased openness towards civil society by external stakeholders.

1.4 Findings of the Evaluations

As previously mentioned, nine evaluations are available to date. These are:

TABLE III.1.1: Completed country evaluations

| | <i>Country</i> |
|----|----------------|
| 1. | Bolivia |
| 2. | Bulgaria |
| 3. | Croatia |
| 4. | Czech Republic |
| 5. | Germany |
| 6. | Greece |
| 7. | Romania |
| 8. | Vietnam |
| 9. | Wales |

The NCOs were asked to rank the Outputs and Outcomes against each other (from most to least significant). This helps CIVICUS assess to what extent these are important to the different institutions. An assessment of this, as well as to what extent the Outputs and Outcomes were achieved, is found below:

Outputs

1. A body of knowledge on the state of civil society at national level

This output, judged mostly by the comprehensiveness, accuracy, relevance, accessibility and, in some cases, the level of interpretation and analysis of the CSI products, received a generally positive assessment, ranging from between **mostly and completely satisfactory**. This output was generally seen as the most important. With the exception of Croatia and Romania, this output was rated by the NCOs as one of the two highest priorities for the CSI project. In several cases, CIVICUS noted difficulty with the quality of translation of the final country report, and the limited extent of interpretation and analysis undertaken in the report was also highlighted as an obstacle for being able to distil actionable and nuanced recommendations and future civil society strengthening initiatives. Several NCOs reiterated the comment that drafting successful country reports is often a challenge, mainly due to the complex nature of the primary data gathered.⁶

⁶ In the case of CSI-SAT countries, a relative deficit in secondary data availability was noted as a difficulty.

2. *Forums for sharing knowledge on civil society within participating countries as well as cross-nationally*

In most cases, this output was considered to be **mostly achieved**. Three countries rated the creation of forums for sharing knowledge on civil society as one of the two highest priorities (Bulgaria, Croatia and the Czech Republic), while in two cases this ranked among the lowest two priorities (Germany and Romania). Not surprisingly, the venues for sharing knowledge are mainly the NAG meetings, Regional Stakeholder Consultations (RSCs) and the National Workshop. The value and utility of the RSCs and National Workshop was recognized to a larger extent than that of the NAG, although it was admitted that this forum prompted to reflect more thoroughly on the concept of civil society. The National Workshop was considered to be very helpful as a forum for sharing knowledge, since a wider range of stakeholders is involved.

3. *Shared understanding of the state of civil society among a broad range of stakeholders*

Establishing a shared understanding of the state of civil society among a broad range of stakeholders was highlighted as a second priority by the Czech Republic, Romania and Germany. In most cases the output was **mostly** or **completely achieved**. This was possible thanks to the various venues and forums organized that encouraged exchanges on the topic among a broad range of stakeholders. In some contexts it was noted that the consultations and workshops had several recurring participants, which increased the sense of dialogue and shared understanding among the stakeholders.

4. *A Set of strategies for strengthening civil society developed*

Exclusively Croatia, Romania and Vietnam rated this output among the two highest priorities, while establishing a set of strategies was **mostly achieved** in all but two cases (Bolivia and Germany). In Vietnam, areas for policy and action received a great deal of emphasis, especially with respect to a 'law of association' currently being drafted. In the remaining cases, it was mentioned that this did not occur, since stakeholders feel 'powerless' to change or strengthen the impact of civil society on a national level. A lack of a sense of ownership and/or consensus among National Workshop participants was put forward as the main obstacle to achieving this output. In the other cases more optimism towards this output was expressed, as it can contribute to "charting the way forward".

Outcomes

1. *Increase in knowledge based actions by civil society stakeholders*

This output was considered the **highest priority**, and considered as **mostly** achieved in all countries. Preliminary indications of knowledge based actions by CSI stakeholders are particularly noted in two cases (Croatia and Romania), as several organizations, both national and international (USAID/World Learning), reportedly used and requested the data, while an increasing involvement of university students was also registered in this respect.

2. *Increased collective voice of civil society in governance and development*

This output was less important for the NCOs than was expected by the CIVICUS team, and has been **somewhat** achieved in most cases. A sustained effort to continue roundtable and similar discussions is noted in only one case (Romania), while in the other countries the NCOs perceive the consultations and meetings to have been project-specific and therefore 'once-off' occurrence.

3. *Increased openness towards civil society by external stakeholders*

The majority of the NCOs rated an increased openness towards civil society by external stakeholders as a second priority outcome, and in most cases it was only fairly achieved. In several cases the project has encouraged, or even lead to, dialogue between mostly local government and CSOs (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic and Romania), and has likewise created heightened donor interest in civil society issues (Bolivia).

In conclusion, the evaluations demonstrate that the outputs and outcomes have been achieved to varying degrees. It is clear that the key element which has led to some countries attaining the outputs and outcomes to a higher degree has been the impetus and interest in the project shown by the NCO, particularly where the NCO saw a strong relevance of the project for civil society at large. The evaluations that have been completed to date, show that where the concept and empirical reality of civil society is still in its early stages is where most of the momentum and impetus can be registered, and is where the outputs and outcomes have been achieved to a greater extent.

1.5 *Additional evaluation criteria*

Relevance

The CSI's relevance for both the NCOs and the NAG/SAG is assessed between **completely** and **mostly relevant** in almost all cases, since the CSI was seen as relating very closely to the NCOs or NAG/SAG member's work. Similarly, its relevance for civil society strengthening is considered **quite high** in most cases. The CSI is considered to primarily build knowledge and understanding of civil society. It is important to note that the relevance for civil society as a whole seems to be rated much higher in countries where this concept is not yet thoroughly researched or even widely understood. In a context like Germany, with a well-developed civil society, it was considered 'naive' to think that the CSI project would have an extraordinary impact, or be very relevant on a national level.

Validity

Some aspects, with respect to the project methodology and validity, were repeatedly raised by NCOs:

- ◆ **Rigidity of methodology:** In several cases, it was felt that the Policy Impact Studies (PIS), as well as the questionnaires for RSCs/population survey, would have been more useful if the NCO would have adapted them more to fit the specific country context.
- ◆ **(Some) indicator distinctions:** The criticism and suggestions here are manifold and often contradictory. One NCO suggested reducing the number of indicators, while others added or suggested to add new indicators. Another NCO, also suggested further investigating potential causal relationships between indicators.
- ◆ **Score definitions:** Several NCOs considered the current score scale (0-3) to be limiting and the descriptions often open to interpretation and subjectivity, which may jeopardize the comparability of the scores. This concern is shared by CIVICUS, which will take up the suggestion to nuance and define the indicator scale further.

From the perspective of the NCOs it was noted that more training on the implementation of the Media Review would have been helpful. Since some NCOs have less experience in

conducting research activities than others, the quality of the primary research activities tends to vary from country to country. That said, it is worth mentioning that most NCOs very actively engaged with the methodology, despite some criticism on details. In many cases the idea of evaluating civil society, using a range of perspectives and depicting it via the Civil Society Diamond, has shaped and influenced the work and thinking of many NCOs.⁷

Capacity Building

As mentioned previously, some NCOs, implementing the CSI, have more research experience than others, which in turn has had an impact that the CSI has had on capacity-building. An example is Macedonia and Croatia, where implementation of the CSI improved staff capacity to use technical software, conduct data analysis and their writing skills. In most cases the project was believed to have built capacity with respect to research activities, convening and facilitating workshops and in fostering networks. However, in a few instances these capacities were already in place prior to the implementation of the project.

CIVICUS assistance

For the most part, CIVICUS' assistance was evaluated **favourably**, in particular the assistance provided by the respective country support person. In the case of countries that started implementing the CSI relatively early, it was mentioned that the toolkit changed frequently and that many systems and procedures that made the project more manageable were not available at the early stages.

Sustainability

Most NCOs that implemented the full CSI considered that the project should be re-implemented in 2-5 years. In most CSI-SAT countries it is also considered that the full CSI project should now be implemented. In the cases of Greece and Vietnam this was recommended to be done as soon as possible, in order to benefit from the momentum built by the implementation of the CSI-SAT. This can be regarded as a positive indicator of the relevance of the CSI to CSOs and the commitment of national CSI partners.

2. Early Signs of Impact of the CSI

2.1 Background

Throughout the final months of the project implementation and thereafter, preliminary impacts or signs of impact are requested to be monitored by the NCOs. These impacts can be related to the work by the national CSI partner, or impacts on other stakeholders and processes. The following text is a preliminary analysis of the first signs of impact at country level and internationally. Given the advanced timeline in the Central and Eastern European countries, and owing to in-depth discussions during a regional CSI workshop held for those countries, most findings focus on this region. Some findings are also available for Mongolia and Vietnam. It is expected that the International CSI Workshop will investigate the signs of impacts registered among the remaining CSI countries.

⁷ Refer to section 'Early Signs of Impact' for details.

2.2 Types of impact

Beyond the level of impact, such as institutional, local or national levels, other types of impact can be identified. These are not 'watertight', and often a specific impact will fall under two or more categories simultaneously.

Institutional change and strategy

This impact denotes a particular institutional or organizational choice that occurred because of the CSI project implementation, such as:

- ◆ In Bolivia most of the NCO's projects are now being developed based on the findings of the CSI.
- ◆ In Bulgaria, the CSI report was used as the basis for the development of a code of conduct for the NCO.
- ◆ In Macedonia, it was noted that a strategic shift of project planning and execution took place as a consequence of the CSI. The NCO has decided that it will, where appropriate; first conduct research on a question before developing any specific project activities. It was also noted that the four dimensions of the diamond influenced the work and framed the thinking of the NCO on its other projects.

Advocacy and awareness-raising

In several cases the CSI triggered a greater use of the media (or of other mechanisms for awareness-raising) by civil society, while strengthening the willingness and ability of the CSOs to lobby or advocate for related issues. Some examples include:

- ◆ The Macedonian NCO chose to further hone its ability to conduct advocacy and training. In their words, they would like to become an evidence-based – as opposed to perception-based – advocate of public information.
- ◆ In Bulgaria, a task force was created to advocate for greater transparency of government spending on civil society, which is still in existence several months after its creation.
- ◆ In the case of Slovenia, two projects were presented to the government based on the CSI: 1) a project aimed at providing stakeholders with avenues to monitor and influence the drafting of budget laws, at the local and national level, and 2) a project for increasing transparency within civil society.
- ◆ In Romania, the CSI is being used in advocacy initiatives by other NGOs, as the lack of influence of CSOs on public policy was highlighted as a major weakness. The CSI was also used to justify arguments in negotiations to include NGOs in the Economic and Social Committee set up by government.
- ◆ A further example for advocacy can be found in the case of Vietnam, where an association of national CSOs lead by the Stakeholder Assessment Group (SAG) members has commented on the law on association which guarantees the right of organizations and related procedures. As the current framework is not enabling enough, the federation has prepared a different draft, and other local NGOs have given comments to the ministry of home affairs. The law will be discussed at a National Assembly meeting in June.
- ◆ The use of media for the broader dissemination of project results was particularly noteworthy in Croatia, the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovenia, where print media, television and radio were utilized to raise awareness about civil society to the general public.

- ◆ In Hong Kong, the NCO was invited to be the keynote speaker in a month long radio special on civil society, on one of the main radio stations. As a result, the CSI findings were disseminated to a large population of stakeholders, academics and the general public.
- ◆ In Ghana, Nepal, Taiwan and Vietnam newspapers have expressed interest in the implementation and the results of the CSI.
- ◆ Media has also been actively engaged in the cases of Honduras and Uruguay.

Links and connections

A further category of impact concerns the creation of links and communication between institutions or actors, nationally and internationally, which were previously not engaging with one another. Some examples include:

- ◆ In Bulgaria, the CSI boasted new partnerships among previous rival NGOs developing out of the RSC. It was also seen that NGOs across regions began cooperating and establishing contacts due to the CSI's implementation.
- ◆ Some international cooperation was also established by the CSI, notably cooperation between the NCOs of the Czech Republic and Poland on the CSI study itself.
- ◆ In the case of Mongolia, the report and project resonated widely, so that some CSOs have decided to hold a CSI meeting in their community and have invited the NCO Project Coordinator and Civil Society Expert to participate and provide guidance.
- ◆ In the case of Vietnam, SNV and UNDP have created a shorter, more recommendation and action focused report on the basis of the CSI-SAT country report.
- ◆ In the case of Uruguay the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in-country expressed interest in collaborating with the NCO subsequent to the National Workshop having been held.
- ◆ Furthermore, it was noted by the NCO of the Czech Republic that the data of the CSI in their country is now frequently used in essays and papers by students and other authors.

Evidence-based action

This impact refers to examples in which the CSI is essential to the production of a document, policy or increased development of a sector, such as:

- ◆ The CSI is also being used by the CEE Trust in the Czech Republic to identify 'white spots', such as undiscovered issues within civil society.
- ◆ Furthermore, the CSI findings have generated the interest and will of the NCO in Romania to encourage women's participation in the NGO sector.
- ◆ In Cyprus, the UNDP launched a capacity building programme for NGOs focusing on the weaknesses identified by the CSI assessment in the Island.

Innovation

This relates to an activity or action that was unprecedented and inspired by the project.

- ◆ In Poland, an internet panel was introduced as part of the CSI, in which over 300 stakeholders took part. The NCO is planning to continue using the panel to consult on current issues and problems, as a opinion barometer among civil society leaders.

Myth or reality

The CSI helped question some preconceived notions on certain issues, with surprising findings which often uncovered a different reality.

- ◆ In Macedonia, the media review showed more positive results than originally anticipated. Also, the community survey was used on the NCO's staff in Macedonia and uncovered that among staff, only a minority have volunteered or made any donations during the last year.
- ◆ In the case of the Czech Republic citizen participation was assessed as relatively high which challenges the pre-conceived notion that citizen apathy is prevalent in the country.
- ◆ Despite the fact that charitable giving is seen as one of the strongest values of civil society in Egypt and Turkey the related indicator scored poorly in both countries.

New knowledge

This impact refers to the CSI as a new knowledge and awareness resource.

- ◆ In some cases, such as the Czech Republic, Poland and Romania the project allowed for a way of broadening the perception that only NGOs are civil society.
- ◆ In Macedonia, the CSI helped to structure and analyse data on project activities of CSOs in a biannual CSO directory publication.
- ◆ In Bulgaria and Poland, the CSI reports are being sourced for other publications, while in Croatia and the Czech Republic the reports are utilized as an open source by universities and policy makers alike. Masters in Arts students, who worked on the case studies in the Czech Republic also developed these topics in their theses.
- ◆ In both Croatia and Romania, a common language and understanding on civil society was deepened, as the CSI has become a widely used framework for measuring, understanding and talking about civil society.
- ◆ In Sierra Leone and Uganda, the CSI reports created opportunities to investigate issues of civil society's donor dependency in Africa, thus creating a forum for discussing this pressing issue.
- ◆ In Mongolia, Nepal and Uganda, political structures drastically changed in the midst of writing the reports and the NCOs changed the reports in turn, thus creating a document that captures how current events are shaping and being shaped by civil society first-hand.

Snowball-effect

It was furthermore registered that, in several cases, research is being conducted on the basis of something the CSI shed light on and alternatively tools from the CSI are being used for other projects.

- ◆ In Macedonia, the CSI highlighted areas that require further investigation, such as a survey on philanthropy, public trust, networking, umbrella organizations, the public's perception of civil society and internal democracy practices, while in the Czech Republic studies of umbrella organizations were inspired by the CSI.
- ◆ In the Czech Republic, which also implemented the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector study five years ago, a 'tradition' of conducting in-depth studies every 4 to 5 years is being created.

- ◆ In Poland, the project is meant to be adapted for implementation at the local level.

Cross-sectoral cooperation

This impact occurs when the implementation of the CSI galvanizes cooperation between sectors:

- ◆ In Macedonia, as part of a programme managed and funded by European Agency for Reconstruction, the NCO is providing key technical assistance to the government unit of civil society with four components: 1) developing government strategy for cooperation with civil society, 2) setting up transparent criteria for state financing of CSOs, 3) improvement of visibility of civil society unit within government and 4) capacity building of the public administration.
- ◆ In Croatia, the NCO was invited, by the Assembly of the City of Zagreb, to facilitate the process of developing a City Foundation on the development of civil society. The Ministry for Social Care also invited the NCO, since it felt the CSI would provide good information and a knowledge base. The NCO will organize a larger conference on social services for CSOs and other social workers, on the future development of social policies.
- ◆ In Slovenia, cooperation with the Ministry for Public Administration was engaged in the national workshop; the national workshop report is available on the ministry's website.
- ◆ A government representative in Montenegro's SAG has become more active since the CSI and is lobbying for the development of a strategy between government and civil society.
- ◆ In Poland, the CSI provided the basic structure and main content of civil society's input into the National Development Plan for the year to come.
- ◆ In Vietnam, the Prime Minister's research group has expressed a keen interest in the project.
- ◆ Some donor agencies have adopted the CSI's methodology and language, such as the civil society departments of SIDA and EuropeAid.

2.3 Conclusion

While in most participating countries, it is still too early to assess the CSI project's impact, in particular in the Central Eastern European (CEE) region, it can be stated that the project has already stirred considerable interest by a myriad of stakeholders from academia, the media, CSOs and government. It remains to be seen if these areas of impact are also relevant for the CSI in other countries and whether other areas of impact will emerge.

IV Ways Forward for the CSI

1. Next Steps for the CSI

Since the first request for statements of interest for organisations to participate in the CSI pilot phase in 2000, an exiting and challenging five years has passed and many valuable lessons have been learnt. Most significantly, in its current phase, the CSI was carried out in more than 50 countries, covering all parts of the world. While some countries are still in the final stages of the project, many partners have completed the CSI and have begun to disseminate and make use of its findings.

For CIVICUS, the next months will remain a busy period, which will focus on four sets of activities: 1) Joint Learning; 2) Analysis; 3) Evaluation and 4) Re-design

1.1 *Joint Learning*

CIVICUS will convene the national CSI partners, members of the International Steering Group, donors and a range of other stakeholders at a two and a half day workshop to discuss the emerging results, share lessons learnt, evaluate project activities and talk about the future of the project. The workshop, which brings together more than 100 participants, will take place from the 19th to the 21st of June 2006, in Glasgow, Scotland. By bringing the various project stakeholders together for a focused discussion on key findings, strengths and challenges of the CSI, the workshop will constitute the culmination of the current project phase.

1.2 *Analysis*

The CSI team will utilize the available data to conduct various analyses and produce a range of outputs.

1. Global Report on the State of Civil Society
 - ◆ Vol I: Country Profiles, providing a concise summary of the key findings of each CSI country study, to be published in early 2007.
 - ◆ Volume II: Comparative Perspectives on Civil Society, to be published in mid2007. This volume will provide an overview of the global findings and a critical review of the CSI's methodology. Second, the book will present regional perspectives on civil society written by regional experts, and the third section of the book will analyse results, along the CSI's four main dimensions (structure, environment, values and impact) and address cross cutting themes. The conclusion will discuss the contributions of the CSI to the knowledge-base on civil society.
2. The CSI will set-up a user-friendly online database that will make the vast amount of information from CSI country studies available for researchers, practitioners and other interested parties.

These products are only some of the envisioned outputs. Since there is widespread interest in the CSI findings, the project will therefore emphasise the analysis of the available data, especially with regard to cross-cutting issues across regions, which will be published

through a range of different venues, such as working papers, short policy papers, contributions to edited volumes and conference presentations.

1.3 External Evaluation

To learn from the valuable experiences gained during this extensive project phase, the CSI is currently undergoing an extensive project evaluation. International NGO Training and Research Center (INTRAC), has been hired to conduct the external evaluation carried out between April and September 2006. INTRAC is an international consultancy and research organisation with expertise on civil society issues, The results of this evaluation will inform the re-design and continuation of the project in a new phase, which is intended to start in the first half of 2007. Three objectives guide the external evaluation process:

1. To evaluate the extent to which the project has achieved its overall purpose, outputs and outcomes
2. To assess the appropriateness of the institutional setup, structures and processes of the project, including CIVICUS' project support to the NCOs and project coordination overall.
3. To draw lessons and put forth recommendations for the future of the project.

The recommendations from this report, which will be made available on the CIVICUS website, together with an in-house review of the methodological tools, will guide the re-design phase.

1.4 Redesign

The implementation process of the comprehensive CSI framework and toolkit, in such a vast number of diverse countries, posed certain challenges to the CSI team at CIVICUS and its partner organisations at national level. Key challenges included:

- ◆ Allowing sufficient flexibility to adapt the framework to country-specific contexts without losing common core standards.
- ◆ Ensuring high-quality translations of project toolkit and products into/from local languages.
- ◆ Ensuring both analytical rigour as well as truly participatory and consultative approaches.
- ◆ Securing commitment from a wide range of stakeholders to a consultative process.
- ◆ Raising financial resources for in-country project activities.

The re-design phase, envisaged to be completed by early 2007, will incorporate the recommendations of the external evaluation, as well as the review of tools, which is to be undertaken by the CSI team itself. Additionally, the CSI team will gather its own insights and experiences from the current implementation period. The team will contribute to the learning process and investigate possible or necessary changes of the project framework.

2. The Future of the CSI

Based on the findings of the evaluation, the next phase of the CSI will likely begin in 2007, with a call for participation anticipated for first quarter of 2007. CSOs in various countries

are already expressing interest in finding out about the next stage of the programme and many current partners have indicated an interest in implementing the tool again. It is therefore anticipated that there will be a growth in the number of participating countries.

With the amended framework and tools, it is anticipated that each CSI phase will take two years. Countries that have been part of the CSI since 2003 will be able to update the baseline data that they have been collecting and new countries will be given enough time to run through the whole CSI process. The next phase will place greater emphasis on comparative analysis, by comparing across regions, on a global level and by being able to make comparisons over time. This will enable the CSI to single out developments and changes in particular countries.

The CSI will contribute to expanding the knowledge base on civil society issues at country level, as well as globally. The availability of this information to users worldwide, through the online database, will make this information more widely available to practitioners, donors, and scholars alike.

As for the future of the project, the CIVICUS CSI team believes that there is a tremendous level of ownership by national CSI partners and other stakeholders, which should form an extremely solid and strong basis for making the CSI the most widely used tool to assess and strengthen civil society around the world.

Annex 1: Dimension Scores⁸

| Region/Country | Structure | Environment | Values | Impact |
|--|-----------|-------------|--------|--------|
| <i>Asia</i> | | | | |
| Mongolia | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.7 | 1.4 |
| South Korea | 1.5 | 1.6 | 2.3 | 1.9 |
| Taiwan | 1.4 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 |
| Vietnam | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.7 | 1.2 |
| <i>Latin America</i> | | | | |
| Argentina | 1.4 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.9 |
| Bolivia | 1.8 | 1.3 | 1.7 | 1.8 |
| Chile | 1.6 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 1.7 |
| Ecuador | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.6 |
| Uruguay | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.4 |
| <i>Middle East and Mediterranean Latin America</i> | | | | |
| Egypt | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 1 |
| Lebanon | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.6 | 1.5 |
| Cyprus-N | 1.0 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.2 |
| Turkey | 0.7 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 |
| <i>Post-communist Europe and Eurasia</i> | | | | |
| Bulgaria | 1.1 | 1.3 | 2.1 | 1.5 |
| Croatia | 1.1 | 1.3 | 2.1 | 1.5 |
| Czech Republic | 1.7 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 1.8 |
| Georgia | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.7 | 1.4 |
| Macedonia | 1.5 | 1.4 | 2.0 | 1.8 |
| Poland | 1.3 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 1.7 |
| Romania | 1.3 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.6 |
| Slovenia | 1.2 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.3 |
| Ukraine | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 1.5 |
| <i>Sub-Saharan Africa</i> | | | | |
| Ghana | 1.4 | 1.4 | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| Uganda | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 2.4 |
| <i>Western Europe</i> | | | | |
| Cyprus-S | 1.3 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.8 |
| Germany | 1.6 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.5 |
| Greece | 0.9 | 2.1 | 2 | 1.3 |
| Italy | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
| Northern Ireland | 1.8 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| Scotland | 2.0 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.4 |
| Wales | 1.9 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.7 |

⁸ Please note that for some countries these scores have not been finalized and may change slightly in the future. These are the scores currently available, as of June 2006.

Annex 2: THE CSI SCORING MATRIX

1 - STRUCTURE

1.1 - Breadth of citizen participation

Description: How widespread is citizen involvement in civil society? What proportion of citizens engage in civil society activities?

1.1.1 - Non-partisan political action

Description: What percentage of people have ever undertaken any form of non-partisan political action (e.g. written a letter to a newspaper, signed a petition, attended a demonstration)?

| | |
|--|---------|
| A very small minority (less than 10%). | Score 0 |
| A minority (10% to 30%) | Score 1 |
| A significant proportion (31% to 65%) | Score 2 |
| A large majority (more than 65%) | Score 3 |

1.1.2 - Charitable giving

Description: What percentage of people donate to charity on a regular basis?

| | |
|---------------------------------------|---------|
| A very small minority (less than 10%) | Score 0 |
| A minority (10% to 30%) | Score 1 |
| A significant proportion (31% to 65%) | Score 2 |
| A large majority (more than 65%) | Score 3 |

1.1.3 - CSO membership

Description: What percentage of people belong to at least one CSO?

| | |
|----------------------------------|---------|
| A small minority (less than 30%) | Score 0 |
| A minority (30% to 50%) | Score 1 |
| A majority (51% to 65%) | Score 2 |
| A large majority (more than 65%) | Score 3 |

1.1.4 - Volunteering

Description: What percentage of people undertake volunteer work on a regular basis (at least once a year)?

| | |
|---------------------------------------|---------|
| A very small minority (less than 10%) | Score 0 |
| A small minority (10% to 30%) | Score 1 |
| A minority (31% to 50%) | Score 2 |
| A majority (more than 50%) | Score 3 |

1.1.5 - Collective community action

Description: What percentage of people have participated in a collective community action within the last year (e.g. attended a community meeting, participated in a community-organised event or a collective effort to solve a community problem)?

| | |
|----------------------------------|---------|
| A small minority (less than 30%) | Score 0 |
| A minority (30% -50%) | Score 1 |
| A majority (51% to 65%) | Score 2 |
| A large majority (more than 65%) | Score 3 |

1.2 - Depth of citizen participation

Description: How deep/meaningful is citizen participation in civil society? How frequently/extensively do people engage in civil society activities?

1.2.1 - Charitable giving

Description: How much (i.e. what percentage of personal income) do people who give to charity on a regular basis donate, on average, per year?

| | |
|--------------|---------|
| Less than 1% | Score 0 |
| 1% to 2% | Score 1 |

| | |
|--------------|---------|
| 2.1% to 3% | Score 2 |
| More than 3% | Score 3 |

1.2.2 - Volunteering

Description: How many hours per month, on average, do volunteers devote to volunteer work?

| | |
|--------------------|---------|
| Less than 2 hours | Score 0 |
| 2 to 5 hours | Score 1 |
| 5.1 to 8 hours | Score 2 |
| More than 8 hours. | Score 3 |

1.2.3 - CSO membership

Description: What percentage of CSO members belong to more than one CSO?

| | |
|----------------------------------|---------|
| A small minority (less than 30%) | Score 0 |
| A minority (30% to 50%) | Score 1 |
| A majority (51% to 65%) | Score 2 |
| A large majority (more than 65%) | Score 3 |

1.3 - Diversity of civil society participants

Description: How diverse/representative is the civil society arena? Do all social groups participate equitably in civil society? Are any groups dominant or excluded?

1.3.1 - CSO membership

Description: To what extent do CSOs represent all significant social groups (e.g. women, rural dwellers, poor people and minorities)?

| | |
|---|---------|
| Significant social groups are absent / excluded from CSOs. | Score 0 |
| Significant social groups are largely absent from CSOs. | Score 1 |
| Significant social groups are under-represented in CSOs. | Score 2 |
| CSOs equitably represent all social groups. No group is noticeably under-represented. | Score 3 |

1.3.2 - CSO leadership

Description: To what extent is there diversity in CSO leadership? To what extent does CSO leadership represent all significant social groups (e.g. women, rural dwellers, poor people, and minorities)?

| | |
|--|---------|
| Significant social groups are absent / excluded from CSO leadership roles. | Score 0 |
| Significant social groups are largely absent from CSO leadership roles. | Score 1 |
| Significant social groups are under-represented in CSO leadership roles. | Score 2 |
| CSO leadership equitably represents all social groups. No group is noticeably under-represented. | Score 3 |

1.3.3 Distribution of CSOs

Description: How are CSOs distributed throughout the country?

| | |
|---|---------|
| CSOs are highly concentrated in the major urban centres. | Score 0 |
| CSOs are largely concentrated in urban areas. | Score 1 |
| CSOs are present in all but the most remote areas of the country. | Score 2 |
| CSOs are present in all areas of the country. | Score 3 |

1.4. - Level of organisation

Description: How well-organised is civil society? What kind of infrastructure exists for civil society?

1.4.1 - Existence of CSO umbrella bodies

Description: What percentage of CSOs belong to a federation or umbrella body of related organisations?

| | |
|----------------------------------|---------|
| A small minority (less than 30%) | Score 0 |
| A minority (30% to 50%) | Score 1 |

| | |
|----------------------------------|---------|
| A majority (51% to 70%) | Score 2 |
| A large majority (more than 70%) | Score 3 |

1.4.2 - Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies

Description: How effective do CSO stakeholders judge existing federations or umbrella bodies to be in achieving their defined goals?

| | |
|--|---------|
| Completely ineffective (or non-existent) | Score 0 |
| Largely ineffective | Score 1 |
| Somewhat effective | Score 2 |
| Effective | Score 3 |

1.4.3 - Self-regulation

Description: Are there efforts among CSOs to self-regulate? How effective and enforceable are existing self-regulatory mechanisms? What percentage of CSOs abide by a collective code of conduct (or some other form of self-regulation)?

| | |
|--|---------|
| There are no efforts among CSOs to self-regulate. | Score 0 |
| Preliminary efforts have been to self-regulate but only a small minority of CSOs are involved and impact is extremely limited. | Score 1 |
| Some mechanisms for CSO self-regulation are in place but only some sectors of CSOs are involved and there is no effective method of enforcement. As a result, impact is limited. | Score 2 |
| Mechanisms for CSO self-regulation are in place and function quite effectively. A discernible impact on CSO behaviour can be detected. | Score 3 |

1.4.4 - Support infrastructure

Description: What is the level of support infrastructure for civil society? How many civil society support organisations exist in the country? Are they effective?

| | |
|---|---------|
| There is no support infrastructure for civil society. | Score 0 |
| There is very limited infrastructure for civil society. | Score 1 |
| Support infrastructure exists for some sectors of civil society and is expanding. | Score 2 |
| There is a well-developed support infrastructure for civil society. | Score 3 |

1.4.5 - International linkages

Description: What proportion of CSOs have international linkages (e.g. are members of international networks, participate in global events)?

| | |
|--|---------|
| Only a handful of "elite" CSOs have international linkages. | Score 0 |
| A limited number of (mainly national-level) CSOs have international linkages. | Score 1 |
| A moderate number of (mainly national-level) CSOs have international linkages. | Score 2 |
| A significant number of CSOs from different sectors and different levels (grassroots to national) have international linkages. | Score 3 |

1.5 - Inter-relations

***Description:* How strong / productive are relations among civil society actors?**

1.5.1 - Communication

Description: What is the extent of communication between civil society actors?

| | |
|-------------|---------|
| Very little | Score 0 |
| Limited | Score 1 |
| Moderate | Score 2 |
| Significant | Score 3 |

1.5.2 - Cooperation

Description: How much do civil society actors cooperate with each other on issues of common concern? Can examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances/coalitions (around a specific issue or common concern) be identified?

| | |
|--|---------|
| CS actors do not cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. No examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances/coalitions can be identified / detected. | Score 0 |
| It is very rare that CS actors cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Very few examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected. | Score 1 |
| CS actors on occasion cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Some examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected. | Score 2 |
| CS actors regularly cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Numerous examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected. | Score 3 |

1.6 - Resources

Description: To what extent do CSOs have adequate resources to achieve their goals?

1.6.1 - Financial resources

Description: How adequate is the level of financial resources for CSOs?

| | |
|--|---------|
| On average, CSOs suffer from a serious financial resource problem. | Score 0 |
| On average, CSOs have inadequate financial resources to achieve their goals. | Score 1 |
| On average, CSOs have most of the financial resources they require to achieve their defined goals. | Score 2 |
| On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure financial resource base. | Score 3 |

1.6.2 - Human resources

Description: How adequate is the level of human resources for CSOs?

| | |
|--|---------|
| On average, CSOs suffer from a serious human resource problem. | Score 0 |
| On average, CSOs have inadequate human resources to achieve their goal. | Score 1 |
| On average, CSOs have most of the human resources they require to achieve their defined goals. | Score 2 |
| On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure human resource base. | Score 3 |

1.6.3 - Technological and infrastructural resources

Description: How adequate is the level of technological and infrastructural resources for CSOs?

| | |
|--|---------|
| On average, CSOs suffer from a serious technological and infrastructural resource problem. | Score 0 |
| On average, CSOs have inadequate technological and infrastructural resources to achieve their goals. | Score 1 |
| On average, CSOs have most of the technological and infrastructural resources they require to achieve their defined goals. | Score 2 |
| On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure technological and infrastructural resource base. | Score 3 |

2 - ENVIRONMENT⁹

2.1 - Political context

Description: What is the political situation in the country and its impact on civil society?

2.1.1 - Political rights

Description: How strong are the restrictions on citizens' political rights (e.g. to participate freely in political processes, elect political leaders through free and fair elections, freely organise in political parties)?

⁹ For most of the indicators, secondary data sources are available for a broad range of countries. For each indicator, the scores indicate how to translate the original secondary data into the 4-point scale of the CSI scoring matrix.

| | |
|--|---------|
| There are severe restrictions on the political rights of citizens. Citizens cannot participate in political processes. | Score 0 |
| There are some restrictions on the political rights of citizens and their participation in political processes. | Score 1 |
| Citizens are endowed with substantial political rights and meaningful opportunities for political participation. There are minor and isolated restrictions on the full freedom of citizens' political rights and their participation in political processes. | Score 2 |
| People have the full freedom and choice to exercise their political rights and meaningfully participate in political processes. | Score 3 |

2.1.2 - Political competition

Description: What are the main characteristics of the party system in terms of number of parties, ideological spectrum, institutionalisation and party competition?

| | |
|---|---------|
| Single party system. | Score 0 |
| Small number of parties based on personalism, clientelism or appealing to identity politics. | Score 1 |
| Multiple parties, but weakly institutionalised and / or lacking ideological distinction. | Score 2 |
| Robust, multi-party competition, with well-institutionalised and ideologically diverse parties. | Score 3 |

2.1.3 - Rule of law

Description: To what extent is the rule of law entrenched in the country?

| | |
|---|---------|
| There is general disregard for the law by citizens and the state. | Score 0 |
| There is low confidence in and frequent violations of the law by citizens and the state. | Score 1 |
| There is a moderate level of confidence in the law. Violations of the law by citizens and the state are not uncommon. | Score 2 |
| Society is governed by fair and predictable rules, which are generally abided by. | Score 3 |

2.1.4 - Corruption

Description: What is the level of perceived corruption in the public sector?

| | |
|-------------|---------|
| High | Score 0 |
| Substantial | Score 1 |
| Moderate | Score 2 |
| Low | Score 3 |

2.1.5 - State effectiveness

Description: To what extent is the state able to fulfil its defined functions?

| | |
|--|---------|
| The state bureaucracy has collapsed or is entirely ineffective (e.g. due to political, economic or social crisis). | Score 0 |
| The capacity of the state bureaucracy is extremely limited. | Score 1 |
| State bureaucracy is functional but perceived as incompetent and / or non-responsive. | Score 2 |
| State bureaucracy is fully functional and perceived to work in the public's interests. | Score 3 |

2.1.6 - Decentralisation

Description: To what extent is government expenditure devolved to sub-national authorities?

| | |
|---|---------|
| Sub-national share of government expenditure is less than 20.0%. | Score 0 |
| Sub-national share of government expenditure is between 20.0% and 34.9%. | Score 1 |
| Sub-national share of government expenditure is between 35.0% than 49.9%. | Score 2 |
| Sub-national share of government expenditure is more than 49.9%. | Score 3 |

2.2 - Basic freedoms and rights

Description: To what extent are basic freedoms ensured by law and in practice?

2.2.1 - Civil liberties

Description: To what extent are civil liberties (e.g. freedom of expression, association, assembly) ensured by law and in practice?

| | |
|---|---------|
| Civil liberties are systematically violated. | Score 0 |
| There are frequent violations of civil liberties. | Score 1 |
| There are isolated or occasional violations of civil liberties. | Score 2 |
| Civil liberties are fully ensured by law and in practice. | Score 3 |

2.2.2 - Information rights

Description: To what extent is public access to information guaranteed by law? How accessible are government documents to the public?

| | |
|--|---------|
| No laws guarantee information rights. Citizen access to government documents is extremely limited. | Score 0 |
| Citizen access to government documents is limited but expanding. | Score 1 |
| Legislation regarding public access to information is in place, but in practice, it is difficult to obtain government documents. | Score 2 |
| Government documents are broadly and easily accessible to the public. | Score 3 |

2.2.3 - Press freedoms

Description: To what extent are press freedoms ensured by law and in practice?

| | |
|---|---------|
| Press freedoms are systematically violated. | Score 0 |
| There are frequent violations of press freedoms. | Score 1 |
| There are isolated violations of press freedoms. | Score 2 |
| Freedom of the press is fully ensured by law and in practice. | Score 3 |

2.3 - Socio-economic context¹⁰

***Description:* What is the socio-economic situation in the country and its impact on civil society?**

2.3.1 - Socio-economic context

Description: How much do socio-economic conditions in the country represent a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society?

| | |
|--|---------|
| Social and economic conditions represent a serious barrier to the effective functioning of civil society. More than five of the following conditions are present: 1. Widespread poverty (e.g. more than 40% of people live on \$2 per day) 2. Civil war (armed conflict in last 5 years) 3. Severe ethnic and/or religious conflict 4. Severe economic crisis (e.g. external debt is more than GNP) 5. Severe social crisis (over last 2 years) 6. Severe socio-economic inequities (Gini coefficient > 0.4) 7. Pervasive adult illiteracy (over 40%) 8. Lack of IT infrastructure (i.e. less than 5 hosts per 10.000 inhabitants) | Score 0 |
| Social and economic conditions significantly limit the effective functioning of civil society. Three, four or five of the conditions indicated are present. | Score 1 |
| Social and economic conditions somewhat limit the effective functioning of civil society. One or two of the conditions indicated are present. | Score 2 |

¹⁰ This sub-dimension/indicator is not broken up into individual indicators to facilitate and simplify scoring. The sub-dimension/indicator consists of 8 socio-economic conditions which are of importance to civil society. The scores for this indicator are designed in such a way that they indicate how many socio-economic obstacles are there for civil society (max: 8; min: 0). The task for the NAG scoring meeting is to simply verify the number of obstacles (as identified by the secondary data) and assign the score accordingly.

| | |
|---|---------|
| Social and economic conditions do not represent a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society. None of the conditions indicated is present. | Score 3 |
|---|---------|

2.4 - Socio-cultural context

Description: To what extent are socio-cultural norms and attitudes conducive or detrimental to civil society?

2.4.1 - Trust

Description: How much do members of society trust one another?

| | |
|--|---------|
| Relationships among members of society are characterised by mistrust (e.g. less than 10% of people score on the World Value Survey (WVS) trust indicator). | Score 0 |
| There is widespread mistrust among members of society (e.g. 10% to 30% of people score on the WVS trust indicator). | Score 1 |
| There is a moderate level of trust among members of society (e.g. 31% to 50% of people score on the WVS trust indicator). | Score 2 |
| There is a high level of trust among members of society (e.g. more than 50% of people score on the WVS trust indicator). | Score 3 |

2.4.2 - Tolerance

Description: How tolerant are members of society?

| | |
|--|---------|
| Society is characterised by widespread intolerance (e.g. average score on WVS derived tolerance indicator is 3.0 or higher). | Score 0 |
| Society is characterised by a low level of tolerance (e.g. indicator between 2.0 and 2.9). | Score 1 |
| Society is characterised by a moderate level of tolerance (e.g. indicator between 1.0 and 1.9). | Score 2 |
| Society is characterised by a high level of tolerance (e.g. indicator less than 1.0). | Score 3 |

2.4.3 - Public spiritedness¹¹

Description: How strong is the sense of public spiritedness among members of society?

| | |
|--|---------|
| Very low level of public spiritedness in society (e.g. average score on WVS derived public spiritedness indicator is more than 3.5). | Score 0 |
| Low level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator between 2.6 and 3.5). | Score 1 |
| Moderate level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator between 1.5 and 2.5). | Score 2 |
| High level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator less than 1.5). | Score 3 |

2.5 - Legal environment

Description: To what extent is the existing legal environment enabling or disabling to civil society?

2.5.1 - CSO registration¹²

Description: How supportive is the CSO registration process? Is the process (1) simple, (2) quick, (3) inexpensive, (4) following legal provisions and (5) consistently applied?

| | |
|--|---------|
| The CSO registration process is not supportive at all. Four or five of the quality characteristics are absent. | Score 0 |
| The CSO registration is not very supportive. Two or three quality characteristics are absent. | Score 1 |
| The CSO registration process can be judged as relatively supportive. One quality | Score 2 |

¹¹ The score is derived by averaging the means for the three variables (1. claiming government benefits, 2. avoiding a fare on public transport and 3. cheating on taxes).

¹² This indicator combines a number of individual quality characteristics of the registration, namely whether the registration is (1) simple, (2) quick, (3) inexpensive, (4) fairly applied and (5) consistently applied. The process of using these five 'Yes/No' variables for the scoring of the CSO registration indicator by the NAG follows the process outlined for sub-dimension 3. The indicator scores are defined by how many of these five quality characteristics are existent/absent.

| | |
|--|---------|
| characteristic is absent. | |
| The CSO registration process is supportive. None of the quality characteristics is absent. | Score 3 |

2.5.2 - Allowable advocacy activities

Description: To what extent are CSOs free to engage in advocacy / criticize government?

| | |
|--|---------|
| CSOs are not allowed to engage in advocacy or criticise the government. | Score 0 |
| There are excessive and / or vaguely defined constraints on advocacy activities. | Score 1 |
| Constraints on CSOs' advocacy activities are minimal and clearly defined, such as prohibitions on political campaigning. | Score 2 |
| CSOs are permitted to freely engage in advocacy and criticism of government. | Score 3 |

2.5.3 - Tax laws favourable to CSOs

Description: How favourable is the tax system to CSOs? How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that are eligible for tax exemptions, if any? How significant are these exemptions?

| | |
|---|---------|
| The tax system impedes CSOs. No tax exemption or preference of any kind is available for CSOs. | Score 0 |
| The tax system is burdensome to CSOs. Tax exemptions or preferences are available only for a narrow range of CSOs (e.g. humanitarian organisations) or for limited sources of income (e.g. grants or donations). | Score 1 |
| The tax system contains some incentives favouring CSOs. Only a narrow range of CSOs is excluded from tax exemptions, preferences and/or exemptions, or preferences are available from some taxes and some activities. | Score 2 |
| The tax system provides favourable treatment for CSOs. Exemptions or preferences are available from a range of taxes and for a range of activities, limited only in appropriate circumstances. | Score 3 |

2.5.4 - Tax benefits for philanthropy

Description: How broadly available are tax deductions or credits, or other tax benefits, to encourage individual and corporate giving?

| | |
|---|---------|
| No tax benefits are available (to individuals or corporations) for charitable giving. | Score 0 |
| Tax benefits are available for a very limited set of purposes or types of organisations. | Score 1 |
| Tax benefits are available for a fairly broad set of purposes or types of organisations. | Score 2 |
| Significant tax benefits are available for a broad set of purposes or types of organisations. | Score 3 |

2.6 - State-civil society relations

***Description:* What is the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the state?**

2.6.1 - Autonomy

Description: To what extent can civil society exist and function independently of the state? To what extent are CSOs free to operate without excessive government interference? Is government oversight reasonably designed and limited to protect legitimate public interests?

| | |
|---|---------|
| The state controls civil society. | Score 0 |
| CSOs are subject to frequent unwarranted interference in their operations. | Score 1 |
| The state accepts the existence of an independent civil society but CSOs are subject to occasional unwarranted government interference. | Score 2 |
| CSOs operate freely. They are subject only to reasonable oversight linked to clear and legitimate public interests. | Score 3 |

2.6.2 - Dialogue

Description: To what extent does the state dialogue with civil society? How inclusive and institutionalized are the terms and rules of engagement, if they exist?

| | |
|--|---------|
| There is no meaningful dialogue between civil society and the state. | Score 0 |
| The state only seeks to dialogue with a small sub-set of CSOs on an ad hoc basis. | Score 1 |
| The state dialogues with a relatively broad range of CSOs but on a largely ad hoc basis. | Score 2 |

| | |
|--|---------|
| Mechanisms are in place to facilitate systematic dialogue between the state and a broad and diverse range of CSOs. | Score 3 |
|--|---------|

2.6.3 - Cooperation / support

Description: How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that receive state resources (in the form of grants, contracts, etc.)?

| | |
|--|---------|
| The level of state resources channelled through CSOs is insignificant. | Score 0 |
| Only a very limited range of CSOs receives state resources. | Score 1 |
| A moderate range of CSOs receives state resources. | Score 2 |
| The state channels significant resources to a large range of CSOs. | Score 3 |

2.7 - Private sector-civil society relations

***Description:* What is the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the private sector?**

2.7.1 - Private sector attitude

Description: What is the general attitude of the private sector towards civil society actors?

| | |
|-----------------------|---------|
| Generally hostile | Score 0 |
| Generally indifferent | Score 1 |
| Generally positive | Score 2 |
| Generally supportive | Score 3 |

2.7.2 - Corporate social responsibility

Description: How developed are notions and actions of corporate social responsibility?

| | |
|--|---------|
| Major companies show no concern about the social and environmental impacts of their operations. | Score 0 |
| Major companies pay lip service to notions of corporate social responsibility. However, in their operations they frequently disregard negative social and environmental impacts. | Score 1 |
| Major companies are beginning to take the potential negative social and environmental impacts of their operations into account. | Score 2 |
| Major companies take effective measures to protect against negative social and environmental impacts. | Score 3 |

2.7.3 - Corporate philanthropy¹³

Description: How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that receive support from the private sector?

| | |
|---|---------|
| Corporate philanthropy is insignificant. | Score 0 |
| Only a very limited range of CSOs receives funding from the private sector. | Score 1 |
| A moderate range of CSOs receives funding from the private sector. | Score 2 |
| The private sector channels resources to a large range of CSOs. | Score 3 |

3 - VALUES

3.1 - Democracy

***Description:* To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote democracy?**

3.1.1 - Democratic practices within CSOs

Description: To what extent do CSOs practice internal democracy? How much control do members have over decision-making? Are leaders selected through democratic elections?

| | |
|--|---------|
| A large majority (i.e. more than 75%) of CSOs do not practice internal democracy (e.g. | Score 0 |
|--|---------|

¹³ The NAG's task in scoring the indicator is to assess the significance of corporate support to civil society. Here, the score descriptions focus on two elements: (1) the overall size of corporate support to civil society and (2) the range of CSOs supported by the corporate sector. Both elements are combined in the indicator score descriptions.

| | |
|--|---------|
| members have little / no control over decision-making, CSOs are characterised by patronage, nepotism). | |
| A majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 50%) do not practice internal democracy (e.g. members have little/no control over decision-making, CSOs are characterised by patronage, nepotism). | Score 1 |
| A majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 50%) practice internal democracy (e.g. members have significant control over decision-making; leaders are selected through democratic elections). | Score 2 |
| A large majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 75%) practice internal democracy (e.g. members have significant control over decision-making; leaders are selected through democratic elections). | Score 3 |

3.1.2 – Civil society actions to promote democracy

Description: How much does civil society actively promote democracy at a societal level?

| | |
|--|---------|
| No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. | Score 0 |
| Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole. | Score 1 |
| A number of CS activities can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking | Score 2 |
| CS is a driving force in promoting a democratic society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility. | Score 3 |

3.2 – Transparency

Description: To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote transparency?

3.2.1 - Corruption within civil society

Description: How widespread is corruption within CS?

| | |
|--|---------|
| Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are very frequent. | Score 0 |
| Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are frequent. | Score 1 |
| There are occasional instances of corrupt behaviour within CS. | Score 2 |
| Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are very rare. | Score 3 |

3.2.2 - Financial transparency of CSOs

Description: How many CSOs are financially transparent? What percentage of CSOs make their financial accounts publicly available?

| | |
|--|---------|
| A small minority of CSOs (less than 30%) make their financial accounts publicly available. | Score 0 |
| A minority of CSOs (30% -50%) make their financial accounts publicly available. | Score 1 |
| A small majority of CSOs (51% -65%) make their financial accounts publicly available. | Score 2 |
| A large majority of CSOs (more than 65%) make their financial accounts publicly available. | Score 3 |

3.2.3 – Civil society actions to promote transparency

Description: How much does civil society actively promote government and corporate transparency?

| | |
|---|---------|
| No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. | Score 0 |
| Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole. | Score 1 |
| A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and/or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking. | Score 2 |
| CS is a driving force in demanding government and corporate transparency. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility. | Score 3 |

3.3 – Tolerance

Description: To what extent do civil society actors and organisations practice and promote tolerance?

3.3.1 Tolerance within the civil society arena

Description: To what extent is civil society a tolerant arena?

| | |
|--|---------|
| CS is dominated by intolerant forces. The expression of only a narrow sub-set of views is tolerated. | Score 0 |
| Significant forces within civil society do not tolerate others' views without encountering protest from civil society at large. | Score 1 |
| There are some intolerant forces within civil society, but they are isolated from civil society at large. | Score 2 |
| Civil society is an open arena where the expression of <i>all</i> viewpoints is actively encouraged. Intolerant behaviour is strongly denounced by civil society at large. | Score 3 |

3.3.2 – Civil society actions to promote tolerance

Description: How much does civil society actively promote tolerance at a societal level?

| | |
|--|---------|
| No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. | Score 0 |
| Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole. | Score 1 |
| A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and/or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking. | Score 2 |
| CS is a driving force in promoting a tolerant society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility. | Score 3 |

3.4 - Non-violence

Description: To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote non-violence?

3.4.1 - Non-violence within the civil society arena

Description: How widespread is the use of violent means (such as damage to property or personal violence) among civil society actors to express their interests in the public sphere?

| | |
|--|---------|
| Significant mass-based groups within CS use violence as the primary means of expressing their interests. | Score 0 |
| Some isolated groups within CS regularly use violence to express their interests without encountering protest from civil society at large. | Score 1 |
| Some isolated groups within CS occasionally resort to violent actions, but are broadly denounced by CS at large. | Score 2 |
| There is a high level of consensus within CS regarding the principle of non-violence. Acts of violence by CS actors are extremely rare and strongly denounced. | Score 3 |

3.4.2 – Civil society actions to promote non-violence and peace

Description: How much does civil society actively promote a non-violent society? For example, how much does civil society support the non-violent resolution of social conflicts and peace? Address issues of violence against women, child abuse, violence among youths etc.?

| | |
|--|---------|
| No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions actually contribute to societal violence. | Score 0 |
| Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole. | Score 1 |
| A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking. | Score 2 |
| CS is a driving force in promoting a non-violent society. CS actions in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility | Score 3 |

3.5 - Gender equity

Description: To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote gender equity?

3.5.1 - Gender equity within the civil society arena

Description: To what extent is civil society a gender equitable arena?

| | |
|--|---------|
| Women are excluded from civil society leadership roles. | Score 0 |
| Women are largely absent from civil society leadership roles. | Score 1 |
| Women are under-represented in civil society leadership positions. | Score 2 |
| Women are equitably represented as leaders and members of CS. | Score 3 |

3.5.2 - Gender equitable practices within CSOs

Description: How much do CSOs practice gender equity? What percentage of CSOs with paid employees have policies in place to ensure gender equity?

| | |
|----------------------------------|---------|
| A small minority (less than 20%) | Score 0 |
| A minority (20%-50%) | Score 1 |
| A small majority (51%-65%) | Score 2 |
| A large majority (more than 65%) | Score 3 |

3.5.3 - Civil society actions to promote gender equity

Description: How much does civil society actively promote gender equity at the societal level?

| | |
|--|---------|
| No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions actually contribute to gender inequity. | Score 0 |
| Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole. | Score 1 |
| A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking. | Score 2 |
| CS is a driving force in promoting a gender equitable society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility. | Score 3 |

3.6 - Poverty eradication

Description: To what extent do civil society actors promote poverty eradication?

3.6.1 - Civil society actions to eradicate poverty

Description: To what extent does civil society actively seek to eradicate poverty?

| | |
|--|---------|
| No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions serve to sustain existing economic inequities. | Score 0 |
| Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole. | Score 1 |
| A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking. | Score 2 |
| CS is a driving force in the struggle to eradicate poverty. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility. | Score 3 |

3.7 - Environmental sustainability

Description: To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote environmental sustainability?

3.7.1 - Civil society actions to sustain the environment

Description: How much does civil society actively seek to sustain the environment?

| | |
|--|---------|
| No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions serve to reinforce unsustainable practices. | Score 0 |
| Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole. | Score 1 |
| A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or | Score 2 |

| | |
|--|---------|
| public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking. | |
| CS is a driving force in protecting the environment. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility. | Score 3 |

4 - IMPACT

4.1 - Influencing public policy

Description: How active and successful is civil society in influencing public policy?

4.1.1 – 4.1.2 - *Human Rights and Social Policy Impact Case Studies*

Description: How active and successful is civil society in influencing public policy?

| | |
|--|---------|
| No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. | Score 0 |
| CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact. | Score 1 |
| Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited. | Score 2 |
| Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected. | Score 3 |

4.1.3 - *Civil Society's Impact on National Budgeting process Case Study*

Description: How active and successful is civil society in influencing the overall national budgeting process?

| | |
|---|---------|
| No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. | Score 0 |
| CS activity in this area is very limited and focused only on specific budget components. ¹⁴ | Score 1 |
| Civil society is active in the overall budgeting process, but impact is limited. | Score 2 |
| Civil society plays an important role in the overall budgeting process. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected. | Score 3 |

4.2 - Holding state and private corporations accountable

Description: How active and successful is civil society in holding the state and private corporations accountable?

4.2.1 - *Holding state accountable*

Description: How active and successful is civil society in monitoring state performance and holding the state accountable?

| | |
|--|---------|
| No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. | Score 0 |
| CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact. | Score 1 |
| Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited. | Score 2 |
| Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected. | Score 3 |

4.2.2 - *Holding private corporations accountable*

Description: How active and successful is civil society in holding private corporations accountable?

| | |
|--|---------|
| No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. | Score 0 |
| CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact. | Score 1 |
| Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited. | Score 2 |
| Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected. | Score 3 |

4.3 - Responding to social interests

Description: How much are civil society actors responding to social interests?

¹⁴ The term "specific budget component" refers to a single issue or sub-section of the budget, such as the defence budget or welfare grants. Higher scores are assigned for those civil society activities, which provide an analysis, input and advocacy work on the *overall* budget.

4.3.1 - Responsiveness

Description: How effectively do civil society actors respond to priority social concerns?

| | |
|---|---------|
| Civil society actors are out of touch with the crucial concerns of the population. | Score 0 |
| There are frequent examples of crucial social concerns that did not find a voice among existing civil society actors. | Score 1 |
| There are isolated examples of crucial social concerns that did not find a voice among existing civil society actors. | Score 2 |
| Civil society actors are very effective in taking up the crucial concerns of the population. | Score 3 |

4.3.2 - Public Trust

Description: What percentage of the population has trust in civil society actors?

| | |
|----------------------------|---------|
| A small minority (< 25%) | Score 0 |
| A large minority (25%-50%) | Score 1 |
| A small majority (51%-75%) | Score 2 |
| A large majority (> 75%) | Score 3 |

4.4 - Empowering citizens

Description: How active and successful is civil society in empowering citizens, especially traditionally marginalised groups, to shape decisions that affect their lives?

4.4.1 - Informing/ educating citizens

Description: How active and successful is civil society in informing and educating citizens on public issues?

| | |
|--|---------|
| No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. | Score 0 |
| CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact. | Score 1 |
| Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited. | Score 2 |
| Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected. | Score 3 |

4.4.2 - Building capacity for collective action

Description: How active and successful is civil society in building the capacity of people to organise themselves, mobilise resources and work together to solve common problems?

| | |
|--|---------|
| No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. | Score 0 |
| CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact. | Score 1 |
| Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited. | Score 2 |
| Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected. | Score 3 |

4.4.3 - Empowering marginalized people

Description: How active and successful is civil society in empowering marginalized people?

| | |
|--|---------|
| No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. | Score 0 |
| CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact. | Score 1 |
| Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited. | Score 2 |
| Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected. | Score 3 |

4.4.4 - Empowering women

Description: How active and successful is civil society in empowering women, i.e. to give them real choice and control over their lives?

| | |
|--|---------|
| No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. | Score 0 |
| CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact. | Score 1 |
| Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited. | Score 2 |
| Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected. | Score 3 |

4.4.5 - Building social capital¹⁵

Description: To what extent does civil society build social capital among its members? How do levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness of members of civil society compare to those of non-members?

| | |
|---|---------|
| Civil society diminishes the stock of social capital in society. | Score 0 |
| Civil society does not contribute to building social capital in society. | Score 1 |
| Civil society does contribute moderately to building social capital in society. | Score 2 |
| Civil Society does contribute strongly to building social capital in society. | Score 3 |

4.4.6 - Supporting livelihoods

Description: How active and successful is civil society in creating / supporting employment and/or income-generating opportunities (especially for poor people and women)?

| | |
|--|---------|
| No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. | Score 0 |
| CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact. | Score 1 |
| Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited. | Score 2 |
| Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected. | Score 3 |

4.5 - Meeting societal needs

***Description:* How active and successful is civil society in meeting societal needs, especially those of poor people and other marginalised groups?**

4.5.1 - Lobbying for state service provision

Description: How active and successful is civil society in lobbying the government to meet pressing societal needs?

| | |
|--|---------|
| No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. | Score 0 |
| CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact. | Score 1 |
| Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited. | Score 2 |
| Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected. | Score 3 |

4.5.2 - Meeting pressing societal needs directly

Description: How active and successful is civil society in directly meeting pressing societal needs (through service delivery or the promotion of self-help initiatives)?

| | |
|--|---------|
| No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. | Score 0 |
| CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact. | Score 1 |
| Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited. | Score 2 |
| Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected. | Score 3 |

4.5.3 - Meeting needs of marginalised groups

Description: To what extent are CSOs more or less effective than the state in delivering services to marginalised groups?

| | |
|---|---------|
| CSOs are less effective than the state. | Score 0 |
| CSOs are as effective as the state. | Score 1 |
| CSOs are slightly more effective than the state. | Score 2 |
| CSOs are significantly more effective than the state. | Score 3 |

¹⁵ To score this indicator, we make use of the measure of trust (see sub-dimension socio-cultural norms in Environment dimension): 1) Compute the three measures for two sub-groups of the population: (1) CSO members and (2) non-CSO members and 2) Compare each measure's score for the two sub-groups and establish which sub-group has the better score (i.e. indicating higher trust).

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