activism

• COLOMBIA: ‘Citizens are outraged and tired of the policies that have plunged them into poverty’

  CIVICUS speaks with Alexandra González Zapata, coordinator for democracy and social protest at the Solidarity Committee with Political Prisoners Foundation, and a member of the Campaign to Defend Freedom. The Solidarity Committee Foundation is a Colombian civil society organisation that works to defend the rights to life, freedom, physical and moral integrity, decent, fair and impartial treatment and other rights of people deprived of liberty, prosecuted for political crimes and criminalised for participating in social protest. The Solidarity Committee Foundation is a member of the Campaign to Defend Freedom, which focuses on denouncing arbitrary detentions, judicial persecution and the criminalisation of social protest in Colombia. A network made up of social, student, cultural, community and human rights organisations, Defend Freedom works in a coordinated manner to challenge the illegal use of force as a mechanism of persecution against those who, individually or collectively, demand and promote human rights through social mobilisation in Colombia.

  

  What triggered the 2019 protests in Colombia, and why did they escalate?

  Outrage has been building up little by little in Colombia. Even as it was inaugurated in August 2018, President Iván Duque's government did not enjoy wide margins of legitimacy and support. The electoral results showed that a broad segment of the citizenry rejected traditional power and all that it represented: policies in favour of war, privatisation and indebtedness. This discontent increased as the government announced a series of policy measures, including among those who had voted for Duque.

  The government's proposals were aimed at eliminating the state pension fund Colpensiones, raising the retirement age and lowering the salary for young people to 75 per cent of the minimum wage, among other measures. A widespread atmosphere of indignation emerged as a result, yielding a unified call for mobilisation on 21 November 2019.

  What few expected by then was that the mobilisation would continue over the days that followed 21 November. On that day some acts of vandalism were committed, which the national government tried to use as an excuse to criminalise social protest and adopt measures to restrict freedoms, including a curfew. In response to this, citizens went out to demonstrate freely. We really do not know which was the first neighbourhood or the first block to start banging pots and pans on 22 November, but what we do know is that this dynamic expanded throughout the capital city, Bogotá, as well as other cities around Colombia, shifting the narrative that had prevailed on the media, which was all about vandalism, towards a public discourse that highlighted citizen outrage and social demands.

  How have these mobilisations managed to be sustained over time? How are they different from others in Colombia in the past?

  From 2013 onwards, social mobilisation in Colombia has been on the rise. In 2013 there was an agricultural strike that lasted for more than 20 days and managed to keep several major national roads closed. Then came the agricultural strikes of 2015 and 2016, and the so-called ‘mingas for life’, marches and protests of tens of thousands of Indigenous peoples, and the student strikes of 2018 and 2019.

  In other words, we’ve seen numerous massive and sustained mobilisations over the past few years. What is different about the ongoing national protests in comparison to past mobilisations is that they have been characterised by a majority participation of urban citizens and mainly middle-class people. This caused them to be viewed not as the actions of a particular group of people – Indigenous peoples, peasants, or students – but instead as the work of outraged citizens who are tired of the policies that have increasingly plunged them into poverty, even though the country keeps flaunting positive economic growth indicators. Hence its massive and sustained character.

  What do the protesters demand, and what response do they expect from the government?

  The National Strike Committee has submitted a list of petitions around 13 major issues: guarantees for the exercise of the right to social protest; social rights; economic rights; anti-corruption; peace; human rights; the rights of Mother Earth; political rights and guarantees; agricultural and fishery issues; compliance with agreements between government and social organisations; withdrawal of legislation; the repeal of specific laws; and reform of the law-making process.

  On the first item, guarantees for the right to social protest, protesters urge the government to dismantle the Mobile Anti-Riot Squadron (ESMAD) and refrain from establishing any other similar force. They demand that those responsible for the death of Dylan Cruz, an 18-year-old who was shot dead in the head while running unarmed to escape ESMAD in the early days of the protest in Bogotá, be brought to justice and held accountable.

  On the second item, social rights, protesters demand an end to labour subcontracting, the establishment of an interest rate for mortgage loans that is fair and correlated to people’s real incomes and the repeal of the tax that is currently used to finance the electricity company Electricaribe.

  So far the government has shown no willingness to enter into any real dialogue and negotiation; instead, it insists on beginning ‘exploratory dialogues.’ Protesters expect the government to convene a negotiating table as soon as possible to address the substantial issues that have been raised.

  How did the government react to the protests? What human rights violations were committed by the security forces?

  On 15 November 2019, six days before the first protest was scheduled to take place, the national government made the decision to involve the army in control and security operations in Bogotá. Nine Brigade XIII contingents were deployed and more than 350 soldiers took part in monitoring, patrolling and security controls in Bogotá. This militarisation still persists in the city. The presence of a ‘riot squad’ of the national army, according to information released by the authorities, is particularly concerning. It should be noted that, except in exceptional circumstances, military forces should not intervene in operations to control, contain or even guarantee the celebration of social mobilisations.

  In addition, as confirmed by the authorities, starting at 6am on 19 November, 37 raids were carried out in the residences and workplaces of media professionals throughout Colombia. To date, 21 of those raids have been declared illegal after undergoing judicial scrutiny, because they did not comply with legally established requirements, including being based on reasonable suspicion. According to information provided by the authorities, the raids involved people who were thought to be prone to committing acts of vandalism during the protest. However, it was mainly people linked to artistic groups, alternative media and social movements. Among the items seized were posters, brushes and paintings.

  Also on 19 November, the Ministry of the Interior issued Decree 2087/2019, establishing new measures for the maintenance of public order. Article 3 made “a very special call to district and municipal mayors, so that in their duty to preserve public order in their respective territories, they comply [with the provisions of the Law] in matters of public order.” This call prompted the authorities of at least eight cities – Bogotá, Buenaventura, Cali, Candelaria, Chía, Facatativá, Jamundí and Popayán – to declare curfews. These affected the exercise of the rights to free movement and social protest for all citizens, even though acts affecting public order had been extremely localised.

  Throughout the protests, the authorities made an improper and disproportionate use of force. Although Resolution 1190/2018 states that “the use of force must be considered the last resort of intervention by the National Police,” in most cases ESMAD has intervened without any apparent reason to do so. On 22 November it intervened in Plaza de Bolívar, where more than 5,000 people had assembled, although the demonstration was completely peaceful. On 23 November, Dylan Cruz was killed as a result of an unjustified intervention by ESMAD during a peaceful mobilisation. Although the weapon uses was among those authorised, the ammunition fired by ESMAD caused the death of this young man because of improper use, since according to international standards this type of weapon can only be fired at a distance greater than 60 metres, and only against lower extremities; otherwise, it is deemed to entail lethal risk. Strikingly, on a video recorded live by the Defend Freedom Campaign, an ESMAD agent can be heard encouraging another one to shoot, saying: “Shoot anyone, just anyone, come on daddy.”

  During the protests more than 300 people were injured, including 12 who had eye injuries. Some young people were injured by firearms shot by the police, including Duvan Villegas, who might remain paralysed as a result of a bullet hitting him in the back. Another young man lost his right eye in Bogotá after being hit by a rubber bullet fired by the ESMAD, and two other people could face the loss of their legs due to the impact of teargas canisters thrown by the police from close range.

  Overall, there were 1,514 arrests during the protests, 1,109 of them in Bogotá. Out of 914 people who were arrested, 103 (6.8 per cent) were prosecuted for allegedly being caught in the act of committing violence against a public official; however, arrest procedures were declared illegal in a high number of cases, both because there were not enough grounds for conducting them and because they were accompanied by physical violence against detainees.

  The rest of the people who were detained (93.2 per cent) were transferred for protection or by police procedure. According to the law, detention in these cases is justified when the life or integrity of the person or a third party is at risk or danger. However, in practice an abusive use of this power was made, since these were mostly administrative detentions, used as a mechanism of intimidation and punishment against citizens who were exercising their right to protest. Therefore, these were mostly arbitrary detentions.

  In some of these cases, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment was documented during detention, particularly in Immediate Attention Commands or police stations. Cases came to our attention of people who were forced to undress, others who received electric shocks through electrical control devices and some who had broken bones in their hands as a result of baton charges or being kicked.

  Additionally, in Bogotá, more than 620 people who were transferred to the Protection Transfer Centre were punished with police appearance orders, in many cases for the crime of disruption, for having obstructed transport. This mechanism, which results in fines amounting to around 200,000 Colombian pesos (approx. US$60), was used indiscriminately and has affected the exercise of social protest.

  How has civil society organised in the face of these abuses?

  In 2012, the Defend Freedom Campaign was established. Through its Verification and Intervention Commissions, recognised in Resolution 1190 of 2018, the campaign does on-site monitoring of social mobilisation, documents cases of arbitrary and excessive use of force by police authorities, arbitrary detention and transfer for protection and various forms of repression and abusive use of police power against protesters and human rights defenders, and it systematises the information collected. The campaign also promotes the creation of a National Network of Civil Society Commissions for Verification and Intervention in situations of social mobilisation.

  Likewise, through a joint demand, the National Process of Guarantees, the Agrarian, Peasant, Ethnic and Popular Summit and the Defend Freedom Campaign have obtained verifiable commitments from the national government and the government of Bogotá to establish public policies aimed at enforcing respect for the freedoms of individuals, communities and social organisations that promote and defend rights. The most important of these were Decree 563/2015 (Protocol of Action for Social Mobilisations in Bogotá: For the Right to Mobilisation and Peaceful Protest) issued by the Office of Bogotá’s Mayor and Resolution 1190/2018 (Protocol for the coordination of actions to respect and guarantee peaceful protest) issued by the Ministry of the Interior.

  What immediate measures should the Colombian government adopt in response to the protests?

  First, the government should convene the monitoring mechanism (‘Mesa de Seguimiento’) to respect and guarantee peaceful protest, as a space for negotiation and dialogue that should define mechanisms to guarantee the right to protest, as envisaged in Resolution 1190. Likewise, the government should immediately suspend the use of 12-calibre shotguns by ESMAD members, due to their high impact on people’s physical integrity and life. Second, it should refrain from pursuing stigmatisation and criminalisation campaigns against those who engage in social protest. Third, the government should initiate a negotiation process with the National Strike Committee to address its demands. And in response to the substantive demands made by the National Strike Committee, the government should start by withdrawing its proposals for labour and pension reform that are due for congressional debate, and initiate a broad and participatory process towards the formulation of new laws concerning those issues.

  Do you think the response of the international community has been adequate? How could international groups and organisations support Colombian civil society and contribute to safeguarding civic space in the country?

  I believe that the international community and the United Nations system were able to issue a timely warning regarding the risks of repression of social protest. The call made by human rights organisations in the USA to urge their government to start a moratorium on the sale of US riot weapons to Colombia was also timely.

  However, it would also be important for Colombian civil society to receive longer-term support to undertake medium-term strategies that allow for a deeper and more detailed follow-up of the human rights situation, and particularly to help make progress in judicial investigations for the human rights violations allegedly committed during the protests.

  Civic space in Colombia is rated as ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with the Solidarity Committee Foundation through itswebsite andFacebook page, or follow@CSPP_ on Twitter.
  Get in touch with the Defend Freedom Campaign through itswebsite andFacebook page, or

   

• COLOMBIA: ‘The protection of the environment is inseparable from the success of the peace process’

  Following a year marked by massive mobilisation on the climate emergency, CIVICUS is interviewing civil society activists, leaders and experts about the main environmental challenges they face in their contexts and the actions they are taking. CIVICUS speaks with a young Colombian student, active in the climate movement, who for security reasons asked to remain anonymous. In addition to mobilising in the context of the #FridaysForFuture movement, the interviewee is part of Post-Conflict Children (Hijos del Posconflicto), a recently created group that seeks to render the experiences of people on the ground visible and defend the peace process in Colombia. On the crossroads of various struggles, the interviewee emphasises the defence of the peace process as a key to preserving Colombia’s environment and biodiversity.

  

  From your perspective, what is the most urgent environmental problem in Colombia?

  The most urgent environmental problem is deforestation. Deforestation rates in Colombia are very high, and the situation has not improved following the signing of the peace agreements. That is because, in times of armed conflict, the Colombian guerrillas, mainly the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), controlled much of the jungle territory of Colombia. Of course, no one dared get into that territory: multinationals and oil companies did not have a presence there; nor did the industry of cattle-raising. After the peace agreements were signed and the guerrillas withdrew, the problem that has plagued Colombia since the 1950s – land distribution – increased.

  Colombia has extremely regressive land distribution, with land property concentrated in very few hands. With the withdrawal of the guerrillas and the arrival of multinational corporations, land grabbing has increased. Lands are privately appropriated, deforested and used for raising livestock, while the local population continues to be displaced.

  At the same time, there are still active armed groups operating outside the law, particularly far-right paramilitary groups, alongside the smaller guerrilla force of the National Liberation Army (ELN) and some FARC dissidents who refused to engage with the peace process. These armed groups are fighting over the territory with the aim of taking control of coca crops and expanding them, causing greater deforestation.

  Therefore, both the continuation of the conflict in some territories and its termination in others are having a direct influence on deforestation. The peace process contains a series of mechanisms to counteract deforestation, but its effects will depend on whether it is effectively implemented. In that sense, the protection of the environment is inseparable from the success of the peace process.

  What mechanisms in the peace agreements would help stop deforestation?

  The peace agreements include two specific mechanisms to stop deforestation. The first one is comprehensive rural reform, aimed at distributing land in the Colombian countryside and enforcing respect for the uses assigned to the land – for example, by ensuring that if land is for agricultural use, it is not used for raising livestock. The second mechanism is the Programme of Substitution of Crops for Illicit Use, aimed at tackling the drug problem. It is important to understand that many poor peasant families have had to grow coca in order to survive; through this programme, the state is offering them economic incentives to transition towards other sustainable crops.

  How does youth activism contribute to the effective implementation of the peace agreements?

  The struggle for peace is taking place on all fronts. We do three things: we mobilise on the streets in defence of the peace process; we do educational work so that people understand why the peace process is so important; and we do advocacy in various spaces.

  The context in which we do this work is quite difficult. As soon as he took office, President Iván Duque objected to the peace process and tried to modify all aspects that he did not agree with or that he claimed were not fair. If he succeeds, this would ultimately mean a deactivation of the process that resulted from the agreements and the need to start over from scratch. This was no surprise: his entire campaign revolved around the peace process and was based on the dissemination of lies about it. He won the elections by manipulating people’s fears; he told people that the agreements would enshrine impunity. He tried to scare us by telling us that if the left won, we would become a second Venezuela. He also lied regarding his plans for extractive industries: he stated that oil exploration and exploitation through fracking would not be authorised, but in late December 2019 he drafted a decree that would allow fracking.

  As an activist for peace and the environment in Colombia, have you had any participation in the global movement for climate justice?

  Yes, along with a small group, I joined the Fridays for Future initiative. But our participation was limited to a series of actions and strikes aimed at launching the climate movement in our country.

  It has been quite difficult for us to elicit mobilisation around the global climate crisis. First of all, there is much ignorance. In Colombia, most people have no idea what it is being done to them; the current president took advantage of this to spread lies, run a disinformation campaign and win the elections. In a country where public education is of very low quality and only rich people are able to further their studies, it is very easy to lie to people and make them believe you. So, the first problem is ignorance. Add to that fear: in Colombia people are afraid to speak, organise and protest. Colombians live in a state of incredible anxiety due to the systematic murders of social and environmental leaders. Colombia is one of the most dangerous countries in the world for human rights defenders in general and for environmental leaders in particular.

  All of this has limited climate mobilisation. Some isolated actions have been held, but there has not been a big national, high-impact demonstration. That is why we were surprised to find out that a massive school mobilisation took place in the south of the country, in the department of Huila, where we least expected it to happen due to the complex security dynamics in those territories. We managed to get in touch with the young people who mobilised in Huila and together we took part in a national meeting held in the department of Caquetá, also known as the golden door to the Colombian Amazon. At that meeting we managed to coordinate our work with the communities that live in Amazonian territory and so far we are in the process of raising the cause of the Amazon and initiating a resistance to defend our forest.

  We are currently starting to bring all the environmental groups together into a single climate front. We hope this will inspire those who are afraid to join as well.

  Have you had any participation in international climate forums?

  We have been to a Latin American meeting of Fridays for Future that was held in Chile with the support of 350.org. It was a meeting of climate advocates to build a Latin American network and take the movement to the regional level. It helped us a lot to meet other young people from other parts of the region who were also mobilising, to discover that we could get together and feel that we had international support to do our job. It gave us some hope.

  Right after that meeting, we began to try to form a national environmental network, travelling to as many territories as possible and enlisting young people from other Colombian regions. There is still a lot to be done, but we are growing exponentially because when a new group joins in, they reach out to three or four other groups. Throughout 2019 we focused on this process, touring territories, communicating our message to people and creating links. We believe that the next time we may be able to mobilise at the national level. We will do so on 24 April 2020, on the occasion of the next global strike.

  What kind of support would you need to be able to hold in 2020 the mobilisation that was not possible in 2019?

  Right now our window of opportunity is the national strike, the series of protests that have taken place in several Colombian cities since November 2019. In a country where people are afraid to speak, on 21 November last year millions of people took to the streets. It was one of the largest mobilisations Colombia has witnessed over the past 40 years. This is a unique opportunity. Within the framework of these protests, the environmental movement has also put forward its proposals and demands. We may not be able to mobilise people specifically around climate, but we can take advantage of these mass mobilisations and put our issues out there. If there are people willing to mobilise, we can approach them, tell them what is happening to the environment and communicate our demands so that they understand that our issues also concern them and they start mobilising for them as well. By doing this, we succeeded in getting the national strike committee to include the declaration of a climate emergency in Colombia among its demands. This has been a very big breakthrough.

  Civic space in Colombia is rated as ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Fridays for Future through itswebsite, and with the Colombian campaign byemail or through itsFacebook page, and follow @FutureColombia on Twitter.

• COP26 : « Mon espoir est que les gens se rassemblent pour demander justice »

  À la veille de la 26ème Conférence des Parties des Nations Unies sur le changement climatique (COP26), qui se tiendra à Glasgow, au Royaume-Uni, du 31 octobre au 12 novembre 2021, CIVICUS a interrogé des militants, des dirigeants et des experts de la société civile sur les défis environnementaux auxquels ils sont confrontés dans leur contexte, les actions qu’ils entreprennent pour y faire face et leurs attentes pour le sommet à venir.

  CIVICUS s’entretient avec Mitzi Jonelle Tan, une jeune militante pour la justice climatique basée à Metro Manila, aux Philippines, membre des Young Climate Champions Philippines et participante active du mouvement international Fridays for the Future.

  Quel est le principal problème climatique dans votre communauté ?

  Les Philippines subissent de nombreux impacts du changement climatique, qu’il s’agisse de sécheresses plus longues et plus chaudes ou de typhons plus fréquents et plus intenses. Outre ces impacts climatiques - auxquels nous n’avons pas été capables de nous adapter et qui nous laissent sans soutien pour faire face aux pertes et aux dommages - nous sommes également confrontés à de nombreux projets destructeurs de l’environnement, souvent entrepris par des multinationales étrangères, que notre gouvernement autorise et même encourage.

  Young Climate Champions Philippines, la version philippine de Fridays for Future, milite pour la justice climatique et pour que les voix des personnes issues des communautés les plus touchées soient entendues et amplifiées. Je suis devenue militante en 2017, après avoir travaillé avec des leaders autochtones aux Philippines, car ce travail m’a fait prendre conscience que la seule façon de parvenir à une société plus juste et plus verte est une action collective menant à un changement systémique.

  Avez-vous été confrontée à des réactions négatives face au travail que vous réalisez ?

  Oui, comme pour toute personne qui s’élève contre l’injustice et l’inaction, notre gouvernement, par l’intermédiaire de ses agents rémunérés, désigne les militants comme des terroristes : pour résumer, il nous traite de terroristes pour avoir demandé des comptes et poussé au changement. Être militant du climat s’accompagne toujours de la peur aux Philippines, le pays qui, pendant huit années consécutives, a été classé comme le plus dangereux d’Asie pour les défenseurs et militants de l’environnement. Nous ne vivons plus seulement avec la peur des impacts climatiques, mais aussi avec celle que la police et les forces de l’État s’en prennent à nous et nous fassent disparaître.

  Comment établissez-vous des liens avec le mouvement international pour le climat ?

  Je collabore beaucoup avec la communauté internationale, en particulier par le biais de Fridays for Future - MAPA (Most Affected Peoples and Areas), l'un des groupes de Fridays for Future dans le Sud. Nous y parvenons en ayant des conversations, en apprenant les uns des autres et en élaborant des stratégies conjointes, tout en nous amusant. Il est important que le mouvement mondial des jeunes soit très bien mis en réseau, uni et solidaire, afin de s’attaquer réellement au problème mondial de la crise climatique.

  Quels sont vos espoirs que la COP26 débouche sur des progrès, et quelle utilité voyez-vous à de tels processus internationaux ?

  Mon espoir ne réside pas dans les soi-disant dirigeants et politiciens qui se sont adaptés au système et l’ont géré pendant des décennies au profit d’une minorité, généralement issus du Nord global. Mon espoir repose sur les gens : sur les militants et les organisations de la société civile qui s’unissent pour réclamer justice et dénoncer le fait que le système axé sur le profit qui nous a conduits à cette crise n’est pas celui dont nous avons besoin pour en sortir. Je pense que la COP26 est un moment crucial et que ce processus international doit être utile, car nous en avons déjà eu 24 qui n’ont pas donné grand-chose. Ces problèmes auraient dû être résolus lors de la première COP et, d’une manière ou d’une autre, nous devons veiller à ce que cette COP soit utile et débouche sur des changements significatifs, et non sur de nouvelles promesses vides.

  Quels changements souhaiteriez-vous voir se produire pour commencer à résoudre la crise climatique ?

  Le seul changement que je demande est un grand changement : un changement de système. Nous devons changer ce système qui donne la priorité à la surexploitation du Sud et des peuples marginalisés au profit du Nord et de quelques privilégiés. Un développement bien compris ne devrait pas être basé sur le PIB et la croissance éternelle, mais sur la qualité de vie des gens. C’est possible, mais seulement si nous nous attaquons à la crise climatique et à toutes les autres injustices socio-économiques qui en sont la cause.

  L’espace civique auxPhilippines est classé « réprimé »par leCIVICUS Monitor.
  Contactez les Young Climate Champions Philippines via leursite web ou leur pageFacebook, et suivez Mitzi Jonelle surTwitter etInstagram. 

• COP26: ‘False solutions are brandished to divert our attention from those responsible’

  In the run-up to the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26), which will take place in Glasgow, UK between 31 October and 12 November 2021, CIVICUS is interviewing civil society activists, leaders and experts about the environmental challenges they face in their contexts, the actions they are undertaking to tackle them and their expectations for the upcoming summit.

  CIVICUS speaks with Lia Mai Torres, Executive Director of the Center for Environmental Concerns (CEC) – Philippines, a civil society organisation (CSO) that helps Filipino communities address environmental challenges. Founded in 1989 through an initiative of organisations representing fisherfolk, farmers, Indigenous peoples, women, people living in urban poverty and professional sectors, CEC focuses on environmental research, education, advocacy and campaigning. It is also part of the secretariat of the Asia Pacific Network of Environment Defenders (APNED), a coalition of organisations working in solidarity to protect the environment and its defenders.

  

  What’s the key environmental issue in your country that you’re working on?

  The main environmental issue that the Philippines is currently facing is the proliferation of environmentally destructive projects and programmes. This situation persisted or even worsened under the pandemic.

  Just recently, the current administration lifted a moratorium on mining, based on claims that it will help the economy recover, after it was hard hit by the poor pandemic response. This will usher in around 100 mining agreements in different parts of the country. This was opposed by many communities due to the negative impacts of existing mining operations. An example is in the village of Didipio, Nueva Vizcaya, in the northern part of the Philippines, where a mining agreement with the Australian-Canadian company OceanaGold was renewed for another 25 years. The Bugkalot and Tuwali Indigenous communities are already suffering from a lack of water supply due to the mining operations and they fear that this will worsen with the continuing operations.

  Infrastructure projects are also a priority of the government, which claims that they will also help the economy. However, there are projects that are foreign funded under onerous loans that will worsen the situation of residents. An example of this is the China-funded Kaliwa Dam in Rizal province, in the southern part of Luzon island. It will encroach on the Dumagat Indigenous people’s ancestral domain, including sacred sites, as well as a protected area.

  Another example are the monocrop plantations that can be found mostly in the provinces of Mindanao. Ancestral domains of the Lumad Indigenous people have been converted into banana and pineapple plantations. Some residents report illnesses from the synthetic chemicals used in the plantations and many are being displaced from their farmlands.

  These are a few examples of priority projects that are pushed by the government to bring so-called development. However, it is obvious that these do not genuinely improve the situation of local communities, most of which are already experiencing poverty. In addition, the natural resources of the country are mostly not exploited to the benefit of its citizens, since the products extracted are destined for export. Only very few local and international corporations benefit from them. Natural resources are used for profit and not for national development.

  Have you faced backlash for the work you do?

  CEC works with local communities, since we believe that environmental struggles cannot be won without the united efforts of the people who are experiencing environmental impact. The real power comes from the organisations on the ground. CSOs like ours and other sectors should support their efforts, connecting local struggles to build a strong environmental movement at the national and international levels.

  Because of our support to local communities, we have faced reprisals. In 2007, Lafayette Mining Ltd, an Australian mining company, filed a libel case against CEC’s then-executive director for exposing the impacts of the company’s operations. In 2019 and 2021, our organisation was targeted through red-tagging, a practice by which the government declares individuals and organisations as terrorists or communists, in retaliation for our humanitarian missions following a typhoon and during the pandemic. 

  We also received information of a threat of a police raid in our office for providing sanctuary to Lumad Indigenous children who were forced out of their communities due to militarisation, threats and harassment. Our peaceful protest actions are often violently dispersed by the police and private security forces, and a member of our staff was arrested in 2019.

  Behind all these attacks are state security forces alongside the private security forces of corporations. The police and military have seemingly become part of the corporations’ security forces, using repressive measure to ensure that their operations run smoothly.

  How do you connect with the broader international climate movement?

  As many countries, especially from the global south, are experiencing similar environmental problems, we recognise the need to connect with organisations in other countries. In 2015, CEC was among the conveners of the International People’s Conference on Mining, in which environmental defenders were able to learn from each other’s experiences and coordinate local campaigns.

  CEC also helped establish APNED, a solidarity campaign network that provides mutual support to campaigns, raises issues at the international level, advocates for greater protection to defenders, conducts capacity-building activities and facilitates services. We believe that it is important to have solidarity among defenders to help strengthen local movements as well as the international struggle for our environmental rights.

  What hopes, if any, do you have for COP26 to make progress on your issue, and how useful generally do you find such international processes?

  Even before the pandemic, there were concerns regarding the inclusion of frontline or grassroots environmental defenders in international processes such as the climate talks. Lack of inclusivity became more evident under the pandemic, as many CSOs have found it difficult to attend due to additional requirements and expenses. In addition, only accredited organisations can attend formal events, and these are only very few with accreditation. Further, governments’ reports are usually far from reality. The worsening climate crisis is proof that governments are not doing enough.

  Despite this, we will still participate in the formal and side events of COP26, aiming to bring attention to how many developed countries and big corporations are worsening the climate crisis through resource grabbing and the exploitation of the natural resources of poor countries, exacerbating existing poverty, and how false solutions are brandished to divert our attention from their responsibility and lack of accountability. We also want to highlight the importance of environmental defenders in protecting our environment and upholding our environmental rights, and therefore the need to ensure that they do not suffer more politically motivated human rights violations that hinder them from doing their important work.

  What one change would you like to see that would help address the climate crisis?

  We hope that the profit-oriented capitalist framework will be changed in the Philippines. This would ensure resource conflicts will be addressed, environmental protection for ecological balance upheld, genuine climate adaptation programmes established and due attention given to vulnerable groups. This also includes holding countries and corporations that contribute to the climate crisis accountable and providing support for poor countries to adapt.

  Civic space in the Philippines is rated ‘repressed’by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with the Center for Environmental Concerns-Philippines through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@CEC_Phils on Twitter. 

• COP26: ‘Much more money is being invested in destroying the planet than in saving it’

  The 26th United Nations Conference of the Parties on Climate Change (COP26) has just ended in Glasgow, UK, and CIVICUS continues to interview civil society activists, leaders and experts on the outcomes of the summit, its potential to solve the environmental challenges they face and the actions they are taking to address them.

  CIVICUS speaks with Ruth Alipaz Cuqui, an Indigenous leader from the Bolivian Amazon and general coordinator of the National Coordination for the Defence of Indigenous Peasant Territories and Protected Areas (CONTIOCAP). The organisation was founded in late 2018 out of the convergence of several movements of resistance against the destruction of Indigenous territories and protected areas by extractive projects and the co-optation of traditional organisations representing Indigenous peoples. Initially composed of 12 movements, it now includes 35 from all over Bolivia.

  

  What environmental issues do you work on?

  As a defender of Indigenous territories, Indigenous rights and the rights of nature, I work on three different levels. First, on a personal level, I work in my community of the Uchupiamona Indigenous People, the whole of which is within one of the most diverse protected areas in the world, the Madidi National Park.

  In 2009 my people were on the verge of giving out a logging concession that would devastate 31,000 hectares of forest, in an area that is sensitive for water preservation and particularly rich in bird diversity. To stop that concession, I made an alternative proposal, focused on birdwatching tourism. Although currently, because of the pandemic, tourism has proven not to be the safest bet, the fact is that we still have the forests thanks to this activity – although they always remain under threat due to pressure from people in the community who need the money right away.

  My community currently faces serious water supply issues, but we have organised with young women to restore our water sources by reforesting the area with native fruit plants and passing on knowledge about these fruit and medicinal plants from our elders to women and children.

  Secondly, I am a member of the Commonwealth of Indigenous Communities of the Beni, Tuichi and Quiquibey rivers, a grassroots organisation of the Amazon region of Bolivia that since 2016 has led the defence of the territories of six Indigenous Nations – Ese Ejja, Leco, Moseten, Tacana, Tsiman and Uchupiamona – from the threat of the construction of two hydroelectric plants, Chepete and El Bala, that would flood our territories, displace more than five thousand Indigenous people, obstruct three rivers forever and devastate two protected areas, the Madidi National Park and the Pilón Lajas Biosphere Reserve. On 16 August 2021, Indigenous organisations supporting the government authorised the launch of these hydroelectric power projects.

  The Tuichi River, which is within the Madidi protected area and is essential to the community ecotourism activity of my Uchupiamona People, has also been granted in its entirety to third parties outside the community for the development of alluvial gold mining. The Mining and Metallurgy Law discriminates against Indigenous peoples by allowing any external actor to acquire rights over our territories.

  Finally, I am the general coordinator of CONTIOCAP, an organisation that has denounced the systematic violations of our rights in the Indigenous territories of the four macro regions of Bolivia: the Chaco, the valleys, the Altiplano and the Amazon. These violations come hand in hand with oil exploration and exploitation, the burning of forests and deforestation to free up land for agribusiness, the construction of roads and hydroelectric plants and the alluvial gold mining activity that is poisoning vulnerable populations.

  Have you faced negative reactions to the work you do?

  We have faced negative reactions, mainly from the state, through decentralised bodies such as the National Tax and Migration agencies. I recently discovered that my bank accounts have been ordered to be withheld by the two agencies.

  During a march led by the Qhara Qhara Nation in 2019, I was constantly followed and physically harassed by two people, while I was in the city to submit our proposals alongside march leaders.

  And recently, when Indigenous organisations sympathetic to the government gave authorisation to the hydroelectric plants, our denunciations were met with actions to disqualify and discredit us, something the Bolivian government has been doing for years. They say, for instance, that those of us who oppose the hydroelectric megaprojects are not legitimate representatives of Indigenous peoples but activists financed by international non-governmental organisations.

  How do your actions connect with the global climate movement?

  Our actions converge with those of the global movement, because by defending our territories and protected areas we contribute not only to avoiding further deforestation and pollution of rivers and water sources, and to preserving soils to maintain our food sovereignty, but also to conserving ancestral knowledge that contributes to our resilience in the face of the climate crisis.

  Indigenous peoples have proven to be the most efficient protectors of ecosystems and biodiversity, as well as of resources fundamental for life such as water, rivers and territories, against the position of the state whose laws rather serve to violate our living spaces.

  Have you made use of international organisations’ forums and spaces for participation?

  Yes, we do it regularly, for example by requesting the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to follow up on the criminalisation of and violence against defenders of Indigenous peoples’ rights in Bolivia and by participating in the collective production of a civil society shadow report for the United Nations Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review of Bolivia, which we presented during the Council’s pre-sessions in October 2019.

  Recently, in a hearing in the city of La Paz, we presented a report on violations of our rights to the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples.

  What do you think of the spaces for civil society participation in the COPs, and how do you assess the results of the recently concluded COP26?

  Once again, at COP26 states have exhibited their complete inefficiency in acting in compliance with their own decisions. I have stated on more than one occasion that 2030 was just around the corner and today we are only eight years away and we are still discussing what are the most efficient measures to achieve the goals set for that date.

  Much more money is being invested in destroying the planet than in saving it. This is the result of states’ actions and decisions in favour of a wild capitalism that is destroying the planet with its extractivism that is predatory of life.

  Let’s see how much progress has been made since the Kyoto Protocol, which was agreed in 2005 to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In recent years, companies have used the supposed concept of the ‘right to development’ to continue operating to the detriment of the planet and, above all, to the detriment of the most vulnerable populations such as Indigenous peoples. We are the ones who pay the costs, not the ones who cause the disasters.

  The results of COP26 do not satisfy me because we want to see tangible actions. The Bolivian state has not even signed the declaration, even though it has used the space of COP26 to give a misleading speech that the capitalist model must be changed for one that is kinder to nature. But in Bolivia we have already deforested around 10 million hectares, in the most brutal way imaginable, through fires that for more than a decade and a half have been legalised by the government.

  I think that as long as these forums do not discuss sanctions on states that do not comply with agreements, or that do not even sign declarations, there will be no concrete results.

  Civic space in Bolivia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with CONTIOCAP through itsFacebook page and follow@contiocap and@CuquiRuth on Twitter. 

• COP26: ‘My hope lies in the people coming together to demand justice’

  In the run-up to the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26), which will take place in Glasgow, UK between 31 October and 12 November 2021, CIVICUS is interviewing civil society activists, leaders and experts about the environmental challenges they face in their contexts, the actions they are undertaking to tackle them and their expectations for the upcoming summit.

  CIVICUS speaks with Mitzi Jonelle Tan, a young climate justice activist based in Metro Manila, Philippines, who organises with Youth Advocates for Climate Action Philippines and is active in Fridays for Future International.

  What’s the key climate issue in your community?

  The Philippines is plagued by several impacts from climate change, from droughts that are getting longer and warmer to typhoons that are getting more frequent and more intense. Aside from these climate impacts – that we have not been able to adapt to and leave us with no support when it comes to dealing with the loss and damages – we also face numerous environmentally destructive projects, often undertaken by foreign multinational companies, that our government is allowing and even encouraging.

  Youth Advocates for Climate Action Philippines, the Fridays for Future of the Philippines, advocates for climate justice and to make sure that voices of people from the most affected communities are heard, amplified and given space. I first became an activist in 2017 after working with Indigenous leaders of the Philippines, which made me understand that they only way to achieve a more just and greener society is through collective action leading to system change.

  Have you faced backlash for the work you do?

  Yes, just like anyone who speaks up against injustice and inaction, our government through its paid trolls red-tags and terror-tags activists – it basically calls us terrorists for demanding accountability and pushing for change. There is a fear that comes along with being a climate activist in the Philippines, which has been characterised as the most dangerous country in Asia for environmental defenders and activists for eight years in a row. It’s not just the fear of the climate impacts, it’s also the fear of police and state forces coming to get us and making us disappear. 

  How do you engage with the broader international climate movement?

  I organise a lot with the international community, especially through Fridays for Future – MAPA (Most Affected Peoples and Areas), one of the global south groups of Fridays for Future. We do it by having conversations, learning from each other and creating strategies together, all while having fun. It’s important for the global youth movement to connect with one another, unite and show solidarity in order to truly address the global issue of the climate crisis.

  What hopes, if any, do you have for COP26 to make progress on your issue, and how useful generally do you find such international processes?

  My hope doesn’t lie with the so-called leaders and politicians who have continued business as usual for decades for the profit of the few, usually for the global north. My hope lies in the people: activists and civil society coming together to demand justice and to really expose how this profit-oriented system that brought us to this crisis is not the one that we need to bring us out of it. I think COP26 is a crucial moment and this international process has to be useful because we’ve already had 24 too many. These problems should have been solved at the very first COP, and one way or another we have to make sure that this COP is useful and brings meaningful change, not just more empty promises.

  What one change would you like to see – in the world or in your community – to help address the climate crisis?

  The one change I ask for is a big one: system change. We need to change our system from one that prioritises the overexploitation of the global south and marginalised peoples for the profit of the global north and the privileged few. The way we view development, it shouldn’t be based on GDP and everlasting growth, but rather on the quality of people’s lives. This is doable – but only if we address the climate crisis and all the other socio-economic injustices at its roots.

  Civic space inthe Philippinesis rated as ‘repressed‘by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Youth Advocates for Climate Action Philippines through itswebsite or Facebook page, and follow @mitzijonelle onTwitter andInstagram. 

• COP26: ‘We need to regenerate ourselves and what we have destroyed’

   Portuguese

  As the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) gets underway in Glasgow, UK, CIVICUS continues to interview civil society activists, leaders and experts about the environmental challenges they face in their contexts, the actions they are taking to address them and the reprisals they face because of their work.

  CIVICUS speaks with Daniel Gutierrez Govino, founder of the Alter do Chão Forest Fire Brigade, a group that works to prevent, combat and promote socio-political coordination against fires in the Amazon forest in the state of Pará, Brazil. He is also a co-founder of the Alter do Chão Aquifer Institute, an institution that promotes social projects in the town of Alter do Chão, municipality of Santarém in Pará.

  What made you become an environmental defender?

  I felt the urgency to work to keep the planet viable for humans and other species. I was moved, and still am today, by the possibility of human beings reversing their actions and ways of thinking about our role in nature. We need to regenerate ourselves and what we have destroyed.

  What does the Alter do Chão Brigade do?

  We have worked since 2017 to prevent and combat forest fires in Alter do Chão, in the municipality of Santarém in the north of Brazil. We brought together a group of community volunteers who, with great courage, have worked to protect biodiversity, the people of Alter do Chão and the region from forest fires. To do this, we received training from the Military Fire Brigade, the Civil Defence and the Municipal Secretariat for the Environment and Tourism of Belterra. We have trained new brigade members and promoted socio-political coordination and communication with local communities.

  What restrictions have you faced in response to your environmental activism?

  In the case of the Alter do Chão Brigade, I and three other brigade members were arrested in 2019 on unfounded charges of causing fires in an environmental protection area. Our work was criminalised because it proposes solutions and a transformation of the local political context.

  In addition, the current national context for organised civil society is hostile. We were scapegoats in a narrative that sought to criminalise civil society organisations, at a time when the country’s president and his supporters were trying to blame civil society for the dramatic increase in forest fires.

  I have also faced resistance when trying to promote changes in current public policies in the microcosmos of Santarém. Political and social conservatism undermine any movement that seeks to advance progressive agendas. The government, the civil police and the local elite reject environmental activism by attacking our work. We were lucky and our privilege kept us alive, but activists in the Amazon are always threatened with violence and death. It is not a safe region for those who fight for freedom and justice.

  What kind of support did you receive when you were criminalised?

  We received all kinds of support when we were arrested, both nationally and internationally. The key support came from pro bono criminal lawyers from the Freedom Project, who still accompany us to this day. But we also received support from national institutions such as Projeto Saúde e Alegria and Conectas, as well as from international ones, such as WWF Brazil, Article 19, Front Line Defenders and many others.

  We were released from prison after a few days thanks to the actions of these defence and protection networks. However, the criminal process against us has been ongoing for two years, without any proof backing the accusations against us. At the federal level, the police investigation was closed; however, the authorities of the state of Pará have insisted on charging us. Recently, the jurisdiction of the court case was challenged by the federal prosecution, but for months the process has drifted in the Brazilian justice system. Part of our equipment remains confiscated to this day. I have no more hopes for justice.

  Despite all of this, I believe that Brazilian civil society is emerging stronger. Our partner Caetano Scannavino, from Projeto Saúde e Alegria, who also works in Alter do Chão, says it is like a boomerang effect. I think this assessment is brilliant. They attack us, and their attacks make us stronger.

  What avenues are available for activists in your region to seek protection and support? What kind of support do you need from civil society and the international community?

  The main thing is to be aware of the available support networks and coordinate with them before anything bad happens, that is, to coordinate preventively. This includes national and international institutions, such as those that supported us. But above all, it is crucial to know local support networks.

  The types of support needed are specific and depend a lot on each region. Brazil is of a continental size and the needs of the south are not the same as those of the Amazon, for example. One cannot even say that the Amazon is a region, because it is, in fact, a continent with particularities in each region. But it is these networks that will connect those in need of support with those who can help.

  Civic space in Brazil is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Alter do Chão Forest Fire Brigade through itswebsite or itsFacebook page.

   

• COP28: ‘To truly end the fossil fuel era, bold visions must now turn into historical action on the ground’

  CIVICUS speaks with Kaisa Kosonen, Senior Policy Advisor at Greenpeace Nordic, about the outcomes of theCOP28 climate summit and the vital role played by civil society in setting the agenda for fossil fuel phase-out. Kaisa was Greenpeace International delegation’s lead at COP28.

   

  What were the opportunities for civil society to influence the negotiations at COP28?

  I think the biggest influence civil society made was in agenda setting. Fossil fuel phase-out was never an official agenda item at this COP, but we managed to make it the number one topic for the global stocktake, and the main benchmark for success.

  Within the United Nations (UN) space at COP28 civil society was guaranteed a certain level of participation and access. However, areas dedicated to civil society, such as side event and press conference rooms and pavilions for civil society organisations, were noticeably separated from negotiation areas, government press conferences and media zones.

  On top of this, a unique aspect of COP28 was the record number of fossil fuel lobbyists who participated, securing more passes than all delegates from the 10 most climate-vulnerable nations combined. This influx of lobbyists introduced a different dimension of economic influence to the summit.

  Were climate activists, both local and international, able to exercise their right to protest?

  Greenpeace chose to focus its activities exclusively within the UN area, known as the blue zone. Within this area, protests were allowed if prior permission had been sought and granted. However, we encountered increased constraints and a lot of back-and-forth this time, with some unfounded wordsmithing on banner texts. Other groups also mentioned that their protests were redirected to less relevant locations and some activists experienced an atmosphere of intimidation.

  It is crucial that the UN Secretariat and security safeguard civil society spaces in COPs. Freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly should not be subject to negotiation with the host country’s presidency.

  What’s your assessment of the COP28 final declaration?

  The COP28 outcome delivered a long-awaited signal on ending the fossil fuel era, along with a call to massively scale up renewables and energy efficiency this decade. But it fell short in some aspects, containing potentially dangerous distractions and loopholes. The lack of sufficient means to achieve the proposed goals raises questions about the practical implementation of the commitments. Real progress will be determined by actions taken on the ground.

  Civil society played a crucial role setting the agenda at COP28, successfully steering the focus of world governments towards the urgent need for a fossil fuel phase-out aligned with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5 degrees warming limit. This shift in attention, sustained for almost two weeks, marked an unprecedented achievement during a UN climate summit. There’s no way back now.

  Despite its weak language, the declaration sent a clear signal that the fossil fuel era will come to an end. The practical requirement for ‘transitioning away from fossil fuels’ to achieve ‘net zero by 2050’, if implemented sustainably, would mean a near-complete phase-out of fossil fuels within the next three decades. To truly end the fossil fuel era, bold visions must now turn into historical action on the ground.

  The call for countries to contribute to the phase-out in a ‘just, orderly, and equitable manner’ emphasises the responsibility of wealthy states to take the lead and support global south countries in their transition.

  The operationalisation and initial capitalisation of the loss and damage fund also mark a turning point for global climate action – but only if it is built on.

  In the year ahead, the fund must be set up so that funding can start flowing to those who need it. Permanent, predictable funds must be established to meet the growing needs, flowing from the countries and corporations that have contributed most to the climate crisis towards those that have contributed less but are disproportionately impacted on by its effects. We must prevent further losses and damages through a fast and fair fossil fuel phase-out.

  What further steps need to be taken for the COP28 outcomes to have a tangible and positive impact?

  With this COP28 outcome we now have new global benchmarks for aligning action with the Paris Agreement 1.5 degrees limit and climate justice. This crucial roadmap includes accelerating global emission cuts, increasing reliance on renewables and energy efficiency, expediting the transition away from fossil fuels, putting an end to deforestation and fostering the growth of climate finance. Focus must now shift to real action on the ground.

  Over the next year, states face a critical period where they must formulate new national climate targets and plans to deliver their fair contributions to all these global goals. Simultaneously, countries need to collaboratively design the future landscape of international climate finance, moving beyond existing commitments to fill the growing gaps.

  What are your thoughts on the choice of Azerbaijan as COP29 host?

  The choice of Azerbaijan as the host for COP29 raises many concerns, given its economy’s very high reliance on oil and gas exports, and poor track record on human rights. The upcoming COP should primarily focus on delivering climate finance to those made vulnerable and lacking capacity, and on redirecting financial flows away from problems and towards solutions. Key to this is holding the fossil fuel industry and major polluters accountable for the damage they have caused, which won’t be easy with a host that’s highly invested in fossil fuels.

  That said, as the history of this process shows, when a determined group of progressive countries come together to drive change, and they are supported by the global climate movement, breakthroughs can happen. So the priority now is to ensure that by COP29 next year, countries will have taken key steps to accelerate the fair and swift transition away from fossil fuels on the ground, and that they’re ready to take the bull by the horns and make polluters pay.

   

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  Get in touch with Greenpeace through itswebsite,Instagram andFacebook accounts, and follow@Greenpeace and@kaisakosonen on Twitter.

  The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

• CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY: ‘Solidarity is essential because we face very powerful interests’

  CIVICUS discusses civil society’s advocacy for the European Union’sCorporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) with Brad Adams, Executive Director and founder of Climate Rights International (CRI). CRI is a civil society organisation that focuses on the connections between climate change and human rights, putting pressure on governments and corporations to take action to end abuses. Along with many other organisations, it played a key behind-the-scenes role in the final approval of the CSDDD.

  The CSDDD aims to protect human rights and the environment while tackling climate change. It empowers European courts to hold large companies accountable for practices such as child or forced labour in their supply chains and production, and requires companies to align their business strategies with the Paris Agreement climate goals. It also seeks to improve access to justice and provide remedies for victims, ensuring companies are held accountable for their actions or failures to act.

  What’s the CSDDD and what difference should it make?

  The CSDDD is potentially the most important piece of environmental and climate change legislation in the world. The European Union (EU) is the world’s largest economic bloc, bigger than the USA and China, and when it legislates or issues regulations, it has the power to set global standards. For example, when the EU required Apple to stop changing iPhone chargers every few years, Apple eventuallychanged its global policy to comply with the EU standard and avoid heavy fines.

  The strength of the CSDDD is that it requires companies to adopt and implement climate transition plans in line with theParis Agreement. A key global problem is that companies often claim to be Paris Agreement-compliant but continue business as usual. This directive imposes legally binding human rights and environmental due diligence obligations on large companies, requiring them to identify, mitigate and remediate the environmental and human rights harms they cause in their operations and supply chains. This is a major step forward.

  In addition, the CSDDD establishes financial liability for violations, creating a strong incentive for compliance. Under some conditions, civil society organisations (CSOs) and trade unions will be able to bring claims and hold companies to account. This underlines the crucial role of civil society, as governments often fail to enforce laws, even those they have passed themselves.

  A notable weakness of the directive, however, is its limited scope. It only applies to large companies with over a thousand employees and an annual turnover of more than €450 million (approx. US$480 million). This was meant to exclude small and medium-sized enterprises that say they don’t have the capacity to meet the requirements. As a result, an estimated 65 per cent of companies that could be covered are not.

  Nevertheless, the directive still covers around 50 to 60 per cent of all business activity. Over time, we expect the size of companies covered to be reduced, extending the directive’s reach.

  We hope the CSDDD will lead to better environmental and climate standards worldwide. This directive will require large companies doing business with the EU to meet basic environmental standards in their supply chains and production. If companies must meet these standards to do business with the EU, we expect these internal standards to become global standards, influencing their operations wherever they do business. 

  What role did civil society play in the adoption of the directive?

  Civil society played a crucial role. The directive wouldn’t have been adopted without the persistent efforts of many CSOs to put pressure on states.

  It took many years to get to this point. When the directive began to unravel because of theobjections of the German Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the support of climate sceptic governments such asItaly’s, civil society stepped in. We worked with the Belgian EU presidency, Green parties and supportive states to keep the directive on track and get it adopted.

  Civil society also engaged with large companies that were in favour of the directive, encouraging them to intervene. These companies recognised that while the directive might impose short-term costs, it would ultimately benefit them by raising global standards. They wanted to ensure a level playing field by holding companies from countries with lower standards, such as China and Vietnam, to the same high standards they’d have to comply with. If this works it will be a welcome change from the typical corporate race to the bottom.

  Civil society rescued and advanced this critical piece of legislation by successfully linking supportive companies and governments.

  What concessions were made to get the directive adopted?

  For legislation to be adopted in the EU, it must first be approved by the European Commission and then by the European Parliament. The final step is approval by the European Council of Ministers, an intergovernmental body that under its complicated rules in this case only needed a qualified majority of its 27 members.

  The Council had given its provisional approval, but at the final stage the FDP withdrew its support. This is a small economically neoliberal party that is a minor part of theGermancoalition government but may have thought it could use its stance to gain an electoral advantage. Without telling the main coalition parties it apparently contacted parties in other member states and urged them to withdraw their support. Enough did so to raise doubts about whether the required qualified majority could still be achieved. So the CSDDD was temporarily withdrawn to avoid defeat. With the help of other European CSOs and the Belgian presidency, we worked to reassemble a group large enough to achieve the qualified majority.

  Concessions made to secure this majority included raising the employee and turnover thresholds that companies had to meet to be covered by the directive. This helped overcome the objections of those concerned about potential impacts on small and medium-sized enterprises.

  While the final text wasn’t exactly what we’d hoped for, it was still a significant victory. For the first time, it sets out basic principles and standards covering virtually all major multinational companies involved in global trade. Almost every global trading company you can think of will be covered by the CSDDD.

  We expect these companies to put pressure on the EU to amend the law to include those not currently covered by the CSDDD, creating a business consensus to extend its reach so companies won’t be able to compete with lower prices simply because they aren’t held to the same standards.

  Overall, it’s not enough of what’s needed, but it’s a big step in the right direction.

  What are the next steps?

  The provisions of the CSDDD will be implemented gradually, giving companies time to adjust their operations.

  We’ll have to wait and see what happens with thenew European Parliament and how supportive it is of climate policy. Although the Greens lost many seats, there’s still a majority of political parties that recognise the seriousness of climate change. The key question is whether they believe it requires urgent action and whether they will move quickly to implement it.

  We’ll continue to campaign for this directive alongside partner CSOs. We’ll engage in discussions with the Commission and members of parliament to explore ways to strengthen this legislation over time. However, it’s likely to be several years before the EU considers amending and improving this directive. In the meantime, our primary focus will be on ensuring companies comply with the requirements of the new law.

  How else is CRI working to hold corporations accountable?

  We’ve been working on Mexico’s avocado industry, which is responsible for deforestation, water theft from local communities and intimidation and violence against Indigenous communities and civil society activists. Given that 80 per cent of avocados grown in Mexico are exported to the USA, we felt a responsibility to address this issue.

  Thanks to the cooperation of many local organisations and activists who remained anonymous for security reasons, we published ourreport last November. We also approached Mexican and US companies with our findings and pressed the Mexican and US governments to create a mandatory deforestation-free certification process for the sale of avocados. We spoke to federal agencies in both countries. We worked with journalists at the New York Times, which published a key full-pagestory, and with members of the US Senate, who sent a key letter to the US government. We held webinars with civil society in Mexico. In February, as a result of our pressure, both governmentsannounced a ban on the sale of avocados grown in illegally deforested areas. Indigenous communities had been complaining about this for years, and we were finally able to make their voices heard.

  Solidarity was essential because we faced very powerful interests, including big companies with huge investments and drug cartels laundering money through the avocado industry. But we were still able to reach an agreement to end these harmful practices.

  Get in touch with CRI through itswebsite orFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@ClimateRights on Twitter. And get in touch with Brad Adams throughLinkedIn.

• CUBA: ‘All tactics used by activists have been turned into crimes’

  CIVICUS speaks about changes to the Cuban Penal and Family Codes and the government’s reaction to mass protests in 2021 with Marta María Ramírez, a Cuban journalist and autonomous feminist.

  

  Photo by María Lucía Expósito

  How do you assess recent changes to the Cuban Penal Code?

  The reform of the Penal Code cannot be understood without reference to last year’s protests. The argument provided to justify this reform referred to the previous constitutional reform: once the constitution was updated in 2019, a reform of the Penal Code was required. But the constitutional process itself was misleading: one would think that a constitutional update is something positive, but this is not necessarily the case in Cuba. The constitutional reform process was confusing: while the rituals of consultation were carried out, the reform was basically imposed. And in terms of substance, the new constitution contains many questionable elements, which are precisely the ones that should have been changed but were carried over intact from the old constitution.

  For instance, while the new constitution recognises the market, it continues to declare socialism as the economic system in place and highlights the ‘irrevocable’ character of socialism. The one-party system remains intact, with the Cuban Communist Party recognised as ‘the superior leading political force of society and the state’ on the basis of ‘its democratic character and permanent link with the people’.

  As a result, other freedoms that the constitution also recognises are rendered meaningless. For example, the constitution recognises ‘the rights of assembly, demonstration and association, for lawful and peaceful purposes, [...] provided that they are exercised with respect for public order and in compliance with the prescriptions established by law’ – but this is the very same law that establishes that the only legitimate political affiliation is to the Cuban Communist Party.

  The same applies to the freedoms of expression and artistic creation, which are recognised if they are exercised ‘in accordance with the humanist principles on which the cultural policy of the state and the values of socialist society are based’, that is, only if they are used to express acquiescence rather than critical thought.

  In any case, on the basis of this reform it was argued that the rest of the legal framework, including the Penal Code and the Family Code, should be updated. In the case of the Family Code, this was really necessary, because it had not been updated since 1975 and was totally out of step with the reality of today’s society. The reform of the Penal Code was also justified by the need to ‘modernise’ legislation and codify crimes that the previous code, which dated from 1987, did not recognise, such as environmental crimes, cybercrime and gender-based violence. But from my perspective, this reform can only be understood in reference to the July 2021 protests and their predecessors: those of 11 May 2019, 27 November 2020 and 27 January 2021.

  To shield the regime from dissent, all tactics used by activists have been turned into crimes of public disorder and crimes against state security, and foreign funding of civil society organisations and the media is criminalised. The aim is to stifle dissident media, because how is a media not aligned with the state to be financed in Cuba?

  Penalties for various crimes have also increased. Not only has the death penalty been retained, but the range of crimes it can be applied for has increased. The age at which a person is decreed criminally responsible is among the lowest in the world. What kind of modernisation is this? For some reason it was decided not to submit this reform to any kind of consultation.

  If we analyse the production of laws in recent years, it is clear that this has been systematically aimed at shielding the regime, which has gone beyond controlling actions to try to control thought as well. This protective shield is completed with the new Penal Code, which seeks to prevent a repetition of last year’s protests and silence all dissent.

  How can we understand the discrepancy between these highly regressive changes to the Penal Code and the apparently progressive reform of the Family Code currently underway?

  The Family Code is also being updated following the constitutional reform, although it should – and could – have been reformed much earlier. The first time I heard about equal marriage in Cuba was back in 2007. Even then there were calls for reform coming from academia, which is where activism linked to gender issues, women’s rights and sexual minorities was concentrated.

  But there was a lot of resistance and it was argued that recognition of equal marriage required a constitutional reform. This was obviously not true: marriage was regulated by the Family Code and not by the constitution, and when the constitution was reformed, this right was not included, but rather purposefully excluded and left pending for whenever the Family Code was reformed.

  The issue of equal marriage was again at the centre of the debate from the moment that, following the constitutional reform, the Family Code needed to be reformed as well, and pressures mounted for this right, not enshrined in the constitution, to be recognised by the Code – something that could have been done in 2007, 15 years ago. But this is clearly the way Cuba is ruled.

  In the draft Family Code that was submitted to consultation no special protection was included for trans children. Nothing, not a single mention, although it is known that this group experiences high rates of school dropout, expulsion from their homes and school bullying, both by students and teachers, experiencing a total impossibility to live their gender identity with guarantees. When trans people grow up, particularly trans women, they are the favoured victims of punitive provisions relating to ‘pre-delinquent behaviour’. This concept is so fascist that it is no longer called this in the current Penal Code, but it will remain in force through other regulations, in the practices of law enforcement officials and in the biases that will continue to exist.

  Why are we discussing these issues now? I have the impression that this is being used as a smokescreen, a manoeuvre to placate a demand without making profound changes to the political regime. These two seemingly contradictory strategies – a regressive reform of the Penal Code and a seemingly progressive reform of the Family Code – both point in the same direction, that of the stabilisation of the regime.

  I say ‘seemingly progressive’ because after a long process of consultations, parliament must now take the proposals received, reformulate the bill and set a date for a referendum to turn it into law. We still don’t know what will remain in the bill and what will be watered down or modified. Nor do we know how this document will translate into the daily lives of Cuban families.

  What positive elements are expected to be included in the new Family Code?

  One of the issues included in the draft Family Code is same-sex marriage and adoption by same-sex couples. Another issue that has been included is that of so-called solidarity gestation, or surrogacy, which until now has been illegal. This of great concern to feminist activists. Let’s remember we are in a context of brutal machismo and feminisation of poverty. How will solidarity gestation be regulated? Even if the law is clear on the prohibition of remuneration, how will it be possible in this context to avoid the development of an informal economy based on the exploitation of pregnant women?

  Another important issue is that of the rights of grandparents to have a relationship with their grandchildren, which has its counterpart in some provisions on parental responsibility, which would include respecting and facilitating the right of children to maintain communication with their grandparents and other close relatives.

  The issue of parental responsibility is key. It replaces the concept of parental authority, bringing a welcome shift from the idea of fathers’ and mothers’ power over children to the idea that parents are responsible for and have a responsibility towards their children. This is very interesting, and yet it has generated uproar, not only from social conservatives but also from political activists.

  This must be understood within Cuba’s political context. Activists – not necessarily conservative ones – feel that the emphasis on responsibility would allow the state to label them as irresponsible so they can take their children away from them, or threaten to do so to force them to desist from their activism. Many activists, and particularly women with maternal responsibilities, have already encountered this kind of threat, with comments such as ‘take care of your children’, ‘we know you have your daughter’ and ‘be careful, do it for your child’.

  But I think this threat is already out there, and under the new Code fathers could also be forced to exercise their responsibilities – something that does not currently happen in Cuba, with the feminisation of poverty being a consequence. As elsewhere in the region, there has been a massive increase in single-parent, female-headed households, something official statistics do not fully recognise.

  Another issue that has been at the centre of discussions is that of the children’s progressive autonomy. We know that punishment – including physical punishment – is normalised in Cuba, and parents make important decisions for their children without consulting them. The idea that parents are able to decide everything for their children until they come of age has changed over time, increasingly replaced by the concept that children progressively acquire the capacity to make their own decisions. I personally believe that as parents we should no longer talk about ‘parenting’ a child, but rather about accompanying them in their learning process.

  An important issue contained in the version of the document that went out to consultation is that of child marriage, added at the last minute as a result of strong pressure from feminist activism and independent media and allies. It is a vital issue, but legislators had not seen it.

  Many of these issues have created controversy, but I don’t think there has been real debate. In a context of high political polarisation, Cuba is not ready for debate. As activists who participated as independent observers have reported, the debates that have taken place in the consultative stages have been misguided and have not been led by people well trained to conduct them. There really is no debate in Cuba; you simply hear monologues for and against.

  What other problems do you see?

  Generally speaking, the problem is not with the contents of the Family Code. Women make up more than half of the population, and if you also count children, adolescents and LGBTQI+ people, the new code would meet the needs of a large majority.

  But we have great doubts about the reasons why it is being pushed through just now, especially because of the way in which some controversies were encouraged that served to obscure the fact that at the same time a terribly regressive reform of the Penal Code was being imposed on us, without any debate.

  In the new Penal Code, everything we do as activists and citizens is criminalised. It is a medieval code. The Family Code, on the other hand, is presented to us as ultra-modern and the result of consensus, which also creates uncertainty about its implementation. But while we have no doubts about the implementation of the Penal Code – we know that it will be implemented to the letter – if the Family Code ends up being as modern and progressive as advertised, I have huge doubts that it will actually be implemented. 

  To a large extent, those who would benefit from the new Family Code are the same people who will be repressed under the new Penal Code. Those who are protesting for the release of activists imprisoned after the 2021 protests are mostly single mothers demanding their children’s freedom. Many of those who took to the streets to protest were poor, Afro-descendants, transgender people and children raised by single mothers. This problem has existed for a long time and there have been no public policies aimed at solving it. There has not been the slightest attempt to make public policies with a gender perspective. In this context, it cannot be expected that the new Family Code will make such a big difference.

  Civic space in Cuba is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Follow@Martamar77 on Twitter.

• CUBA: ‘The only options available are prison, exile, or submission’

  

  CIVICUS speaks with Cuban activist  Carolina Barrero, who has been in exile in Spain since February 2022, about the circumstances driving increasing numbers of Cubans out of the country.

  Carolina is an art historian and a member of the 27N movement, formed out of the protests held on 27 November 2020 outside the Ministry of Culture in Havana to denounce lack of freedoms, the repression of dissent and harassment against the San Isidro Movement, a protest group started by artists. She was forced to leave Cuba in reprisal for her activism in support of relatives of political prisoners held since the protests of 11 July 2021, known as 11J.

  Why did you leave Cuba?

  My story as an activist forced into exile follows the pattern typically used by the state security apparatus to neutralise dissidents. I was told many times that I had to leave or else I would suffer legal consequences and eventually go to jail. I never gave in. I currently have four open cases, for instigation to commit a crime, conspiracy against state security, contempt and clandestine printing. Every single time I was threatened with prosecution and imprisonment if I did not stop my activism. I was urged to ‘stay quiet’, a classic euphemism for subdued.

  On 31 January 2022, I was arrested at aprotest outside the 10 de Octubre Municipal Court in Havana. It was the first day of thetrial of a group of 11J protesters. I was with other activists including Alexander Hall, Leonardo Romero Negrín, Daniela Rojo and Tata Poet, accompanying political prisoners’ mothers who were waiting to see their children from a distance when they were brought to court. When that happened, we all applauded and shouted ‘freedom’ and ‘they are heroes’. State security offices violently arrested us, beat us and put us in a cage truck to take us to different police stations.

  As happened before, state security told me that I had 48 hours to leave Cuba. But this time I was told that if I didn’t, 12 mothers of political prisoners would be prosecuted for public disorder. At first I thought it was just an empty threat, but they told me, ‘for 20 years we have been doing this to the Ladies in White’, a group who have been mobilising for their detained relatives since 2003. In other words, they were prepared to go all the way.

  The Cuban dictatorship knows very well how to put pressure on us using our families and our private lives, because they have us under surveillance and they know everything about us. For instance, they know if your mother has a heart condition so they pay her a visit to force you to stay quiet and not give her a heart attack. If you have committed an infidelity, they threaten to show photos to your partner. If you are at university, they threaten you with expulsion. If you live in rented housing, they pressure your landlords to throw you out. Their tactic is to detect your weakness and blackmail you into submission. At some point you get tired of this life and choose to self-censor.

  These threats were not working with me, so they threatened me with infringing on the freedom of third parties. They knew of my close ties with the mothers of imprisoned protesters and particularly with Yudinela Castro and Bárbara Farrat. Most of these mothers live in very precarious situations and cannot denounce the arbitrariness they suffer. Many have more than one child in prison, sometimes also their husbands, so they are quite alone. When they threatened me with criminalising and imprisoning them, I decided this time I had to leave.

  How different is the situation of political exiles from that of those emigrating for economic reasons?

  In principle, there would seem to be a big difference between exile resulting from the use of systematic repression to punish or neutralise political dissent and emigration motivated by social and economic asphyxiation. However, this classification obscures the ultimate causes of the factors that lead people to leave Cuba.

  Under a dictatorship such as Cuba’s, the root reasons why people leave the country are always political. All waves of exile from Cuba, from the 1960s to the present day, have had a political background: repression by the ruling regime. Not only are political freedoms missing, but all the freedoms necessary for people to be able to manage their own destiny. In Cuba people have no agency over any aspect of their public or private lives; all aspects of life are controlled by the Cuban state, which is not merely authoritarian, but totalitarian.

  No one flees paradise. No one decides to leave their life, work, career and affections to pursue the ‘American dream’. Although in some cases the forced character of exile seems clearer than in others, at the end of the day every exile from Cuba is a forced exile. We flee to survive and to have the opportunity to just be.

  Many Cubans risk their lives at sea or cross jungles with their babies to get to a place where they don’t know the language or the culture, just to be a little freer. In Cuba, if you don’t fit the mould set by the Communist Party, the only authorised party, in power since 1965, you are treated as a potential criminal. Everything is politically determined, from access to education and healthcare to the possibility of earning a living. Economic suffocation also has political causes. So it is misleading to distinguish sharply between political exile and economic migration.

  Following the protests of 11 July 2021 and their repression, it became clearer than ever that the only three options available to Cubans are prison, exile, or submission.

  Like other Cuban activists in exile, you have conducted international advocacy ever since you left Cuba. Do you think this could prompt the Cuban state to rethink its tactic of offering exit instead of prison?

  At the moment, the Cuban state is more concerned about us being inside, lighting the fire of protest, than outside, denouncing repression in international forums. But I think the regime’s calculations are wrong, because those of us who have gone into exile have not forgotten Cuba and are not going to abandon the cause of democracy. And international advocacy plays an important role in our struggle.

  This, which may seem innocuous to the regime, is a fundamental part of activism to end the dictatorship because it attacks one of the fundamental pillars that have sustained the regime: the effectiveness of international propaganda. The Cuban state has allocated enormous resources to diplomacy so that every embassy is a propaganda centre that promotes the narrative, the epic and the myth of the Cuban Revolution.

  To counter the effect of propaganda on international opinion, now Cuba also has a growing army of ambassadors who have witnessed and been part of the latest cycle of protests and can speak in international forums of what is really happening in Cuba. I firmly believe that, to a large extent, the fall of the dictatorship depends on the fall of the myth. This is an important task for us in exile.

  What are the chances of a political transition in Cuba?

  I do not dare to make predictions on such a delicate issue, and one so longed for by Cubans for decades. But I am able to highlight one fact: the Cuban regime has never been as weak as it is now. After the mass protests, the regime can no longer hide the extent of the discontent, which it has historically blamed on a few opponents who, according to its narrative, are funded by ‘the empire’. Social discontent is now evident and massive, reaching all corners of the island and all social groups. The dictatorship no longer has the support of the poorest or of those it claims to defend, but only of the military and bureaucratic leadership.

  It also has a serious succession problem. Since Miguel Díaz-Canel assumed power after being appointed by Raúl Castro, he has not made a single administrative decision that has earned him praise. Everything has been a disaster and he will be remembered as an incompetent dictator with very little charisma. I think the regime spends 24 hours a day thinking of how to fill this power vacuum, since Díaz-Canel has no credibility whatsoever, even among officials, and even demoralises the repressive apparatus. The problem is that they have no one to replace him with, nor do they know how. They could stage a vote, but the situation is so delicate that they know it could easily get out of hand. They could even stage a self-coup, but this is also a very delicate path that could end up being lethal.

  At the current international juncture, Cuba’s position on the Russian invasion of Ukraine makes the Cuban dictatorship, the oldest in the western hemisphere, even more difficult to justify in the eyes of international opinion. Justifying Cuba has become a challenge even for those with a marked ideological bias. Added to these factors are the economic, social and humanitarian crises, all of which threaten the regime and its continuity. Faced with the energy crisis and shortages of basic goods, the Cuban foreign minister himself has requested support from the Biden administration, something totally unheard of. The irony is complete: in Cuba there are people in prison accused of ‘mercenaryism’ for having received US support, and now it turns out that the Cuban government itself has become a mercenary by its own definition.

  What will happen or not, I dare not predict. I believe that the protests will not be silenced and our voices will continue to be heard. I only hope that the democratic transition will come about through a peaceful process rather than violence.

  Beyond overthrowing the dictatorship, the goal – and the challenge – is to build a democracy. For this we will need the support of civil society organisations such as CIVICUS. After six decades of civic and political anaesthesia, in recent years Cuban civil society has awoken and showed that it has the capacity, the will and the determination to move towards democracy. We have an open window of opportunity and, as the Cuban writer José Lezama Lima would say, we have the power for change.

  ---

  Civic space in Cuba is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Contact Carolina Barrero through herInstagram page and follow@carolinabferrer on Twitter.

  Photo credit: Fernando Fraguela

   

• DRC: ‘Civil society is targeted by politicians who see it as an obstacle to their power’

  CIVICUS speaks with journalist and human rights activist Jonathan Magoma about recent elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

  Jonathan Magoma is Country Programme Director and interim Executive Director of Partnership for Integral Protection (PPI), a civil society organisation that works for peace and the protection of human rights defenders in the DRC and the region.

  How free and fair were recent elections in the DRC?

  The presidential election of 20 December 2023 was held so as to show the world that the government conducted it within the constitutional deadline, but it was marred by fraud and irregularities.

  The electoral process was neither free nor fair. In several districts, rebel groups imposed their choices. In the province of Ituri, in the northeast of the DRC, the Chini ya Tuna armed group forced people to vote for a candidate from their community. The militias even took away two voting machines so they could enter the votes themselves.

  Towards the centre of the country, in Sankuru province, the brother of a Congolese dignitary set up a militia to disrupt the election and commit violence against agents of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), simply because he couldn’t line up as a national deputy candidate when his party failed to reach the required threshold. His armed men quietly took away election kits as observers looked on helplessly.

  Candidates also distributed gifts in polling centres to influence voters in their favour. Some candidates or their representatives were caught distributing money to voters on election day, which is illegal. In some centres some were arrested by the police, while others were not apprehended.

  In the Kabare district of South Kivu, for instance, electoral materials were transported to polling centres in the vehicles of a political party that was a member of the presidium of Sacred Union of the Nation (USN), the coalition backing the candidacy of President Félix Tshisekedi. Observers and voters at the centre cried foul.

  What were the basis of the opposition’s fraud allegations?

  The allegations of fraud made by the opposition are legitimate. They are based on the fact that a number of politicians close to the government kept full electoral kits in their homes in order to vote fraudulently. Voting machines were discovered in private homes containing ballot papers already signed and filled out. As a result, in most polling centres there was a shortage of voting machines, leading people in some districts to revolt.

  On 31 December, CENI published the provisional results of the presidential election, proclaiming Tshisekedi, the incumbent seeking a second term, as the winner. But five days after this, on 5 January, CENI invalidated the votes received by deputy candidates who had run in the national and provincial legislative elections and the municipal vote held on 20 December. Their candidacies were voided following numerous accusations of illegal possession of voting machines, fraud, destruction of electoral material, ballot box stuffing and incitement to commit acts of violence against CENI agents. The excluded candidates include three serving ministers, four provincial governors, six senators and a member of the bureau of the National Assembly. Almost all were USN members.

  At the same time, the electoral commission announced the annulment of the election results in the districts of Masimanimba in Kwilu province and Yakoma in North Ubangi province on the grounds of ‘massive and exaggerated fraud’. Unfortunately, the decision had nothing to say about the highly contested presidential election. But how could such irregularities have occurred at all other voting levels and not at the presidential election that was held on the same day and with the same ballot papers?

  This question gave rise to debate within civil society and, within the political opposition, it prompted several demonstrations to contest this ‘sham’ election and demand its annulment. But it was in vain: on 20 January, Tshisekedi was sworn in by ‘his’ Constitutional Court as president of the DRC.

  How did civil society, and PPI in particular, try to make the election free, fair and peaceful?

  In the run-up to the election, we launched awareness campaigns to promote a peaceful vote. We held advocacy actions with election stakeholders, getting them to adhere to democratic values guaranteeing fair, free, transparent and inclusive elections and to the need to guarantee civic space before, during and after the elections. We also trained civil society groups and journalists in election observation and media coverage.

  We observed the polls and contributed to the resulting civil society report. However, this report was not taken into account by the relevant bodies.

  I personally carried out observation in a village about 35km north of the town of Bukavu, where what are viewed as ‘observers in waistcoats’ are more or less respected and most CENI agents knew me. But for no reason, I was forbidden to spend more than 15 minutes in a polling station. In neighbouring centres, people complained about lack of access to polling stations. Some observers also complained. In my polling station, the voting machine was supposed to start at 6am but was not put into operation until after noon, which made voters angry.

  We continue to monitor the situation closely and assist human rights defenders, journalists and others who have been threatened or prosecuted for playing important roles or exposing irregularities during the elections. PPI is currently supporting two journalists and a civil society activist who are being prosecuted by the prosecutor general’s office in South Kivu province for denouncing electoral fraud perpetrated by a politician close to the government. PPI provides activists under threat with legal and judicial assistance, along with psychosocial support and advice on physical and digital security. Where necessary, medical or financial assistance, or even support for relocation, is offered to activists at risk.

  It must be noted that we are still in an election period, as elections for senators and governors have not yet taken place. Originally scheduled for February, CENI has postponed them and they will now take place in late March and early April. Meanwhile, civil society continues to be targeted by politicians who see it as an obstacle to their power.

  What were the demands of protesters on election day, and how did the government respond?

  On 20 December, some people in Beni and Goma could not stand the wait. When they arrived at polling stations early in the morning, they could not find their names on the lists posted outside. What’s more, some polling stations were not yet open. In some centres, only two polling stations out of 10 were open, or one out of eight. Rumours circulated about some candidates’ illegal possession of voting machines. All this led to spontaneous demonstrations, particularly in Beni, where one centre was vandalised.

  In several districts, voting continued beyond closing time. The government acknowledged ‘logistical difficulties’ but praised CENI for the ‘successful’ organisation of the elections. Obviously, CENI was not up to the task of managing the logistics of the elections. It was then announced that voters would be allowed to cast their ballots the following day, and voting resumed in almost every centre in the DRC. In Bas Uélé province, voting lasted three days, from 20 to 22 December.

  What are your expectations for the post-election period?

  I remain pessimistic because I am convinced that the elections were not transparent, free, credible or independent. What’s more, less than half of potential voters turned out. This is a strong message for a president who has supposedly been elected with more than 73 per cent of the vote among those who are said to have voted.

  In such a context, the legitimacy of the government will inevitably be called into question. Moreover, in December, former CENI president Corneille Nanga initiated a political-military movement allied with the M23 terrorist movement, which is supported by the Rwandan government and waging war in the east of the country.

  In the post-electoral period, serious human rights violations are likely to occur, as was documented during Tshisekedi’s first five-year term, even though he had promised to make respect for human rights and democracy his priority.

  Now that the ruling coalition has claimed an absolute majority in parliament, it is quite possible that it will start changing laws for its benefit, and even constitutional articles that were considered untouchable. This would create chaos and torpedo our hard-won democracy.

  What should be done to strengthen democracy in the DRC?

  At present, civic space in the DRC is repressed to the extent that it is virtually closed. Political rhetoric contradicts developments on the ground. Opponents are prosecuted and imprisoned for their opinions. Protesters are put down in a bloody way. Journalists such as Stanis Bujakera, Blaise Mabala, Philémon Mutula and Rubenga Shasha and many activists are persecuted and imprisoned for doing their job. We are intimidated, sometimes threatened and people are murdered.

  If we are to have any hope of strengthening democracy in the DRC, we will have to hold the government to account for its internal and external commitments. The fourth cycle of the United Nations Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review, due later this year, is a great opportunity for Congolese leaders to renew their commitment to democracy and respect for fundamental rights.

  Global civil society and the human rights community must stand shoulder to shoulder with Congolese activists in the quest for democracy. This can be achieved through joint advocacy and lobbying activities, as well as capacity development and exchanges of experience.

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  Civic space in the DRC is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Contact PPI through itswebsite and follow@PPIREGIONALE and@JonathanMagoma on Twitter.

• DRC: ‘The United Nations’ peacekeeping mission has failed’

  CIVICUS speaks about the ongoing protests against the United Nations (UN) Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), MONUSCO, with social activists Espoir Ngalukiye and Sankara Bin Kartumwa.

  Espoir and Sankara are members of LUCHA (Lutte Pour Le Changement), a civil society organisation (CSO) that advocates for human dignity and social justice in the DRC. It has played a role in peaceful protests against MONUSCO.

  

  What triggered the anti-MONUSCO protests?

  The eastern region of the DRC has faced security issues for over three decades. People are protesting for MONUSCO to leave because its strategy to maintain peace has failed.

  MONUSCO was deployed to restore peace in the DRC by protecting civilians, facilitating safe electoral processes and fighting rebel groups. But it has been in the country for close to 20 years and the opposite has happened: the number of armed groups has risen, people continue to live in unsafe conditions and innocent lives are being lost despite the presence of MONUSCO.

  It was the peacekeeping mission’s job to prevent that happening, but it has not served us diligently and has proven to be useless. Right now, extremely high levels of violence are causing many people to migrate in search of safety. This alone is evidence enough that the peacekeeping mission has failed.

  Many people in local communities do not have a good relationship with MONUSCO because they believe the mission has not taken up its role to protect them. Civilians’ lack of trust, in turn, makes it challenging for MONUSCO to carry out its mandate. But if it was effective, people would not be protesting against it.

  How have the authorities responded to protesters’ demands?

  The immediate response has been violence by both MONUSCO and the Congolese authorities. We have seen people injured and killed just because they were part of the protests. People are angry because security issues have been ongoing for years, and MONUSCO should have seen this coming: it was only a matter of time before people started acting on their anger towards the mission. MONUSCO should have come up with ways to deal with the situation without people having to lose their lives. 

  As for the Congolese authorities, they have arrested people unlawfully. Most people who have been detained are facing terrible conditions in prison and our concern is that they all get justice. We do not want them to be tortured for fighting for their rights.

  The UN Secretary-General has condemned the violence and called for the Congolese government to investigate it. But the demand for MONUSCO’s departure has not been addressed, and protesters say they will not stop demonstrating until MONUSCO leaves.

  Unfortunately, the Congolese authorities have not addressed our concerns either. From our standpoint, they will be the next to be targeted because they have been elected and are paid to protect us. If they cannot live up to their responsibilities, we will hold them accountable. They must join their voice to ours and ask MONUSCO to leave.

  What is civil society in general, and LUCHA in particular, doing to help improve the situation?

  LUCHA is a CSO that advocates for change in a non-violent manner. We have tried to show people it is possible to advocate for change without using violence. Our members have participated in protests against MONUSCO, which we believe are legitimate and constitutional, so we also demand non-violence and respect for the law on the government’s part. Our country has a violent history, and we would like to change that narrative.

  We are an organisation led by young people who have experienced war and conflict and want to see a better society emerge, and a better future for all. We struggle for Congolese people and their right to have access to basic needs, starting with living in a safe environment. We have members on the ground in the areas where the protests are happening, and their role is to monitor the situation and report on the events taking place.

  LUCHA is using our social media accounts to inform people in and outside the DRC about the situation and how it is impacting on so many innocent lives. We hope this will create awareness and push the authorities to address our demands.

  Our monitors on the ground also work to ensure protesters do not employ violence, but this has proven to be a challenge because most people are tired and at this point they are willing to do whatever it takes to get MONUSCO to leave, even if it means using violence.

  What should the international community do to help?

  The international community has been hypocritical and has always prioritised their own needs. It is unfortunate that the recent events are happening in a mineral-rich area of our country. Many powerful people have interests there and are willing to do anything to ensure they are protected. That is why so few countries are speaking up against what is happening.

  Geography also puts us at a disadvantage. Maybe if we were Ukraine our voices would have mattered but we are the DRC, and international players only care about our resources and not our people. But the people who are getting killed in the DRC are human beings who have families and lives and dreams just like the ones being killed in Ukraine.

  The international community must understand that we need peace and security, and that MONUSCO has failed to deliver and needs to leave our country. It must listen to the voice of the people who are sovereign. Listening to the people will be the only way to stop the protests. Trying to stop them any other way will lead to more violence and more deaths.

  Civic space in the DRC is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with LUCHA through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@luchaRDC on Twitter. 

• EGYPT: ‘The president is desperate for international attention ahead of 2024 election’

  CIVICUS speaks with Ahmed Samih about the repression of civic space in Egypt ahead of the COP27 climate summit, which will be held in Egypt in November. 

  Ahmed is an Egyptian civil society activist living in exile and co-founder of the Andalus Institute for Tolerance and Anti-Violence Studies, an Egyptian civil society organisation (CSO) established in 2004 to advocate for tolerance and the elimination of all forms of discrimination in Egypt and the Middle East and North Africa.

  What is the current state of civic freedoms in Egypt?

  Civic freedoms are almost non-existent under the regime led by President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi due to the ideology of the ruling military class, which dates back to the 1952 military coup. Its ideology is based on a view of society as immature and irresponsible, and therefore not capable of sharing social, economic and political responsibilities with the state. In that, the Egyptian state has mimicked the Soviet model since 1953.

  The regime relies on laws as a tool to control society, instead of just regulating it. Other institutions, such as parliament, have a duty to assist the executive in dominating society. This legal doctrine contrasts with the one embraced by countries that believe in the rule of law, where legislation is aimed at developing society rather than dominating it. Legal domination being such a central idea, the state can’t accept the existence of civil society, although many civil society structures predate the existence of the Egyptian state. The military regime that emerged in 1952 took over the assets of charities that were dedicated to serving society, on the basis of the belief that it is the state’s responsibility to provide for poor people, which leaves no room for others. This has also opened the doors to corruption.

  Historically, civic space in Egypt has shrunk or expanded depending on the ability of the political regime to understand the reality of social change. President Hosni Mubarak, in power from 1981 until he was ousted in 2011, clearly understood these dynamics. He grasped the international human rights paradigm and allowed some freedoms at the local level. He didn’t shut down CSOs but instead permitted them to work on his own terms, under surveillance. Quite pragmatically, he understood that their work contributed to the stability he needed to remain in power. In other words, he utilised civil society to stay in power for three decades.

  How do you interpret President El-Sisi’s recent call for a national political dialogue?

  Thecall for anational political dialogue is likely the consequence of the president’s acknowledgement of two key challenges ahead.First, he has realised that the ongoing economic crisis is likely to be followed, possibly soon, by social unrest, eventually leading to political unrest if not contained. Observers have already forecasted social unrest breaking out ahead of the 2022 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP27), which will be held in Sharm El Sheikh in Egypt in November.

  The other key challenge is the 2024 presidential election, where he, as a presidential candidate, will be asked for a real electoral programme with a timeline. He can’t repeat the experience of the2018 presidential election, in which he ran in the absence of any actual competitor. For the upcoming election, a more open political atmosphere will be necessary. However, political competition remains blocked as most political activists are imprisoned or exiled.

  In this context, the aim of the national dialogue is likely to oxygenate the political atmosphere. Towards the world, President El-Sisi has even shifted the official discourse, from denying human rights issues to admitting their applicability in Egypt. But it is important to note that the outcomes of the dialogue will be by no means binding, and El-Sisi will not be accountable to any of the parties involved. The dialogue, and the discursive shift, are just what he views as an optimal solutions to two major problems he will likely face.

  How does the upcoming COP27 summit fit into the regime’s strategy?

  El-Sisi is desperate for international attention and respect ahead of the presidential election but hasn’t so far gained any. Under his presidency, Egypt hasn’t hosted an international event since the 2015 Egypt Economic Development Conference.

  Hosting COP27 is an excellent opportunity for his regime to whitewash its international reputation without opening up its closed civic space. El-Sisi was eager to host COP27 because the climate summit’s outcomes are not binding, so being the host won’t put his government under pressure to adopt the resulting recommendations, and Egypt even stands to benefit from international investment in its renewable energies sector.

  The only potential issue is posed by international environmental activists who will likely protest, which is why the Egyptian government chose Sharm Al Sheik, a geographic locationwhere protests can easily be contained by security forces.

  To what extent is campaigning for the liberation of imprisoned activists such as Alaa Abdel Fattah affecting Egypt’s public relations machine?

  Some high-profile cases, such as that of imprisoned Egyptian-British blogger and activist Alaa Abdel Fattah, can in the short term be damaging to the government’s whitewashing attempts. Alaa has been on hunger strike since April and his family has been quite active in sharing updates on his condition with international media and advocating for his liberation, to the point that he has become a sort of symbol of the plight of persecuted and imprisoned Egyptian human rights defenders.

  But having Alaa as a symbol for the campaign has a downside. While the campaign may lead to his release or an improvement in the conditions of his detention, if he gets released before November the campaign will lose momentum and the Egyptian government will position itself as moderate and reasonable. So in the long run, the campaign won’t make a big dent on Egypt’s public relations machine.

  For it to profit the most off COP27, the Egyptian government needs to bring as many global leaders as possible to Sharm El Sheikh. To prevent this happening, there is a need for a broad connected campaign led by Arab and international advocates to raise awareness about the human rights situation in Egypt. Sadly, I am not aware of any significant coordination efforts between human rights and environmental activists, Egyptian or otherwise, inside Egypt or abroad, in the run-up to COP27.

  Civic space in Egypt is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor. 
  Follow@AhmedSamih on Twitter.

• EGYPT: ‘We are dealing with an extremely elaborate, very creative repressive machinery’

  CIVICUS speaks with Egyptian activist Mona Seif about the international campaign for the release of  her brother, British-Egyptian political prisoner Alaa Abdel Fattah, ahead of the COP27 climate summit  taking place in Egypt in November. Alaa played a leading role in the protests that led to the downfall of  former dictator Hosni Mubarak in 2011, but since President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi came to power in  2014,  he has spent most of the time in prison or police detention. He has been jailed since December  2021 on a five-year sentence for sharing a Facebook post denouncing abuses against imprisoned  activists. Following the 2011 uprisings Mona has been part of the No Military Trials for Civilians Group. Alaa and Mona’s father, Ahmed Seif El-Islam, is also a prominent human rights lawyer.

  What is Alaa’s situation in prison?

  He’s been denied both a British consular visit and his lawyer’s visits. So on 2 April he went on a hunger strike in protest.

  It has been nearly 200 days now. To sustain his strike this long, he has been ingesting around 100 to 150 calories per day. Last time I saw him, before I travelled outside Egypt in June, he had already lost a lot of weight and looked quite frail. When I visited him again more recently it shocked me. I had never seen him so weak, so emaciated. He has become a skeleton with a lucid mind.

   As his demands are still not being addressed, he is considering going back to a full hunger strike, when he relied only on water and salts. That means his health may deteriorate much faster.

  What are his demands?

  Alaa’s demands have evolved since he first went on his hunger strike. In the early days, he requested an independent judge to investigate all the human rights violations he had endured since September 2019, which our family reported.

  Alaa has been systematically deprived of his basic rights as a prisoner, and while in the Tora maximum-security prison he witnessed horrific crimes. He saw officers preventing detainees accessing any kind of medical care and saw inmates dying after calling for help for hours.

  As a British citizen, he demanded access to the British consulate and his lawyers in the UK. He waited for this to happen for four months before he started a hunger strike.

  In a recent family visit, Alaa handed my mother and sister a new list of demands concerning the situation of all prisoners and political prisoners, arguing that there is no room for ‘individual salvation’. He now demands the release of all those detained or imprisoned in national state security detention facilities and headquarters after exceeding the two-year maximum pretrial detention period, as well as all people imprisoned for expressing their ideas, convicted for political reasons, or tried by emergency courts.

  What tactics are the Egyptian regime using to silence dissent?

  We are dealing with an extremely elaborate repressive machinery, which is very creative in coming up with new tactics of repression and shifting them when necessary.

  For instance, between 2013 and 2015 the government mostly dug up old assembly laws and used them to crush protests. Since 2015 there has been a steep rise in enforced disappearances: people are simply kidnapped and disappeared, possibly kept in a military-run detention facility. We continue to lack sufficient information about these sites. Then there was a wave of prosecution of protesters on terrorism charges.

  Since 2019 people have been increasingly detained on state security accusations, with detention being renewed over and over without detainees being referred to the courts for as long as the government sees fit. They are doing what we now call ‘recycling’ detainees: people are kept in detention for some time, then released but soon slapped again with the exact same charges – but as there is now a new case against them, they press the reset button and keep them for yet another period of preventive or pretrial detention.

  How have international allies helped raise human rights issues?

  International civil society is our main lifeline. Most of the media platforms are blocked in Egypt. Many lawyers have been harassed and targeted, and some are in prison. A lot of human rights defenders have been pushed into exile, or are continuously threatened and harassed, or have been thrown in prison. So it is increasingly hard to find someone who will speak up on our behalf.

  The few civil society organisations that are still operating domestically, and definitely international organisations based abroad, are the main channels through which the families of prisoners and other people in Egypt can voice their concerns, call for help, try to gather some attention and put on some pressure to at least try to alleviate some of the abuses.

  Over the past two years, we have increasingly relied not just on international organisations abroad, but also on the Egyptian diaspora. Within their capacity, those who have had to leave Egypt try to bring attention to what is happening in the country.

  But we must bear in mind the regime also harasses Egyptians living abroad, often through retaliation against family members who remain in the country. Egyptian embassies in some countries, such as Germany, are complicit with state security services. They send people to harass activists and report on them, so many are afraid of participating publicly in peaceful protests.

  We have relied on allied civil society organisations for reporting purposes. The number of rights violations and crimes committed on a weekly basis is enormous, and tactics of repression shift so much that it is sometimes hard to keep up.

  I experienced all these changes in tactics first-hand, as a sister of a detainee. But keeping up and documenting everything is overwhelming. Most people doing human rights work in Egypt are burnt out and exhausted. This has been going on for years and everyone has dealt with trauma in one form or another.

  How do you view the Egyptian government’s initiative to release some political prisoners ahead of COP27?

  The Egyptian regime has released only 500 detainees over the past few months. But there are tens of thousands of political prisoners in Egypt.

  The recent releases are part of the regime’s international public relations strategy in response to concerns expressed by the international community about the deteriorating human rights situation. The authorities claim they are opening a new chapter in its relationship with domestic civil society, the opposition and the international community.

  But this is far from the truth. They are not willing to do the bare minimum. Alaa’s case makes clear that the regime is not serious about resolving the situation of political prisoners. Alaa continues to be denied his basic rights both as an Egyptian and a British citizen. I’m worried this may continue up until a point the damage will be irreversible.

  If such a high-profile prisoner is subjected to these kinds of human rights violations, including torture, one can only imagine what is happening to other prisoners without Alaa’s support and visibility. I think the release of a few people is the best we can hope for.

  Needless to say, no one is being held accountable for the torture or ill-treatment of prisoners. Since 2019 the General Prosecutor has not addressed any complaints concerning the situation in prisons. Whenever a particularly serious human rights violation gets some attention, the PR machinery sets in motion to smear the detainees and their families. And for most families, the focus is on stopping ongoing violations that endanger the lives of their loved ones rather than holding perpetrators accountable. In the long run, it will be a problem that we are all so focused on trying to save as many people from this prison system as possible that nobody is paying enough attention to seeking proper justice and accountability.

  Do you think COP27 will provide an opportunity for international solidarity with Egyptian civil society?

  The reality is that most governments don’t care what the ruling regime is doing in Egypt. They are willing to turn a blind eye to El-Sisi’s atrocities because he fits into regional arrangements and is easily brought into mega business deals and arms deals that involve a lot of money. Who cares how big a debt he is accumulating on the shoulders of Egyptian people.

  This makes it much harder for people working on documenting and exposing the regime’s crimes to try to stop them. At the end of the day, business deals sustain the facade of mutual respect between western governments and the Egyptian government.

  The Egyptian government is increasingly aware and taking advantage of the fact that it can get away with so many crimes as long as it keeps satisfying the economic interests of France, Germany, the UK and the USA.

  This is all working very well in the run-up to COP27, which the Egyptian regime is clearly using as a whitewashing PR stunt. In doing this, they are being assisted not just by the Gulf countries, which was to be expected, but by many western governments. Despite the recent talk of the USA withholding some of its military aid, if you look at it, the reality is that El-Sisi is getting all the support he needs.

  All we can do about this is what we are already doing, which is try as much as possible to make enough noise to bring attention to the crimes and rights violations the Egyptian regime does not want the world to know about. This may come at an extremely high price, but it is what it is. This is the reality of living in Egypt in 2022, under El-Sisi’s rule.

  ---

  Civic space in Egypt is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

  Follow @Monasosh and @FreedomForAlaaon Twitter and sign this petition for Alaa’s release.

• EGYPT: ‘Women’s rights are not a priority in the government’s agenda’

  Content warning: this interview contains references to sexual assault, rape and femicide.

  CIVICUS speaks with Azza Soliman about the widespread anger triggered by recent femicides in Egypt, and more generally in the Middle East and North Africa, and civil society’s role in eliminating gender-based violence (GBV).

  Azza is a lawyer, women’s rights advocate and co-founder of the Centre for Egyptian Women Legal Assistance (CEWLA), an Egyptian civil society organisation (CSO) established in 1995 to advocate for gender equality, and specifically for the legal equality of women and amendment of discriminatory laws.

  Why has the recent femicide case had so much impact?

  The news about the murder of Naira Ashraf, a student at Mansoura University, by a man whose marriage proposal she rejected, went viral on social media, bringing massive media coverage in the news – as if it were an unprecedented incident.

  The truth is that our society has a very short memory: it easily forgets the killing of women and girls, so it treats every femicide as if it were the first, rather than as part of a systemic problem. Egyptian media does not even bother to refer to existing data on GBV collected by CSOs.

  Civil society has been researching these issues, so we are not surprised at cases such as Naira’s. In our society, women’s bodies are subject to all kinds of violence due to custom and tradition, and this is reinforced by the lack of legislation on GBV that could act as a deterrent. A United Nations (UN) survey conducted in 2015 concluded that almost eight million Egyptian women were victims of violence committed by their partners or relatives, or by strangers in public spaces.

  Religious discourse degrades women instead of strengthening our role in society. Public discourse not only normalises violence against women but also justifies it by blaming the victim. This was clear in the comments the news of Naira’s murder received on social media, which questioned the very idea of women’s rights and women’s freedom to reject a potential partner.

  In short, femicide is part of growing social phenomenon of GBV that has many faces. In the extreme, it takes the form of murder, but it has many other expressions, including collective sexual harassment, which has also recently become more widespread.

  In the light of this, CSOs have raised their voice against the outdated legal definition of rape in Egyptian legislation, which leaves out many forms of the phenomenon that used to be relatively unfamiliar in our society. The law defines rape as the forced penetration by the male sexual organ and excludes penetration with any other objects, as well as forms of rape that don’t involve penetration.

  Additional forms of GBV, including domestic violence, have been exposed thanks to social media, where women and girls have become more outspoken and have started telling their stories. Now the law needs to catch up.

  How similar is the context in Egypt to that of other Arab countries?

  I think femicides in Arab countries have commonalities that are the result of a shared inherited patriarchal culture. This generates sympathy for the murderer over the victim, whose so-called ‘honour’ is called into question.

  Very recently, a case similar to Naira’s happened in Jordan: Iman Arsheed, a 21-year-old student, was shot on her university campus in Amman. Her family said she had rejected multiple marriage proposals from her suspected murderer. Both killings, in Egypt and Jordan, were followed by a smear campaign against the victims and in defence of the murderers. Both countries lack laws that protect women from violence.

  The latest murders have sparked widespread outrage about femicides and calls for change across the region. For example, young feminist groups proposed a call for a regional strike on 6 July, and our organisation joined forces with other feminist groups in the region. Some held protests, while others issued statements in support of the strike.

  What roles have you and other Egyptian CSOs played in advocating against GBV?

  One of the main reasons behind rising levels of femicide in Egypt is the absence of legislation to protect women from GBV. Of course, the law alone cannot prevent GBV, but it is a crucial tool for social change. That is why our organisation, CEWLA, has collaborated with other feminist organisations to prepare a draft law on GBV. Two female members of parliament have proposed the draft bill on two separate occasions, but the legislation committee of parliament has so far failed to include it on its agenda.

  Civil society has also shed light on the outdated legal definition of rape in Egypt’s Penal Code and continues to call for legal change. As part of the Feminist Arab Alliance, CEWLA also contributed to drafting model GBV legislation for the Arab world. 

  Back in 1999, CEWLA was a pioneer in conducting research on the issue of ‘honour crimes’ in Egypt, which is still a somewhat taboo subject. Our research found that judges usually use Article 17 of Egypt’s Penal Code to commute punishment for the perpetrator of honour crimes, on the basis of the accusation that the victim has violated ‘customs and traditions’. We have long advocated for ending the use of this article, as it is only used this way in GBV cases, and not in others such as drug-trafficking cases.

  This brings us to the vital role of judicial authority in combating the male-dominated culture that threatens the safety of women. In this regard, as recommended by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), we conduct gender-sensitive training of judicial and law enforcement officers and other public officials. We also work to raise social awareness because of its potential to confront regressive thoughts in society. Recently, we have launched a social media campaign, ‘Violence is Culture,’ that aims to generate social discourse condemning GBV. 

  On the ground, we facilitate dialogue between local women and officials in a police station located in Imbaba, one of Giza’s working-class neighbourhoods. Our programme builds trust between the two parties, so women and girls can report any form of GBV, including domestic violence, and the police commits to taking them seriously.

  What should the Egyptian government do to curb femicide?

  Women’s rights are not a priority in the government’s agenda. This is the first obstacle against passing a GBV law. We insist on such law being passed since we live in a modern state where victims and survivors should be able to seek justice through the law.

  Once such a law is passed, we will need to focus on its enforcement, which should be supported by the joint work of the media, the Ministry of Education and the religious institution for Muslims, Al-Azhar. These institutions should adopt a progressive discourse about women’s rights and against GBV. These efforts should be part of the overall concept of the rule of law, where impunity for violence against women is not tolerable.

  The Egyptian government should expand the GBV unit of the Ministry of Interior in Cairo to police stations across the country, especially in rural areas, where local people don’t let CSOs ‘interfere’ in GBV cases. Our lawyers have been attacked in these villages. The state’s support is essential for us to continue our work.

  The Egyptian government is responsible for implementing international recommendations and standards. The latest CEDAW report included a series of recommendations, including to combat GBV, that the government has agreed to pursue.

  What obstacles do Arab feminists face, and what kind of international support do they need?

  Undoubtedly, civic space has shrunk enormously in the Arab region over the past eight years as Arab governments have copied and pasted repressive legislation to restrict the freedom of association. Moreover, Arab feminist groups operate in very hostile cultural environments. On top of that, the pandemic put enormous pressure on us for almost three years.

  More recently, funding for CSOs has also diminished as international donors have reallocated funds towards Ukraine. All this has combined negatively to reduce cooperation among Arab CSOs, in contrast to the proliferation of civil society initiatives across the region following the 2011 uprisings.

  International CSOs must put pressure on their governments so they include articles requiring respect for human rights in their agreements with Arab regimes. They must make sure their governments fulfil their commitment to these articles to support the human rights defenders in Arab countries who are subjected to travel bans, among other violations.

  International organisations should also prioritise mental health support for Arab women human rights defenders who experience burnout. We have gone through a lot. Well-being support is not a luxury: it is essential for us to continue our work.

  Civic space in Egypt is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with CEWLA through itsFacebook page. 

• EL SALVADOR: ‘Legalising abortion is all about recognising women’s status as citizens’

  CIVICUS speaks with Morena Herrera, president of Citizens’ Group for the Decriminalisation of Abortion, about the struggle for abortion rights in El Salvador, which has some of the most restrictive abortion laws in the world.

  Citizens’ Group is a Salvadoran civil society organisation that works to raise public awareness of sexual and reproductive health issues, advocates for the reform of abortion rights legislation and provides legal support to women accused of or convicted for having abortions or related crimes.

  What’s the situation of women who need to have abortions in El Salvador?

  Currently, El Salvador’s laws do not allow abortion under any circumstances, not even in the case of a pregnancy of a nine-year-old girl, a pregnancy entailing risk to the pregnant person’s life, or a case of foetal malformation incompatible with extra-uterine life. Even in ectopic pregnancies, which occur outside the uterus and cannot be carried to term, doctors are usually forced to wait until there is no foetal heartbeat before performing the termination, putting the pregnant woman at serious risk of haemorrhaging.

  This is the reality faced by women seeking to terminate a pregnancy in El Salvador. They face legal restrictions, criminal charges, prosecution and the risk of imprisonment. All they have left is clandestine abortion, which is often unsafe. Women living in poverty face much greater risks. Those with financial resources can leave the country and seek assistance somewhere where abortion is legal, while those with no resources have no options.

  This explains why suicide has become the leading indirect cause of maternal death among adolescents. In the absence of alternatives for terminating a pregnancy, some adolescents with imposed or unwanted pregnancies see suicide as the only way out.

  How are Salvadoran feminist organisations, including Citizens’ Group, working for abortion to be decriminalised?

  Feminist organisations in El Salvador – particularly Citizens’ Group and the Feminist Collective – have worked to open up a conversation about abortion from new perspectives. We approach it as an issue of public health, social justice and reproductive justice, as well as from the angle of democracy, since at the end of the day it is all about recognising women’s status as citizens.

  Citizens’ Group works along three interrelated lines. The first is litigation and the legal defence of women criminalised for abortion or obstetric emergencies. We have denounced this as a violation of human rights and have managed to get 73 women who had been convicted out of prison.

  Our second line of work is advocacy and campaigns for legal change. We have disseminated a narrative in defence of women’s rights and freedom, and we have submitted initiatives to reform the Penal Code, along with an appeal for unconstitutionality and petitions to follow up on a Supreme Court ruling that recognised the need to reform the legislation.

  In this area we have made uneven progress. There has been progress in the field of public opinion, but this has not yet reflected on the legal framework, partly because politics in El Salvador are controlled by a single party, and partly because religious and conservative parts of society have an enormous influence over the state.

  Our third area of work is litigation in international arenas such as the Inter-American and the United Nations human rights systems.

  Who is for and against legal abortion in El Salvador?

  In El Salvador, these two blocs are not homogeneous. The one that actively opposes abortion is not very numerous, but it includes people with a lot of economic power, media influence and the capacity to put pressure on institutions. They are small in number but have a lot of power. For instance, for a recent hearing at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), they hired expensive law firms and went very well prepared. They also have an army of social media trolls who attack and threaten those of us who argue that change is necessary.

  However, on the side of change there are numerous organisations, not only feminist and women’s rights organisations, but also human rights organisations that have gradually come to understand that the absolute criminalisation of abortion is a violation of human rights. These organisations have supported us at IACtHR hearings even though the decriminalisation of abortion is not the main focus of their work. They have done so from a social justice perspective in the face of a reality that is too unfair for women, and particularly for poor women.

  This bloc, in sum, encompasses a broad spectrum of organisations and people committed to human rights but working mostly outside institutions and with far fewer financial resources and access to influential media.

  What significance could an upcoming IACtHR ruling on the Beatriz case have?

  The Beatriz case is an emblematic case in the struggle for the legalisation of abortion in El Salvador. It’s the case of a young woman who was prevented by the Salvadoran state from having an abortion, even though her pregnancy endangered her physical integrity and her life.

  An IACtHR ruling on this case would have enormous significance. Already at the end of 2021, the IACtHR condemned the state of El Salvador in the Manuela case, the case of another young woman who was criminalised after suffering an obstetric emergency and died because she did not receive the required medical attention. This ruling established that the criminalisation of poor women facing obstetric emergencies is inseparable from the context of absolute criminalisation of abortion.

  A ruling in the Beatriz case would highlight other consequences of the absolute prohibition of abortion and could lead to legal reform that prioritises women’s rights.

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  Civic space in El Salvador is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Citizens’ Group for the Decriminalisation of Abortion through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@AbortoPORlaVIDA on Twitter.

• EL SALVADOR: ‘Patriarchal justice persecutes, tortures and abuses women’

  CIVICUS speaks with Sara García Gross about the recent judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) against the Salvadoran state, and the struggle of Salvadoran women for the right to abortion.

  Sara García Gross is advocacy coordinator of the Citizens’ Group for the Decriminalisation of Abortion in El Salvador. Founded in 2009, the organisation promotes public awareness to change abortion laws, provides legal support to women who have been convicted or charged with abortion or related crimes and disseminates information on the importance of women receiving adequate sexual and reproductive healthcare to prevent them resorting to unsafe, life-threatening abortions.

  What is El Salvador’s feminist movement demanding when it comes to sexual and reproductive rights?

  As feminists we are fighting to change the law that criminalises abortion under all circumstances. In El Salvador women are unjustly persecuted. Women’s reproductive rights are violated, especially for younger women and those who live in poverty and in the country’s rural areas. In this sense, we in the feminist movement are fighting to change a restrictive, absolutist and absurd regulatory framework.

  We are also fighting for women’s freedom. There are currently 12 women in prison serving sentences that are extremely unjust. Our fight is for women’s freedom and women’s lives. We want abortion to be legal in El Salvador. We fight for women to have the right to build our own lives. We denounce forced pregnancies; this is a form of torture. There are girls as young as 10 years old who face forced motherhood. There are young women who have not received any sexual education and do not have access to contraceptive methods. We are fighting for the right to comprehensive sex education.

  We also fight for the recognition of the rights of LGBTQI+ people, because hate crimes are another cruel form of torture that the state imposes or condones.

  What tactics does the Citizens’ Group for the Decriminalisation of Abortion use?

  In our struggle for women’s freedom, we have pursued multiple strategies, starting with strategic litigation to obtain everything from commutations of sentences to sentence reviews. Our focus is on achieving freedom, putting into practice the feminist slogan ‘I believe you sister’. We fight for the recognition of the innocence of women facing unjust and absurd sentences.

  But the legal route has not been our only key strategy; social mobilisation at national and regional levels has also played a major role. The feminist movement has organised and spoken out in relation to the cases of criminalised women. Sit-ins have been organised in front of embassies in El Salvador and other countries, letters have been sent to the courts and campaigns for reproductive justice have been carried out, including the ‘We are missing 17’ campaign.

  Another very important strategy has involved the Inter-American human rights system. We brought the case of a woman known as Manuela to the IACtHR, which recently condemned the Salvadoran state for cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. Strategic litigation in the Inter-American system has allowed us to address the problems of persecution, torture and judicial and police abuse faced by women in El Salvador. Justice in El Salvador is patriarchal justice.

  Another strategy has focused on collecting evidence. We have carried out an investigation called ‘From hospital to prison’, which allowed us to make this problem visible. Through a review and analysis of case files, sentences and investigations, we have been able to understand who anti-abortion legislation targets and who it persecutes: young and poor women living in rural areas. This constitutes intersectional discrimination.

  The campaigns, dialogues and debates we promote in academia as well as grassroots communities have also been part of our strategy. Advocacy processes are key, so that when we are able to identify windows of opportunity in the Legislative Assembly or other state institutions, we can promote the submission of new initiatives.

  In the past, several bills were submitted to reform article 133 of the Criminal Code to decriminalise abortion on four grounds. These bills were far from getting passed; in some cases they were quickly shelved and in others they languished for years in legislative committees. Women’s organisations were met with great hostility. However, our advocacy strategies allowed us to place the issue of abortion on the public agenda.

  What does Salvadoran public opinion think about abortion and what work are you doing to present an alternative narrative to criminalisation?

  Among public opinion, there is broad acceptance of abortion when it’s needed to save a pregnant woman’s life: more than half of the population has said so in various surveys.

  We live in a conservative country, with some fundamentalist groups calling themselves ‘pro-life’. The reality is that they are in favour of clandestine abortion, criminalisation and women dying. These groups maintain a double standard that we, as organised feminist civil society, work to expose. While women living in poverty are criminalised, those with economic resources are able to travel and access safe abortions. This double standard is unacceptable.

  For us, it is important to visualise other narratives and make women’s realities known. Reducing stigma requires showing, humanising and talking about life stories. These are women who had hopes and plans for their lives that state violence prevented them from realising.

  Talking about the issue in different places, humanising this reality and questioning this system that imposes the mandate of motherhood – a gender stereotype – allows us to address the issue without stigma or prejudice and, above all, from a human rights perspective.

  What are the implications of the IACtHR ruling in Manuela’s case?

  This ruling came after years of work and struggle. We started working on the case in 2011, providing psychosocial, political and legal support to Manuela’s family.

  Advocacy in the Inter-American system was key. The ruling in Manuela’s case is historic: the IACtHR has recognised that Manuela was innocent, that she really faced an obstetric emergency and that gender stereotypes, starting with the mandate of motherhood, permeated the entire process. The IACtHR has understood that the absolute ban on abortion results in criminalisation and obstacles to access to reproductive rights.

  The judgment will have both national and regional effects. The main regional effect is the establishment of jurisprudence that obliges both El Salvador and the rest of the countries in the region to take a series of measures. First, to guarantee professional secrecy of health personnel so that no woman seeking reproductive health services is denounced for alleged abortion-related crimes. Second, to ensure that gender stereotypes are not applied in the judicial sphere, including those claiming that women must act according to a reproductive role and, therefore, with maternal instinct. Third, to implement adequate protocols to attend to obstetric emergencies with accessible and quality health services.

  The Salvadoran state will have to carry out some additional actions in compliance with the IACtHR ruling. First, while it is in the process of regulating the obligation to maintain medical professional secrecy and the confidentiality of medical records, it must eliminate the practice of medical professionals denouncing women who seek reproductive health services. Second, it must provide full reparations to Manuela’s family. Third, it must make legislative and policy changes to ensure non-repetition, so that no one else goes through a similar experience, for instance by guaranteeing comprehensive care in cases of obstetric emergencies and adapting pre-trial detention so that it is only used in exceptional cases.

  We continue to fight so that women are never again criminalised. There are still 12 women who remain in prison, but we believe that Manuela’s case shines a light on these injustices and gives us the strength to continue fighting. For us, Manuela means justice and hope.

  What kind of support do abortion rights groups in El Salvador need from their peers around the world? 

  We believe feminist solidarity is key. We want to make this issue visible in the region and the world. We want people to talk about what is happening here. We want people to talk about the consequences of the absolute prohibition of abortion. We want people to talk about how this punitive system does not solve anything.

  It is not acceptable for the exercise of a reproductive right – a right to health – to be treated as a crime entailing prison sentences. We need to shine the spotlight on El Salvador and make the Salvadoran state feel it is being watched. Every chance we get, we must demand freedom for women, freedom for the 12 who are still in prison and reparations for all the women who have faced this kind of criminalisation. We must demand that abortion be legally recognised as a right.

  Civic space in El Salvador is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Citizens’ Group for the Decriminalisation of Abortion in El Salvador through itswebsite orFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@AbortoPORlaVIDA on Twitter. 

• EL SALVADOR: ‘The election is only a formality to give the green light to a dictatorship’

  CIVICUS speaks about El Salvador’s general election with Carolina Amaya, a Salvadoran freelance journalist specialising in climate crises and socio-environmental conflicts.

  What’s at stake in this election?

  Eighty years after the end of the Maximiliano Martínez dictatorship, El Salvador is approaching a new dictatorship. On 4 February, once President Nayib Bukele is unconstitutionally re-elected, Salvadorans will lose guarantees for our basic human rights.

  Bukele's first administration was characterised by widespread human rights violations: excessive militarisation, a prolonged state of emergency, stigmatisation and criminalisation of poverty as synonymous with involvement in gangs, attacks on independent press, land dispossession, environmental destruction, persecution of environmental defenders – the list goes on. This reality is disguised by propaganda disseminated by media and content creators aligned with the government. Their narrative is that gangs will be back on the streets if Bukele or his party, Nuevas Ideas, lose power.

  Bukele is seeking re-election after ignoring the Salvadoran constitution, which does not allow it. Therefore, his new administration will be unconstitutional, as will all the decisions he makes. It is to be feared that all the rights enshrined in that same constitution will be violated. And we will no longer know how long Bukele and his circle will remain in power.

  In short, what is at stake in the election is our dying democracy. Salvadoran citizens will get to have their say at the ballot box now, but it is uncertain whether they will be able to do so freely again in the future.

  What are the chances of this election being truly free and fair?

  The election will be free, but completely irregular given that the front-runner’s candidacy is unconstitutional. The process has been flawed from the moment the Supreme Electoral Tribunal allowed the registration of Bukele’s candidacy, despite him being ineligible for re-election.

  As for fairness, there are other parties running on different platforms, but competition is unequal. The ruling party has made use of official funds for its electoral campaign, while the rest had to use their own funds to compete against a lavishly funded apparatus with a strong presence on both social and traditional media. This annihilates any alternative, so the election is only a formality to give the green light to a dictatorship.

  The democracy that was born in 1992 has been eroded over the years. Every political party that has held power has been embroiled in corruption scandals. Corruption, the arrogance of elites, the inefficiency of the state and the lack of transparency have resulted in widespread distrust. Impoverished communities have become strongholds of Bukelism because they depend on government welfare to satisfy immediate needs; it is clear to them that they cannot expect long-term solutions.

  The government has campaigned intensely by handing out food boxes and cutting the ribbon on construction projects, all of which is prohibited by the Electoral Code. But there is no authority that can put a stop to these illegal acts because the entire state structure is co-opted by Bukelism, including the judiciary and watchdog bodies.

  What has the climate of opinion been ahead of the election?

  Social media such as YouTube and TikTok are dominated by disinformation and the manipulation of information, while a campaign of fear has taken hold on television. This is nothing new in El Salvador: political parties have long campaigned on the fear that El Salvador could become another Cuba or Venezuela. Now the threat is focused on insecurity and the preservation of life.

  It is very concerning that this messaging has permeated Salvadoran society to the point of not only normalising Bukele's unconstitutional candidacy but also giving him the certainty of a comfortable win.

  What’s the position of civil society, the political opposition and public opinion regarding the government's security policy?

  Bukele’s government has been authoritarian throughout all these years and in many ways, not just in the area of security. During the pandemic it locked up thousands of people who did not comply with isolation directions. When the quarantine was over, it established the state of emergency that continues to allow it to spy on us, persecute us and lock us up. Bukele has militarised the streets, and this has intensified in January 2024, on the eve of the election. The military has been patrolling every neighbourhood of San Salvador, the capital, to demonstrate its presence and power.

  The public is grateful that the gangs lost much of their grip over the country. That is the main achievement of the Bukele administration. The problem is that most people are unaware of the reality of Bukele’s negotiations with gangs, so they think that he managed to clear the streets of gang members just by subjecting them to his state of emergency.

  The media’s handling of images of imprisoned gang members has been very effective, to the point that it has had international repercussions. In several Latin American countries experiencing the scourge of organised crime, people are calling for an authoritarian figure just like Bukele to put an end to it. Even the president of Honduras, ideologically far removed from Bukele, has opted for militarisation and the use of repression to deal with gangs.

  How has civic space been restricted under Bukele?

  As a journalist, I can attest to the fact that many people shy away from the cameras because they dare not make public statements. Sources that spoke to me for years have increasingly stopped responding to my calls, starting from 2019, when Bukele came to power. The situation has worsened as this administration has progressed. Freedom of expression is increasingly limited, as is freedom of assembly. For example, when marches are called in the capital, police blockades are set up to hold back buses coming from the interior.

  Harassment of dissenting voices is also apparent on social media. Day after day, journalists and human rights defenders are denigrated by armies of trolls. I am among the 10 female journalists most attacked on Twitter. Attacks against us women are often misogynistic in nature.

  Some organisations, such as Acción Ciudadana, the Association of Journalists of El Salvador and Cristosal, continue to denounce the lack of a free environment for the expression of opinions, but their complaints have had little effect. Freedom of expression has continued to erode. And a country without freedom of expression, where human rights are violated and human rights defenders are persecuted, is nothing short of a dictatorship.

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  Civic space in El Salvador is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Follow@sharkgirl_sv on Twitter.

• EUROPE: ‘Governments are adopting measures that are beneficial for the climate but forget to include people’

  

  CIVICUS speaks with Karin Van Boxtel, Co Interim Director of Both ENDS, about the farmers’ protests happening across Europe.

  Both ENDS is a civil society organisation (CSO) based in the Netherlands that works jointly with environmental groups in African, Asian and Latin American countries towards a sustainable, fair and inclusive world. It seeks to strengthen civil society globally so it can gain critical influence over decisions and activities that affect people’s rights and the environment.

  Why are farmers protesting in several European countries?

  First of all, it is essential to recognise the diversity within the farmers’ community, because they are not a homogeneous group. Some are frontrunners and champions of sustainability and others aspire to be but face systemic obstacles, including lack of access to funding and land, challenges posed by the trade system and competition from imports. And then there’s a smaller group of farmers who simply resist change, but their influence is huge. We should focus on supporting the first two groups – helping frontrunners maintain their status and facilitating the transition for those aspiring to be frontrunners.

  The reality for these farmers across Europe is similar to farmers globally: current policies do not adequately support them. Both ENDS works with pioneering civil society and farmer organisations that connect with other farmers to join their efforts on, for instance, agroecology and food forests. Policy efforts globally have historically centred on the third group of farmers, instead of the first two. This started to shift in recent years, but caused discontent and insecurity among farmers most resistant to change, as well as among companies invested in the current system.

  The existing system fails to reward the right behaviours and doesn’t offer any long-term security through a combination of misdirected finances and improper trade rules. In the EU these trade rules lead to competition from cheap imports coming from countries with lower production and labour standards. In African, Asian and Latin American countries, environmental damage is done with the production of fodder inputs or food for export to the EU. One example is the production of soy, which leads to deforestation and land rights violations in Brazil. This system has led to a rise in production costs in the EU while prices have remained stagnant or fallen, and environmental impacts elsewhere are not integrated in the prices.

  Farmers’ protests are therefore revealing a systemic problem. Farmers are battling a system that doesn’t provide the right incentives and doesn’t reward those who are pioneers in sustainability. They also feel they aren’t receiving the recognition they deserve.

  How are climate policies impacting on farmers?

  Farmers are being negatively affected because governments are adopting measures that are beneficial for the climate but forget to include people. A climate transition is not enough – what’s needed is a just climate transition. This means a just energy transition and, equally importantly, a just food transition.

  Achieving a just food transition requires an analysis of the food system on a global scale, because this is a system that operates globally. Take for instance the implementation of deforestation regulations, a key measure to combat climate change. In principle this is a commendable measure – however, it poses challenges for many farmers, particularly small-scale farmers in countries in Asia or Latin America. In these regions, only larger farmers can meet the requirements of deforestation laws, which reveals that this measure, while part of much-needed climate action, lacks justice.

  This is the core of the issue. When formulating trade policy or negotiating trade agreements, states tend to overlook the perspectives of the farmers who are not necessarily at the forefront of sustainable practices but aspire to be. This applies not only to the Netherlands and other European countries but also to Brazil or Indonesia, among many countries in the global south.

  When designing climate measures, it is crucial to listen to and consider the needs of frontrunner and aspiring frontrunner farmers. This is different from prioritising the interests of agricultural giants, such as companies producing animal feed or those engaged in trading agricultural products.

  How is the far right politicising these tensions, and with what results?

  The far right is exploiting farmers’ perceptions of current climate measures as unjust. It is capitalising on the gaps in solutions identified by civil society, transition thinkers and frontrunner farmers all over the world.

  We realise many climate measures are having unfair effects. The challenge lies in ensuring that money financing the climate transition reaches farmers, particularly frontrunners, rather than the same companies that have so greatly contributed to the problems those measures are trying to address.

  A key element of the far right’s appeal is that they offer false hope to those who are reluctant to transition and reject any change. They offer simplistic solutions that don’t address the issue at its root, and are therefore not real solutions.

  What’s civil society’s position?

  Regarding the protests, civil society’s standpoint has been that peaceful protests should be allowed. The context is of growing criminalisation, particularly in countries where the far right is in the government. This is not unique to Europe but is a global concern. In some countries governments tend to tolerate agricultural protests more due to the economic significance of agriculture and its impact on food security, but overall, civic freedoms are increasingly under threat, with protesters –particularly climate protesters – facing detention or restrictions.

  As for the substance of the issue, civil society believes that a real solution requires a power shift, a systemic change in the trade and financial systems. This idea unites farmers’ organisations currently protesting in Europe and worldwide. Notably, despite apparent differences in viewpoints, in the Netherlands Extinction Rebellion supported farmers’ protests. This is because they also recognise the need for a structural power shift.

  It's worth noting the ongoing collaboration between CSOs and partner organisations, both locally and globally. Last year in the Netherlands, civil society joined forces with CSOs globally, Dutch farmer organisations, academics and private sector to address the Dutch agricultural agreement under negotiation. It raised concerns about its impact on farmers and communities in the global south and called for an agreement that both benefits Dutch farmers and considers the perspectives of farmers globally. The manifesto highlighted the need to change the trade system, fostering the regionalisation of food systems, prioritising farmers over companies and ensuring funds reach frontrunners. This collaborative effort is a strategy to bring about systemic change.

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  Civic space in the Netherlands is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Both ENDS through itswebsite or Facebook page, and follow it onTwitter andInstagram.