activism

  • PHILIPPINES: ‘We fear the democracy those before us fought so hard for will be erased’

    CIVICUS speaks about the recent presidential election in the Philippines with Marinel Ubaldo, a young climate activist, co-founder of the Youth Leaders for Environmental Action Federation and Advocacy Officer for Ecological Justice and Youth Engagement of Living Laudato Si’ Philippines (LLS).

    Founded by Catholic lay people, LLS began in 2018 as an interfaith movement calling on Filipino financial institutions to divest from coal-related operations and other environmentally harmful activities. It aims to empower people to adopt lifestyles and attitudes that match the urgent need to care for the planet. It promotes sustainable development and seeks to tackle the climate crisis through collective action.

    Marinel Ubaldo

    From your perspective, what was at stake in the 9 May presidential election?

    The 2022 election fell within the crucial window for climate justice. As stated in the latest report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, we need to keep global warming below 1.5 degrees Celsius or we will suffer terrible consequences, such as a rise in sea levels that will submerge much of the currently populated land, including the Philippines. Upcoming leaders will serve for the next six years –and possibly beyond. They have the immense responsibility of putting a climate change mitigation system in place for our country and urging more countries to do the same.

    As shown by Super Typhoon Rai that hit the Philippines in December 2021, climate change affects all of us. Whole communities lost their loved ones and their homes. Young people will reap the fruits, or pay the consequences, for whatever our incoming leaders do in response to this crisis. This is why climate anxiety is so prevalent among young people.

    How did young people mobilise around this election?

    Young people campaigned house to house. We also went to grassroots communities to educate voters on how to vote wisely. Alongside other organisations that form the Green Thumb Coalition, our organisation produced a Green Scorecard and we used our social media platforms to promote the ‘green’ candidate.

    One of the biggest youth initiatives around the elections was ‘LOVE, 52’, a campaign aimed at empowering young people and helping them engage with candidates and make their voices heard in demand of a green, just, and loveable future through better governance. We wanted to shift the focus from candidates’ personality and patronage politics to a debate on fundamental issues, and to help young people move traditional powerholders towards a people-centred style of policymaking.

    We called this initiative ‘LOVE, 52’ in reference to the fact that young people – people under 40 – comprise 52 per cent of the Philippines’ voting population. We sought to appeal to younger voters’ emotions, and our central theme was love because a frequent response to the question ‘why vote?’ is to protect what we love: our families, our country, and our environment. The main element of this campaign was a ‘love letter’ drafted by several youth organisations and addressed to the country. It contained young people’s calls to incoming leaders, including those of prioritising environmental and social issues, coming up with a coherent plan to address the climate crisis, and supporting a vibrant democracy that will enable climate and environmental justice. We gathered all the love letters people wrote, put them in one envelope, and delivered them physically to the presidential candidates’ headquarters.

    What are the implications of the election results for civil society and civic freedoms?

    The results of these elections will have a lot of implications for the Filipino people. They will have a direct impact on civil society and our freedoms of association, expression and peaceful assembly.

    The winning candidate, senator Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos Jr., the son and namesake of a former dictator, has said that he will include his family in his administration. Just today, I saw the new president’s spokesperson on the news saying Marcos will make his own appointments, bringing in the people he trusts. I think he will really try to control the government with people who follow him unconditionally. He will put such people in all the positions available, so everyone will tell him what he wants to hear and no one will disagree with him. I think this is the scariest part of it all.

    I fear in a few months or years we will be living under a dictatorship. Marcos may even be able to stay in power for as long as he wants. After trying to reach power for so long, he has finally won, and he won’t let go of power easily.

    It’s very scary because the human rights violations that happened during his father’s dictatorship are not even settled yet. More human rights violations are likely to happen. It’s a fact that the Filipino people won’t be allowed to raise their voices; if they do so, they may risk being killed. This is what happened under martial law during Ferdinand Marcos’s dictatorship.

    This will definitely affect civil society. It will be very difficult for humanitarian workers to respond to any crisis since Marcos will likely aspire to micro-manage everything. We fear the democracy those before us fought so hard for will be erased.

    Regarding the specifics of policymaking, we don’t really know what the plan is. Marcos campaigned on vague promises of national unity and implied that all problems would be solved if people unite behind his leadership. Needless to say, he never mentioned any policy to tackle climate change and the environmental crisis.

    Against all signals, I keep hoping the new administration will be receptive to people’s demands. I really hope our new president listens to the cries of the people. Our leaders must reach out to communities and listen to our issues. I doubt Bongbong Marcos is capable of doing that, but one can only hope.

    What support does Filipino civil society need from international civil society and the international community?

    We need to ensure the international community sends out a consistent message and stands by our side when oppression starts. We also need them to be ready to rescue Filipinos if their safety is at risk. We activists fear for our lives. We have doubts about how receptive and accepting the new administration will be toward civil society. 

    Today is a gloomy day in the Philippines. We did our best to campaign for truth, facts, and hope for the Philippines. Vice President Leni Robredo campaigned for public sector transparency and vowed to lead a government that cares for the people and bolsters the medical system. If she had won the elections, she would have been the third woman to lead the Philippines after Cory Aquino and Macapagal Arroyo.

    Leni’s loss is the loss of the Philippines, not just hers. There are still too many people in the Philippines who believe Marcos’s lies. I don’t blame the masses for believing his lies; they are victims of decades of disinformation. Our system sadly enables disinformation. This is something that needs to be urgently tackled, but the next administration will likely benefit from it so it will hardly do what’s needed.

    We now fear every day for our lives and for the future of our country.

    Civic space inthe Philippinesis rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
    Get in touch with Living Laudato Si’ Philippines through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@LaudatoSiPH on Twitter and@laudatosiph on Instagram

  • POLAND: ‘right-wing backlash is just one side of the coin, the other being the active mobilisation of rights-oriented civil society’

    Krzysztof SmiszekCIVICUS speaks with Krzysztof Śmiszek, a member of the Polish Parliament and chair of the Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBTI Rights, the first of its kind in Poland, about the situation of LGBTQI+ rights and activist responses to the anti-rights backlash.

    Before entering politics in 2019, Krzysztof had been an activist for almost 20 years. He is also a member of Justice and Human Rights Committee, the European Union Committee and the Polish delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of theCouncil of Europe.

    What is the situation of LGBTQI+ rights in Poland?

    The situation for the LGBTQI+ community is really hard and complicated. In the last six years there wasn’t any progress at the legislative level so there are plenty of issues that remain unsolved, such as same-sex marriage, special legal procedures for the recognition of trans people’s identities and the prosecution of homophobic speech and hate crimes. 

    In 2015 the reins of Poland were taken over by a right-wing government and, in my opinion, the government is now using racism, xenophobia and homophobia to divide society. Since 2015 we have witnessed a rise in homophobic and transphobic speech as well as intolerant actions aimed at the LGBTQI+ community. The current government is not going to pass any legislation to make the lives of LGBTQI+ people easier.

    I believe that the LGBTQI+ community has become a scapegoat: it is them that the government blames for any problem. A few years ago, it was refugees who played this part, and now they are also being targeted once again. The government also used to blame women’s rights organisations for everything, and now the LGBTQI+ community is being accused of the worse. 

    These are very hard times for the LGBTQI+ community in Poland, because whenever you tune in public TV, read the newspaper, or navigate government websites, you see it being used as a scapegoat. We are witnessing more and more hate crimes and incidents around Poland. Last year we had presidential election and the current president campaigned on an extremely ideological homophobic platform, and he won, which means that politicians and the government now believe that homophobic and transphobic discourse brings popularity. 

    Are there any reasons for optimism in such a bleak context?

    There surely are, because right-wing backlash is just one side of the coin, the other being the active mobilisation of rights-oriented civil society. After six years of witnessing hate speech, people who normally would not have been interested in LGBTQI+ issues have started to care. Civil society is much more progressive and open than the politicians in power. As an activist I see a huge energy that goes beyond the big cities in Poland: there are formal and informal initiatives springing up everywhere.

    Although we are going through hard times, the strong civil society reaction against the government’s intolerance and homophobic discourse and agenda makes me feel optimistic. This year we had around 20 Pride events throughout the country. There is positive mobilisation within society, compared to the situation 20 years ago, when I first became an activist.

    So the situation is more complex than you would think: while Poland does have its homophobic side, with organisations fuelled with a lot of money coming from the right wing, there is also a big movement supporting LGBTQI+ organisations and activists with money, time, energy and solidarity.

    LGBTQI+ activism is using a wide range of tactics, from perfectly designed social media awareness campaigns including short movies about the normal lives of rainbow families to building connections with potential allies, even unlikely ones. A while ago an organisation working against homophobia allied with progressive Catholics, which was really smart because Poland is still regarded as a majority Catholic country. It was very wise to involve someone considered as ‘the enemy’ in the movement. There are also ongoing collaborations with politicians. 

    All the while the government spreads hate, younger generations, people between 18 and 29 years old, are increasingly normalising LGBTQI+ rights and actively and fully supporting the LGBTQI+ agenda. Of course, this does not mean that all young people are gay-friendly: as everyone else, they are divided between openness to European values and the intolerance of the radical right wing.

    What is the Intergroup on LGBTI Rights, what are its goals and priorities, and what work does it do?

    The Intergroup on LGBTI Rights includes members of different parties represented in Parliament who meet and discuss about LGBTQI+ issues. When I organise the group meetings, I perceive the interest of civil society: they want to participate and have contact with politicians. As an activist and now a politician, I view this as the wisest way to ensure progress on our agenda because having activists put pressure on politicians is something that actually works.

    One of our priorities is making Parliament a safe place for the LGBTQI+ community. We believe that Parliament belongs to voters, and as LGBTQI+ people are voters, they have the full right to be present in Parliament and have contact with politicians.

    The main challenge the Intergroup faces is to listen to the worries of the LGBTQI+ community and translate them into legislative proposals. And whenever there is a practical problem with the administration or related to action by public authorities, we are informed by representatives of the LGBTQI+ community and try to shed light on the issue with the help of the media. Politicians and parliamentarians have the power to bring media attention to specific issues.

    As for our tactics, we organise press conferences and invite government representatives, we collaborate with the European Union and the European Parliament, where there’s also an LGBTQI+ group, we keep in touch with international partners and we try to make international audiences aware of what is going on in Poland. For example, when facing proposals to declare ‘LGBT-free zones’ throughout Poland, we brought it to the attention of the European Council and showed it proof that the Polish authorities were discriminating against the LGBTQI+ community. This is something that as politicians we are able to do.

    Is that why you decided to enter politics? Having had experience as both an activist and a legislator, do you think you have been able to tackle the same problem from different angles?

    As an activist I was the one knocking on politicians’ doors and it was their choice to be open to my arguments or not. After doing this for 20 years I thought ‘enough is enough’ and decided that I should now be the one opening doors for LGBTQI+ activists. That was my motivation to get into Parliament, along with the fact that I just did not agree with what was going on in Poland in terms of respect for fundamental human rights, under attack by right-wing politicians.

    I belong to The Left, a centre-left political coalition that was founded to compete in the 2019 parliamentary election. Many of my friends who were also elected to Parliament are now recruiting people from civil society. As a result, now there are feminists who used to work at feminist civil society organisations, people who were involved in ecological movements and people like me, coming from the LGBTQI+ movement, who are playing a role in political institutions. All of us are tired of being just activists, and are now translating our experiences into the language of Parliament.

    Civic space in Poland is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
    Follow@K_Smiszek onTwitter. 

  • QATAR: ‘Labour reforms need to continue after the World Cup is over’

    Vani SaraswathiCIVICUS speaks aboutthe World Cup in Qatar with Vani Saraswathi, editor-at-large and director of projects at Migrant-Rights.org andthe author ofStories of Origin: The Invisible Lives of Migrants in the Gulf.

    Migrant-Rights.org is aGulf-basedcivil society organisation that works to advance the rights of migrant workers in Gulf countries. It documents migrant narratives and promotes local discussion and campaigns to bring changes in policies, practices and attitudes towards migrant workers.

    What human rights violations have you documented in construction works for the 2022 Qatar World Cup?

    The economy of Qatar is heavily dependent on migrant workers, who make up over 93 per cent of the labour market. The construction sector iseven moreheavily dependent on migrant labour, and due to the nature of the work exploitation and rights violations are much more visible than in other sectors. This also happens in the hospitality sector, domestic work and fishing and agriculture, but tends to be more hidden.

    Since 2000, Qatars population has grown very fast, from 700,000 people in 1999 to 1.7 million in 2010 to close to three million now. The infrastructure and the services needed to host such a large population have not kept pace: people were being recruited quickly, but support systems were not built fast enough.

    Rights violations have shifted over the years from poor accommodation to crowded accommodation to rampant wage theft. As the scale of construction operations grew, corporations resorted to subcontracting, with worker recruitment, safety and welfare left in the hands of subcontractors and no effective legal mechanism for oversight, which enabled corruption.

    Unfortunately, the narrative on corruption around worker recruitment focuses on origin countries because for one of the richest countries in the world it is easier to blame poorer countries than take responsibility for the problem. The fact that many of the kickbacks are filling the pockets of procurement officers and businesspeople in destination countries is overlooked.

    This is the environment in which abuse takes place. Workers are entering the country already in debt and often do not receive the salary they were promised.

    Certain steps have been taken to fix this issue. The Qatar Visa Centre, for instance, takes care of the last mile of recruitment so workers sign their contract and undergo medical testing before they come. Fees are also being paid in Qatar. But the bulk of the exploitation happens on the job, when people are not paid what they were promised, or they are made to work overtime with no extra pay. This is not being properly addressed.

    Migrant workersmain concern is to be able to send money home, and as long as they get theirmoney they are often willing to tolerate many abuses: social isolation, cultural exclusion, terrible living conditions and lack of access to justice. These issues are ongoing.

    On other issues, such as workplace safety and heat stress, Qatar has been working on upping standards. There is still a lot to be done, but in the context of the Gulf, summer midday work bans and heat stress regulations are a big step forward. But it is not sufficient.

    A pending issue is health deterioration. Most construction workers are recruited when they are in their early 20s and usually undergo stringent medical tests to ensure they are in best health. But their health deteriorates quickly post-arrival. Due to the inhospitable and unhygienic living and working conditions, they often develop various comorbidities including high blood glucose levels and hypertension. There are also several cases of unexplained deaths of previously healthy, young men, but their deaths are attributed to natural causes or cardiac arrests, and Qatar has failed to investigate the real causes. In contrast to those who have accidents, whose injuries are assessed and who may get a disability allowance or insurance, those developing severe health conditions receive no compensation. Instead, they suffer the consequences when their productivity diminishes, and the burden is passed on totheir familiesand origin countries.

    Do you think recent labour reforms will have a positive effect?

    One of the main reforms has been the removal of the requirement for foreign workers to apply for an exit permit to leave Qatar. The other Gulf countries, except for Saudi Arabia, had already done the same, allowing for some freedom of movement.

    Another important change has been the removal of the requirement of a no objection certificate. This means that all workers, including domestic workers, are allowed to change jobs at any point in their labour contract. This measure triggered a lot ofpushback.

    A new online system was set up that allowed people to search and apply for jobs. It initially went well, but employers started pushing back when they saw the prospects of an exodus and feared losing control of their workers. The Shura Council, the legislative body, also weighed in, following which Qatar introduced a new requirement: to go through the online process to change jobs, workers must submit a resignation letter stamped by their employer. This became a de facto no objection certificate. There are strong power dynamics at play. For instance, there have been cases of workers getting approval to change jobs after not having been paid for months, changing jobs and then having their authorisation withdrawn and made to go back.

    A non-discriminatory minimum wage has also been introduced. Although pretty low, it is still a minimum wage. The basic monthly salary amounts to approximately US$275, or around US$500 if thecompany does notprovide accommodation and food. It is not much in a country with a per capita GDP of above US$60,000, and hence applies only to low-income migrants from Asia and Africa.

    Additionally, across Gulf countries there is a system in place for all workers to be paid electronically. Its aimed at preventing non-payment but has repeatedly failed to do so. The system should spot non-payment cases early on, rectify them and hold the employer accountable, but it does not. Non-payment cases typically arise when workers who havent been paid for several months file a complaint. Setting aside the problem of domestic workers, a persistent problem of non-payment results from smaller companies at the bottom of the supply chain being unable to pay if they are not paid on time by their client.

    The government of Qatar also set up a work insurance fund to protect workers when employers fail to pay them. When a workers complaint is resolved by either a court or the dispute settlements committee, a mechanism that handles workerscomplaints, the fund must pay. There are certain criteria to qualify and there is a cap on how much a worker can receive that is lower than what most of them are owed. Itdoesn’tmatch the scale of abuse that happens, but its still something.

    Finally, management-worker joint committees have been allowed within companies. This was presented as either a step towards allowing unionisation, or a substitute for it. But the power dynamics are so skewed there is very little scope for collective bargaining, and they do not remotely resemble unions, even if the joint committees have elected representatives.

    What role has civil society played in raising awareness of these and other rights violations?

    A transnational advocacy network comprising mostly trade unions and international human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch was activated following Qatars designation as host of the 2022 World Cup.

    The World Cup was a good entry point as it forced Qatar to allow for investigations. The network obtained access and produced reports. A lot of international journalists came in. This is something we must recognise, because other countries that held big events, such as theDubai Expo or the Formula One race in Bahrain,didn’t allow this kind of scrutiny.

    But Qatar hasnt always managed the attention well and sometimes got too defensive or complained that its efforts to open up and allow criticism were underappreciated. But while the government engaged with foreign or international trade unions speakingon behalf of Asian and African workers, it never allowed criticism to be voiced internally and never allowed those workers to organise. The same goes for civil society.

    At the local level there are charitable institutions but there is not a rights-oriented civil society. The closest there is to this are organisations such as Migrant-Rights.org, working regionally. To nurture civilsociety, space would need to exist to speak about womens rights, LGBTQI+ rights, citizenship rights and many other issues people are grappling with but cannot currently express. But the government knows this is a Pandoras box. The most it will do is selectively open up some space for issues that are less threatening, such as the situation of migrants, as long as local activism around it remains suppressed.

    The situation is different from what happens in Bahrain and Kuwait, where despite harsh oppression,there are still independent voices rising and fighting back. People are being jailed or forced into exile but there is still a civil society vibrancy thatdoesn’t exist in the open in Qatar. It is probably present behind closed doors and in smaller spaces. People are talking about these issues, but they are not speaking aloud. Qatar,however, recently held its first elections for the Shura Council, so things may be about to change.

    Has there been any accountability for violations of workersrights?

    The problem in Qatar is that laws have been enforced and reforms have been implemented only in response to criticism. This time around, it was in response to the attention brought by international organisations under the spotlight of the World Cup. The problem with this kind of response is that it tends to stay on paper because it is not the result of dialogue with the key stakeholders, namely employers and workers, and an understanding of the system on the ground.

    Enforcement is difficult because local employers are pushing back: they feel that workersrights come at a cost that is being paid from their pockets. The government has made no attempt to talk to stakeholders on the ground, and it wont be able to implement any reform without them. Qatar is a tiny country. Were talkingabout a handful of extremely powerful families who are in business, in the security apparatus, in the Shura Council, everywhere. Some of their companies have a proven record of poor practices, including using short-term visas and not giving end-of-service payments, and they continue to be awarded new contracts over and over. They are not held to account.

    What needs to be done so the rights of migrant workers in Qatar are not forgotten when the World Cup ends?

    The World Cup is just one event and a starting point for limitless business ambitions. If you look at industry reports, it is clear that large-scale infrastructure projects are going to continue. I only hope that those who shone the spotlight on Qatardidn’t do it because of the sport, but because they really care about migrant workers. Because if that is the case, they should continue promoting reforms and monitoring their effective implementation after the World Cup is over.

    Qatar needs to ensure workers get their wages and fair compensation and that nobody leaves the country in distress.Otherwise rights violations will continue to happen, and its not right. I hope the government at least realises that even when the World Cup is over, itdoesn’t need that kind of bad publicity.


    Civic space in Qatar is ratedrepressed’by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch withMigrant-Rights.orgthrough itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@MigrantRights and@vanish_forever on Twitter.

  • SIERRA LEONE: ‘We advocate for a civic space where people can protest with no risks’

    Andrew LavaliCIVICUS speaks about recent protests in Sierra Leone with Andrew Lavali, Executive Director of the Institute for Governance Reform, a civil society organisation (CSO) that advocates for good governance in Sierra Leone.

    What triggered the recent protests in Sierra Leone?

    Sierra Leone has many underlying issues that have greatly contributed to the recent protests. First, political polarisation has grown tremendously since the change of power in 2018. Fights over limited public sector jobs have made politics a zero-sum game.

    For the past 15 years we have seen this happen as groups in power try to appease their support bases by employing people from a certain region, who then risk losing their jobs when the government changes. To an extent, preaching hate and stoking polarisation have become a political strategy used by parties to either stay in power or propel themselves to leadership.

    It appears the opposition party has not fully embraced the result of the 2018 election and it may have fuelled the protests, judging by the fact that these broke out only in areas where the opposition have a strong presence and not throughout the country. The fact that protests are focused in certain places makes one to think that they are not just about socio-economic issues but there are also underlying political issues.

    At the same time, there are genuine concerns about economic hardship. COVID-19 restrictions and the Russian-Ukraine war have resulted in rising prices of essential commodities, especially for people living in urban areas. Socio-economic issues such as high youth unemployment and poor access to essential services are real problems. Protesters are demanding the president’s resignation due to the economic hardship they are experiencing.

    How have the authorities responded?

    During the protests both civilians and police officers were attacked, and some were killed, revealing an ongoing tension between citizens and the police. Evidence shows that the protests were in no way peaceful. They were leaderless and faceless. Some Sierra Leoneans living abroad used social media to call for protest. According to the police, they only heard about the protest on social media. They did not receive any official request from an identifiable person for police clearance.

    As soon as the violence erupted and the situation became unsafe for those not protesting, the government imposed a curfew. There were also internet restrictions imposed because protesters were coordinating their actions via social media platforms. Security presence on the streets has increased since then. These measures helped to scale down the violence and improve safety and security.

    The government also responded by making arrests. A leading youth activist in an opposition area was killed during a police raid. The response raised concerns about how police are trained to handle protests. The police have not sat down with interest groups to see how future protests can be organised. There are legitimate fears that given Sierra Leone’s recent history of violence, high youth unemployment and economic hardship, protests can easily get out of control and become very difficult to handle.

    Do you think the response will deter people from protesting?

    People will certainly be timid for a while, but I don’t think the police response will stop them mobilising in the long run. There are too many issues citizens want the government to address and if it fails to do so, protests will inevitably keep breaking out. Regardless of protests being instrumentalised for political purposes, there is a general situation of hardship that needs to be addressed. As civil society we will continue to monitor the situation and try to bring citizen voices into policy conversations.

    Protest restriction has a long history in Sierra Leone. For the past 15 years police have failed to grant permission to protest. This strained relationship with the police has culminated in a case against the police being brought to the Supreme Court by civil society. Civil society is currently documenting the events that are taking place and will then get together to discuss the situation and try to find a way to advocate for more open civic space in which people can protest without risking their lives.

    What assistance is needed from the international community?

    We need the international community to help us promote democracy, the rule of law and effective governance. International allies should support open platforms for dialogue between the police and various interest groups on the rights and responsibilities of protesters and the role of the police in securing their rights. The international community could help CSOs create awareness and provide training so that the security forces will protect the rights of citizens to exercise their right to protest safely.

    Civic space in Sierra Leone is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor. 
    Get in touch with the Institute for Government Reform through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@GovernanceFor on Twitter.

  • SIERRA LEONE: ‘We are dealing with a relentless campaign by anti-rights groups’

    Nicky Spencer CokerCIVICUS speaks about the struggle for sexual and reproductive health rights in Sierra Leone with Nicky Spencer-Coker, head of advocacy and movement building of Purposeful Sierra Leone.

    Purposeful is a feminist hub for girls’ activism, rooted in Africa and working all around the world. The organisation has played an active role in promoting the Safe Motherhood and Reproductive Health Bill in Sierra Leone.

    What is the Safe Motherhood and Reproductive Health Bill?

    The Safe Motherhood and Reproductive Health Bill is currently being drafted following the president’s announcement that his government unanimously backs an initiative to promote risk-free motherhood, made during the 10th Africa Conference on Sexual Health and Rights held in Freetown, Sierra Leone, in early July. But the message that came out on the media was that Sierra Leone had legalised abortion, which was actually not the case.

    Following its announcement, the government has hired national and international consultants to take part in the process. Further, a working group that includes activists, practitioners and government officials is working alongside the Ministry of Health.

    The expectation is that the bill will have reached parliament by the time the new parliament opens in October. Sierra Leone will have elections next year and we do not want this to carry over into the election period because we could face problems with members of parliament wanting to protect their seats by not engaging with an initiative that could be viewed as controversial, as it should include access to sexual and reproductive health services. We hope the bill will be submitted to parliament by October and it will pass this year.

    In 2015 parliament passed the Safe Abortion Act, which was supposed to allow women and girls access to safe abortions. But the former president blocked the bill, possibly due to both lack of political will and pressure from anti-rights and religious groups.

    It is worrying that the same issues that led the former president to not sign the Safe Abortion Act continue to be raised by certain segments of society in the context of the Safe Motherhood and Reproductive Health Bill. We hope this time around it will be different because our president has signalled that he and his cabinet are willing to challenge abortion stigma in the context of health services for girls and women.

    In addition, our government has signed international instruments such as the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, which requires states to provide people with access to adequate and affordable health services. This puts pressure on the government to respect and promote the right of women to health, including sexual and reproductive health. We remain hopeful that these commitments will be fulfilled.

    How has civil society in general, and your organisation in particular, advocated for abortion rights?

    Women’s rights groups and activists for sexual and reproductive health rights have been fighting for the abolition of colonial-era abortion laws for years, with the movement growing stronger in 2014 and 2015 when the Safe Abortion Act was being advanced. Most of these organisations and activists collaborate under the umbrella of the People’s Alliance for Reproductive Health Advocacy, a coalition that advocates for sexual and reproductive rights through engagement, dialogue and partnership with key stakeholders.

    As well as being part of the coalition, Purposeful also operates as an independent organisation that carries out our own advocacy work in communities. We are an African-led feminist hub for girls’ activism, and we want to make sure Sierra Leonean girls inherit a world where they can live safely and have choices. High on our agenda are sexual and reproductive rights, but we work on a wide platform including the provision of comprehensive sexual education, accurate information on reproductive health choices and life skills.

    A strategy that has proven particularly successful for the Coalition has been to engage directly with various groups of stakeholders. We have tried to stay in constant dialogue with organisations and people who vehemently oppose women’s sexual and reproductive rights. Telling human stories that show how women and young girls are affected by the lack of access to reproductive health services has helped bring awareness of the severity of the issues we face.

    Over the years, the Coalition has been fortunate to work with medical professionals and the Ministry of Health to shift the narrative on the safe termination of pregnancy and safe motherhood in Sierra Leone, a country with a very high rate of teenage pregnancy and maternal mortality. A significant number of these deaths are caused by lack of access to safe abortion and reproductive health choices.

    Have you faced anti-rights backlash?

    In 2015, when the Safe Abortion Act was being discussed, there were several confrontations between anti-rights groups and civil society activists, and I was nearly assaulted when attending a parliamentary session. For the drafting of the current bill we are not seeing the same level of aggression, but we are dealing with a relentless campaign by some anti-rights and religious groups that are going on radio and television to denounce a bill that does not even yet exist.

    We don’t find the backlash surprising and we know that the position of certain groups won’t ever change. But it’s the government’s responsibility to look to the greater good and ensure the health and wellbeing of women and girls.

    Besides, we have seen a positive response from the public. I think this is the result of civil society’s focus on sharing information and creating awareness. We also appreciate international attention, as it will provide incentives for the government to stay true to its words.

    What are the next steps, and what kind of international support would Sierra Leonean civil society need?

    There is a joint drive by the Ministries of Education and Health to ensure the success of the initiative that is pushing the government to provide comprehensive sexual education in schools. Our country has extremely high rates of teenage pregnancy, which we hope to reduce through education. While legalising abortion is important, many other issues regarding accessible and affordable health services for women and girls must also be addressed, and healthcare professionals must be adequately trained to provide those services.

    We need international civil society to keep these issues on the agenda. In Africa we have noticed that when you stop insisting on something, governments automatically think the issue is off the table and there’s no need for them to do anything about it. It’s our job to continue to remind our government that it has signed certain instruments that make it imperative for it to recognise the reproductive rights of women and girls. We also need to have a cross-border conversation with other African countries that have more progressive reproductive health rights legislation.

    Civic space in Sierra Leone is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
    Get in touch with Purposeful through itswebsite orFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@Purposeful_org on Twitter.

  • SINGAPORE: ‘The entrenched system instils fear, making progress for civil society slow and difficult’

    Kirsten HanCIVICUS speaks about Singapore’s recent leadership change with Kirsten Han, an independent writer, journalist and member of the Transformative Justice Collective (TJC).

    The TJC is a group that works to demystify and challenge Singapore’s criminal punishment system, including by calling for the abolition of the death penalty.

    Who is new prime minister Lawrence Wong and what are the implications of his recent appointment?

    Lawrence Wong is a long-time civil servant who served as the principal private secretary to former prime minister Lee Hsien Loong before entering politics. He’s seen as a stable and reliable leader rather than a maverick. His political approach has so far emphasised continuity and stability, and there’s been little indication that significant changes in human rights and civil liberties will occur under his leadership. This suggests the status quo will largely be maintained, which isn’t positive for civil society.

    We expect a general election to be held relatively soon, but the exact timing is uncertain and will be determined by Wong. There’s speculation the election could take place around September or, failing that, before the end of the year, but no date has been set. This will be the first election with the fourth generation of the People’s Action Party (PAP) officially at the helm.

    The PAP has been in power since 1959 and has undergone three generational changes so far. While there may not be the same level of enthusiasm or reverence for this new generation of leaders, dramatic shifts in the political landscape are unlikely. Any change is expected to be gradual, with the PAP possibly losing more of its vote share, but I don’t expect major upheavals.

    There’s currently little information on Lawrence Wong’s policy agenda. He’s not yet laid out anything very specific about his administration’s priorities across domestic and foreign policy. Every new prime minister in Singapore has promised a more open Singapore, but this hasn’t materialised, particularly not in greater respect for fundamental rights like freedom of expression or assembly. While Wong’s leadership style may differ from his predecessor’s, what really matters is the substance. And I haven’t seen much to be hopeful about for civil society on this front.

    What are people’s expectations?

    There’s considerable public concern about the cost of living and housing. Property and rental prices have risen significantly, making housing a major issue Wong will have to address.

    Among politically engaged young Singaporeans, there’s increasing discussion about Singapore’s role and relationship with Israel, an issue the government is reluctant to address publicly. The government has imposed strict controls on public organising and activism on the Israel–Palestine issue, including blanket bans on public activities and restrictions on the use of Speaker’s Corner, a traditional space for public discourse. Several activists have been put under police investigation for activities in solidarity with Palestine.

    Young Singaporeans are also concerned about racism and racial justice, and would like to see greater openness to differing political views. There’s growing pressure for change and an increasing desire for political plurality, in general and in parliament.

    The government has so far been able to manage a lot of this pressure, including by investigating activists and maintaining tight controls. The entrenched system, with its many levers of power and control, continues to instil fear among people, making progress for civil society groups gradual and challenging. Nevertheless, momentum for change is slowly building.

    What’s Wong’s position on thedeath penalty?

    As far as I know, Wong has not publicly stated his position on the death penalty. This issue remains primarily the responsibility of the Minister for Home Affairs and Law, who retained his position in Wong’s cabinet reshuffle. I don’t expect the government’s stance on the death penalty to change any time soon. If Wong has a different opinion from what the minister has expressed, we’ve not seen any evidence of it. Personally, even if a difference did exist, I’m not convinced Wong’s position would prevail over the status quo.

    Progress has been extremely difficult for the abolitionist movement. It has become increasingly hard for death row prisoners to find legal representation for post-appeal applications. Many represent themselves, and even then, they are often accused of abusing the legal process. In May, the Minister for Home Affairs and Law said in parliament that they’re looking into how to tackle what they say are cases of abuses of legal process, suggesting it will become even more difficult for death row prisoners to file applications.

    This could have repercussions for activists who support them. In the same speech, the minister publicly highlighted my involvement in helping the mother of a death row prisoner file an application. He read out my email address in parliament, accusing me of helping abuse the court.

    In addition, the government is aggressively promoting its pro-death penalty narrative. It has declared an annual Drug Victims Remembrance Day and launched extensive campaigns to highlight the harm caused by drugs to argue that a war on drugs is needed. This narrative basically frames death penalty abolitionists as endangering or betraying Singapore by undermining its war on drugs. The implication is that activists are opposing the country’s efforts to protect people from the dangers of drugs.

    While this response from the government suggests our campaigning has had some impact, it also indicates a strong resistance to change. At present, there’s no sign the government is moving away from the death penalty; in fact, it’s doubling down on its position. The campaign for abolition remains an uphill battle.

    Do you expect the situation of civil society to change under Wong?

    Civil society in Singapore is under considerable pressure. Over the past decade, conditions have tightened and people continue to be investigated for exercising their right to freedom of assembly. As far as we can see, this trend is likely to continue. While there can always be hope that Wong will prove us wrong once he settles into his role, right now there’s no indication anything is going to improve.

    We continue to hear about people being called in for police investigations. Recently, a migrant worker who’d been the victim of harassment, Uddin MD Sharif, was unjustly repatriated. After police closed their investigation without finding the harasser, Sharif was forced to return to Bangladesh because he no longer had a work permit and was no longer needed for the investigation. He appealed to Wong, who Sharif said promised to convey the appeal to the immigration authorities, but nothing changed and Sharif was still sent back.

    This suggests that either Wong has little influence over discretionary policy or he did not prioritise a case that was so clearly unjust. This doesn’t inspire confidence Wong will be more progressive or active in defending human rights and workers’ rights, so I don’t expect civil society to have an easier time under his leadership.

    Civic space in Singapore is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with the TJC through itswebsite,Facebook orInstagram page, and follow@kixes and@tjc_singapore on Twitter.

  • SLOVAKIA: ‘We hope the government’s attempts to stifle activism will ultimately fail’

    RastoKuželCIVICUS discusses democracy, civic space and media freedoms in Slovakia with Rasto Kužel, Executive Director of MEMO 98, a leading media monitoring organisation with 25 years of experience. MEMO 98’s mission is to provide people with fair and comprehensive information on public affairs, empowering them to engage in their communities and hold authorities accountable.

    The Slovak government recently proposed major changes to public television and radio, sparking condemnation from civil society, journalists’ organisations, the political opposition, international media organisations and regional institutions. Media freedoms have been in the spotlight since the 2018 murder of journalist Jan Kuciak, which led to the resignation of pro-Russian populist Prime Minister Robert Fico and the election of a short-lived anti-corruption government. However, Fico and his Smer partyreturned to power in 2023, and an ally of the prime minister was elected president in April 2024. In a polarised political environment, Fico was the target of an assassination attempt on 15 May.

    How is the government proposing to change the media system and why is this controversial?

    The new government proposes significant changes to the public television and radio system. These changes include restructuring the management of the public broadcaster RTVS, which currently generally enjoys editorial independence.

    Initial criticism, particularly from the European Union and Slovak journalists and civil society, led to some revisions of the draft law, which, if passed, would mean the end of RTVS. However, the aim remains the same – to designate a government-friendly director and increase government control over the public broadcaster. This would effectively turn public television and radio into state-controlled entities.

    While never fully free from political pressure, RTVS has performed its public service duties generally well, in line with the existing legislation. The media regulator didn’t find its news and current affairs programmes breached impartiality or objectivity rules. There’s no need to replace the current management. This is just a politically motivated move to replace RTVS’s independent director with someone loyal to the government.

    This pattern of media capture mirrors developments in neighbouring countries such as Hungary and Poland, where it’s been used to control state institutions and democratic processes. Critics argue that proposed changes in Slovakia are part of a wider strategy to undermine democratic institutions, including an independent judiciary, free media and civil society.

    What other concerns have been raised by civil society and the opposition?

    Since this government took office, democratic institutions and the rule of law have been seriously threatened. The government is actively trying to obstruct legal proceedings against its members, including Fico and his defence minister, who are accused of involvement in criminal activities. Legal and parliamentary manoeuvres have been used to block corruption charges. The General Prosecutor has invoked special provisions in the Penal Code to stop legal charges against people close to the ruling coalition, and parliament failed to strip Fico of his immunity when he was a regular member of the previous parliament. This sparked widespread protests, particularly against the dismantling of the special prosecutor’s office investigating corruption.

    This year, the focus has shifted to concerns about civic space and media freedom. The government is pushing through a law requiring organisations that receive over €5,000 (approx. US$5,400) in foreign funding to disclose their sources. This is reminiscent of tactics used by authoritarian regimes such as Russia to stifle dissent.

    Public and private broadcasters involved in critical reporting have been targeted. A big protest is being planned at a major private TV station, where it has emerged that the owners are pressuring the station to tone down its coverage critical of the government. This channel, known for its critical and objective journalism, faces threats against its ability to fulfil this role.

    The government’s pro-Russian stance is particularly worrying given Slovakia’s proximity to the conflict in Ukraine. This shift towards Russia has already damaged Slovakia’s standing in the European Union (EU) and NATO, particularly after Fico revealed sensitive information to please pro-Russian groups at home. There’s wider concern that Slovakia’s security will be compromised if Russia isn’t stopped in Ukraine. Despite strong public support for the EU and NATO, the government is undermining efforts to support Ukraine and uphold democratic values. Its vague talk of peace suggests a reluctance to provide military support and puts Slovakia’s credibility and security at risk.

    How have foreign policy disputes exacerbated political polarisation, and with what consequences?

    Slovakia’s 2024 presidential election exacerbated existing divisions, driven by tactics to mobilise voters through fear and disinformation. The ruling parties targeted the opposition candidate, an independent and former foreign minister known for his strong pro-European and pro-Atlantic stance, by falsely portraying him as pro-war. They claimed that a vote for him would drag Slovakia into the Ukraine conflict, suggesting that Slovak people would be drafted and sent to war. This narrative was misleading and manipulative.

    The campaign was marked by negativity and fuelled polarisation, a strategy that has become a hallmark of the current government. Smear campaigns targeted not only political opponents but also the media. Fico has frequently used derogatory language, referring to his opponents as ‘pigs’ and ‘prostitutes’, further inflaming tensions.

    This toxic political environment culminated in a shocking event: an assassination attempt on Fico. The government had adopted a tactic of holding meetings with supporters outside the capital. During one of these meetings, in the small town of Handlová, a 71-year-old pensioner with controversial affiliations opened fire on Fico, hitting him four times. This violent incident underlines the dangerous consequences of embracing such a divisive and aggressive rhetoric.

    What was the public reaction to the assassination attempt, and what are its implications?

    The assassination attempt was a deplorable event and was condemned by many sectors of Slovak society. MEMO 98 and many other civil society groups immediately condemned the violence, describing it as an attack on democracy. Despite our political disagreements with Fico’s pro-Russian policies, we strongly believe violence has no place in a democracy. The government was democratically elected and its authority should not be undermined by such violent attacks. We called for a moment of reflection and urged society and politicians not to exploit this incident for political gain.

    But this wasn’t an isolated incident. It followed a series of tragic, violent events, including the murder of journalist Jan Kuciak and his fiancée in 2018 and the murder of two LGBTQI+ people. These crimes shocked the nation and highlighted the dangerous levels of polarisation and hatred that political rhetoric has fuelled.

    The attempt on Fico’s life has already led to heightened tensions and a blame game between political factions. Members of the ruling coalition have accused the opposition and media of creating a climate of hatred despite their own history of using inflammatory, derogatory and divisive language.

    It’s also contributing to the further deterioration of democratic institutions. We are already seeing increased attacks on independent media and civil society. The government is using the incident to justify further crackdowns on dissent. Journalists are being accused of escalating tensions simply for asking probing and critical questions.

    There’s urgent need for a return to civil discourse and a renewed commitment to democratic principles. It’s vital for society to promote healing and rebuild trust in our democratic institutions.

    What is civil society doing to protect democracy, and how can the international community support its efforts?

    Civil society working to protect democracy is astonished at the speed with which the government has been dismantling institutions and targeting its critics. While we saw this coming, we were still surprised by these attempts to dismantle democratic institutions and have been forced to hold the line and engage in activism. But we are committed to upholding the rule of law and maintaining democratic institutions, and we hope the government’s attempts to stifle activism will ultimately fail.

    The international community’s support and attention will be crucial. Current illiberal, populist and authoritarian trends transcend borders and require a global response. The challenges posed by the growing influence of social media and the decline of independent media require collective action. There’s a great need for solidarity and effective sharing and coordination, particularly at the regional level. International allies can support our efforts by raising awareness, providing platforms for our voices and fostering a network of solidarity and shared strategies.

    Civic space in Slovakia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with MEMO 98 through itswebsite orInstagram page, and follow@memo98slovakia and@rastokuzel on Twitter.

  • SUDAN: ‘The only way out of this mess is through civilian rule’

    11.pngCIVICUS speaks about thewar in Sudan and its repercussions for women and civil society with Reem Abbas, a Sudanese feminist activist, writer and fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP).

    Founded in 2013, TIMEP is a civil society organisation that works to centre advocates and experts from and in the Middle East and North Africa in policy discourse to foster more fair and democratic societies.

    What’s the current humanitarian situation in Sudan?

    Active conflict persists in around 60 per cent of Sudan’s territory. The continuous fighting entails targeting of civilians and mass displacement. In some states, much of the civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, markets, schools and universities, has been damaged. In Khartoum and West Darfur states, about 70 per cent of hospitals have been damaged or partially destroyed.

    Civilians and civil society activists are unsafe. The situation greatly restricts people’s freedom of movement, their ability to sustain a livelihood and their capacity to express their opinions freely. There are pockets of relative security in Eastern and Northern Sudan, but even in areas deemed secure displacement persists and schools remain closed because internally displaced people are living in them and other public buildings.

    Many livelihoods have totally collapsed, leaving people increasingly dependent on aid. We are already witnessing cases of famine, particularly affecting children, resulting in deaths.

    How has the conflict impacted on women and girls?

    Women have always been targeted in conflicts in Sudan. Political violence, rife in Sudan given its volatile political history, has also often taken aim at women. There’s rarely any accountability for sexual and gender-based violence. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – the militias that are fighting against the army – are abducting women and selling them as sexual slaves in markets or holding them captive for extended periods. Families are left in distress, unsure of the whereabouts of their daughters, and are sometimes embezzled for money.

    This is a war on women. Part of it stems from structural factors that place women in subordinate positions, but there’s also a punitive element directed at women for their pivotal role in the 2019 revolution that overthrew dictator Omar al-Bashir. During the revolution, women were out there, highly visible on the frontlines, and now it feels like they’re being punished for it.

    The targeting of women is tearing the social fabric apart. As public spaces become unsafe for women, fewer women are participating in public life, including in economic activities and activism. This will have long-term consequences.

    What roles is civil society playing in this context, and what challenges does it face?

    It’s important to recognise that civil society in Sudan isn’t a monolithic entity, but rather a complex mix of different layers. Some were heavily involved during the transitional period that followed the revolution, getting deeply integrated with government structures at the time. Then there are women’s groups, each with their own focus and agenda. Alongside them, there are more formal organisations such as non-governmental organisations and trade unions. And let’s not overlook the revolutionary elements, such as the resistance committees and emergency responserooms, decentralised and horizontal structures working to shelter displaced people, support hospitals and secure food and water supplies.

    The more formal parts of civil society are currently heavily involved in politics, while its revolutionary segments are deeply engaged in grassroots humanitarian efforts. They’re essentially functioning as local governments in areas where official governance structures are absent.

    Despite its crucial role, civil society faces numerous challenges. The organic growth of grassroots movements is stunted by conflict and dictatorship. The polarising effects of war have led to divisions along political, ethnic and regional lines, further fragmenting civil society. Activists are increasingly targeted by the RSF or the army, threatening their ability to operate.

    In an environment where conformity to mainstream opinions is increasingly enforced, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain dissenting voices. This situation underscores the urgent need to safeguard the diversity and autonomy of civil society in Sudan.

    However, attention and funding often gravitate towards already well-funded organisations, leaving grassroots initiatives to rely solely on community support. While funding alone doesn’t create a functional organisation, it’s important for organisations and groups to grow in an organic way and be able to garner support from the community.

    How is civil society advocating for peace and democracy?

    Right now, the conversation is all about security and getting things back to normal. People are doubting whether we can even think about democracy after all this chaos. The situation’s tough, with militarisation and conflict everywhere. But the only way out of this mess is through civilian rule. We need to figure out how to link the peace process to a long-term political solution that puts us back on track for democracy.

    Unfortunately, the focus of the political elite appears to be more on preserving its positions rather than addressing urgent issues. There are concerns that the largest political coalition has developed close ties with the militia, causing unease among those involved in the revolution. Without a bigger political group that really listens to people and leads responsibly, we’re going to be stuck with military rule for ages. Right now, it should be all about finding common ground and putting the focus on the people who’ve suffered most from this war – not about politicians trying to claw back power or siding with the military.

    There’s a lot of talk about how the transitional government messed up and led to the coup and the war. People are sceptical about civilian rule and whether it can fix things. It’s easier to sell the idea of a military-run government when people are feeling scared and vulnerable. Even though it’s militarisation that got us into this mess in the first place, it’s understandable because people just want to feel safe again.

    What should the international community do to address Sudan’s dire security and humanitarian situation?

    It’s time for the international community to stop sticking to one side of the story and start listening to everyone involved. They’re pumping all their funds into one camp and ignoring a whole bunch of other perspectives. We need more humanitarian aid, particularly considering the famine situation. Millions of people are at risk, with nowhere to turn and nothing to support themselves with.

    Investment in basic infrastructure like hospitals and water plants is crucial too. People need services, and they need them now. Some areas haven’t had clean water for months because water plants are getting caught in the crossfire.

    The international community must also demonstrate political determination. People’s lives are on the line. We need clear plans and urgent action to stop this war.

    I want to emphasise the significance of civil society solidarity. This is crucial when our governments show ambivalence towards our concerns. In such situations, we must become each other’s voices and amplify our collective message. We must seek ways to connect, demonstrate solidarity and collaborate effectively.

    It’s important to learn from one another and work together towards shared objectives. Collaboration with civil society groups and networks across the world is greatly appreciated. It’s through such partnerships that we can make a meaningful impact and bring about positive change.


    Civic space in Sudan is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with TIMEP through itswebsite or itsFacebook andLinkedIn pages, and follow@TimepDC and@ReemWrites on Twitter.

  • SWITZERLAND: ‘It was about time for everybody to have the same rights, with no discrimination’

    RetoWyssCIVICUS speaks with Reto Wyss,International Affairs Officer of Pink Cross, about the recentreferendum on same-sex marriage in Switzerland and the challenges ahead.

    Pink Cross is Switzerland’s national umbrella organisation of gay and bisexual men, and for 28 years it has advocated for their rights in the country’s four language regions. It stands against discrimination, prejudice and violence based on sexual orientation, gender identity and HIV status, and strives for acceptance and equal rights for all queer people on both a national and international level. It conducts its work through an active media presence, advocacy, campaigning and efforts to strengthen the LGBTQI+ community.

    What was the process leading to the legalisation of same-sex marriage in Switzerland, and what roles did Pink Cross play?

    The same-sex marriage bill was submitted to parliament in 2013 and it went back and forth several times between the two legislative chambers until it was finally passed in December 2020. Pink Cross did intensive and quite traditional advocacy, lobbying and public campaigning all along the process.

    We talked a lot with politicians of the conservative-liberal Free Democratic Party of Switzerland as well as the Christian Democratic People’s Party of Switzerland. We ordered a legal opinion that clearly stated that, contrary to what opponents of the law said, there was no need to change the Swiss Constitution to open marriage to all people. If that had been the case, the legalisation of same-sex marriage would have required a positive popular vote in the majority of the Swiss cantons, which would have made things a lot more complicated.

    To enshrine same-sex marriage, all that was needed was a law like the one parliament had passed, amending the Civil Code to extend marriage to all couples beyond those of a man and a woman.

    No referendum was necessary: the one held on 26 September was an optional referendum launched by opponents of the law, who intended to show that parliament’s decision was not welcome by the Swiss people and overturn it. To have this referendum called, they campaigned actively to gather the 50,000 signatures required. LGBTQI+ organisations would have been largely pleased with letting the decision made by parliament stand, rather than asking everybody whether they agreed with granting us the same rights as everyone else.

    The civil society campaign was officially launched on 27 June, with events in 23 towns and villages across Switzerland. Over the following 100 days, the queer community mobilised around the country with dozens of actions to demand the right to equality. The campaign was supported by several LGBTQI+ organisations, including Pink Cross, the Swiss Organisation of Lesbians-LOS, Network-Gay Leadership, WyberNet-Gay Professional Women, Rainbow Families and Fédération Romande des Associations LGBTIQ+.

    We wanted to gain as much visibility as possible, so we campaigned with thousands of rainbow flags hanging out of balconies throughout the country and posted many great videos online. This was a very broad grassroots campaign with many activists taking part in it, both online and in person. Our main message was that the same rights must be recognised for everybody, with no discrimination, and that in Switzerland it was about time.

    Who campaigned for and against same-sex marriage in the run-up to the vote? How did groups opposed to same-sex marriage mobilise?

    Leftist and liberal parties and organisations campaigned in favour of the law, while the right-wing populist Swiss People’s Party – although not all of its elected representatives – campaigned against it, along with a whole bunch of conservative and clerical organisations, including the rather small Evangelical People’s Party. The Catholic Church was against the law, although not all of its representatives or institutions had the same position. The Protestant Church backed the law, although not unanimously.

    Mobilisation against the law took place mainly in the countryside and – obviously – online. Their arguments were mostly about the alleged well-being of children, and focused on the fact that the law allowed same-sex married couples access to adoption and conception through sperm donation.

    What will be the immediate effects of the new law?

    On 26 September, by 64 per cent of the vote, the Swiss people expressed their agreement with the law granting equal marriage for all. The law will come into force on 1 July 2022 and will have very important and immediate practical effects, because the legal status of marriage has several important differences from the registered partnership (RP) regime already available to same-sex couples.

    The recognition of marriage to all couples will eliminate the inequalities in legal treatment that still exist regarding facilitated naturalisation, joint adoption, joint property, access to medically assisted reproduction and legal recognition of parent-child relationships in cases of medically assisted reproduction.

    If they want to be recognised as legally married, same-sex couples currently in RPs will have to apply for the conversion of their RP into legal marriage at the registry office by means of a so-called ‘simplified declaration’, which won’t carry excessive costs, although the exact procedure is yet to be determined and may vary from one canton to the next.

    Those who were married abroad but whose marriage was recognised in Switzerland as an RP will have their RP automatically and retroactively converted into marriage. 

    What other challenges do LGBTQI+ people in Switzerland face, and what else needs to change to advance LGBTQI+ rights?

    A lot remains to be done in terms of preventing, registering and convicting hate crimes adequately. Pink Cross is currently advancing this issue in all cantons, because this is within their jurisdiction. Likewise, we are preparing a first ‘precedent’ to get a ruling on the ‘anti-LGBT agitation’ paragraph that was introduced into criminal law last year.

    Finally, institutional anchorage of LGBTQI+ advocacy definitely still needs to be strengthened on a national level, specifically within the federal administration, either through a specific commission or by extending the mandate of the Federal Office for Gender Equality. So we are also working to move ahead on this.

    Civic space in Switzerland is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
    Get in touch with Pink Cross through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@pinkcross_ch on Twitter. 

  • SWITZERLAND: ‘The victory of marriage equality will boost our efforts towards the next steps’

    JessicaZuberCIVICUS speaks with Jessica Zuber, co-leader of Operation Libero’s marriage for all campaign, about the recentreferendum on same-sex marriage in Switzerland. Operation Libero is a non-partisan civil society movement founded to campaign against populist initiatives. Its work focuses on preserving and developing liberal democracy, fostering strong relations between Switzerland and Europe, promoting a liberal citizenship law, supporting a democracy-strengthening digital transformation and encouraging more transparent, accountable and inclusive politics.

    What role did Operation Libero play in the process leading to the recent legalisation of same-sex marriage?

    Since its foundation, Operation Libero has fought for equal legal treatment. We accompanied the parliamentary process and lobbied so that the law was passed, which happened in December 2020, after almost seven years. A couple of days before the opponents of the law handed in their referendum request, we pushed our ongoing petition, which went viral and received over 60,000 online signatures within a single weekend. To us, that was a very strong signal on the state of public opinion.

    We launched our campaign six weeks before the vote. It focused on the motto ‘same love, same rights’. Our campaign complemented that of the ‘official’ committee led by the LGBTQI+ community, showing real same-sex couples on their posters. To set ourselves apart and appeal to a more conservative target, we showed same-sex couples alongside heterosexual couples.

    For the launch of our campaign, we staged a marriage and the pictures of this ceremony provided the visuals for media coverage during the campaign. Some of our main concepts were that fundamental rights must apply to all people, and that no one loses when love wins. It was a feel-good campaign, as we intentionally refrained from being too controversial – for instance, by highlighting that homophobia is still a phenomenon very present in Swiss society.

    During the campaign, around 150,000 of our flyers were handed out, 13,000 coasters ordered and 10,000 stickers distributed. Our main financial income to pay for this was the sale of our special socks, of which we sold almost 10,000 pairs. We organised boot camps to prepare voters for debates and launched a poster campaign in train stations and public buses. The joint flyer distribution event with members of the right-wing populist party – who, against the official party line, supported marriage for all – attracted media attention and succeeded in showing how broad support for the law was.

    Last but not least, a week before the vote we held an event where 400 people lined up on either side to applaud newlywed couples – same-sex and different-sex – as they ran through. This was a very inspiring event, the biggest of its kind in Switzerland.

    We are very happy that we won the referendum with 64 per cent of voters supporting the law. September 26th marks a big step for Switzerland: after far too long a wait, access to marriage finally applies to all couples, regardless of gender or sexual orientation. This eliminates key legal inequalities for same-sex couples, for example in facilitated naturalisation, the receipt of widows’ pensions, adoption and reproductive medicine.

    Why was a referendum called after parliament had already legalised same-sex marriage?

    Opponents of the law launched the referendum to try to overturn it. Their arguments were centred on the traditional view of marriage as a ‘natural’ union between a man and a woman and its centrality in society. They said that ‘introducing universal marriage is a social and political rupture that nullifies the historic definition of marriage, understood as a lasting union between a man and a woman’. They were particularly upset by the fact that the law enables access to sperm donation for female couples, as they believe this forfeits the best interests of the child. They also feared that these changes would lead to the legalisation of surrogacy.

    On a more technical level, they argued that universal marriage could not be introduced through a simple legislative amendment, but required a change to the constitution.

    Who were on the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ sides in the referendum?

    After parliament passed the law, a cross-party committee – mainly comprising representatives of the right-wing Swiss People’s Party and the Federal Democratic Union, an ultra-conservative Christian party – launched a petition for a referendum. They successfully gathered more than 50,000 signatures necessary to push their proposal through and get a national vote. The right to veto a parliamentary decision is part of the Swiss system of direct democracy.

    During the campaign, these groups put out campaign posters and online ads and participated in public media discussions. Their main argument was that children’s well-being was in danger, so they put the focus of the public debate on adoption and reproductive rights.

    Fortunately, civil marriage for same-sex couples enjoys widespread political support, as seen on 26 September. With the exception of the Swiss People’s Party, all the governing parties supported the bill, as did the Greens and Liberal Greens, who are not in the government.

    There was even some openness from religious groups. In November 2019 the Federation of Swiss Protestant Churches spoke out in favour of same-sex civil marriage; however, the Conference of Swiss Bishops and the Swiss Evangelical Network remain opposed to it.

    The aggressiveness with which the law granting marriage for all was fought and the fact that about a third of voters rejected it, partly for homophobic reasons, shows that homophobia is still widespread and still far too widely accepted.

    We also faced the challenge that as the polls projected a relatively clear victory from the outset, it made it harder for us to mobilise people. Our fear was that people might take victory for granted and not go out to vote. But we were able to reach people with the message that a victory by a wider margin was an even stronger sign for equality in Switzerland.

    What other challenges do LGBTQI+ people face in Switzerland, and what else needs to be changed to advance equal rights?

    LGBTQI+ groups will continue to fight, notably against hate crimes. Marriage for all does not deliver absolute equality for female couples who receive a sperm donation from a friend or choose a sperm bank abroad, in which cases only the biological mother will be recognised. These debates will still occur, and the LGBTQI+ community will continue to fight for equality.

    The clear ‘yes’ to marriage for all is a strong signal that the majority of our society is much more progressive and open towards diverse life choices than our legal system, strongly based on a conservative family model, might suggest. Indeed, marriage for all is just a small step towards adapting the political and legal conditions to the social realities we live in. The ‘yes’ to marriage equality will boost our efforts towards the next steps.

    We demand that all consensual forms of relationships and family models – whether same-sex or opposite-sex, married or not – become equally recognised. Marriage, with its long history as a central instrument of patriarchal power, must no longer be considered the standard model. It must not be privileged, either legally or financially, over other forms of cohabitation. In the coming months and years, Operation Libero will campaign for individual taxation, regulated cohabitation, simplified parenthood and a modern sexual criminal law.

    Civic space in Switzerland is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
    Get in touch with Operation Libero through itswebsite or itsFacebookTik Tok, andInstagram pages, and follow@operationlibero and@jessicazuber on Twitter.

  • TANZANIA: ‘The new administration is committed to ending discriminatory policies that undermine girls’ rights’

    PrudenceMutisoCIVICUS speaks with Prudence Mutiso, Legal Adviser at the Center for Reproductive Rights-Africa about the Tanzanian government’s policy on pregnant and married girls in schools.

    Founded in 1992, the Center for Reproductive Rights is a global human rights organisation of lawyers and advocates seeking to ensure the protection of reproductive rights as basic human rights fundamental to the dignity, equality, health and wellbeing of every person.

    The Center works across five continents and has played a critical role in securing legal victories on reproductive rights issues, including access to life-saving obstetrics care, contraception, maternal health and safe abortion services, as well as the prevention of forced sterilisation and child marriage, in national courts, United Nations’ committees and regional human rights bodies.

  • THAILAND: ‘Spyware was used to monitor protesters’ online activity’

    Sutawan ChanprasertCIVICUS speaks about the use of surveillance technology against civil society activists in Thailand with Sutawan Chanprasert, founder and executive director of DigitalReach, a civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes digital rights, human rights and democracy in Southeast Asia.

    What is DigitalReach working on?

    DigitalReach is a digital rights organisation working in southeast Asia. We are looking at the impact of technology on human rights and democracy in the region. We initiated this project with a focus on the use of Pegasus spyware in Thailand and reached out to The Citizen Lab and iLaw for collaboration. This is because iLaw is a well-known organisation based in Thailand with a great connection with local activists, and The Citizen Lab is well-known for its expertise in spyware investigation.

    What were the main findings of this research?

    Pegasus spyware, which is produced by NSO group and sold only to state agencies, can infect devices (both iOS and Android) through a technology called ‘zero click’, which means that it needs no action on the part of the targeted user. Once the spyware is installed, it can gain access to everything on the device, including photos and text messages, and can turn the camera and microphone on and off.

    In Thailand, this spyware has been used against at least 35 iPhone users: 24 activists, three CSO workers, three academics and five opposition politicians. These infections happened between October 2020 and November 2021, which was peak time for the democracy movement.

    There were three reasons why the spyware was used against dissidents: to monitor protesters’ online activity, to monitor the protests and to find out more about the movement’s funding. On the basis of forensic evidence, The Citizen Lab confirmed that zero-click technology was used, exploiting vulnerabilities in the system to gain access to the devices.

    This was likely not the first time spyware was used against activists in Thailand, but we have no evidence to confirm this suspicion. Other digital surveillance tools have also been used: as detailed in our report, GPS devices were found attached to some dissidents’ vehicles during democracy mobilisations.

    How did the government react to your findings?

    On 22 July the Prime Minister said in parliament that he does not know anything about this spyware, and he added that such spyware would be unnecessary as we all knew what was going on from social media. The Deputy Minister of Defence also declared in parliament that it is not the government’s policy to use spyware against people or ‘generally’ violate their rights. Meanwhile, the Minister of Digital Economy and Society stated in parliament that spyware technology had been purchased but not by a department or agency under his authority. However, he referred to it generically as ‘spyware technology’, without ever confirming that he was referring to Pegasus.

    Is there anything CSOs and activists can do to counter spyware?

    Spyware is considered a dual-use item, which means it can also be useful in criminal investigations. However, we all know this is not always the case. In Thailand and many other countries, spyware has been used against dissidents and members of the opposition, which means that the technology needs to be strictly regulated so it’s not abused. However, it’s hard to see that happening under the current administration, as the government itself is the likely perpetrator. Only policymakers who care about human rights will be able to make progress on this.

    As for individual activists, there is no total solution to prevent a device from being infected by this kind of spyware. However, exposure to this threat can be reduced in several ways, such as by using two-factor authentication, using a security key or an authenticator app rather than an SMS, using a messaging platform with the disappearing message feature and by enrolling in Google’s Advanced Protection Program.

    What can the international community do to support Thai activists facing surveillance?

    This is a tricky question. Thailand doesn’t currently have an active local digital rights organisation, so working on this would be a good first step to increase digital security protection. The global community that works on digital security can play an important role. However, training activities offered in Thailand must be conducted in the local language and customised to fit the Thai context.

    There’s also a need for digital security work in Thailand that goes beyond training, including monitoring to watch for emerging digital threats against dissidents, more research and work with local activists and organisations to ensure their long-term digital safety with a sustainable approach. Funding is also needed because local activists and organisations must buy tools to support their digital security.

    Civic space in Thailand is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
    Follow DigitalReach via itswebsite and follow@DigitalReachSEA on Twitter.

  • THE GAMBIA: ‘Civil society works to ensure Jammeh and other perpetrators of human rights violations face justice’

    Adama JallowCIVICUS speaks about the prospects of The Gambia’s former dictator Yahya Jammeh being put on trial with Adama Jallow, National Coordinator of the Gambia Center for Victims of Human Rights Violations (Victim’s Center).

    Founded in 2017, the Victims Center is a civil society organisation (CSO) that seeks justice and reparations for victims of human rights violations under the dictatorship. It has successfully pressured the government to recognise the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC).

    What are the main conclusions of the TRRC report?

    After consulting with victims of Yahya Jammeh’s inhumane treatment, the TRRC’s report concluded that Jammeh should be brought to justice and victims must receive help and support to recover from the atrocious experience they endured under the former dictator’s rule. The government has released a white paper in which it accepts the recommendations made by the TRRC. We believe this is huge, considering the amount of work civil society put into advocating for the establishment of the TRRC.

    The TRRC report is a sort of roadmap we can use so that justice can be served in The Gambia. Out of the 265 recommendations made by the TRRC, the government rejected only two, while marking the rest for implementation. Many atrocities were committed under Jammeh’s dictatorship and were highlighted by both perpetrators and victims before the TRRC. These include sexual and gender-based violence, torture, enforced disappearances and killings, arbitrary detention and crimes in which the victims were accused of witchcraft.

    The TRRC’s report states that The Gambia’s society and government institutions have a responsibility to prevent the reoccurrence of the crimes it documented. Its recommendations focus basically on the well-being of victims, who are expected to receive individual and collective reparations, and the prosecution of perpetrators. 

    We initially did not think the government would agree to implementing the TRRC’s recommendations. It came as a shock to us when the government agreed to it, because it is a new experience for civil society to be seen and heard by the government. It is a positive indication that our government is prepared to work together with us. The fact that only two of the recommendations were rejected surpassed our expectations. Now we will focus on pushing the government to implement the recommendations.

    What does the Victims Center do?

    The Victim’s Center was established in 2017, right after the regime change. Under Jammeh’s rule citizens lived in an oppressive state that restricted their rights and freedoms, and there was no freedom of association, assembly and expression. Many human rights violations and abuses occurred, including killings, torture and other cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment, disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detention, sexual violence and the indiscriminate and illegal use of force. Many civil society activists and organisations were arrested because of the work they did – basically for speaking up against the regime and pushing for democracy.

    When Jammeh was overthrown, and we got a new government, civil society and victims felt the need to seek justice and hold Jammeh accountable for the atrocities committed under his rule. We formed the Victims Center to offer a platform for victims to express their issues, seek support and assistance and advocate towards the government.

    Part of our mission is to advocate for the TRRC report. We have been fortunate enough to receive international support. Organisations such as Human Rights Watch have released letters in solidarity with the victims and to demand the government responds to our advocacy asks. We have also worked closely with other CSOs and victim-led organisations to ensure that the government takes its duty seriously, recognises victims and provides reparations. We want to make sure the government provides reparations to all victims, without discriminating against anyone.

    We have also seen a need to go out and sensitise people on transitional justice processes, victims’ rights and the cases submitted to the TRRC. The Victim’s Center has always been at the forefront of advocating and engaging with the Ministry of Justice and mobilising media to ensure victims are getting the help they need. Despite the challenges we have faced, such as intimidation and lack of capacity, we remain committed to helping victims get justice.

    How has civil society advocated for prosecution?

    The Gambia’s civil society has been very active throughout the process. We understood the importance of engaging with the government because it will play a key role in ensuring that justice is served. We had meetings with the Ministry of Justice staff to find out how they intend to support victims.

    We have also disseminated press releases demanding that justice take place at the societal level. We think it is important to inform victims, their families and society at large about the contents of the TRRC report and how The Gambia’s society will benefit from it, so we have held conferences. We have also formed partnerships with other local and international CSOs to reach a wider audience and to put additional pressure on our government.

    We know that our laws present obstacles. We were supposed to have a new constitution to replace the 1997 one, but the new text was rejected by the National Assembly. The legislation presently in place does not consider enforced disappearance or torture as crimes, which is something civil society advocates for. We now hope the National Assembly can adjust the old constitution to ensure the possibility of litigation in such cases. In the meantime, the Ministry of Justice has promised to form a body to handle cases involving crimes that are not codified in our legislation.

    In essence, civil society has engaged extensively to ensure that Jammeh and other perpetrators face justice.

    Do you foresee any challenges in the implementation of the report’s recommendations?

    We foresee several challenges, one of them being the Ministry of Justice’s lack of capacity to handle cases of extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearance and torture. We need experts to oversee these cases so that everyone who is prosecuted is brought to justice.

    Another challenge lies with our constitution, as neither the old nor the current draft recognises enforced disappearance and torture. These are some of the human rights violations victims experienced and we need them to be recognised so that victims can receive help and perpetrators can be tried.

    We are also concerned about whether Jammeh can be brought to trial outside The Gambia, given that he is not currently residing in the country. We are trying our best to see how we can work with other organisations to address this issue.

    But all these challenges have not discouraged us. We continue advocating with partners to ensure the TRRC’s recommendations are implemented. We are also putting pressure on the Ministry of Justice to come up with a realistic timeframe that will convince us that the government is really committed to implementing the recommendations. We encourage the government to work closely with CSOs and victim-led organisations to ensure they implement the white paper with an inclusive approach.

    What kind of support does civil society in The Gambia need from the international community?

    Local CSOs and victim-led organisations need funding to continue their advocacy work, build capacity and support victims. International CSOs should partner with us and advise us on a way forward in terms of what types of cases could be brought, and how they can be brought if the constitution is not changed or amended. We also need them to use their resources to put pressure on the Gambian government to make sure justice prevails.

    Civic space in The Gambia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
    Get in touch with the Gambia Center for Victims of Human Rights Violations through itsFacebook, and follow@gambia_vc on Twitter. 

  • TUNISIA: ‘We are just students fighting for the future in times in which our opinions are disregarded’

    Aziza FakherCIVICUS speaks about the impacts of the climate crisis in Tunisia and civil society responses with Aziza Fakher, a biology-geology engineering student and member of Youth for Climate Tunisia (YFC Tunisia).

    Founded by two students in July 2019, YFC Tunisia strives for social and climate justice in Tunisia. It acknowledges the impact of the climate crisis on vulnerable and marginalised communities and demands climate action through digital campaigns and on-the-ground mobilisation.

    What prompted the foundation of YFC Tunisia, and what issues do you currently work on?

    The movement was started during the 2019 heatwave, which hit the whole of Tunisia and was so bad that you couldn’t leave your home without first getting properly hydrated.

    Due to its diversity of ecosystems and landscapes, Tunisia faces multiple climate issues. Access to water is a human right, but here it is a very challenging issue. Receding coastlines put the lives of many Tunisians living on islands in peril. The coastline as a whole is endangered.

    We are also working with other civil society organisations (CSOs) to stop industrial pollution in the city of Gabès, which faces an environmental catastrophe. Industries there have destroyed natural ecosystems and Indigenous communities. This fits the definition of ecocide, and the rest of the country should acknowledge it.

    All of this has impacted on women in very specific ways. There are rural areas where women still have to carry barrels of water for as far as 10 kilometres. In places such Gabès, they live amid pollution, and for those of reproductive age this can have long-lasting impacts both on themselves and on future generations. 

    We advocate for the introduction of climate education in all school curriculums and for exposing women to it as well, so they can transmit it to their children. Although the government has signed an agreement indicating support, it has so far been passive. CSOs lack funds to get this work done and the state hasn’t intervened or reached out to help.

    Why is climate so important for young people in Tunisia?

    This is important to us because it’s our future that is at stake. Young people have been very serious and dedicated to tackling this crisis from day one: we have skipped school to fight for the climate, we have helped other CSOs, we have reached out to political figures who have shut us down and refused to meet with us and listen to us. We have played a role in influencing other young people and raising wider awareness, which has been an important goal of the movement since it was founded. Indeed, we are still recruiting more young activists every day and we are able to provide them with a platform and a space to express themselves and their thoughts about the ongoing crisis.

    People tend to forget that we are just students fighting for the future in times in which our opinions are disregarded. Many of us are endangering our daily lives, but we think it is worth it.

    How has thecurrent political crisis influenced your work?

    The political and economic situation has influenced our movement. If one of your main tactics is to reach out to decision-makers to advocate for the adoption and implementation of laws and policies, a constantly changing situation is a big problem. It does not let us get ahead in our work and regularly makes us lose ground on the progress previously made.

    When we first held a strike in Tunis, the Tunisian capital, we were exposed to religious conspiracy theories, which people tried to use against us because they refused to believe that climate change was real. Politicians and government officials should have conveyed the correct message to educate the public so that this crisis isn’t something alien and mysterious to them. But they didn’t.

    We received backlash and were targeted with criticism and hate speech concerning our methods. Others, however, have said that our discourse is too soft, that we do not take risks and that we are not active in real life. Our response to them is that we are young Tunisians living in a context of political unrest, so our real-life activities are always uncertain.

    The economic context for activism is also complicated, especially following the recent news about the president’s intention to ban all foreign funding for Tunisian CSOs.

    We have often found ourselves lagging in the funding department. The situation is very difficult for many CSOs that have no independent funding. If we are unable to get funding, we will be unable to work on new projects. We are very uncertain regarding our future plans. And being young activists, we also struggle to exercise our right to access data and information, which is a huge issue in Tunisia.

    Additionally, we have faced bureaucratic restrictions. For example, we have recently had to submit our registration paperwork because we are working on climate education and we are not allowed to work with children or in a school or university environment unless we are recognised and certified as a formal CSO. But we have faced challenges because the process is very slow and requires a huge amount of paperwork.

    What are your demands for national and international decision-makers ahead of the COP27 climate change summit?

    We are aware that activity in the global north has a huge environmental impact on the global south, including Tunisia. Since COP27 will be held in Egypt this year, we have formed a coalition with other environmental rights groups to work at a regional level.

    We want to see more engagement from local and global politicians in terms of laws and policies to tackle climate change, and also for them to condemn greedy capitalist profiteers. We would like the Tunisian government to acknowledge the Sustainable Development Goals in the Tunisian context and to implement nationally determined contributions and start a transition to renewable energy.

    New laws must also be introduced to protect future generations’ right to water and food security. The Ministry of Environment must adopt climate change mitigation and adaptation measures. Effective waste recovery and management systems must be adopted, because the lack of these is a huge problem for local communities. People have died as a result of living near toxic waste dumps. We also need state-run awareness campaigns targeted at marginalised and vulnerable communities. And we want climate education in all schools, because of its crucial role in preparing kids for the future to come.

    We are willing to work together with other CSOs that share our goals. Because these are human rights issues, we would like to bring them into the United Nations Human Rights Council and its Universal Periodic Review sessions, where civil society voices are heard, taken into consideration and empowered.

    Civic space in Tunisia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
    Get in touch with Youth for Climate Tunisia through itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@yfctunisia on Twitter.

  • UGANDA: ‘Hate speech against LGBTQI+ people comes from religious, traditional and political leaders’

    CIVICUS speaks about the situation of LGBTQI+ rights in Uganda and the ongoing impacts of the British colonial legacy with Opio Sam Leticia, founder and Executive Director of Queer Youth Uganda (QYU).

    QYU is a civil society organisation founded in 2006 that advocates for the rights of young LGBTQI+ people.

    Opio Sam Leticia

    What is the current situation of LGBTQI+ people in Uganda? 

    The absence of laws that protect LGBTQI+ people makes for a delicate situation in Uganda. The LGBTQI+ community faces discrimination in many aspects. People are still being denied their right to housing in some places because of their sexual orientation and gender identity. They continue to suffer assaults, sexual violence and ‘corrective rape’ as a way of trying to change them into what those perpetrating abuses think is the African way of life, with the LGBTQI+ ‘lifestyle’ still viewed as an imposition of ‘western ideology’. We have had several cases of LGBTQI+ activists who have been evicted by their landlords as a result of their community advocacy work.

    Discrimination in workplaces is still rampant: many people who openly identify as LGBTQI+ find it challenging to get employed. The unemployment rate in the LGBTQI+ community is high because there are not enough job opportunities. In addition, some LGBTQI+ people do not have the skills needed for the job market due to their higher school dropout rates. Parents play a significant role in this because when they discover their kids’ sexual orientation they often deny them access to education and even throw them out of their homes.

    The breakout of the COVID-19 pandemic revealed the underlying issues that people in the LGBTQI+ community deal with. During the pandemic, several homeless shelters for LGBTQI+ people were raided by the police. As a result, many people were left homeless and others were jailed for three months, sometimes more than once.

    Despite the work done to ensure access to health services as a need, there is still discrimination at public health centres meant to provide free healthcare for all people in Uganda. Discrimination in access denies LGBTQI+ people this basic right.

    Does Ugandan legislation discriminate against LGBTQI+ people?

    The Ugandan constitution stipulates equality for all people, but every single day there are cases of assault and rights violations of LGBTQI+ people.

    The law is used as an instrument to oppress LGBTQI+ people instead of promoting their human rights. Same-sex marriage is illegal and same-sex relations are criminalised with harsh penalties, including life imprisonment under Penal Code Act 145. Despite the existence of mechanisms such as the Uganda Human Rights Commission and the Equal Opportunities Commission, it is clear that the rights of LGBTQI+ people continue to be systematically violated.

    The government of Uganda continues to enforce the 1950 Penal Code, which prohibits same-sex relations and threatens to imprison LGBTQI+ activists. Parliament has continued to pass bills against sexual minorities, such as the recent Sexual Offences Bill 2021. The current legislation threatens our work environment and our very existence as an LGBTQI+ organisation in Uganda.

    To what do you attribute the recent tightening of legislation criminalising LGBTQI+ people?

    Uganda is a highly religious country where traditional cultural beliefs or norms take centre stage. LGBTQI+ people see their basic human rights violated because of deeply embedded cultural and religious beliefs. That is why political advocacy does not have an impact: politicians are quick to play the morality card to please their constituencies and sideline the issues raised by LGBTQI+ organisations.

    The government should work to integrate the LGBTQI+ community into Ugandan society, not least because we can play a pivotal role in the country’s economic and social development. We can contribute by paying taxes and creating jobs, among other things.

    But instead, the LGBTQI+ community faces hate speech coming from religious, traditional and political leaders who promote homophobia. Far from receiving mass support and recognition from the state and citizens, LGBTQI+ activists and organisations have faced increasing human rights abuses and attacks.

    What work does your organisation do?

    QYU is an LGBTQI+ youth-led community-based organisation that advocates for the rights of young LGBTQI+ people in rural and peri-urban areas of Uganda. QYU operates in the four regions of Uganda: the Eastern, Southern, Western and Bunyoro Kitara/Albertine regions. We have five key programmes that we run in communities to offer safe spaces and promote the participation of LGBTQI+ people in human development: human rights awareness and advocacy, sexual reproductive health rights and services, emergency housing and accommodation, economic empowerment, and advocacy, alliance building and partnerships.

    Through implementing these programmes, we want to create a legal and policy environment where the rights of LGBTQI+ people are upheld and respected. The high numbers of rape cases and arbitrary arrests have pushed us to advocate for equal and inclusive reproductive health rights and access to sexual and reproductive health services and to set up safe spaces at community health centres so that LGBTQI+ people can access healthcare facilities without the trauma of being harassed.

    In addition, QYU responds to urgent housing needs of LGBTQI+ people who are victims of social stigma and discrimination from their families and the public. We also mobilise and empower LGBTQI+ people, particularly young people, by providing them with practical skills, knowledge and appropriate information regarding employment and social entrepreneurship and developing their personal and professional skills for the labour market. Through partnership building, advocacy and referral, we work with like-minded organisations to advocate for and advance the rights and freedoms of LGBTQI+ people at both the national and international levels.

    But we have faced several challenges that make it difficult to carry out our work. We have continued to suffer office break-ins from unknown individuals, causing fear among our staff members. We also have limited funding, which impacts the scope of our work because we can only do so much with the funds we have.

    What should Commonwealth states do to promote LGBTQI+ rights?

    Commonwealth states should work together since most have the same codes that criminalise LGBTQI+ people, dating back to the colonial era. So many years later, they are still making daily life miserable for LGBTQI+ people in the countries that are part of the Commonwealth. I think member countries should use the various organs of the Commonwealth to provide a platform for LGBTQI+ voices. Those that have decriminalised same-sex relations should support those fighting toward that goal.

    The international community fighting for similar causes should also use their platforms to raise awareness on the kind of struggles we are facing. Their mobilisation will hopefully pressure our governments to create policies that will benefit all members of society regardless of their gender identity or sexual orientation.

    Civic space in Uganda is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
    Get in touch with Queer Youth Uganda through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@QueerYouth2006 on Twitter. 

  • VENEZUELA: ‘The government seeks to stoke nationalist sentiment to try to hold on to power’

    Mariano_de_Alba.pngCIVICUS speaks with Mariano de Alba, Senior Adviser at the International Crisis Group, about the recent referendum called by the Venezuelan government on the status of the Essequibo territory, disputed with neighbouring Guyana, and its possible implications for democracy in Venezuela and peace in the region.

    The International Crisis Group is an independent organisation that works to prevent wars and design policies to build a more peaceful world.

     

    Why did the Venezuelan government decide to submit the Essequibo issue to a referendum?

    The announcement of the referendum came first as a reaction by the Venezuelan government to the recent oil bidding rounds conducted by Guyana in maritime areas that Venezuela considers as pending delimitation. As the referendum was being organised, it became clear that the Venezuelan government was attaching additional value to it as a tool to test its capacity for electoral mobilisation a few months in advance of the presidential election due to take place later this year.

    In addition, by placing the dispute with Guyana on the public agenda, the Venezuelan government seeks to stoke nationalist sentiment in the Venezuelan population, and most particularly among the armed forces, a key group in its strategy to retain power.

    What’s the legal value of the referendum?

    According to jurisprudence by the Supreme Court of Justice, Venezuela’s highest judicial body, consultative referendums, a mechanism established in the Venezuelan constitution, are not binding. This view was publicly ratified by the chief lawyer who was appointed by the government to prepare the referendum questions.

    But for political reasons, since before the referendum and particularly in view of its results, the government has insisted that it does have a binding character in order to justify a series of actions it has announced in relation to the territory in dispute. These, however, have been no more than symbolic announcements, since Venezuelan armed forces have not effectively entered the disputed territory, which has been under Guyanese administration for many, many years.

    How did the opposition react to the referendum, and how will this impact on the 2024 elections?

    There were differences among various opposition groups on how to position themselves in relation to the referendum. First of all, it should be noted that on 17 October, when the government and the opposition met in Barbados to sign an agreement on the conditions to hold elections, they also signed another agreement in which they committed themselves to ‘ratify the historical rights’ of Venezuela and to ‘uphold the full validity of the 1966 Geneva Agreement’, the treaty that reignited the dispute, in which Guyana, Venezuela and the UK agreed to seek a solution to the conflict. As a result, at least part of the opposition leadership found it difficult to oppose the referendum.

    However, María Corina Machado, the main opposition leader, elected as a unity candidate in primaries held in late October 2023, did criticise the referendum, arguing that ‘sovereignty must be exercised, submitted to consultation’. The most important difference within the opposition is that some opposition leaders believe that one should participate in all electoral processes, regardless of the conditions, while others do not. Some voted in the referendum, while others didn’t.

    Ahead of the presidential elections, a key element of the government’s strategy is to foster division among the opposition, so that one part ends up calling for non-participation due to lack of sufficient guarantees and another part decides to participate. In the face of a divided opposition the government has a real chance of winning the election, since under the current electoral system whoever gets the most votes, even if short of 50 per cent, is elected. The election will take place in an authoritarian context in which the conditions for the competition will be poor and there is a high risk of government repression.

    What has been Guyana’s reaction?

    Guyana is focused on seeking a favourable decision at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where in 2018 it filed a lawsuit seeking ratification of the validity of the 1899 arbitral award that gave it the territory it now controls and administers, and which Venezuela ignores, arguing that the award was the product of procedural fraud.

    However, recent tensions complicate the picture for Guyana. First, because, at least on paper, the Venezuelan armed forces have substantially superior capabilities compared to Guyana’s. Hence Guyana’s intention to seek to strengthen its military alliances and obtain guarantees from allied states. Second, the uncertainty resulting from these tensions could affect the remarkable recent economic growth of Guyana, a country with a small population but high income due to the recent discovery and exploitation of oil resources. Already in mid-December 2023, London’s Lloyd’s insurance market rated the Guyanese exclusive economic zone as risky, which could increase the cost of shipping oil from there.

    What are the risks of an escalation into armed conflict?

    The referendum has substantially increased tensions between Guyana and Venezuela. Guyana saw the referendum and the subsequent actions of the Venezuelan government as a threat. But Guyana has also taken advantage of the tensions to try to strengthen its diplomatic and military alliances with states such as the UK and the USA.

    In the short to medium term, the risk of these tensions escalating into armed conflict is low, partly because the international reaction would be so critical of it. Moreover, while the Venezuelan government has announced and gone through with actions such as appointing an authority for the territory in dispute, it has been careful to ensure that the implementation of these actions has remained on Venezuelan territory for the time being.

    But escalation is not out of the question. Tension could lead to a limited confrontation, following which it could become difficult for one or both of the countries to de-escalate.

    From the Venezuelan perspective, escalation is a risky gamble because it could generate greater discontent among the Venezuelan armed forces, which would have to risk their lives, particularly if Guyana receives the support of a key ally such as the USA. Moreover, the Venezuelan government is striving to reintegrate itself into the international community, and initiating a conflict with Guyana would derail those efforts.

    On the Guyanese side, it is uncertain whether military support would actually come in the event of a substantial military conflict. Such a conflict could also make it very risky for some companies operating in Guyana to continue doing business there. Therefore, at least in the short and medium term, barring any surprises, attempts to keep tensions on the public agenda will predominate, but without resulting in any real escalation.

    At the end of the day, both countries, as the neighbours they are, will be obliged to try to negotiate. Even if Guyana obtains a favourable ICJ decision, that will hardly be the end of it, as without Venezuela’s cooperation it will be very difficult to enforce the judgment. Moreover, the maritime area will still be pending delimitation, so sooner or later negotiations will have to take place in any case.

    What is the status of diplomatic negotiations?

    Serious diplomatic efforts have been undertaken by various countries to try to convince both governments of the importance of lowering tensions and avoiding armed conflict. These efforts resulted in an agreement signed in St Vincent and the Grenadines on 14 December. There, it was agreed to de-escalate tensions and hold a new meeting in Brazil before the end of March.

    However, distrust between the two governments remains deep. The visit of a British warship to Guyana in late December, which Venezuela interpreted as a threat to which it responded by conducting military exercises on its territory, did not help a bit.

    The outlook is complicated by the fact that both governments believe they can make political gains out of these tensions, Venezuela for predominantly domestic political reasons, and Guyana first and foremost to strengthen its military alliances, and secondarily because, if it manages the situation well, the ruling party’s prospects could improve ahead of elections in 2025.

    Behind the scenes, diplomatic efforts continue because in the face of the war in Ukraine and the conflict in Gaza, the idea prevails that there is no international space for another armed conflict, and even less so in Latin America and the Caribbean, which for so many years has been a zone of peace, at least as far as inter-state conflicts are concerned.


    Civic space in Venezuela is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with the International Crisis Group through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram accounts, and follow@CrisisGroup and@marianodealba on Twitter.

  • VENEZUELA: ‘The government wants a civil society aligned with its interests, tamed and silent’

    Alí DanielsCIVICUS discusses the ‘anti-NGO law’ recently passed in Venezuela with Alí Daniels, Co-Director of Acceso a la Justicia, a civil society organisation (CSO) dedicated to monitoring justice administration and the rule of law in Venezuela.

    On 15 August, Venezuela’s National Assemblyapproved a bill known as the ‘anti-NGO law’, which severely restricts freedom of association. The law requires CSOs to declare the origin of their funding, imposes strict reporting obligations, including a requirement to provide sensitive information, and bans organisations deemed to promote ‘fascism, intolerance and hatred’. The measure, proposed some time ago, was finally adopted after the28 July presidential election, which the opposition won by a large margin. The government has ignored the results, violently suppressed democracy protests and sought to stifle all sources of dissent.

    What’s the anti-NGO law, and what’s its place within the ruling regime’s repressive machinery?

    This new law has been presented as an instrument to regulate the exercise of freedoms of association and expression, when in fact it seeks to hinder it. One third of its 39 articles contain severe sanctions such as fines, deregistration, expulsion of foreigners and the dissolution of organisations. Although it claims to seek greater transparency and accountability, it contains only two articles on this issue, which was already regulated by the Civil Code.

    One of the most worrying aspects of the new law is that it obliges CSOs to reregister within 180 days and could leave them in legal limbo if they don’t receive a response from the authorities. It also imposes annual reviews, creating an unnecessary administrative burden even for those lacking financial resources.

    The anti-NGO law is part of a long-standing strategy of repression that includes human rights violations such as enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions and extrajudicial executions. It’s another cog in a repressive machine that includes measures such as revoking the passports of human rights defenders and activists, illegal surveillance of phones and social media and censorship of platforms such as WhatsApp and Twitter/X. Senior government officials have already labelled us terrorists, encouraging and justifying the intensification of repression.

    The anti-NGO law can also be seen as a response to international pressure questioning the legitimacy of the 28 July election. With it, the government is doubling down on its willingness to punish anyone who questions its legitimacy.

    What impact could this law have?

    We are very concerned that the new law is very similar to Nicaragua’s, which in just one year has led to more than 3,000 CSOs being made illegal.

    In the medium term, the new law could have a serious impact on the humanitarian situation. The new restrictions could lead to a reduction in the number of CSOs, while those that still operate may be forced to reduce their capacity to implement projects. Many CSOs may end up opting to become informal groups. While this would reduce costs, it would also limit their ability to receive funding, as donors often prefer to work with formal legal entities.

    The damage this could cause is not limited to CSOs – it also affects the people who depend on their services. For political reasons, the Venezuelan government adopts contradictory positions: it forces bankrupt companies to keep operating, allegedly to ‘protect jobs’, but it dissolves CSOs for failing to pay a fine. It claims to protect jobs, but dissolves organisations that create jobs in the humanitarian field.

    The anti-NGO law is designed to limit the independence of civil society, allowing only likeminded CSOs to operate. The government wants a civil society that’s aligned with its interests, tamed and silent.

    How is civil society working for a democratic transition in Venezuela?

    In a context marked by censorship of political expression and press freedom, Venezuelan civil society is playing a crucial role in the struggle for a democratic transition. In the face of restrictions on political parties and government control of the media, CSOs have become reliable sources of information, providing an alternative analysis to the official narrative. We provide data the government would rather hide, such as the rise in child malnutrition. We show reality as it is, and that’s why they want to suppress us.

    CSOs act as monitors and whistleblowers, offering critical analysis and proposing alternatives for Venezuela’s future. We advocate for dialogue and a negotiated transition, but we also set clear ethical and legal boundaries to ensure those responsible for crimes against humanity are brought to justice.

    How can the international community support civil society in Venezuela?

    The international community can help us keep what is happening in Venezuela in the global debate by echoing our condemnation of human rights violations and crimes against humanity. This is extremely important so those more ideologically reticent can recognise that human rights violations have no ideology and torture is unacceptable and must be condemned and punished no matter who commits it.

    It’s important that states with influence over the Venezuelan government, such as Brazil and Colombia, use their position to encourage dialogue. Diplomatic pressure and mediation by friendly countries could facilitate a process of negotiation and peaceful resolution. We have been facing a complex humanitarian emergency for more than two decades; any support to alleviate the crisis is greatly appreciated and will continue to give us hope and strength to face the very serious situation we are in.

    Civic space in Venezuela is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with Acceso a la Justicia through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@AccesoaJusticia and@alijdaniels on Twitter.

  • VENEZUELA: ‘With the new NGO law, the government aims to take control of the entire associational fabric’

    RigobertoLoboPuentesCIVICUS speaks with Rigoberto Lobo Puentes, founder of Promotion, Education and Defence of Human Rights (Promoción, Educación y Defensa en Derechos Humanos, PROMEDEHUM), about Venezuela’s NGO bill which, if passed, will further hinder civil society’s work.

    PROMEDEHUM brings together people whose common goal is education about and the promotion and defence of human rights.

    How has civic space in Venezuela changed recently?

    Civic space has experienced tensions for more than a decade. In 2010 the government implemented the Law of National Sovereignty and Self-Determination to restrict access to funding by human rights organisations, citing alleged external threats against the Venezuelan government. This law was only the first step. Starting in 2016, when the ruling party lost control of the National Assembly, the government began to issue emergency decrees granting powers to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to audit any agreement signed with international bodies by organisations or individuals to implement projects in Venezuela. This was part of a strategy to suffocate human rights organisations financially until they were forced to shut down.

    In 2020 the government body that regulates the banking system ordered banks to monitor the financial operations of civil society organisations (CSOs), supposedly to prevent money laundering and terrorism financing. Following criticism from international human rights protection bodies, in 2021 the provisions of the National Office against Organised Crime and Terrorist Financing in relation to CSOs were slightly amended. However, they continue to violate international human rights standards. Among other things, they provided for the creation of a new body in charge of authorising the registration and operation of CSOs and obliged CSOs to provide sensitive information.

    This attack caused fissures in civil society, as many thought that since the focus was on human rights organisations, other CSOs, including humanitarian organisations, were out of harm’s way, even if they also in one way or another defended human rights. Many CSOs said they had no problem with the obligation to register. The situation was very confusing. It was never clear where the registry was or would be, and in each city, organisations were given different information.

    In 2021, the ruling party-controlled National Assembly unanimously approved a national legislative plan that included a Law on International Cooperation, which also established a mandatory registry for CSOs. The aim again was to limit access to funding for CSOs.

    In 2022, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force refuted the idea that all these regulations were needed. Its assessment of Venezuela concluded that there was no evidence the proposed or implemented CSO registries could prevent potential abuses linked to terrorism financing.

    Finally, in January 2024 the National Assembly approved in first reading of the draft Law on Control, Regularisation, Operations and Financing of Non-Governmental and Related Organisations, better known as the NGO law. If passed, this law will allow the government to further restrict the functioning of civil society, as it broadly prohibits ‘political activities’ without clearly defining what this refers to, and could result in the imposition of sanctions or the closure of CSOs deemed to be engaging in ‘political activities’. In the session where the bill was approved, more than 60 CSOs were singled out as enemies and traitors to the homeland.

    The continued threats to and vilification and persecution of CSOs and human rights defenders, and restrictions and attacks on media and journalists, raids on offices and jailing of humanitarian workers, have created a climate of great fear. Many CSOs have lost members, some have closed, and many human rights defenders have migrated for various reasons, including because they have been persecuted or fear persecution in the near future. Some organisations, including media outlets, have adopted self-censorship or changed the nature of their activities to prevent reprisals.

    What impacts would the NGO law have in this context?

    The NGO law seeks to limit citizen participation and human rights advocacy. It would turn the freedom of association into a matter of public order, exposing organisations to surveillance and police control. Organisations that fail to register or disclose their sources of funding could face fines, deregistration and criminal prosecution. They could be criminalised under charges of terrorism, money laundering, destabilisation, conspiracy and foreign interference.

    Although the draft law may appear to target only human rights organisations, its impacts will be much broader, as it aims to take control of the entire associational fabric. All organisational forms, including political parties and education and academic organisations, are potential targets. Victims of human rights violations could lose all legal support. People affected by Venezuela’s humanitarian emergency could lose access to civil society humanitarian programmes, which could be replaced by government programmes with restrictive access conditions.

    In short, the government seeks a tailor-made civil society. It has an interest in the continuity of humanitarian organisations, as they relieve it of a burden and help it maintain an image of openness with the international community. But it wants humanitarian organisations to play a purely welfare role, with no connection to human rights, and to refrain from publishing any information that might project a negative image of Venezuela.

    The government has already made progress in this area. To some extent it already controls the activities of humanitarian organisations and obtains constant information on their activities throughout Venezuela.

    Why has the NGO law been revived after it was put on hold last year?

    The government has moved forward with this law as prospects increase of an election in the near future. The law can be used not just against human rights CSOs. It can be used against any organisational form that is considered a space for critical thought or dissent. This particularly applies to CSOs working on civil and political rights issues, demanding electoral transparency, monitoring campaigns and observing elections.

    From the government’s perspective, civil society jeopardises its prospects of staying in power. Under fair electoral conditions, civil society’s monitoring, documentation and denunciation of human rights violations perpetrated by an already unpopular government could harm its electoral standing. For years the government has sought to subdue, suffocate or nullify CSOs, and this will intensify as it faces the need to ensure its continuity in power.

    The NGO law had been suspended but not forgotten. The government simply waited for the right time to resume its attacks. Recently, there have been accusations against and arrests of members of the military, political parties and journalists in connection with an alleged assassination plot that has been classed as terrorism. This is part of a situation created by the government to justify actions to neutralise those who might become obstacles in the face of an election. In this context, the possibility of the NGO law being passed should not be ruled out.

    How have civil society and the public reacted to these attacks?

    Despite the seriousness of the law, there is a lot of misinformation and a high level of ignorance among Venezuelan citizens. Even some CSOs are unaware of its existence or its importance.

    However, civil society has issued numerous criticisms. Between 2022 and 2024, national and international CSOs have published at least 15 statements and analyses of the NGO law and the law on international cooperation. Numerous forums, talks and awareness campaigns have been held, inside and outside Venezuela.

    Many organisations and human rights defenders have participated in interactive sessions at the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council and in side events at the UN, the Organization of American States and the Summit of the Americas, and have submitted reports to human rights bodies. As a result of this advocacy, between 2021 and 2023, 11 statements and reports about these laws were published by international bodies.

    Those of us outside Venezuela have also advocated with the governments of our host countries. In Argentina, where I am at the moment, politicians and civil society have publicly condemned the NGO law.

    The Venezuelan government doubled down and on 12 January launched a public consultation on the law, without making the official text of the draft law public or inviting human rights CSOs to participate. According to the information that has come to light, most of the participants in the consultation have been state officials, including police officers. From what we have been able to observe in consultation events, which take place relatively spontaneously in various places and without an established format, and in the discussions on the issue in the National Assembly, the prevailing discourse has delegitimised CSOs, which are referred to as enemies of the state.

    What guarantees does Venezuelan civil society need to keep doing its work?

    To continue our advocacy work in defence of civic space we need more international organisations and people to come on board to help report on the deteriorating situation. CSOs need access to more accurate and reliable information to help build alliances more quickly and effectively.

    Venezuelan CSOs continue to work to communicate any changes that occur and to raise the alarm when attacks on rights take place. We continue to advocate with other states, especially when there are changes of government that could affect international policies of states. One imminent risk is of the non-renewal of the mandate of the International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela, established by the UN Human Rights Council in 2019. This would be a serious blow to Venezuelan civil society.

    Venezuelan organisations should also evaluate and rethink strategies in terms of the impact of the information we produce. We should better showcase the strengths of the Venezuelan human rights movement. Perhaps proactive transparency, to the extent that it does not put organisations and their members at greater risk, could serve to influence both the international community and the public. It is crucial that people in Venezuela understand the dimensions of the losses that the deterioration of civic space and the extinction of CSOs pose to our country.


    Civic space in Venezuela is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with PROMEDEHUM through itswebsite orFacebook account, and follow it onInstagram and Twitter.

  • VIETNAM: ‘Failure to address torture of political prisoners should trigger a review of trade deals’

    88ProjectCIVICUS speaks with Kaylee Uland and Jessica Nguyen, co-director and advocacy officer with The 88 Project, about the criminalisation and repression of human rights activism in Vietnam.

    The 88 Project is a civil society organisation (CSO) that advocates for and shares the stories of Vietnamese political activists who are persecuted because of their peaceful activism for human rights.

    What does The 88 Project do?

    The 88 Project is a research and advocacy organisation that maintains the most comprehensive and up-to-date database on the situation of political prisoners and human rights activists in Vietnam. Our database informs media coverage and policy debates on Vietnam and is used by journalists, diplomats and policymakers. According to our database, as of 24 June 2022, there are at least 208 known political prisoners behind bars in Vietnam, the highest number of any country in Southeast Asia.

    What is the current situation of civic freedoms in Vietnam?

    The 88 Project has tracked very negative trends regarding the Vietnamese government’s crackdown on political dissent. These include an increase in arrests of those in formal and informal media professions over a period of four years from 2018 to 2021. The arrests of media workers as a percentage of total activist arrests went up from less than three per cent in 2018 to 18 per cent in 2020 and 34 per cent in 2021.

    The use of harsh sentences of at least five years in prison to stifle critical voices has also increased: while such sentences were 23 per cent of total sentences of activists in 2018, the rate rose rapidly to 44 per cent in 2019, 48 per cent in 2020 and 72 per cent in 2021.

    The practice of holding activists and political prisoners incommunicado for extended periods of time – of eight months or more – has become increasingly common: it was applied to 12 per cent of all activists arrested in 2018 and to 21 per cent in 2019, surging to 49 per cent in 2020, before slightly decreasing to 42 per cent in 2021.

    The crackdown on dissent has also expanded to include new issues and groups, as seen in the recent arrest and imprisonment of four CSO leaders working on climate change and environmental issues. They were charged with ‘tax evasion’, a tactic used by the government to silence critics who cannot be tried under the national security provisions of the criminal code. This sent tremors of fear through the environmental movement in Vietnam.

    Efforts to censor social media have intensified, as has compliance with government censorship requests by US-based tech companies. With a population of 98 million, Vietnam is one of Facebook’s top 10 markets by user numbers, with 60 to 70 million people on the platform. Facebook provides one of the few spaces where Vietnamese people can communicate relatively freely. This space is, however, rapidly closing as Facebook increasingly complies with censorship requests from the government and allows bad actors to exploit content moderation rules to have accounts locked and posts deleted. Exacerbating the situation, Vietnam is now planning to impose new rules that require social media firms to take down content it deems illegal within 24 hours.

    Further, the deliberately complex law regulating the ability of CSOs to receive and spend domestic or foreign funding gives the government control over organisations and individuals. CSOs find it hard to comply fully with these laws, which makes them vulnerable to government scrutiny. Punishment for tax violations may include heavy fines, closure and criminal charges that lead to the imprisonment of CSO managers.

    What is the situation of political prisoners?

    The authorities commonly use torture and other inhumane treatment against political prisoners, particularly those in pretrial detention. The most common perpetrators of these violations are public security officers at the provincial level, followed by those at the district and city levels, and then those at the national level. Occasionally, activists who are at risk but not imprisoned are assaulted or otherwise harassed by people suspected to have ties to the government, such as plainclothes police.

    The government insists that there is no incommunicado detention in Vietnam, while acknowledging that for national security cases, a ‘very special measure’ applies, under which detainees are not allowed to see their defence counsel until after the investigation has concluded. Activists are often subjected to unobservable interrogation and to conditions that begin to break down their emotional and physical health. Isolation also removes their plight from the public eye, as information about their condition is sporadic and incomplete at best. Thirty-five activists arrested in 2020 and 2021 were held in incommunicado pretrial detention for eight months or longer.

    Eight people who were arrested in 2020 have not yet been brought to trial. Journalist Le Anh Hung, arrested in July 2018, has not only not yet been brought to trial but has also been repeatedly transferred to mental health facilities for forced psychiatric treatment. 

    Political prisoners are often denied legal representation during the investigation period and at trial. The 88 Project has documented the cases of at least 14 political prisoners who were denied legal representation in 2020 and 2021. When political prisoners are denied legal representation, they are often less aware of their rights and lack a critical communication channel to their families and the outside world. Often, families do not know about trial dates well in advance; sometimes, they learn nothing until after activists have been sentenced. An emblematic case of denial of legal representation is that of two activists from the Hmong minority, Lau A Lenh and Sung A Sinh, who were charged with overthrowing the state and attempting to establish a separate state in north-western Vietnam and sentenced to life in prison.

    Prisoners are often denied medical treatment and family members are prevented from providing medication to them. Many with pre-existing conditions or those who experience health problems while imprisoned have claimed that inadequate medical treatment resulted in greater long-term health complications. Some, including Huynh Huu Dat, have died in prison due to lack of proper healthcare. 

    The government claims that prison conditions have improved, but political prisoners and their families continue to report unclean food, overcrowding, lack of access to clean water, poor sanitation and lack of lighting. Virtually all prisoners suffer from harsh prison conditions, and they are often disciplined and retaliated against if they try to petition for improved prison conditions for themselves or others.

    Cutting prisoners off from family and support networks is yet another way to mistreat them without using force. The authorities often limit family visitation rights or detain political prisoners in places far from their homes, making it extremely difficult for families to visit. Under the pandemic, ‘COVID restrictions’ were also used as an excuse to deny family visits. The 88 Project identified at least 21 political prisoners subjected to this treatment in 2020 and 2021.

    We have also documented many cases of physical and psychological pain, which often amount to torture as defined under international law, inflicted to coerce confessions, obtain information, or punish political dissidents for their opinions. A frequent form of psychological abuse consists in sending political prisoners to mental health institutions against their will, even if they have no history of mental illness. Examples of political prisoners subjected to forced mental health treatment include Le Anh Hung, Nguyen Thuy Hanh and Pham Chi Thanh. Another harsh aspect of prison treatment is the use of solitary confinement to isolate political prisoners and punish them for asserting their rights.

    Is there any accountability for cases of torture and ill-treatment?

    Unfortunately, there is very little accountability. Regarding COVID-19-related restrictions, the government argued that the right to health of the community took priority over prisoners’ right to see family members. The authorities also justify forced mental health treatment tactics on ‘humanitarian aid’ grounds. They say they are respecting and protecting political prisoners’ right to health by sending them to mental health institutions for medical treatment. However, to the best of our knowledge, most cases are of forced treatment, used to isolate political prisoners from their support networks and to discredit them.

    The Vietnamese government has been repeatedly warned about its failure to meet its international obligations against torture. The United Nations (UN) Committee Against Torture (CAT) has stressed the importance of proper criminalisation of torture, fundamental legal safeguards, direct applicability of the Convention against Torture by domestic courts and independent investigation concerning allegations of excessive use of force or deaths under custody.

    During Vietnam’s 2019 UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a number of states raised concerns about allegations of torture and the Vietnamese government voluntarily agreed to several important recommendations, such as making sure that evidence obtained through torture is inadmissible at trial and taking steps to prohibit harassment and torture during the investigation process and detention.

    Despite these international warnings, in its responses to CAT’s comments and recommendations from the 2018 Concluding Observations, issued in September 2020, Vietnam continued to maintain that ‘allegations of the widespread use of torture and ill-treatment, particular in police stations, and in certain places where persons are deprived of their liberty [...] are all unsubstantiated and inaccurate claims’. This contradicts the findings of our report.

    How have domestic and international CSOs raised these issues?

    Many international groups report on allegations of torture and inhumane treatment in Vietnam as part of their ongoing human rights research. However, torture is a difficult topic to research and report on, as information flowing out of Vietnamese prisons is minimal and often censored, and prisoners and family members may fear further retaliation for raising their concerns. Prisoners are often better able to report on prison conditions upon their release, as was recently the case of Tran Thi Thuy.

    Thuy was imprisoned for eight years and was denied communication with her family and adequate medical treatment despite having severe tumours. The authorities demanded a confession in exchange for treatment. Thuy was also forced to work under extreme labour conditions; by the end of her sentence, she could barely walk. The international community should question the treatment prisoners face, and whether it may be even worse than what is reported in the news that reach international outlets.

    Regardless of the obstacles they face, activists, their families and CSOs continue to raise the issue of ill-treatment of political prisoners via research and direct advocacy. For example, in April, the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and the International Federation on Human Rights jointly issued an urgent appeal for international intervention in the case of land rights activist Trinh Ba Phuong. Groups also petition the UN, and especially its Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, to investigate cases where inhumane treatment is suspected. Further, abuse by Vietnam’s police force more broadly is well-documented.

    What can the international community do to address the issue of torture in Vietnam?

    Given the absolute nature of the right to freedom from torture, failure on the part of the Vietnamese government to address issues of torture and inhumane treatment of political prisoners should trigger a review of its trade deals and other relationships with international actors. We urge human rights advocates and representatives of the USA, the European Union, and others to demand that Vietnam implement the concrete actions that are clearly stated in CAT’s Concluding Observations in the Initial Report of Viet Nam of 208 and to follow up on the UPR recommendations that Vietnam accepted in 2019.

    We also urge the authorities to accept visits by the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, as well as visits by states’ consular representatives to conduct investigations of prison conditions in multiple locations.

    Civic space in Vietnam is rated ‘closedby theCIVICUS Monitor.
    Get in touch with The 88 Project through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@The88Project on Twitter.

  • Women Human Rights Defenders Face Greater Risks Because of their Gender

    By Masana Ndinga-Kanga, Crisis Response Fund Lead with CIVICUS.

    The rallying calls of #SudanUprising, have been led by Sudanese women who are teachers, stay-at-home-mothers, doctors, students and lawyers. And yet, when President Al Bashir stepped down on April 11, the names of the women who spearheaded this political shift, were largely missing from the headlines. This erasure is not uncommon. Women Human Rights Defenders (WHRDs) are often erased or slandered in efforts to intimidate them into quitting continuing their human rights work. In Egypt, Guatemala, Saudi Arabia, Uganda or the Philippines they are often called agents of international interests.

    Read on: Inter Press Service

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