advocacy
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LESOTHO: ‘We need constitutional protections for press freedom and access to information’
CIVICUS speaks about press freedoms in Lesotho with Kananelo Boloetse, chairperson of the Lesotho Chapter of the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA Lesotho).Established in 1996, MISA Lesotho is a civil society organisation (CSO) dedicated to monitoring, investigating and reporting on violations and promoting media freedoms and the freedom of expression through research, advocacy, collaboration and capacity development.
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LIBERIA: ‘Anyone who committed crimes during the civil wars should be prosecuted, wherever they are’

CIVICUS speaks about the current war crime trial against former Liberian rebel commander Kunti Kamara with Adama Dempster, Secretary General of Civil Society Human Rights Advocacy Platform of Liberia.
Civil Society Human Rights Advocacy Platform of Liberia is a civil society network that brings together human rights civil society organisations (CSOs) across Liberia to advocate for human rights and bring justice and redress to the victims of human rights violations.
What is the significance of the ongoing trial of Kunti Kamara?
Kuinti Kamara’s trial is significant because it offers hope to the victims and survivors of Liberia’s civil wars, and especially to the direct victims of the atrocities he committed. It is also an indication that no one is above the law regardless of the position of power they occupy.
Kamara is the former commander of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy. a rebel group active in the early 1990s. He stands accused of imposing a state of terror on the population of Lofa, a county in north-western Liberia, during the first civil war from 1989 to 1996, which left a quarter million people dead.
Widespread atrocities – unspeakable crimes – were committed in Liberia. Kamara is charged with crimes against humanity, torture and acts of barbarism. He appears to have been involved or complicit with the forced recruitment of child soldiers, gang rapes, sexual slavery, looting, extrajudicial executions and even cannibalism. Nobody who commits such crimes should be able to avoid judgment.
Kamara is among the second group of people to be prosecuted for their role in the civil wars. His trial has recently begun at a French Court of Appeals in Paris, where he is being prosecuted under the legal principle of universal jurisdiction, according to which crimes against humanity know no borders.
This means that no matter where the perpetrators find themselves, whether in the country where they committed their crimes or anywhere else, they can still be held accountable, and justice can be served. CSOs on the ground have had the opportunity to speak in trials involving Liberians abroad and victims and survivors have had their say. The international community is helping us seek justice by bringing the accused to trial. That makes it unique and important to the quest for justice in Liberia.
How does civil society in general, and your organisation in particular, work for justice and accountability?
Since the civil wars ended in Liberia in 2003, civil society has played a leading role in seeking justice by investigating and documenting human rights abuses committed during the time of the conflict, advocating against the culture of impunity and helping victims, including by raising their voices.
To live in an environment that recognises human rights, we must first deal with unaddressed human rights violations that happened in the past. While we advocate for improving the current human rights situation, we also advocate for past human rights violations to be addressed so we can move forward.
Civil Society Human Rights Advocacy Platform of Liberia is a coalition of human rights CSOs. Along with the Global Justice Resource Project, a global digital platform that connects local CSOs seeking justice around the world, we document war-related atrocities committed in Liberia and work to make sure those responsible are prosecuted.
We understand that our society is still traumatised by the civil war, so we work to create awareness, educate and sensitise local communities on human rights issues. We train local human rights community-based CSOs across Liberia so they can also carry out advocacy work and help victims and survivors.
Advocacy is one of the strong elements of our work, which we use to shift the understanding of human rights issues at the national and regional levels so violations can be addressed. Our advocacy involves engaging with stakeholders from relevant institutions, the government and the international community. We specifically work with foreign governments so that any individual who committed crimes in Liberia during the civil wars can be prosecuted regardless of where they are in the world. Diaspora advocacy is also part of our work.
Over the years we have engaged in the follow up of the recommendations of the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), issued in 2009 and not yet implemented. We also conduct workshops with university students so they can learn about the importance of the TRC’s recommendations and measures the government should adopt to implement them.
We have had the opportunity to engage with the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review process by submitting a shadow report on the human rights situation in Liberia, and with the UN Human Rights Committee, where we participated in the review of the implementation of the TRC’s report.
Have you faced any challenges in the course of your work?
We have faced several challenges in doing our work. As human rights defenders we face continuous risk and are threatened by the very fact that we live among the people who committed the unspeakable crimes we work to bring justice over.
We have been placed under surveillance, followed and monitored by various groups that feel targeted by our work. People working on war crime cases have been threatened directly or indirectly through text messages and on social media. There is no law or policy to protect human rights defenders in Liberia. But because we want to see human rights recognised and respected, we continue to take the risk and carry on our work regardless of the threats.
Following up on the recommendations of the TRC report for more than a decade has also been challenging due to lack of political will and technical and funding support for advocacy around their implementation. Most organisations involved urgently need technical capacity to be able to continue their work.
What are the chances that Kamara’s trial will bring justice?
The Kamara trial has given Liberians hope that when crimes are committed, there is a possibility of justice being done. The fact that charges were brought and Kamara was put on trial made us believe justice will be served. It is also an opportunity for the accused to prove his innocence.
The trial also made us more hopeful that the Liberian government will realise it must urgently implement a mechanism capable of bringing justice in the country. We understand this might take time due to lack of resources and capacity, but a plan should be put in place towards that end. Kamara’s trial highlights the importance of establishing a mechanism in Liberia so that other people who stand accused can be brought to justice and victims and survivors can receive justice no matter the time or place.
The recent visit to Liberia by the US Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice, Beth Van Schaack, was a strong signal of support for our efforts to bring accountability and has given us a sense of hope and of being on the right path to challenging the culture of impunity.
What kind of support does Liberian civil society need from the international community?
We need the international community to encourage our government to live up to its responsibility to bring accountability and justice to its citizens when their human rights are violated. Our government has not shown the required political will so far, but we believe pressure from the international community will make it see the urgent need to hold perpetrators of war crimes accountable. The government should request support from the international community, including technical and financial support to establish a court to that end.
Funding is also needed to set up programmes to support victims and survivors. Most people who were sexually exploited during the wars have not even had the opportunity to seek medical help. So we also need the international community to help us put together and fund programmes bringing trauma counselling for victims, survivors and their families.
Read more here.
Civic space in Liberiais rated‘obstructed’by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with the Civil Society Human Rights Advocacy Platform of Liberia through itsFacebook page.
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LITHUANIA: ‘Civil society must humanise the public narrative around irregular migration’
CIVICUS speaks about a new law enabling pushbacks of asylum seekers at the Belarus-Lithuania border withMėta Adutavičiūtė, head of Advocacy at the Human Rights Monitoring Institute (HRMI).Established in 2003, HRMI is a Lithuanian human rights civil society organisation (CSO) thatadvocates for national laws and policies consistent with the state’s international human rights obligations and works to ensure the effective enjoyment of human rights.
What are the main points of the new legislation allowing for the pushback of asylum seekers?
The amended Law on State Border and its Protection, passed in April 2023, recognises and enables the practice that began in August 2021 of discouraging people from attempting to cross the border at non-designated places and returning them to Belarus once they have crossed the border into Lithuanian territory.
The amended law provides legal ground for pushbacks without the need to declare a state of emergency. Now pushbacks can be carried out on the government’s decision any time it considers there is an extraordinary situation caused by a ‘mass influx of aliens’. A novelty introduced by the law are the civilian volunteer units to support border guards. Both are allowed, under certain circumstances, to use coercive measures. The State Border Guard Service has recently announced a call for this volunteer service.
What are the issues around pushbacks?
According to both Lithuanian and international refugee law, unlawful entry should not be penalised when a person is eligible to request asylum in a country. However, pushbacks are being carried out with regard to people who might have genuine grounds for asylum, such as those coming from Afghanistan and Syria.
Under the amended law, the State Border Guard Service should perform an individualised assessment to determine whether a person is fleeing persecution and is in fact a refugee as defined in the 1951 Refugee Convention. However, the procedure for such an assessment hasn’t yet been established, and there are good reasons to doubt that border guards can carry out an assessment properly. In our opinion, the decision on whether a person has grounds to request protection should be made by the migration department, while state border officers should only find out whether a person intends to seek asylum and register asylum applications.
Our preliminary assessment is that although the provisions of the law shouldn’t apply to people fleeing military aggression, armed conflict or persecution or trying to enter Lithuania for humanitarian reasons, people continue to be pushed back without an individualised assessment of their circumstances and without any human rights safeguards being applied.
How has HRMI advocated against the new law?
HRMI submitted comments to the draft law and alternative proposals, urging lawmakers to refrain from legalising pushback practices and instead ensure access to asylum procedures for all people irrespective of their means of entry.
We also continue advocating for the rights of migrants and asylum seekers by raising public awareness on the current disturbing situation.
Our next steps are to closely monitor the implementation of the new legislation and prepare a comprehensive report based on interviews with asylum seekers. Meanwhile, our colleagues and volunteers from Sienos Grupė provide humanitarian aid to migrants and asylum seekers stuck at the border.
Additionally, HRMI has a strategic litigation programme that includes 17 cases. The purpose of this programme is to seek justice for asylum applicants and call for judicial review of the most pressing legal issues in the Lithuanian migration and asylum system.
What obstacles does Lithuanian civil society working on migration face?
Even though there are no legal restrictions on the work of CSOs helping migrants and refugees, one of our largest challenges is that the public generally approves of restrictive government policies and practices and only a minority support a human rights-based approach in managing increased irregular migration. The government’s strategy of deterrence, constantly picturing migrants and asylum seekers as a threat, has largely influenced the public. Opinion polls conducted in 2021 indicated growing negative attitudes towards migrants and refugees. This is why civil society’s advocacy efforts must focus not only on laws and policies, but also on humanising the public narrative around irregular migration.
Moreover, lack of information makes it difficult for CSOs to assess the full implications of this law for asylum seekers. Official statistics only include the people who were pushed back on specific days, and there are no statistics available of people who were let in and provided with the opportunity to lodge asylum applications. We also don’t have access to demographic data such as countries of origin, gender, age and other individual characteristics that could allow us to identify the specific vulnerabilities of people who were pushed back.
How has the international community reacted to the new policy?
Many international organisations and media outlets immediately contacted us seeking information and requesting our assessment of the situation. A strong statement came from the Human Rights Commissioner of the Council of Europe, Dunja Mijatović, who called on the Lithuanian parliament to reject the amendments and ensure that the legislative process is guided by human rights standards with a robust, human rights-compliant and protection-oriented legal framework. The law was also criticised by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In contrast, the reaction from the European Union has been lacking.
Overall, however, we are grateful for the crucial international support we have received in our advocacy efforts, as well as for legal advice provided by our allies. It is very important they remain engaged and continue monitoring the developments on the border.
Civic space in Lithuania is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with HRMI through itswebsite or itsFacebook page.
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MALAYSIA: ‘Young voters could be Malaysia’s kingmakers

CIVICUS speaks with Tharma Pillai, co-founder and Advocacy Director of Undi18.
A youth civil society organisation (CSO) born out of the student movement, Undi18 successfully advocated for the amendment of article 119(1) of Malaysia’s Constitution to reduce the minimum voting age, allowing people over 18 to vote in the 19 November 2022 election.
How did Undi18 start and what was your objective?
In 2016, my co-founder and I were both studying in the USA and that year’s election inspired us. I came from a sciences and technology background, where most people don’t really care about these things. But seeing democracy in action and our US classmates engage with the electoral process made us reflect on our inability to vote in our home country, Malaysia. It was quite interesting that because they had the right to vote, they felt the responsibility of helping choose the best possible leader for their country.
We started thinking of ways to replicate these practices and bring this kind of energy into Malaysian university campuses. It was only natural for us to focus on the right to vote because voting age in Malaysia was 21, which meant that a high proportion of college students were ineligible to vote. This did not happen in the USA, where the minimum voting age is 18. By 2016, some of our US classmates were voting for the second time in their lives, while I had never yet had the chance. We thought that would have to change
When we did our research, we realised that our demand was not radical at all, and in fact it was long overdue. We were one of only eight countries in the entire world with a minimum voting age as high as 21. We launched Undi18 – which means ‘Vote18’ – as soon as we came back to Malaysia. Our single focus was on the amendment of article 119(1) of the Federal Constitution to lower the voting age from 21 to 18.
What tactics did you use to campaign for change?
To make sure we had a stronger voice, in the first year we ran a digital advocacy campaign, something unheard of in Malaysia, where most civil society work and campaigning take place very much on the ground. We came into existence as a hashtag movement in February 2017.
At the time we were not registered as a CSO. We didn’t have funding. Our team was very small. The campaign was our passion project. But due to effective digital mobilisation, it looked like we had so many supporters. That prompted the media to pick up on our story. We were always willing to work with people of all political leanings.
Many Malaysian CSOs tend to side squarely with the opposition because for a long time our country had one-party rule. We of course worked with the opposition, but we also engaged with other parties. That also made us open to engaging with whoever criticised our movement and addressing any grievances directly.
In addition to the digital campaign, we started off a petition and a memorandum to the prime minister. Unfortunately, we didn’t get too far with the government. We knocked on many doors and talked to many people, but the government viewed young people as inclined to vote for the opposition, so they disliked the idea of lowering the voting age for reasons of political calculation. But we gained traction with the opposition, which raised the issue in their manifesto. This gave us a lot of leverage when the opposition eventually came to power in 2018. They had promised to deliver change on this issue.
How did you engage with the parliamentary process?
As soon as the new government was inaugurated, we tried to convince them to introduce an amendment bill, but there were challenges. No constitutional amendment had ever been passed in Malaysia by a government without a parliamentary supermajority of two thirds, and this new government only had a simple majority. It took a year for the government to finally greenlight the
initiative.But not having a supermajority, the government needed to negotiate with the opposition. We did our best to engage with political parties across the spectrum, especially those in the opposition, to convince them that this was not a partisan initiative and all could benefit, them included. We pleaded with them to support the bill for the sake of young people, democracy and Malaysia’s future. Luckily, the then-Minister of Youth and Sports was a very strong ally of ours and helped us navigate these obstacles.
Thanks to these efforts, in July 2019 this became the first constitutional amendment in Malaysia’s history to pass with 100 per cent of the votes in the lower and upper houses of parliament.
Were there any implementation challenges?
There were postponements and delays. The agreement with the opposition was that the law would be implemented within two years. The two-year timeline was unusual, but necessary due to the technical difficulties entailed by the new automatic voter registration system.
Repeated promises were made that this would be done by July 2021.But another change of government slowed things down, as the new government thought young voters would vote against it. In March 2021, it announced implementation would be postponed until September 2022 at the earliest, but it didn’t provide a clear date.
We campaigned against this postponement and held protests across Malaysia, which grew to include larger issues fuelling public anger, including the economic situation, the shutdown of parliament and the poor management of the COVID-19 health crisis. We also sued the government. We filed a judicial review against the prime minister, the Election Commission and the government of Malaysia for postponing the implementation of the UNDI18 Bill beyond the due date. The High Court decided in our favour and ordered the federal government to implement the bill by 31 December 2021. Due to public pressure that was sustained thanks to the protests, the government decided against appealing the verdict and complied. As a result, the bill was finally implemented on 15 December 2021, and when the updated voter rolls were published one month later an additional 5.8 million voters had been included in the system and 18-year-olds could officially vote in the next election.
What were the main elements of the amendment?
The amendment had three components. First, it lowered the voting age from 21 to 18. Second, it also lowered the minimum running age to 18, meaning you could become an elected member of parliament at that age. And third, it established automatic voter registration for anyone turning 18.
The 2022 elections were the first in which people between 18 and 21 cast their ballots. An additional 5.8 million new voters were added to the electoral roll issued in January 2022. Malaysia being a country of 33 million, this was quite a number.
In Malaysia, ‘young voters’ are defined as those between 18 to 40 years old. After the changes, they account for 51 per cent of the electoral roll, up from 40 per cent. This means young people could make change happen. Malaysian politics are dominated by old people. At one point we had the oldest prime minister in the world – a 93-year-old man. Now for the first time, young voters could be Malaysia’s kingmakers. This is why youth turnout is a key element to watch when analysing the results of this election.
Change started happening even before the polls opened. In the run-up to the election, many senior leaders were replaced with younger candidates in order to appeal to young voters. Overall, the number of young and new candidates increased. And all parties had more youth-centric manifestos, addressing some of the concerns expressed by young people, such as corruption, climate change, the state of the economy and healthcare.
What more needs to be done to make policymaking more inclusive of younger people?
I think Malaysia needs political rejuvenation, and that can be done through education. Our society gives too much power to older people, who of course don’t want to let go of it, whether it’s in government, civil society, politics, or business. To change things, you must train young leaders – but nobody is doing this kind of work. At Undi18 we are doing our best to fill that gap so that young people can take up the space, gain power and get ready to be the country’s next leaders.
We strongly believe that informed voters are integral to democratic success, so we have been working with the Ministries of Education and Higher Education to advance educational programmes to address this issue systemically. We want educational curricula to emphasise democracy so the democratisation process beginsin schools. Some topics such as constitutional rights, human rights and the functions of the parliament are already in the syllabus, but they’re not emphasised enough.
We also have our own programmes. We run outreach campaigns on social media platforms. We are quite active there as most of our target audience is there. We also run outreach programmes in schools and universities to educate students about their rights. And we have corporate, civil society, government and international partners to ensure we reach as many people as possible.
Civic space in Malaysia is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor. -
MALDIVES: ‘We have come a long way, but more needs to be done to further open up civic space’
CIVICUS speaks about the situation of women’s rights in Maldives with Safaath Ahmed Zahir, founder and president of Women & Democracy (W&D). Founded in 2016, W&D is a civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes women’s economic and political participation and good democratic governance in the Maldives through research, advocacy and awareness-raising activities.What led you to become an activist and found a women’s rights CSO?Growing up in Maldives, a small island developing nation, the disparities between men and women became evident to me. I came from a majority-women family and witnessed the personal upheavals that my mother endured and how much my family battled for my education. Returning home after studying abroad was an eye-opener for me. In interviewing for a job, I experienced first-hand the deep-rooted patriarchal culture and the double standards women face on a daily basis. So I decided to put my education to good use: to push for women’s rights and empowerment in my country.I first played a role in creating Women on Boards, a CSO promoting gender diversity in the workplace. This inspired me to try to contribute further to building the organisational infrastructure and community to support women’s economic and political participation in Maldives. The organisation I founded, W&D, is now one of the most prominent in Maldives, with over 300 members, 200 of them aged between 18 and 29.
What are the main women’s rights challenges in Maldives?
Maldives ranked 106 out of 144 nations in the World Economic Forum’s 2017 Global Gender Gap Report. Women are marginalised in the political sphere due to institutional barriers, discriminatory cultural practices and social norms. Despite being roughly half of the population, having a 98 per cent literacy rate and actively participating in political parties, in 2009 only 6.5 of members of parliament were women. The proportion fell to 5.9 per cent in 2013, and again to 4.6 per cent in 2019. Currently, only four out of 87 parliamentarians are women, and few women hold senior public sector roles.
With the passing of the Decentralisation Act, which allocates 33 per cent of local council seats to women, there has been some progress in local governance. The Maldives’ women development committees are an important platform for women to enter into politics and to participate in the decision-making process at local and national levels. But many barriers still limit their fulfilment of their mandate. They should be empowered to achieve true decentralisation.
Women continue to take on the burden of childcare and domestic chores, which makes it difficult for women to engage in economic activities on a par with men. Female labour force participation in Maldives is higher than in other South Asian countries, but women tend to be clustered in low-growth sectors and in lower-paying positions, and they earn less than men. While tourism is the lifeblood of our economy, women make up only seven per cent of the tourism labour force.
Women’s entrepreneurship is generally underdeveloped, and women’s economic contribution tends to be rendered invisible, particularly in major sectors such as tourism, fisheries, construction and wholesale and retail trading. Gendered economic inequalities were exacerbated under the pandemic, reversing what little progress had been made over previous years.
Gender-based violence also remains an entrenched problem. One in three women aged between 15 and 49 have experienced physical or sexual violence at some point in their lives. There is a great need for more and better infrastructure to support survivors.
In sum, a clear female disadvantage persists. Regulatory institutions must be strengthened to solidify existing gender equality gains and mitigate gender inequalities.
How is civil society in general, and W&D in particular, working to address these challenges?
Women’s rights CSOs have been working to address these challenges for several years, through capacity development workshops, advocacy campaigns, movement-building and creating opportunities for women and girls.
Six years on from its founding, W&D has become a leading CSO working to protect the rights and improve the lives of women. We particularly advocate for women’s safety, economic and political leadership and for inclusive democratic governance.
Since 2018, we have conducted an annual capacity development programme to advance women’s leadership and political empowerment in partnership with the International Republican Institute. In three years, more than 680 women aspiring to public office and political leadership have taken part in our training activities. In the 2021 elections for local councils and women’s development committees, 83 women who successfully completed our training were elected.
During the pandemic, we launched a rapid response programme for vulnerable women and girls. In response to the dramatic increase in reports of domestic abuse, we established a domestic violence and mental wellness helpline to help women seek the assistance of the relevant authorities, undertake safety planning and connect them with wellbeing resources. We provided survivors with psychosocial counselling and referred the most urgent cases to emergency shelters or other safe spaces. With a grant from the Queen’s Commonwealth Trust (QCT) we were able to assist 130 women.
Also with QCT support, we worked to improve access to menstrual materials for vulnerable women and girls. Approximately 10,500 sanitary materials were distributed as part of our rapid response programme. We have just received additional support to continue our rapid response programme. We expect to assist at least 240 more women and girls within the next eight months.
Additionally, in partnership with the Commonwealth Foundation we have hosted multi-stakeholder discussions and consultations with vulnerable populations, relevant government bodies and CSOs to offer policy reforms to address the needs of the most vulnerable.
This year we implemented a project to help strengthen the capacity of CSOs and community-based organisations working towards women’s empowerment and social development in Maldives. We brought together more than 160 people from various organisations.
How has civil society in Maldives joined the recent global mobilisation wave against gender-based violence?
Over the past seven years there have been many street mobilisations, mainly condemning rape and demanding justice for sexual crimes against women and girls and children in Maldives. Protection gaps in rape laws and barriers to accessing justice have perpetuated the prevalence of sexual violence and the lack of justice for survivors. The dire state of women’s safety in Maldives was highlighted by the 2016 Demographic Health Survey conducted by the Ministry of Health, which showed that one in every four women in relationships had faced physical or sexual violence from an intimate partner in their lifetime. In recent years, the Maldivian community has become more outspoken on the issue, particularly amidst the #MeToo movement, where a lot of Maldivian women came forward with their experiences.
Throughout 2020 and 2021, there were multiple street mobilisations spurred by cases of sexual violence and injustice. In early 2020, following a case of sexual abuse of a two-year-old girl by her relatives, outraged citizens protested against rape and urged the government to protect children from predators. The authorities again came under criticism in mid-2020 after a foreign woman was sexually assaulted and the suspects were released from custody, with reports soon following that one of them was in a position of influence. People gathered outside parliament to protest against rape and impunity.
Following the exacerbating effects of the pandemic on violence and abuse against women and girls, protesters rallied again in 2021 The government has taken steps to address these problems. It ratified the First Amendment to the Sexual Offences Act to improve the definition of rape and strengthen investigations, including by removing burdensome evidence requirements. In 2021, it also criminalised marital rape, marking a significant milestone for the women’s rights movement. But there is still a lot of progress to be made in combating the violence and abuse faced by women and children.
How has the space for civil society action evolved over the past few years?
As a relatively new democracy, the Maldives has taken significant steps towards ensuring civic space freedoms, but there is still a lot of room for improvement.
Following the November 2018 elections, Maldives has experienced legislative reforms and a relative opening up of civic space. A commission was established to probe unresolved disappearances. Maldives drastically improved its position in the World Press Freedom Index, moving from 142 to 87 out of 180 countries. This was made possible by reforms such as the repeal of the 2016 defamation law.
While Maldives has come a long way since its first democratic election back in 2008, more needs to be done to further open up civic space. Over the years, human rights defenders have been targeted and subjected to verbal attacks, including hate speech and death threats, while women activists have faced online vilification and threats due to their work for women’s rights.
CSOs are also under pressure from extremists and hate groups, whose influence in limiting the social and cultural lives and roles of women has persisted. There have been instances of religious scholars advocating for girl child marriage and female genital mutilation, and attempts to suppress women advocates who speak out against these grave violations of women’s rights. Women human rights defenders are specifically targeted and face additional and gender-specific challenges, including threats of sexual violence and rape.
What kind of international support does the Maldives’ women’s rights movement need?
We need the continued support of international partners and collaborators to maintain and advance our work to empower women. As our movement is mainly composed of CSOs, we rely on the generosity of international organisations that identify with our mission to be able to continue to run the projects that are making a difference in Maldives.
We also need continued opportunities for dialogue and collaboration with the international community. The exchange of ideas and information among countries and cultures is inspiring and empowering for women and girls in Maldives, particularly in the areas of business and politics.
International support for Maldivian civic space also plays a significant role in furthering women’s empowerment. This is largely achieved by developing the skill sets of CSOs through workshops and programmes run by our international partners and collaborators.
Vocal support from the international community for the Maldives women’s rights movement is also crucial. While we have faced obstacles, CSOs in Maldives have persevered in promoting women’s rights and we will continue to do so alongside our international partners and supporters.
Civic space in Maldives is rated ‘obstructed’by the CIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Women & Democracy through its website or Facebook page, and follow @wdmaldives on Twitter.
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MALTA: ‘People should be able to access abortions locally without the risk of criminalisation or stigmatisation’
CIVICUS speaks about the struggle for abortion rights and the anti-rights backlash in Malta with Break the Taboo Malta.Break the Taboo Malta is a storytelling platform that documents abortion experiences to highlight the lived reality and address abortion stigma in Malta.
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MAURITIUS: ‘LGBTQI+ people no longer need to live with the constant fear of being criminalised’
CIVICUS speaks with Najeeb Ahmad Fokeerbux, founder of the Young Queer Alliance (YQA), about the recent ruling by the Mauritius Supreme Court that declared the criminalisation of same-sex relations unconstitutional.The YQA is a non-governmental, youth-led and apolitical organisation registered in Mauritius that seeks to empower LGBTQI+ people and organisations, promote equality and lead change.
What is the situation of LGBTQI+ rights in Mauritius?
The human rights of LGBTQI+ people in Mauritius have progressed for one and a half decades now. The issue of healthcare for LGBTQI+ people was raised in the National Assembly as early as 1995 with regard to HIV/AIDS prevention, care and treatment. Since then, we’ve seen strides with HIV interventions targeted at LGBTQI+ people with change accelerating since 2008. The Employment Rights Act was passed in 2008, and would later become the 2019 Workers’ Rights Act. The Equal Opportunities Act was promulgated in 2012 and the Civil Status Act was amended in 2021, allowing for the registration of sex at birth of intersex persons as ‘undetermined’.
Yet local organisations, including the YQA, have faced a deadlock in addressing some pressing needs and aspirations of LGBTQI+ people such as the decriminalisation of homosexuality, the recognition of trans people and marriage equality, and it didn’t seem that legislative change would occur anytime soon.
What was the process leading to the decriminalisation of same-sex relations?
Conversations around litigation to challenge section 250(1) of the 1838 Criminal Code, which criminalised homosexuality, started as early as 2014. Numerous community consultations were held, but no queer people were ready yet to take on the challenge. It was a David versus Goliath situation.
Since YQA was founded in 2014, advocacy efforts started making progress with policymakers. Conversations gained new momentum in 2018 with the queer community winning support from international allied organisations. India decriminalised homosexuality in 2018, and with around 65 per cent of Mauritians being of Indian descent, this had a lot of impact. There didn’t seem to be a reason for Mauritius not to follow suit.
In September 2019, with the support of two law firms based in Mauritius and France, three friends and fellow activists and I approached the Supreme Court to seek constitutional redress on the basis that section 250 (1) of the Criminal Code violated our fundamental rights and freedoms and was therefore unconstitutional. Two additional cases followed: one by renowned gay artist Henry Coombes and another one by a young queer activist, Ridwaan Ah-Seek.
But change wasn’t going to happen if we only sought it in court. We had to accompany the legal process with efforts to change the hearts and minds of people. In other words, we had to fight two battles – one in court and another in society – at the same time, while ensuring that plaintiffs remained safe and didn’t lose the courage to continue a legal battle that would take years.
The YQA mobilised the community and funding from donors for this strategic and planned effort. In addition to our lawyers, we got support from the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives, the Equal Rights in Action Fund of the National Democratic Institute, the European Union delegation in Mauritius, Planet Romeo Foundation and The Other Foundation. They supported a range of projects to empower LGBTQI+ ambassadors, provide media training, engage with both the public and private sectors and undertake research. We submitted the results of a research project we conducted in 2021 to the courts as evidence.
The four plaintiffs – two Hindus, one Christian and one Muslim – brought to court our stories as queer people from all parts of Mauritian society. Three of us being public officers, we were able to show the challenges we faced due to this abhorrent law being on the books. We played our part and our skilled lawyers played theirs. One thing led to another, and four years later, on 4 October 2023, LGBTQI+ people in Mauritius no longer needed to live with the constant fear of being criminalised.
What made Mauritius not follow the regressive path taken insome other African countries?
The Supreme Court showed independence, impartiality and sensitivity to human rights. The principle of separation of powers was upheld. Mauritius is seen as a respected political and economic player in the region. We hope we will be an example for other Commonwealth and African Union member states to follow.
However, we recognise that unfortunately, many African countries are plagued by dangerous imported extremist doctrines that are erasing the core meaning of being African. The situation is worse than that when the colonial masters enslaved us, for it is our own kin, people with our same skin colour and the same African roots, who are dehumanising and un-Africanising us, while it is them who are bringing in an imported ideology – homophobia.
What’s next on the LGBTQI+ agenda in Mauritius?
Two issues that need to be tackled are the recognition of trans people and marriage equality. By preparing ourselves and providing there are adequate resources, the YQA will be able to help us overcome these two injustices.
This ruling paved the way for greater inclusion of LGBTQI+ people in Mauritius. But although same-sex private sexual relationships among consenting adults have been decriminalised, it remains crucial to educate queer people and people in general about the ruling and its implications for human freedom, equality, dignity and rights.
What international support do you receive, and what further support do you need?
The YQA works in networks with LGBTQI+ activists and organisations in the region and beyond. This is what makes our queer movement a global one. And it contributes to learning, sharing and lifting each other’s spirits.
Achieving the recognition of trans people and marriage equality will require institutional support, strengthened allyship, the participation of the private sector and sustained funding. At the same time, Mauritius is set on the path to becoming an upper-middle-income or high-income economy, making organisations such as the YQA ineligible for donor aid. Donors have to understand that the overall economic situation does not benefit LGBTQI+ people equally and should therefore continue providing targeted support, capacity development and funding to LGBTQI+-led organisations to continue our work.
Civic space in Mauritius is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with the Young Queer Alliance through itswebpage orFacebook page.
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MEXICO: ‘Civil society is a retaining wall against government malpractice’
CIVICUS speaks with Carlos G Guerrero Orozco, a Mexican lawyer and co-founder and president of Human Rights and Strategic Litigation-Mexico (DLM Mexico), about a recent victory of Mexican civil society in defence of civic space.
DLM Mexico is a civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes human rights and the strengthening of the rule of law in Mexico by providing strategic litigation advice and promoting accountability.
What constraints does civil society experience in Mexico, and how is it working to preserve civic space?
Historically, Mexican civil society has been a retaining wall against government malpractice. For playing this role, which the authorities can find uncomfortable, it has been subjected to restrictions, particularly denial of legal recognition of organisations and their functions.
The state has reacted to the work of civil society by limiting its ability to act as a monitor, watchdog and check on power. In the legal area, it has sought to limit its capacity to undertake legal processes and generate accountability. One way of doing this is by disregarding the legal standing that allows CSOs to initiate appeals for protection and other proceedings to protect rights.
Under Mexican law, CSOs whose mission is to defend the human rights of groups such as children, Indigenous people, survivors of gender-based violence, victims of corruption or public mismanagement and people deprived of their liberty can claim legal standing by virtue of these groups’ special situation with the legal system.
DLM Mexico provides advice to CSOs, collectives, citizen groups, citizen participation committees and human rights defenders involved in strategic litigation cases, providing them with tools to strengthen their capacities in court and overcome obstacles they may face in proving their legal standing in the case.
Another way of constraining civil society is to target CSO authorities and hold them criminally liable for actions taken in the course of their work. This is what happened with a recent reform of the Mexico City Penal Code. The reformed code’s article 256 equated CSO leaders with public officials and specified that public servants – and therefore also CSO leaders – could be liable for corruption offences. By including CSO directors and managers in the definition of ‘public servants’, it extended to them the criminal liability public servants are under.
A particular concern was about the broad and imprecise wording of the definition of the crime of corruption as the conduct of anyone who ‘performs or fails to perform what the law requires them to perform or refrains from performing what the law forbids, in order to obtain an undue advantage of any nature, including financial, for themselves or for a third party’. This undoubtedly opened the door to arbitrary treatment.
The publication of the reformed Penal Code brought concern from various quarters, but particularly civil society, which issued a joint communiqué expressing its alarm.
DLM Mexico filed a request with the Mexico City Human Rights Commission to exercise its power to challenge laws deemed unconstitutional. Days later, the Human Rights Commission filed an action of unconstitutionality before the Mexican Supreme Court.
How was the case resolved, and what do you think its impact will be?
This month the Supreme Court discussed and resolved the case, declaring article 256 unconstitutional and void.
The Court established that, according to article 108 of the Constitution, it is not permissible to extend the definition of public servant to people who do not hold a position within the structure of the state. It also considered that the classification of CSO directors and managers as public officials was potentially prejudicial to their rights and freedoms because it created undue criminal consequences for private individuals. It clarified that the fact they receive public funds does not justify extending the penalties applicable to public servants to private individuals who manage CSOs.
This decision safeguards the rights of CSO leaders and ensures they can continue their work without fear of unfair criminal repercussions.
Although the case focused on Mexico City’s legislation, the ruling put a brake on other states’ intentions to include in their legislation sanctions against CSO staff for their activities, used to silence the voices of civil society. This is particularly relevant in a country where the judiciary is neither robust nor independent.
The Court’s decision is testament to the power of civil society advocacy and the importance of protecting civic space. It is a reminder of our collective ability to challenge and overturn laws that threaten our democratic freedoms.
What other issues are on civil society’s agenda when it comes to the rule of law and democratic freedoms?
Unfortunately, under the current administration there have been several issues that both civil society and the private sector have had to address. The president and members of his party use aggressive discourse towards civil society that is openly restrictive of civic space and hostile to judicial independence and autonomous bodies. The government has restricted access to public information, de-emphasised the protection of personal data, undermined the National Anti-Corruption System and downplayed Mexico’s crisis of enforced disappearances at the hands of organised crime.
DLM Mexico’s agenda has focused on strengthening the National Anti-Corruption System by addressing the problem of underreporting of corruption, calling for registration and transparency of beneficial ownership of companies and training officials to better investigate acts of corruption in civil and administrative matters.
Civil society’s reaction to defend against institutional erosion and the deterioration of the separation of powers was recently seen on the streets when many people mobilised in Mexico City and other cities across the country in the ‘March for Democracy’. A few weeks before the start of the June presidential election campaign, people mobilised against the government’s attacks on the National Electoral Institute, in defence of the independence of the judiciary and autonomous bodies and against the president’s undue influence on the electoral competition and his polarising attitudes.
Although there was no shortage of opposition politicians who tried to exploit it for political gain, the mobilisation was basically a defensive reaction by civil society to government abuses. Before marching, protesters presented a list of demands. However, far from providing any response, the government has hardened its positions even further.
Fortunately, Mexico still has strong institutions, as well as strong private and social sectors that take an interest in public issues. This tempers the risks to our democracy regardless of which party’s candidate wins the presidential election.
Civic space in Mexico is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with DLM Mexico through itswebsite and follow@DLM_Mx on Twitter and@dlmx on LinkedIn.
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MEXICO: ‘Human rights defenders constantly put their freedom and their lives at risk’
CIVICUS speaks with Antonio Lara Duque, a human rights lawyer with the Zeferino Ladrillero Human Rights Centre (CDHZL), about the situation of Indigenous rights defenders in Mexico, and specifically about the situation of Kenia Hernández, a criminalised and unjustly imprisoned woman Indigenous leader.CDHZL is a civil society organisation in the state of Mexico that accompanies the struggles of Indigenous communities, native peoples and collectives who are seeking a dignified life by claiming and exercising their human rights.
Who is Kenia Hernández, and why is she detained?
Kenia is an Indigenous Amuzga young woman. She is 32 years old. She is the coordinator of the Zapata Vive Libertarian Collective, which promotes peaceful resistance against the neoliberal development model. She is a lawyer by training, a self-identified feminist and is dedicated to defending human rights, and specifically to defending people imprisoned for political reasons, looking for missing people with the goal of finding them alive and giving legal support to female victims of violence.
Kenia was arrested on 18 October 2020 under accusations of attacks on a public thoroughfare and robbery with violence. She was charged with serious crimes to ensure she could be kept in the most terrible maximum-security prison for women in all of Mexico.
On 15 March 2022 the trial court in Ecatepec, in the state of Mexico, will determine whether she is guilty or innocent in one of the five criminal cases against her. All these cases were fabricated with the sole purpose of isolating her and preventing her from continuing mobilising, as well as to send a signal of exemplary punishment to all those people she managed to bring together into a nationwide movement that questioned the private management of highways.
Is Kenia’s case part of a broader trend of criminalisation of Indigenous defenders in Mexico?
Indeed, Kenia’s case reveals that the Mexican state has a clear policy of a ‘pedagogy of punishment’, for two reasons.
First, it sends a signal to the people who protest, and particularly to those who protest against the privatisation of highways, that they should no longer resort to public demonstrations as a form of social mobilisation, because if they do, they will bring upon themselves an unjust and cruel imprisonment such as the one experienced by Kenia.
Second, Mexican state officials are trying to subdue and bend the will of Kenia, to punish her for protesting, but also to weaken her convictions, to subdue the energy and strength she puts into protest, to let her know who is in charge and who must obey. As she has not submitted to them, they continue to keep her in prison. They know that if she is released she will go back to her activism.
Both situations are seriously worrying, because they seek to reverse decades of social struggles and opening of democratic spaces.
What is civil society, and specifically CDHZL, doing to secure her release?
CDHZL is dedicated to disseminating, promoting and defending the human rights of peoples, organisations and human rights defenders. We defend the environment, land and territory, the human right to water and Indigenous culture. And we focus particularly on the protection of human rights defenders, since in Mexico these are people who constantly put their freedom and their lives at risk.
Part of our work consists in providing legal defence to human rights defenders who are unjustly criminalised and imprisoned for the peaceful defence of their rights. In its 10 years of existence, CDHZL has helped around 250 people regain their freedom.
We hope that soon Kenia will be another of them. Mexican civil society has given a lot of visibility to her case, putting her criminalisation on the public agenda and involving key people, in particular Mexican senators, to convince relevant decision-makers to stop criminalising Kenia. We have also tried to bring her case to the international arena, pointing out the punitive policy of the Mexican federal government.
Through its large team of lawyers, CDHZL has sustained a legal defence in the five legal processes against Kenia, with all that they entail: dozens of hearings, challenges and trials of guarantees, some of which we won. But clearly this is much more than a legal struggle, as high-ranking officials are determined to keep Kenia in prison at all costs.
Has there been any improvement in the situation of Indigenous defenders under the current leftist government?
We expected improvements in the situation of Indigenous peoples and human rights defenders and collective rights more generally, but unfortunately there continues to be a generalised disdain among the federal government, regardless of its leftist leanings.
The government has been unable or unwilling to tune in to the most heartfelt demands of Indigenous peoples. Aggressions against human rights defenders have continued, including disappearances, murders and imprisonments. When it comes to imprisonment, Kenia’s case is one of the most shocking examples of the misuse of the criminal justice system against a human rights defender under a government that claims to be the architect of a ‘fourth transformation’ – a process of profound change supposedly comparable to those of independence (1810-1821), reform (1858-1861) and revolution (1910-1917).
What kind of regional and international support does Mexican civil society need in its struggle for human rights and civic space?
Undoubtedly, international observation, very poorly accepted by the current government, would help recover democratic spaces for social protest and the free expression of ideas.
Appeals to the Mexican government can help sensitise the authorities to the importance of respecting human rights and those who defend them beyond political party affiliations.
International mediation and good offices will undoubtedly be a key tool to strengthen civil society in the defence of human rights, particularly in processes where the life and freedom of human rights defenders and Indigenous peoples’ rights are at stake.
Civic space in Mexico is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with CDHZL through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow @cdhzloficial on Twitter.
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MEXICO: ‘Legal change on LGBTQI+ rights does not bring instant social change’
CIVICUS speaks with Erika Venadero about the recent extension of same-sex marriage rights to all of Mexico’s states and the ongoing campaign to realise LGBTQI+ rights in Mexico. Erika is a sexual diversity human rights activist in the state of Jalisco and a member of the National Network of Diverse Youth (RNJD), a coalition of LGBTQI+ youth rights groups from across Mexico.What work does RNJD do?
RNJD is a space that was born out of the 2019 Consultative Youth Parliament, where a Youth Law was discussed.
As young people we had no legal recognition. We had never been considered as subjects of rights. The people in charge of making the laws and dictating the rules according to which we should lead our lives are adults, even quite old adults, and mostly men. Not surprisingly, they do not understand and prioritise our interests and needs, and instead legislate for adults, and especially for adult men. Hence the need to demand that we be recognised as young people and, above all, as diverse young people.
Only recently has our network become formalised as a civil association. We are only three years old. Nevertheless, we have engaged in the recent process to legalise same-sex marriage.
While most of us don’t wish to enter into a civil union, proving our relationship to a public official with signatures and other formalities, we know there are people who wish to have this experience, and exclusion from this right is accompanied by many other forms of exclusions Even if we don’t want this, or don’t want it at this point in our lives, we know that other LGBTQI+ people do, and that the denial of this right is part of what makes LGBTQI+ people second-class citizens.
What was the process leading to the legalisation of same-sex marriage like, and what role did civil society play in it?
The struggle for the recognition of the symbolic union between two people who love each other – simply two people, as the current law puts it, without any gender markers – began many years ago, and progressed thanks to the work of individuals and groups who pushed to extend this right to all people.
LGBTQI+ people are treated as second-class citizens simply because we do not comply with socially established norms that privilege heterosexual relationships. Laws are written and implemented, and all political and social spaces are created, occupied and run by heterosexual people. So this struggle began with a reflection about our lack of representation and visibility in various spaces: personal, political, social and work-related, among others. We have the right to live a full life, but the hegemonic practices that are imposed on us prevent us from living a free life due to the simple fact that we are who we are and love who we love.
The legalisation of equal marriage in Mexico has been a victory for civil society, and specifically for LGBTQI+ collectives and their allies working with LGBTQI+ people day in and day out. Through their daily work on the streets and in every space, they shifted opinions and reached agreements for the recognition of our rights to be taken forward to the political level of decision making.
That is why RNJD has been present throughout the process, from the early drafts of the law to parliamentary debates and votes. These are debates that can go on for a long time. As they deal with ‘sensitive’ issues, some political sectors will try to postpone votes indefinitely in the hope that the issue will fade into oblivion. That is why it was important for RNJD to stand firm to demand these bills be discussed and voted on. We will continue to stand firm for the laws to be implemented.
Have you faced anti-rights campaigns or any other form of backlash?
Every time LGBTQI+-related news comes out, the response is an avalanche of diversophobic comments. Our very nature makes some people uncomfortable. All our lives we have been forced to live under heterosexual norms, so we have faced anti-rights expressions for as long as we can remember.
During the recent process to change the law we have faced an intense anti-rights campaign. Not only do anti-rights groups insult and attack us, they also denounce our publications on social media and have sometimes managed to have them removed. We activists suffer constant personal attacks and our social media accounts are frequently blocked. In my case, for instance, an anti-rights group once attacked me so much and reported my profile so many times that Facebook took it down. It’s really hard to understand what it is that bothers them so much.
Lots of people express hatred towards us. Many keep close watch of everything we do and every single thing we upload, both on the RNJD page and on our personal accounts.
Clearly people already know who we are and what we do. The network is extremely active and visible in social, political and cultural spheres. We have had very tense internal discussions about the double-edge sword of visibility. Our work has made us visible to both those who hate us and those who are willing to get information, learn about our work, understand what we are about and eventually support us. I prefer to focus on those who come to us for information rather than those who throw their hatred at us.
To confront anti-rights movements and hate speech, our strategy is to generate alternative narratives. We even use humour to disarm their arguments. For instance, we suggest that they love the traditional heterosexual family so much that they feel like having two of those – a reference to infidelities and what is colloquially known in Mexico as the ‘big house’ and the ‘small house’. These response mechanisms have helped us provoke dialogue.
What are the next steps after the legalisation of same-sex marriage in Jalisco?
The idea that equal marriage is now legal in all Mexican states and LGBTQI+ people can marry just about everywhere is simply not true.
Although the bill has been voted into law in Jalisco, the civil registry manual continues to define marriage as a union between a man and a woman. As long as local legislators do not change this, many civil registry officials will continue to resort to this text to deny LGBTQI+ people access to equal marriage.
In addition, several Mexican states have passed and implemented equal marriage laws years ago, despite which many obstacles still remain. Legal change does not bring instant social change. Hence the importance of continuing to focus on cultural change. Laws can change very quickly, and they do change overnight, but culture does not, and we must not forget that those who manage civil registries are people who have been socialised in a certain culture. Even if they are public servants and must apply the rules emanating from the state, they may also have particular religious or moral convictions. Changing these takes time. The process of cultural change is extremely slow, but we need it to happen to unlock all the locks.
What other challenges do LGBTQI+ people face in Mexico, and what else needs to change?
LGBTQI+ people in Mexico face many, many challenges, largely as a product of overlapping vulnerabilities and inequalities. For example, the same issues that affect women in general also affect LGBTQI+ women: the fact that we are lesbian, bisexual or transgender does not mean that we are not women and cannot become pregnant. But in most of Mexico it is still not legal to voluntarily terminate a pregnancy, despite what the Supreme Court has said about it.
Another huge problem in Mexico is that of enforced disappearances. Jalisco, my state, is one of the states with the highest numbers of disappeared people – and LGBTQI+ people are among the disappeared.
Another pending issue is the Care Act, currently blocked in Congress. LGBTQI+ people need safe spaces to inhabit, grow up and grow old. All our research, all our statistics indicate that LGBTQI+ people in Mexico are alone and largely unsupported.
A specific problem for LGBTQI+ people is so-called ‘conversion therapies’. These consist of inhumane and degrading acts aimed at suppressing diverse sexual orientation, that is, aimed at eliminating our true selves. I have personally experienced ‘corrective rape’. My aggressors, people who claimed to be followers of the word of God, told me that they were ‘making me a woman’.
Centres offering ‘conversion therapy’ operate throughout Mexico and do so legally. Legislation is currently being discussed at the national level to put an end to these therapies, but in the meantime these places continue to operate. In Jalisco, the centres that carry out these practices only need to register and pay a monthly fee. A simple formality and payment enables them to commit countless atrocities.
Another pending issue is that of the recognition of gender identity, especially regarding children. Several states have laws granting trans people legal recognition of their self-perceived identity, but many more have not yet started moving in that direction.
As much as we continue to fight and mobilise, we may not see all these changes materialise, in which case we will have done it for the generations coming after us. We are creating spaces for the future in the same way that others did for us since the 1980s. We will make sure that things keep moving forward.
Civic space in Mexico is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with the National Network of Diverse Youth through itsFacebook page and follow@RNJF20 and@kika_venadero on Twitter.
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MEXICO: ‘The problem of insecurity is paramount, but it cannot be solved with militarisation’
CIVICUS speaks about the militarisation of security in Mexico and its implications for civil society with Sofía de Robina, a lawyer with Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustín pro Juárez-Centro Prodh.
Centro Prodh is a Mexican civil society organisation (CSO) founded in 1988 by the Society of Jesus with the aim of defending victims of serious human rights violations and promoting structural changes to allow all people in Mexico to enjoy and exercise the full range of their human rights equally. Its work focuses specifically on Indigenous peoples and groups, women, migrants and victims of repression.

What trends do you see in the militarisation of public security in Mexico?
At Centro Prodh we have seen that starting in 2006, with the deployment of the armed forces in the fight against drug trafficking, there has been an increased focus on the use of force by elements of the military sector instead of on strengthening the civilian police with a focus on prevention and prioritising access to justice and the fight against the corruption of authorities linked to organised crime. Consequently, rather than decreasing, violence increased, as did human rights violations.
The presence of the army and its responsibility for human rights violations dates a long way back – it was involved in the so-called ‘dirty war’ of the 1960s and 1970s. However, this trend deepened under the administration of President Felipe Calderón of the National Action Party, continued under President Enrique Peña Nieto of the Institutional Revolutionary Party and further intensified under the current government of MORENA’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador.
Over 80 per cent of the current members of the National Guard – created in 2019 through a constitutional reform and initially under the civilian command of the Ministry of Public Security – come from the military. According to the National Guard Law, the institution performs tasks of migration review and supervision, surveillance and investigation. This is extremely worrying as it is becoming a military body. Practically all of its commanders, both administrative and operational, come from the Ministry of National Defence (SEDENA), which means the National Guard is increasingly subordinate to the army.
Congress recently approved an executive initiative to reform the National Guard Law, transferring its operational and territorial command to SEDENA. This is contrary to the constitution, which establishes that public security should be the responsibility of civilian institutions, as ratified by the Supreme Court.
In addition, in 2020 it was established that the armed forces could continue to carry out tasks related to public security, without making clear how they would comply with the principles of exceptional, extraordinary, subsidiary, complementary and supervised intervention. Initially it was agreed that they would do so until 2024, but Congress has just approved a reform to extend the deadline until 2028, without providing any justification.
All these decisions are evidence of the government’s commitment to militarised security instead of strengthening civilian police forces and state and federal prosecutors’ offices, which we believe would be more appropriate if the objective is to investigate crimes and human rights violations.
Moreover, military presence has been strengthened not only in the area of public security, but also in other areas of public administration, such as customs and ports, as well as in the construction of public works. The armed forces have one of the largest budgets in the public administration and are not subject to adequate controls, even though they have historically been characterised by a lack of transparency and accountability.
The National Human Rights Commission has shown no signs of true autonomy when it comes to military oversight. This is evidenced by the small number of recommendations it has issued despite the abundance of complaints involving the National Guard, as well as its refusal to challenge the unconstitutional legal changes.
The attorney general’s office has also failed to carry out relevant investigations into the matter, perpetuating impunity. Oversight bodies are clearly not a sufficient counterweight to SEDENA’s growing power.
Why has this trend developed?
It is undeniable that the current context is one of unprecedented violence and that organised crime carries great weight in Mexico. It is responsible for many human rights violations, often in collusion or at least with the acquiescence of authorities at all levels. In some places, removing the armed forces overnight would not be the most appropriate measure to take.
It is understandable that both the government and society are concerned about security: it is one of the problems that most affects Mexicans. However, the government has opted for militarisation, indicating that there are no other options available. Meanwhile, it has not taken any steps to strengthen adequate investigations to dismantle corruption and organised crime networks.
The militarisation of security has not yielded good results. It has failed to reduce violence and has perpetuated human rights violations. For this reason, international organisations promote a ‘programmatic’ or gradual withdrawal of armed forces, while civilian forces and access to justice are strengthened. However, these recommendations are not being heeded and the role of the armed forces continues to be increased.
We can’t emphasise enough that action must be taken to tackle insecurity. But it is important to discuss what measures should be employed. We believe it should be done by strengthening the civilian police and improving access to justice, and not by means of militarisation.
How is Centro Prodh working on the impacts of militarisation?
Centro Prodh defends and supports people who have been victims of serious human rights violations, mostly enforced disappearances, torture and extrajudicial executions. We work from a comprehensive defence perspective that includes legal defence, organisational and educational support for communities and organisations, international litigation, campaigns and public policy advocacy.
Militarisation is one of the main focuses of our work because it has a great impact on human rights, especially for people in vulnerable situations and historically excluded people who are at the centre of our attention: poor people, migrants, Indigenous people and women.
Although militarisation has deepened in recent years, Centro Prodh has long worked on cases of serious rights violations due to military involvement in public security. These types of abuses have always occurred, and we do not foresee them stopping any time soon.
It is common that, as in the Tlatlaya case – where it’s alleged senior army officers ordered soldiers to kill suspected members of criminal gangs and survivors were tortured, and which remains unpunished – the armed forces carry out detentions making a disproportionate use of force and resort to torture to fabricate evidence, without being held accountable for it.
We have worked on cases that have reached the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), such as the case of the Campesinos Ecologistas (‘environmental peasants’), two peasants who were defending their land and were arbitrarily detained and tortured by military forces. In 2010, the IACtHR ordered the Mexican state to redress the violations suffered by the two activists and implement structural changes to eradicate the causes of the abuses: to maintain an updated register of detainees with accessible information and control mechanisms, investigate allegations of torture and reform the Code of Military Justice to ensure that military jurisdiction does not apply to cases of human rights violations.
We have also worked domestically on case of torture committed the armed forces – and specifically by SEDENA and the navy – which have often included sexual violence against women, including cases brought by Claudia Medina and Korina Utrera, Denis Blanco and Charly Hernández.
In working with the families of the 43 students who were disappeared in Ayotzinapa in 2014, we have also observed the resistance of the armed forces to hand over information and be held accountable.
In short, our concern about the militarisation of public security stems from our work to document and support action on cases of serious human rights violations committed by the armed forces.
How is civil society responding to militarisation?
Civil society has mobilised against militarisation for many years, and not just under the current government. This has been a longstanding and ongoing concern.
Organisations working on the ground throughout Mexico have documented the impacts of militarisation. The Women’s Human Rights Centre in Chihuahua has done crucial work documenting violations, particularly disappearances perpetrated by the armed forces, and obtained a recent IACtHR ruling in the case of Alvarado v. Mexico, which established that ‘the intervention of the armed forces in public security activities must be based on criteria of strict proportionality, exceptionality and due diligence to safeguard the guarantees established in the Convention, because the fundamental role of the military forces cannot be conciliated with the essential functions of the civil authorities’.
Organisations such as Tlachinollan have highlighted the repercussions of the presence of the armed forces in Indigenous and poor territories. They have worked on cases such as that of Inés Fernández and Valentina Rosendo, two Indigenous women who survived sexual torture by the armed forces, which led to a ruling by the IACtHR.
Many local organisations, such as Fray Matías de Córdova Human Rights Centre in the south of Mexico and Casa del Migrante de Saltillo in the north, have expressed concern about the militarisation of the borders and the National Guard’s conduct in migration-related tasks .
International human rights organisations have expressed similar concerns. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has been vocal on the issue since its first visit to Mexico in 1996. It has issued constant recommendations to successive governments ever since.
So have various United Nations’ (UN) human right experts, such as the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. The Committee on Enforced Disappearances recently visited Mexico and referred to militarisation as one of the main reasons why we currently have more than 105,000 disappeared people.
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has also consistently and emphatically expressed its concern about the military presence and resulting human rights violations.
What alternatives is civil society proposing?
Civil society stands in line with the recommendations made by international organisations, which are very clear: a programmatic withdrawal of the armed forces should be undertaken and civilian institutions should be strengthened – by means of training, funding and a public security strategy that addresses the root causes of the problem – alongside investigative institutions to ensure access to justice.
Unfortunately, instead of following these recommendations, the government has deepened militarisation not only de facto but also de jure, through the creation of a dense legal and institutional framework. This indicates that the trend will be difficult to reverse and will have long-term consequences. SEDENA has always resisted controls and will not voluntarily give back the power it has gained, and it will not be easy for future governments to take it away from it. The possible erosion of the military’s subordination to civilian power opens up a question mark over the future of democracy.
What kind of support could the international community provide?
It is very important for the international community to keep an eye on what is happening in Mexico, monitor the decisions being made, defend civil society in the face of a government that has repeatedly restricted its work and that of independent journalists, and offer support to victims. We need their help so that human rights are placed at the centre of our politicians’ decisions.
Our criticisms are not personal or partisan attacks. Over the years we have looked at the faces of people who have suffered the consequences of militarisation first-hand. The work we do is indispensable in any democracy.
Civic space in Mexico is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Contact Centro Prodh through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@SofiadeRo and@CentroProdh on Twitter.
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MEXICO: ‘When climate activism threatens powerful interests, it is labelled on the same level as terrorists and drug traffickers’
CIVICUS speaks about the role of civil society and its expectations for the upcoming COP28 climate summit with María Reyes, a young human rights and environmental activist from the Mexican state of Puebla.María is part of the Indigenous Figures (Futuros Indígenas) collective, made up of peoples, including young people, from Mexico and Central America. She participates in the global south division of Fridays for Future (FFF), an organisation that fights for environmental justice and advocates for action in the face of the climate emergency.
What are Mexico’s main environmental problems?
Generally speaking, Mexico is very vulnerable to the climate crisis. Water scarcity is a central issue, partly caused by droughts, but also by infrastructure problems, as many people do not have access to piped drinking water, and by very poor distribution and overexploitation of aquifers by private companies. If we add to the existing drought the fact that in many communities there are companies that obtain concessions through non-legal and non-transparent means and appropriate the little water that is left, the situation for people becomes unbearable.
Mexico is one of the most dangerous countries to be an activist and environmental defender. In the southeast of Mexico there is a series of transnational extractive megaprojects, such as the Interoceanic Corridor and the ‘Mayan Train’, which threaten the environment through logging and water extraction, and displace wildlife, expropriate territories and resources, harm people and commit human rights violations. Local communities, particularly Indigenous communities, are criminalised when they oppose these megaprojects that are imposed on their territories without any consultation and without their consent or through the staging of rigged consultations.
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MOZAMBIQUE: ‘The new NGO Law will be the death of the civic movement’

CIVICUS discusses the state of civic space and new restrictions being imposed on civil society in Mozambique with Paula Monjane, Executive Director of the Civil Society Learning and Capacity Building Centre (CESC).
CESC is a non-partisan, non-profit civil society organisation (CSO) founded in 2009 with the mission of strengthening the capacity of citizens and communities to participate actively in socio-economic and political development processes, investing in knowledge sharing, learning tools, monitoring and advocacy for public policies that respond to people’s needs.
What are the current conditions for civil society in Mozambique?
The legal, political, institutional and practical conditions under which civil society operates in Mozambique have deteriorated over time. Over the past 10 to 15 years, despite having a constitution and laws that safeguard and recognise fundamental universal rights, we have witnessed increasing curtailment of freedoms of expression and information, press freedom and freedoms of assembly and public participation. This curtailment has been practised in violation of both the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique and the global and African human rights instruments Mozambique has signed. Currently, legislation is being proposed to silence dissenting voices and people fighting for better governance of public affairs and the protection of human rights.
Freedom of the press and expression has been marked by intimidation, kidnappings and disappearances of journalists, illegal detentions and physical violence, including killings perpetrated with impunity, mainly by police officers and other security forces. In 2021 alone, the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) recorded 23 cases of violations.
In addition to these actions, there have been legislative onslaughts to limit press freedoms. In 2018, Decree 40/2018 introduced inexplicably high taxes for the licensing and registration of media companies and the accreditation of national and foreign press correspondents. In 2020 the decree was repealed due to pressure by MISA and the fact that the Constitutional Council declared it unconstitutional. But in December 2021, the government introduced a bill on media and broadcasting that would further restrict the exercise of press freedoms.
Attempts to deny permission for peaceful protests and control and suppress them have also increased. In 2022, several peaceful protests organised by feminist activists that had been notified to the relevant institutions were interfered with. In many cases activists were rounded up at police stations for no clear reason. People defending human rights have suffered reprisals, ranging from verbal and bodily threats to murder.
Elections, which have never been free or fair, have been the scene of systematic fraud, with violence committed before, during and after voting, and impunity for the state agents involved in it.
Spaces for people’s participation, which became popular in the 2000s, have been losing steam in the face of an increasingly closed political regime. People’s participation in state planning has become dependent on the will of the state official who oversees the area and the locality in question. In addition, we are witnessing a rise in controls imposed on CSOs that scrutinise the government in the areas of democracy, governance and human rights and threats they will be ‘blacklisted’.
Other restrictive measures have included changes introduced in the Criminal Code in 2014, defining defamation of senior state officials as a crime against state security and the approval of the 2022 Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Act, which overregulates CSOs.
Under the pretext of fighting terrorism, yet another proposal that restricts a fundamental right, that of freedom of association, was approved by the Council of Ministers in September 2022 and sent to the Assembly of the Republic, Mozambique’s parliament, for approval in October.
How will this new law affect CSOs in Mozambique?
The draft law establishes a legal regime for the creation, organisation and functioning of CSOs and contains several norms that violate freedom of association, despite this right being safeguarded by the constitution and international human rights treaties. It gives the government absolute and discretionary powers to ‘create’, control the functioning of, suspend and extinguish CSOs.
If the bill is approved, it will legitimise already existing practices restricting civic space, allowing the persecution of dissenting voices and organisations critical of the government, up to banning them from continuing to operate. It will be the death of the civic movement, as only organisations aligned to the ruling party will survive. Party leagues affiliated with opposition political parties and opposition political parties themselves may be at risk of extinction.
Among other things, if passed, the new law would require that statutory changes that involve changes in objectives, activities or even the name of a CSO be approved by the regulatory body, without imposing any deadline for it to issue a decision. It would impose a single template for the bylaws of all CSOs, including details on authorities, mandates, forms of operation, reporting and members’ rights, easily allowing for the criminalisation of their leaders. It would reverse the burden of proof: CSOs will have to prove they are fulfilling their objectives and functioning properly through an annual report submitted every first quarter, and will risk suspension or termination if they fail to submit two reports. This law is intrusive in an area regulated by private law as established by the constitution and also ignores the variety of associations that exist in Mozambique. In addition, it gives the government the authority to conduct monitoring visits, audit accounts, visit implementation sites, demand periodic reports and request additional documentation whenever it sees fit.
Under the guise of preventing money laundering and terrorism financing, the draft law treats CSOs as criminals from the get-go. It is also unclear how these excessive controls could actually result in greater success in the fight against terrorism financing.
Why is the Mozambican government regulating CSOs as part of the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing?
The argument that this law aims to combat money laundering does not hold up, first of all because another law was passed in July 2022, law 11/2022, which deals specifically with money laundering and terrorism financing. CSOs must comply with it and it contains a specific article dedicated to them.
Out of the 40 recommendations issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for states to adopt in the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing, only one – recommendation 8 – pertains to CSOs, and focuses on the possible need to adapt the legal framework based on risk assessment, in order to identify the sub-sector at risk, understand possible risks and develop adequate measures for mitigation and supervision based on and proportional to risk.
Additionally, the FATF has attached an extensive interpretative note to recommendation 8 and has produced a report on best practices, which mentions the need to respect international human rights law, indicates that measures should not disrupt or discourage legitimate charitable activities and notes that actions taken against non-profit organisations suspected of engaging in terrorism financing should minimise the negative impact on the innocent and legitimate beneficiaries of their services.
In October 2022, Mozambique was put on the FATF grey list, but the only action it needed to take in relation to CSOs was to conduct a terrorism financing risk assessment in line with FATF standards and use this as the basis for developing a disclosure plan. These recommendations are also in line with the assessment conducted in 2021 by the East and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, the FATF’s regional partner organisation for East and Southern Africa. But instead, the Mozambican government has presented parliament with a bill to restrict the work of CSOs. The question then is, what are its real intentions?
The Mozambican government is not alone in attempting to pass an anti-civic space law. Several African states are using FATF recommendations and international pressure as an excuse to legitimise breaches of international and regional human rights instruments and their constitutions, relying on the indifference and sometimes even the protection of some bodies that should be defending these rights.
Over the past two decades, in a context of democratic regression and a growing prevalence of authoritarian governments, the African continent has seen many laws and measures passed or proposed that restrict universal rights and civic space. According to Freedom House’s 2022 report, 24 African countries have attempted to pass anti-civil society measures and laws. Twelve have succeeded in passing them, six have failed or given up and six have initiatives pending, including Mozambique.
How is civil society responding?
Soon after the surprise approval of the draft NGO law, national, provincial and district CSOs came together in what is now a movement fighting for the right to freedom of association. Aware that this process is not merely technical, but mainly political, we embraced multiple tactics, from lobbying and advocacy with decision makers in government, parliament and national and international human rights institutions to campaigns to deepen people’s understanding of the implications of this law’s approval.
We also conducted several technical analyses and promoted national and international debates. After many efforts and difficulties, we were able to hold a two-day meeting with relevant parliamentary working committees in November 2022. This resulted in the important decision that there was need for a broad consultation with citizens and social organisations at the national level, as universal and fundamental rights are at stake. Consultations were held in all 10 provinces between 6 and 16 February 2023, organised by the Assembly of the Republic alongside the Movement of CSOs In Defence of the Right and Freedom of Association, and included the participation of over 600 CSOs that were unanimous in rejecting the draft law.
Despite these important steps, we remain concerned about the link made between the urgency to approve the law and Mozambique’s removal from the FATF grey list. This means that even if it does not correspond to what is required of Mozambique, parliament will approve the law as soon as it resumes work next March. Given the defects of the draft law, we think the time is too short for a proper revision that ensures it doesn’t violate the fundamental and universal right to freedom of association.
If it is passed, we will push for it to be declared unconstitutional. We also expect more visible action from international and regional bodies, including CSOs. Given the dimension of the problem, in Mozambique as in the continent, and because it falls under their mandates, we expect urgent condemnation from the African Union, through the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and from the United Nations, through the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on counterterrorism and human rights.
On behalf of CSOs fighting for human rights and democracy, we hope that the solidarity already shown will continue and that we will join efforts to push back against anti-civic space initiatives such as this.
Civic space in Mozambique is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with CESC through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@CescMoz on Twitter.
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NAMIBIA: ‘We have seen some progress on LGBTQI+ rights, but there is a lot of work still to be done’
CIVICUS speaks about recent moves to ban same-sex marriage in Namibia with Kevin Wessels, a young activist and a seasoned consultant and social entrepreneur working to advance human rights in Namibia.Kevin works with several Namibian LGBTQI+ rights organisations, driven by a vision of a just society where everyone, including LGBTQI+ people, enjoys equal rights and opportunities. To that end, he connects with like-minded people and organisations in Namibia, across Africa and around the world.
Namibia has a reputation for being a democratic country with relatively open civic space. Do LGBTQI+ people enjoy the same freedoms as everyone else?
Despite Namibia being a democratic country where civic freedoms are mostly respected, the situation of LGBTQI+ people is mixed: it is better than in many other countries in the region, but legal and social discrimination persist. Namibia has seen some progress on LGBTQI+ rights, such as the recognition of gender identity.
Most recently, in May 2023, Namibia’s Supreme Court ruled that the government must recognise the unions of same-sex couples who married in countries where it was legal for them to do so, even though same-sex marriage remains illegal in Namibia itself. The ruling, which drew mixed reactions in a country that’s socially conservative, was in sharp contrast to developments in Uganda, where one of the world’s most draconian anti-LGBTQI+ laws has been passed.
But Namibian LGBTQI+ people continue to face numerous challenges, so there is a lot of work still to be done.
First and foremost, there is the matter of legal status: same-sex sexual activity remains prohibited under the common law, which Namibia inherited when it gained independence from South Africa in 1990. Although South Africa decriminalised same-sex sexual activity, Namibia has not.
The law criminalises acts of ‘sodomy’ and is applied only to men. While punishment for this offence is not clear, there is evidence of the law being enforced, with over 100 reported cases resulting in more than 50 arrests since 2003. However, consensual sodomy has seldom been prosecuted, so the provision appears to be largely obsolete. Nevertheless, its mere existence is a violation of human rights and underpins further acts of discrimination, and is inconsistent with Namibia’s constitution, which provides for equality and non-discrimination.
LGBTQI+ people in Namibia continue to face discrimination, harassment and stigma, both in society and in their families. This often results in challenges in accessing healthcare, education and employment opportunities.
Key issues on the Namibian LGBTQI+ rights movement’s agenda include decriminalisation of same-sex relations and the establishment of stronger legal protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, equal access to healthcare, including gender-affirming care, educational initiatives and awareness campaigns to increase understanding of LGBTQI+ issues and acceptance of LGBTQI+ people, and firm policies to address hate crimes and violence against LGBTQI+ people.
How are Namibian LGBTQI+ organisations working to promote LGBTQI+ rights?
There are several active LGBTQI+ advocacy groups in Namibia, including Equal Rights Namibia, Drag Night Namibia, Out-Right Namibia and the Namibian Transgender Movement, among others. I am directly associated with several of these. We focus on raising awareness, advocating for legal reforms and supporting LGBTQI+ people.
LGBTQI+ organisations seek to influence policymakers to achieve legal reforms and protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. Some have pursued legal cases to challenge discriminatory practices and establish legal precedents for LGBTQI+ rights in Namibia.
LGBTQI+ groups also conduct educational campaigns and workshops to raise awareness and promote understanding of LGBTQI+ issues among society as a whole. They foster visibility and create community by holding parades and festivals during Pride Week celebrations. They provide support, counselling and resources to LGBTQI+ people facing discrimination, mental health challenges or other issues related to their identity. They create safe and inclusive spaces for LGBTQI+ people to connect and share experiences.
Building a supportive community is a fundamental aspect of this work, and so is the celebration of our achievements. LGBTQI+ organisations celebrate milestones and achievements in the fight for equal rights, such as our recent legal victory, successful awareness campaigns and the establishment of new support networks and safe spaces. We are most proud of the progress we have made in gaining legal and societal acceptance of LGBTQI+ rights and people.
Have you faced backlash for the work you do?
Yes, I have! People and organisations advocating for LGBTQI+ rights in Namibia, as in many parts of the world, often face backlash as a direct result of their advocacy work. This may come in various forms, including discrimination and social stigma, particularly within communities, harassment or threats to personal safety, legal challenges or restrictions and resistance from conservative anti-rights groups that may present legal challenges, disrupt activities, issue statements publicly questioning LGBTQI+ rights and stoke social opposition.
Despite these challenges, many LGBTQI+ activists and organisations in Namibia and around the world continue to work tirelessly to promote equal rights and acceptance for LGBTQI+ people. We exhibit resilience, determination and a commitment to creating a more inclusive and accepting society.
Do you see the anti-rights reaction in Namibia as part of a regional or global trend?
There are domestic, regional and global factors at play. While anti-LGBTQI+ groups across countries tend to raise the same themes and use a shared set of tactics, the level of opposition and the specific issues can differ according to the cultural, religious and political context. Some regions may experience more organised and coordinated anti-rights efforts, while others may face a less centralised opposition. Anti-rights groups often have international connections and support, sharing strategies and resources across borders, although the extent of this coordination can vary widely.
In other words, it’s important to recognise that LGBTQI+ rights movements and their opponents exist on a spectrum, and there is a diversity of views within societies. And while there may be pockets of strong opposition, there are also many people and organisations globally working to promote LGBTQI+ rights and equality. Efforts to advance LGBTQI+ rights often involve engaging in open dialogue, education and advocacy to address misconceptions and promote understanding among these different segments of society.
What triggered the recent initiative to ban same-sex marriage in Namibia? How have LGBTQI+ groups and other human rights organisations reacted, and what are the next steps in this struggle?
In July 2023, the National Council, Namibia’s upper house of parliament, passed a law banning same-sex marriage and punishing its supporters. The bill was aimed at countering the recent Supreme Court ruling that authorised the recognition of certain same-sex unions contracted abroad. Its proponents stated that its purpose was to ensure respect for the definition of marriage as between a man and a woman. The text of the bill defines marriage as a union between persons of opposite sexes and defines a spouse as ‘half of a legal union between two persons born genetically male and female’. It states that marriages concluded abroad between two persons of the same sex cannot be recognised in Namibia and makes the solemnisation, participation in, promotion or advertisement of such a marriage a criminal offence punishable with up to six years in prison and fines up to NAD 100,000 (approx. US$5,200).
This is the fastest a law has been passed in Namibia. It was adopted by the National Council without any opposition, and the National Assembly, parliament’s lower house, also quickly endorsed it. However, it still needs to be promulgated by the president to come into force. The LGBTQI+ community has condemned it as an unconstitutional attack on our rights, but there is nothing we can do to stop the president from signing it into law. We will have to contest it in court for it to be deemed unconstitutional.
What kind of support do Namibian LGBTQI+ organisations receive from international partners, and what further support is needed?
Namibian LGBTQI+ organisations are well connected with international movements for LGBTQI+ rights. We often participate in international conferences, workshops and events to share experiences, strategise together and exchange information, research and best practices to enhance advocacy efforts. Global spaces also give additional visibility to our efforts. As part of its awareness campaigns, for instance, Drag Night Namibia, one of the organisations I collaborate with, recently staged a performance in Berlin, Germany.
International movements help raise awareness about LGBTQI+ issues in countries where there may be limited local support. They show solidarity by condemning human rights violations. In this context, various Namibian LGBTQI+ organisations have condemned the Ugandan government’s laws and actions against LGBTQI+ people.
Additionally, international partners may from time to time provide financial support to Namibian LGBTQI+ organisations in the form of grants or donations to help us carry out our work effectively. But we still need a lot of further support, not just financial but also in terms of the provision of platforms for advocacy and visibility.
Civic space in Namibia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Kevin at and follow@wessels_nam on Twitter andwessels_official on Instagram.
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NEPAL: ‘This landmark decision represents significant progress for all LGBTQI+ people’
CIVICUS speaks with Sanjay Sharma, Programme Director of Nepal’s Blue Diamond Society, about the recentSupreme Court’s order to register same-sex marriages and civil society’s role in advancing LGBTQI+ rights in the country.Founded in 2001, Blue Diamond Society is a pioneering and leading LGBTQI+ civil society organisation (CSO) working toensure equal rights, equal access to public and private services, economic empowerment, representation and protection for all of Nepal’s sexual and gender minorities.
What is the status of LGBTQI+ rights in Nepal?
The Nepalese Constitution recognises the rights of gender and sexual minorities as fundamental rights. Article 12 states that people can obtain a citizenship certificate that aligns with their gender identity, while Article 18, on the right to equality, and Article 42, on the right to social justice, explicitly forbid discrimination based on gender identity or sexual orientation.
Being LGBTQI+ is not criminalised in Nepal, so we can talk about LGBTQI+ issues everywhere, including parliament and government offices. The school curriculum also addresses LGBTQI+ issues. The LGBTQI+ community is diverse, and the number of our allies and of innovative ideas to benefit our community are increasing.
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NETHERLANDS: ‘A strong sense of solidarity endures with those who are left-behind’
CIVICUS speaks about snap elections taking place in the Netherlands on 22 November with Niels Hoogerheijde, Policy Advisor at Partos, the Dutch membership body for civil society organisations (CSOs) working in international development. -
NETHERLANDS: ‘We call on potential coalition partners to stand up for our country’s international reputation’
CIVICUS speaks about thefar-right victory in the snap elections that took place in the Netherlands on 22 November with Niels Hoogerheijde, Policy Advisor at Partos, the Dutch membership body for civil society organisations (CSOs) working in international development.Did the election victory of the far right come as a surprise?
It did come as a surprise. Usually the far-right Party for Freedom (PVV) achieves increasingly good results in the final days of the election campaign only to underperform on election day. This is what we expected to happen this time, so when we saw a PVV poll surge in the days prior to 22 November, we thought the numbers were inflated and its victory was not a realistic possibility – just as with previous elections. This year, however, the PVV did perform as the polls forecasted.
The result may be viewed as part of a wider regional trend. As far as Europe goes, far-right politicians are using migration or blaming migrants for all the crises that their countries are going through. The government of Italy is led by Giorgia Meloni of Brothers of Italy. Support for Marine Le Pen’s National Rally is growing in France. Reform UK, the party launched by Nigel Farage, is also rising in the polls. The common denominator of all of these is the use of a negative narrative about migrants to win people over – and it is working.
How have civil society and progressives reacted to the election results?
The day after the election results were announced, there were various demonstrations across the country in favour of human rights and in solidarity with asylum seekers, LGBTQI+ people and particularly the Dutch Muslim community, who have been the PVV’s main target for years.
The PVV has put forward despicable proposals that are not only unconstitutional but also truly inhumane. People, including in civil society, have strong fears about what could happen to Dutch Muslims, asylum seekers and other excluded groups if we get a government led by the PVV.
In addition, there are worries about the Netherlands’ international reputation. The PVV wants a Dutch exit from the European Union and wants to abolish the entire budget for development cooperation.
How much leeway would a coalition government led by PVV leader Geert Wilders have to implement its promised policies?
Throughout the campaign – and his whole political career – Wilders has made outrageous and even unconstitutional promises of what he will do if elected. But we shouldn’t forget that he will not govern alone. He will need to reach agreements to form a working majority in parliament.
What he is able to do will truly depend on the composition of the government. It is too early to tell because the elections were only three weeks ago. But the government formation process started that same week. Many things have happened since, involving many politicians. I think three parties on top of the PVV are bound to be involved in the new government in some way.
It is very unlikely that the largest party in the current caretaker government, the conservative People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, will not have any role in the future government. It used to be the main ruling party, and even as a junior coalition partner, its presence will still be important. The other two relevant parties are the New Social Contract (NSC) and the Farmers and Citizens Party (BBB).
We might see the formation of a majority coalition including the four of them, or a minority coalition government composed of only some of these parties, seeking the support of other parties on specific topics. For the moment, politicians from all parties are making statements on conditions to work with other parties. Such statements are all part of the negotiation process so they should not be taken at face value but with the strategic goals of the respective party in mind.
What can be done to prevent regressive policies materialising?
Wilders’ proposals range from the ridiculous to the outrageous. They include an entry ban for asylum seekers, the closure of mosques and Islamic schools and outlawing the Quran. In the past, he has also proposed to create a Ministry of Deportation, to introduce a tax on women wearing hijab and to shoot young criminals of Moroccan descent in the knees. All of this is very well documented and most of it is unconstitutional.
His key issue, the one that has made him most popular, concerns migrants and asylum seekers. Wilders wants to shut down the asylum system and not let any new asylum seekers into the Netherlands. By doing this, the Netherlands would breach its obligations under international law to provide safe haven for refugees.
It is crazy to think if he had received a majority of parliamentary seats, these policies would have already materialised. As he lacks such a majority, Wilders must negotiate with other parties. And this is where we and other civil society groups come in, talking with party representatives about policy priorities and people’s needs and concerns. Potential coalition partners can play a crucial role, which is why Partos is calling on the BBB and NSC to stand up for the Netherlands’ international reputation.
We have always been an outward-looking country that prides itself on its international reputation and tries to uphold international law. The city of The Hague, the site of our national government, profiles itself as the capital of international law, peace and justice. If you are truly committed to those values, you cannot abolish development cooperation altogether or do away with international treaties. You must respect the rule of law, the Dutch Constitution and our country’s international commitments.
Civic space in the Netherlands is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Partos through itswebpage and follow @PartosNL onLinkedIn andTwitter.
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NIGERIA: ‘Many families prefer to keep their daughters at home to ensure their safety’
CIVICUS speaks with activist Jeff Okoroafor about Nigeria’s security situation, including the trend of kidnappings of schoolchildren by rebel groups.Jeff is spokesperson for #BringBackOurGirls, a diverse citizen group that advocates for the effective search and rescue of all abducted children and the containment and neutralisation of insurgency in Nigeria.
What’s the security situation in Nigeria’s Kaduna state?
The security situation in Kaduna state is alarming and continues to deteriorate. Kidnappings for ransom and other forms of violence are on the rise. Those primarily responsible for these criminal activities appear to be Fulani herders, organised in bandit groups that have reportedly become affiliated with the Boko Haram insurgency. They are creating widespread chaos and terror in northern Nigeria.
The state’s inability to curb such criminal activity and protect its citizens was reflected in the recent abduction of 287 students. A whole decade after Boko Haram kidnapped 276 high school girls in Chibok, a town in northeast Nigeria, the security situation remains precarious and has even worsened.
Kaduna’s state authorities have proven ineffective in addressing these challenges. Instead of taking decisive action to dismantle these groups, they have opted to pay off insurgents to temporarily halt the violence. This is ultimately counterproductive, as the government submits to blackmail by rebel groups, further undermining security and leaving people vulnerable.
During the recent Eid al-Fitr festival, a video emerged of over 100 armed Fulani herders conducting prayers in Kaduna. Gatherings of such size cannot happen without security agents being aware, pointing to possible complicity by the authorities. This lack of reaction fosters an environment of fear and insecurity.
The ongoing cycle of violence, displacement and ransom-taking disrupts the lives of local communities, contributing to food insecurity as farmers cannot safely work their lands. It is crucial for the government to take a more strategic and robust approach to restore order and protect people.
How have kidnappings affected the situation of girls and women?
Right after the abduction of the Chibok girls, efforts were made to develop strategies to improve security in schools and safeguard girls and women in society. A task force involving community members and government representatives, including the then Minister of Finance, initiated the Safe School Initiative.
This programme proposed to enhance security in schools by installing CCTV cameras, bringing in security agents, putting up perimeter fences and providing secure transportation. However, it never materialised.
Today, many families prefer to keep their daughters at home to ensure their safety rather than risk sending them to school. In northern Nigeria, over 13.8 million children aren’t attending school, and the number continues to increase. Lack of formal education only exacerbates existing inequalities that disproportionately affect women and girls. The situation demands urgent action, but unfortunately the government is not doing much.
What’s the government’s approach to securing the safe return of abducted people?
The government doesn’t have a specific approach. The fact that mass abductions have continued, including the kidnapping of 300 female students in Zamfara state in 2021 and 100 schoolchildren in Kebbi state a few months later, highlights the lack of a real strategy to address the issue. Between January and April 2024 alone, 599 people were kidnapped.
The government is largely reactive rather than proactive, which is concerning. It has not clearly communicated any specific measures. This indicates a significant gap in leadership and a disconnect between its goals and people’s needs.
Civil society, which often operates close to affected communities, is calling on the government to adopt more effective strategies. These include developing a comprehensive plan for the safe return of the remaining 91 Chibok girls and other abducted people. Civil society also proposes establishing a military situation room with civil society participation to enhance information sharing and collaboration in addressing security challenges.
We also demand an end to political interference in security matters, as this has been a barrier to effective action in states like Kaduna. The Nigerian military and police have the capacity to tackle these challenges, yet there seems to be a lack of political will to take decisive action.
There is a pressing need for the government to adopt a comprehensive, coordinated strategy to address the security crisis and protect the lives and properties of its citizens. This includes collaborating with civil society, improving information sharing and taking decisive military and law enforcement actions to dismantle insurgent groups.
How is civil society working to address the problem, and what obstacles does it face?
Civil society organisations are making significant efforts to raise awareness and urge government action, but progress has been slow. Overall, there have been 80 new attacks on schools since the Chibok girls were abducted, resulting in the kidnapping of 1,800 students and 64 teachers.
Nigerian civil society faces significant challenges in doing this work. Freedom of speech is not fully guaranteed, and those who speak out often face threats or retaliation. For instance, members of Bring Back Our Girls, including myself, have faced arrests and harassment for advocating for justice and the safe return of abducted girls.
Ethnicity and religion also divide Nigerian society, making it difficult for people to unite in pursuit of common goals. People tend to support leaders from their own ethnic or religious groups, even when they don’t act in the best interests of the country.
Advocacy work isn’t just challenging due to these obstacles – it’s also costly. Organisations must carefully plan and execute their strategies with very limited resources. In the past, strong international partnerships helped support civil society efforts, but these relationships have weakened over time.
Still, civil society continues pushing for change and striving to hold the government accountable.
What forms of international support does Nigerian civil society need?
In the early days of the Bring Back Our Girls movement, prominent figures such as then-President Barack Obama and First Lady Michelle Obama raised awareness by publicly supporting the cause. Hollywood celebrities, musicians and news networks also played a crucial role in amplifying the movement.
We need to achieve a similar level of international support and visibility. The Nigerian government tends to be more responsive to international pressure, so we encourage world leaders and organisations to keep the conversation alive and help us hold the Nigerian government accountable. This includes asking about the whereabouts of the 91 remaining Chibok girls and demanding action from Nigerian officials.
We urge people around the world to use their platforms to put the Nigerian government under the spotlight and keep these issues alive.
Civic space in Nigeria is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Bring Back our Girls through itswebsite and follow@BBOG_Nigeria and@JeffOkoroafor on Twitter.
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NIGERIA: ‘People experience gross rights violations because of their sexual orientation or gender identity’
CIVICUS speaks about the situation of LGBTQI+ rights in Nigeria and the ongoing impacts of the British colonial legacy with Olaide Kayode Timileyin, executive director of Queercity Media and Productions.Queercity Media is a civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes the rights of LGBTQI+ people in West Africa through advocacy and communications.
What is the current situation of LGBTQI+ people in Nigeria?
Nigerian LGBTQI+ people are marginalised. They experience gross violations of their rights because of their sexual orientation or gender identity, including extortion perpetrated by state actors such as the police and military as well as non-state forces such as local boys, landlords and bosses. Other violations include blackmail, mob attacks, assault and battery.
It is very traumatic to live in an environment that discriminates against you and puts your life in danger. Homophobia is a huge problem. It is disheartening to see cisgender heterosexual people threaten the lives of LGBTQI+ people.
Does Nigerian legislation discriminate against LGBTQI+ people?
Yes, Nigerian laws discriminate against LGBTQI+ people. Two major laws criminalise LGBTQI+ people: the Criminal Code Act and the 2013 Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act. Under these laws LGBTQI+ people are not allowed to get married or carry out their advocacy activities. In addition, their way of life is not considered to be normal because it goes against social norms. As a result of these laws, members of our communities are arrested and their rights systematically violated by the police.
A few states, such as Lagos, also have local laws that criminalise LGBTQI+ people. In the past year Queercity Media has recorded two murders of LGBTQI+ people that were clearly linked to homophobia. In response to these we have held a nationwide digital campaign, with over a hundred people signing our petition on one of the cases.
It is very unfortunate that we have not seen any form of government response in these cases, or any other hate crime committed on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. Instead, rights violations against the Nigerian LGBTQI+ community have only increased. For example, a recently proposed cross-dressers bill further targets and aids the targeting of queer people.
It is clearly necessary to work on the integration and reintegration of LGBTQI+ people as active members of Nigerian society. Criminalisation not only cripples the socio-economical capacity of this population but also disempowers LGBTQI+ people from active participation in nation-building.
What does Queercity Media do, and what kind of backlash have you faced?
We are a community-based media organisation whose four cardinal points are productions, events, campaigns and archiving. These represent our strategic departments, namely Queercity Productions, GLOW UP Pride, Queercity Campaigns and The Nigerian LGBT+ Museum of Arts.
As well as the rights violations that some of our staff, myself included, have experienced at the hands of the Nigerian police because of our work, the comments section of our Facebook page can sometimes be quite scary. This is one of our main ways of being in direct contact with everyday Nigerians, and it is mostly filled with negative comments or aggressive arguments among strangers.
Sometimes we learn from these reactions to better design our campaign language and approach. However, funding is a major problem for us and many LGBTQI+ organisations in West Africa, as no one seems to be interested in LGBTQI+ people, organisations or businesses, so we are often self-funded. Lack of access to proper funding also massively limits the reach we have compared to mainstream media organisations.
How can the international community support LGBTQI+ people fighting for their rights in Commonwealth countries?
Sadly, partnerships across Commonwealth countries on LGBTQI+ rights and movement-building is slow, and I do not know the reason for this. But I believe if we could find organisations doing the same work we are doing in other Commonwealth countries, it should be easy to create networks and partnerships to foster each organisation’s strategic goals in their home countries.
The international community and international civil society could help by recognising the socio-political nuances of working with local LGBTQI+ organisations and the need to be more flexible with their partnership and funding approach. That way, the advocacy work of organisations and activists living in contexts of restricted civic space will be enhanced and they will be able to better promote the rights of LGBTQI+ people.
Civic space in Nigeria is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Queercity Media and Productions through itswebsite orFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@PrideInLagos on Twitter. -
NORTH KOREA: ‘It is time for the international community to adopt a ‘human rights up front’ approach’
CIVICUS speaksabout the activism of North Korean escapees with Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK).Founded in 2001 and based in the USA, HRNK is a human rights organisationwith the principal objective of raising international awareness of North Korea's human rights situation.Is it possible to carry out any form of activism in North Korea?
No form of activism is possible in North Korea. There is no civil society due to an overwhelming and unprecedented level of coercion, control, surveillance and punishment. The markets that emerged following the famine of the 1990s and the newly created domestic mobile phone network allow North Koreans to engage in limited forms of market activity, but even this is subject to state surveillance and control. Every North Korean, regardless of whether they are a member of the ruling party or a government official, belongs to a party-controlled organisation, such as the Youth League or the Women’s Union. Anecdotal information from sources inside the country suggests that there is sporadic opposition and resistance to state agents at the local level, but the regime has gone to extreme lengths to prevent the emergence of any organised opposition.
Have there been any recent changes in how the North Korean regime responds to dissent?
Under the pretext of COVID-19 prevention, the North Korean regime has intensified its crackdown on those attempting to smuggle in information from the outside world or attempting to access such information. In December 2020 the Supreme People’s Assembly, North Korea’s highest legislative body, passed the ‘Anti-Reactionary Ideology and Culture Law’. This law imposes severe criminal penalties on those who access or disseminate foreign content, including movies, dramas, music and books. The penalties are especially severe, up to a life sentence of hard labour, for those who smuggle in or disseminate South Korean media.
How do people manage to escape North Korea?
Leaving the country without official authorisation is regarded as treason in North Korea. To escape, North Koreans need the assistance of religious networks, international civil society organisations (CSOs) and brokers who operate in the China-North Korea border region. The author and journalist Melanie Kirkpatrick has called this escape route ‘Asia’s underground railroad’. In some cases, family members or relatives who have already escaped pay brokers to arrange the escape. The most common route is through China and Southeast Asia. Upon arrival in Thailand, the escapees either choose to go to South Korea or apply for asylum in other countries.
However, since Kim Jong-un came to power in late 2011, the North Korean regime has intensified border security. The Chinese government has also taken steps that make it more difficult for the escapees to move inside China. In addition, the Chinese government has a longstanding policy of forced returns, whereby it repatriates any North Korean refugees arrested in its territory. This violates China’s obligations as a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, since North Korean refugees face a credible fear of persecution upon return.
This, combined with the COVID-19 border lockdown, means the number of escapees reaching South Korea has plummeted. The highest annual recorded number of arrivals to South Korea was 2,914 in 2009, but this fell to only 67 in 2022. The easing of COVID-related measures is likely to result in a greater number of attempts to flee.
What kind of help do escapees receive?
Most escapees choose to go to South Korea, as they are granted citizenship upon arrival under South Korea’s constitution. The South Korean government provides various forms of economic, educational and job training assistance to North Korean refugees. International and local CSOs also help them adjust to life in South Korea.
The situation is still difficult for many escapees, given how different the two societies have become in over seven decades of division. According to the latest available data from South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, a total of 34,000 escapees have resettled in South Korea to date. Refugees who choose to go to other countries, including the UK and the USA, primarily receive help from CSOs and other escapees who have already relocated there.
How do escapees work to document and denounce human rights violations in North Korea?
North Korean escapees play a critical role, given their first-hand experience of life under the regime. Many refugees, including those who are survivors of North Korea’s detention facilities, provide vital testimony to CSOs that seek to document and raise awareness of human rights violations in North Korea. Escapee testimony has also played a critical role in the work of the United Nations (UN) Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea, whose 2014 report concluded that the North Korean regime has committed crimes against humanity pursuant to policies determined at the highest levels of the state. Both the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea and the Seoul office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights continue to work closely with North Korean escapees.
Some refugees operate their own organisations. In addition to documenting and raising global awareness of the human rights situation in North Korea, they are often involved in sending outside information to North Korean people. Methods they use include radio broadcasts, leaflet balloons flown across the Korean demilitarised zone and rice and micro-SD cards in plastic bottles that are floated across the maritime border between the two Koreas. It is also common for individual escapees to send money to family members in North Korea with the help of brokers.
How does HRNK support escapees?
HRNK works closely with North Korean escapees to document and raise awareness of the human rights situation in North Korea. Given the lack of on-the-ground access inside North Korea, we employ a methodology that combines satellite imagery analysis, witness testimony and open-source investigation.
Testimonies are often given by escapees who have already resettled in South Korea, although HRNK has sometimes obtained information through refugees with contacts inside North Korea. HRNK has held consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council since April 2018 and reports to various UN bodies and hosts side events in Geneva and New York. We have facilitated the participation of North Korean escapees at these events to amplify their voices on the international stage.
What further international support do diaspora activists need?
North Korean activists need support from both private and public sources of funding. In general, North Korean human rights activists are overworked and underfunded. ‘Like-minded’ governments such as those of Japan, South Korea, the USA and others display interest in the issue but have often sidelined human rights concerns to focus solely on negotiating military, political and security matters. It is time for the international community to adopt a ‘human rights up front’ approach to North Korea, ensuring that human rights concerns are integrated into every aspect of its interactions with North Korea. Escapee activists will play a critical role in this effort.
Civic space in North Korea is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with HRNK through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@committeehrnk onTwitter.
