advocacy

• CUBA: ‘All tactics used by activists have been turned into crimes’

  CIVICUS speaks about changes to the Cuban Penal and Family Codes and the government’s reaction to mass protests in 2021 with Marta María Ramírez, a Cuban journalist and autonomous feminist.

  

  Photo by María Lucía Expósito

  How do you assess recent changes to the Cuban Penal Code?

  The reform of the Penal Code cannot be understood without reference to last year’s protests. The argument provided to justify this reform referred to the previous constitutional reform: once the constitution was updated in 2019, a reform of the Penal Code was required. But the constitutional process itself was misleading: one would think that a constitutional update is something positive, but this is not necessarily the case in Cuba. The constitutional reform process was confusing: while the rituals of consultation were carried out, the reform was basically imposed. And in terms of substance, the new constitution contains many questionable elements, which are precisely the ones that should have been changed but were carried over intact from the old constitution.

  For instance, while the new constitution recognises the market, it continues to declare socialism as the economic system in place and highlights the ‘irrevocable’ character of socialism. The one-party system remains intact, with the Cuban Communist Party recognised as ‘the superior leading political force of society and the state’ on the basis of ‘its democratic character and permanent link with the people’.

  As a result, other freedoms that the constitution also recognises are rendered meaningless. For example, the constitution recognises ‘the rights of assembly, demonstration and association, for lawful and peaceful purposes, [...] provided that they are exercised with respect for public order and in compliance with the prescriptions established by law’ – but this is the very same law that establishes that the only legitimate political affiliation is to the Cuban Communist Party.

  The same applies to the freedoms of expression and artistic creation, which are recognised if they are exercised ‘in accordance with the humanist principles on which the cultural policy of the state and the values of socialist society are based’, that is, only if they are used to express acquiescence rather than critical thought.

  In any case, on the basis of this reform it was argued that the rest of the legal framework, including the Penal Code and the Family Code, should be updated. In the case of the Family Code, this was really necessary, because it had not been updated since 1975 and was totally out of step with the reality of today’s society. The reform of the Penal Code was also justified by the need to ‘modernise’ legislation and codify crimes that the previous code, which dated from 1987, did not recognise, such as environmental crimes, cybercrime and gender-based violence. But from my perspective, this reform can only be understood in reference to the July 2021 protests and their predecessors: those of 11 May 2019, 27 November 2020 and 27 January 2021.

  To shield the regime from dissent, all tactics used by activists have been turned into crimes of public disorder and crimes against state security, and foreign funding of civil society organisations and the media is criminalised. The aim is to stifle dissident media, because how is a media not aligned with the state to be financed in Cuba?

  Penalties for various crimes have also increased. Not only has the death penalty been retained, but the range of crimes it can be applied for has increased. The age at which a person is decreed criminally responsible is among the lowest in the world. What kind of modernisation is this? For some reason it was decided not to submit this reform to any kind of consultation.

  If we analyse the production of laws in recent years, it is clear that this has been systematically aimed at shielding the regime, which has gone beyond controlling actions to try to control thought as well. This protective shield is completed with the new Penal Code, which seeks to prevent a repetition of last year’s protests and silence all dissent.

  How can we understand the discrepancy between these highly regressive changes to the Penal Code and the apparently progressive reform of the Family Code currently underway?

  The Family Code is also being updated following the constitutional reform, although it should – and could – have been reformed much earlier. The first time I heard about equal marriage in Cuba was back in 2007. Even then there were calls for reform coming from academia, which is where activism linked to gender issues, women’s rights and sexual minorities was concentrated.

  But there was a lot of resistance and it was argued that recognition of equal marriage required a constitutional reform. This was obviously not true: marriage was regulated by the Family Code and not by the constitution, and when the constitution was reformed, this right was not included, but rather purposefully excluded and left pending for whenever the Family Code was reformed.

  The issue of equal marriage was again at the centre of the debate from the moment that, following the constitutional reform, the Family Code needed to be reformed as well, and pressures mounted for this right, not enshrined in the constitution, to be recognised by the Code – something that could have been done in 2007, 15 years ago. But this is clearly the way Cuba is ruled.

  In the draft Family Code that was submitted to consultation no special protection was included for trans children. Nothing, not a single mention, although it is known that this group experiences high rates of school dropout, expulsion from their homes and school bullying, both by students and teachers, experiencing a total impossibility to live their gender identity with guarantees. When trans people grow up, particularly trans women, they are the favoured victims of punitive provisions relating to ‘pre-delinquent behaviour’. This concept is so fascist that it is no longer called this in the current Penal Code, but it will remain in force through other regulations, in the practices of law enforcement officials and in the biases that will continue to exist.

  Why are we discussing these issues now? I have the impression that this is being used as a smokescreen, a manoeuvre to placate a demand without making profound changes to the political regime. These two seemingly contradictory strategies – a regressive reform of the Penal Code and a seemingly progressive reform of the Family Code – both point in the same direction, that of the stabilisation of the regime.

  I say ‘seemingly progressive’ because after a long process of consultations, parliament must now take the proposals received, reformulate the bill and set a date for a referendum to turn it into law. We still don’t know what will remain in the bill and what will be watered down or modified. Nor do we know how this document will translate into the daily lives of Cuban families.

  What positive elements are expected to be included in the new Family Code?

  One of the issues included in the draft Family Code is same-sex marriage and adoption by same-sex couples. Another issue that has been included is that of so-called solidarity gestation, or surrogacy, which until now has been illegal. This of great concern to feminist activists. Let’s remember we are in a context of brutal machismo and feminisation of poverty. How will solidarity gestation be regulated? Even if the law is clear on the prohibition of remuneration, how will it be possible in this context to avoid the development of an informal economy based on the exploitation of pregnant women?

  Another important issue is that of the rights of grandparents to have a relationship with their grandchildren, which has its counterpart in some provisions on parental responsibility, which would include respecting and facilitating the right of children to maintain communication with their grandparents and other close relatives.

  The issue of parental responsibility is key. It replaces the concept of parental authority, bringing a welcome shift from the idea of fathers’ and mothers’ power over children to the idea that parents are responsible for and have a responsibility towards their children. This is very interesting, and yet it has generated uproar, not only from social conservatives but also from political activists.

  This must be understood within Cuba’s political context. Activists – not necessarily conservative ones – feel that the emphasis on responsibility would allow the state to label them as irresponsible so they can take their children away from them, or threaten to do so to force them to desist from their activism. Many activists, and particularly women with maternal responsibilities, have already encountered this kind of threat, with comments such as ‘take care of your children’, ‘we know you have your daughter’ and ‘be careful, do it for your child’.

  But I think this threat is already out there, and under the new Code fathers could also be forced to exercise their responsibilities – something that does not currently happen in Cuba, with the feminisation of poverty being a consequence. As elsewhere in the region, there has been a massive increase in single-parent, female-headed households, something official statistics do not fully recognise.

  Another issue that has been at the centre of discussions is that of the children’s progressive autonomy. We know that punishment – including physical punishment – is normalised in Cuba, and parents make important decisions for their children without consulting them. The idea that parents are able to decide everything for their children until they come of age has changed over time, increasingly replaced by the concept that children progressively acquire the capacity to make their own decisions. I personally believe that as parents we should no longer talk about ‘parenting’ a child, but rather about accompanying them in their learning process.

  An important issue contained in the version of the document that went out to consultation is that of child marriage, added at the last minute as a result of strong pressure from feminist activism and independent media and allies. It is a vital issue, but legislators had not seen it.

  Many of these issues have created controversy, but I don’t think there has been real debate. In a context of high political polarisation, Cuba is not ready for debate. As activists who participated as independent observers have reported, the debates that have taken place in the consultative stages have been misguided and have not been led by people well trained to conduct them. There really is no debate in Cuba; you simply hear monologues for and against.

  What other problems do you see?

  Generally speaking, the problem is not with the contents of the Family Code. Women make up more than half of the population, and if you also count children, adolescents and LGBTQI+ people, the new code would meet the needs of a large majority.

  But we have great doubts about the reasons why it is being pushed through just now, especially because of the way in which some controversies were encouraged that served to obscure the fact that at the same time a terribly regressive reform of the Penal Code was being imposed on us, without any debate.

  In the new Penal Code, everything we do as activists and citizens is criminalised. It is a medieval code. The Family Code, on the other hand, is presented to us as ultra-modern and the result of consensus, which also creates uncertainty about its implementation. But while we have no doubts about the implementation of the Penal Code – we know that it will be implemented to the letter – if the Family Code ends up being as modern and progressive as advertised, I have huge doubts that it will actually be implemented. 

  To a large extent, those who would benefit from the new Family Code are the same people who will be repressed under the new Penal Code. Those who are protesting for the release of activists imprisoned after the 2021 protests are mostly single mothers demanding their children’s freedom. Many of those who took to the streets to protest were poor, Afro-descendants, transgender people and children raised by single mothers. This problem has existed for a long time and there have been no public policies aimed at solving it. There has not been the slightest attempt to make public policies with a gender perspective. In this context, it cannot be expected that the new Family Code will make such a big difference.

  Civic space in Cuba is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Follow@Martamar77 on Twitter.

• CUBA: ‘The only options available are prison, exile, or submission’

  

  CIVICUS speaks with Cuban activist  Carolina Barrero, who has been in exile in Spain since February 2022, about the circumstances driving increasing numbers of Cubans out of the country.

  Carolina is an art historian and a member of the 27N movement, formed out of the protests held on 27 November 2020 outside the Ministry of Culture in Havana to denounce lack of freedoms, the repression of dissent and harassment against the San Isidro Movement, a protest group started by artists. She was forced to leave Cuba in reprisal for her activism in support of relatives of political prisoners held since the protests of 11 July 2021, known as 11J.

  Why did you leave Cuba?

  My story as an activist forced into exile follows the pattern typically used by the state security apparatus to neutralise dissidents. I was told many times that I had to leave or else I would suffer legal consequences and eventually go to jail. I never gave in. I currently have four open cases, for instigation to commit a crime, conspiracy against state security, contempt and clandestine printing. Every single time I was threatened with prosecution and imprisonment if I did not stop my activism. I was urged to ‘stay quiet’, a classic euphemism for subdued.

  On 31 January 2022, I was arrested at aprotest outside the 10 de Octubre Municipal Court in Havana. It was the first day of thetrial of a group of 11J protesters. I was with other activists including Alexander Hall, Leonardo Romero Negrín, Daniela Rojo and Tata Poet, accompanying political prisoners’ mothers who were waiting to see their children from a distance when they were brought to court. When that happened, we all applauded and shouted ‘freedom’ and ‘they are heroes’. State security offices violently arrested us, beat us and put us in a cage truck to take us to different police stations.

  As happened before, state security told me that I had 48 hours to leave Cuba. But this time I was told that if I didn’t, 12 mothers of political prisoners would be prosecuted for public disorder. At first I thought it was just an empty threat, but they told me, ‘for 20 years we have been doing this to the Ladies in White’, a group who have been mobilising for their detained relatives since 2003. In other words, they were prepared to go all the way.

  The Cuban dictatorship knows very well how to put pressure on us using our families and our private lives, because they have us under surveillance and they know everything about us. For instance, they know if your mother has a heart condition so they pay her a visit to force you to stay quiet and not give her a heart attack. If you have committed an infidelity, they threaten to show photos to your partner. If you are at university, they threaten you with expulsion. If you live in rented housing, they pressure your landlords to throw you out. Their tactic is to detect your weakness and blackmail you into submission. At some point you get tired of this life and choose to self-censor.

  These threats were not working with me, so they threatened me with infringing on the freedom of third parties. They knew of my close ties with the mothers of imprisoned protesters and particularly with Yudinela Castro and Bárbara Farrat. Most of these mothers live in very precarious situations and cannot denounce the arbitrariness they suffer. Many have more than one child in prison, sometimes also their husbands, so they are quite alone. When they threatened me with criminalising and imprisoning them, I decided this time I had to leave.

  How different is the situation of political exiles from that of those emigrating for economic reasons?

  In principle, there would seem to be a big difference between exile resulting from the use of systematic repression to punish or neutralise political dissent and emigration motivated by social and economic asphyxiation. However, this classification obscures the ultimate causes of the factors that lead people to leave Cuba.

  Under a dictatorship such as Cuba’s, the root reasons why people leave the country are always political. All waves of exile from Cuba, from the 1960s to the present day, have had a political background: repression by the ruling regime. Not only are political freedoms missing, but all the freedoms necessary for people to be able to manage their own destiny. In Cuba people have no agency over any aspect of their public or private lives; all aspects of life are controlled by the Cuban state, which is not merely authoritarian, but totalitarian.

  No one flees paradise. No one decides to leave their life, work, career and affections to pursue the ‘American dream’. Although in some cases the forced character of exile seems clearer than in others, at the end of the day every exile from Cuba is a forced exile. We flee to survive and to have the opportunity to just be.

  Many Cubans risk their lives at sea or cross jungles with their babies to get to a place where they don’t know the language or the culture, just to be a little freer. In Cuba, if you don’t fit the mould set by the Communist Party, the only authorised party, in power since 1965, you are treated as a potential criminal. Everything is politically determined, from access to education and healthcare to the possibility of earning a living. Economic suffocation also has political causes. So it is misleading to distinguish sharply between political exile and economic migration.

  Following the protests of 11 July 2021 and their repression, it became clearer than ever that the only three options available to Cubans are prison, exile, or submission.

  Like other Cuban activists in exile, you have conducted international advocacy ever since you left Cuba. Do you think this could prompt the Cuban state to rethink its tactic of offering exit instead of prison?

  At the moment, the Cuban state is more concerned about us being inside, lighting the fire of protest, than outside, denouncing repression in international forums. But I think the regime’s calculations are wrong, because those of us who have gone into exile have not forgotten Cuba and are not going to abandon the cause of democracy. And international advocacy plays an important role in our struggle.

  This, which may seem innocuous to the regime, is a fundamental part of activism to end the dictatorship because it attacks one of the fundamental pillars that have sustained the regime: the effectiveness of international propaganda. The Cuban state has allocated enormous resources to diplomacy so that every embassy is a propaganda centre that promotes the narrative, the epic and the myth of the Cuban Revolution.

  To counter the effect of propaganda on international opinion, now Cuba also has a growing army of ambassadors who have witnessed and been part of the latest cycle of protests and can speak in international forums of what is really happening in Cuba. I firmly believe that, to a large extent, the fall of the dictatorship depends on the fall of the myth. This is an important task for us in exile.

  What are the chances of a political transition in Cuba?

  I do not dare to make predictions on such a delicate issue, and one so longed for by Cubans for decades. But I am able to highlight one fact: the Cuban regime has never been as weak as it is now. After the mass protests, the regime can no longer hide the extent of the discontent, which it has historically blamed on a few opponents who, according to its narrative, are funded by ‘the empire’. Social discontent is now evident and massive, reaching all corners of the island and all social groups. The dictatorship no longer has the support of the poorest or of those it claims to defend, but only of the military and bureaucratic leadership.

  It also has a serious succession problem. Since Miguel Díaz-Canel assumed power after being appointed by Raúl Castro, he has not made a single administrative decision that has earned him praise. Everything has been a disaster and he will be remembered as an incompetent dictator with very little charisma. I think the regime spends 24 hours a day thinking of how to fill this power vacuum, since Díaz-Canel has no credibility whatsoever, even among officials, and even demoralises the repressive apparatus. The problem is that they have no one to replace him with, nor do they know how. They could stage a vote, but the situation is so delicate that they know it could easily get out of hand. They could even stage a self-coup, but this is also a very delicate path that could end up being lethal.

  At the current international juncture, Cuba’s position on the Russian invasion of Ukraine makes the Cuban dictatorship, the oldest in the western hemisphere, even more difficult to justify in the eyes of international opinion. Justifying Cuba has become a challenge even for those with a marked ideological bias. Added to these factors are the economic, social and humanitarian crises, all of which threaten the regime and its continuity. Faced with the energy crisis and shortages of basic goods, the Cuban foreign minister himself has requested support from the Biden administration, something totally unheard of. The irony is complete: in Cuba there are people in prison accused of ‘mercenaryism’ for having received US support, and now it turns out that the Cuban government itself has become a mercenary by its own definition.

  What will happen or not, I dare not predict. I believe that the protests will not be silenced and our voices will continue to be heard. I only hope that the democratic transition will come about through a peaceful process rather than violence.

  Beyond overthrowing the dictatorship, the goal – and the challenge – is to build a democracy. For this we will need the support of civil society organisations such as CIVICUS. After six decades of civic and political anaesthesia, in recent years Cuban civil society has awoken and showed that it has the capacity, the will and the determination to move towards democracy. We have an open window of opportunity and, as the Cuban writer José Lezama Lima would say, we have the power for change.

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  Civic space in Cuba is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Contact Carolina Barrero through herInstagram page and follow@carolinabferrer on Twitter.

  Photo credit: Fernando Fraguela

   

• DRC: ‘The United Nations’ peacekeeping mission has failed’

  CIVICUS speaks about the ongoing protests against the United Nations (UN) Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), MONUSCO, with social activists Espoir Ngalukiye and Sankara Bin Kartumwa.

  Espoir and Sankara are members of LUCHA (Lutte Pour Le Changement), a civil society organisation (CSO) that advocates for human dignity and social justice in the DRC. It has played a role in peaceful protests against MONUSCO.

  

  What triggered the anti-MONUSCO protests?

  The eastern region of the DRC has faced security issues for over three decades. People are protesting for MONUSCO to leave because its strategy to maintain peace has failed.

  MONUSCO was deployed to restore peace in the DRC by protecting civilians, facilitating safe electoral processes and fighting rebel groups. But it has been in the country for close to 20 years and the opposite has happened: the number of armed groups has risen, people continue to live in unsafe conditions and innocent lives are being lost despite the presence of MONUSCO.

  It was the peacekeeping mission’s job to prevent that happening, but it has not served us diligently and has proven to be useless. Right now, extremely high levels of violence are causing many people to migrate in search of safety. This alone is evidence enough that the peacekeeping mission has failed.

  Many people in local communities do not have a good relationship with MONUSCO because they believe the mission has not taken up its role to protect them. Civilians’ lack of trust, in turn, makes it challenging for MONUSCO to carry out its mandate. But if it was effective, people would not be protesting against it.

  How have the authorities responded to protesters’ demands?

  The immediate response has been violence by both MONUSCO and the Congolese authorities. We have seen people injured and killed just because they were part of the protests. People are angry because security issues have been ongoing for years, and MONUSCO should have seen this coming: it was only a matter of time before people started acting on their anger towards the mission. MONUSCO should have come up with ways to deal with the situation without people having to lose their lives. 

  As for the Congolese authorities, they have arrested people unlawfully. Most people who have been detained are facing terrible conditions in prison and our concern is that they all get justice. We do not want them to be tortured for fighting for their rights.

  The UN Secretary-General has condemned the violence and called for the Congolese government to investigate it. But the demand for MONUSCO’s departure has not been addressed, and protesters say they will not stop demonstrating until MONUSCO leaves.

  Unfortunately, the Congolese authorities have not addressed our concerns either. From our standpoint, they will be the next to be targeted because they have been elected and are paid to protect us. If they cannot live up to their responsibilities, we will hold them accountable. They must join their voice to ours and ask MONUSCO to leave.

  What is civil society in general, and LUCHA in particular, doing to help improve the situation?

  LUCHA is a CSO that advocates for change in a non-violent manner. We have tried to show people it is possible to advocate for change without using violence. Our members have participated in protests against MONUSCO, which we believe are legitimate and constitutional, so we also demand non-violence and respect for the law on the government’s part. Our country has a violent history, and we would like to change that narrative.

  We are an organisation led by young people who have experienced war and conflict and want to see a better society emerge, and a better future for all. We struggle for Congolese people and their right to have access to basic needs, starting with living in a safe environment. We have members on the ground in the areas where the protests are happening, and their role is to monitor the situation and report on the events taking place.

  LUCHA is using our social media accounts to inform people in and outside the DRC about the situation and how it is impacting on so many innocent lives. We hope this will create awareness and push the authorities to address our demands.

  Our monitors on the ground also work to ensure protesters do not employ violence, but this has proven to be a challenge because most people are tired and at this point they are willing to do whatever it takes to get MONUSCO to leave, even if it means using violence.

  What should the international community do to help?

  The international community has been hypocritical and has always prioritised their own needs. It is unfortunate that the recent events are happening in a mineral-rich area of our country. Many powerful people have interests there and are willing to do anything to ensure they are protected. That is why so few countries are speaking up against what is happening.

  Geography also puts us at a disadvantage. Maybe if we were Ukraine our voices would have mattered but we are the DRC, and international players only care about our resources and not our people. But the people who are getting killed in the DRC are human beings who have families and lives and dreams just like the ones being killed in Ukraine.

  The international community must understand that we need peace and security, and that MONUSCO has failed to deliver and needs to leave our country. It must listen to the voice of the people who are sovereign. Listening to the people will be the only way to stop the protests. Trying to stop them any other way will lead to more violence and more deaths.

  Civic space in the DRC is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with LUCHA through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@luchaRDC on Twitter. 

• EGYPT: ‘Activists who work from abroad are being targeted through their families’

  

  CIVICUS speaksabout the ongoing repression of dissent in EgyptwithAhmed Attalla, Executive Director of the Egyptian Front for Human Rights (EFHR).

  Founded in 2017 and registered in the Czech Republic, EFHR is a civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes human rights in Egypt, with a specific focus on criminal justice, through advocacy, research and legal support.

  What are the conditions for civil society in Egypt?

  Civic space in Egypt has remained highly restricted for the past decade, with the authorities consistently targeting civil society activists, journalists, political dissidents and human rights advocates.

  The 2019 NGO law restricts the rights of CSOs. It mandates their registration and enables the government and security forces to interfere in their operations and order the cessation of activities deemed sensitive by the government, such as monitoring human rights conditions and denouncing violations. Organisations registered under this law may also face funding restrictions.

  Some CSOs had to shut down because the authorities targeted them with counter-terrorist measures or prosecuted their directors in Case no. 173 of 2011, commonly known as the ‘Foreign Funding Case’. In some instances, the directors of these organisations were prohibited from leaving the country and their assets were frozen. Some courageous organisations have persisted in their work even in the face of attacks against their directors and staff.

  In September 2021, the government launched the National Human Rights Strategy, a propaganda tool aimed at concealing the human rights crisis ahead of hosting the COP27 climate summit in 2022. As part of this initiative, it took steps to release some political prisoners and engaged in a national dialogue that contained a broader spectrum of political actors, including civil society representatives.

  How has Egyptian civil society organised in the face of repression?

  Civil society has adapted to the ongoing repression in various ways. Many CSOs have decided to limit their public engagement and abstain from taking to the streets or limit their work to the provision of legal aid while refraining from undertaking research and international advocacy, especially with international human rights mechanisms. Other organisations have been forced to relocate their operations abroad to safeguard their staff and ensure the continuity and integrity of their work, which has had the opposite effect of facilitating their advocacy efforts with international mechanisms and among European Union (EU) member states.

  In response to the continuous pressure, many organisations have started collaborating more closely. In 2019, EFHR coauthored a joint report with eight other CSOs for the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council and participated in the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) session in which Egypt’s human rights record was examined. In 2023, we jointly submitted another report for Egypt’s UPR. We have also engaged in joint campaigns and participated in the formation of coalitions aimed at addressing specific challenges. Egyptian CSOs are increasingly recognising the importance of working together to amplify their impact and advocate for change.

  How does EFHR work in such a repressive context?

  When it was founded in 2017, EFHR was officially registered in the Czech Republic with affiliates in Egypt, where our team of researchers and lawyers provides crucial legal support by attending daily court hearings and working directly with victims of prosecution. We have successfully coordinated work between our overseas office and our colleagues based in Egypt. Our work focuses on issues that are ignored by the Egyptian authorities, including issues concerning criminal justice, detention conditions and gender-based violence.

  We take various security measures to protect the identities of our staff. For instance, our research publications don’t include author names or contact details, and we maintain the anonymity of our legal team. These precautions give us some space to work and leverage our findings and expertise with international mechanisms, by engaging with UN Special Rapporteurs and working groups and collaborating with EU diplomats.

  However, we have also faced some challenges. Three of our lawyers have been implicated in state security cases, facing accusations of affiliating with terrorist groups and potentially engaging in the use of force. We have managed to relocate other at-risk colleagues to ensure their safety. The same is happening to other Egyptian human rights organisations, whose members either managed to flee the country or were arrested and remained in prison for least two years.

  How do you support Egyptian activists under threat?

  We provide legal assistance to those who have been arrested or targeted by the authorities and take measures to ensure activists’ digital security and protect their anonymity, enabling them to continue their work. We collaborate with partners and foreign embassies to put pressure on the Egyptian government, but sometimes this doesn’t work.

  Within Egypt, there are a few tools available to protect our colleagues at risk. Even political parties cannot protect their members in Egypt, so they also face regular detentions. Parties often attempt to exert pressure on the authorities to release arrested politicians but after releasing them the government arrests other members of the same organisations.

  Are Egyptian activists safe in exile?

  Activists who work from abroad are being targeted through their families. For example, the Egyptian-American human rights advocate Mohamed Soltan, who filed a case against former prime minister Hazem el-Beblawi, saw his five family members harassed and arrested as a result of his activism. A German resident, Alaa Eladly, was arrested upon landing in Cairo just because his daughter, Egyptian activist Fagr Eladly, criticised President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi president over human rights abuses at a 2015 press conference between the president and then German chancellor Angela Merkel . The father of Belgium-based journalist and human rights advocate Ahmed Gamal Ziada has recently been detained and accused of misuse of communication, spreading false news and joining a banned group. This strategy aims to silence activists and impose an even higher personal cost for doing their work.

  What can the international community do to support Egyptian civil society?

  To gain a comprehensive understanding of the situation in Egypt it is important to listen to the perspectives of local human rights defenders. Our international allies and partners must exert pressure on the Egyptian government to open civic space, stop targeting journalists, civil society activists and political figures and filing trumped up charges against them, and release all political prisoners detained for defending the fundamental rights to freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression.

  EU member states must revise their terms of cooperation with Egypt to prioritise human rights. For instance, they should include human rights considerations as a conditionality for providing financial aid. It is imperative to strike a balance between the interests of governments and the demands of Egyptian civil society. It is also essential to sustain financial support for Egyptian CSOs, especially now that the economic crisis has also hit civil society.

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  Civic space in Egypt is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with EFHR through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@egyptian_front onTwitter.

• EL SALVADOR: ‘The president’s aim is to concentrate power’

  CIVICUS speaks with Eduardo Escobar, executive director of Acción Ciudadana, an organisation that promotes transparency, accountability and the fight against corruption in El Salvador, about the political situation since President Nayib Bukele’s party won the February 2021 legislative election.

  

  Do you think that democracy and the rule of law are being eroded in El Salvador?

  We should first ask ourselves whether El Salvador ever had a full democracy with the rule of law. If we reduce democracy to its electoral dimension, we could say that the will of the people has been respected and elections have become the only road to power. Despite some irregularities, we have had democracy in that sense. Since 2009, some progress was also made in terms of the balance of powers: we got an independent Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, an independent Institute for Access to Public Information (IAIP) and a prosecutor’s office that was striving to do its job.

  Thus, when Nayib Bukele became president in 2019, there was a functioning electoral democracy, with some important advances being made in the republican dimension and the rule of law. President Bukele interrupted this process, constantly attacking the freedom of expression, the freedom of the press and the freedom of association. In the context of the pandemic, the government illegitimately and unconstitutionally violated the freedom of movement. What little progress had been made was completely lost.

  After the legislative elections held on 28 February 2021, which Bukele won by a wide margin, legal certainty ceased to exist. As soon as the new legislative assembly formed in early May, it dismissed the judges of the Constitutional Chamber and the head of the attorney general’s office. We had come to trust that the Constitutional Chamber would protect us from arbitrariness, but that certainty vanished in an instant. Shortly afterwards, the new Constitutional Chamber enabled the president’s immediate re-election for a second term, so far prohibited by the Salvadoran Constitution.

  Have the opposition or civil society been able to do anything about recent changes?

  The opposition was not smart. Until May 2021 it held an absolute majority in the legislative assembly but failed to take advantage of it. Opposition parties didn’t think they needed to hurry because they never thought they would lose. Now they have become irrelevant. Their presence is merely testimonial because the president’s party, Nuevas Ideas, and its allies have a supermajority. The opposition is limited to making statements and peddling proposals that everyone knows will not prosper.

  Most of civil society has been closed off from participating in the legislative process. It is not that in the past every civil society proposal was approved – in fact, they were often not even discussed – but there were certain thematic areas where civil society participation was vital to pass a law. That is over: now only pro-government organisations are invited and admitted to committee sessions. Independent civil society has little influence over public policy because the government does not understand its role and is unwilling to integrate its input into decision-making. Thus, it has been reduced to a voice of denunciation with no power to reverse illegal or unconstitutional decisions, as there are no independent institutions left to react to its demands.

  President Bukele campaigned on an anti-corruption programme. Has there been any progress in this regard?

  The instrumentalisation of the issue of corruption was one of the bases of Bukele’s victory; his campaign slogan was ‘give back what you stole’. The issue of corruption is broad and complex, but that slogan was clear and precise, and appealed to many people. But it was only a campaign strategy.

  Once in power, he deactivated all existing anti-corruption mechanisms, disregarding IAIP resolutions, preventing audits by the Court of Auditors of government ministries, denying the prosecutor’s office access to public bodies involved in corruption cases, and finally removing the prosecutor and imposing one of his unconditional supporters, who even has legal complaints filed against him. We have no way of knowing the government’s expenditure, particularly those related to the pandemic. The administration has been so opaque that we don’t even have reliable data on how many people were infected with COVID-19, how many were hospitalised and how many died. The government does not provide information, it hides it. And when there are revelations or allegations of corruption, it attacks and defames the whistle-blower.

  How has this situation affected Acción Ciudadana’s work?

  Acción Ciudadana promotes political reform, transparency, accountability, citizen participation and the fight against corruption and impunity. Hence, much of the work we do is monitoring: we monitor political financing, internal political party elections and electoral propaganda; the work of the attorney general’s office, transparency in public administration and obstacles to access information; and the functioning of institutional mechanisms for the prevention, detection and punishment of corruption.

  To do our investigations we need access to public information, but the avenues of access are being closed. For example, the law establishes that information on travel by public officials must be public; however, the government has decided that this information is to be kept confidential for seven years. In this particular case there has been some pressure in the media and on social media, and the government changed its criteria and now withholds this information for up to 30 days after each trip, supposedly to protect the security of the concerned official. This is still illegal.

  When we are denied information that should be public, we can no longer turn to the bodies that safeguard access to information because they are either co-opted or frightened. For example, some political parties – starting with the ruling party – do not hand over their financial information to us. We have repeatedly denounced this to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal for almost three years, but the Tribunal does not accept our complaints. So when a party does not provide us with information, we no longer appeal to the Tribunal, and when faced with an unconstitutional law, we no longer appeal to the Constitutional Chamber.

  We have also lost much of our advocacy capacity. Normally our monitoring would lead to legal complaints and criminal investigations. But nowadays the most we can do is publish the results of our investigations in some media outlets and offer them to the public. We can no longer feed them into institutional processes. For example, we found that in the 2019 presidential campaign a company donated US$1 million to the Grand Alliance for National Unity, Bukele’s electoral coalition, and in 2020 the government awarded that company a public-private partnership contract to manage and expand the airport. We see this as a case of conflict of interest, but we cannot take the issue to the prosecutor’s office or the Court of Auditors and ask them to investigate.

  President Bukele seems difficult to classify ideologically. What is his programme?

  If I had to classify the president’s party, I would say that it is a catch-all party, without an ideologically defined political project. Until he was expelled in 2017, Bukele belonged to the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, and he portrayed himself as a revolutionary leftist who embraced Hugo Chávez and spoke of social justice. Then, as president-elect, he gave a speech at the Heritage Foundation, one of the most conservative think tanks in the USA, and he couldn’t have sounded more neoliberal. He has always claimed that the issues that need solutions were not a matter of ideology, and Nuevas Ideas was set up with the logic that everyone could fit in it, regardless of whether they were on the left or on the right. And that’s how it has been; there’s a bit of everything in there.

  Bukele does not have an ideological programme; his aim is to concentrate power. He can take right-wing or left-wing measures, but not because he has one ideology or the other, but because it happens to be what benefits him the most. For example, most of the pension system in El Salvador is private and he will probably nationalise it, not because he believes that this essential public service should be managed by the state, but because the Pension Fund moves millions of dollars, and the government wants to get its hands on it because it is short of resources, in debt and without further sources of funding, since the possibility of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund has just collapsed. Of course, privatisation is being presented as an act of justice towards pensioners, who receive miserable pensions. Based on this measure, an outside observer might think that his is a leftist government, but this is not an ideological measure, but rather one made out of convenience. The government is driven by the pursuit of political and economic gain, which is why it often appears erratic or improvised. There is no vision to guide the government’s planning.

  What are the causes of the protests currently faced by the government?

  The protests that began in early September erupted in reaction to the adoption of bitcoin as an official currency alongside the US dollar. Many people who support and value Bukele have opposed this measure, because they thought it could adversely affect them. This is the first government measure that has been widely rejected, and I think it was not only because of opposition to the cryptocurrency, but also because of the way decisions are being made, in the absence of sufficient information, debate and participation. Bukele made the announcement of this measure at an event in Miami on a Saturday, and the following Monday the bill was submitted to Congress. By Tuesday it had been passed. Everything was resolved in three or four days, amid total secrecy.

  Unfortunately, the reaction on this issue has been an exception, possibly because it is a subject that many people don’t understand much about, which causes fear. Generally speaking, most people applaud the president, his handling of the pandemic and his Territorial Control Plan, which is a strategy for militarising citizen security. This is because the narrative constructed by the government has been successful. For example, when the judges of the Constitutional Chamber were dismissed – a manoeuvre that civil society denounced as a coup d’état – the government said that the corrupt had been thrown out and many people believed it. There were people who came out to protest, not only from organised civil society, but also citizens in general, but they were a minority. It is difficult to counter the official narrative.

  What support does Salvadoran civil society need to be able to play its full role?

  It is quite complicated. Journalists manage to get information leaked to them and get their stories out, but we are not journalists. To get the information we need to play our accountability role we look for it on institutional portals and make information requests. Any effort to get public institutions to disclose information a bit more would help us.

  We also need support in terms of personal and digital security, as well as in the area of communications, because evidently civil society has not been able to communicate our messages adequately and we have not been able to build an alternative narrative to the official one.

  Civic space in El Salvador is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Acción Ciudadana through itsFacebook page and follow@CiudadanaAccio1 and@esec76 on Twitter. 

• ESTONIA: ‘Legal changes deepen the cultural shift favourable to LGBTQI+ rights’

  CIVICUS speaks about civil society’s role in the recentlegalisation of same-sex marriage in Estonia with Kelly Grossthal, head of strategic litigation at the Estonian Human Rights Centre (EHRC).

  Established in 2009, the EHRC is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) working to create anopen society where human rights are guaranteed by the state, and where everyone knows that their rights, as well as the rights of others, deserve equal protection. 

  How significant is the recent legalisation of same-sex marriage?

  Marriage equality has always been the ultimate goal of LGBTQI+ and human rights advocates. The previous arrangement, that of civil unions, was only a temporary compromise. In 2014, the Estonian parliament passed the gender-neutral Registered Partnership Act, which came into force in 2016. Under this law, couples entering a partnership agreement are entitled to joint property rights, succession rights, shared financial obligations, access to each other’s private information and resolution of issues related to the end of life. However, due to the law’s lack of implementation provisions, many couples had to resort to the courts to be able to actually exercise these rights.

  In 2018, the Supreme Court ruled that, regardless of the lack of implementing provisions, the Registered Partnership Act was in force and was part of the Estonian legal order. It stated that failure to issue implementing provisions did not automatically render the legislation unconstitutional, as some argued. This highlights that even with the Registered Partnership Act in place, the struggle for marriage equality persisted.

  How did the EHRC advocate for legal change?

  Since its establishment in 2009, the EHRC has monitored legislation that impacts on LGBTQI+ people and put forward suggestions to improve it. Our main advocacy goal has always been legal equality. However, we have encountered numerous obstacles, primarily stemming from the political climate and societal attitudes. For many years LGBTQI+ rights lacked support from public opinion, and therefore it was not advantageous for politicians to actively champion the cause.

  We have conducted public campaigns advocating for LGBTQI+ rights as human rights, engaged in research, contributed to public discussions and pursued legal cases through our strategic litigation programme. Strategic litigation aims to have a societal impact through specific cases and narratives. When selecting cases related to the LGBTQI+ community, our primary criterion is their potential to maximise a positive outcome for LGBTQI+ people’s human rights.

  We handled several cases that have improved access to social benefits and adoption rights for LGBTQI+ people and filed petitions for constitutional review of regressive laws. For instance, in 2019 the Supreme Court ruled that a provision in the Aliens Act that prevented the granting of temporary residence permits to same-sex registered partners of Estonian citizens for leading a family life in Estonia was unconstitutional and therefore invalid.

  Many of our advocacy efforts have been planned and executed in cooperation with the Estonian LGBT Association and the Equal Treatment Network, which unites 10 Estonian CSOs dedicated to protecting the equal rights of different target groups.

  How have public attitudes towards LGBTQI+ people evolved over time?

  Just a couple of years ago, the majority of Estonians opposed marriage equality. Resistance could have been influenced by personal values, religious beliefs, or a fear of change. Over the past few years, however, there has been intense societal debate over LGBTQI+ issues. Various video campaigns and petitions have been launched both in support of and against the Registered Partnership Act, marriage equality and LGBTQI+ rights more generally. Unfortunately, this has led to an increase in hate speech towards LGBTQI+ people, fuelled by conservative politicians. But it had the positive effect of making rainbow families more visible, as they shared their stories in response to anti-rights attacks.

  The ongoing debate and increased visibility have played a crucial role in driving cultural change and garnering support for LGBTQI+ rights. The adoption of the Registered Partnership Act and the legalisation of same-sex marriage were two big milestones. Legal changes seem to have further deepened the positive cultural shift.

  For over a decade the EHRC has commissioned public opinion surveys on LGBTQI+ issues from an independent research company, Turu-uuringute AS. According to the most recent one, conducted earlier this year, support for marriage equality has increased by six points in the past two years, with 53 per cent of Estonians currently in favour. Progress has been significant: a decade ago only 34 per cent were in favour and 60 per cent opposed it.

  Civil society has been instrumental in shifting public opinion about LGBTQI+ people, with numerous LGBTQI+ groups and networks organising events for both LGBTQI+ people and the public as a whole.

  The Estonian LGBT Association has been the main organiser of Baltic Pride, the most recent of which took place in the capital, Tallinn, in June, just before the parliamentary vote on marriage equality. It attracted over 7,000 participants from three Baltic states and there were no major incidents. It was a truly joyous march followed by an open-air concert with community artists and a picnic.

  Since 2017, Estonia has also hosted an LGBTQI+ film festival, Festheart, organised by a small CSO. Initially held in the town of Rakvere, by 2020 it had expanded to Tartu, Estonia’s second-largest city.

  Has the legalisation of same-sex marriage elicited any anti-rights backlash?

  As anticipated, there has been a conservative backlash in response to the new legislation. Two parties, the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia and Isamaa (Fatherland), have been vocal opponents of LGBTQI+ rights in general and marriage equality in particular. Their leaders and prominent members have expressed great dissatisfaction with the new law, and some politicians have pledged to reverse it should conservative parties regain power.

  The anti-LGBTQI+ civil society movement in Estonia is closely linked to conservative parties. A few weeks before the final parliamentary vote, conservative CSOs and parties organised a demonstration in front of parliament. Surprisingly, it attracted only a few thousand protesters and was not as visible and large as some previous demonstrations. Nonetheless, protests of this nature will likely continue in some form, although their scale and impact are difficult to predict.

  Do you think progress in Estonia can pave the way for similar developments in other post-Communist countries?

  We certainly hope so! At the same time, it is crucial to acknowledge that each country in our region is distinct, with its own language, culture and political landscape. In the case of Estonia, there’s currently a ruling coalition with all three members prioritising individual liberties, which has provided civil society with a historic opportunity to advance marriage equality. Hopefully, favourable conditions will also arise for our Baltic friends and beyond.

  Meanwhile, we are delighted to share our experiences, both failures and successes, with our regional allies. Although we are a traditional human rights advocacy organisation, we maintain strong connections with LGBTQI+ CSOs in Latvia and Lithuania. We have collaborated on several international projects related to combating hate speech, working with victims of hate crimes and promoting equal treatment.

  What forms of international support does Estonian civil society need to keep supporting LGBTQI+ people and advancing their rights? 

  International cooperation and support are incredibly important. Human rights work can be frustrating at times, and it is comforting to connect with others working in other countries and facing similar societal and personal struggles. While it may sound like a cliché, it is vital to establish connections, share experiences and learn from each other. This process is empowering and fosters development.

  It is crucial to recognise that marriage equality alone will not solve all the problems. Issues such as bullying of LGBTQI+ children, harassment of LGBTQI+ people, anti-LGBTQI+ hate speech, disinformation, intolerance and the denial of transgender rights continue to be pressing concerns. We have seen in other countries that progressive laws and legal precedents can be reversed. Therefore, it is essential for like-minded individuals and CSOs to cooperate across borders. Just as we are currently endeavouring to support the human rights of Hungarian LGBTQI+ people through various actions and means, we hope to receive support ourselves in times of urgent need.

  Civic space in Estonia is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Estonian Human Rights Centre through itswebsite or itsFacebook page.

• EUROPE: ‘The Energy Charter Treaty is having a chilling effect on climate legislation’

  CIVICUS speaks with Paul de Clerck,Economic Justice Coordinator at Friends of the Earth Europe, about the implications for climate action of the Energy Charter Treaty.

  Friends of the Earth International was founded in 1971 by four civil society organisations (CSOs) from France, Sweden, the UK and the USA to campaign together on key issues such as nuclear energy and whaling. Over time it grew to become a federation of 73 groups across the world. Its European arm, Friends of the Earth Europe, is the continent’s largest grassroots environmental network, bringing together more than 30 national CSOs with thousands of local groups. In coordinationwith other European CSOs, it currently advocates for European Union states to withdraw from the Energy Charter Treaty, which is preventing them from adopting and implementing effective policies to address climate change.

  What is the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)?

  The ECT is a trade agreement that was established in 1994, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. A large part of the 15 former Soviet countries had huge oil and gas reserves and western oil and gas companies wanted to ensure for themselves unrestricted access to invest in and extract those resources. So they agreed that the European Union (EU) and all its member states would grant these companies an investor-state dispute settlement system: a mechanism that allows companies to sue governments when they adopt new policies or laws that affect their financial interests. 

  For example, if a state introduces a new environmental or labour law that could jeopardise current or future profits, a company can file a lawsuit. This is especially relevant when it comes to oil and gas projects because oil-extraction facilities are usually operational for about 40 to 50 years, and the expected profit over such a long time can be enormous. 

  Such lawsuits are presented before investment tribunals, which are completely industry-biased as they don’t take human rights, labour rights, environmental rights or other public interest issues into consideration. As lawsuit processes are usually negotiated in secrecy, there is very little information available regarding the amounts of the settlements. 

  These lawsuits have become increasingly frequent in Europe as states have adopted climate transition policies. Companies are resorting to the ECT to claim massive compensation, ranging from hundreds of million to billions of euros. This mechanism not only forces governments to pay for compensation, but also stops them introducing new sustainable energy policies. That is what we call the ‘chilling effect’: governments anticipate they will be sued so they either weaken their legislative proposals, delay them or discard them altogether.

  The ECT is an old treaty that is out of line. Its main purpose is to protect fossil fuel companies, and it’s completely at odds with the Paris Agreement on climate change and the EU’s climate and sustainability agenda.

  Several EU states have recently announced they will withdraw. What happens after a state quits the ECT?

  France, Spain and the Netherlands have recently made such announcements, but the only state that has withdrawn so far has been Italy. Following the announcement, it takes one year for withdrawal to become effective. However, the treaty’s so-called ‘sunset clause’ states that if a country leaves the ECT, investors can continue to sue it for another 20 years. This gives an almost unlimited right to companies and investors and is one of the reasons why we are urging EU states to leave the treaty all together, in a coordinated way. If they did so, they could agree on passing EU-level legislation preventing further investor-state dispute settlement cases. About 90 per cent of current cases involve EU states, so they would gain much better protection this way.

  Over the past two and a half years the ECT has been renegotiated, and in June 2022 member states reached an agreement to reform it. But from the civil society perspective, this is not good enough. First, because it extends protection for fossil fuels for another 10 years. And second, because it would extend its reach to other energy sources such as hydrogen production from biomass with carbon capture and storage, which would result in increasing rather than decreasing risk.

  This is going to be decided within the next month, first by EU member states, and then by all ECT member states. The European Commission, the EU’s executive body, wants EU states to remain parties to the ECT, and it is pushing for the EU as a whole to adopt the modernised agreement. Several states are in favour of adopting the reform as they assess this new treaty as a better protection than the old. Of course, these are states that have been less exposed to the legal risks posed by international investors. On the other hand, there are the states that have been sued, such as France, Italy, Poland and Spain. Earlier this year, Italy lost a case against an English oil company that cost it several hundreds of million euros. 

  Has the war in Ukraine and Europe’s current energy crisis affected the negotiation process?

  Even though Russia is not an ECT state party, there are possible implications to the fact that the EU has taken several measures to restrict the operations of Russian companies. These are partly based in other European countries, which means they could sue European states.

  There could also be other impacts. Most European countries are persistently trying to find new sources of gas and hydrogen and are looking at African markets. Several African countries such as Nigeria are in the process of becoming ECT members, and it is suddenly in the interest of European states to bring them on board. This is having an impact on the negotiation process, although I am not sure it is a decisive one.

  What should we expect to happen now?

  The European Council, which brings together the heads of the 27 EU member states, needs to decide whether the reform will be adopted. It was supposed to decide by 25 October, but because of all the withdrawal announcements it has been unable to do so. Now a decision is expected by mid-November. If the European Council approves the reform, then the European Commission and its members will go to the annual ECT meeting, which will be held in Mongolia on 27 November. That meeting is the second step to move forward on the reform’s approval. The third and final step will be a vote by the European Parliament.

  We are campaigning for the EU and its member states to reject the reform. If we lose, then we will shift our focus towards the European Parliament. For the past two years, its representatives have been completely left out of negotiations and several parliamentary blocs have been very critical about the treaty. So we are still hoping we will be able to stop the agreement in the European Parliament.

  Along with other European CSOs, we have been doing a lot of joint advocacy with European institutions and coordinating actions, messages and strategies across Europe. We must put pressure on governments. The next few weeks will probably be decisive.

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  Get in touch with Friends of the Earth Europethrough itsFacebook page and follow@foeeurope on Twitter.

• EUROPEAN MEDIA FREEDOM ACT: ‘National security cannot justify the use of spyware on journalists’

  CIVICUS speaks about the role of civil society in the drafting process of the European Media Freedom Act with Jordan Higgins, Press and Policy Officer at the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF).

  Founded in 2015, ECPMF is a civil society organisation that seeks to promote, preserve and defend media freedom by monitoring violations,providing practical support and engaging diverse stakeholders across Europe.

  Why was the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) needed?

  The EMFA aims to support media freedom and promote media pluralism in the European Union (EU). While media-related matters have traditionally fallen under the competence of member states, EU-wide action has become necessary due to the severity of the threats media freedom faces across Europe.

  The EMFA was introduced in September 2022 and underwent successive rounds of negotiations, culminating in a political agreement reached on 15 December 2023. It is comprehensive and seeks to address critical threats to media freedom, including the independence of public service broadcasters, concentration of media ownership and the capture of media through the allocation of state advertising, among other issues.

  It safeguards the right of audiences to access pluralistic media sources and establishes a European Board for Media Services, composed of national media authorities that will advise the European Commission on the consistent application of key provisions of the Act in all member states. It also focuses on ensuring the safety of journalists, protecting them and their sources from surveillance and the use of spyware.

  In sum, the EMFA is a crucial tool to address some of the major threats faced by journalists and protect the editorial and market independence of media.

  What did civil society bring to negotiations?

  This initiative aimed to strengthen press freedom in Europe and was widely welcomed by civil society, including us at ECPMF.

  From the early stages, media freedom organisations proposed critical amendments to specific aspects of the EMFA that did not comply with the highest media freedom standards. In particular, we pushed for greater transparency in media ownership, comprehensive rules regulating financial relations between the state and media, including the allocation of state advertising, and full protection of journalists from all forms of surveillance, including spyware. We also advocated for the independence of national media regulators and the European Board for Media Services.

  The process incorporated the perspectives of media freedom experts and journalists and culminated in the final trilogue negotiations between the European Parliament, Council and Commission. One of the key areas of interest for media freedom advocates during these negotiations was EMFA Article 4 on the protection of journalistic sources. In particular, we hoped to see the removal of provisions – promoted by Cyprus, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Malta and Sweden – that included ‘threats to national security’ as justification for the use of spyware on journalists.

  To what extent did the final text address civil society concerns?

  Civil society, particularly media freedom organisations, advocated for a robust version of the EMFA that considered the needs of those most affected by it. Throughout the negotiation process, we voiced our objections to concerns from publishers’ groups and regarding proposed amendments to Article 4, which could have removed legal safeguards that shield journalists from the deployment of spyware under the pretext of national security. Fortunately, the final version no longer cites ‘national security’ as a justification for using spyware on journalists.

  Now our work will shift towards ensuring the effective implementation of the EMFA through active monitoring, particularly in EU member states where press freedom is under the greatest threat.

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  Get in touch with ECPMF through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@ECPMF on Twitter.

• FINLAND: ‘We’ll have the most right-wing government since the 1930s’

  CIVICUS speaks about Finland’s new government with Silla Ristimäki, development policy specialist at Fingo.

  Founded in 2018, Fingo is an umbrella organisation comprising about 270 Finnish civil society organisations (CSOs). Fingo monitors and defends civic space in Finland and around the world with the aim of building a strong, diverse, open, active and free civil society with solid operating capacities.

  What was the relationship between government and civil society like under the government of former Prime Minister Sanna Marin?

  Sanna Marin’s government took measures to promote transparency and the rule of law and improve conditions for civil society. Under the previous government’s programme, Finland took an active role in promoting open government internationally. Several initiatives were undertaken to improve the participation of and dialogue with Finnish civil society to increase transparency, which was seen as an integral part of all national governance objectives. For example, a transparency register was developed in 2023 to keep track of lobbying with parliament.

  The previous government’s programme also aimed to harmonise procedures for tracking civil society funding while respecting CSOs’ autonomy and guaranteeing equal treatment of organisations. The objective was to reduce bureaucracy and increase the predictability of funding. Changes were made in accounting and fundraising regulations that particularly favoured small CSOs. Overall, official development assistance grew quite consistently. Fundamentally, the nature of relationships was about building a partnership between state and civil society to reduce inequality.

  What were the key issues that influenced the outcome of the 2023 parliamentary elections?

  Sanna Marin’s government was a coalition of left-wing parties that pushed, for example, for stricter climate policies and reduced inequalities, including gender-based one. During its term, the Finnish government’s debt grew significantly. At the same time, Russia’s attack on Ukraine resulted in an unprecedented change in Finnish popular opinion regarding NATO membership. So the elections were greatly influenced by two major issues: the severity of government debt and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

  The economic and security conditions increased the popularity of right-wing parties. The National Coalition Party that won the election has been the longest and loudest advocate of Finland’s NATO membership. It also pushed an agenda to urgently reduce Finnish public debt. The far-right Finns Party, which came second, ran an anti-immigration campaign and proposed balancing the budget by reducing climate measures and cutting development funding. On 18 June it was confirmed that Ville Tavio from the Finns Party will be the new minister for Trade and Development.

  The Social Democratic Party headed by Sanna Marin came third. This is politically noteworthy, since the ruling party generally tends to do much worse in parliamentary elections. There was a significant fall in support for The Greens and the Left Alliance, and some experts say that people voted strategically for the Social Democratic Party to try to prevent the emergence of a conservative right-wing government. However, the new government coalition formed with the Finns Party, Swedish People’s Party of Finland and the Christian Democrats will be the most right-wing government Finland has had since the 1930s. Their overall interpretation of the elections results is that Finland ‘needs a change in direction’, and that people particularly want new fiscal policies.

  How much public debate was there around Finland’s accession to NATO?

  There has never been a lot of public political debate over Finland’s accession to NATO. Politicians used to maintain a position that it was never the right time for it, and if Finland were to change its position of neutrality and consider accession to NATO, a referendum would be organised before a final decision was made.

  But the situation changed when Russia attacked Ukraine. Polls showed a significant increase in support for accession, rising to above 60 per cent. Almost no members of parliament publicly raised concerns or expressed an opinion against Finland’s accession. In the end, Finland applied for NATO membership without a referendum being held. It was considered that the polls were a strong enough indication of citizen support.

  What is the new government programme’s stance on civil society and human rights?

  All three parties that received the most votes in the election are largely committed to supporting civil society and recognise the value of safeguarding civic space. The new government’s programme, published on 16 June, confirms that a vibrant civil society is a prerequisite for social development and states that in all its activities Finland will promote the principles of democracy, civil society and the rule of law.

  However, it also states that Finland will reduce the number of refugees it welcomes, control immigration and limit the rights of migrants. It doesn’t mention the issues of loss and damage and climate finance. While it claims that Finland will stick to its national Climate Change Act, which commits it to become climate-neutral by 2035, it also states that this must not be done at the expense of increasing daily living costs or negatively impacting on the market competitiveness of Finnish industries.

  How is civil society working to safeguard human rights and democracy in Finland?

  Civil society works at the local and national levels to promote human rights and safeguard democracy in Finland.

  In regard to democracy, Finnish civil society has a role in providing training for democracy skills (such as decision-making in communities and communication skills); advocating towards policy-makers on a variety of societal issues; as well as working with decision-makers and officials for the implementation of democratic decisions. For example, with regards to social and health care services as well as development cooperation, this last role in implementation is quite crucial. Generally, the basis for the work of Finnish civil society is human rights: concretely this means for example working for the economic rights of vulnerable people in Finland or promoting the ‘leave no one behind’ -principle in development cooperation.

  Fingo has three main areas of work: advocacy, learning and communications. Advocacy is targeted towards political leaders. Fingo undertakes efforts to improve the operational environment and institutional support for CSOs and to protect civic space. The learning component is particularly targeted at building capacity among member CSOs, offering training on, for example, how to improve advocacy, communication and analytical skills and fundraising proposals, or how to mainstream gender. A significant portion of this component is to advance global citizenship education. Communications efforts are targeted at the broader public to uphold and generate further support for human rights and democracy through media engagement and campaigns.

  Following the publication of the new government’s programme, our next step is to re-evaluate the priorities of our advocacy efforts. For example, the new government has left reproductive rights out of development assistance priorities, so this may be an area that needs particular attention. All efforts to jointly protect civic space globally are valuable and support one another.

  Civic space in Finland is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Fingo through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@FingoFi onTwitter.

• GEORGIA: ‘Civil society must be ready for any further regressive move the government attempts’

  CIVICUS speaks about Georgian civil society’s successful campaign against the draft Agents of Foreign Influence Law with Nino Ugrekhelidze, co-founder of the CEECCNA (Central Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and Central and North Asia) Collaborative Fund, and Guram Imnadze, Director of the Democracy and Justice Programme of theSocial Justice Center.

  Founded in 2022, the CEECCNA Collaborative Fund is a feminist fund that moves sustainable resources for social justice movements across the CEECCNA region.

  The Social Justice Center is a progressive civil society organisation (CSO) working on human rights and social justice in Georgia. It seeks to identify the structural reasons for economic, social and political inequality, and share critical knowledge while contributing to change through democratic means.

  What was the draft Foreign Agents Law that was proposed in Georgia?

  On 20 February 2023, the ruling party presented a draft law on ‘Agents of Foreign Influence’. The initiative would affect any Georgian-language media and any CSO registered in Georgia that receive more than 20 per cent of their annual income from a ‘foreign power’, meaning a foundation or organisation registered outside Georgia. They would be forced to register on a ‘Foreign Influence Agents Registry’ and disclose foreign funding. If they failed to do          so, they would risk very high fines.

  But the need for more transparency is an excuse, because there are already numerous laws regulating the financial transactions and transparency of legal entities, CSOs included, such as the Law on Grants and the Law on Budgeting and Accounting. There have not been cases of CSOs not complying with the existing legal requirements. In fact, most large CSOs also use their media platforms to provide annual financial reports and list their donors.

  The draft law includes language that has negative connotations in Georgia due to our Soviet past. ‘Agent’ means ‘traitor’, especially if used together with the adjective ‘foreign’. It has the clear purpose of delegitimising independent CSOs and critical media by labelling us as enemies of the state, politically biased and aligned with the opposition.

  The government is doing everything it can to delegitimise CSOs as local actors voicing real local needs. They don’t want the public to listen to us when we criticise the government and provide information that is true and in the interest of the country – they want them to believe that we are the ones lying to them.

  This is part of a larger government stigmatising campaign against civil society and independent media, which gained momentum over the past few months.

  Who would be most affected if this law was passed?

  It is critical to highlight the role that CSOs have played in Georgia since we gained independence – civil society has played a key role in the democratic transition and in ensuring the provision of services the government could not provide, particularly to vulnerable groups. When the state could not fully perform its duties, it was civil society that stepped in and got the work done.

  If the law was passed, people with HIV and disabilities, survivors of domestic violence, women, children and LGBTQI+ people would be among the first to be directly impacted. Programmes targeted at these groups have been created and operated by Georgian CSOs, because the government is either not interested and therefore does not prioritise this work or does not have the money for it.

  Of course, as the government is not funding these programmes, Georgian CSOs operating them typically get their funding from outside the country. Domestically, there is very little interest in funding civil society; domestic funding is almost non-existent and CSOs are severely underfunded. Major civil society donors are various private and public foundations, and bilateral and multilateral institutions from the USA and the European Union, all of which maintain political neutrality. Many of them even fund the government agencies as well.

  If the law were adopted, given the difficulties in fundraising domestically, CSOs would be exposed to financial starvation. Numerous CSOs would have to shut down. And this would be no accident: it is part of a very intentional attack on the financial resilience of CSOs.

  How has civil society organised against the bill?

  Over 380 CSOs signed a statement explaining their strong opposition to the bill. Civil society and independent media worked hard to reach people with compelling messages, avoiding NGO jargon and explaining in simple terms why this bill is against the interests of the country and against democracy – why, in fact, this bill is a Russian import, part of a trend that is quickly gaining ground across the region.

  It took some effort to mobilise against the bill because civil society had been demonised for so long already, and many people did not want to support ‘foreign agents’. But our key message was that our government may have pro-Russian course, but our people do not, and we don’t intend to be part of the Russian Federation ever again. This connected with a widespread sentiment of Georgian people.

  This messaging dispelled the climate of resignation that things cannot change and helped mobilise people. On 7 March, parliament passed the draft law in the first reading, but just as the bill was being discussed, tens of thousands gathered outside parliament to protest in Tbilisi. There were protests day and night, for several days in a row. This was one of the largest demonstrations in Georgia’s modern history.

  The protests were repressed by riot police using rubber bullets, teargas and water cannon. At least one person lost an eye because of police brutality. Over 150 people were detained for ‘disobedience’ but later released following further pressure from protesters.

  As a result of the protests, the bill was recalled on 10 March. That day we realised that if we come together, things can change. There was a spirit of resistance, unity, dignity and solidarity in the protests. People who were not necessarily politicised became interested in politics. And it all started because civil society came together to stand up against a bill that posed an existential threat.

  Protesters connected in a very well-articulated way the situation in Georgia with the plight of Ukraine, and understood this as a fight against Russian political interests trying to absorb us as a country. That’s why they also showed solidarity with Ukraine, singing their anthem and displaying pro-Ukraine messages.

  The way young Georgians reacted gives us hope for the future. The way they came together, the way they protested, the messages they conveyed – it was so politically consistent and coherent. They protested, they resisted, and when the protest was over, they even cleaned the public space after themselves. They were truly amazing.

  Would you say danger has passed?

  Parliament is currently on its best behaviour because it had a moment of realisation that this might turn into a revolution. In pushing forward the bill, the government thought there was no limit to its power, but found such a limit in the protests. A sentiment started spreading among protesters that they could fire their representatives, send them home. But the government’s targeting of civil society is not over yet – it is only starting. Although the bill has been withdrawn, the prime minister has already said that they are going to continue pushing for it. He even doubled down as he mentioned that their step will be to tackle so-called ‘gay propaganda’, another Russian import that is part of the crackdown on progressive civil society.

  The government continues its campaign against civil society. Even if the law does not pass, the official narrative keeps labelling civil society and independent media as ‘foreign agents’, and the consequences of this will continue to be felt for a long time. In Kutaisi, for instance, a social justice activist saw their home vandalised, and someone marked it with a sign alerting that ‘an agent lives here’. It is to be expected that anti-rights forces will use this language as a weapon against civil society activists.

  And of course, the authorities continue to use other tools they have to obstruct civil society work. For instance, Georgia has a problematic administrative code that grants the police and the courts the right to use administrative sanctions such as fines and detentions without sufficient evidence and due process. Such measures are often used against civil society and human rights activists. Since 2016, administrative fines for most common administrative offences have quadrupled. This is a serious barrier for civil society work, as it is expensive for activists to pay the fines.

  What kind of international support does Georgian civil society currently need?

  Georgia is currently experiencing a rapidly shrinking civic space, and the government is sliding towards authoritarianism. International solidarity and conversations on the political situation in Georgia and the whole post-Soviet region are going to be critical.

  In post-Soviet countries, the influence of Russian politics is very strong. There is an actual war going on in Ukraine, and what is happening in Georgia is in a way war by different means. These are two fronts of the same fight against Russian imperialism. Understanding this is essential.

  Also, we need to talk more about where money comes from for anti-rights organisations. There are very clear mechanisms to track where money comes from when it comes to CSOs and independent media, but there are none to investigate where funding for anti-rights groups such as religious fundamentalist and far-right organisations comes from. One reason is that they often don’t register as CSOs – this means they wouldn’t even be under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Agents Law if it were passed. Lots of money for these organisations is coming from Russia without any conditionalities or reporting mechanisms in place.

  This is a way bigger problem than Georgia having a Foreign Agents Law. We need to make the connection to what is happening elsewhere. In Ukraine and Moldova there were also attempts to adopt a similar law and people pushed back. The logic of this law is already working in Mongolia, and it is effectively in place in Belarus.

  We need more complex conversations about what we are organising against, how this is impacting us, what tactics are being used and how human rights language and spaces are being co-opted. The obvious types of support needed are spaces for such conversations and funding, because ultimately, for us to resist, we need spaces to reflect, build strategies and develop our political imagination, and we need resources, given that we are already so underfunded across the region. We must be ready for any further regressive move the government attempts. We haven’t seen the last of it.

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  Civic space in Georgia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Social Justice Center through itswebsite andFacebook page, and follow@SjcCenter and@niiugre on Twitter.

• GEORGIA: ‘The foreign agents law poses a threat to the vibrancy and autonomy of civil society’

  CIVICUS speaks with Nino Samkharadze, policy analyst at the Georgian Institute of Politics, about thecontroversial ‘foreign agents’ law just passed in Georgia.

  The Georgian Institute of Politics is a Tbilisi-based non-profit, non-partisan research and analysis organisation dedicated to fortifying the foundations of democratic institutions and effective governance in Georgia.

  What’s the purpose of Georgia’s law on foreign agents?

  According to the government, the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, which has just been passed by parliament, aims to increase the transparency of civil society’s operations by requiring civil society organisations (CSOs) to disclose their sources of funding and provide details about the nature of their activities.

  In its transition from the post-Soviet era, Georgia faces economic and political challenges. Its evolving democracy is characterised by weak institutions and it’s heavily dependent on support from international sources, including financial grants from the European Union (EU), European states and the USA. The introduction of this law may have been a response to concerns about foreign influence, but it has sparked debate in Georgian society. It poses a threat to the independence and security of CSOs. Its vague language and broad room for interpretation provide the government with opportunities to influence and control civil society, potentially stifling dissenting voices and undermining the positive contributions of CSOs to democratic governance.

  Why did the government reintroduce the bill after failing to pass it last year?

  The process began with the introduction of a first version of the bill in February 2023. It wasn’t proposed directly by the ruling Georgian Dream party but by People’s Power, a splinter political group closely linked to Georgian Dream and espousing even more radical anti-western narratives. But it was met with considerable domestic and international opposition. Protests erupted in Tbilisi, Georgia’s capital, and criticism came from European institutions and the US government. In response, Georgian Dream announced it would vote against the bill, which ultimately led to its rejection by parliament. Following this failure, Georgian Dream underwent a period of reflection and intensified its propaganda. It softened the bill’s language and tone to make it appear less radical and reintroduced it in April 2024. Soon after, on 14 May, it was passed by parliament.

  Georgian Dream came to power in 2012 and is now in an unprecedented third term in office. Since it began its third term in 2020, it has increasingly shown anti-democratic tendencies. With a general election scheduled for October 2024, it’s under increasing pressure as polls indicate a decline in public support. If it doesn’t maintain its majority, it will have to seek cooperation from opposition parties. In this context, the government may see the passage of this law as a way to defuse opposition and strengthen its grip on power.

  How do you think the law would affect civil society?

  The impacts of the law on civil society are expected to be significant and multifaceted, affecting various dimensions of its functioning and autonomy.

  CSOs are likely to be negatively labelled as serving the interests of foreign powers, undermining public confidence in their activities and missions. This labelling could easily lead to stigmatisation and marginalisation, reducing the effectiveness of advocacy efforts and diminishing their influence in the public sphere.

  The law’s provisions for extensive monitoring also pose a threat to the autonomy of CSOs and the privacy of their staff. The government’s ability to access and publish personal data, including correspondence and communications, could hamper CSOs’ ability to operate freely and investigate cases of corruption and human rights abuses.

  Further, the ambiguity of the law leaves room for interpretation and potential abuse by the government. Similar to the situation in Russia, where laws targeting ‘foreign agents’ have been used to restrict civil society activities, the vague language of the law could allow for further restrictions on CSOs and their ability to operate independently.

  The law may also lead to a withdrawal of funding from international foundations and donors. Given the increased risks and restrictions on civil society activities, donors may be reluctant to continue supporting organisations in Georgia, further limiting the resources available for democracy and state-building efforts.

  Overall, the draft law poses a threat to the vibrancy and autonomy of Georgian civil society. It undermines the essential role CSOs play in promoting democratic values, defending human rights and holding the government to account. It could have far-reaching consequences for Georgia’s democratic development and its relationship with the international community.

  How has civil society reacted?

  Georgian civil society has vehemently opposed the bill, seeing it as a dangerous step towards authoritarianism. This law poses a threat to critical voices and raises fears of further concentration of power in the hands of the ruling elite, as has happened in Belarus and Russia.

  No wonder the bill is also often referred to as the ‘Russian law’ – it’s seen as a precursor to outcomes similar to those seen in Russia. It’s feared that dissenting voices will be marginalised or silenced under this law, mirroring the situation in Russia where government critics often face persecution or exile. Given the consolidation of the ruling party and the erosion of democratic principles in Russia, there are concerns in Georgia that the ruling party is also seeking to consolidate power and stifle dissent. Despite some differences between both legal texts, the broader implications for democracy and civil liberties are deeply worrying.

  Georgian society, known for its pro-European and pro-democracy stance, has taken to the streets to protest against this threat. International partners, including the EU and the USA, have also criticised the law and stressed the importance of upholding democratic values.

  How has the government responded to the protests?

  The government’s response to the mass protests has been one of dismissal, demonisation and repression.

  The government has tried to discredit the protesters, particularly younger people, by suggesting they are uninformed about the law and are being manipulated. However, this is contradicted by the fact that many of the protesters, many of whom are students, are well educated and have a clear understanding of the issues at stake.

  The government has also resorted to tactics of repression and intimidation, with reports of regular arrests, beatings and pressure on people associated with the protests. Civil servants, including teachers and academics, have been threatened with the loss of their jobs if they are found to be involved in the protests. This has a chilling effect and discourages dissent.

  CSOs have been targeted with demonisation campaigns that portray them as enemies of the country. While there has been no immediate closure or direct pressure on these organisations, the hostile rhetoric and stigmatisation contribute to an environment of fear and intimidation.

  This authoritarian approach reflects a concerted effort to stifle dissent and maintain control, even at the expense of democratic principles and human rights. It threatens to further undermine confidence in institutions and exacerbate social and political tensions.

  How can the international community best support Georgian civil society?

  The international community can play a crucial role in supporting Georgian civil society at this difficult time.

  High-level visits and engagement by representatives of the EU and the USA are essential. We hope they’ll lead to tangible measures to hold accountable those members of Georgian Dream who supported this law. This could include the introduction of targeted sanctions against people responsible for undermining democratic principles. In addition, the EU should use Georgia’s official status as a candidate for EU membership to impose conditions of adherence to democratic norms and respect for human rights. Sanctions or other forms of pressure could be imposed if these principles are violated.

  It’s also crucial that the EU and the USA continue to demonstrate their unwavering support for Georgia and its pro-European aspirations. Financial assistance and political support are essential to strengthen civil society and maintain momentum in the struggle for democracy. Without this support, civil society risks being further marginalised and weakened by the government.

  A combination of diplomatic pressure, conditionality and unwavering support from the international community is needed to support Georgian civil society in its struggle for democracy and human rights.

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  Civic space in Georgia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Georgian Institute of Politics through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@GIP_ge and@nincavar10 on Twitter.

• GERMANY: ‘Our response to internationally networked far-right groups must also be globally interconnected’

  CIVICUS speaks about the rise of the far right in Germany with Peter Anhalt, director of the right-wing extremism department, and Maximilian Ruf, director of the research department, at Violence Prevention Network.

  Founded in 2004, Violence Prevention Network is one of Europe’s largest civil society organisations (CSOs)working to prevent and counter violent extremism.

  What are the main far-right groups in Germany, and what’s their agenda?

  There are diverse far-right groups that converge on social media platforms such as Telegram and gaming platforms while also networking offline in various ways. For example, the pan-European, anti-Islam, far-right political movement Pegida – Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West – and its offshoots regularly assemble for rallies and demonstrations.

  Alongside Germany’s biggest far-right political party, Alternative for Germany (AfD), there are several small parties on the far-right and right-wing extremist spectrum at the national level, including III. Weg (The Third Way), Die Heimat (The Homeland) and Die Rechte (The Right), and at the regional level, such as Freie Sachsen (Free Saxons).

  Additionally, there are right-wing extremist groups in organised crime milieus, often well-connected with local biker scenes and kickboxing or martial arts communities, as well as with conventional communal structures.

  Representatives of the so-called New Right, such as Götz Kubitschek’s Institute for State Policy and the Identitarian Movement led by Martin Sellner, have provided right-wing extremism with a seemingly intellectual and modern facade, even though there is little novelty in their ideology. Terms like ‘ethnopluralism’, ‘New World Order’ and ‘remigration’ simply give a new look to racist, antisemitic and misanthropic ways of thinking.

  Organisations such as the Hammerskins, the Brotherhood Thuringia (Turonen), NSU 2.0 and the Patriotic Union continue to pose a significant threat. The Patriotic Union, uncovered by the authorities in late 2022, is an eclectic personal and ideological mix of right-wing extremism, esotericism, conspiracy ideologies and sovereignist thinking tied to the so-called Reichsbürger scene (Citizens of the Empire). The suspected members of this organisation are currently on trial, accused of membership of a terrorist organisation and a violent plot to overthrow the German state, among other charges.

  All these far-right groups hold an exclusionary, discriminatory and racist view of humanity combined with antisemitism and misogyny. Despite having diverging positions on some issues, they’re all united in their rejection of and opposition to the basic liberal order and democratic institutions.

  Why has support for AfD grown so much in recent years?

  AfD serves as a bridge for bringing into parliament ideas that delegitimise democracy. At a time of uncertainty and crisis, party members provide supposedly simple solutions, stir up resentment and appeal to people who might be open to authoritarian responses. What’s noteworthy about AfD is that, unlike most other far-right parties in Europe, it has grown in popularity while at the same time becoming increasingly and openly radicalised. Rather than this deterring voters, the party has grown in popularity.

  As with any divisive political movement, AfD and other far-right groups exploit uncertainties around pressing issues. At the core of their agenda is restricting the rights of migrants and refugees, ignoring the fact that Germany needs more immigration to stabilise its economy and ensure future prosperity.

  The COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent anti-pandemic measures also became a central rallying point for conspiratorial groups, many of which aligned with far-right authoritarian ideologies that, after a first moment of uncertainty, further fuelled AfD.

  AfD, in line with other far-right groups, also deny the human-caused nature of climate change and the need to address it, often portraying environmental efforts as ‘attacks on regular people’ who prefer to drive petrol cars and cannot afford to live in ‘ivory towers’. They also resist other progressive causes such as gender equality and LGBTQI+ rights, smearing LGBTQI+ people as a threat to children while framing any steps towards further antidiscrimination and equality measures as attacks on traditional families and their way of life.

  Recently, farmers’ protests against agricultural subsidy cuts have inadvertently attracted far-right support. In some regions, a combination of farmers and far-right protesters has resulted in threatening actions, such as gallows parades and symbolic executions of members of the governing coalition. Their narratives have blended farmers’ grievances with other issues aimed at channelling hate against the current government.

  It is important to note that most of the farmers very credibly distanced themselves from such co-option attempts. However, this shows how AfD and related far-right groups continuously try to hijack existing grievances and concerns by a variety of societal groups that can be framed as ‘the regular people’ in an attempt to pit them against existing democratic institutions.

  What triggered recent protests against AfD?

  Recent mass protests were triggered by an investigative report by independent media organisation Correctiv about a meeting held in a hotel near Potsdam in November 2023, where high-ranking AfD members were present alongside neo-Nazis and businesspeople sympathetic to the cause of mass deportation of people viewed by them as non-ethnic Germans. Martin Sellner, among others, spoke about a proposal for so-called ‘remigration’, which would effectively mean the forced expulsion of millions of people with migratory backgrounds currently living in Germany, including German citizens.

  The article, published in German on 10 January, was a wake-up call. It sparked relatively spontaneous mass protests against AfD and right-wing extremism across Germany. Even though there was nothing new about the ideas discussed there, including ‘remigration’, and AfD’s support for them, the way the report presented the meeting as a ‘secret plan against Germany’ prompted broader sections of German society to recognise the real threat posed by right-wing extremism to a pluralistic society and liberal democracy.

  How has the government reacted to this?

  Most democratic parties, including the governing coalition, have long sought to reduce support for the far right by attempting to address the concerns it raises. This has led to, for example, a more stringent stance on migration. However, the adoption of far-right narratives to diminish the appeal of the original proponents never works out. People usually stick with the original message-bearers, as evidenced by the rising poll numbers for AfD in Germany.

  Although the German government has funded prevention and counter-extremism initiatives over the past two decades, only recently did it increase funding for measures explicitly targeted against right-wing extremism, following a period in which the focus was on Islamist extremism. Several new cabinet and ministerial action plans against right-wing extremism have now been initiated, but it will take time for progress to be made.

  We hope for a continuous and comprehensive strategy for preventing and countering violent extremism of any type, avoiding fluctuations in funds based on attention waves. This would enable us to remain vigilant against all threats to democracy. A potential new law for the promotion of democracy may serve as the basis for this.

  How is your organisation working to address extremist threats?

  In Germany, many CSOs working to respond to extremist threats, including Violence Prevention Network, are substantially funded by the federal government and local authorities. This allows us to implement comprehensive measures to promote democracy, prevent extremism, deradicalise young people and provide support for people to disengage.

  For instance, we hold intercultural and interreligious workshops in schools. These focus on strengthening young people’s self-esteem, fostering an appreciation of diversity and promoting respectful behaviour. We provide training for professionals who work with young people, equipping them to identify and counter extremist arguments early on. These courses also offer strategies for building a trusting relationship with young people at risk of radicalisation and preventing radicalisation. Further, we operate mobile counselling and intervention teams that help deradicalise young people, including within the prison system. We work to identify people at risk of extremism and facilitate disengagement processes with the involvement of their friends and families.

  In addition, we carry out a lot of work online and focus on providing young people with information and opportunities for support in disengaging from the extremist scene. We aim to reintegrate those at risk into the democratic community to prevent incidents where they cause harm to themselves or others.

  What additional support does German civil society need to sustain these efforts?

  Over the past two decades, western states have invested billions in the global south to foster democracy, facilitate peacebuilding and deter violence that poses a threat to western interests. However, the largest current threat is posed by right-wing extremist movements operating within western countries. Security and development spending hasn’t adapted to this evolving trend and hasn’t been sufficiently allocated to countries like Germany, where the far-right movements are based, operate and are growing in popularity. This situation requires an urgent shift in approach. If conventional funding sources cannot be adjusted, it is essential to collaboratively explore alternative funding methods.

  Given the internationally networked character of violent far-right groups, our response must also be globally interconnected. The strengthening of German civil society initiatives focused on advancing rights and pluralism through exchanging knowledge, building partnerships, promoting innovative approaches and channelling appropriate funding will contribute to a more robust global response to the shared challenge of right-wing extremism.

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  Civic space in Germany is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Violence Prevention Network through itswebsite and follow it on LinkedIn.

• GERMANY: ‘Our street blockades hurt society the least and put no one’s life in danger’

  CIVICUS speaks with Zoe Ruge of Last Generation about climate activism and its criminalisation in Germany.

  Last Generation is an international network of climate activists using civil disobedience to urge governments to address the climate emergency, enabling citizen participation and financially supporting the global south as a primary victim of climate change that it hasn’t caused.

  What forms of protest has Last Generation deployed in Germany?

  Last Generation has come to dominate the climate movement in Germany, so its tactics have become the prevailing tactics. The most common form of climate protest in Germany is currently street blockades, and blockades of public infrastructure more generally, because they are efficient at creating a certain level of disruption. A small number of people protesting peacefully is all it takes to generate a wide public reach. Additionally, street blockades are a platform to have talks with politicians and citizens about the climate crisis, do media work and underline our demands.

  Alongside disrupting everyday traffic, we draw attention to the major responsibility of the richest one- to-10 per cent of the population. To target them specifically, we block airports, spray-paint private jets, disrupt big events and bring protests into museums and other public spaces.

  Our street blockades hurt society the least and put no one’s life in danger. We take adequate security measures, for instance to make sure no emergency vehicle gets stuck in traffic. In case of an emergency, we are ready to open the blockade and clear the street.

  We know the kind of civil disobedience tactics we use face criticism, and we constantly reflect on our practices and take all feedback into consideration. We have aimed to choose a protest form that effectively rises awareness and is the least disruptive for people, and we think the street blockade is one such form. It may cause people to get to work half an hour late one day, but it provides a much-needed opportunity to stop people’s everyday routine and encourage them reflect on what we’re doing and where it’s leading us.

  What have been your biggest achievements?

  More people are realising the seriousness of the crisis we’re facing. Street blockades allow us to talk to people who would normally not get involved but are forced to listen and ask questions about our reasons to be there and our demands. Through disruption, we’ve been able to bring a lot of climate-related topics into public discourse, not only through media coverage but also thanks to local, face-to-face conversations. We are seeing rising awareness, which is necessary to deal with the consequences of the climate crisis.

  In terms of policies, one of our demands during the first protest wave was a law similar to the one France has, to save food from going to waste in supermarkets. One third of all food is lost in the production chain, which equates to a lot of preventable CO2 emissions. Such a law is currently being discussed in several federal states.

  In terms of public awareness, when street blockades began about a year ago they attracted 25 to 30 people, and now they bring thousands to the streets in Berlin. Churches are standing behind us and civil society groups are also voicing demands for climate action.

  Overall, we are receiving increasing support from the whole society. We get invitations to discuss the climate crisis with politicians, artists, at schools and with other parts of civil society. In response to the criminalisation we are facing, which has included the freezing of some of our assets, we have also seen a rise in donations from the public.

  What are your demands to the German government?

  What Last Generation demands are pretty simple things that must be done to tackle the consequences of the climate crisis and prevent it escalating. We demand a speed limit of 100 kilometres per hour in Germany, which would bring a reduction of more than 6.7 million tons of CO2 emissions a year, and a permanent €9 (US$9.90) monthly ticket to make public transportation affordable. This was tested last year and was a huge success, as many people shifted from using cars to using public transport – but now it’s quite expensive again.

  Our third demand is the establishment of a citizen assembly as a long-term mechanism for us to deal with the climate crisis as a society and end the use of fossil fuels in a socially just manner by 2030. Since our politicians are not even able or willing to implement a speed limit, we need citizens to be able to help tackle the climate crisis through more direct democratic tools.

  As part of a global movement, Last Generation works in close cooperation with Debt For Climate, a grassroots global south-driven initiative connecting social justice and climate justice struggles with the aim of freeing impoverished countries from a debt burden that is often used as a tool for further natural resource extraction. We support their demand for financial support because they are the primary victims of climate change that they haven’t caused. German politicians tend to argue that the climate catastrophe isn’t happening in Germany, although it is indeed taking place, maybe to a lesser extent. But in other parts of the world people are already dying because of it while more developed countries continue benefiting from their resources.

  How have German authorities reacted to your demands?

  Reactions have varied at different government levels. We’ve had very productive talks with local politicians who have shown openness and understanding. But at the federal level we’ve faced a harsh and criminalising public discourse. Last Generation is being called a criminal group and increasingly treated as such.

  We face accusations that we are hurting the cause of climate protection because our tactics are scaring people away. But it’s not true. The government is just trying to shift the focus from the substance of our demands to the form of our actions and avoiding our questions of why we still don’t have a speed limit and why we still don’t have proper affordable public transportation even though we have the resources for it.

  The fact that our government isn’t willing to act as the climate emergency demands and is instead turning against us is the main challenge that we as climate activists currently face.

  How is the government criminalising climate activism?

  There are between 3,000 and 4,000 cases coming to court soon, mainly connected to street blockades. In Germany, this kind of spontaneous demonstration is protected by law, but once the police intervene and tell you to leave, it’s not so clear whether the assembly continues to be legally protected. There are also accusations of vandalism on the basis that people have damaged walls by spray-painting them.

  A serious accusation being used against climate activists is that of being part of a criminal group. Based on section 129A of the German Criminal Code, when the police start an investigation on these grounds they can listen to your phone calls, read your messages and search your homes. This is weird because Last Generation is so transparent that anything the government would like to know about us – our structures, our funding, our planned protests – is publicly accessible. We have nothing to hide.

  This June, some of us experienced searches of our homes, our website was taken down, our bank accounts were frozen and we had work materials confiscated. Activists are struggling because it’s scary to feel that the police could force their way in, search your entire home and take away whatever they want.

  A friend of mine, Simon Lachner, was recently taken from his home to the police station and kept there for the entire day, just because he had publicly announced a protest scheduled for that afternoon. In Bavaria, people have been repeatedly taken into preventive custody for long periods of time to keep them from protesting. This form of preventing protests is becoming more common.

  What kind of support are you receiving, and what further support would you need to continue your work?

  The criminalisation of peaceful protests organised by people who aren’t trying to hurt anyone but who want to protect lives elicits instant solidarity. Thousands of people have joined Last Generation’s protest marches. Frozen funds have been almost fully replaced by donations pouring in. People contact us to ask how they can play their part in climate activism.

  We’re also part of the A22 international network of climate movements that use civil disobedience tactics, and this also supports us, especially in the face of criminalisation. Other organisations from all around the world are reaching out to us and offering help such as legal support.

  What we need is for everybody to consider their potential role in building a more resilient society. One of the most efficient ways to fulfil our collective responsibility is by exercising our right to protest within a democratic system.

  Civic space in Germany is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Last Generation through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@AufstandLastGen onTwitter.

• GERMANY: ‘The far right is instrumentalising protests triggered by completely legitimate concerns’

  CIVICUS speaks about the rise of the far right in Germany with Jakob Guhl, Senior Manager, Policy and Research at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD).

  Founded in 2006, ISD is a civil society organisation (CSO) that works to safeguard human rights and reverse the rising tide of polarisation, extremism and disinformation worldwide.

  What are the major far-right groups in Germany?

  Currently, the major far-right political party is Alternative for Germany (AfD), which has just achieved its highest-ever results in national polls, standing at around 22 per cent. In some East German states with elections coming later this year, AfD leads polls with over 30 per cent.

  There are also more traditional neo-Nazi parties such as The Homeland (NPD). Although it is still quite active, it isn’t very relevant anymore. It’s considered an anti-constitutional extremist party and for this reason, the Constitutional Court recently ruled that the government is allowed to withhold federal funding from it.

  Additionally, there is a broad network of loose groups known as the ‘new right’ that includes the Identitarian Movement, which the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) has designated as a right-wing extremist threat. The ‘new right’ is essentially made up of ethno-nationalists who assert that the German identity is an ethnic identity. They extensively use social media to bring their ideas into the mainstream and shift public discourse on topics like immigration and integration.

  In terms of narratives and policies, AfD is becoming increasingly indistinguishable from these ethno-nationalist groups, as evidenced by its recent secret meeting to discuss plans for mass deportation of people living in Germany, including German citizens, whom they view as ethnically non-German.

  How do far-right groups spread their messages?

  There are significant interactions among ethno-nationalist groups on a personal level. They engage with each other by attending conferences, participating in podcasts and writing prefaces for each other’s books. Some even work as assistants for AfD members of parliament.

  Both the ‘new right’ and AfD have been aptly using social media for many years. According to a comparative analysis we did in 2019, AfD significantly outperformed major political parties for views, likes and engagement. This trend continues today, and they also leverage YouTube or newer platforms like TikTok, which attract many young people, so they are able to reach even larger audiences.

  Their messages focus on highly emotive issues, such as ‘migrant crimes’ and ‘threats to German traditions’, which tap into cultural elements that provoke strong reactions and anger. For instance, they portray the Greens, an environmental political party, as detached elites comfortably situated in central Berlin, pushing their green policies without understanding the reality of ordinary people. This populist communication style has proved effective, and it’s further amplified by the dynamics of social media algorithms that reward outrage, sensationalism and emotional content.

  What public concerns has AfD tapped into?

  When AfD was established in 2013, its main focus was opposition to European Union (EU) and German policies in response to the financial crisis. It was born as an anti-EU and anti-Euro party that advocated against providing financial support to Greece and other countries particularly affected by the crisis, and against the EU collective debt mechanism.

  Starting in 2015, with the beginning of the so-called migration crisis, AfD shifted towards an anti-refugee and anti-Muslim discourse, depicting Islam and Muslims as alien to Germany. AfD politicians openly cooperated with the pan-European, anti-Islam, far-right political movement Pegida – an acronym for ‘Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West’. AfD members frequently appear as speakers at their events.

  During the mass protests that took place against measures to curb the spread of COVID-19, AfD was part of a broad coalition promoting COVID-19 denial and anti-lockdown narratives. The coalition included ‘new right’ groups, Holocaust deniers and conspiracy theorists, among others.

  Recently, AfD and other far-right groups have tried to hijack and instrumentalise farmers’ protests over subsidy cuts, seeing them as an opportunity to undermine the government. While far-right symbols and AfD speakers have been present in these protests, the official associations of farmers have clearly distanced themselves from the far right. It is important not to stigmatise the farmers’ movement as a whole as being infiltrated by the far right, as they have completely legitimate concerns about agricultural subsidy cuts, while at the same time being alert to far-right attempts to hijack these protests.

  What accounts for AfD’s growing popularity?

  The popularity of the AfD stagnated during the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2021 federal elections. However, starting in early 2023, it has gained momentum. The AfD often diverges from the positions of major established parties on critical issues. For instance, it has opposed German military support for Ukraine, questioned scientific consensus on climate change and rejected green policies. Their most recent surge in popularity can be in part be attributed to people’s heightened concerns about immigration, which is visible in surveys from mid-2023.

  At the same time, AfD has radicalised, partially due to its relationship with ethno-nationalist groups, which has led to its monitoring by BfV as a potential threat to the constitution. Paradoxically, this has been accompanied by a trend of increasing normalisation and popularisation of AfD among the public. This tension is at the heart of today’s German politics.

  Has AfD encountered any progressive resistance?

  As it has grown in popularity, AfD has also encountered resistance, as attested by the ongoing protests against AfD’s mass deportation plans in numerous cities and towns. Protesters form a broad coalition comprising political parties, churches, unions, local initiatives supporting refugees, left-wing and anti-fascist groups and climate change activists like Fridays for Future.

  This diverse protest movement also has internal contradictions. In a Munich rally, some speakers criticised the government for its migration policies, which they attributed to an attempt to win back voters from AfD by taking a hardline approach. Left-leaning activists argue that such policies will only pave the way for even more extreme anti-migrant measures. Despite these tensions, however, the coalition remains broad and maintains significant popular support.

  How is ISD working to address extremist threats in Germany?

  One of the things our Berlin office focuses on is digital literacy and media competencies initiatives. In the age of social media, it’s crucial for people to critically assess credible sources of information, be aware of manipulation tactics and understand how disinformation spreads and coordinated networks amplify specific narratives. Our goal is not to tell people what to think but to provide them with tools for critical evaluation of information sources, narratives, communication tactics and rhetorical styles.

  For example, the Berlin office is actively involved in the Business Council for Democracy project, collaborating with digital literacy experts to educate adults. Many similar initiatives primarily target young people, who are often digital natives, but the spread of disinformation and conspiracy theories online can affect people of all ages. We engage employers, which many people still trust, unlike political parties and media.

  What forms of support do you receive, and what further support do you need?

  Our cooperation with the government encompasses a wide range of initiatives. Various German federal ministries have provided funding for our research on antisemitism and far-right extremism and funded projects related to political education.

  One major recent issue is the budgetary crisis and disagreement within the governing coalition on how to address it. The same budget cuts that have affected subsidies for farmers also impact on agencies dedicated to political education and projects on democracy promotion and the prevention of radicalisation. Unfortunately, this funding reduction comes at an inopportune time, coinciding with the rise of the far right and the normalisation of extremist ideas.

  Compared to other countries, the German state used to extensively support civil society initiatives. It’s a double-edged sword: while it’s positive that the government invests in civil society, it has also made German CSOs somewhat dependent on the state. The budgetary crisis has disrupted the financial sustainability of many organisations, which are now unsure whether they will be able to continue their work as effectively and on the same scale.

  While German CSOs could benefit from international donor support, it’s also crucial to facilitate greater knowledge exchange among activists and networks from different parts of the world. Despite variations in intensity, many countries face similar challenges of the mainstreaming of far-right ideas through social media, harassment of activists and elected officials, and local-level political violence.

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  Civic space in Germany is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with ISD through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@ISDglobal onTwitter.

• GHANA: ‘The ‘anti-gay’ bill will have far-reaching consequences if we do not fight it now’

  CIVICUS speaks with Danny Bediako, founder and executive director of Rightify Ghana, about the LGBTQI+ rights situation and the significance of Ghana’s ‘anti-gay’ bill. Rightify Ghana is a human rights organisation that advocates for community empowerment and human rights, and documents and reports human rights abuses in Ghana.

  What are the aims of Rightify Ghana?

  Rightify Ghana was formed because LGBTQI+ organisations were all based in the capital, Accra. Living in Kumasi, in the Ashanti region in Ghana, I felt that I had to do something, so I brought together some people I knew and urged them to reach out to others. We all came together and formed Rightify Ghana. 

  We do advocacy work and report and document human rights violations. We contribute to capacity building through community empowerment activities, including human rights education and sensitisation on safety and security. While as an organisation we do not directly offer sexual health or HIV/AIDS-related services, we facilitate access to them for the people who reach out to us.

  We have become a widely known organisation, with people reaching out for information and referrals to certain services. We also offer psychosocial support to people facing various forms of abuse and human rights violations. We undertake media monitoring to understand how the media reports on LGBTQI+ matters and identify rising challenges, and particularly security threats, to inform and educate the LGBTQI+ community.

  What are the major challenges facing LGBTQI+ people in Ghana?

  For several years the LGBTQI+ community has been targeted by homophobic people, both from state institutions and non-state groups and individuals. But there isn’t enough awareness on these issues, so we usually have to deal with them by ourselves. There are frequent reports of attacks against LGBTQI+ people, including outing them, blackmailing, kidnapping them for ransom and outright physical violence.

  Ghana had previously sold itself globally as a progressive country, one that respects democratic principles and constitutional rule. But this year the rights violations that the LGBTQI+ community has experienced for years came to light. Attacks came in quick succession and caught us off guard.

  We started 2021 with the closure of a community centre established by LGBT+ Rights Ghana. Then an alleged lesbian wedding, which attendees claim was a birthday party, was stormed and denounced by traditional rulers, police and media. Twenty-two people were arrested and later released.

  In May came the case of the Ho 21, in which police and a team of reporters disrupted an event of human rights defenders who document and report violations against the LGBTQI+ community. Twenty-one of them were arrested, becoming victims of the crime they work to document. This nearly broke the whole movement down because other organisations closed their offices out of fear and activists went into hiding; there was too much uncertainty, and most people fell silent.

  Most recently, the so-called Proper Human Sexual Rights and Ghana Family Values Bill – the ‘anti-gay bill’ – was officially introduced to parliament and is now open to contributions from the public.

  What does the bill say, and what motivates those behind it?

  The first time I read the bill, I felt like I couldn’t breathe: my right to exist in this country would be taken away from me. The bill promotes ‘conversion therapy’, making it a state function to torture people who question their sexuality or identify as intersex or transgender. Conversion therapy is very dangerous: those who undergo it may experience depression, anxiety and suicidal thoughts. United Nations Special Rapporteurs have stated that conversion therapy is a form of torture.

  Even though it is bipartisan, the bill is being pushed mostly by the opposition: seven out of eight members of parliament (MPs) supporting the bill are part of the opposition, including the speaker, who brought together the lawmakers and the homophobic group, the National Coalition for Proper Sexual Human Rights and Family Values. To promote the bill, they are using disinformation and lies, including incorrect HIV data stating that eight out of 10 HIV/AIDS cases are of LGBTQI+ people.

  We asked the Ghana AIDS Commission to speak out and release a statement against misinformation stigmatising people living with HIV/AIDS, but they declined out of fear. We then asked an independent fact checker, Ghana Fact, which confirmed that the claims were false. It was in turn falsely accused of being funded by the LGBTQI+ community.

  If you ask me where all this hate is coming from, I would say it has been imported. The religious texts that are being used to condemn sexual minorities and the current bill are backed by the US far-right movement, and particularly the World Congress of Families, which held a conference in Ghana in 2019. Leading up to the conference, they hosted several key personalities in Ghana, including a former president, the national chief imam and a former speaker of parliament, to ensure that they would encourage homophobia in the ‘background’.

  We believe that the US far-right movement has lost its own fight against equality, diversity and progressive values in the global west, so they have turned to Africa, which they view as fertile ground for their agendas. As early as 2017, we started to notice individuals urging the government to do something against the LGBTQI+ community. They did not seem to have enough resources to succeed, but once they formed an alliance with the World Congress of Families and began receiving funding, resources and technical support, they have been able to propose the worst bill we have ever seen go into our parliament.

  What are the bill’s implications for LGBTQI+ people in Ghana? 

  The implications of the bill reach even beyond those who identify as part of the LGBTQI+ community and are already being felt, even before it has been passed. Blackmail has become a major issue faced by the LGBTQI+ community. We used to see two or three cases a week, but now we are getting about three per day. We are seeing homophobic people on dating sites and social media pose as gay to lure gay men into their homes, where they subject them to group violence. In one particular case, the victim was blackmailed and threatened with death. If the bill is passed, people like these will have free rein to harm others, because the law will condone their behaviour.

  Ghanaians give much importance to the value of sympathy, but this bill is also going to criminalise the exercise of this value. If an LGBTQI+ person is subjected to violence in public, nobody will come to their rescue because you can be prosecuted for that. The implications are very serious in the area of public health. According to the bill, if you know or suspect that someone is an LGBTQI+ person, you must report them to the police. This applies to nurses and other health workers, which will lead to fewer people seeking health services.

  HIV programmes targeting key populations are run by community-based organisations that are mostly peer-led, and if the bill bans them from operating and bans others from registering, people will not be able to access healthcare, which is a constitutional right, making it much harder to fight HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases.

  While our constitution prohibits censorship, this bill will ban the publication of LGBTQI+ content, including reports of crimes against the LGBTQI+ community. This also applies to social media. It will take away our constitutional rights to freedom of speech and expression, as well as our right to dignity and privacy. While the constitution speaks against discrimination of all forms, this bill is going to legalise discrimination against LGBTQI+ people.

  It will also target those who are not queer, including people who use sex toys or cross-dress for comedy, and youth groups and students. Our cultural traditional norms of people of the same gender walking and holding hands and putting our arms across each other’s shoulders are at stake – we sometimes also sit on each other’s laps if there is no space! All these will be outlawed due to being seen as indecent exposure and public show of amorous relations.

  What are the current priorities for Rightify Ghana and other LGBTQI+ organisations in Ghana?

  Our biggest priority is safety. Even before it is passed, we have already started seeing parts of the bill being implemented. For instance, we have seen an increase in arrests of our community members. In one of these cases, the police arrested two people and urged them to give them the names and addresses of other queer people. They were picked up by the police not for committing any crime, but because someone told them that they were queer.

  Each time we hear of people being arrested, activists rush to police stations to get them out. We are paying for our freedom. Although bail in Ghana is free, the police won’t let them go. Under Section 104 of the current Criminal Offences Act, they cannot arrest you just because someone told them you are gay, but they still do. They know they cannot prosecute you, but if you want to recover your freedom fast, they make you pay.

  We are also worried that if the bill is passed, its effects may reach further, into the homes of Ghanaian people across the world. The typical Ghanaian diasporic family upholds in their home the same principles they would in Ghana, so queer Ghanaians in the diaspora may also become victims of parents who don’t want to come back with a lesbian or gay child, and may be excommunicated from the family due to homophobia. Even in the UK, Canada and other western countries, Ghanaian families still attend Ghanaian churches where homophobia is preached. If the bill is passed, this is the law that will rule within their homes, and not that of the countries they live in.

  What are you doing to push back against the bill?

  We are working to take up space, encourage dialogue and start conversations. People have been brainwashed by the homophobic disinformation and genuinely think that queer people are paedophiles and other terrible things. We correct these lies and try to find ways so that people start listening to us and understand that people do not ‘become’ gay due to media influence and they are not ‘recruited’ by some Western power to become gay.

  Some people do not know or believe that the queer community faces human rights violations. When we show them the facts, tell them the names of those who have been beaten, evicted, lost their job, or been suspended from school and make them understand that this could be their family member, they might start listening and shift their stance, even if not to support us, at least to soften their position and listen.

  We are strategising against the bill and building alliances with mainstream organisations that have access to the legislature and the executive. This is not something one organisation can fight. It is a collective struggle. We mapped the legislative arena to identify those MPs we could reach out to, speak with and share information with, because we needed to have progressive MPs debating on our behalf.

  Awareness-raising and engagement are also taking place online. People have reached out to the LGBTQI+ community and offered donations, expertise and contacts so that we could reach out to key personalities who could help. Protests were also coordinated and held outside the country, for instance in Canada, the UK and the USA. Online organising allowed us to hold abroad the in-person protests that for security reasons we could not physically hold here.

  How can international civil society best support the struggle for LGBTQI+ rights in Ghana?

  When people ask us what they can do, we tell them to protest, to create awareness, to let people know what is happening in Ghana and urge their governments to do something about it. If they have worked in Ghana before and have contacts among powerful people in Ghana, they should use them. A consultant who has worked with a ministry can use their contacts there, and a civil society organisation that has worked here can use its networks to support local organisations. They should encourage their own governments to take up any opportunity to raise the human rights implications of the bill with the Ghanaian government. International civil society organisations and the global community should definitely put more pressure on the Ghanaian government. 

  This is a crisis and local organisations and activists were not prepared, so we need a lot of support, particularly technical expertise in the legal arena. It is also key to have allies who can speak on our behalf, so that not all those speaking up against the bill are part of the LGBTQI+ community.

  Another thing that the global community and international civil society can do is support us through funding. Rightify Ghana is currently self-financing its activities and cannot offer the level of support that people need. As soon as the bill was submitted to parliament, evictions of LGBTQI+ people increased alongside arrests, and we saw an increase in the number of people asking for help finding shelter, but unfortunately, our community doesn’t have safe houses.

  People are being evicted not just by their landlords but also by their own families under suspicion of homosexuality, and they are not finding new places to live. We receive a lot of desperate messages from people who are temporarily staying with friends but urgently need a more stable arrangement. Some of these people are under very high risk.

  In one such case, a woman who identifies as lesbian told us she considered leaving the country because a group of boys in her community threatened her with ‘corrective rape’. She lives with her family, and if she tells them about the threat, they will realise that she is a lesbian and will throw her out. Either way, she is in a very dangerous situation, and right now, there is not much that we can do to help her.

  Civic space in Ghana is rated ‘narrowed’by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Rightify Ghana through itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@RightifyGhana on Twitter. 

• GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: ‘A system that embraces diversity and inclusion is more legitimate’

  CIVICUS speaks with Marc Limon, Executive Director of the Universal Rights Group and former diplomat at the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, about the deficits of the global governance system and proposals for reform.

  Based in Geneva, Switzerland, theUniversal Rights Group is the only think tank in the world that focuses exclusively on global human rights policy.

   

  What are the main challenges with the global governance system, and what are the Universal Rights Group’s proposals to tackle them?

  A primary deficit in the global governance system is the inadequate representation of developing countries, particularly those in the global south. Despite the majority of UN member states being developing nations, there is a prevalent feeling that their needs and views are not being considered. Many feel that the system has been shaped by western powers to serve their own interests, further contributing to this perceived lack of inclusivity.

  To foster greater inclusivity, the UN Human Rights Council has established a Trust Fund to encourage participation in its sessions by developing countries, particularly from small island developing states and least developed countries. These are countries that don’t have missions in Geneva and may have never attended a Council session in the past. Thanks to economic support granted by this fund, officials from these countries can travel to Geneva and participate in the Council’s sessions.

  The Universal Rights Group supports this initiative by helping these countries with capacity development, facilitating their participation in Council meetings and eventually encouraging them to establish a mission in Geneva or consider running for a Council seat. By doing so, we aim to contribute to creating a more inclusive system, ensuring that developing countries are involved to the decision-making process.

  What would a more robust, effective, and democratic global governance system look like?

  For the global governance system to be more robust, effective and democratic, the three UN pillars – security, development and human rights – should have equal importance. Today, a lot of emphasis and funding are placed on the security and development pillars, while the human rights pillar is underfunded and under-resourced. While the UN Security Council and the UN Economic and Social Council are primary UN bodies, the Council remains a subsidiary one.

  Participation by developing countries should be increased across all three pillars as well as in other international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. This would create ownership among developing nations. But this would require, for instance, Security Council reform. Its current configuration, with its five permanent members reflecting post-Second World War power relations, is outdated, as seen in the exclusion of powerful developing countries such as Brazil and South Africa.

  The call for diversity and inclusion extends beyond structural reforms to staffing of UN agencies. At the Office of the Higher Commissioner of Human Rights, for instance, half of staff are from western states, with Africa and Asia greatly underrepresented. It would require concerted efforts to address this kind of imbalance.

  What benefits do you anticipate from a more diverse and inclusive system?

  A system that embraces diversity and inclusion is more legitimate. If developing states are actively involved in the decision-making process, they are less likely to perceive that the system is imposing decisions on them.

  Further, a diverse and inclusive system ensures that the topics discussed are more relevant. By considering a broader range of perspectives, the agenda becomes more responsive to the diverse needs of countries worldwide, making the system more attuned to the realities and challenges faced by a varied international community.

  The bottom line is that inclusion and diversity contribute to a more effective system. Developing countries are more likely to accept and value UN recommendations, particularly on issues such as human rights, when they perceive an equal stake in the system. Having their nationals involved in different UN human rights mechanisms reinforces this sense of equality, making recommendations more credible and impactful. Particularly when it comes to human rights, it is crucial to involve victims and human rights defenders. This is the area of focus of the Universal Rights Group.

  How does the Universal Rights Group involve victims and human rights defenders?

  First, we focus on empowering environmental human rights defenders who are at the forefront of environmental struggles. Rather than relying solely on international environmental law and governmental actions, we recognise the crucial role of individuals and local communities who work tirelessly to protect their environment and advocate against greenhouse gas emissions. We believe that the most effective way to protect the environment is to protect those who protect it.

  We also advocate for victims who seek accountability when states engage in gross and systematic human rights violations. International efforts are often focused on public shaming – on denouncing the actions of these states. But we tend to forget the victims and their rightful claim to remedy and reparations. For this reason, the Universal Rights Group is working to shift the narrative by placing the lives and faces of the victims at the forefront of the Human Rights Council. We aim to have the rights of those affected by human rights abuses recognised and prioritised so that their needs for justice, remedy and reparations are addressed.

  What specific reforms are your organisation campaigning for?

  Our efforts are now focused on the UN General Assembly’s 2021-2026 Review, set to assess whether the Human Rights Council should remain a subsidiary body or become a main body of the UN. This offers a unique opportunity to strengthen the Council and its mechanisms.

  We have also contributed to the UN Development System reform, which places sustainable development at the heart of the UN’s work. Considering that over 90 per cent of targets of the Sustainable Development Goals are grounded in intensive human rights work, this reform integrates human rights into UN development programming. We believe that if countries make progress on human rights, they are, by extension and definition, making progress on sustainable development. That’s why we consider it crucial for the UN to integrate human rights into national-level UN development programming.

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  Get in touch with the Universal Rights Group through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@URGthinktank and@marc_limon on Twitter.

  This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

• GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: ‘Every person on the planet should have an equal opportunity to participate in decision-making’

  CIVICUS speaks with Andreas Bummel, co-founder and Executive Director of Democracy Without Borders (DWB) and the Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly, about the deficits of the current global governance system and civil society’s proposals for reform.

  Founded in 2017, DWB is an international civil society organisation with national chapters and associates across the world, aimed at promoting global governance, global democracy and global citizenship.

  What’s wrong with existing global governance institutions?

  Global governance has rightly been described as a spaghetti bowl, and that’s because there is too much fragmentation, overlap, incoherence and opacity, with many parallel and siloed processes going on at the same time, involving who knows how many institutions, initiatives and projects.

• GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: ‘It may take a crisis as big as the one that originated the system to produce the reform it needs’

  CIVICUS speaks with John Vlasto, Board Chair of the World Federalist Movement (WFM), about the deficits of the existing global governance system and civil society’s proposals for reform.

  Founded in 1947, WFM is a non-profit, nonpartisan organisation seeking a just, free and peaceful world where humanity and nature flourish in harmony, through the creation of more effective, transparent and accountable global governance.

  What are the biggest shortcomings of the existing system of global governance?

  The main problem is that decisions are made in defence of the national interest rather than to serve the common good of humanity. This means we get the lowest-common denominator compromises rather than the profound changes that humanity needs.

  The way decisions are currently made is absurd. Take the ongoing COP28 climate summit: it’s a circus, a clear symptom of dysfunctional global governance. We are driving the planetary ecosystem over a cliff because although it’s clearly in humanity’s best interest to reduce carbon emissions straight away, it’s in no nation’s interest to move to do so first.

  Decision making is dysfunctional because of the nature of our global governance institutions. The United Nations (UN) is basically a congress of ambassadors tasked with defending each country’s national interest as perceived by their governments. The dynamic is of competition rather than collaboration, so you end up with the lowest-common denominator compromises.

  How could this problem be tackled?

  To tackle global challenges we need global governance. We are taking enormous risks with our planetary home – but we don’t have to. We know how to create a legitimate and accountable decision-making process that serves the common good – through carefully implemented democracy.

  We could think of global governance as a well-functioning Europe – or a well-functioning USA, for that matter – extended to the global scale.

  What the world is missing that Europe has is a parliament. There is a longstanding proposal for creating a parliamentary assembly at the UN. There’s a big difference between a parliament and a congress of ambassadors such as the UN General Assembly. As explained by Edmund Burke, a British philosopher and politician of the 18th century, a parliament isn’t a collection of ‘ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests each must maintain’ – it is ‘a deliberative assembly… with one interest, that of the whole’.

  In a federal system like the USA, Congress has two chambers, one representing the people and another representing the states. This is a model that could be followed on a global scale. For the USA it would make no sense to have only one chamber representing the states – but that’s what we currently have at the UN, with all nations, regardless of size, having one seat at the General Assembly, an organ that consequently has little real power.

  As Carlos Romulo of the Philippines said after the 1945 San Francisco conference that established the UN, ‘as a spokesman for a small nation, I want to make it very plain that my nation... would be very happy indeed to trade the fiction of equality in a powerless Assembly for the reality of a vote equal to our actual position in the world in an Assembly endowed with real power’.

  If it followed the federal model, the UN would still have a General Assembly representing the interests of nations. But it would also have a parliamentary assembly, representing the people, making decisions to serve the common good of humanity.

  I believe that ultimately representatives to such body should be elected on the basis of the ‘one person, one vote’ principle, but I don’t believe we should do that tomorrow. Right now, the principle ‘one nation, one vote’ means a range from one vote per 1.4 billion people to one vote per 12,000. If we were to establish a world parliament tomorrow we should use degressive proportionality, as does the European Parliament, which means that although more populous nations elect more representatives than smaller nations, smaller nations are allocated more seats than they would strictly receive in proportion to their population. This is an intermediate solution between one nation one vote and one person one vote.

  Is there anything else that can be done?

  We need profound changes, the most profound being a UN parliamentary body, but in the meantime, there’s a whole bunch of lower-hanging fruit. In particular, WFM has two projects that I would like to mention.

  One of them is MEGA – Mobilising an Earth Governance Alliance, (or ‘Make Earth Great Again’!). MEGA is a coalition of civil society organisations that will be working in cooperation with like-minded states to strengthen existing environmental governance mechanisms and institutions and establish additional ones. It will be officially launched in January 2024 and will offer a forum for environmental organisations, experts, like-minded governments, legislators, campaigners and other stakeholders to engage, share information and strategies and support advocacy for better global environmental governance. It will produce a wide range of reports, proposals and campaigns – some managed by MEGA itself, others by partner organisations. MEGA as a whole provides a comprehensive solution to the environmental crises we face, and a basis for global governance more broadly.

  MEGA is promoting the implementation of the recommendations of the Climate Governance Commission’s 2023 report. To that end, we will be mobilising ‘smart coalitions’ of state and non-state actors – a proven method for the reform of global governance, the International Criminal Court and the landmines ban treaty being cases in point. Countries least responsible for climate change and suffering the greatest impact are potential leading members of such coalitions.

  Another WFM project, launched in October, is LAW not War. This doesn’t seek to change the institutions of global governance, but to make better use of the ones we already have. It proposes to enhance the jurisdiction and use of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) so that international disputes can be resolved peacefully rather than through recourse to the threat or use of force.

  Specifically, the objectives of the campaign are to increase the number of states accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ; encourage more frequent use of the ICJ as a dispute resolution mechanism provided in international treaties; appeal to states to make use of ICJ jurisdiction through mutual agreement for specific disputes; support UN bodies to request ICJ advisory opinions on critical issues; and encourage states to adopt constitutional amendments or legislative measures to affirm the UN Charter’s prohibition of war and the obligation to resolve international disputes peacefully, including through recourse to the ICJ.

  Do you think global governance would benefit from greater civil society access and participation?

  The dysfunction of global governance is not fundamentally about civil society having poor access. That’s a symptom of the core dysfunction, which is about decision making and legitimacy. If there were a world parliament, by virtue of its role it would give a voice to civil society – not only to civil society but also to business, Indigenous peoples and everyone else. A system allowing greater access to more voices would be better informed, more representative and more legitimate. But the solution is not simply giving civil society more access, because what would be the point in giving civil society the most wonderful access to a broken system? But if you created a parliament, civil society access would follow.

  What would it take for the reforms that you propose to materialise?

  This decision making and legitimacy dysfunction goes back to the very origins of the current system when the winners of the Second World War gave themselves a veto. It may take a crisis as big as the one that originated the system to produce the profound reform it needs. As Milton Friedman noted, what’s done in a crisis depends on the plans that are lying around at the time, so part of WFM’s role is to write the plan and keep it alive in the minds of policy makers until the crisis occurs and the politically impossible becomes the politically inevitable.

  Exactly what such a crisis will be is unknowable, but I don’t think we’ve had a catalyst anywhere near the scale necessary yet. It took the Second World War to produce the current system, and it could take a third to produce a new one – though of course, it might be too late for that if as a result of this crisis we have been incinerated. The big question then is whether there will be sufficient catalyst for change before we pass some catastrophic tipping point.

  If one takes the view that catastrophe is inevitable, or on the other hand that everything will work out in the end, then there would be no point in advocating for better global governance. In my view it could go either way, so there remains a realistic path to a just, free and peaceful world, where humanity and nature flourish in harmony, and there is no better use of time than doing what one can to help steer humanity onto this path.

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  Get in touch with the World Federalist Movement through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@worldfederalist on Twitter.

  This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

• GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: ‘The current system is dysfunctional, but we still depend on it in crucial ways’

  CIVICUS speaks with Natalie Samarasinghe, Global Director for advocacy at the Open Society Foundations (OSF), about the need for global governance reform and the proposalfor a civil society envoy within the United Nations (UN) system.

  OSFs is the world’s largest private funder of independent groups working for justice, democratic governance and human rights. It bases its work on the principles of justice, equity and expression as defining characteristics of any truly open society.

  What do you think are the biggest shortcomings of thecurrent global governance system?

  The most evident issue is its lack of effectiveness. While the global governance system is essential and is tasked with significant responsibilities, it is not delivering results. It’s dysfunctional and fails to respond to the biggest challenges we face – the existential climate emergency, the pandemic, the cost-of-living crisis and other major conflicts. The system is not dealing with these challenges – it’s not anticipating them nor preventing their escalation.

  The global governance system is also dysfunctional in addressing lower-magnitude issues. We were used to seeing the UN Security Council struggle to deal with big conflicts in which one of the permanent members had a close interest. But now we are seeing the UN being kicked out from countries where there is no such interest. Decades-old peacekeeping operations are being questioned for having achieved too little. Debt is another good example of an area where we don’t seem to be able to get fair deals on the table.

  This plays a significant role when it comes to legitimacy. We have a system that has baked-in inequalities. The quota system of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the structure of the UN Security Council are obvious examples. These were initially accepted because there was a common understanding that, to an extent, they worked. This is no longer the case: these systems are not doing what they are supposed to do: keep big powers in check. And it’s an even bigger problem because they are still tasked with fulfilling essential functions that millions of people across the world depend on.

  But there is no alternative global forum to replace the current system. While there are institutions such the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, we still heavily rely on the IMF and the World Bank for most of the development infrastructure and humanitarian needs. And when we are looking for verified information, such as updates on the situation in Israel and Palestine, we still place trust in UN sources.

  Although the current global governance system is dysfunctional, we still depend on it in crucial ways. So one of the massive issues we face is how to create something new without tearing down the old, which we still need.

   

  How could existing global governance institutions be made more effective?

  Let’s take the International Labour Organization as an example. This organisation, which predates the UN system, employs a tripartite system in which workers, employers and the government are represented – what we would now call a multistakeholder system. This means the right people are brought to the table at the right time. It’s not just the decision-makers, but also those who will take care of implementation and the ones who will be affected by the decisions.

  While decision-making processes that follow this system can sometimes be painfully slow, implementation picks up speed because the decision is clear and has ownership and legitimacy for all parties involved.

  There are lots of examples of processes bringing people together in similar ways. The case of Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, shows that these don’t need to be time-consuming. In this case it was quite fast thanks to a structure that, although representative, included a limited number of people.

  It’s also interesting to explore complementary systems operating at multiple levels. Take, for instance, the global refugee system. Despite its limited ability to address the issue of climate refugees, there is no interest in introducing changes at a global level, for fear that opening it up to discussion can end up undermining it. But there is still the possibility of introducing innovations at the city and community levels, as shown in responses to the Ukraine crisis.

  Effective leadership is also crucial. Peacekeeping and mediation were not included in the UN Charter but were developed over time in response to a need. We need visionary leaders with the flexibility to generate new ideas. As we confront challenges such as climate change, the success of major gatherings such as climate summits hinges on leaders who can bring innovation and vision to the table. UN reform is urgently needed, but without good leaders it will remain elusive.

  Howis OSF working to advance a more robust, effective and democratic global governance system?

  OSF is the largest private funder of independent groups working for justice, democratic governance and human rights, and we are looking at how best to make our support count as new challenges meet existing ones. Earlier this year, we polled people across 30 countries – large, small, high-income, developing – and the results were both reassuring and alarming: people care about democracy and human rights. An overwhelming number of respondents were positive about the enduring value of these principles. But they aren’t seeing these values translate into results on the ground or in improvements in their daily lives, especially when it comes to economic and social rights.

  In addition to working with those on the ground, OSF is able to take a step back and look at the bigger picture. We can bring people together across geographies, issues and sectors. This allows for cross-learning from various human rights spaces and tools, tackling problems from different angles and supporting innovative ideas. OSF can back those advocating for change as well as provide funds to support the change-makers.

  A clear example of this approach was during the COVID-19 pandemic, when we advocated for developing countries not only to have access to vaccines but also to be able to produce them themselves, including support for the establishment of a vaccine manufacturing plant in Senegal.

  OSF aims to translate its advocacy into tangible actions, leveraging its privileged position to make a unique contribution.

  What initiatives is civil society advancing to reform global governance?

  I would like to highlight the UNMute Civil Society initiative, which advocates for a civil society envoy or a civil society champion within the UN system.

  The problem with civil society engagement is that it’s often seen through a very narrow prism of who’s in the room at a particular event, without a consistent, cross-cutting approach and outreach strategy to mainstream civil society participation.

  A civil society envoy could perform a number of sorely needed tasks, such as identifying gaps, assessing best practices, enhancing accessibility and streamlining processes. At the moment, it’s challenging, especially for smaller civil society groups, to navigate the plethora of websites, forms, requirements and timelines that are all different depending on which part of the UN they want to engage with. Sometimes the rules differ from event to event. An envoy could help simplify all this, and also help ensure that engagement is meaningful, substantive and helpful to all involved.

  Let’s clarify that the civil society envoy would not be someone who represents civil society, just like the Youth Envoy does not represent all young people, nor the head of UN Women represent all women. This is someone who represents the UN and its commitment to having civil society not just in the room, but on the ground, helping the UN to achieve its goals.

  And here’s where we could get creative. The envoy could explore ways of engaging people with digital and non-digital approaches and explore civil society engagement with the UN and also the World Bank, regional banks and other regional institutions. The envoy could also track the allocation of funds, and draw attention to the extremely low levels of funding – such as development and climate funding – that goes to groups such as grassroots women’s organisations.

  The role has enormous potential in terms of the change it could inspire. This is a hugely important effort, and I am really glad that CIVICUS and many other civil society organisations are pushing for it. I also know that there are plenty of supportive UN member states, even if people tend to think they are not. We’ve moved way beyond that. If you look at the UN75 Declaration or the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), there is a clear recognition that civil society needs to be at the table, and the envoy offers a way to do it in a more coherent and effective way.

  What benefits do you anticipate from greater civil society access and participation?

  Civil society participation is essential. We are not going to get anywhere on anything if we do not have people, communities, social movements and organisations involved. They have a key role in shaping responses to issues such as COVID-19 and climate change. By including civil society in decision-making, decisions gain legitimacy because they are based on what those directly affected think is the best solution.

  An example of how having civil society around the table has revolutionised our approach are cash transfers. Donors were against giving cash directly to people. They would rather give vouchers or support a project. But civil society showed them that when given cash, people would mostly make the right choices without the need for much of the infrastructure otherwise needed. Similarly, civil society has helped to advance accountability for human rights violations where UN processes have not been able to, through national-level work on targeted sanctions.

  Civil society groups are on the frontlines of development, climate change and humanitarian crisis. They are valuable partners of the UN and could be equally valuable partners of the World Bank and IMF if they were allowed to.

  It is often said that the UN does not have enough funds or capacity to get things done on the ground – but civil society is that capacity. Instead of designing a new set of SDGs, let’s have the UN transfer power, responsibility and funding to local groups that have the legitimacy and the ability to deliver what people on the ground need and want. This would be transformative.

  And civil society also acts as a conscience to international organisations and multilateral institutions by reminding them what they stand for. As we look at the suffering of civilians – in Ukraine, Israel and Palestine, Sudan and elsewhere – it seems like we have forgotten why we have humanitarian and human rights laws. Despite grave risks, civil society acts without fear or favour, calling out violations wherever they occur. And we at Open Society are committed to do what we can to help.

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  Get in touch with the Open Society Foundations through theirwebsite orFacebook page, and follow@OpenSociety and@OpenNatalie on Twitter.

  This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

• GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: ‘The scale and urgency of our challenges calls for more than incremental reform, it requires transformation’

  CIVICUS speaks with Stirling Dean, Chair and Executive Director of the United Institutions Foundation, about the deficits of the global governance system and civil society’s proposals for reform.

  The United Institutions Foundation administers the institutional development of United Institutions, a planned new global institution for international cooperation between the public, private and civil sectors.

   

  What’s the current state of multilateralism?

  Multilateralism has served as the foundation of the global rule-based order for over 70 years and still does today. However, it is currently under severe strain and being undermined by a host of interconnected challenges.

  First and foremost, our world is facing a host of escalating global challenges including climate change, biodiversity loss, pollution and inequality, which threaten the wellbeing of people and the planet. The multilateral system and many of our institutions are chronically overstretched due to the sheer number, complexity and scale of these challenges. Further, meeting the day-to-day demands coming from these challenges takes priority, making it difficult to tackle the root causes. Countries are also falling far behind in realising the new multilateral agreements that we have put in place to address these challenges, including the 2030 Agenda that established the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement on climate change.

  At the same time, we face a deteriorating international security environment, armed conflicts and deep divisions within and between nations. We are moving towards a more multipolar world with renewed distrust and competition between major powers. We are also seeing a rise in populism, nationalism, protectionism, misinformation and deliberate attempts to undermine democratic values around the world, which are also negatively impacting on multilateralism and international cooperation.

  Civic space is furthermore shrinking around the world, as many countries work to undermine human rights, including the rights to freedom of expression and assembly. This is in direct opposition to the principles of the 2030 Agenda as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which has been signed and ratified by those same countries. These practices affect not only people at the local and national levels but also have repercussions for the governments themselves, for their relations with other nations and for multilateralism as a whole. Moreover, they negatively affect the realisation of our global agendas, which affects us all.

  Moreover, we have paid far too little attention to the need to strengthen the multilateral system. Our current structures and institutions were largely built for the circumstances of the last century and many are now outdated and haven’t been upgraded and adequately equipped for the complex interlinked challenges and political realities of today’s world. They also don’t adequately account for the much larger set of stakeholder groups that are engaged in global affairs today. Lack of connectivity, integration, inclusion, alignment and coordination across governance structures, mechanisms, sectors, policy areas and geographies are significant challenges.

  Financing is a key challenge as well. Our global systems and institutions are chronically underfunded and development cooperation continues to be insufficient to meet demand, as only a handful of countries are delivering on the official development assistance target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income.

  On the positive side, the United Nations (UN) system is still making a tangible difference for countries and millions of people around the world. Countries did come together at the UN to adopt new global agendas, and to a large extent are committed to engaging with each other through multilateral institutions. They are also aware of the governance challenges we face and are actively looking at ways to turn the tide.

  Moreover, non-state stakeholders across sectors and geographies are engaged and committed to addressing our challenges and realising these agendas. They are also calling for strengthened inclusion in global decision-making and working to hold governments to account.

  Last but not least, according to surveys conducted by the UN and other institutions, the vast majority of the world’s people still strongly support and believe in international cooperation and multilateralism. And that is essential.

  Are non-state stakeholders sufficiently included in key deliberations at the UN?

  Non-state stakeholders have been engaged in UN deliberations since its founding and have been quite instrumental in helping drive many of the developments and decisions that states have made at the UN. However, due to the intergovernmental nature of the UN there have always been barriers to stakeholder engagement, and participation has been limited. Moreover, the inclusion of non-state stakeholders is often treated as an afterthought and regarded by many as mere tokenism.

  To a large extent non-state stakeholders believe that their level of inclusion and participation in UN deliberations is completely insufficient. They argue that when it does take place, it is mostly limited to two-minute interventions with no follow up, which does not constitute meaningful engagement, debate or collaboration, and I tend to agree. For decades, they have called for greater and more meaningful engagement, and with the ever-growing number of stakeholders engaged in global affairs, this call is today stronger than ever.

  What can be done to improve things?

  There have been multiple attempts to strengthen working methods between UN member states and non-state stakeholders and to increase inclusion and participation in UN deliberations, but, with few exceptions, the resulting changes have most often been minor due to built-in resistance, constraints related to the intergovernmental nature of the organisation and pushback from various member states.

  However, there are proposals for reform worth considering. These include the recommendations made by the Unmute Civil Society initiative, led by the governments of Costa Rica and Denmark, and the proposed establishment of a UN civil society envoy, supported by multiple civil society campaigns.

  UN member states could also explore the plethora of already established engagement methodologies used by individual UN agencies, civil society, the private sector and some national and local governments. These include comprehensive e-consultation platforms, hearings, co-creation workshops, civil society mechanisms and focus groups, just to mention a few. There are literally dozens of opportunities that could be explored.

  We will have to wait and see what proposals make it into the Pact for the Future, the outcome document of the upcoming Summit of the Future. Given past experiences, if any changes are made, they will most likely be incremental and nowhere near what is needed. Also, while the scope of the outcome document does include an important proposal for increased inclusion of youth, it does not address the need to strengthen inclusion and participation of all stakeholder groups. I hope this will change during the upcoming negotiations of the zero draft of the document.

  What’s at stake in the Summit of the Future?

  UN member states are holding the Summit of the Future with the aim of agreeing on a range of reforms and investments to reinvigorate multilateralism, strengthen international cooperation and accelerate progress in realising global development agendas.

  A host of reform proposals have been put forth and are being considered for inclusion in the summit and its outcome document. These include possible reforms to the UN, reform of the international financial architecture, strengthening global emergency response, adopting a new agenda for peace, strengthening digital cooperation and accounting for the interests of future generations in global decision making, among others. It is a tall agenda but a very necessary one. Each of the proposed reforms is important and will be required in helping us turn the tide.

  Concerningly, however, numerous mission-critical governance challenges, reforms and investments, some of which were included in the UN Secretary-General’s ‘Our Common Agenda’ report, were not included in the agreed scope of the summit outcome document. These include realising a whole-of-society approach, breaking silos, investing in our capacity to implement integrated approaches, realising a more networked and inclusive multilateralism and strengthening inclusion and participation of all stakeholder groups in global decision making, among others. If these issues are not addressed, many of our governance challenges will remain and negatively affect our ability to achieve the results that we need.

  What is United Institutions, and how can it help improve multilateralism?

  Strengthening multilateralism and international cooperation to address our global challenges and realising our agendas will require a lot more than the proposals currently being considered for the Pact for the Future. The scale and urgency of our challenges also calls for more than incremental reforms, it requires transformation.

  As outlined in ‘Our Common Agenda’, we need a more networked, inclusive and effective multilateralism that involves all stakeholder constituencies and enables us to work in a more comprehensive and integrated manner. This requires an investment in the connectivity and capacity of the global ecosystem of mechanisms and stakeholders beyond the UN. It also requires that a host of system-wide governance challenges are solved, including silos, fragmentation and lack of inclusion. It would also require us to work together across sectors to build trust, strengthen relations, realise integrated approaches and establish global solidarity. These are functions the UN is not designed for and are not addressed by the UN reform proposals being considered for the Pact for the Future. Fragmented ad hoc solutions will not suffice either. Getting there will instead require strategic investments into functions and capabilities of the multilateral system and the global governance architecture that complement existing structures.

  The United Institutions is a planned new global institution, integrator platform and permanent world forum for global cooperation between the public, private and civil society sectors, being developed for the international community. It is intended to serve as a complement to the UN. It is developed with a view to strengthen governance, cooperation and collective action, and to support and enable the international community to realise a more networked and inclusive multilateralism, build out the institutional framework at the global level and link sectors, mechanisms and processes together across policy areas and geographies.

  The platform will provide a unifying charter, enabling environment and infrastructure for cooperation at the global level, and is designed to work in coordination with existing mechanisms at the international and national levels. It will enable existing structures and institutions to strengthen their interconnectivity, coordination and alignment in a coherent and integrated manner, and to transform institutional silos and fragmentation into systemic and sustained cooperation, integration and collective action. Among its functions, it is also intended to support and help transform working methods and relations between non-state stakeholders and UN member states, and to strengthen civic engagement and civic space at the global level.

  Both the plans for the United Institutions and the proposals being considered for the Pact for the Future are aimed at strengthening multilateralism and international cooperation, but they don’t address the same needs and instead complement each other. The United Institutions is currently in preparatory development ahead of its institutional formation and operationalisation. To learn more about this, please visit www.unitedinstitutions.org.

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  Get in touch with the United Institutions Foundation through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@ui_foundation on Twitter.

  This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.