africa
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TANZANIA: ‘The new administration is committed to ending discriminatory policies that undermine girls’ rights’
CIVICUS speaks with Prudence Mutiso, Legal Adviser at the Center for Reproductive Rights-Africa about the Tanzanian government’s policy on pregnant and married girls in schools.Founded in 1992, the Center for Reproductive Rights is a global human rights organisation of lawyers and advocates seeking to ensure the protection of reproductive rights as basic human rights fundamental to the dignity, equality, health and wellbeing of every person.
The Center works across five continents and has played a critical role in securing legal victories on reproductive rights issues, including access to life-saving obstetrics care, contraception, maternal health and safe abortion services, as well as the prevention of forced sterilisation and child marriage, in national courts, United Nations’ committees and regional human rights bodies.
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TANZANIA: ‘What is needed is a new constitution reflecting the will of the people’
CIVICUS speaks about the prospects for democratic change under a new president in Tanzania with Maria Sarungi Tsehai, a communications expert and founder of Change Tanzania. Change Tanzania is a social movement that began on social media as an informal group of people focused on bringing positive, sustainable change to Tanzania.
What is the current state of civic space – the freedoms of association, peaceful assembly, and expression – in Tanzania?
Civic space continues to be restricted, as the legal framework has not changed. Amendments have been proposed to the 2020 Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations, which have led to the severe restriction of online freedom of expression and digital media freedoms. However, these amendments are limited good news, as critical issues such as the criminalisation of what is perceived as ‘fake news’ or misinformation remain and the authorities have retained ultimate arbitrary power to take action and have so-called ‘prohibited content’ removed within two hours. The list of prohibited content, which is open to interpretation and has been used to restrict media freedom and the freedom of expression in the past, remains.
Regarding the freedom of peaceful assembly, restrictions have become harsher, to the extent that internal political party meetings are now banned and have been disrupted by riot-geared police, as witnessed recently in the case of a number of meetings and convenings held by the main opposition party, the Party for Democracy and Progress – better known as CHADEMA for its acronym in Swahili – as well as in the case of the National Convention for Construction and Reform, another opposition party, whose internal council meeting was broken up by the police on 28 August 2021.
Those who continued to gather in defiance have been illegally detained and kept incommunicado. In some cases, this has involved dozens of people, while recently in Mwanza, in northern Tanzania, it has affected close to 100 CHADEMA supporters. The chairman of CHADEMA, Freeman Mbowe, was recently abducted by masked security forces and held incommunicado for days before being charged with terrorism – all because he defied police calls and flew to Mwanza to be part of a symposium on constitutional reforms.
President Samia Suluhu Hassan has accused citizens leading movements for constitutional reform of fostering foreign interests and seeking to destabilise the country for personal gain, therefore designating their actions as ‘sedition’.
When CHADEMA supporters assembled outside the court building the day Freeman Mbowe was due to appear in court, they received rough treatment from the police and were picked off the streets and detained just for standing silently with banners and wearing opposition t-shirts. Many women have been detained in such a way and denied their basic rights to food, water and sanitary pads while in illegal detention. One female CHADEMA leader, Neema Mwakipesile, was detained for over 14 days, and was initially denied any access to a lawyer or contact with family members.
The government has also frequently instrumentalised the COVID-19 pandemic to limit political gatherings. Specifically, any gathering deemed to be critical of the government is restricted using COVID-19 regulations, while mass gathering in stadiums for sports and entertainment are still allowed.
As for restrictions on the freedom of expression, harsh reprisals against those speaking up have not been limited to opposition members and critics but have recently started to target dissenting voices within the ruling Party of the Revolution (Chama Cha Mapinduzi, CCM). On 31 August 2021, a CCM member of parliament, Jerry Silaa Ukonga, was suspended because during a meeting with his constituents he said that parliamentarians should pay income taxes. His suspension will deter other lawmakers from speaking up any matter that may be deemed critical of the government, as the parliamentary leadership is an extension of the executive rather than an independent pillar of government.
Has the new government under President Suluhu – who came to power following the death of President John Magufuli – taken any steps to improve the conditions for civil society and the expression of dissent?
First of all, calling it a ‘new government’ is a misnomer, because it is basically the same government, in which the former vice president became president and a little cabinet reshuffle took place, but most key positions were retained by the same group of people. There was some hope around the new minister responsible for foreign affairs, but for civil society not much has changed, as the mechanisms for the oversight of civil society organisations (CSOs) and the legal framework have remained in place.
In fact, a by-law has been recently introduced whereby CSOs are not allowed to give out joint statements without previously developing a memorandum of understanding that needs to be submitted and registered with the NGO Registrar. So it’s the same laws and the same people who continue to be a threat to any open dissent. This continuity is visible in the government’s response to Tanzania’s Universal Periodic Review examination at the United Nations Human Rights Council, which hardly seems to have addressed any area of concern.
The only visible difference under the new president has been the government’s admission of the existence of the COVID-19 pandemic. The new president has introduced and encouraged COVID-19 preventative measures and Tanzania officially joined the COVAX initiative, as a result of which it has received vaccines.
However, there has been no change regarding the key people overseeing health policies, and as a result trust in the government is low. The mixed messaging has led to apathy and disbelief; therefore, vaccine uptake is slow and even precautions are not enforced genuinely and systematically. Additionally, COVID-19 data has not been released in a regular and systematic manner. The government randomly releases ad hoc and aggregate numbers that are impossible to assess. There are evidently a lot of COVID-19-related deaths that go undocumented.
Do you think the fact that the country has its first female president will make a difference for women’s rights?
So far, nothing has changed. In fact, President Suluhu has fronted herself as a patriarchy enabler, both in rhetoric and appointments. She has adopted approaches similar to those used by previous governments to target opposition and dissent. She has even refused to lift a ban on pregnant schoolgirls from re-entering formal education after delivery.
For real change to happen, a shift in fundamental structures needs to take place, starting with constitutional and legal reforms to enable political competition and allow access for more female decision-makers who are not dependent on patronage by the male-dominated leadership of the CCM. But President Suluhu is ignoring calls for constitutional reform.
What would the government need to do so that Tanzania becomes more open and democratic?
Unfortunately, the government led by the CCM, which is in power as a result of an openly rigged election that was accompanied by one of the most violent post-election repression episodes, is not capable of driving any democratic reform. What is needed is a new constitution reflecting the will of the people. A good place to start would be the ‘Warioba draft’ – named after the chairperson of the Constitutional Review Commission, retired judge Joseph Warioba - that was published in 2013 and ditched at the last minute by CCM in October 2014, during its failed attempt to pass a new constitution through a constituent assembly.
The process has to be revived and it has to be multi-party and involve the citizenry more broadly. But President Suluhu seems unwilling to do this, and in some cases, as in that of Freeman Mbowe, she has shown outright hostility towards the opposition. If its only goal is to cling to power, the government will not work on any real reforms. The sooner this becomes clear to everyone, the better.
Besides writing a new constitution, the government would also need to improve accountability, especially by following up on the Controller and Auditor General’s (CAG) Annual Report. The first thing that President Suluhu did when she was sworn in was to ask the CAG to submit its report and promised that measures would be taken against those civil servants who were involved in wrongdoing. She also ordered a CAG special audit of the Central Bank for the first quarter of 2021. But the report was never published, and only a press statement was released which said that everything was in order. Regarding accountability and transparency, rejoining the Open Government Partnership would be a good starting point. The government should also introduce police and prison reforms and make new appointments for positions including judges, the Inspector General of Police, the Attorney General, the Chief Justice, and other positions to improve justice and social services.
How can global civil society support civil society in Tanzania?
The main focus should be on high-level, intense pressure on the government of Tanzania to engage with the opposition and credible civil society representatives and citizen groups in ushering in constitutional reforms so that by 2025 we will have laid down the foundations for free and fair elections. Otherwise, the next elections may put Tanzania on a very dangerous path in many regards.
Global civil society needs to make sure that Tanzania is held accountable and that in all discussions fundamental structural and legal framework reforms are emphasised. It should make sure not to succumb to nice promising rhetoric and superficial cosmetic changes because allowing the government to get away with such flimsy actions will have very grave consequences.
Those funding projects in Tanzania need to consider funding social movements and more loose coalitions of citizens and groups rather than small circles of civil society actors that embrace a top-down approach. This will have significant impacts on building a society conducive to the greater good and serving the wider population.
Civic space inTanzaniais rated as ‘repressed’by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Change Tanzania through itsFacebook page and follow@ChangeTanzania and@MariaSTsehai on Twitter. -
Tanzania: Civil society groups express concern over rapid decline in human rights
Tanzania: 65 civil society groups call on the Tanzanian Government to address rapidly deteriorating environment for media, human rights defenders and opposition party members
#Tanzania: 65 rights groups urge government to end attacks on activists, journalists and members of the opposition party. #Civicspace in rapid decline https://t.co/PVn1DdeCM8 pic.twitter.com/UfSocmIx9p
— CIVICUS (@CIVICUSalliance) May 10, 2018To President John Magufuli
Your Excellency,
We, the undersigned civil society organisations (CSOs) from across the world, write to express our deep concern over the worrying decline in respect for human rights, including the rights to freedom of association, expression and peaceful assembly, in Tanzania. We urge your government to take proactive measures to protect these rights which are crucial to civic space and publicly recognise the essential role that a vibrant civil society and an independent media play in creating peaceful and equal societies.
Tanzania’s long-standing commitment to improving the human rights of all people, both nationally and within the region, is notable and should be acknowledged as such. However, we are deeply alarmed that these human rights issues are being precipitously undermined by the unwarranted closure of media outlets, judicial persecution and harassment of independent journalists, the targeted assassination of opposition party members, blanket restrictions on peaceful protests and the introduction and invocation of a raft of laws to undermine freedom of speech online. These and other forms of harassment and persecution of civil society and media discussed below erode Tanzania’s role as a regional champion of public freedoms, peace and stability and represent a breach of its international, national and regional human rights obligations and commitments.
New legal restrictions criminalizing freedom of expression on social and traditional media
The Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations, which was signed into law in March 2018, criminalises a broad scope of legitimate forms of online freedom of expression. Under the regulation, all bloggers and persons operating online radio and television streaming services must secure a license and pay an annual fee of over $900 before they can publish any material online. Such fees are not only financially prohibitive but place an arbitrary bar to entry to exercise the right to freedom of expression. We are also deeply concerned by provisions which endow the government with the authority to revoke a permit if a site or blogger publishes content that "causes annoyance" or "leads to public disorder."
Of equal concern are vague and overbroad provisions of the 2015 Cybercrimes Act which empower the government to arbitrarily ban and sanction the dissemination of newspaper articles or social media posts which it deems critical, including insulting the President. In particular, Article 16 criminalizes the publication of all information deemed “false, deceptive, misleading or inaccurate.” Persons found to have contravened the Act are subject to draconian prison sentences and harsh fines of not less than five million shillings ($2,190) or a term of not less than three years or both. Since coming into force, the law has been invoked to persecute dozens of individuals and journalists. In one week alone, five private citizens were charged under the Cybercrimes Act for statements made on Facebook, WhatsApp and other social media platforms, including a three-year sentence handed down to a private citizen for insulting President John Magufuli on Facebook.
Moreover, the Media Services Act, which came into force in November 2016, allows the authorities to unilaterally determine which journalists receive licenses, forces all journalists to obtain a license, and makes defamation and sedition a criminal offense. Under the law, the government-run Accreditation Board is empowered to “suspend or expunge journalists” for committing “gross professional misconduct as prescribed in the code of ethics for professional journalists.” The penalties for violating provisions of law are severe. According to the law, anyone found guilty of acting with a seditious intention who commits an offence is liable to a fine of not less than 5 million Shillings (approximately $2,260) or three years in prison or both.
Suspensions, fines and banning media outlets
Despite strong constitutional, United Nations and African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights safeguards protecting the right to freedom of expression, the government has systematically targeted Tanzanian media outlets through a combination of closures and hefty fines on newspapers. This campaign of harassment, which appears to be an attempt to suppress their work to report on government policy and conduct, has resulted in four prominent newspapers being banned in 2017 and four other papers being heavily fined in early 2018.
On 24 October 2017, the government banned the Swahili-language Tanzania Daima for a period of 90 days on specious claims of publishing false news about anti-retroviral drug use for people with HIV. This was the fourth newspaper banned since June 2017 including Mwanahalisi which was banned for 24 months in September 2017; the weekly Raia Mwema for 90 days in September and Mawio newspaper for 24 months in June 2017.
On 2 January 2018, the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) fined five television stations a combined 60 million Tanzanian shillings ($27,000) for broadcasting “offensive and unethical” content, in particular for airing a press statement issued on 30 November by the Legal Human Rights Centre (LHRC). The report by LHRC documented violations such as detentions, intimidation and physical abuse in the context of the 6 November 2017 elections of councillors in 43 wards. The TV stations that featured the LHRC's press statement and were subsequently penalised include: Star TV, Azam Two, East Africa TV, Channel 10 and ITV.
Judicial harassment and persecution of journalists and human rights defenders
In stark contrast to the authorities’ human rights obligations to uphold and protect the safety of journalists, several independent media practitioners have recently been subject to physical attacks and judicial persecution. Recently on 21 November 2017, newspaper journalist Azory Gwanda was abducted by a group of unknown assailants in the Coast Region. Prior to his enforced disappearance, Gwanda who is a journalist with newspapers, Mwananchi and The Citizen, had authored a number of articles documenting the murders of several local officials and police officers. To date Gwanda’s whereabouts remain unknown.
In August 2017, a Tanzania court began hearing a case against Micke William and Maxence Melo Mubyazi, co-owners of the whistleblower website, Jamii Forums. Both journalists were charged under the Cybercrimes Act on spurious accusations of obstructing justice for failing to disclose the identities of persons who posted details of allegedly corrupt officials on Jamiiforums. There have been over 40 adjournments of the case, including most recently on 3 May 2018. If convicted, they face fines up to 3 million shillings ($1,300) or a jail term of at least one year, or both.
Groups and defenders advocating for the rights of LGBTI individuals have also been equally persecuted. Among a wave of recent attempts to suppress organisations and activists working on SOGI issues, in October 2017, 13 human rights lawyers and defender were arbitrarily arrested and detained on allegations of promoting “promoting homosexuality”. Three civil society representatives, including Ugandan and South African lawyers from the Initiative for Strategic Litigation in Africa and nine members of Tanzanian Community Health and Education Services and Advocacy (Chesa), were arrested during a private meeting.
Killings and criminal cases against political opposition members
Since the start of 2018, scores of political opposition members and parliamentarians have been violently attacked and even killed. On 22 February, Godfrey Luena, a member of parliament with Tanzania’s main opposition party Chama Cha Demokrasia Na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) and a vocal land rights defender, was killed with machetes outside of his home. Mr Luena had been a critic of alleged state sponsored land-grabbing. Days earlier, on 13 February, Daniel John, a CHADEMA official in Dar es Salaam, was abducted and killed by unknown assailants using machetes. Mr John was supporting an opposition political campaign for a contested parliamentary seat in Dar es Salaam.
A number of opposition party members and lawmakers have also been targeted in what appears to be a systematic campaign of judicial harassment. Among other worrying cases, two opposition leaders, CHADEMA MP Joseph Mbilinyi and local party leader Emmanuel Masonga were sentenced to five months on 26 February 2018 for insulting President John Magufuli during a political rally.
Harassment, intimidation arbitrary arrest of peaceful protesters
In response to growing public frustration over human rights backsliding in the country, individuals and groups have increasingly sought to exercise their rights to peaceful assembly to air their legitimate grievances. Worryingly, the authorities, including members of the government and security apparatus, have resorted to arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force and intimidation to silence these protests.
In April 2018, Tanzanian activists called for national demonstrations to bring attention to the decline in respect for human rights in Tanzania. However, in contravention of international standards, the authorities, which require anyone seeking to hold a public assembly to secure a permit, declared the protests illegal.
The government and police forces responded to these calls to stage public protests with severe intolerance, including hostile statements by senior government and police officials, including threats that protesters “will be beaten like stray dogs."Days before the planned 26 April demonstrations seven people were arrested in Arusha for their purported role in organising the protests. The few who dared to take part in the protests were quickly persecuted; nine protesters, who marched in Dar Es Salaam, were almost immediately arrested.
Recommendations to the Government of Tanzania
The undersigned groups urge your government to create an enabling environment for civil society and the media to operate in accordance with the rights enshrined in the Constitution of Tanzania, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, including the guidelines on freedom of association and peaceful assembly. Tanzania has ratified both the ICCPR and the African Charter. At a minimum, the following conditions should be ensured: freedom of association, freedom of expression, the right to operate free from unwarranted state interference, the right to seek and secure funding and the state’s duty to protect. In light of this, the following specific recommendations are made.
1) All disabling and restrictive provisions in the Cybercrimes Act, the Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations and the Media Services Act must be amended and replaced by progressive sections that will guarantee freedom of expression and the media in line with international human rights standards.
2) The cases of newspapers banned, suspended or fined under the Media Service Act 2016 should be reviewed to enable them to continue their operations without undue interference.
3) Independent investigations should be conducted into cases of attacks and assaults on journalists, human rights defenders and opposition party members with a view to bringing suspected perpetrators to justice and these attacks should be publicly and unequivocally condemned.
4) Government officials should desist from publicly threatening human rights defenders including when activists that are working to expose corrupt practices in government or are critical of government policies and actions.
5) Best practices on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly prescribed by the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association should be adopted by the Government of Tanzania including removing the permission regime and providing recourse in cases of unlawful denial of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.
Sincerely,
- Access Now
- African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies (ACDHRS)
- Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB)
- Amnesty International
- ARTICLE 19 East Africa
- The Article 20 Network
- Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC)
- Association for Human Rights in Ethiopia (AHRE) - Ethiopia
- Association for Progressive Communications (APC)
- Bahrain Center for Human Rights - Bahrain
- Balkan Civil Society Development Network (BCSDN)
- Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS)
- Caucasus Civil Initiatives Center (CCIC)
- Center for Civil Liberties - Ukraine
- Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation (CHRR) - Malawi
- Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations
- Chapter Four - Uganda
- Citizens for Democratic Rights in Eritrea (CDRiE) - Eritrea
- CIVICUS
- Civil Rights Defenders (CRD)
- Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)
- Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI)
- Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO) - South Sudan
- DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project)
- End Impunity Organisation
- Ethiopia Human Rights Project (EHRP) - Ethiopia
- Freedom House
- Front Line Defenders
- Greenpeace Africa
- Governance, Elections, Advocacy, Research Services (GEARS) Initiative - Zambia
- Groupe d’Action pour le Progrès et la Paix (ONG GAPP-BÉNIN) - Bénin
- HAKI Africa - Kenya
- Human Rights Defenders Network - Sierra Leone
- International Civil Society Center (ICSC)
- International Rivers - Africa Program
- Iraqi Network of Social Media - Iraq
- Jamaa Resource Initiatives - East Africa
- JOINT Liga de ONGs em Mocambique - Mozambique
- Karapatan Alliance for the Advancement of People’s Rights - Philippines
- Kepa - the Finnish NGO platform - Finland
- Latin American and Caribbean Network for Democracy (REDLAD)
- Liberia Coalition of Human Rights Defenders (LICHRD) - Liberia
- Ligue Djiboutienne des Droits Humains (LDDH) - Djibouti
- Ligue Iteka - Burundi
- Lumiere Synergie pour le Developpement - Senegal
- Malawi Human Rights Defenders Coalition - Malawi
- Minority Rights Group International
- National Civic Forum - Sudan
- Observatoire des Droits de l'Homme au Rwanda - Rwanda
- Odhikar - Bangladesh
- OutRight Action International
- Pan-African Human Rights Defenders Network (PAHRDN)
- Public Interest Law Center (PILC) - Chad
- RESOCIDE - Burkina Faso
- Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights
- Robert L. Bernstein Institute for Human Rights | NYU School of Law
- Servicios y Asesoría para la Paz (Serapaz) - México
- Sinergia - Venezuela
- Solidarity Center
- Sudanese Development Initiative (SUDIA) - Sudan
- Tournons la page (TLP)
- West African Human Rights Defenders’ Network (WAHRDN)
- World Movement for Democracy
- The Zambia Council for Social Development (ZCSD) - Zambia
- Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum - Zimbabwe
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Tanzania: upsurge in restrictions on fundamental freedoms
Tanzania has been placed on a watch list of countries in which there are growing and worrying threats to civic space. The country is rated as obstructed on the CIVICUS Monitor, a global platform tracking civic violations around the world, who issue a quarterly watch list to highlight ongoing concerns in countries demonstrating worrying trends.
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THE GAMBIA: ‘Civil society works to ensure Jammeh and other perpetrators of human rights violations face justice’
CIVICUS speaks about the prospects of The Gambia’s former dictator Yahya Jammeh being put on trial with Adama Jallow, National Coordinator of the Gambia Center for Victims of Human Rights Violations (Victim’s Center).Founded in 2017, the Victims Center is a civil society organisation (CSO) that seeks justice and reparations for victims of human rights violations under the dictatorship. It has successfully pressured the government to recognise the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC).
What are the main conclusions of the TRRC report?
After consulting with victims of Yahya Jammeh’s inhumane treatment, the TRRC’s report concluded that Jammeh should be brought to justice and victims must receive help and support to recover from the atrocious experience they endured under the former dictator’s rule. The government has released a white paper in which it accepts the recommendations made by the TRRC. We believe this is huge, considering the amount of work civil society put into advocating for the establishment of the TRRC.
The TRRC report is a sort of roadmap we can use so that justice can be served in The Gambia. Out of the 265 recommendations made by the TRRC, the government rejected only two, while marking the rest for implementation. Many atrocities were committed under Jammeh’s dictatorship and were highlighted by both perpetrators and victims before the TRRC. These include sexual and gender-based violence, torture, enforced disappearances and killings, arbitrary detention and crimes in which the victims were accused of witchcraft.
The TRRC’s report states that The Gambia’s society and government institutions have a responsibility to prevent the reoccurrence of the crimes it documented. Its recommendations focus basically on the well-being of victims, who are expected to receive individual and collective reparations, and the prosecution of perpetrators.
We initially did not think the government would agree to implementing the TRRC’s recommendations. It came as a shock to us when the government agreed to it, because it is a new experience for civil society to be seen and heard by the government. It is a positive indication that our government is prepared to work together with us. The fact that only two of the recommendations were rejected surpassed our expectations. Now we will focus on pushing the government to implement the recommendations.
What does the Victims Center do?
The Victim’s Center was established in 2017, right after the regime change. Under Jammeh’s rule citizens lived in an oppressive state that restricted their rights and freedoms, and there was no freedom of association, assembly and expression. Many human rights violations and abuses occurred, including killings, torture and other cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment, disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detention, sexual violence and the indiscriminate and illegal use of force. Many civil society activists and organisations were arrested because of the work they did – basically for speaking up against the regime and pushing for democracy.
When Jammeh was overthrown, and we got a new government, civil society and victims felt the need to seek justice and hold Jammeh accountable for the atrocities committed under his rule. We formed the Victims Center to offer a platform for victims to express their issues, seek support and assistance and advocate towards the government.
Part of our mission is to advocate for the TRRC report. We have been fortunate enough to receive international support. Organisations such as Human Rights Watch have released letters in solidarity with the victims and to demand the government responds to our advocacy asks. We have also worked closely with other CSOs and victim-led organisations to ensure that the government takes its duty seriously, recognises victims and provides reparations. We want to make sure the government provides reparations to all victims, without discriminating against anyone.
We have also seen a need to go out and sensitise people on transitional justice processes, victims’ rights and the cases submitted to the TRRC. The Victim’s Center has always been at the forefront of advocating and engaging with the Ministry of Justice and mobilising media to ensure victims are getting the help they need. Despite the challenges we have faced, such as intimidation and lack of capacity, we remain committed to helping victims get justice.
How has civil society advocated for prosecution?
The Gambia’s civil society has been very active throughout the process. We understood the importance of engaging with the government because it will play a key role in ensuring that justice is served. We had meetings with the Ministry of Justice staff to find out how they intend to support victims.
We have also disseminated press releases demanding that justice take place at the societal level. We think it is important to inform victims, their families and society at large about the contents of the TRRC report and how The Gambia’s society will benefit from it, so we have held conferences. We have also formed partnerships with other local and international CSOs to reach a wider audience and to put additional pressure on our government.
We know that our laws present obstacles. We were supposed to have a new constitution to replace the 1997 one, but the new text was rejected by the National Assembly. The legislation presently in place does not consider enforced disappearance or torture as crimes, which is something civil society advocates for. We now hope the National Assembly can adjust the old constitution to ensure the possibility of litigation in such cases. In the meantime, the Ministry of Justice has promised to form a body to handle cases involving crimes that are not codified in our legislation.
In essence, civil society has engaged extensively to ensure that Jammeh and other perpetrators face justice.
Do you foresee any challenges in the implementation of the report’s recommendations?
We foresee several challenges, one of them being the Ministry of Justice’s lack of capacity to handle cases of extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearance and torture. We need experts to oversee these cases so that everyone who is prosecuted is brought to justice.
Another challenge lies with our constitution, as neither the old nor the current draft recognises enforced disappearance and torture. These are some of the human rights violations victims experienced and we need them to be recognised so that victims can receive help and perpetrators can be tried.
We are also concerned about whether Jammeh can be brought to trial outside The Gambia, given that he is not currently residing in the country. We are trying our best to see how we can work with other organisations to address this issue.
But all these challenges have not discouraged us. We continue advocating with partners to ensure the TRRC’s recommendations are implemented. We are also putting pressure on the Ministry of Justice to come up with a realistic timeframe that will convince us that the government is really committed to implementing the recommendations. We encourage the government to work closely with CSOs and victim-led organisations to ensure they implement the white paper with an inclusive approach.
What kind of support does civil society in The Gambia need from the international community?
Local CSOs and victim-led organisations need funding to continue their advocacy work, build capacity and support victims. International CSOs should partner with us and advise us on a way forward in terms of what types of cases could be brought, and how they can be brought if the constitution is not changed or amended. We also need them to use their resources to put pressure on the Gambian government to make sure justice prevails.
Civic space in The Gambia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with the Gambia Center for Victims of Human Rights Violations through itsFacebook, and follow@gambia_vc on Twitter. -
The Gambia: Time to respect the will of Gambians
Global civil society alliance CIVICUS urges Gambian President Yahya Jammeh to respect constitutional norms and the will of the Gambian people. As the 19 January deadline for the inauguration of incoming President Adama Barrow approaches, Gambian authorities are silencing independent media houses and arbitrarily arresting public spirited citizens calling on incumbent president Jammeh to hand over power in line with the results of the 1 December 2016 elections.
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The Human Rights Council must establish a mechanism on Ethiopia
UN Human Rights Council – 33rd Special Session on Ethiopia
December 2021
Delivered by Lisa MajumdarThank you, Madame President.
We welcome the convening of this long overdue Special Session on Ethiopia.
The High Commissioner’s update to the Council in November highlighted the need for transparent investigations and accountability for what has been unfolding in the country over the past year. The conflict and the human suffering have both escalated since then.
Restrictions imposed have left humanitarian groups unable to carry out their work amidst increased humanitarian needs, food insecurity, and disruption of livelihoods. As a result of this loss in services, millions could be denied the aid they need to stay alive.
Fragile gains made by civil society over the past few years are at great risk. It has become dangerous for national civil society to engage in public advocacy, with pressure imposed and threats perpetrated by both State and non-State actors, compounded by a sweeping state of emergency. The online space for dissent is radically shrinking. Numerous journalists have been detained, with at least nine still in custody at the beginning of this month.
The conflict itself has spread to neighbouring regions and threatens millions of civilians.
There is a clear absence of any transparent and credible national accountability process for violations and abuses committed. Following calls from the High Commissioner and civil society, the Council must act on its prevention mandate, which was established to avert atrocity and crimes against humanity. It can do so by adopting a resolution that establishes an independent investigative mechanism mandated to investigate, report on, and to collect and preserve evidence of alleged violations and abuses of international human rights law and violations of international humanitarian law by all parties to the conflict.
We thank you.
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The Post- 2015 Development Agenda: Time to Learn and Connect
With the 2015 deadline of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) fast approaching, governments and organisations across the world are looking towards the next step. Introspection is a necessary part of the process as both the successes and failures of the original MDG agenda are being assessed and dissected, providing captivating accounts on both sides. The eLearning Africa news service has been following developments and taking notes.
The areas that have attracted our attention are, naturally, education and ICT infrastructure. Whilst impressive statistics concerning achievements under the MDG2 (achieving universal primary education) are abound, debates are also raging over what these numbers actually mean.Read more at eLearning Africa News Portal
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The situation of environmental human rights defenders across Africa continues to be dire
CIVICUS statement at the 77th Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights
Agenda Item 3 (Human rights situation in Africa)
Statement on the situation of environmental human rights defenders in Africa
Delivered by Paul Mulindwa
Global civil society alliance CIVICUS and partners under Environmental Rights Legal Framework Coalition congratulate the Chair, on your re-election for the 2nd mandate as the chair of the Commission, and we commit to a continued collaboration. We welcome this opportunity to address the African Commission on the situation of environmental human rights defenders in Africa.
Honourable Chairperson, the situation of environmental human rights defenders across Africa in 2023 continues to be dire, in the face of ever-increasing environmental degradation, natural disasters caused by the effects of climate change, and abuses against vulnerable communities for profit or so-called progress. Increased armed conflicts and insecurity have left communities in extractive areas particularly vulnerable to abuses without safe access to courts or remedy.
Between January 2015 – March 2023, the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre tracked more than 4,700 global attacks against human rights defenders raising concerns about harmful business practices, with 75% of these attacks being against environmental human rights defenders. 431 of the attacks documented were against defenders in Africa, including 68 attacks in 2022 and 2023.
Despite the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and subsequent instruments recognising most of the rights affected by climate change, many vulnerable communities including Indigenous Peoples are adversely affected. Yet, in 2023, many African governments still face significant challenges in the implementation and enforcement of such frameworks.
The closing of civic space through restrictive legislation, judicial harassment, intimidation and attacks against indigenous peoples, civil society organisations, media actors, and environmental and land defenders create real barriers for progress. Increases in attacks against human rights defenders and communities has been exacerbated by harmful business practices across the continent.
The lack of regulation and accountability for violations of environmental rights and environmental degradation, and against environmental defenders, particularly by the business sector, jeopardises Africa’s vision 2063 for prosperous sustainable development in a continent-wide free trade area.
CIVICUS also commends the Commission for passing its Resolution on Business and Human Rights in Africa (ACHPR/Res.550 (LXXIV) 2023) as a critical first step in regional implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and advancing the business and human rights agenda and notes the urgent need for the establishment of a regional instrument for accountability for corporate entities for environmental abuses.
Honourable Chairperson, we therefore urge the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to:
- Adopt a resolution for the drafting of a regional instrument for the protection of Environmental Rights in Africa.
- Expedite the process of the drafting of an African Regional Instrument to Regulate the Activities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, towards ensuring accountability and access to remedy for business-related human rights violations in Africa, with particular focus on marginalized and vulnerable populations, in accordance with Resolution on Business and Human Rights in Africa (ACHPR/Res.550 (LXXIV) 2023).
- Adopt a resolution for a moratorium on resource extraction activities in conflict and fragile state in Africa.
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TOGO: ‘The international community must send a clear message that power grabs won’t be tolerated’
CIVICUS discusses the crackdown on civil society in Togo with a human rights defender who asked to stay anonymous for security reasons.Political tensions in Togo have increased following the recent adoption ofconstitutional changes. Under the new parliamentary system, the president will be elected by parliament rather than popular vote, and a powerful new post of President of the Council of Ministers will be created. Suspicions are that the changes will enable President Faure Gnassingbé to stay in power. Gnassingbé has ruled Togo since 2005, when he took over from his father, who’d seized power in a 1967 coup. The government has banned protests against the changes, disrupted civil society meetings, arbitrarily arrested and detained protesters and suspended and deported journalists for covering the unrest.
What are the main constitutional changes and why have the political opposition and civil society objected to them?
On 25 March, Togo’s National Assembly adopted a new constitution that dramatically changes the country’s governance from a presidential to a parliamentary system. The changes were not put to a referendum, but were decided through opaque legislative procedures. The main changes are the abolition of direct presidential elections and the creation of the powerful role of President of the Council of Ministers. Similar to a prime minister, this president is elected by parliament for a six-year term that can be extended indefinitely if he retains majority support. This removes the two-term limit imposed by the 2019 constitution, which was introduced after massive public protests.
The new constitution sparked widespread controversy and came amid an already tense political climate, with parliamentary and regional elections originally scheduled for 13 April repeatedly postponed while lawmakers debated the constitutional changes. Political parties, civil society organisations (CSOs), the Catholic Church and part of the population see it as an attempt by the ruling family to cling to power, as the amendments would extend the 19-year presidency of Faure Gnassingbé and the 57-year dynastic rule of the Gnassingbé family.
We strongly condemn the adoption of the new constitution and the lack of transparency in the process. This is a constitutional coup that restricts citizens’ political rights, exacerbates political instability and undermines democratic governance.
What reforms are needed to ensure genuine multi-party democracy in Togo?
First, it’s crucial to restore direct presidential elections based on universal suffrage, because the electoral system should truly reflect the will of the people. But a president shouldn’t be allowed to rule indefinitely, so it’s also crucial to reintroduce term limits for the president and other key officials to prevent the concentration of power and promote accountability.
In addition, an independent electoral commission should be established to restore public confidence in a system that’s now perceived to be biased in favour of the ruling party. This commission should oversee all electoral processes and ensure they are free, fair and transparent.
It is also key to ensure equal access to campaign resources for all political parties. Fair media coverage and campaign financing would contribute to a more competitive and representative electoral process. It is equally important to strengthen legal safeguards. All parties should be allowed to operate freely without interference or fear of persecution and violence from state authorities.
We need to increase civic participation. Reforms should facilitate platforms for CSOs to engage in political debate. We must support grassroots movements with resources and training to help them mobilise people and educate them about democratic principles and their rights.
Togolese civil society is already pushing for these changes. Groups such as ‘Touche pas à ma constitution’ (‘Don’t touch my constitution’) are organising protests, raising awareness and holding community meetings to educate people and challenge the new constitution. They have also filed complaints with regional bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), calling for the annulment of the new constitution and the restoration of democratic norms. CSOs and democratic political parties are presenting a united front to demand democratic reforms.
How has the government responded to the protests?
The government has responded to the protests with a heavy-handed approach aimed at silencing dissent. Many opposition leaders and activists have been arrested. On 26 March, law enforcement and security forces banned two press conferences organised by political parties and CSOs on the grounds that the organisers didn’t have proper permits. This was a clear attempt by the government to stifle opposition voices. On 3 April, nine leaders of the political opposition party Dynamique Mgr Kpodzro were also arrested for ‘disturbing public order’. They were released six days later.
The use of violence, a hallmark of the Gnassingbé regime, has created a climate of fear. Anyone who takes part in opposition activities is framed as a criminal who threatens public order and is prosecuted. This has a chilling effect on civil society activism. Many people are afraid of being arrested or violently attacked if they engage in political discourse or take part in protests. This criminalisation undermines our ability to mobilise effectively and advocate for democratic reform.
With our freedoms of expression and assembly severely curtailed, we’ve found it increasingly difficult to organise events, hold press conferences or communicate our messages without interference from security forces. This has increasingly isolated us from the wider public. The crackdown on dissent has undermined public trust in both the government and CSOs, as people become disillusioned with the political process and the weak foundations of democracy.
How can the international community help address the suppression of civic freedoms in Togo?
The international community can play a key role by applying diplomatic pressure and supporting democratic reforms. Public condemnations and resolutions by international bodies such as the United Nations and the African Union can help highlight these issues and push for necessary changes. International bodies and representatives should engage directly with Togolese officials to address concerns.
They should also support local civil society by providing funding, resources and training. This support is essential to strengthen CSOs’ capacity to advocate for democracy and human rights, and to mobilise and empower people.
Independent monitoring and reporting mechanisms are essential to assess the political situation, ensure transparency in the upcoming elections and document human rights violations. If violations continue, the international community should consider sanctioning key officials and making development aid and assistance conditional on respect for democratic principles and human rights. This can serve as an incentive for the government to undertake meaningful reforms.
ECOWAS is also in a position to mediate between the government, the opposition and local civil society to promote a more inclusive and democratic environment. At a time when democracy is in retreat in West Africa, with four countries having suffered military coups since 2020 and 15 leaders having circumvented term limits, ECOWAS must take a firm stand against unconstitutional changes such as those recently seen in Togo and send a clear message that power grabs won’t be tolerated.
Civic space in Togo is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
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Togo’s violations of the press are out of step with democratic norms
CIVICUS speaks toKoffi Déla Frack Kepomey, the executive director of Concertation Nationale de la Société Civile du Togo (CNSC-Togo) concerning the recent closure of a television and radio station by the regulatory authority as well as the torture of a journalist.
1. Two independent media outlets, LCF television station and radio City FM, were closed by the media regulatory authority High Authority for Audio-Visual and Communication (HAAC) on 6 February 2017. Can you detail these closures?
The High Authority for Audio-Visual and Communication (HAAC) issued a communiqué on 19 September and 26 December 2016 respectively saying that it had informed media outlets LCF and City FM which are under the media group Sud Média, of irregularities and invited them to comply with the rules before 5 February 2017. A failure to comply would lead to the withdrawal of their licenses the HAAC said.
During a press conference convened by the president of the HAAC, Pitang Tchalla, on 3 February 2017, he declared that he was not aware of the existence of documents constituting a file of the Sud Média group and announced they will be closed after 5 February 2017.
The director of the Sud Média group, Luc Abaki, confirmed that the Sud Média group complied with the rules and that all documents had been provided to the then HAAC president Philippe Evegno.
Some questions remain to be clarified after the closure such as what exactly is the Sud Média group being blamed for? What are the underlying and unsaid reasons for this case?
Although it is the HAAC that attributes frequencies to radio and television stations, and gives authorisation to the written press, the HAAC also does not have the authority to cancel frequencies from those with legal existence. This power belongs to the justice arm of the state. Article 130, title IX of the Constitution states, among others that “… the HAAC has the competence to grant authorisations to new installations of private television and radio stations”. Additionally, article 24 of the Organic Law establishing the HAAC specifies that the HAAC has the competence to grant authorisations for the installation and operation of television and radio stations. Analysing these two situations shows clearly that the powers that be have decided to muzzle the press.
CNSC remains particularly concerned about the increasing restrictions for the freedom of expression and freedom of the press in Togo.
2. Journalist Robert Avotor was violently attacked on 7 February 2017 and tortured for two hours by security forces when reporting on a land dispute in Akato-Viépé. What happened?
The journalist Robert Avotor was carrying out his reporting work when he was arrested, handcuffed and tortured. This happened in Akato-Viépé, a suburb of Lomé, where he was reporting on a land dispute.
According to the journalist there is a land dispute in Akato-Viépé following a decision of the Supreme Court ruled that some buildings had to be demolished. Gendarmes came to force people from the area. There were about one hundred men in combat uniforms. Robert went there to do a report. He had his press vest and his press card. He descended from his motorcycle and approached the gendarmes and presented himself and requested to speak with the chief of the gendarmes.
Here are the facts as described by the journalist in his own words: “One of them asked me who I am and I repeated to him that I am a journalist. They responded that there was no chief among them, that they were all chiefs. After this, they asked me to show my press card, which I did. Afterwards they said: ‘We don’t eat cards here’. One of them ordered me to leave the premises. He had hardly finished saying that when he started to beat me. I ran but other gendarmes caught me and started clubbing me. They then handcuffed me, put me in a corner and walked away. Some minutes later, they came back and asked me for which press organisation I work for. I told them I came from L’Alternative. They asked me who the director was. I said it was Ferdinand Ayité. They responded, ‘This time, we have you. We always come across this name. We will make you feel what we are capable of. When you are in the crowd, you make noise. Today, it’s you alone.’ They left me in the corner. They handcuffed my hands behind my back. From time to time they came back to tighten my handcuffs. This hurt my wrists.
At a certain point, I felt the need to relieve myself. I asked them if they would permit me to urinate. They categorically refused. I then urinated in my pants and this amused them. They also brought in another person that they had discovered filming the eviction. I was there, handcuffed, for more than two hours. They then handcuffed us together (with the other person that had also been arrested), and we got into their vehicle. Once we arrived at the Gendarmerie of Sagbado, they erased all the images in our phones and on our devices. They gave us back our phones and asked us to leave. They took note of our identity numbers and we left around 14.30.”
According to Ferdinand Ayité, director of L’Alternative, journalist Robert Avotor has been subject to anonymous calls and harassment since the attack on 7 February. On the night of 19 February, while going home by motorcycle, he was followed by a car that sped up and hit the rear of his motorcycle, leading him to fall.
The Minister of Security, Yak Damehame, has received the journalist a couple of days later, together with the director of l’Alternativenewspaper and other media actors, in which he reassured to take the necessary sanctions to those responsible.
3. How would you describe the situation of freedom of expression in Togo?
The closure of these two independent media described above and the attack on and torture of journalist Robert Avotor by security forces are incidents that bear a heavy cost for freedom of expression in Togo.
The mission of the High Authority for Audio-Visual and Communication (HAAC) is “to guarantee and ensure the freedom and protection of the press and other ways of mass communication” and the first article of Organic Law 2004-021/PR of 15 December 2004 regulating the HAAC, modified by Organic Law 2009-029 of 22 December 2009 and Organic Law 2013-016 of 8 July 2013 says the HAAC is an “independent institution, independent of the administrative authorities, of all political power, of all associations and pressure groups”. The HAAC does not have the calling/ vocation to close media.
Togo has ratified international agreements, and in particular, it has ratified the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and also its Constitution does not permit torture.
These incidents constitute an obstacle to the exercise of the freedom of press and the freedom of expression, also protected by the Togolese Constitution and are an attack on human rights. They risk to annul all the efforts the government has implemented in that sense, and above all eligibility for different programmes of the Millenium Challenge Corporation.
4. How has Togolese civil society reacted to these developments?
Confronted with these events, civil society in Togo has mobilised to express their indignation through press statements, open letters and public marches. A public march was organised on 25 February in Lomé by CSOs and press organisations, joint by certain political parties, to condemn the closure of LCF and City FM. Although the march was authorised by municipal authorities, the crowd was dispersed by security forces using teargas grenades and batons, and chased protestors into the compound of the University of Lomé. CSOs and press organisations condemned strongly this violation of peaceful assembly.
Joint press statements were organised to denounce the violations of the freedom of expression, and open letters were written to government structures to use their influence to guarantee the freedom of expression. For example, CNSC has written to the MCA Cell, a structure put in place by the government to assist Togo to benefit from the Treshold and Compact of the Millenium Challenge Corporation.
5. Can you tell us some more about the environment for civil society in Togo?
At the moment we can say that there is a beginning of awareness within Togolese civil society in terms of mobilisation that needs to be encouraged. However, civic space is still under threat and there is need for more sensitisation and capacity enhancement to preserve civil society.
6. What support can international and regional groups offer to CNSC-Togo and other civil society organisations in the country?
Togolese CSOs not only need capacity enhancement for the effective preservation of civic space but also institutional support. There is a need to strengthen CSOs and activists on the preservation of civic space by accentuating the use of technology and including them in regional and international networks in order to share experiences and information.
Institutional support is a big need of CSOs in Togo, for them to achieve increased effectiveness and sustainability. Additionally regional and international groups must advocate, to the international community and the partners for Togo to respect regional and international instruments in practice.
Confronted with this situations, CNSC-Togo has addressed a communication to the Coordinator of the Cell MCA – Togo, a cell that was set up by the state to improve the indexes of development, freedom, corruption in order for Togo to benefit from the Millenium Challenge Corporation. We have asked the cell to use its influence to bring the president of the HAAC to reconsider its decision to withdraw the authorisation to close the LCF and City FM stations of the Sud Média group.
- For more information on CNSC-Togo and their activities, visit their website,www.cnsctogo.org
- Please describe in one paragraph what CNSC-Togo does.CNSC (Concertation de la Société Civile du Togo) is a Togolese civil society network with 72 member organisations, working mainly on the themes of democracy, good governance, and the promotion and protection of individual and collective rights of Togolese citizens.
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TUNISIA: ‘Civil society is not yet under direct threat, but we believe that our turn is coming’
CIVICUS speaks about the prospects for democracy in Tunisia following the president’s July 2021 power grab with Amine Ghali, director of Al Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center (KADEM). KADEM is a civil society organisation (CSO) aimed at promoting civil society’s contribution to democracy and transitional justice in Tunisia and the wider region, through awareness-raising, capacity-strengthening and documentation. -
TUNISIA: ‘The new constitution will guarantee the president extensive powers, enabling further violations’
CIVICUS speaks about Tunisia’s 25 July constitutional referendum with Amine Ghali, director of Al Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center (KADEM).
KADEM is a civil society organisation (CSO) that aims to promote civil society’s contribution to democracy and transitional justice in Tunisia and the wider Middle East and North Africa region, through awareness-raising, capacity-building and documentation.
Why is President Kais Saied holding a constitutional referendum on 25 July?
Changing the constitution or revising it is part of the president’s private project – a plan he didn’t announce either when running for the presidency in 2019 or during his first two years in office. This all started with President Saied dismissing the prime minister and suspending parliament in July 2021.
At that time, he didn’t even announce the revision of the constitution. It was only in mid-December that the president had to spell out a roadmap under international and local pressure. At the heart of Saied’s roadmap is a new constitution.
Unlike the 2014 constitution, which was based on broad consensus, the process leading to a constitutional referendum didn’t gain public support. When people were asked their opinion on revising the constitution, as part of online consultation organised in early 2022, only around 30 per cent of respondents agreed. Still, the president has gone ahead with the constitutional review process, with a referendum campaign asking Tunisians to vote ‘yes’ to ‘correct the course of the revolution’.
To what extent has civil society engaged in the process leading to the upcoming referendum?
Civil society has gone through unprecedented times in recent months. When it comes to its stance on the issue, in broad terms civil society has mostly been either silent or supportive.
At the start of the president’s July 2021 power grab, some civil society activists who were fed up with problems we have encountered in the past few years, with an inefficient democracy, saw Saied’s move as a political attempt to correct the trajectory of our democracy. One of Saied’s early promises was to fight corruption and bad governance.
But as soon as the president revealed his intention to change the constitution, political parties, influential people and some civil society groups started to oppose him.
Civil society is not one group or in one position – of course there is some diversity. The most vocal and influential groups are critical of him, especially since the planned new constitution was shared with the public; they realised its aim is not to ‘restore democracy’, but rather attack it. Now many are trying to stop the referendum process happening.
How has civil society organised against the referendum?
Although civil society’s response is late, they have recently used a range of means to oppose the referendum. Coalitions have been built, civil society has published position papers, conferences have been held.
Some groups are calling for a boycott of the referendum while others are trying to bring a case to court, although they do so in the face of presidential attack on justice: in June the president fired 57 judges, accusing them of corruption and protecting ‘terrorists’. In protest against judicial interference, Tunisian judges went on strike, only returning to work very recently.
The Tunisian League of Human Rights, a prominent CSO, has called on the president to withdraw his proposal and instead enter a wider dialogue with Tunisian society.
How free and fair might the referendum be?
When democratic transition took place in 2011 our country strived to create independent institutions such as the electoral commission and an anti-corruption body, among others. The proposed constitution dissolved almost all these independent bodies.
The only one it keeps is the electoral commission, which President Saied seized control of in May by firing its members and appointing new ones. In February he dissolved the High Judicial Council, as well as sacking the judges in June.
Given that context, the independence of this ‘independent commission’ running the referendum, and the integrity of the whole election, must be questioned.
What are your expectations for the results, and what impact will they have on the quality of democracy?
By examining the latest polls on President Saied’s approval ratings, he still has huge public support. But this is the result of his populism. He is a populist president and populism – at least in its early years – has many supporters. But once a populist president fails to deliver on their promises, they lose popularity and support. In Tunisia, we are still going through the early stages of populism.
Despite his popularity, I believe that his upcoming referendum will have a very low participation rate. With a small turnout, the legitimacy of the result will be questioned.
But the president and his regime don’t care about legitimacy. For example, when the national consultation took place months ago, it was a complete failure in terms of the participation rate. Yet President Saied used it as a justification to hold this referendum.
If the referendum is approved, it will be followed by parliamentary elections in December, according to his roadmap; parliament was dissolved in April. Meanwhile, there will probably be several ‘reforms’ and new laws. I am afraid to say that the next phase is quite scary because the president has the ultimate power to change laws without any checks and balances, in the absence of an independent judiciary, constitutional court and parliament.
Democracy means the separation of powers, checks and balances, and participation, but all of these have been cancelled by the president since July 2021. He has tightened his grip over the entire executive body, the entire legislative body, and even part of the judiciary. With an attack on the judiciary, we can count less on judges to be the ultimate defenders of rights and freedoms. Our democracy is probably at its worst level since the 2010 revolution that ousted autocrat Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali.
The human rights situation is worsening with the decline of democracy. We have witnessed several human rights violations, some of which reminded us of the kind of abuses that were committed during the early years of the revolution. The difference between that time and now is the absence of any accountability. The president hasn’t been held accountable for any decision he has made during the last year.
From our side, civil society has condemned these violations, but it was not enough, so we have been trying to network with various defenders of democracy in Tunisia as well as abroad. In the next phase, civil society will continue its pressure and mobilise against any deviations from democracy, given that the new constitution will guarantee the president extensive powers and open the doors for further violations.
How has the international community responded?
We feel the international community has left Tunisia behind. The international community is offering a very weak response to this attack on democracy and the loss of a democratic country. The community of democratic countries is not putting in much effort to keep Tunisia within its family.
Many of us are very disappointed by their reactions to the closure of parliament and what followed. The result is a very bad draft constitution that will probably cancel Tunisia’s democracy. But there has been no solid response from democratic friends of Tunisia.
In this way, they encourage the president to commit more violations. These countries are back to their policies of the past decades in prioritising security and stability over democracy and human rights in our region.
Civic space in Tunisia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with KADEM through itswebsite or itsFacebook page. -
TUNISIA: ‘We are just students fighting for the future in times in which our opinions are disregarded’
CIVICUS speaks about the impacts of the climate crisis in Tunisia and civil society responses with Aziza Fakher, a biology-geology engineering student and member of Youth for Climate Tunisia (YFC Tunisia).Founded by two students in July 2019, YFC Tunisia strives for social and climate justice in Tunisia. It acknowledges the impact of the climate crisis on vulnerable and marginalised communities and demands climate action through digital campaigns and on-the-ground mobilisation.
What prompted the foundation of YFC Tunisia, and what issues do you currently work on?
The movement was started during the 2019 heatwave, which hit the whole of Tunisia and was so bad that you couldn’t leave your home without first getting properly hydrated.
Due to its diversity of ecosystems and landscapes, Tunisia faces multiple climate issues. Access to water is a human right, but here it is a very challenging issue. Receding coastlines put the lives of many Tunisians living on islands in peril. The coastline as a whole is endangered.
We are also working with other civil society organisations (CSOs) to stop industrial pollution in the city of Gabès, which faces an environmental catastrophe. Industries there have destroyed natural ecosystems and Indigenous communities. This fits the definition of ecocide, and the rest of the country should acknowledge it.
All of this has impacted on women in very specific ways. There are rural areas where women still have to carry barrels of water for as far as 10 kilometres. In places such Gabès, they live amid pollution, and for those of reproductive age this can have long-lasting impacts both on themselves and on future generations.
We advocate for the introduction of climate education in all school curriculums and for exposing women to it as well, so they can transmit it to their children. Although the government has signed an agreement indicating support, it has so far been passive. CSOs lack funds to get this work done and the state hasn’t intervened or reached out to help.
Why is climate so important for young people in Tunisia?
This is important to us because it’s our future that is at stake. Young people have been very serious and dedicated to tackling this crisis from day one: we have skipped school to fight for the climate, we have helped other CSOs, we have reached out to political figures who have shut us down and refused to meet with us and listen to us. We have played a role in influencing other young people and raising wider awareness, which has been an important goal of the movement since it was founded. Indeed, we are still recruiting more young activists every day and we are able to provide them with a platform and a space to express themselves and their thoughts about the ongoing crisis.
People tend to forget that we are just students fighting for the future in times in which our opinions are disregarded. Many of us are endangering our daily lives, but we think it is worth it.
How has thecurrent political crisis influenced your work?
The political and economic situation has influenced our movement. If one of your main tactics is to reach out to decision-makers to advocate for the adoption and implementation of laws and policies, a constantly changing situation is a big problem. It does not let us get ahead in our work and regularly makes us lose ground on the progress previously made.
When we first held a strike in Tunis, the Tunisian capital, we were exposed to religious conspiracy theories, which people tried to use against us because they refused to believe that climate change was real. Politicians and government officials should have conveyed the correct message to educate the public so that this crisis isn’t something alien and mysterious to them. But they didn’t.
We received backlash and were targeted with criticism and hate speech concerning our methods. Others, however, have said that our discourse is too soft, that we do not take risks and that we are not active in real life. Our response to them is that we are young Tunisians living in a context of political unrest, so our real-life activities are always uncertain.
The economic context for activism is also complicated, especially following the recent news about the president’s intention to ban all foreign funding for Tunisian CSOs.
We have often found ourselves lagging in the funding department. The situation is very difficult for many CSOs that have no independent funding. If we are unable to get funding, we will be unable to work on new projects. We are very uncertain regarding our future plans. And being young activists, we also struggle to exercise our right to access data and information, which is a huge issue in Tunisia.
Additionally, we have faced bureaucratic restrictions. For example, we have recently had to submit our registration paperwork because we are working on climate education and we are not allowed to work with children or in a school or university environment unless we are recognised and certified as a formal CSO. But we have faced challenges because the process is very slow and requires a huge amount of paperwork.
What are your demands for national and international decision-makers ahead of the COP27 climate change summit?
We are aware that activity in the global north has a huge environmental impact on the global south, including Tunisia. Since COP27 will be held in Egypt this year, we have formed a coalition with other environmental rights groups to work at a regional level.
We want to see more engagement from local and global politicians in terms of laws and policies to tackle climate change, and also for them to condemn greedy capitalist profiteers. We would like the Tunisian government to acknowledge the Sustainable Development Goals in the Tunisian context and to implement nationally determined contributions and start a transition to renewable energy.
New laws must also be introduced to protect future generations’ right to water and food security. The Ministry of Environment must adopt climate change mitigation and adaptation measures. Effective waste recovery and management systems must be adopted, because the lack of these is a huge problem for local communities. People have died as a result of living near toxic waste dumps. We also need state-run awareness campaigns targeted at marginalised and vulnerable communities. And we want climate education in all schools, because of its crucial role in preparing kids for the future to come.
We are willing to work together with other CSOs that share our goals. Because these are human rights issues, we would like to bring them into the United Nations Human Rights Council and its Universal Periodic Review sessions, where civil society voices are heard, taken into consideration and empowered.
Civic space in Tunisia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Youth for Climate Tunisia through itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@yfctunisia on Twitter. -
UGANDA: ‘Closure of the UN office will result in the loss of a crucial player in the field of human rights’
CIVICUS speaks about the human rights situation and the closure of the United Nations (UN) office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Uganda with Dr Livingstone Sewanyana, founder and Executive Director of the Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI) andUN independent expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order.Founded in 1991, FHRI is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) working to advance democratic development and fundamental freedoms in Uganda.
What were the achievements of the UN human rights office in Uganda, and why is it closing?
The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights was established in Uganda during a period of conflict that particularly affected northern Uganda, with a head office in Kampala and regional offices based in north and northeastern Uganda. Its main objective was to promote reconciliation and peacebuilding, which was successfully achieved.
The UN office played a key role in creating awareness among communities about their rights and ways to defend them. It conducted extensive human rights monitoring to expose violations and contributed significantly to building the capacity of the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) – the national human rights institution – and various local CSOs through technical assistance and, at times, financial support for their programmes.
After the goal of rebuilding northern Uganda was achieved, the agreement was extended multiple times, with 2023 agreed as a potential cut-off. The Ugandan authorities cite the achievement of its goals as a reason not to prolong the UN office’s mandate. Civil society groups, however, think its closure will result in the loss of a crucial player in the field of human rights, given the critical role it played in terms of democratisation in Uganda, capacity development, technical assistance and human rights monitoring.
How do you assess the work of the UHRC?
The UHRC is entrusted with a broad mandate, encompassing both promotional and protective functions, along with a tribunal for handling human rights complaints. As the national human rights institution, it consistently submits annual reports to parliament.
While the UHRC’s promotional efforts are commendable, challenges arise in its protective role because this requires goodwill from the state. Insufficient resources and lack of political will, particularly on controversial issues, hinder its ability to function effectively.
The UHRC’s independence has always been questioned. Although the authorities may not interfere directly with its work, the lack of executive action on its recommendations undermines its potential and credibility. The UHRC needs more space to execute its mandate effectively.
How does FHRI defend and promote human rights?
For over 32 years, we’ve monitored, documented and reported human rights abuses. Our reports reach various stakeholders, including government, parliament, international bodies, the media and civil society. We also engage with young people through university programmes, fostering an understanding of rights and obligations. We actively assist victims of human rights violations through our legal aid programme, which handles over 1,000 cases every year, and provide mediation and administrative support services.
Our campaigns include a 30-year effort to abolish the death penalty. Although Uganda has retained it, the death penalty is now restricted to the most ‘serious crimes’, and opportunities for a prerogative of mercy have been established. If someone who’s been sentenced to death is not executed within three years, their sentence is automatically commuted to life imprisonment. We have consistently challenged the application of the death penalty in the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court.
We also engage in legislative advocacy, analysing bills and voicing our position on their human rights implications, as seen in our response to the Anti-Homosexuality Act 2023, which unfortunately retained a provision for the death penalty. However, we succeeded in securing the removal of the mandatory death penalty provision by parliament.
We actively report to the UN Human Rights Council and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. As a UN independent expert, I recently presented my sixth report to the Human Rights Council, sharing findings from my visit to the Republic of Georgia.
In sum, our work cuts across community, district, national and international divides. Taking a holistic approach, we conduct awareness raising, capacity development and advocacy campaigns and provide legal protection to victims of abuse through recourse to courts. We are affiliated with the World Coalition Against the Death Penalty and the International Federation of Human Rights Defenders.
What challenges do Ugandan human rights organisations face?
Civic space is getting more and more restricted and civil society is becoming more apprehensive. We have limited funding to carry out our work and regularly face legislative challenges, such as the restrictive Public Order and Management Act of 2013, which constrains assemblies and public meetings.
Civil society groups are confined to operating within the narrow framework of the law, and it’s difficult to expand the frontiers of your work. Recently, 54 CSOs have had to suspend their operations due to non-compliance with the NGO Act 2016.
To ensure the sustainability of our day-to-day operations we need expertise, and retaining experienced staff is difficult due to the potential lure of international organisations.
There’s a need to broaden civic space and ensure an enabling environment for everyone to exercise their rights. For this to happen, the state must implement recommendations from the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review process and UN treaty bodies.
What international support do you receive, and what support do you need?
CIVICUS has been instrumental in supporting our human rights monitoring and reporting work. We have submitted several joint reports to the UN Human Rights Council and UN Human Rights Committee.
We also require assistance in capacity development to promote better understanding of the human rights architecture. Most crucially, financial support is needed to empower human rights defenders to participate in forums and carry out their work effectively. In a society grappling with poverty and high unemployment, the demand for technical and financial assistance is high, and human rights organisations are often looked upon as potential providers.
Civic space in Uganda is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with FHRI through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@FHRI2 and@LSewanyana onTwitter.
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UGANDA: ‘Hate speech against LGBTQI+ people comes from religious, traditional and political leaders’
CIVICUS speaks about the situation of LGBTQI+ rights in Uganda and the ongoing impacts of the British colonial legacy with Opio Sam Leticia, founder and Executive Director of Queer Youth Uganda (QYU).
QYU is a civil society organisation founded in 2006 that advocates for the rights of young LGBTQI+ people.
What is the current situation of LGBTQI+ people in Uganda?
The absence of laws that protect LGBTQI+ people makes for a delicate situation in Uganda. The LGBTQI+ community faces discrimination in many aspects. People are still being denied their right to housing in some places because of their sexual orientation and gender identity. They continue to suffer assaults, sexual violence and ‘corrective rape’ as a way of trying to change them into what those perpetrating abuses think is the African way of life, with the LGBTQI+ ‘lifestyle’ still viewed as an imposition of ‘western ideology’. We have had several cases of LGBTQI+ activists who have been evicted by their landlords as a result of their community advocacy work.
Discrimination in workplaces is still rampant: many people who openly identify as LGBTQI+ find it challenging to get employed. The unemployment rate in the LGBTQI+ community is high because there are not enough job opportunities. In addition, some LGBTQI+ people do not have the skills needed for the job market due to their higher school dropout rates. Parents play a significant role in this because when they discover their kids’ sexual orientation they often deny them access to education and even throw them out of their homes.
The breakout of the COVID-19 pandemic revealed the underlying issues that people in the LGBTQI+ community deal with. During the pandemic, several homeless shelters for LGBTQI+ people were raided by the police. As a result, many people were left homeless and others were jailed for three months, sometimes more than once.
Despite the work done to ensure access to health services as a need, there is still discrimination at public health centres meant to provide free healthcare for all people in Uganda. Discrimination in access denies LGBTQI+ people this basic right.
Does Ugandan legislation discriminate against LGBTQI+ people?
The Ugandan constitution stipulates equality for all people, but every single day there are cases of assault and rights violations of LGBTQI+ people.
The law is used as an instrument to oppress LGBTQI+ people instead of promoting their human rights. Same-sex marriage is illegal and same-sex relations are criminalised with harsh penalties, including life imprisonment under Penal Code Act 145. Despite the existence of mechanisms such as the Uganda Human Rights Commission and the Equal Opportunities Commission, it is clear that the rights of LGBTQI+ people continue to be systematically violated.
The government of Uganda continues to enforce the 1950 Penal Code, which prohibits same-sex relations and threatens to imprison LGBTQI+ activists. Parliament has continued to pass bills against sexual minorities, such as the recent Sexual Offences Bill 2021. The current legislation threatens our work environment and our very existence as an LGBTQI+ organisation in Uganda.
To what do you attribute the recent tightening of legislation criminalising LGBTQI+ people?
Uganda is a highly religious country where traditional cultural beliefs or norms take centre stage. LGBTQI+ people see their basic human rights violated because of deeply embedded cultural and religious beliefs. That is why political advocacy does not have an impact: politicians are quick to play the morality card to please their constituencies and sideline the issues raised by LGBTQI+ organisations.
The government should work to integrate the LGBTQI+ community into Ugandan society, not least because we can play a pivotal role in the country’s economic and social development. We can contribute by paying taxes and creating jobs, among other things.
But instead, the LGBTQI+ community faces hate speech coming from religious, traditional and political leaders who promote homophobia. Far from receiving mass support and recognition from the state and citizens, LGBTQI+ activists and organisations have faced increasing human rights abuses and attacks.
What work does your organisation do?
QYU is an LGBTQI+ youth-led community-based organisation that advocates for the rights of young LGBTQI+ people in rural and peri-urban areas of Uganda. QYU operates in the four regions of Uganda: the Eastern, Southern, Western and Bunyoro Kitara/Albertine regions. We have five key programmes that we run in communities to offer safe spaces and promote the participation of LGBTQI+ people in human development: human rights awareness and advocacy, sexual reproductive health rights and services, emergency housing and accommodation, economic empowerment, and advocacy, alliance building and partnerships.
Through implementing these programmes, we want to create a legal and policy environment where the rights of LGBTQI+ people are upheld and respected. The high numbers of rape cases and arbitrary arrests have pushed us to advocate for equal and inclusive reproductive health rights and access to sexual and reproductive health services and to set up safe spaces at community health centres so that LGBTQI+ people can access healthcare facilities without the trauma of being harassed.
In addition, QYU responds to urgent housing needs of LGBTQI+ people who are victims of social stigma and discrimination from their families and the public. We also mobilise and empower LGBTQI+ people, particularly young people, by providing them with practical skills, knowledge and appropriate information regarding employment and social entrepreneurship and developing their personal and professional skills for the labour market. Through partnership building, advocacy and referral, we work with like-minded organisations to advocate for and advance the rights and freedoms of LGBTQI+ people at both the national and international levels.
But we have faced several challenges that make it difficult to carry out our work. We have continued to suffer office break-ins from unknown individuals, causing fear among our staff members. We also have limited funding, which impacts the scope of our work because we can only do so much with the funds we have.
What should Commonwealth states do to promote LGBTQI+ rights?
Commonwealth states should work together since most have the same codes that criminalise LGBTQI+ people, dating back to the colonial era. So many years later, they are still making daily life miserable for LGBTQI+ people in the countries that are part of the Commonwealth. I think member countries should use the various organs of the Commonwealth to provide a platform for LGBTQI+ voices. Those that have decriminalised same-sex relations should support those fighting toward that goal.
The international community fighting for similar causes should also use their platforms to raise awareness on the kind of struggles we are facing. Their mobilisation will hopefully pressure our governments to create policies that will benefit all members of society regardless of their gender identity or sexual orientation.
Civic space in Uganda is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Queer Youth Uganda through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@QueerYouth2006 on Twitter. -
UGANDA: ‘No candidate can possibly win the election without young people’s votes’
CIVICUS speaks with Mohammed Ndifuna, Executive Director of Justice Access Point-Uganda (JAP). Established in 2018, JAP aims to kickstart, reignite and invigorate justice efforts in the context of Uganda’s stalled transitional justice process, its challenges implementing recommendations from its first and second United Nations Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Reviews and the backlash by African states against the International Criminal Court.
Mohammed is an experienced and impassioned human rights defender and peacebuilder with over 15 years of activism in human rights and atrocity prevention at the grassroots, national and international levels. He was awarded the 2014 European Union Human Rights Award for Uganda, has served on the Steering Committee of The Coalition for the Criminal Court (2007-2018) and the Advisory Board of the Human Rights House Network in Oslo (2007-2012), and currently serves on the Management Committee of The Uganda National Committee of Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities.
What is the state of civic space in Uganda ahead of the much-anticipated 2021 elections?
Civic space in Uganda may be characterised as harassed, stifled and starved. It would seem like civil society has been on a slippery slope of sorts, with things turning from bad to worse. For instance, civil society organisations (CSOs) have witnessed a wave of brazen attacks against their physical space in the form of office break-ins and broad-daylight workplace raids. In the meantime, there seems to be no let-up in the waves of attacks against CSOs, and especially against those involved in human rights and accountability advocacy. Over the past few years, an array of legislation and administrative measures has been unleashed against CSOs and others, including the Public Order Management Act (2012) and the NGO Act (2016).
Ahead of the general and presidential elections, which will be held on 14 January 2021, the Minister of Internal Affairs has ordered all CSOs to go through a mandatory validation and verification process before they are allowed to operate. Many CSOs have not been able to go through it: by 19 October 2020, only 2,257 CSOs had successfully completed the verification and validation exercise, including just a few that do mainstream advocacy work on governance.
Ugandan CSOs are largely donor-dependent and had already been struggling with shrinking financial resources, severely affecting the scope of their work. This situation became compounded by the COVID-19 outbreak and the lockdown that was imposed in response, all of which impaired CSO efforts to mobilise resources. Therefore, these three forces – harassment, restrictions and limited access to funding – have combined to weaken CSOs, pushing most of them into self-preservation mode.
The stakes for the 2021 elections seem to be higher than in previous years. What has changed?
The situation started to change in July 2019, when Robert Kyagulanyi, better known by his stage name, Bobi Wine, announced his bid to run for president as the candidate of the opposition National Unity Platform. Bobi Wine is a singer and actor who is also an activist and a politician. As a leader of the People Power, Our Power movement, he was elected to parliament in 2017.
Bobi’s appeal among young people is enormous, and let’s keep in mind that more than 75 per cent of Uganda’s population is below the age of 30. This makes young people a significant group to be wowed. No candidate can possibly win the Ugandan election without having the biggest chunk of young people’s votes. In the upcoming presidential race, it is Bobi Wine who appears most able to galvanise young people behind his candidature. Although not an experienced politician, Bobi is a charismatic firebrand who has been able to attract not just young people but also many politicians from traditional political parties into his mass movement.
Bobi Wine, long known as the ‘Ghetto President’, has taken advantage of his appeal as a popular music star to belt out political songs to mobilise people, and his roots in the ghetto also guarantee him an appeal in urban areas. It is believed that he has motivated many young people to register to vote, so voter apathy among young people may turn out to be lower in comparison to past elections.
Given the ongoing cut-throat fight for young people’s votes, it is no surprise that the security apparatus has been unleashed against young people in an apparent attempt to stem the pressure they are exerting. Political activists linked to People Power have been harassed and, in some instances, killed. People Power’s political leaders have been intermittently arrested and arraigned in courts or allegedly kidnapped and tortured in safe houses. In an apparent attempt to make in-roads into the ranks of urban young people, President Yoweri Museveni has appointed three senior presidential advisors from the ghetto. This raises the spectre of ghetto gangster groups and violence playing a role in the upcoming presidential elections.
Restrictions on the freedom of expression and internet use have been reported in previous elections. Are we likely to see a similar trend now?
We are already seeing it. Restrictions on the freedoms of expression and information are a valid concern not just because of hindsight, but also given recent developments. For instance, on 7 September 2020 the Uganda Communications Commission (UCC) issued a public notice stating that anyone wishing to publish information online needs to apply for and obtain a licence from the UCC before 5 October 2020. This will mostly affect online users, such as bloggers, who are paid for published content. Obviously, this is meant to stifle young people’s political activities online. And it is also particularly concerning because, as public gatherings are restricted due to COVID-19 prevention measures, online media will be the only method of campaigning that is allowed ahead of the 2021 elections.
There is also increasing electronic surveillance, and the possibility of a shutdown of social media platforms on the eve of the elections may not be too remote.
How has the COVID-pandemic affected civil society and its ability to respond to civic space restrictions?
The COVID-19 pandemic and the measures taken in response have exacerbated the already precarious state in which the CSOs find themselves. For instance, civil society capacity to organise public assemblies and peaceful demonstrations in support of fundamental rights and freedoms or to protest against their violation has been restricted by the manner in which COVID-19 standard operating procedures (SOPs) have been enforced. This has resulted in the commission of blatant violations and onslaughts against civic space. For instance, on 17 October 2020, the Uganda Police Force and the Local Defense Units jointly raided thanksgiving prayers being held in Mityana district and wantonly tear gassed the congregation, which included children, women, men, older people and religious leaders, for allegedly flouting COVID-19 SOPs.
As the enforcement of COVID-19 SOPs gets intertwined with election pressure, it is feared that the clampdown on the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association will be aggravated. Regrettably, CSOs already find themselves restricted.
How can international civil society help Ugandan civil society?
The situation in which Ugandan civil society finds itself is such that it requires the urgent support and response of the international community. There is a need to turn the eyes towards what is happening in Uganda and to speak up to amplify the voices of a local civil society that is increasingly being stifled. More specifically, Ugandan CSOs could be supported so they can better respond to blatant violations of freedoms, mitigate the risks that their work entails and enhance their resilience in the current context.
Civic space inUganda is rated ‘repressed’by the CIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Justice Access Point through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@JusticessP on Twitter. -
UGANDA: ‘Our government cares only about profit, not people’
CIVICUS speaks about the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) project and its potential impacts on the climate and on the health and livelihoods of local communities with Nyombi Morris, founder of Earth Volunteers.Established in 2020, Earth Volunteers is a Ugandan civil society organisation (CSO) that brings together young people who are passionate about planting trees, protecting forests and standing up for climate justice. Earth Volunteers advocates for climate justice and promotes climate education in local schools.
What is EACOP, and what is wrong with it?
EACOP is a pipeline project that will transport oil from Uganda to Tanzania, for export through the Tanga port on the Tanzanian coast. It will travel through hundreds of miles, flowing oil through sensitive environments, including the richly biodiverse Murchison Falls National Park in western Uganda.
The project is led by China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and TotalEnergies, a French company, and funded by Standard Bank, among others. Ever since it kicked off in 2015, it has caused numerous activists to lose their lives and has put many natural resources on the verge of disappearing.
Local communities are already being affected by the pipeline. While pipeline construction itself hasn’t yet started, a process has begun to acquire the land required for the pipeline and related facilities. Those who own land on the projected pipeline’s path or in its vicinity are already unhappy because of the mistreatment they are experiencing and the lack of transparency in the process. They say they were not consulted about the project before it was approved and they are now being pressured to sell off their farms, homes and land at cheap prices and forced to leave to make way for the pipeline.
How is civil society in general, and your organisation in particular, mobilising against the pipeline project?
I have not seen any established CSO come out to oppose or even challenge the pipeline project. It is only us, individual activists loosely connected through informal networks, who are trying to sensitise people and mobilise them against the danger of allowing money-makers to exploit our land to take away the oil and get rich off it. We can’t drink or eat oil, and this will only make us poorer and less healthy.
As one of those activists, I have organised strikes to challenge the project, but since my last protest this March, I have received threats from unknown people who say they are police officers and tell me they are going to come and arrest me.
How has the government reacted so far?
Our government cares only about profit, not people. We have put pressure on them and urged them to be mindful about the approval they give to investors, as they only benefit the wealthy and do nothing to improve people’s lives. But the response we always get in return is threats.
Personally, I do not expect my government to listen to my concerns. The problem is, if they do not, this is a death sentence for many people in both Uganda and Tanzania. We already face the challenge of inflation and we may be heading towards famine and insecurity because people are being forced to sell off their properties in western Uganda and the capital, Kampala, is their next destination. This is one of the biggest and fastest-growing cities in Africa, with a population that has already hit four million.
What kind of support does the anti-pipeline movement need from international civil society and the wider international community?
We need three different support structures. Firstly, we need funds to continue door-to-door mobilisation. We need to speak up with a strong voice, so it is our role to wake up the public and get people to start demanding justice.
Secondly, we need the media to cover our movement and amplify our voice. We need the world to join us in challenging these perpetrators of environmental destruction. Except for Standard Bank, which is from South Africa, pipeline funders are from the global north, and we need people in their countries to know what is happening so they can join us in exposing these capitalist fundamentalists who only care about money – not about people, and not about nature.
Finally, we need protection. I am constantly receiving threats, and since last week I haven’t even been allowed to tweet for fear of my life and the lives of my family. We are in danger and nobody is helping us with security and support. I am hiding at my sisters’ place but very soon we are going to run out of resources such as food.
Every organisation I reach out to, they redirect me to CSOs that are not really independent but actually serve the government that is targeting me. I feel like there is no one I can trust in my country. This is terrible and traumatising, and many others are going through the same. We cannot imagine help coming from anywhere but international civil society.
Civic space in Uganda is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Earth Volunteers through itswebsite or its Facebook andInstagram pages,and follow @earthvolunteers on Twitter. -
UGANDA: ‘We’ll participate in COP28 to pressure world leaders to divert funding away from oil and gas’
CIVICUS speaks about recent developments involving the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) project and civil society’s efforts to stop it with Zaki Mamdoo, Campaign Coordinator of Stop EACOP.Established in 2020, Stop EACOP is a coalition of Ugandan environmental and climate justice organisations that oppose the pipeline project due to the significant threats it poses to protected ecosystems, water resources and community lands across Tanzania and Uganda.
What are your coalition’s aims?
Our aim is to halt the construction of EACOP to avert the catastrophic environmental and climate consequences associated with the pipeline and safeguard human rights and communal territories.
To achieve this, we employ a multifaceted strategy: heightening public awareness, exerting pressure on financial institutions and raising their reputational costs so they distance themselves from the project, mobilising impacted communities and rallying to force governments and oil corporations to suspend the project.
A cornerstone of our approach is engaging with young people. Our partner programmes in both Tanzania and Uganda are focused on youth. We proactively seek out young people in various initiatives, including security training sessions. Recently, we’ve identified student leaders from various universities who had organised to spread awareness about the project’s impacts among their peers. We are actively pursuing funding and other opportunities to bolster their efforts.
Internally, we give space to youth representatives to contribute their perspectives. We’re committed to amplifying young voices and offering avenues for their growth and development as activists. A reflection of this is that I am 26 years old and trusted with the leadership as campaign coordinator.
How has the situation evolved since welast spoke over a year ago?
There have been significant changes over the past year. Drilling has started in one of the most important biodiversity hotspots. One of the companies leading the project, French energy conglomerate Total Energies, has launched oil drilling in Uganda’s Murchison Falls National Park, home to diverse animal and bird species, including elephants, giraffes and lions. Its ecological significance is heightened by the presence of the Murchison Falls-Albert Delta Wetland System, essential for Lake Albert fisheries.
The pipeline threatens the park’s biodiversity and tourism appeal. It will also have economic impacts, as the park is a major contributor to Uganda’s economy, accounting for 59 per cent of exports and having generated over US$1 billion in revenue in 2022.
Negative consequences are already evident, with displaced elephants damaging crops and posing threats to human lives in nearby communities. Tragic incidents involving elephants have already occurred in Buliisa district, where the park is located.
This is clearly just another a case in which profit is prioritised over environmental and socioeconomic considerations.
Our demands, however, remain unaltered: we adamantly call for the project’s complete cancellation due to its intolerable environmental and human risks. And while governmental authorities have largely remained unresponsive, we’ve achieved progress with financial institutions. Remarkably, 27 banks have already denied funding for EACOP, and an additional 23 major insurers and reinsurers have declined to support the pipeline.
What restrictions do Stop EACOP activists face?
We operate in fairly restrictive environments in which the freedom to protest is often violated. Recently, for instance, four of our activists were forcibly arrested on charges of ‘inciting violence’, transported in police vehicles and kept in jail overnight for protesting against the pipeline in Kampala, Uganda’s capital.
The activists, three women and one man, were protesting peacefully, but their arrests were unnecessarily violent. It must be emphasised that only four protesters were involved, so the degree of force applied was clearly excessive, yet not entirely unexpected. Historically, Ugandan authorities have responded aggressively to any demonstrations perceived as anti-government, in line with a dictatorial regime indifferent to public sentiments or alternate viewpoints. This reaction is not unprecedented, although it’s intriguing that the government seems threatened by even small-scale protests like this four-person event.
But this won’t stop us: we will continue to demonstrate peacefully. Several of our members maintain a fund to secure bail or engage lawyers whenever activists are arrested. We arrange legal representation and explore the possibility of anticipatory bail when possible. However, given the sporadic nature of these protests, support is often provided post-arrest. We’ve also partnered with organisations that specialise in security training so that we can provide tools for advocates to voice their concerns without jeopardising their personal safety.
How do you connect with the global climate movement?
We connect with climate activists worldwide by sharing experiences and strategies and providing each other with support across borders. Global solidarity strengthens our efforts, so we appreciate any form of international backing for our cause.
What lies ahead remains uncertain, but as demonstrated in numerous instances globally, when we come together to back local communities as they advocate for their rights and a more promising tomorrow, there is a potential to counter even the largest of corporate giants effectively.
More than a million people have already raised their voices against EACOP. We believe that together we can stop it.
Are you planning to engage with the upcoming COP28 climate summit?
We’re deliberating on the optimal way to participate in COP28 to pressure world leaders to address the pipeline project directly and divert funding away from new oil and gas developments. I will be there to represent the campaign.
Despite controversies surrounding the summit’s leadership and lack of an enabling civic space in the host country, the United Arab Emirates, we are hopeful that substantive progress will be made. But we recognise that lasting change will require continued people-powered mobilisation. We’re committed to sustaining our fight for climate justice and environmental preservation in East Africa.
Civic space in Uganda is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Stop EACOP through itswebsite and follow@stopEACOP on Twitter.
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UGANDA: “Nadie puede ganar las elecciones sin los votos de los jóvenes”
CIVICUS conversa con Mohammed Ndifuna, Director Ejecutivo de Justice Access Point-Uganda (Punto de Acceso a la Justicia-Uganda, JAP). Establecido en 2018, JAP busca impulsar, animar y fortalecer la lucha por la justicia en el contexto del estancado proceso de justicia transicional de Uganda, las dificultades del país para implementar las recomendaciones de su primer y segundo Exámenes Periódicos Universales en el Consejo de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas, y la reacción de algunos estados africanos contra la Corte Penal Internacional.
Mohammed es un experimentado y apasionado defensor de los derechos humanos y trabajador por la paz, con más de 15 años de activismo en derechos humanos y prevención de atrocidades a nivel local, nacional e internacional. En 2014 recibió el Premio de Derechos Humanos de la Unión Europea para Uganda; ha integrado el Comité Directivo de la Coalición por la Corte Penal (2007-2018) y la Junta Asesora de la Human Rights House Network en Oslo (2007-2012), y actualmente integra el Comité de Gestión del Comité Nacional de Uganda para la Prevención del Genocidio y las Atrocidades Masivas.
¿Cuál es la situación del espacio cívico en Uganda de cara a las muy esperadas elecciones de 2021?
El espacio cívico en Uganda puede ser caracterizado como un espacio acosado, asfixiado y expoliado. La sociedad civil da la impresión de estar en una especie de pendiente resbaladiza mientras las cosas cambian de mal en peor. Por ejemplo, las organizaciones de la sociedad civil (OSC) han experimentado una ola de ataques descarados contra su espacio físico que han tomado la forma de intrusiones y allanamientos de sus oficinas a plena luz del día. Entretanto han continuado los ataques contra las OSC en general, y en particular contra las que hacen incidencia en derechos humanos y promueven la rendición de cuentas. En los últimos años se ha promulgado una cantidad de medidas legislativas y administrativas contra las OSC y otros sectores, tales como la Ley de Gestión del Orden Público (2012) y la Ley de ONG (2016).
De cara a las elecciones generales y presidenciales, que se celebrarán el 14 de enero de 2021, el ministro del Interior estableció que todas las OSC deben pasar por un proceso obligatorio de validación y verificación para quedar habilitadas para operar. Muchas OSC no han podido completar el proceso. De hecho, hasta el 19 de octubre de 2020 solo 2.257 OSC habían completado con éxito el proceso de verificación y validación, y entre ellas se contaban solo unas pocas OSC que hacen incidencia en temas de gobernanza.
Las OSC ugandesas son altamente dependientes de los donantes y ya estaban lidiando con la reducción de sus recursos financieros, que afectó fuertemente los alcances de su trabajo. Esta situación se vio agravada por el brote de COVID-19 y las medidas de confinamiento que se tomaron como respuesta, que perjudicaron los esfuerzos de movilización de recursos de las OSC. Así pues, la combinación de estas tres fuerzas - acoso, restricciones y acceso limitado al financiamiento - ha debilitado a las OSC, obligando a la mayoría a centrar sus esfuerzos en su propia supervivencia.
Parecería que hay mucho más en juego en las elecciones de 2021 que en años anteriores. ¿Qué es lo que ha cambiado?
La situación comenzó a cambiar en julio de 2019, cuando Robert Kyagulanyi, más conocido por su nombre artístico, Bobi Wine, anunció que competiría por la presidencia como candidato de la opositora Plataforma de Unidad Nacional. Bobi Wine es cantante, actor, activista y político. Como líder del movimiento Poder Popular, Nuestro Poder, fue elegido legislador en 2017.
La atención que recibe Bobi por parte de los jóvenes es enorme, y hay que tener en cuenta que más del 75% de la población de Uganda tiene menos de 30 años. Esto hace que los jóvenes sean un grupo que es muy importante atraer. Ningún candidato puede ganar las elecciones de Uganda si no recibe la mayor parte de los votos de los jóvenes. En la próxima carrera presidencial, Bobi Wine parece ser el candidato más capaz de atraer estos votos. Aunque no tiene gran experiencia como político, Bobi es una personalidad muy carismática y ha logrado atraer a su movimiento de masas no solo a los jóvenes sino también a muchos políticos de los partidos tradicionales.
Largamente conocido como el “presidente del gueto”, Bobi Wine ha aprovechado su atractivo como estrella de la música popular para producir canciones políticas y movilizar a la gente. Sus raíces en el gueto también lo han tornado más atractivo en las zonas urbanas. Se cree que ha motivado a muchos jóvenes a registrarse para votar, por lo es posible que la apatía entre los votantes jóvenes disminuya en comparación con elecciones pasadas.
En vistas de la actual lucha sin cuartel por los votos de los jóvenes, no es de extrañar que el aparato de seguridad haya arremetido violentamente contra los jóvenes, en un intento evidente de contener la presión que están ejerciendo. Muchos activistas políticos vinculados a Poder Popular han sido acosados y, en algunos casos, asesinados. Varios líderes políticos de Poder Popular han sido intermitentemente detenidos y procesados en los tribunales o presuntamente secuestrados y torturados en sitios clandestinos. En un evidente intento de atraer a los jóvenes del gueto, el presidente Yoweri Museveni ha nombrado como asesores presidenciales a tres personas procedentes del gueto. Esto sugiere la posibilidad de que las bandas de gánsteres del gueto y la violencia desempeñen un rol en las próximas elecciones presidenciales.
En elecciones anteriores hubo restricciones a la libertad de expresión y el uso de Internet. ¿Veremos tendencias similares en esta oportunidad?
Ya las estamos viendo. La preocupación por la restricción de las libertades de expresión e información es válida no solamente en virtud de la mirada retrospectiva, sino también a causa de varios acontecimientos recientes. Por ejemplo, el 7 de septiembre de 2020 la Comisión de Comunicaciones de Uganda (CCU) emitió un aviso público indicando que toda persona que deseara publicar información en internet debía solicitar y obtener una licencia de la CCU antes del 5 de octubre de 2020. Esto afectará principalmente a los usuarios de internet, como blogueros, a quienes se les paga por el contenido que publican. Obviamente, esto intenta reprimir las actividades políticas de los jóvenes en la internet. Y también es particularmente preocupante porque, dado que las reuniones y asambleas públicas están restringidas a causa de las medidas de prevención del COVID-19, los medios de comunicación digitales serán el único método permitido para hacer campaña para las elecciones de 2021.
También ha aumentado la vigilancia electrónica, y no es remota la posibilidad de un cierre de las plataformas de redes sociales en vísperas de las elecciones.
¿Cómo ha afectado la pandemia de COVID-19 a la sociedad civil y a su capacidad para responder a las restricciones del espacio cívico?
La pandemia del COVID-19 y las medidas tomadas en respuesta han agravado el ya precario estado en que se encontraban las OSC. Por ejemplo, la capacidad de la sociedad civil para organizar reuniones públicas y manifestaciones pacíficas en apoyo de los derechos y libertades fundamentales, o para protestar contra su violación, se ha visto restringida por la forma en que se han aplicado los procedimientos operativos estándar (POE) para hacer frente al COVID-19. Esto ha resultado en violaciones y ataques contra el espacio cívico. Por ejemplo, el 17 de octubre de 2020 la Fuerza de Policía de Uganda y las Unidades de Defensa Local allanaron conjuntamente una reunión de oración de Acción de Gracias que se llevaba a cabo en el distrito de Mityana y gratuitamente lanzaron gases lacrimógenos contra la congregación, que incluía a niños, mujeres, hombres, personas mayores y líderes religiosos; la razón alegada fue que las personas reunidas habían desobedecido los POE para el COVID-19.
En cuanto la implementación de los POE para el COVID-19 entre en contacto con la presión electoral, es posible que la represión de las libertades de reunión pacífica y asociación se agrave. Lamentablemente, las OSC ya se encuentran fuertemente restringidas.
¿De qué manera puede la sociedad civil internacional ayudar a la sociedad civil de Uganda?
La situación en que se encuentra la sociedad civil de Uganda es tal que requiere del apoyo y la respuesta urgentes de la comunidad internacional. Es necesario prestar atención a lo que está sucediendo en Uganda y expresarse de modo tal de amplificar las voces de una sociedad civil local que está siendo cada vez más sofocada. Más específicamente, se debería apoyar a las OSC ugandesas para que puedan responder mejor a las violaciones flagrantes de las libertades, mitigar los riesgos que conlleva su trabajo y mejorar su resiliencia en el contexto actual.
El espacio cívico enUganda es catalogado como “represivo” por el CIVICUS Monitor.
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