civic space
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Joint letter to UN Member States: Ensure meaningful virtual participation in 2020 review of the SDGs
Joint letter to United Nations Member States: Ensure meaningful civil society participation in the 2020 virtual High Level Political Forum
Civil society participation in the United Nations cannot be lost as the world fights COVID-19. This July, 48 Member States are reviewing national progress towards the 17 Sustainable Development Goals.
🇺🇳 Civil society participation at the #UN cannot be lost as we #FightCOVID19
— Action for Sustainable Development (@Action4SD) June 3, 2020
460 organisations from 115 countries are writing to their governments urging meaningful virtual opportunities to engage in July’s review of #SDGs at #HLPF2020
📝Joint letter: https://t.co/mYBYQEH7KE pic.twitter.com/BOZQaTGa7J
Dear Excellencies,
We, the undersigned 460 civil society organisations (CSOs) from 115 countries, write to seek your support in ensuring the effective participation of civil society during the upcoming UN High Level Political Forum (HLPF) scheduled for 7-16 July 2020. As the preeminent multistakeholder body responsible for the review and implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), HLPF processes derive strength from the engagement of diverse actors including a broad range of civil society organisations (CSOs) working at various levels. As the HLPF transitions to virtual communication and convening for its July 2020 session due to the global spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is essential that all relevant actors, including States and UN agencies, support and devise clear modalities to enable robust virtual civil society participation.
In response to disruptions caused by COVID-19, a number of Inter-governmental bodies have taken concerted efforts to facilitate extensive virtual participation in official meetings. Inclusive virtual modalities are crucial to supporting international cooperation in the spirit of multilateralism. An enabling environment for all stakeholders to participate that takes into account digital divides is thus crucial.
In his “We are all in this Together” statement of 23 April 2020, UN Secretary General António Guterres underlined the importance of promoting and protecting civic space in response to COVID-19. With respect to the SDGs, Secretary General Guterres unequivocally stated that, “Looking ahead, we need to build back better. The Sustainable Development Goals — which are underpinned by human rights — provide the framework for more inclusive and sustainable economies and societies”. Civil society is key to implementing the SDGs and we must take united action to ensure that the virtual HLPF reflects the broad spectrum of stakeholders who are committed to creating The World We Want.
To this end, we urge all states and UN agencies to support the following measures:
- Provide an opportunity for at least three Major Group and Other stakeholders to respond to each Voluntary National Review (VNR), one of which should be from civil society.
- Representatives from national civil society groups voices should be prioritized for inclusion during the HLPF, with adequate representation from regional and international civil society organisations.
- Written questions should also be presented and answered within a month of the HLPF for those who are unable to ask their question within the given time of the VNR session.
- All civil society shadow VNR reports should be published on the UN’s official HLPF website.
- Ensure side events are inclusive of stakeholder participation, including a wide range of civil society led side online events to be shared in the official programme.
- Identify more participatory approaches to engage with stakeholders on an ongoing basis, including best practice on use of online meeting technology to provide inputs, to ensure a more inclusive process before, during and after the main HLPF sessions
We thank you in advance for your consideration.
Sincerely,
A Toda Voz AC
Aakash Welfare Society Hyderabad
Access Now
Acción Solidaria
ACCIONA Transformando Caminospara SER y HACER A.C.
Accountability Lab
Achtung labs private limited
ACT Alliance
ActionAid Denmark
ActionAid International
Action for Sustainable Develpment
ADAB (Association of Development Agencies in Bangladesh)
ADD International
Adivasi Women's Network
Adivasi-Koordination, Germany
Advocacy, Research, Training and Services (ARTS) Foundation
Afghan NGOs Coordination Bureau (ANCB)
Ageing Nepal
Agenda Cero A.C.
Aid Organization
AIDS-Fondet - The Danish AIDS
Foundation
AidWatch Canada
AIESEC MÉXICO A.C.
Al Dua welfare organization
Al Falah Organization Islampur Swat
Alberta Council for Global
Cooperation
Alfalah Tanzeem Swat
Alimentos de México a Compartir, A. C.
Alkhidmat Foundation GB
Allai Developement Organization
American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU)
Amnesty International
Amnistia Inernacional, Portugal
Animis Philanthropic Ventures Inc.
Arab Youth Platform for Sustainable Development - League of Arab States
ARCADIA - Romanian Association for International Cooperation and
Development
Argentine Network for International Cooperation - RACI
ARTICLE 19
Asia Dalit Rights Forum
Asia Development Alliance
Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center
Asian Solidarity Economy Council (ASEC)
Asociación de Organismos No Gubernamentales (ASONOG)
Asociación Mexicana de Amigos Metabólicos, A.C. A.C.
Asociación Nacional de Síndrome de Williams AC
Association femmes leadership et développement durable
Association for Farmers Rights Defense, AFRD
Association for Human Rights in Ethiopia
Association For Promotion Sustainable Development
Association Nationale des Partenaires Migrants
Associations 21
Augustinians International (Curia Generalizia Agostiniana)
Avoid Accident
Awaz Foundation Pakistan
AwazCDS-Pakistan
Azat Foundation
Baghbaan
Bai Indigenous Womens Network in the Philippines
Bangladesh Indigenous Women's Network
Bangladesh Nari Progati Shangha (BNPS)
Bangladesh NGOs Network for Radio & Communication
Biosauenergie
Bond
Born Free Foundation
Bright Star Development Society Balochistan (BSDSB)
British Columbia Council For International Cooperation
Brooke
Bulgarian Platform for International Development (BPID)
Burundi Child Rights Coalition (BCRC)
CAFSO-WRAG for Development
Canadian Council for International Co-operation
Cancer Aid Society
Caribbean Coalition for Development and the Reduction of Armed Violence (CDRAV)
Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO)
Center for Civil Liberties
Center for Environmental Concerns - Philippines
Center for National and International Studies
Centre for Environmental Justice
Centre for Human Rights and Development
Centre for Research and Advocacy, Manipur
Centre for Social Equity and Inclusion (CSEI)
Centre for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights
Centro de Arte y Cultura Popular Tonalteca A.C.
Centro de Justicia y Paz - Cepaz
Centros de cuidado, Atencion y educación integral coralitos AC
ChildHelp Sierra Leone
Christian Blind Mission
Church of Sweden
Church Women United Washington DC Unit
Civic Initiatives
CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
Civil Society Coalition on Sustainable Development
Civil Society SDGs Campaign/GCAP Zambia
CIVILIS Derechos Humanos
COAST Trust
Colectivo Ollin, Alternativas para la Comunicaciòn, la Sexualidad y el Desarrollo Comunitario AC
Colectivo pro Inclusión e Igualdad Jalisco, A. C.
Colores del Rincón A.C. - MY World México
Commons Cluster of the UN NGO Major Group
Commons for EcoJustice
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI)
Commonwealth Medical Trust
Community Advancement through Research & Development CARD
Community Initiatives for development in Pakistan
Comunidad de Organizaciones Solidarias
Concord Italia
CONCORD Sweden
Congrégation des soeurs de Notre Dame de Charité du Bon Pasteur
Congregation of Notre Dame de Montreal
Congregation of Our Lady of Charity of the Good Shepherd
Congregation of the Mission
Consorcio para el Diálogo Parlamentario y la Equidad Oaxaca A.C:
Cooperation for Peace and Development (CPD)
CoopeSoliDar R.L
Coordinación de ONG y Cooperativas CONGCOOP
Council for NGOs in Malawi - CONGOMA
Council for Participatory Development
Crispin Swedi Bilombele
CRV & Co
D.C. Unit Church Women United
Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation
Dalit NGO Federation, Nepal
Dalit Youth Alliance (DYA)
DanChurchAid
Danish United Nations Association
Dawn Development Organization
Debasis Chowdhury Rana
DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project)
Dehi Ijtimai Tarqyati Social Workers Council (DITSWC)
Dehi Taraqiati Tanzeem (DTT) BILLITANG KOHAT KPK
Derecho, Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (DAR)
Desértica, Soluciones Endovasculares A.C.
Despertares Derechos Humanos
Development Dynamics
DHEWA (development for health education work & awareness) Welfare Society Chakwal Bheen
Dillu Prasad Ghimire
District Development Association
District Development Association Tharparkar (DDAT)
Dóchas
Dominican Leadership Conference
Dosse SOSSOUGA
Dr. Tristaca McCray
DSW (Deutsche Stiftung Weltbevölkerung)
DUF - The Danish Youth Council
Earth Community
East Timor and Indonesia Action Network (ETAN)
Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education and Research
Edmund Rice International
EMPOWER INDIA
Empresa marhnos®
Environmental Partnership Council
EOS - Association for Studies, Cooperation and Development
Equality Bahamas
Equality For All Development Organisation
Estonian Roundtable for Development Cooperation
Ethiopian Human Rights Council
European Youth Forum
Fagaras Research Institute
Federation of Environmental and Ecological Diversity for Agricultural Revampment and Human Rights
Feminist Dalit Organizations (FEDO)
FIAN Sri Lanka
Finnish Development NGOs Fingo
Fixing The World
FKM BKA YWU
FOKUS - Forum for Women and Development
Fondazione Proclade Internazionale - onlus
Food Security Network-PRAN
Foreign Spouses Support Group and Malaysian Campaign for Equal Citizenship
Former Commissioner, National Human Rights Commission Nepal
Forum for Women in Democracy
Forum of women's NGOs of Kyrgyzstan
Forum Syd
Forus
Foundation for Older Persons' Development (FOPDEV)
Foundation For Sustainable Development and Climate Action (FSDCA)
Freshwater Action Network Mexico (FANMex)
Friends of Angola
FUNDACIÓN CONSTRUIR
Fundación Dibujando un Mañana
Fundación Heinrich Böll - Ciudad de México, México y el Caribe
Fundación Mexicana de Medicina Paliativa y Alivio del Dolor en Cáncer A.C.
Fundación Mexicana para la Planeación Familiar, A. C. MEXFAM
FUNDACIÓN MÉXICO MOTIVACTE A.C
Fundación MYWM- MY World México
Fundación Sanders AC
FUNDACION SERENDIPIA A.C.
Fundamedios
Gals Forum International
Gatef orginzation
Generacion2030
GESIP Centro para la Gestión Integral y Participativa S.C.
Gestión Estratégica para Resultados de Desarrollo S.C.
Gestos (soropositividade, comunicação, gênero)
Global Call to Action against Poverty
Global Citizen
Global Integrity
Global NGO Executive Committee
Global Shepherds
Globalt Fokus
Good Shepherd International Foundation- Nepal
Good Shepherd Sisters
Gopal Kiran Samaj Sevi Sanstha
Governance, Elections, Advocacy, Research Services (GEARS) Initiative Zambia
Gram Bharati Samiti (GBS)
GREENfluidics
Groupe d'Action pour le Progrès et la Paix (G.A.P.P.-Afrique)
Groupe d'Action pour le Progrès et la Paix (G.A.P.P.-BÉNIN)
Groupe d'Action pour le Progrès et la Paix (G.A.P.P.-Mali)
Grupo Holístico para el bienestar investigación y desarrollo social Integral, A.C
H. AYUNTAMIENTO DE TECAMACHALCO, PUEBLA MEX.
HAKI Africa
HelpAge Deutschland
Hevas Innovación
Human Rights Focus Pakistan (HRFP)
IMCS Pax Romana
IMS (International Media Support)
Incidencia y Gobernanza Ambiental AC
INCIDIR, A. C.
Institute for Socioeconomic Studies - INESC
Institute of the Blessed Virgin Mary -Loreto Generalate
Instituto de Comunicación y Desarrollo (ICD)
Instituto Potosino de Investigación Científica y Tecnológica, AC
International Association for Religious Freedom Coordination Council for South Asia
International Commission of Jurists
International Federation of Business and Professional Women
International IPMSDL
International Movement for Advancement of Education Culture Social & Economic Development (IMAECSED)
International Network of Women Engineers and Scientists
International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development
International Open Network
International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR)
International Planned Parenthood Federation
International Service for Human Rights
International Women's Development Agency (IWDA)
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs
INTRAC
Jaag Welfare Movement
Jairos Jiri Association
Jandran Welfare Foundation
Japan Civil Society Network on SDGs
Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC)
Jeunes Verts Togo
Julián Carrillo My Words México Kids
Juventud 2030 GTO.
K.U.L.U. - Women and Development (KULU)
Kafka Welfare Organization
Kamal Subedi
Kanimi EcoTienda
Karapatan Alliance Philippines
Kathak Academy
Khpal Kore Organization
KINDERENERGY
Kothowain (Vulnerable Peoples Development Organization)
Kyawkrup Foundation
La Transformación del Graffiti al Arte Pictorico, A. C.
Lanakaná Princípios Sustentáveis
Lanka Fundamental Rights Organization
Latvian Platform for Development Cooperation
Lawyers' Rights Watch Canada
Lepaje Environmental Organization
Let There Be Light International
LGBT+ Danmark
Life Education and Development Support (LEADS)
Light for the World
LSO Sada-e-Thal Welfare Organization
Lutheran World Federation (LWF)
Malaysian CSO SDG Alliance
Maldives NGO Federation
Maleya Foundation
Maranatha Hope
Maryknoll Sisters of St. Dominic, Inc.
Más Coudadanía, AC
Mechanism for Rational Change MERC
Medical Mission Sisters
Mihai and Maria Foundation
Mitini Nepal
MPact Global Action for Gay Men's Health & Rights
Mujer Y Salud en Uruguay - MYSU
MUSONET
MY World Mexico
Myanmar Youth Foundation for SDG
Nagorik Uddyog
Natasha Dokovska
National Advocacy for Rights of Innocent-NARI Foundation
National Campaign Against COVID-19
National Campaign for Education Nepal
National Campaign for Sustainable Development Nepal
National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights
National CSO Platform of Sri Lanka
National Integrated Development Association (NIDA-Pakistan)
National Organization for Sustainable Development (NOSD)
National Trade Union Center (NTUC Phl)
National Youth Council of Russia
Neelab Children and Women Development council
Neighbourhood Community Network
Nepal Development Initiative (NEDI)
Nepal Climate Change Federation
Nepal National Dalit Social Welfare Organization
Nepal SDGs Forum
NGO EFA
NGO Federation of Nepal
NGOCSW/NYC Women and Girls of African Descent Caucus N. America, Latin America and the Caribbean Descent N. America,
Nigeria Network of NGOs
Noakhali Rural Development Organization
NOSOTROS POR LOS NIÑOS CON CÁNCER A.C.
Observatory of Vulnerable peoples' Rights (OVPR)
Okogun Odigie Safewomb International Foundation (OOSAIF)
ONAAR Development Organization
ONE (SINGAPORE)
ONG PADJENA
Open School of Sustainable Development (Openshkola)
Organizacion Mexicana de Enfermedades Raras
Organización por la Cooperación Ecológica A.C.
Organization for the Marginalized And Neglected Groups OMANG
Our Fish, Denmark
Outreach Social Care Project - OSCAR
OutRight Action International
Pakistan Development Alliance (GCAP-Pakistan)
Parliamentarians Commission for Human Rights
Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA)
Participatory Research Action Network- PRAN
Peace Infinity
Peace Justice Youth Organization
PEREMPUAN AMAN
Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement
Plan International
PlanBørnefonden
Plataforma de ONG de Accion Social
Plataforma Portuguesa das ONGD (NGDO Portuguese Platform)
Portuguese National Youth Council
Portuguese Platform for Women's Rights
POSCO Agenda 2030/GCAP Sénégal
Potohar Organization for Development Advocacy (PODA)
Povod
Programa Venezolano de Educación-Acción en DDHH (Provea)
Projonma Academy
Promotora Juvenil don Bosco AC
Proyecto Cantera Juntos por México AC
Purvanchal Rural Development and Training Institute
Radanar Ayar Association
Real Vision Development Organization
Reality of Aid - Asia Pacific (RoA-AP)
Red Agenda 2030 MX
Red Ciudadana 2030 por el Desarrollo Sostenible
Red de Educadores Ambientales de Chihuahua
Red Nicaraguense de Comercio Comunitario (RENICC)
Regional Centre for International Development Cooperation (RCIDC)
REPACT Africa
Rescue Alternatives Liberia (RAL)
Research Centre for Gender, Family and Environment in Development (CHFED)
Réseau Centrafricain au Leadership des Jeunes Femmes en Afrique Francophone
Réseau de Défenseurs des Droits Humains de l'Afrique Centrale (REDHAC)
Roberto ravagnani
Rozaria Memorial Trust
Rural Area Development Programme (RADP)
Rural community devlipment council Gwadar
Rutgers
S.O.S. - Criança e Desenvolvimento Integrale de ANG
SAHARA Voluntary Social Welfare Agency
Sahara Welfare Foundation
Saif Khan
Samarthyam
Sami Foundation
Saudi Green Building Forum
Save the Children International
School of International Futures
SDG Action Alliance Bangladesh
SDGs National Network Nepal
SDSN Youth Mexico
Semillas para la Democracia
SEND-GHANA/Ghana CSOs Platform on the SDGs
SERAC-Bangladesh
SERR Servicios Ecumenicos para Reconciliacion y Reconstruccion
SEVERE Joseph
Sex & Samfund / The Danish Family Planning Association
Shaur Taraqiyati Tanzeem
Shirley Ann Sullivan Educational Foundation
Shivi Development Society
Sindh Desert Development Organization
Sindh Rural Development Organization
Sistemico, Regeneración Socioambiental AC
SLOGA Slovene NGO Platform for Development, Global Education and Humanitarian Aid
Slum Child Empowerment and Development Initiative
Smile Myanmar
Social and Economic Develepment Associares (SEDA)
Social Economic and Governance Promotion Centre
Society for Access to Quality Education
Society for Education and Development
Society for Indigenous Women's Progress
Society for Sustainable Development
Society for the Empowerment of the People
Soka Gakkai International
Soñando y Construyendo por un México Mejor a.c
Soroptimist International
Spektro Asociación para el Desarrollo Social
Sri Lanka Nature Group
Sudan SDGs Platform
Sukaar Welfare Organization
Sustainable Agriculture and Environment.
Sustainable Development Organization (SDO)
Taiwan AID
Takhleeq Foundation
Taraqee Foundation
Teerath Kumar
Temple of Understanding
Teresa Kotturan
The Inclusivity Project
The National Civic Forum - Sudan
The National Council of NGOs/Action on Sustainable Development Goals Kenya Coalition
The Nationwide Movement Yuksalish
The Norwegian Forum for Development and Environment
Think Centre
Tirtha Biswokarma
Toktli Educación Ambiental
Uganda National NGO Forum
Uganda Network of Young People living with HIV/AIDS (UNYPA)
UNA Sweden
Unanima International
UNANIMA International
Union de l'Action Féministe
Unión Nacional de Instituciones para el Trabajo de Acción Social - UNITAS
Unitarian Universalist Association
United Disabled Person of Kenya
United Global Organization of Development (UGOOD)
United Nations Association of Fiji
Universidad Anáhuac Mayab
Universidad Tecnológica de los Valles Centrales de Oaxaca
Urgent Action Fund for Women's Human Rights
Vaagdhara
Vabieka Fest, Festival Internacional de Payasas.
Validity Foundation - Mental Disability Advocacy Centre
Varieties of Democracy Institute
VIER PFOTEN International
Village Development Organization (VDO)
Virginia Gildersleeve International Fund (DBA- Women First International Fund)
Vision GRAM-International
Voces de Cambio, Agenda para el Desarrollo
Voices for Interactive Choice and Empowerment (VOICE)
Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO)
Wada Na Todo Abhiyan
Water, Environment & Sanitation Society (WESS)
Women & Child Welfare Society
Women Deliver
Women's Center for Guidance and Legal Awareness
Women's Rights and Democracy Centre (WORD Centre)
WomenShade Pak
World Animal Net
World Federalist Movement - Canada
Youth Action Hub Guinea - CNUCED
Youth For Environment Education And Development Foundation (YFEED Foundation)
Youth Inter-Active
Yuma Inzolia
YZ Proyectos de Desarrollo a.C.
Zakir Hossain
Zonta International -
Joint Universal Periodic Review (#UPR45) Submissions on Civil Society Space
CIVICUS makes UN Universal Periodic Review (UPR) submissions on civil society space in Chad, China, Malaysia, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Senegal.
The United Nations Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review is a unique process which involves a review of the human rights records of all 193 UN Member States once every 4.5 years.
CIVICUS and its partners have submitted UN Universal Periodic Review (UPR) submissions on six countries in advance of the 45th UPR session in January-February 2024, in the context of the 4th UPR cycle. The submissions examine the state of civil society in each country, including the promotion and protection of the rights to freedom of association, peaceful assembly and expression (including media freedom), and the environment for human rights defenders as well as related unwarranted restrictions. We further provide an assessment of the States’ domestic implementation of civic space recommendations received during the 3rd UPR cycle over 4 years ago and provide a number of targeted follow-up recommendations in relation to core civil society space issues.
Chad – See consolidated report | See full report - CIVICUS and the Réseau des Défenseurs des Droits Humains en Afrique Centrale (REDHAC) express concern about the use of lethal force to target protesters, the blanket ban on protests, and ongoing restrictions on freedom of assembly in the Republic of Chad. The submission shows that the targeting of human rights defenders, the killing of journalists for their human rights activities, and ongoing restrictions on freedom of association continue to take place with high levels of impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of human rights violations as the overall environment for civil society worsens.
China – See full report - CIVICUS and the Asia Democracy Network (AND) document in this submission the use of vague and broad security and public order laws that have served in the People’s Republic of China as a legal basis to shut down civil society organisations and criminalise human rights defenders, journalists and critics, including in Hong Kong. Specific forms of harassment imposed on human rights defenders including movement restrictions, travel bans, surveillance and social media restrictions are also addressed. The submission sheds light on the pervasive censorship of all form of dissent occurring both online and offline, the assault on the media and the crackdown on protests and addresses concerns about systematic repression of ethnic Uighur Muslims and other Muslim minorities, including arbitrary mass detention.
Nigeria - See full report – The submission by CIVICUS and the Nigeria Network of NGOs (NNNGOs) examine the deterioration civic space in the country, highlighting the Federal Republic of Nigeria’s onslaught on freedom of expression and media freedom through its stifling laws that silence critical opinions. We also discuss the attacks and intimidation of civil society activists and journalists by security operatives and government officials, as well as persistent implementation gaps in relation to the rights to freedom of expression and assembly despite significant progress that has been made in addressing data protection issues.
Malaysia – See consolidated report | See full report- The submission by CIVICUS, the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA) and Suaram Rakyat Malaysia highlights the lack of implementation of protection measures for human rights defenders. Numerous cases of harassment of human rights defenders and journalists, including judicial harassment and harassment by non-state actors, are documented. The submission addresses concerns over the systematic harassment of peaceful protesters using the Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 and restrictive provisions in the law that are inconsistent with international law and standards. We also document the use of restrictive laws including the Sedition Act, the Communications and Multimedia Act (CMA) and other laws to silence dissent.
Saudi Arabia – See consolidated report | See full report in English | Arabic- CIVICUS and the Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR) examine the legal framework related to civic space in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which lacks basic rights protections and severely restricts freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression. The submission documents in particular the continued misuse of the overly broad and vague Counter-Terrorism Law of 2017 and the Cybercrime Law of 2007 to clamp down on human rights and peaceful activists. The submission also sheds light on the continued judicial persecution of human rights defenders, including women human rights defenders, who face additional systemic barriers and challenges such as sexual harassment as they advocate for gender equality and the rights of women.
Senegal – See consolidated report in English | French | See full report in English| French - CIVICUS, Coalition Sénégalaise des Défenseurs des Droits Humains (COSEDDH) and the West African Human Rights Defenders Network (ROADDH/WAHRDN) highlight in this submission, among other issues, the increased number of human rights defenders and journalists that have been subjected to arrests and prolonged pretrial detention, including in relation to the organisation of and participation in protests. We further note that the counterterrorism laws approved in June 2021 contain restrictive provisions that could adversely affect civic freedoms, including freedom of association as well as freedom of expression and media freedom.
Civic space in Chinaand Saudi Arabia is rated asClosed by the CIVICUS Monitor. InChad, Senegal and Nigeriait is rated as Repressed, whereas in Malaysiait is rated asObstructed.
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JORDAN: ‘Commercial spyware that enables digital repression and abuse must be completely banned’
CIVICUS speaks with Access Now about their forensic investigation that exposed the use of Pegasus spyware to target activists and journalists in Jordan. Access Now is an international civil society organisation that works to defend and extend the digital rights of people and communities at risk.
What restrictions do Jordanian journalists and activists face?
Over the past four years, the Jordanian government has dialled up its crackdown on the rights to freedom of association, expression and peaceful assembly. Journalists, human rights defenders, labour unions and activists are routinely harassed, detained and prosecuted under vague and draconian laws. In late 2022 and throughout 2023, several lawyers, journalists and activists were arrested in connection with protests or for their social media posts.
Repression has deepened as a result of the new cybercrime law adopted in August 2023. This law threatens online freedom of expression on the basis of ambiguous and overly broad provisions about ‘spreading fake news’, ‘promoting, instigating, aiding or inciting immorality’, ‘online assassination of personality’, ‘provoking strife’ and ‘undermining national unity’. The law is now being weaponised to quash pro-Palestinian protests and activism in Jordan. Since 7 October 2023, hundreds of protesters expressing solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza have been detained and many others prosecuted under this draconian law.
Our recent forensic investigation into the use of NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware in Jordan has revealed an additional layer of repression, with at least 35 people being targeted for no reason other than their peaceful political dissent and human rights advocacy.
How’s spyware used, and who’s using it?
In January 2022, Access Now and Front Line Defenders revealed that Pegasus spyware had been used to hack prominent Jordanian human rights lawyer Hala Ahed. Hala was hacked in March 2021, and it was an isolating and traumatic experience for her. Access Now then joined Citizen Lab to further investigate the use of Pegasus spyware in Jordan.
Our joint forensic investigation uncovered a terrifyingly widespread use of Pegasus to target Jordanian media and civil society. We found traces of Pegasus spyware on the mobile devices of 30 activists, journalists, lawyers and civil society members. Further forensic analysis by our partners Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International’s Security Lab and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project identified five more Pegasus victims, bringing the total to 35.
This is the largest pool of Pegasus victims uncovered in Jordan so far, but we believe actual numbers are much higher. We don’t know exactly who is behind these attacks because spyware manufacturers such as NSO Group make the identification of perpetrators of cyberattacks very hard.
The NSO Group blatantly claims its surveillance technologies are crucial for governments to fight crime and terrorism. Conveniently, this is the same pretext used by dictators and repressive regimes to criminalise the work of journalists and activists and prosecute them under draconian counterterrorism and cybercrime laws. It’s a match made in hell, as a result of which activists and journalists are hacked, prosecuted, jailed, tortured and killed merely for exercising their rights or doing their job.
What can activists and journalists do to protect themselves?
Unfortunately, given their stealthy nature, there’s no bulletproof protection against spyware attacks. Zero click spyware doesn’t require any interaction between the software and the user of the hacked device. It basically exploits a vulnerability in the device’s software to infect it without the user’s knowledge.
Still, there are some basic protection measures everyone should implement. For example, every time a vulnerability is discovered, Apple patches it, which means it’s important for users to ensure their device’s operating system is always up to date, otherwise the patch won’t apply. Activists can also enable the Lockdown Mode feature on their Apple devices, which seems to be helping protect at-risk users.
How does Access Now hold governments and companies accountable?
For years, Access Now and broader civil society have been campaigning for a global moratorium on the export, sale, transfer, servicing and use of targeted digital surveillance technologies until rigorous human rights safeguards are put in place. Commercial spyware that enables digital repression and abuse worldwide, such as Pegasus, must be completely banned. We are not there yet, but this is our baseline to rein in the surveillance tech industry.
There have been some positive steps toward holding spyware companies accountable. For instance, a number of Israeli spyware outfits including NSO Group, Candiru and four Intellexa entities were added to a list of the US Department of Commerce that includes entities engaging in activities contrary to the USA’s national security or foreign policy interests. The latest addition to the list was the Canada-based firm Sandvine, blacklisted for enabling digital repression in Egypt. In February 2024, the US State Department also announced a new visa sanctions policy that will deny visas to anyone involved in, facilitating or deriving financial benefit from the misuse of commercial spyware around the world.
Civil society plays a vital role in exposing how these shady companies profit from facilitating human rights abuses around the world and demanding accountability for violations and reparation to spyware victims. Its continued work is key to holding governments and spyware companies accountable.
Civic space in Jordan is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Access Now through itswebsite orFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@accessnow on Twitter.
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KAZAKHSTAN: ‘No economic or social reform will bring real change unless there is also serious political reform’
CIVICUS speaks about the recent protests in Kazakhstan and the state’s repressive response with Yevgeniy Zhovtis, a prominent human rights lawyer and director of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law (KIBHR).
Founded in 1993, KIBHR is a human rights civil society organisation aimed at promoting civil and political rights, democratic freedoms, the rule of law and the development of civil society through education, data collection, analysis and dissemination of information, and advocacy to harmonise domestic legislation with international standards. Yevgeniy is also a member of Panel of Experts on Freedom of Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute Council.
What caused the recent protests in Kazakhstan?
The demands expressed in the recent protests have deep roots in processes that go back to the 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, when former Soviet republics started to transition towards a capitalist system based on private property. The problem in Kazakhstan was that members of the nomenklatura, the ruling class in Soviet times, and especially those in positions of authority in state-owned companies, became the owners of a big portion of the economy. These elites then started to incorporate elements of authoritarian political control to match their economic power, and gained control of the political space, independent media and public life in general.
As a result, Kazakhstan turned into an authoritarian and oligarchic state, with much of the economy concentrated in the hands of a small group of people close to First President Nursultan Nazarbayev, his clan and his family, and ridden with social inequality.
Unsurprisingly, over the years dissatisfaction grew. People were unhappy about illegal practices that bypassed institutions, corruption, social injustice and inequality, among other things. A protest movement grew in 2011 but ended in massacre. Residents of Zhanaozen, a city in southwest Kazakhstan, went on a hunger strike and set up a protest camp in the city’s main square for months, demanding higher salaries and better working conditions. In December 2011, the police opened fire on them and, according to official data, killed 17 and injured more than a hundred people.
This became to some extent a moment of great symbolic power.
As protests erupted in 2022, what were their demands?
Ten years later, at the very start of 2022, the Ministry of the Economy freed the market for liquefied gas, which is the most important fuel for local cars. Prices went up by 100 per cent.
But the trigger for the 2022 protests was strikingly similar to that of the 2011 protest. People were angry not only because of rising gas and oil prices, but also because of economic mismanagement and corruption. It started with several thousand protesters in Zhanaozen on 2 January and within two or three days it spread to more than 60 cities all around the country. When anger reached a tipping point, many thousands took to the streets.
Initially, protests in many places were driven by groups of political opposition, civic activists who were joined by workers and marginalised groups. It was not a situation in which the mass of the people mobilised against the government. Generally speaking, having lived under an authoritarian state for the past 17 years, people in Kazakhstan have no real political culture or a political voice. Public protests are illegal: people are not allowed to gather in central squares or in any place near a government building, so anyone who protests in the streets is committing an administrative offence.
But people don’t seem to be so afraid anymore. By mid-January 2022, the protests that started in the west had spread out to other regions, and masses of diverse people joined, including not only big crowds of young people but also criminals, militants close to local elites and even some Islamic radicals.
President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev tried to control the situation, replaced some security authorities and put himself at the head of the security council, replacing the First President, who was supposed to occupy this position for life. The government also shut down internet access for several days.
Most protests were spontaneous, and Kazakhstan is a very diverse country, so there was no consolidated leadership. People kept protesting and adding more social and economic demands, which in turn ended up giving way to political demands, including the resignation of the government and removal of the First President and his clan from all positions in politics and the economy. There are no real opposition political parties but those that are close to having that role called out their supporters to protest.
Protests were also mostly peaceful, but some aggressive young people, militant groups close to local elites and Islamic groups clashed with the police. They tried to seize government buildings and, in some cities, they ran out of control.
How did the government respond?
The government reacted with deadly violence, to the point that the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights had to urge it to end the violence towards protesters.
As well as having control of the national security forces, President Tokayev resorted to Russian Security Forces as part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization forces. He brought in more than 2,000 Russian troops, joined by Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan units. These also had a political purpose: to show that Russian president Vladimir Putin had his back.
More than 220 people were killed and more than 10,000 were arrested during the protests. Between 8,000 and 9,000 of them were later released, but some continue in detention. Among them are some people who were violent and committed looting but many others who did not. For almost a week they didn’t have access to basic rights such as communicating with their families or a lawyer, and there have been many cases of torture and cruel treatment in detention. Only by 14 or 15 January, when they regained control, did the authorities start to provide information regarding places of detention and people detained. But judicial procedures continue and the outcome of the trials is uncertain.
Once President Tokayev regained control, Russian security forces left Kazakhstan. The president then moved to consolidate his power. On 11 January he addressed a statement to parliament in which he promised to introduce economic and social reforms aimed at bringing a measure of social justice, reducing inequalities, combatting corruption and improving the economy. He also promised that in September he will announce a set of political reforms.
Did anything change as a result of the protests?
The number of people who took the streets was incredibly high, and that in and by itself was an important positive change. In the medium term we might see an impact in terms of economic and social changes. But we need institutional changes regarding the prison system and the security forces, the police and prosecutor’s office and judiciary. All these institutions must be radically reformed.
And Kazakhstan also needs political reform. I do not expect the government to hold democratic elections anytime soon, but I am concerned about the space for independent media and journalists, for the growth of a democratic opposition and for the development of civil society. At some point there will be a need for political pluralism, party competition and citizen participation.
I think these protests gave the government some food for thought. No economic or social reform will bring real change unless it there is also serious political reform. Otherwise, the story will repeat itself following the same pattern.
What can the international community do to improve civic space in Kazakhstan?
I participated in a meeting with the European Union External Action Service people and have close communications with western embassies regarding civic space and human rights issues. But unfortunately, Kazakhstan is not relevant in the international agenda, and the international community is currently absorbed with the pandemic. Additionally, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is also keeping the world busy. There are some foreign journalists who are being allowed to work in Kazakhstan who will hopefully publish their coverage in popular newspapers, but that’s about it.
At this point, the only way to help is to look at the situation as a systemic problem that has existed for many years, concerning the nature of the political regimes that have been established in the region, lacking in democratic freedoms. High-level advocacy is needed to slowly move the government towards an understanding of the need to open up the space for civic freedoms. Another, more immediate way to help is to work on a case-by-case basis on the situation of human rights activists, journalists and civil society staff who are being prosecuted. International assistance in investigations on human rights violations would also be very valuable.
Civic space in Kazakhstan is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with KIBHR through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@bureau_kz on Twitter. -
KENYA: ‘People are discouraged from voting when they think that voices do not matter’
CIVICUS speaks about the recent presidential election in Kenya with Ken Ogembo, programme manager of Siasa Place.Siasa Place is a civil society organisation (CSO) founded in 2015 with the aim of promoting youth participation in politics. It educates people about the importance of voting and how the government can be held accountable.
Did you observe an increase in civic space restrictions around the 9 August election?
We observed several civic space restrictions during the election. The media did not provide fair coverage to all candidates, and the most popular candidates had a clear advantage because everything they did was widely covered and they got a lot of propaganda. Media are powerful tools that can be used to influence the views of people and in this case were used to promote some parties and bring down others. Social media was also used to spread misinformation that influenced many people’s voting decisions.
Further, there was violence in some counties, which we believe was organised to spark fear. As a result, people no longer felt comfortable attending campaigns for some candidates because of fear they could be attacked.
There were also cases of candidates being attacked. Some female politicians were attacked and assaulted; unfortunately not much was done to protect them or follow up on their cases. William Ruto, announced as the winner of the election, was also attacked in Kisumu. His vehicles were destroyed but fortunately he was not hurt.
There was also a situation in Kakamega county between the two main coalitions, Kenya Kwanza and Azimio la Umoja: they were fighting over access to a stadium and a number of people got hurt in the process.
However, I do not believe violence was serious or widespread to the point that we could say it was what marked the electoral process.
Why was there such low voter turnout?
There are a number of factors that could have possibly contributed to it, but I think it is first and foremost about people being demotivated from voting because they do not see any change happening as a result of elections. Government corruption is pervasive no matter who is in the government, and economic performance is consistently poor. Public services are of very low quality: there are not enough healthcare facilities, doctors are often going on strike, markets are dirty. Youth unemployment continues to be very high, and most people don’t think this will change, so many do not see any reason for voting.
We also need to look at how candidates are nominated. Presidential candidate Raila Odinga’s party, Azimio la Umoja, did not conduct democratic internal processes in most of its strongholds and often nominated people who had long been in power and had performed dismally. People are discouraged from voting when they think their voices do not matter.
I would also say it is also ignorance that drives young people away from the polls. They should understand that regardless of whether they get out to vote, a government will get elected and will rule over them. The fact that they did not vote takes away their moral authority to question those in power. Of course they still have a constitutional right to do so, but their questioning will lack substance and they will not have any alternative to offer.
Through our engagement with young people, we have noticed they lack confidence in the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IBEC), the institution that manages elections, which many consider unable to deliver free and fair elections. They view it as pointless to go out and vote if the IBEC can’t ensure their votes will count.
This is probably a mistake, because there have been improvements in the electoral process, including by making it clear that the results received from voting stations are final. However, the IBEC still has a lot of work to do make people trust the electoral process.
Finally, I think the government played a huge role by not providing any civic education. It only started doing the basics when it was already too late, as most people who didn’t vote had already made up their minds not to. And when the government did, the content was not of the right kind, in the sense that would make people understand why voting is important and how to play their role as citizens.
Has civil society been able to play its role in the electoral process?
Civil society’s role has been somewhat restricted. Many CSOs would need more support and resources to play their full range of roles during elections. During this election we saw many CSOs unable to provide civic education programmes because of lack of funding and government support.
Our job as civil society is to advocate on people’s behalf, inform them about the process and raise awareness of their rights. But most of us were denied the right to do our work due to lack of resources. My organisation, Siasa Place, played a key role in the previous election because it received the required resources in time. But this year the support we needed came about two months before the elections, which is rather late for us to start doing our work at the community level. This affected our role, but we hope things will improve in the coming years. We need government and civil society to work together to inform people around elections so they know what they are doing.
There were also cases of CSOs being instrumentalised by political parties to influence voters. That defeats the whole purpose of having an active civil society. We urge the concerned CSOs to remember their original goals and mission and refocus on them. We should be the voice of marginalised people and communities, not of political parties. It is our duty to hold political parties accountable, not root for them at elections.
Given the very close result, do you think there could be a recount or even an election re-run?
If the defeated candidate can convince the court that there have been irregularities so gross that they have affected the outcome, then the court could nullify the results. But if votes are recounted and the result comes out the same, there won’t be a need for a rerun.
Civic space in Kenya is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Siasa Place through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@siasaplace on Twitter. -
KENYA: ‘The denial of resources for civic education has been a massive blow for civil society’
CIVICUS speaks about the upcoming elections in Kenya with Paul Okumu, head of the Secretariat of the Africa Platform (AP). AP is a pan-African civil society platform based in Nairobi, Kenya, that works to strengthen state-society relations to achieve more effective and inclusive development.With elections still a few months away, is it clear who the contenders will be?
Many are unaware that Kenya has only one election day in which all political positions are filled. But although the focus is on the presidential race, the forthcoming elections will bring in 349 members of the National Assembly, the lower house of parliament, including 290 elected from the constituencies, 47 women elected from the counties and 12 nominated representatives, plus 69 members of the Senate, 47 of whom are elected directly while the rest are elected to represent women, young people and other excluded groups.
In addition, Kenyans will be electing 47 governors, the regional leaders directly responsible to county assemblies, that is, their respective regional parliaments. Kenyans will elect a further 1,450 county assembly members. So the election is a complex one.
For the presidential race, some likely frontrunners are already emerging. The current president, Uhuru Kenyatta, is ineligible to stand for re-election after completing his second term; his deputy, William Ruto, is among the leading candidates alongside former prime minister Raila Odinga. It is worth noting that this is the fifth time Odinga is running for president, having lost his previous attempts and withdrawn once in 2017.
By law candidacies for the presidency will be made official in mid-May, and there are currently almost 45 people who have submitted their names as possible candidates. The election body, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, will have the final word on which candidates fulfil the legal criteria to run.
The question many are likely to ask is why there are only two leading contenders. The answer is as complex as the country’s elections.
In a bid to exercise a divide-and-rule strategy, the British colonial government divided Kenya into regional ethnic units, with people from one unit not allowed to travel to other units without the authority of the colonial government under a system known as Kipande (Identity) system. In addition, people in regions closest to where white people lived were given access to education much earlier so they could work for whites. As a result, these regions (mainly central, Rift Valley and Western) progressed much faster and became dominant in the period leading to and after independence. It helped that these regions are also the most agriculturally productive, which is part of the reason the whites chose them as their residence.
There are about 43 ethnic groups in Kenya, but just five of them constitute over half of its population of about 50 million. Due to the combined effects of colonial boundaries, which the 2010 Constitution kept intact – a story for another day – and the numeric dominance of these few ethnic groups, the country’s politics, in a quite similar fashion to that in South Sudan, continue to revolve around five ethnic groups. Leading presidential candidates always emerge from these five. Currently, the two leading candidates represent a coalition of three and two of these largest ethnic groups.
What will be at stake in the upcoming elections?
The current president is seen to have spent his time investing in sections of the economy that benefited his vast family businesses. From infrastructure to hospitals to the dairy and transport sectors, most of the investments have been in areas that are perceived directly to add value or make it easy for the president’s family businesses to thrive. As a result, there is a perception that what is at stake is the protection of these investments, hence the current complex coalition supported by the president that has brought together people seen to be those who will preserve the status quo.
But at a deeper level, the country is in a serious crisis. The economy has been in recession for over eight months now. Half of its recurrent budget is used on civil service salaries. The latest economic report by the government shows that for the first time in the country’s history, debt costs will surpass the recurrent expenditure, projected at Sh1.34 trillion (US$1.3 billion) for the coming year. The debt binge is mainly from Eurobond offerings, a package of Chinese loans and syndicated commercial loans taken in recent years. Distress levels are so high that the Central Bank has begun to ration foreign reserves, especially US dollars. Fuel prices have risen by nearly 53 per cent in the past one year, largely due to the fact that fuel has always been an easy target for taxation.
And that is not all: European countries have always used Kenya as a trade gateway to the continent and have largely made it a multinational headquarters for European companies working across Africa. This has led to massive losses through tax evasion and avoidance and skewed double taxation agreements, and has killed countless small businesses that could not manage the massive resources and subsidies given by European development finance institutions or donor agencies (such as the CDC Group of the UK) to European corporations so they can win contracts and set up businesses in the country.
But there is a bigger underlying fear among citizens. In 2017 the Supreme Court was forced to overturn the results of the presidential elections after it emerged that the government, through Ot Morpho, a French company fronted by the French government, had manipulated the vote counting and tallying, handing victory to the incumbent president. The subsequent repeat elections were boycotted by the opposition at the last minute on the grounds that the government had refused to make the changes demanded by the Supreme Court to ensure transparent vote counting. This massive collusion and rejection of changes proposed by the judiciary severely eroded confidence in the electoral system. It is believed to be the part of reason for the current low voter registration.
What are the civic space conditions like in the run-up to the election?
The executive and the political class had made attempts to water down the constitution significantly through a process known as Building Bridges Initiative, but they were stopped in their tracks by the courts, including the Supreme Court. This has preserved citizens’ freedoms and has strengthened confidence in the judiciary. Because of this there is still considerable freedom of assembly and expression.
But the government has also tried to limit the work of civil society around the election. In July 2021, the Kenyan Foreign Affairs Ministry sent a confidential memo to all foreign missions and international civil society organisations (CSOs) that usually support civic education, instructing them not to put any resources, either directly or through local CSOs, into civic education and civic advocacy without the express authorisation of the government. To date, such authorisation has not been granted, and it’s not clear if partners have even requested it.
Interestingly, foreign missions kept quiet and refused to divulge this information to local CSOs. It is not clear why the government took this drastic measure, but it is even more baffling why foreign missions have been so quick to obey it when a few years ago they defied a similar directive by the Russian government and funded civic education in that country. A possible reason lies in Kenya’s centrality, alongside Rwanda, for the politics of Africa and the economies of Europe, which these foreign countries are keen to preserve.
As a result of this decision, this year Kenya has had the lowest voter registration in its history and levels of civic awareness have plummeted. The denial of resources for civic education has been a massive blow for civil society, and with the elections under 90 days away, it is not yet clear what role civil society will play around them.
The window for registration as election observers, usually played by the African Union, the Carter Foundation, the European Union and a coalition of civil society groups, is still open, and it is still possible that with alternative sources of funding, CSOs may still engage in some way.
What is the potential for electoral violence?
Violence is highly unlikely. Despite ethnic politics rooted in the colonial regionalisation arrangement, Kenyans are largely peaceful. Most of the post-election violence that Kenya has experienced has been mostly confined to power struggles among the five dominant ethnic groups and has never been about the entire country. Over the past five months, these five ethnic groups have formed two large coalitions, making violence unlikely.
Of course, conflict between these two coalitions cannot be ruled out if one of them loses the elections, but if it occurs, this violence is unlikely to have an impact on the rest of the communities.
Civic space in Kenya is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Africa Platform through itswebsite. -
KOSOVO: ‘Civil society has done most of the effort when it comes to dealing with our recent history’
CIVICUS speaks about intensifying inter-ethnic violence in north Kosovo and civil society’s ongoing peacebuilding efforts withBjeshkë Guri, coordinator of the ‘Dealing with the Past’ programme atYouth Initiative for Human Rights Kosovo (YIHR-KS). Founded in 2004, YIHR-KS is a civil society organisation (CSO) workingto protect and promote human rights and democratic values with a focus on transitional justice and strengthening the role of young people at the local and regional levels.What’s the current security and human rights situation in Kosovo?
The security and human rights situation in Kosovo is complex and multi-faceted. While Kosovo’s Constitution ensures robust human rights protection and incorporates several international human rights mechanisms into its legal framework, inconsistent law implementation creates a fertile ground for rights violations to flourish. Unfortunately, violations persist across many domains, with discrimination and violence against women, LGBTQI+ people, children and non-majority communities being prevalent issues.
In recent years, ethnic violence has increased in north Kosovo, triggered by the implementation of ID and licence plate regulations in 2022. These policies increased tension and ultimately led to Kosovo-Serbs resigning from public institutions and boycotting local elections. Violent clashes were reported in north Kosovo between Kosovo-Albanian police factions and peacekeeping soldiers on one side and Kosovar Serbs on the other. On 24 September, an attack unfolded at Banjska Monastery involving around 30 armed people from Serbia and the Kosovo-Serb community. The incident resulted in a fatal shootout that killed one Kosovar police officer and three attackers. This has heightened tensions further and created a fragile political and diplomatic situation between Kosovo and Serbia.
Political leaders, driven by nationalist propaganda, foster social divisions between two ethnic groups. The risk of secession in north Kosovo, if not properly addressed, would pose a precedent for other separatist conflicts and cause destabilisation in the whole Balkan region. Russia’s war against Ukraine has changed the geopolitical landscape and the stability paradigm in Europe. This created an even greater need to extinguish local conflicts and prevent their recurrence, particularly between Kosovo and Serbia.
What should be done to normalise relations between Kosovo and Serbia?
Serbia’s non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence since 2008 has created obstacles against normalising relations between the two states and induced an economic blockade as well as presenting international diplomatic challenges. The normalisation of relations requires a process of social change alongside the implementation of agreements and resolution of underlying problems, such as the establishment of an association of Serb-majority municipalities and the enhancement of institutional functionality in north Kosovo as well as the recognition of Kosovo’s sovereignty by Serbia.
Civil society on both sides constantly works to improve the situation through a range of initiatives, including continuous support in the negotiation process. However, deteriorating political relations are exacerbating public tensions. As a result, CSOs in Kosovo have difficulties in engaging with communities that are predominantly Kosovo-Serbian.
What are relations between the Kosovo-Albanian and Kosovo-Serbian communities like?
The war in Kosovo claimed thousands of lives and destroyed the social fabric, replacing it with hatred and isolation. The rupture in communication between most Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs has made the two communities closed and isolated, seeing each other as enemies. Children are often brought up in fear and unaware of the wider context and problems shared by all communities in Kosovo. The influence of media, nationalist organisations and an aggressive environment pressure young people to take sides and view ‘the other’ as the cause of all problems. Ignorance about each other is the source of the prejudices and hostility that persist to this day.
An important factor lies with the education system. Various nationalist narratives are perpetuated through history books, as evidenced by an analysis we conducted in 2017. Kosovo-Serb young people learn from history books produced by the Serbian government, which barely mention the Kosovo War and portray Serbian people as the main victims. Xenophobic language has created isolation, prejudice, lack of trust and a feeling of insecurity in both communities.
How is YIHR-KS working toward reconciliation and peacebuilding in Kosovo?
Compared to political institutions, Kosovar CSOs have done most of the effort when it comes to dealing with our recent history. Over the years, the Kosovo government initiated efforts related to transitional justice, including the establishment of an inter-ministerial working group to develop a national strategy on transitional justice, a preparatory team for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a War Crimes Institute. Unfortunately, these initiatives became politicised and to this day Kosovo hasn’t been able to implement a comprehensive transitional justice strategy.
To address the current polarised situation, YIHR-KS launched the ‘Dealing with the Past’ programme, aimed at building a collective memory and lasting peace in Kosovo and the Balkan region. We conduct workshops and memory initiatives aimed at educating young people about the Kosovo War and providing them with opportunities to connect with peers from ‘the other side’.
One notable initiative is the Virtual Museum of Refugees, a digital archive featuring stories of forcibly displaced people. By collecting and sharing refugee interviews, this archive helps preserve memory and provides a basis for the understanding of Kosovo’s past through personal stories. It’s also a platform for refugees to connect with others who may have undergone similar experiences and thus foster a better understanding among survivors of what happened in the war. The museum challenges ethno-nationalistic narratives and builds a shared vision for reconciliation.
We facilitate residential and regional exchanges for young people from Kosovo-Albanian and Kosovo-Serbian communities so they can share experiences, ideas and opinions and learn about transitional justice, intercultural dialogue and negotiation skills. We also organise visits to sites where war crimes occurred against both Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs for them to hear stories from victims’ family members. This experience is transformative because it bridges gaps created by propaganda, which is based on concealing crimes committed against the ‘other’ group.
Every year we conduct street actions to commemorate the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances and the National Day of Missing People. We use these to demand greater commitment and engagement from the government of Kosovo to seek truth and establish justice for over 1,600 missing people of all ethnicities.
We closely cooperate with all YIHR offices in the region, and particularly with Serbia’s due to our shared and troubled past. Together with YIHR Serbia, we issue joint statements and are vocal about the human rights violations committed in the 1990s Balkan wars and the present political and social tensions.
What further international support does Kosovar civil society need?
Civil society activities in Kosovo have significantly expanded over recent years, creating space for policy advocacy and the promotion of transparency and democratic ideals. However, despite the large number of CSOs addressing pressing issues, there is a lack of funding for activities.
We need further support in facilitating the European Union (EU) integration agenda, aligning Kosovo’s legal system with the Community acquis – the accumulated legislation, legal acts and court decisions issued since 1993 that make up EU law, strengthening democratic values and promoting a safe and equal environment for everyone living in Kosovo.
Kosovo would also significantly benefit from joining the Council of Europe. This would enable access to expertise and resources to advance the transitional justice agenda and encourage a victim-led approach.
Civic space in Kosovo is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with YIHR-KS through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@YIHRKosovo on Twitter.
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KOSOVO: ‘Civil society plays a crucial role in maintaining communication in difficult times’
CIVICUS speaks with Milica Andric Rakic, project manager at New Social Initiative (NSI), about intensifying inter-ethnic violence and deteriorating civic space in Kosovo.NSI is a civil society organisation (CSO) that seeks to empower non-majority communities to participate in Kosovo’s social and institutional life and increase trust among communities by helping people to deal with past events and promoting the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.
What’s the current human rights and security situation in Kosovo?
The situation in Kosovo is highly volatile. Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008, but to this day Serbia doesn’t recognise Kosovo as an independent state and continues to claim it as an autonomous province of Serbia. The longstanding impasse in negotiations is straining inter-ethnic relations within Kosovo, between Kosovar Serbian and Albanian communities. Unlike past tensions that eventually subsided, the security situation has steadily worsened over the past two years.
Human rights are generally upheld in Kosovo, although rather selectively. For example, successive governments have refused to implement constitutional court decisions regarding the ownership of an Orthodox monastery’s extensive land and the establishment of an association of Serbian-majority municipalities, two longstanding demands of the Kosovo Serb community. There have been break-ins at Orthodox churches and police arrests of Kosovar Serbs without a prosecutor’s order. While the overall human rights situation isn’t bad, there are specific areas where the government fails to respect the law and court orders.
What was the significance ofviolence in Banjska on 24 September?
The attack occurred in the context of increased tensions in north Kosovo, which included the resignations of thousands of Kosovar Serbs working in the public sector, including the mayors of four municipalities. On 24 September 2023, Serb militants carried out an attack against the Kosovo police in the village of Banjska, in north Kosovo.
North Kosovo’s population is 90 per cent Serbian but its police force is mainly Albanian, which leads to a level of mistrust and tensions that pose a threat of violence. Those involved in the attack had a secessionist political agenda. While secession isn’t an imminent threat, it’s definitely a motivating factor, and many on-the-ground processes have had a disintegrative effect.
What role is civil society playing in normalising relations between Serbia and Kosovo?
It seems that civil society has been the only healthy player in Serbian-Albanian relations. It has played a crucial role in maintaining communication in difficult times. We’ve acted as mediators between the international community and Kosovar and Serbian governments, trying to understand the perspectives of all sides.
From 2011 to 2017, effective dialogue and integrative processes were underway, albeit with slow implementation and numerous challenges. The European Union (EU) played a special facilitating role in the negotiations, motivating both sides through the promise of potential EU membership.
But now the only trend we are witnessing is towards disintegration. The lack of proper dialogue over the past two years indicates a need for a political change on at least one side to move the process forward.
How is NSI working towards peacebuilding in Kosovo?
As an umbrella organisation, we engage Kosovars in inter-community dialogue through various projects. One initiative promotes reconciliation by creating connections and fostering cooperation among young Kosovar Serbs and Albanians. As there are limited organic opportunities for them to meet, the responsibility for creating personal inter-ethnic ties lies largely on the shoulders of local CSOs. If a Kosovar Serbian and an Albanian know each other, there’s an 80 per cent probability that they’ve met at a civil society activity.
Another programme focuses on multiculturalism and bilingualism. Albanian and Serbian are both official languages in Kosovo, and our goal is to increase social acceptance and promote the learning of both. For almost 40 years we haven’t been taught each other’s language in school, which has led to a significant linguistic gap. It should be noted that Albanian and Serbian are very different languages and can both be challenging to learn.
We have a transitional justice programme, where we collaborate with associations that represent various categories of war victims, including families of missing people and internally displaced people. This regional project involves Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia. We support these associations to expand their work from truth-seeking to regional reconciliation, simultaneously enhancing their financial sustainability by securing funding for new projects. We have also participated and proposed policies in the Ministry of Justice’s working group to draft a national strategy for transitional justice.
Moreover, we’ve organised diverse artistic activities, including a joint photo exhibition, ‘All Our Tears’, in which photographers captured images of war victims in Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia. The exhibition was showcased in cities including Kosovo’s capital Prishtina, Serbia’s capital Belgrade and at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. Additionally, we have supported regional theatre projects that raise transitional justice issues through performance.
What challenges do you face in doing your work, and what further support do you need?
There has been a significant narrowing of civic space in Kosovo, marked by delegitimising campaigns targeting CSOs, political opponents and critics of the government, mainly through online harassment. Our organisation, along with some staff, has faced such attacks.
Engaging with the government on policy matters has been challenging, as our recommendations regarding the Kosovar Serb community are often ignored or poorly implemented. It’s evident that the government’s outreach to the Kosovar Serb community is influenced more by international pressure than a genuine willingness to engage. The contacts we maintain with government representatives are often facilitated by outside parties, either from embassies or European think tanks that hold roundtable discussions where we can directly discuss issues of the local Serb community with the government.
Kosovar civil society has sufficient funding opportunities. What we really need is support to maintain our relevance, especially when governments attempt to exclude CSOs from political decision-making processes. Whenever there’s an attempt to narrow civic space, the international community should demonstrate that it’s willing to support local CSOs, signalling their importance and thereby putting pressure on the government to take them into consideration.
Civic space in Kosovo is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with New Social Initiative through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@NSIMitrovica and@AndricRakic on Twitter.
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KYRGYZSTAN: ‘Civil society realises the importance of joint actions to protect rights and freedoms’
CIVICUS speaks about the potential approval of aLaw on Foreign Representatives that would further restrict civil society in Kyrgyzstan with Murat Karypov, Project Coordinator of the legal programme of Bir Duino Kyrgyzstan.Bir Duino Kyrgyzstan is a human rights organisation and one of Kyrgyzstan’s oldest and largest civil society organisations (CSO). Founded in 1999, it works to protect and promote human rights and freedoms, particularly freedoms of association and expression. It provides legal help to civic activists, people from excluded groups and torture victims. It also promotes human rights through arts, including through its annual International Documentary Film Festival on Human Rights.
How is civil society changing in Kyrgyzstan?
Civil society in Kyrgyzstan has changed significantly in recent years. More and more young people are involved in processes to protect and promote human rights and freedoms, and young activists are particularly interested in raising the level of legal consciousness, awareness of international law and international treaties and agreements to which Kyrgyzstan is a party. A large number of young people are interested in improving the situation in the country and openly talk about their proposals and ideas for the socio-economic and political development of Kyrgyzstan. Projects by international organisations aimed at promoting women’s leadership and increasing the level of participation of local communities in decision-making processes at the national level are gaining popularity.
Since 2018, Bir Duino Kyrgyzstan has successfully implemented a study in partnership with the Global Association for Disaster Risk Reduction on promoting the voices of local communities to decision-makers from local to global and reducing gaps between communities. The resulting methodology was effectively applied by Bir Duino to train women community deputies to increase their participation in decision-making processes.
Today, civil society realises the importance of joint actions to protect rights and freedoms in Kyrgyzstan. Activists are more united.
What is the Law on Foreign Representatives?
A new law on CSOs, the Law on Foreign representatives, is making its way through parliament. Its main purpose is to increase the national authorities’ monitoring and evaluation of CSOs.
It’s a version of laws adopted in different countries known as foreign agents’ laws. It’s much like the law in Russia. The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law did a comparative analysis and found that these two laws are very similar.
Already all CSOs regularly provide many mandatory reports in electronic and written form, every month and annually. So the requirement to provide some additional reports is not a challenge for us. But the main issue is how the law will be implemented, and whether it leads to more control over CSO activities.
Some members of parliament say the main reason for this new law is because a lot of CSOs don’t provide sufficient information about their activities, particularly their budgets. They further accuse CSOs of hiding their real purposes, saying some are involved in political lobbying and creating political instability.
As a CSO, we’re responsible for every dollar we receive from international donors. We’re open to providing any kind of information about activities within a funded project. International donors are very strict in their requirements about how funding should be used. I think it’s almost impossible to spend even one dollar for other purposes. That’s why for our organisation and a lot of CSOs, we’re absolutely sure we’re transparent and accountable for any kind of funding we receive from international donors.
How could the new law affect civil society in Kyrgyzstan?
The question is still open. Will this law be accepted or not? Because even after the results of the third stage of consideration, we have some hope the president will use his veto power to refuse this law.
Even after the acceptance of this law, our organisation and partners, and a lot of other CSOs, will go on with our activities and our project implementation, but it will definitely affect our activities, particularly those on human rights. A lot of activities could be classed as political activities, meaning they will be restricted.
Activists have joined efforts to inform international organisations and financial institutions about the need for the president to veto the law due to its inconsistency with human rights principles and standards under the key UN guidelines and the Aarhus Convention, an environmental rights treaty.
Joint appeals on this bill were made on behalf of local CSOs, international organisations and international financial institutions. Domestically, almost 100 local CSOs issued a statement on their position, and over 30 international CSOs published a statement on the new law, including some from the Russian Federation as well as other European countries. They are showing solidarity with our position.
The next steps are to wait for the president’s final decision. There is nothing more the international community can do in this matter.
How might international donors respond?
Even if international donors can no longer implement projects that are seen as political, there are many fields of work they can support. If human rights funding is going to be limited, attention could be given to implementing projects, for example, in the sphere of education, public health or environment.
For example, our organisation closely and actively works with local communities in distant and mountainous regions. People at the local level are not very well informed about the activities of international donors. That’s why their opinions can be manipulated. More conservative groups will tell them that international donors or CSOs are involved in political issues. It can be difficult for us to change their mind and explain we are not involved in political issues. But just imagine if, for example, an organisation supports the construction of a hospital or school of some kind, or reconstruction work, then people in the community will understand that international donors provided support. And nobody will have opportunity to say it’s a political issue or some kind of foreign influence.
Bir Duino Kyrgyzstan has been targeted for pressure and discrimination by conservative groups. Nevertheless, we continue to work to engage with local communities, raise their awareness of the importance of advancing international principles of human rights and freedoms, along with disaster risk reduction, and promote community voices to local to global decision makers.
Civic space in Kyrgyzstan is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch withBir Duino Kyrgyzstan through itswebpage orFacebook page, and follow@birduino_kg on Instagram.
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KYRGYZSTAN: ‘The citizens' choice in the referendum will be decisive for our future’
CIVICUS and the International Partnership for Human Rights speak to Ulugbek Azimov, legal expert at the Legal Prosperity Foundation, about the protests that took place in Kyrgyzstan in October 2020 and subsequent political developments. The Legal Prosperity Foundation (previously the Youth Human Rights Group) is an independent civil society organisation that has worked to promote human rights and democratic principles in Kyrgyzstan since 1995. The organisation carries out educational programmes, conducts human rights monitoring, interacts with international human rights mechanisms and promotes respect for human rights in the context of legal reforms.Kyrgyzstan is often referred to as Central Asia’s only democracy. How close to truth is this depiction?
It is true that in the early 1990s, that is, in the first years of independence, democracy sprouted and began developing in Kyrgyzstan. Compared to other countries in the region, Kyrgyzstan was characterised by a higher level of citizen participation, a more developed civil society and more favourable conditions for the functioning and participation of political parties in the political process. For this reason, Kyrgyzstan was called an ‘island of democracy’ in Central Asia.
However, during the 30 years since independence, Kyrgyzstan has faced serious challenges. Attempts by former presidents to preserve and strengthen their hold on power by putting pressure on the opposition, persecuting independent media and journalists, restricting the freedom of expression, using public resources in their favour, bribing voters and falsifying the results of elections have resulted in major political upheavals on several occasions. In the past 15 years, the government has been overthrown three times during the so-called Tulip, April and October revolutions, in 2005, 2010 and 2020, respectively, with two former presidents being forced to flee the country, and the third forced to resign ahead of time.
Each upheaval has, unfortunately, been followed by developments undermining previous democratic gains. It is therefore not surprising that Freedom House has consistently rated Kyrgyzstan as only ‘partially free’ in its annual Freedom in the World survey. Moreover, in the most recent survey published this year, Kyrgyzstan’s rating deteriorated to that of ‘not free’ because of the fall-out of the October 2020 parliamentary elections, which were marred by serious violations. Thus, Kyrgyzstan is now in the same category in which other Central Asian countries have been for many years.
Were pandemic-related restrictions imposed in the run-up to the 2020 elections?
In response to the rapid increase in COVID-19 cases in the spring of 2020, the Kyrgyzstani authorities adopted emergency measures and introduced a lockdown in the capital, Bishkek, and in several other regions of the country, which led to restrictions on the right to the freedom of movement and other, related rights. All public events, including rallies, were banned.
Measures taken in the context of the pandemic also gave rise to concerns about restrictions on the freedom of expression and access to information. The authorities seriously tightened the screws on critical voices in response to widespread criticism of those in power, including then-President Sooronbai Jeenbekov, for their failure to fight the pandemic effectively. Law enforcement authorities tracked down inconvenient bloggers and social media commentators, visited them in their homes and held ‘prophylactic’ discussions with them. In some cases, social media users were detained for allegedly posting false information about the pandemic and forced to apologise publicly under threat of prosecution.
The law on ‘manipulation of information’, which parliament passed in June 2020, is of particular concern. Although the initiators of the law claimed that it was solely intended to address the problem of fake online accounts, it was clear from the start that this was an attempt by the authorities to introduce internet censorship and close down objectionable sites on the eve of the elections. Following an avalanche of criticism from the media community and human rights defenders, then-President Jeenbekov declined to sign the law and returned it to parliament for revision in August 2020. Since then, the law has remained with parliament.
What triggered the post-election demonstrations in October 2020? Who protested, and why?
The main reason for the October 2020 protests, which again led to a change in power, was people’s dissatisfaction with the official results of the parliamentary elections held on 4 October.
Out of the 16 parties running for seats in parliament, only five passed the seven per cent electoral threshold required to get into parliament. Although then-President Jeenbekov publicly stated that he did not support any party, the one that received most votes – Birimdik (Unity) – was associated with him since his brother and other people from the ruling elite were running on its ticket. The party that ended up second, Mekenim Kyrgyzstan (Motherland Kyrgyzstan), was also viewed as pro-government and was associated with the family of former high-ranking customs service official Raiymbek Matraimov, who was implicated in a high-profile media investigation into corruption published in November 2019. Jeenbekov’s government ignored the findings of this investigation and failed to initiate a criminal case against Matraimov, despite public calls to this end.
It was predictable that Birimdik and Mekenim Kyrgyzstan would fare well in the elections given the use of public resources and reported vote-buying in favour of their candidates. These two parties, which took part in parliamentary elections for the first time, received almost half of the votes and therefore an absolute majority of the seats in parliament. The methods used by the two winning parties to secure control over parliament caused indignation among other political parties that participated in the elections, their voters and even apolitical people.
The elections took place against the backdrop of growing discontent with the social and economic difficulties caused by the pandemic, as well as growing anti-government sentiments among the population.
The ‘dirty’ elections, characterised by an unprecedented scale of violations, became a catalyst for subsequent events. Protests began immediately after the announcement of the preliminary results on the evening of election day, 4 October, and continued throughout the next day. Young people played a decisive role in them: most of those who took to the streets to protest and gathered in the central square of the capital were young people. Unfortunately, most of those who were injured, as well as the protester who died during the October events, were young people too.
What was the government’s reaction to the protests?
The authorities had the opportunity to take control of the situation and resolve it peacefully, but they did not take it. Only in the evening of 5 October did then-President Jeenbekov announce that he would meet with the leaders of the different parties that competed in the elections. He set up a meeting for the morning of 6 October, but this turned out to be too late, as in the night of 5 October the peaceful protests devolved into clashes between protesters and law enforcement officials in Bishkek, ending with the seizure of the White House (the seat of the president and parliament) and other public buildings by protesters. During the clashes, law enforcement authorities used rubber bullets, stun grenades and teargas against the protesters. As a result of the clashes, a 19-year-old young man was killed and more than 1,000 people needed medical attention, including protesters and law enforcement officials, with over 600 police officers injured. During the unrest, police cars, ambulances, surveillance cameras and other property were also damaged, to an estimated value of over 17 million Som (approx. US$200,000).
Did the snap presidential elections held in January 2021 solve the problems raised by the protests?
The main demand of the protesters was to cancel the results of the October 2020 parliamentary elections and hold new, fair elections. This demand was partly satisfied on 6 October 2020, when the Central Election Commission (CEC) declared the election results invalid. However, up to now, no date has been fixed for the new parliamentary elections. The CEC initially scheduled them for 20 December 2020 but parliament responded by promptly adopting a law that suspended the elections pending a revision of the constitution and extended the terms in office of the members of the outgoing parliament until 1 June 2021.
In its assessment of this law, the Venice Commission – an advisory body of the Council of Europe, composed of independent constitutional law experts – concluded that during the current transitional period parliament should exercise limited functions and refrain from approving extraordinary measures, such as constitutional reforms. However, the outgoing parliament has continued its work as usual and approved the holding of a constitutional referendum in April 2021. Newly elected President Sadyr Japarov has suggested holding new parliamentary elections in the autumn of 2021, which would mean that members of the outgoing parliament would continue in their positions even after 1 June 2021.
In accordance with other demands of the protesters, the country’s electoral legislation was amended in October 2020 to reduce the electoral threshold from seven to three percentage points for parties to gain representation in parliament and to reduce the electoral fee from 5 to 1 million Som (approx. US$12,000). These amendments were made to facilitate the participation of a larger number of parties, including newer ones, and to promote pluralism and competition.
The protesters also expressed resentment about the inadequate measures taken to fight corruption. They demanded that the authorities bring to justice corrupt officials, particularly Matraimov, and return stolen property to the state. Speaking in front of the protesters before he became president, Japarov promised that Matraimov would be arrested and punished.
To be fair, Japarov kept his word. After Japarov rose to power in October 2020, Matraimov was arrested in connection with an investigation into corruption schemes within the customs service, pleaded guilty and agreed to compensate the damage by paying back more than 2 billion Som (approx. US$24 million). A local court subsequently convicted him, but handed him a mitigated sentence in the form of a fine of 260,000 Som (approx. US$3,000) and lifted freezing orders on his property, since he had cooperated with the investigation. This extremely lenient sentence caused public outrage. On 18 February 2021, Matraimov was arrested again on new charges of money laundering, but after a few days he was transferred from the pre-trial detention facility where he was being held to a private clinic to undergo treatment for health problems. After that, many labelled the anti-corruption measures of the current authorities as ‘populist’.
In January 2021 Kyrgyz citizens also voted in a constitutional referendum. What were its results, and what consequences will they have for the quality of democracy?
According to the results of the referendum, which took place on the same day as the presidential election in January 2021, 84 per cent of voters supported a transition from a parliamentary to a presidential system of government.
Based on comparative experience, many lawyers and civil society activists do not view this change as negative per se, provided that a well-functioning system of checks and balances is put in place. However, they are seriously concerned that the authorities are attempting to push through the transition at an unjustifiably quick pace using questionable approaches and methods that do not correspond to generally accepted principles and established legal rules and procedures.
The first draft constitution providing for a presidential system of governance, put forward in November 2020, was dubbed a ‘khanstitution’ in reference to the historic autocratic rulers of Central Asia. Critics accused Japarov, who has advocated for this change since taking office in October 2020, of trying to usurp power.
The draft constitution granted the president practically unlimited powers, while reducing the status and powers of parliament to a minimum, thereby jeopardising checks and balances and creating the risk of presidential abuse of power. It also provided for a complicated impeachment procedure that would be impossible to implement in practice. Moreover, while it did not mention the principle of the rule of law even once, the text repeatedly referred to moral values and principles. Many provisions of the current constitution that guarantee human rights and freedoms were excluded.
Because of harsh criticism, the authorities were forced to abandon their initial plans to submit the draft constitution to referendum on the same day as the presidential election in January 2021 and agreed to organise a broader discussion. To this end, a so-called constitutional conference was convened and its members worked for two and a half months, in spite of facing accusations that their activities were illegitimate. At the beginning of February 2021, the constitutional conference submitted its suggestions to parliament.
It should be acknowledged that as a result of the discussion and proposals submitted by the constitutional conference, parts of the draft constitution were improved. For example, the reference to the principle of the rule of law was restored, and significant amendments were made to the sections on human rights and freedoms, including with respect to protecting the freedom of expression, the role of independent media and the right to access information. But it remained practically unchanged with respect to the provisions that set out unlimited powers for the president.
In March 2021, parliament adopted a law on holding a referendum on the revised draft constitution, setting the date for 11 April 2021. This sparked a new wave of indignation among politicians, lawyers and civil society activists, who pointed out that this was against the established procedure for constitutional change and warned again that the concentration of power in the hands of the president might result in authoritarian rule. Their concerns were echoed in a joint opinion of the Venice Commission and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, issued in March 2021 at the request of the Ombudsman of Kyrgyzstan.
The draft constitution has two other problematic provisions. One allows for restrictions to be imposed on any events that contradict ‘moral and ethical values’ or ‘the public consciousness of the people of the Kyrgyz Republic’. These concepts are not defined or regulated, so they might be interpreted differently in different cases, creating the risk of overly broad and subjective interpretation and arbitrary application. This, in turn, might lead to excessive restrictions on human rights and freedoms, including the rights to the freedoms of peaceful assembly and expression.
The other provision requires political parties, trade unions and other public associations to ensure the transparency of their financial and economic activities. Against the background of recent attempts to step up control over civil society organisations (CSOs), there are concerns that it might be used to put pressure on them. On the same day that parliament voted in favour of holding a referendum on the draft constitution, some legislators accused CSOs of allegedly undermining ‘traditional values’ and posing a threat to the state.
Civil society activists continue to call on the current parliament, which in their eyes has lost its legitimacy, to dissolve and on the president to call new elections promptly. Activists are holding an ongoing rally to this end and, if their demands are not met, they plan to turn to the courts on the grounds of the usurpation of power.
The president, however, has rejected all concerns voiced about the constitutional reform. He has assured that Kyrgyzstan will remain a democratic country, that the freedom of expression and the personal safety of journalists will be respected, and that there will be no further political persecution.
The citizens of Kyrgyzstan must make their choice. The upcoming referendum on the current draft constitution may become another turning point in the history of Kyrgyzstan, and the choice made by citizens will be decisive for the future development towards stability and prosperity.
Civic space in Kyrgyzstan is rated as ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with the Legal Prosperity Foundation through itsFacebook page and followlpf_kg on Instagram. -
Kyrgyzstan: Joint NGO report for UN Human Rights Committee review
The United Nations Human Rights Committee will review Kyrgyzstan’s human rights record at its upcoming session in Geneva, which starts on 10 October 2022. The Committee will assess Kyrgyzstan’s compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and adopt conclusions and recommendations based on the third periodic report about the implementation of the covenant submitted by Kyrgyzstan’s government, as well as other information, including NGO reports.
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LATVIA: ‘The legalisation of same-sex civil partnerships has brought instant conservative backlash’
CIVICUS speakswith Kaspars Zālītis, a human rights activist and board member of Mozaika,about therecent legalisation ofsame-sex civil partnerships in Latvia.
Founded in 2006, Mozaika is the oldest LGBTQI+ civil society organisation (CSO) in Latvia. It promotes gender equality and anti-discrimination, raises awareness of diverse sexual orientations, gender identities and expressions of identity, promotes an understanding of diverse family models and their legal recognition and advocates for the harmonisation of Latvian laws with international standards.
How significant is the legalisation of same-sex civil partnerships in Latvia?
The Latvian parliament’s decision to legalise same-sex civil partnerships is historic, particularly considering the nine unsuccessful attempts that preceded it, spread over 24 years.
The decision, which involves eight separate pieces of legislation granting various rights to people in same-sex civil partnerships, is the first step, and a very significant one, to pave the way for further recognition of LGBTQI+ human rights in Latvia. This victory stands as a collective achievement of LGBTQI+ organisations working in tandem with legislators and shows how cooperation between civil society and politicians can foster positive change.
We have some wonderful politicians who facilitated the adoption of this package of laws, while we take the credit for having persuaded them to include LGBTQI+ issues on their agenda. Latvia’s first out LGBTQI+ president has also greatly contributed to a positive image and representation of the community.
Have you experienced backlash?
We’ve experienced instant conservative backlash and the issue is not yet settled. The civil partnership bill was passed by a small majority, and opposition parties asked the president not to promulgate it so they could have time to collect signatures for a referendum to repeal it.
As of today, seven out of eight amended laws have already been signed and are set to come into force on 1 January 2024, allowing people in same-sex civil unions to enjoy some social security and tax benefits and hospital visiting rights. However, the crucial piece of legislation that would allow notaries to register same-sex civil partnerships has been put on hold while the opposition seeks to collect the more than 155,000 signatures needed to call a referendum.
If called, the referendum will be binding if at least 50 per cent of the people who voted in the last election show up and vote. And if a majority of them rejects the law, it will be repealed.
The Latvian LGBTQI+ community is hopeful that this move won’t succeed. Hopefully there will be no referendum, or not enough people will vote in it if there is one, or they will vote against the repeal. We hope the president will be able to promulgate the law so that it can come into force by mid-2024.
How is Mozaika working to advance LGBTQI+ rights in Latvia?
Mozaika is Latvia’s only LGBTQI+ advocacy organisation and for a long time it was the only LGBTQ+ organisation in Latvia. We held a monopoly on LGBTQ+ issues, which resulted in some issues being overlooked due to resource constraints. Thankfully, several new LGBTQI+ organisations have recently been established to bridge the gaps.
Over 18 years, Mozaika has done a lot of work in advocacy, organising Pride events, conducting capacity development for civil society and providing training for the police and other professions. We have continuously engaged in conversations and raised awareness about LGBTQI+ issues among the public. Our efforts have led to a significant improvement in social attitudes toward LGBTQI+ people. In 2015, only nine per cent of people had a positive attitude, with around half neutral. A recent poll indicates a shift, with 25 per cent now expressing a positive attitude, while half maintain a neutral stance.
How do you connect with the international LGBTQI+ movement, and what further support do you need?
We cooperate closely with regional LGBTQI+ organisations to exchange best practices and learn from each other. One of the greatest examples of our cooperation is the annual Baltic Pride, rotating between the capitals of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, with Latvia’s capital Riga hosting the event in 2024. Mozaika is also a part of international umbrella organisations, including ILGA-Europe.
Like every CSO, we struggle with funding sustainability to maintain our activities and ensure financial independence. Given that LGBTQI+ issues are still not popular among local funders, Latvian LGBTQI+ organisations face additional challenges. Even though we’ve achieved significant milestones, we urge the international community to keep monitoring the political situation in Latvia to avert a broader conservative backlash that could jeopardise our accomplishments.
What are your next steps?
The positive changes witnessed since our founding in 2006 reflect the extensive and strategic character of our work. We’re going to persist in litigation on various fronts, such as addressing inheritance rights, seeking recognition for same-sex couples who have married or registered abroad and advocating for the recognition of the children of same-sex families. We’ll also keep working to combat the rising trend of online hate speech and anti-LGBTQI+ propaganda.
Civic space in Latvia is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Mozaika through itswebsite or itsFacebook page and follow@lgbt_mozaika andKasparsZ on Twitter.
The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.
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Law enforcement agencies and decision makers must respect the right to protest in the US
Over 10,000 protesters have been arrested in the #USA.
— CIVICUS (@CIVICUSalliance) June 4, 2020
Law enforcement agencies and decision makers must respect the right to protest.
Statement: https://t.co/BTn0voaqSv#GeorgeFloyd #BlackLivesMatter pic.twitter.com/N25Sx3Ebpw- CIVICUS expresses solidarity with US protesters in their struggle for justice
- We defend the right to peaceful assembly and condemn violent police force
- National and global protests highlight the need to address institutionalized racism, and police impunity and militarisation
Global civil society alliance, CIVICUS, condemns violence against protesters by law enforcement officials over the past few days, and stands in solidarity with those protesting against deep-rooted racism and injustice.
Hundreds of thousands of people have taken to the streets across the United States (US) to protest the murder of George Floyd by police in Minneapolis on 25 May. Their demands for justice for George Floyd and other Black people unlawfully killed at the hands of police have been met with force. Law enforcement agencies have responded to protests using rubber bullets, concussion grenades and tear gas.
CIVICUS reaffirms that the right to protest, as enshrined in international law, must be protected. We call for an end to police violence against Black communities.
Earlier this week, as law enforcement agencies suppressed protests in Washington DC, President Trump threatened to deploy the National Guard to crush demonstrations:
“President Donald Trump is stoking violence by threatening to forcibly deploy military units in states and cities to crush the demonstrations and restore order in a constitutionally questionable manner,” said Mandeep Tiwana, Chief of Programmes at CIVICUS.
There are reports that over 10,000 protesters have been arrested since protests began. CIVICUS is concerned by the arbitrary arrests of thousands of protesters, including 20 members of the press. There are numerous cases of journalists being deliberately targeted by law enforcement agencies and at least 125 press freedom violations have been reported since the start of the protests.
Demonstrations have broken out across the world in solidarity with the US protesters and their demands for justice and accountability. Our recently released State of Civil Society Report 2020 highlights the importance of people’s movements in demanding change. CIVICUS supports the right of protesters around the globe to peacefully and safely assemble during lockdown:
“These protests are a call to action to address systemic racism and unprovoked violence experienced by the Black community in the US and beyond. A systemic reckoning with unaddressed notions of white supremacy is needed,” Tiwana continued.
As a matter of urgency, CIVICUS calls on authorities to respect the rights of freedom of assembly and expression. We urge systemic reforms to address police impunity, militarisation and institutional racism. The deliberate targeting of journalists must also end, as must the incendiary language used by President Trump and other politicians.
We also call on law enforcement agencies to stop using violent methods to disperse protesters and call for an investigation into the unwarranted use of force.
About CIVICUS
CIVICUS is a global alliance of civil society organisations and activists dedicated to strengthening citizen action and civil society throughout the world. We have over 9000 members across the globe. The CIVICUS Monitor is our online platform that tracks threats to the freedoms of assembly, association and expression across 196 countries. Civic space in the United States is currently rated as narrowed by the research and ratings platform.
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LEBANON: ‘Abuses against women are the direct product of the gender imbalances of a patriarchal society’
CIVICUS speaks about the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on Iraqi women and girls and civil society’s role in combatting gender inequalities in Lebanon with Ghida Anani, founder and director of ABAAD – Resource Centre for Gender Equality.ABAAD is a women-led civil society organisation (CSO) that strives for gender equality as a key condition for sustainable social and economic development in the Middle East and North Africa. Its work is organised around three pillars: providing direct services, building capacity and developing resources, and advocating for policy reform.
How has COVID-19 impacted on women and girls in Lebanon?
Even before the pandemic, women and girls in Lebanon suffered from a vicious cycle of gender-based violence (GBV) and discrimination that deprived them of the opportunity to participate meaningfully in social, economic and political life.
Most of the abuses and discriminatory acts experienced by women and girls in Lebanon are the direct product of imbalances between women and men in the patriarchal Lebanese society, which are codified into law. Domestic violence is a longstanding problem due to deeply engrained gender social norms that permeate the entire societal system, policies and legislation. So far the government has failed to recognise and therefore address the problem and has not allocated dedicated resources to tackle GBV.
COVID-19 lockdowns and the ensuing economic downturn did nothing but exacerbate already existing GBV risks both at home and in public spaces. Self-isolation, misuse of power, heightened tensions, financial uncertainties and the disruption of life-saving services were key factors that worsened the situation.
During the pandemic, ABAAD noticed an increase in the severity of the violence women were subjected to at home. Some women reached out to tell us they were struggling with mental health issues and suicidal thoughts. At least two women said they had received death threats from family members after showing flu-like symptoms consistent with COVID-19 infection.
How has civil society in general, and ABAAD in particular, responded to this situation?
Since the initial stages of the outbreak, we put together a response to ensure the continuity of life-saving services. We prioritised the best interests of rights-holders by putting them at the centre of the response.
We had to suspend some in-person activities, such as outreach, community events and awareness and training sessions. But on the positive side, our focus on maintaining life-saving services helped us develop new internal case management guidelines for crisis counselling and emergency support services by phone, along with face-to-face services for high-risk cases.
We also provided community-based awareness sessions on COVID-19 and psychosocial support sessions via conference calls and WhatsApp groups. Our helpline continued to function 24/7, including for services provided by ABAAD’s Emergency Temporary Safe Shelters across the country and its Men Centre. Moreover, as the three safe shelters operated by ABAAD were at full capacity, we worked to create additional capacity by renting new spaces.
We led several campaigns, such as #LockdownNotLockup and #TheRealTest, to fight the stigma surrounding COVID-19, show solidarity with women and let them know that they were not alone. We also worked closely with relevant ministries, United Nations (UN) agencies and CSOs to advocate for enhanced-quality coordinated response at a national level. In partnership with the Lebanese Ministry of Social Affairs, we recently launched a series of workshops about national mechanisms to report GBV and special units dedicated to supporting survivors.
On International Women’s Day, we held digital activism activities and sessions for women and girls through ABAAD’s Women and Girls Safe Spaces. There are 23 such centres across Lebanon, providing a safe, non-stigmatising environment for women and girl survivors of GBV and their children to receive comprehensive and holistic care services.
How is civil society working to bring women’s rights concerns into the policy agenda?
Civil society is working hard to bring gender equality to the top of the policy agenda. As Lebanon approaches its first parliamentary election following the popular uprising of late 2019, Lebanon’s Feminist Civil Society Platform, a group of 52 feminist CSOs and activists first convened by UN Women in the aftermath of the 2020 Beirut explosion, has launched a series of demands for candidates running for parliament to commit to achieving gender equality goals.
Our statement to future members of parliament details the laws that need to be reconsidered from a gendered perspective, including various laws to criminalise sexual violence in the Lebanese Penal Code. This is a demand that CSOs have long advocated for.
Civic space in Lebanon is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS monitor.
Get in touch with ABAAD through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@AbaadMENA on Twitter. -
LEBANON: ‘Civil society has taken the lead in advocating for social change, human rights and political reforms’
CIVICUS speaks about deteriorating civic space conditions amid political and security instability in Lebanon with Fadel Fakih, Executive Director of the Lebanese Center for Human Rights (CLDH).
Founded in 1997, CLDH is a civil society organisation (CSO) working to enforce human rights for all, denounce human rights violators and fight impunity by providing legal and rehabilitation services.
What’s been the impact of the ongoing political paralysis?
Since April 2023, Lebanon’s parliament has repeatedly postponed municipal elections under the pretext of lack of funding and technical and logistical obstacles. This has impeded local democratic processes critical for addressing community needs, allocating resources and delivering essential services. The prolonged delay in holding elections has diminished people’s ability to raise concerns, hold local authorities accountable and participate in decisions directly affecting their lives.
Parliament has also been unable to designate a president since the incumbent’s mandate expired in October 2022. It has tried and failed to elect a new president 12 times already. This political deadlock has significantly impacted on national governance and decision-making processes.
A fully functional presidency is essential to guide Lebanon through its multifaceted crises and ensure the effective operation of government institutions. The absence of a president has obstructed the formation of a new government that would have to enact reforms and address urgent political, economic and security concerns. This has exacerbated public frustration and deepened a pervasive sense of uncertainty.
What’s the current security and human rights situation in southern Lebanon?
Since 8 October 2023, villages in South Lebanon have endured daily Israeli bombardments and exchanges of fire. As a result, at least 14 civilians have been killed, including women, children and older people. The press has also been deliberately targeted, resulting in the death of Reuters journalist Issam Abdallah on 13 October. According to the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health, as of 14 November the death toll stood at 77 people, with 328 wounded.
The deteriorating security situation prompted the closure of 52 schools and forced many people to evacuate their homes, pushing the number of internally displaced people in Lebanon to over 46,000.
Moreover, the Israeli army has deployed artillery shells containing white phosphorus, in violation of international humanitarian law. This has caused extensive damage to private properties, public infrastructure and agricultural land. Israeli shelling in southern Lebanon has also sparked fires that destroyed approximately 40,000 olive trees and scorched hundreds of square kilometres of land, dealing a severe blow to one of Lebanon’s primary agricultural crops.
What are the conditions for civil society in Lebanon?
In recent years Lebanese civil society has grappled with significant challenges. In the absence of basic government action, CSOs have taken the lead in advocating for social change, human rights and political reforms. Over the past year, civil society has tried to maintain momentum for change despite escalating problems, including the vacuum in the presidency, arbitrary deportations of Syrian refugees, targeted attacks on LGBTQI+ people and external security threats.
But civil society efforts have been hindered by limited resources and a context of economic crisis, political instability, widespread corruption and a challenging humanitarian situation. Moreover, a smear campaign that powerful politicians launched in 2019 has caused a surge in hate speech and the targeting of civil society as a whole.
Additionally, during 2023 we have experienced significant backsliding on freedom of expression, as media outlets and journalists have been increasingly targeted through legal actions, arrests, harassment and intimidation. Journalists critical of political figures or parties face reprisal, as influential groups abuse their power to try to suppress media coverage that contradicts their interests. For example, several journalists were recently summoned to the Cybercrimes Bureau in retaliation for their online publications. In October, CLDH faced direct threats from former military personnel for advocating for accountability in the case of a murdered Syrian national.
Reporting on sensitive issues such as sectarian conflicts, government policies, corruption and security challenges often draws excessive attention from authorities who seek to control the narrative and conceal information that could destabilise the status quo. They also intend to use a draft media law currently under parliamentary discussion to further restrict freedom of expression.
How does CLDH work to advance human rights, and what challenges do you face?
CLDH advances human rights through a comprehensive approach that includes advocacy, research, public mobilisation, pro bono legal services for vulnerable groups regardless of nationality or migratory status, rehabilitation services for victims of torture and enforced disappearance and capacity development for key stakeholders in the human rights field. Through a project funded by the United Nations Democracy Fund, we are working to empower victims of human rights violations to become civic activists engaged in public awareness campaigns and policy reforms.
Given the multifaceted nature of our work, we frequently encounter challenges such as limited funding and resources, security risks associated with handling sensitive cases, legal restrictions, widespread misinformation and apathy, and difficulties in accessing vulnerable groups. Other obstacles arise from the economic crisis, deteriorating conditions in Lebanese prisons and financial hardships faced by excluded groups.
What forms of international support does Lebanese civil society receive, and what further support do you need?
Lebanese CSOs receive international support in the form of financial assistance and grants, which are particularly crucial during crises when resources are scarce. Support also comes in the form of capacity development programmes and technical assistance aimed at increasing impact. International partnerships and networks also help amplify the voices of Lebanese civil society and strengthen our calls for policy changes.
Further assistance is needed to ensure the financial sustainability of local CSOs and their resilience to external shocks, enabling consistent operation in difficult circumstances. Donors must align their support with local needs and priorities to address context-specific challenges.
Civic space in Lebanon is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with LCHR through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@HumanRightsCLDH onTwitter.
The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.
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LEBANON: ‘Increased popular awareness is irreversible, it will remain despite any setbacks’
CIVICUS speaks with Ziad Abdel Samad, Executive Director of the Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND), and Zahra Bazzi, ANND ProgrammesManager, about the protests that began in Lebanon in October 2019, the changes achieved and the challenges encountered.ANND is a regional network that brings together nine national networks (encompassing 250 organisations) and 23 civil society organisations (CSOs) in 12 countries. It was established in 1997 and since 2000 has had its headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon. It promotes the role of civil society and the values of democracy, human rights and sustainable development in the region, and advocates for socio-economic reforms aimed at sustainable development and gender justice, with a rights-based approach.
What triggered the protests that began in October 2019?
The protests were motivated by the direct repercussions of the economic and monetary crisis on the Lebanese population, but had deep roots in a structurally flawed economic system and wicked political practices and corruption embraced by successive governments for decades. The few months before the eruption of the revolution saw a looming economic crisis with an increase in government debt and questionable monetary and financial engineering coupled with a decrease in GDP growth, as well as a rise in unemployment, reaching approximately 16 per cent among the general population, and more than 45 per cent among young people, along with growing poverty and increases in the prices of essential commodities. One week before the protests, direct signs of a financial crisis had started to show, including strikes at petrol stations and the inability of the government to access new credit to import wheat and other basic goods, in addition to the eruption of roughly 100 nationwide wildfires and forest fires that destroyed massive green areas and some houses.
Following the late adoption of the 2019 budget in July, the negotiations over the 2020 budget were being finalised in October with a clear aim of increasing state revenue at any cost and reducing the enormous deficit of 11 per cent to escape the crisis. The cabinet meeting held on 17 October suggested a new set of austerity measures, including additional indirect taxation, without envisioning the anger of the Lebanese people and the massive protests that would spread through the country that same day.
Protesters have shared a clear vision with clear demands of the political and economic systems they want to achieve: the resignation of the government – which happened on 29 October 2019; the formation of a new government comprising people independent from the ruling parties – indeed a new government was formed on 22 January 2020, although it does it not conform to the key demands of the revolution; and the holding of democratic parliamentary elections based on a new democratic electoral law. In addition, there were demands to pass laws on the independence of the judiciary, take action to recover assets and other socio-economic demands.
How did the government react to the protests?
Since the first days of the uprisings, political parties and various elements of the regime felt threatened by the imminent change protesters were calling for, which would jeopardise the power they have held for decades. They reacted to this by using excessive force, teargas, rubber bullets, arbitrary detention and arrests, especially after December 2019.
Since the beginning of the protests, several human rights violations were committed against protesters. On 23 November, five young people – including two minors – were arrested and detained by the security forces for taking down a banner belonging to a political party. On the same day, supporters of the Amal and Hezbollah movements violently clashed with peaceful protesters in Beirut and other regions to denounce the closure of roads. Violence increased, a fact that was firmly condemned by United Nations’ experts and special rapporteurs, who called on the Lebanese government to respect the right to the freedom of expression and protect protesters.
The postponement of parliamentary consultations from 9 to 16 December, and then again to 19 December, was accompanied by increasing violence and clashes among protesters, supporters of political leaders and the security forces and army. The most violent clashes were recorded between 10 and 16 December: on 10 December, protesters toured in their cars outside the houses of the previous ministers of public works and transportation, denouncing the poor infrastructure that had caused enormous floods on main roads and highways, locking citizens for hours in their cars. Protesters were attacked ferociously by men in uniforms of the Internal Security Forces, but who were affiliated with some political parties. Cars were vandalised, and protesters and journalists were dragged out and beaten indiscriminately.
On the nights of 14 and 15 December, security forces clashed with supporters of political parties who provoked and attacked them in different ways. Security forces also arbitrarily attacked protesters gathered in Beirut, and fired teargas and rubber bullets at them, in retaliation against the acts of some. These two days of violence ended with the arrest of 23 people, some of whom showed signs of torture after their release. More than 76 protesters reported experiencing some form of attack, either by security officials or as a result of the rubber bullets fired against them. More severely, a few reported being dragged inside the parliament building and beaten by the security forces inside. A few reported the theft of money, legal documentation, or phones.
Violence continued until the night of 16 December, with supporters of political parties attacking the people gathered in squares in Beirut and in the south, and burning down tents and cars. This came in response to a video, probably intentionally spread on social media, of a young man from Tripoli cursing the Shia faith.
Clashes between protesters and security forces and riot police were especially intense during the attacks protesters made against banks, and during protests and attempts to remove the massive walls and blocks unlawfully put in front of parliament, and more recently in front of the Government Palace.
Following the arbitrary arrest of protesters, on 15 January 2020 hundreds gathered outside the detention facility to call for their release, and were subjected to excessive force by the riot police, including the indiscriminate firing of teargas. Journalists and TV reporters were directly attacked by riot police. Footage was leaked showing the security forces beating detainees while transporting them to a detention facility. Some released detainees shared stories of torture and abuse inside detention facilities.
Recent statistics released by the Lawyers’ Committee to Defend Protesters in Lebanon show that between 17 October 2019 and 31 January 2020, around 906 protesters were arrested and detained, including 49 minors and 17 women. Roughly 546 protesters were subjected to violence at the protests or in detention facilities.
When and how did the protests become a ‘revolution’?
The protests are widespread across the country. They are decentralised and remain non-sectarian. As Lebanese people overcame their religious and political divergences and joined forces in an attempt to achieve real change, they made the biggest post-war civil movement in Lebanon. This change had been long-awaited, particularly by civil society, which has tried to promote partnerships and engage in policy-making at various levels for years, despite the lack of serious and effective channels for doing so. Although the term ‘revolution’ has been contested by many, protesters and activists, among others, have insisted on calling the process a revolution, particularly after the increased violence and the death of two martyrs, Hussein Al-Attar and Alaa Abou Fakher.
Although key demands have not changed since the beginning of the protests, more demands were added as the process evolved, especially relating to the socio-economic and financial situation. More importantly, demands started off and remained socio-economic, but were always directly linked to political change.
What role have CSOs played during the process?
CSOs have played an important role in the revolution, which has benefited from their accumulated knowledge, communication skills and organisational capacities. Most of those organisations participated in the protests since day one, but their role went beyond protesting. CSOs are leading in coordinating the protests and organising daily discussions at various squares in Beirut and other regions. These meetings address politics, law, socio-economic policies and human rights. They address people’s concerns and ensure the availability of solutions and alternatives. Participation in discussions has steadily increased and has involved a variety of sectors of society, including young people, women, the private sector, academics, and students. However, protest camps have faced challenges following the destruction and burning of their tents in Beirut and across other areas.
It seems that women and young people are playing increasingly prominent roles in protest movements worldwide. Has this been the case in Lebanon?
While women in Lebanon have been at the forefront of every important political moment in our country, they have been particularly active during the revolution. Slogans and demands related to women’s rights have been very clear and evident, including the right to pass their citizenship to their families, a civil personal status law and protection from violence, Women have organised in groups, or participated individually, to form human shields at the forefront of protests to prevent violence, lead the marches and host discussions on women’s issues.
Feminist and women’s marches were held outside Beirut, in north and south Lebanon particularly. These were bold actions that were not very common prior to the revolution. Feminists were also able to engage critically with the slogans of the revolution and to place their discourse on the table. They were able to draw attention to many patriarchal connotations in slogans, even in the national anthem. In addition to being active alongside men, and sometimes alone, closing roads and occupying squares and public facilities, women cooked meals and offered them to protesters and sitters to support them, and initiated cleaning and recycling campaigns on a regular basis. More importantly, on many occasions, they formed a shield on the front rows between protesters and security forces to minimise the clashes.
The revolution also witnessed very active participation by young people and youth groups. These formed the backbone of the protests, as for years young people have been eager to take part in decision-making and political life. In Lebanon, people below the age of 21 are not eligible to vote in parliamentary and municipal elections, and yet they found a space in this revolution to participate and make their voices heard. As such, young voices and concerns were loud during the protests. Young people were particularly concerned with unemployment, immigration, and the brain drain and suggested bold demands, including calling for the downfall of the regime and all its political leaders without exception and the establishment of a secular system promoting social justice and gender equality.
The revolution has been an opportunity to revive the student movement in Lebanon. Despite all the efforts made prior to the revolution to form a nationwide student movement, in the absence of a national student union the student movement was fragmented and weak. However, after 17 October, student clubs in private universities such as the American University of Beirut, Notre-Dame University and Université Saint-Joseph participated heavily in the protests in and off-campus, forming marches from universities to the main protest squares, and even setting up their own tents in downtown Beirut. Other private universities such as the Lebanese American University and the Lebanese International University held protests on and around campus. The Lebanese University (LU), Lebanon’s national university, saw the biggest student protests. The LU Student Coalition was particularly active in the revolution, from setting up a tent for protesters in Riad Al-Solh square, in downtown Beirut, to hosting various discussions, joining efforts with other student clubs and leftist groups.
Younger school students also had a role in the revolution. Along with university student groups, they took a big part in civil disobedience actions and general strikes. Students closed their schools and universities and protested in front of the Ministry of Education and other public administration offices for many days. As 6 November marked Students’ Day, students all across Lebanon were revolting for a better future. A banner raised by one of the students says it all: “On this day I won’t be learning history, I will be writing it.”
What have protests achieved so far, and what remains to be done?
Within 100 days, the revolution has had an impact on the authorities and also at a popular level.
First, it overthrew the so-called presidential settlement – an agreement among regional and internal forces and other actors – that led Michel Aoun to become president and produced a parliament based on an unconstitutional electoral law. This led to the rise of a new political majority and the formation of a coalition government including seven major political parties. This came at a high price, including the conciliation of regional and local powers, frequent disruption of the work of parliament and government, and very intense pressures especially on the political and security levels.
Second, it overthrew the government, that is, the executive power. This was the settlement’s weakest component, as the prime minister was the weakest among power holders such as Hezbollah, the Amal Movement, and the Free Patriotic Movement.
Third, the revolution interrupted two parliamentary sessions and blocked the adoption of equivocal draft laws listed on the agenda. Mobilised citizens had never been able to cancel a parliamentary session before.
Fourth, it caused disruption within the ruling coalition and among the authorities, as seen in the resignation of the government and the confusion that prevailed in the process of forming a new government, especially when two candidates for the role of prime minister had to be let go for failing to meet the minimum requirements demanded by the revolution, along with other reasons. During this lengthy process, acute differences and contradictions were revealed between allied parties, despite the fact that they belonged to the same block.
Above all, the revolution has increased popular awareness, which has been reflected in thousands of initiatives and discussions. Decentralised protests have taken place across all cities and villages from the far south to the far north and east, and have included all social and age groups. This diverse and inclusive revolution has contributed to breaking the rigid sectarian and regional political discourse, disrupting traditional loyalties and breaking down barriers between social groups and regions. Some people think that this positive shift cannot be considered complete, but there is indeed a consensus that it is a very important and irreversible change, which will remain despite any setbacks. We must be confident that significant progress has been made regarding popular awareness and the ability of social movements to carry out direct political action in the streets.
The revolution has achieved certain gains during the first round and is preparing for the next round, in which new laws and policies need to be adopted as soon as possible to overcome the ongoing financial and economic crises and set a base for a new and fairer economic paradigm.
How connected is Lebanese civil society with its counterparts around the world, and what support does it need from international civil society in order to continue its struggle?
Lebanese civil society is very rich and diverse, and it is connected to its counterparts around the world through different channels. It is indeed very active on the advocacy front and takes part in numerous international advocacy platforms.
In these critical times, the country is going through, civil society is avoiding seeking any support from foreign counterparts, in order to refute all conspiracy theories and accusations that politicians and their affiliates have made against protesters and the revolution. In order to lessen all the claims fabricated against our genuine and national revolution, Lebanese civil society is very reluctant to receive any support that could amount to or be interpreted as intervention by any foreign actor. However, it would welcome solidarity actions and statements, especially those that denounce human rights violations committed against protesters.
Civic space in Lebanon is rated as ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with the Arab NGO Network for Development through itswebsite andFacebook page, or follow@ArabNGONetwork on Twitter.
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LEBANON: ‘The humanitarian emergency is escalating as local communities struggle to support the displaced’
CIVICUS discusses the crisis in Lebanon with Zaher Sahloul, co-founder of MedGlobal, a US-based civil society organisation (CSO) that provides relief to victims of war, disaster and displacement, and supports excluded communities worldwide.
The humanitarian crisis in Lebanon has escalated significantly due to Israeli airstrikes, with the growing number of internally displaced people further straining an already fragile social services system. The health system is struggling to protect its facilities and staff in conflict zones, deal with trauma and provide essential services to displaced people. Alongside the domestic civil society response, an influx of external support, including from civil society, is proving essential to contain the crisis.
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LEBANON: ‘This election has brought to the forefront new voices speaking about rights’
CIVICUS speaks about the recent general elections in Lebanon with Lina Abou Habib, director of the Asfari Institute for Civil Society and Citizenship at the American University of Beirut.The Asfari Institute seeks to bridge academia and civil society activism. It does so through knowledge production, convenings and the creation of safe spaces for learning, dialogue and exchange. Located at the heart of the American University in Beirut, it functions as a regional hub for civil society working for diversity, inclusion, equality, accountability and sustainability.
What change resulted from the 15 May general election?
Despite taking place in an extremely complicated, uncertain and turbulent political and economic context, the process resulted in the election of many new independent candidates coming from civil society and calling for change. These new voices have political agendas that are very different from those of traditional ruling parties: they call for a new, more accountable governance system and for women’s rights, among other issues. These agendas include road maps for overcoming the ongoing deep economic crisis. And most importantly, they focus on how to stop the political race to the bottom that’s been happening in Lebanon.
Most of the independent candidates who were elected are linked to the 17 October protests, the uprisings that took place in 2019, when people clearly said that they had enough of the political elite that had become – and continues to be – outrageously corrupt. The 17 October Revolution was a unique moment because protesters had such diverse, inclusive and feminist voices – feminist demands became an integral part of the political demands of the revolution. For instance, sexual harassment became a political issue because the voices of the LGBTQI+ community and migrant women domestic workers were also represented. No demand was compromised or put aside.
By that time, it became clear to us what system of governance we aspired to. It must be based on equality, inclusion, diversity and respect for human rights. The revolution also gained momentum because the same thing was happening in Chile and other countries where people were rising up. Hence, I do not exaggerate when I say that the feminist voices of the 17 October Revolution inspired political participation in the 2022 election.
It is important to note, however, that some independent members of the new parliament do not share the agenda of the 17 October Revolution and have quite regressive rhetoric. For instance, newly elected member of parliament Cynthia Zarazir called for the death of Syrian refugees on social media. Having people like her in parliament represents a new challenge. Aside from that, I would say that this election has brought to the forefront new voices speaking about rights and pointing the way forward out of the current crisis.
How did the feminist movement work collectively in preparation for the election?
There was rallying behind feminist candidates such as Zoya Jureidini Rouhana, who pushes for an compulsory egalitarian family law, a top priority for Lebanon’s feminist movement. Rouhana is the founder of KAFA (‘enough’) Violence and Exploitation, a feminist civil society organisation that was behind several legal reforms in Lebanon. Moreover, it champions political discourse on gender-based violence. Her electoral campaign was in line with that. It is a rare moment when you have a feminist candidate running on a feminist agenda in a general election – and this was partly possible thanks to the voices that became heard in October 2019. The political movement took shape and gained more feminist voices during those uprisings.
Feminists mobilising around the elections forced candidates to state their position on gender equality, including the rights of the queer community. In return, independent candidates who sided with gender equality were attacked by the regime and conservative forces. One way for government officials and supporters to disparage and attack somebody is to say they are going to endanger the family. This is very unfortunate, but at the same time, it is fantastic that this important conversation is taking place in the public sphere and these issues are being discussed as part of the overall social and political dialogue.
In sum, the inclusive and intersectional feminist movement of Lebanon has succeeded in elevating feminist discourse to the public and political arena. But there is still a long way to go: the new parliament includes only two additional female members compared to the previous one, as only eight women were elected, out of 115 candidates nominated by traditional parties, opposition groups, and civil society. These results are still lacking in terms of reaching a critical mass to exercise feminist influence in parliament.
What’s next for the civil society movement following the election?
The real battle is just about to begin. The election showed that change is possible, but it is still not enough. The next step for us is to figure out how we will hold independent members of parliament accountable. They must be accountable because they won as a result of our collective movement.
We will still be facing a corrupt and oppressive regime and serious issues such as illegal arms and a heavily militarised society, economic downfall, destroyed livelihoods, broken public institutions and irresponsible and unaccountable policymaking. As such, civil society in its diversity, and especially the intersectional feminist movement, should remain vigilant.
The conversation we started must continue, and we need our international allies to help keep it going, and certainly not be complicit with the regime. We have a collective responsibility to monitor human rights violations, talk to feminist activists and help amplify the voices of Lebanon’s intersectional young feminists.
Civic space in Lebanon is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS monitor.
Get in touch with the Asfari Institute through itswebsite and follow@AsfariInstitute on Twitter. -
LESOTHO: ‘We must work hand in hand to promote democracy and hold our leaders accountable’
CIVICUS speaks about the 7 October election in Lesotho with Libakiso Matlho, executive director of Women and Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust-Lesotho (WLSA). WLSA is a civil society organisation (CSO) based in Southern Africa and working to promote women’s leadership and eradicate gender-based violence. It contributed to the recent election process by providing voter education.
How would you assess the recent election in Lesotho in terms of its transparency and fairness?
Looking at the overall proceedings I would say they were transparent and fair. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) did a good job. All candidates were given a platform to share their manifestos as well as their campaigning approaches at different levels, including through the media and public gatherings. Independent candidates did not face any threats. Nobody experienced any restrictions in terms of the exercise of their right to reach out to members of the community and potential voters. Voters were free to attend candidates’ forums and political party rallies.
There were two major challenges, however. One concerned voter civic education, which started a bit later than normal and therefore lasted only about three or four weeks, so it was not as broad as should have been.
The other challenge had to do with the dynamics of the campaign, which was affected by conflict among candidates during public forums. Some participants invited to take part in the discussions also caused chaos. This unfortunately led to a few discussions being cancelled before all the candidates could present their manifestos in some areas, especially those that were marked as hotspots.
Do you foresee any election-related conflict?
It is hard to predict, but this election seems to have been a bit different from others in the past, which makes me wonder.
Around 65 political parties and 2,560 candidates competed in the 7 October election. For a small country with a population of two million, that is a huge number of people. And many might find it difficult to accept the outcome if things do not happen according to their expectations.
The election itself was peaceful, but political tension mounted as votes were counted over the following days. The results were announced on 11 October: the opposition Revolution for Prosperity party came first but was short of a majority, with 56 of 120 seats, while the incumbent All Basotho Convention party (ABC) came second. It is not clear whether ABC will contest the results and its supporters will take to the streets in protest. If this happens, clashes with rival parties might occur and security force repression could follow.
I would not rule conflict out but rather consider it as likely to happen as not.
Do you think the failure to pass constitutional reforms had an impact on the election results?
I think the failure to pass the Omnibus Constitutional Bill, which had been years in the making, probably had a strong impact on the electoral process, and will definitely have an impact on what happens next.
The bill sought to amend key provisions regarding political parties, candidate selection, floor-crossing in parliament, the appointment of senior officials and the role of the prime minister, whose removal would require a two-thirds majority. In May, all major parties in parliament committed to pass the bill by the end of June, but disagreements held it up much longer.
One of the key issues of contention concerned the electoral law, which only allows party leaders to submit a proportional representation party list. With the current system, 80 members of parliament are elected in constituencies and 40 are elected through a proportional division of votes. Small parties are negatively affected because to get some proportional representation seats, they are forced to come together into a list with larger parties, and if they are unable to merge with other parties they are left out.
Another key issue wasthe politicisation of the security sector, which contributes to political instability. The reforms proposed a way to deal with this.
The reforms were eventually passed as parliament was reconvened for an urgent session but, following a series of legal challenges, the Constitutional Court declared them null and void at the last minute before the election.
The failure to pass the reforms will also contribute to continuing difficulties in maintaining coalition governments. Lesotho has had coalition governments since 2012 that have never served a full five-year term due to conflicts that led to their dissolution. In 2017 ABC formed a six-party coalition government, but because of internal conflict Prime Minister Tom Thabane was forced to resign in 2020 and was replaced by Moeketsi Majoro.
Coalitions have not made for stable and effective governments. The coalition-forming process also confuses voters because ideologies are not a big factor when putting them together. This makes voters a bit sceptical that their parties will remain faithful to their mandate.
These were some of the issues the reform was meant to address, but unfortunately they remain unaddressed to this day.
What did voters expect from the election?
One of the expectations voters place on political parties is that they will work on improving service delivery. This includes fixing infrastructure and providing access to water and electricity, among other things. Lesotho also has high rates of unemployment and widespread problems of gender-based violence and femicides, as well as high crime rates that people hope will be addressed by the new government.
Basotho people are not happy with the way the public sector has been managed over the years. Employment is mostly driven by nepotism and political affinities. People are uneasy because political parties on the campaign trail are quick to promise they will fix these things but once in power they fail to deliver.
We have also seen a lot of instability in a key industry, the textile industry, with COVID-19 only making things worse. People were already dealing with bad working conditions and when the pandemic hit many were fired unfairly. This led to worker strikes and has negatively affected foreign investment. Elected leaders need to find means of retaining foreign investment while ensuring good work conditions.
How can the international community support civil society’s work to strengthen democracy in Lesotho?
During the election, civil society faced the challenge that almost all funding for civic education came from the IEC, that is, from the government budget. This could potentially compromise civil society’s watchdog role. Additionally, these funds are never sufficient to allow civil society to conduct its work thoroughly.
The international community should support capacity building so that civil society can conduct robust advocacy during and after the election period. Collaboration between international and local CSOs is also important. For the recent election local CSOs took on voter education alone, without any involvement by international CSOs. We must work hand in hand to promote democracy in our countries and hold our leaders accountable.
Civic space in Lesotho is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
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Letter from Jail: Nicaraguan Farm Leader, Medardo Mairena
Incarcerated farm leader Medardo Mairena writes a letter to media from jail
Medardo Mairena Sequeira, is the Coordinator of the National Council in Defense of Land, Lake and Sovereignty and member of the Civic Alliance for Justice and Democracy. Medardo is one of the leaders of the movement against the construction of the Canal in Nicaragua. Medardo was detained on July 13 along with campesino leader Pedro Joaquín Mena Amador when they were planning to board a plane to the United States to participate in a solidarity event with Nicaragua. Medardo and two other farm leaders, face false charges ranging from terrorism, murder, kidnappings, aggravated robbery and obstruction of public services.
I am grateful to God and my family, to the Nicaraguan people, to independent media, to national and international human rights commissions, to the Organization of American States, to the UN Security Council for not letting the Nicaraguan people alone.
To all my friends, to all the people, I ask you to remain united praying in these difficult times for everyone, especially for us political prisoners. We are imprisoned only because we think differently. The Ortega regime is a coward. They have imprisoned us just for raising our voices and speaking up for those who can’t and for those who are no longer with us. In the penitentiary system, we are in maximum security jails where the cells are in bad conditions, there is no electricity, restrooms are damaged. Windows that are supposed to allow air to enter are closed. It is like being baked in an oven and we are isolated from everyone else. Us campesino leaders are in the Modelo gallery 300, in the place known as “little hell”. We are 20 prisoners in the same conditions, we are sick, and they don’t allow a doctor to visit us. Thanks to god, I’m feeling better but it is only because of god. Here we have mosquitoes, cockroaches, scorpions. They don’t allow us to get out of the cells even for taking sun. They took my friend Pedro Mena’s Medication, he suffers from diabetes and high blood pressure and he always carries his treatment in his bag because he needs to take a daily pill. They treat us inhumanely.
I invite the people to keep doing peaceful demonstrations, as we have always done it. Even if you don’t see me, my heart is always with you because we need to demand our freedom, because we are innocent from the accusations. The day the facts happened in Morito, we were in Managua demanding for dialogue be resumed with the government, because we want justice, democratization and a peaceful exit to the crisis. We cannot forget those whose lives have been taken by the regime. At least my family still has hope of seeing me alive, but the mothers that lost their children do not and we cannot forget their injustice.
Sincerely,
Medardo.
Translated originally from Spanish. Read original letter
CIVICUS has called on the authorities in Nicaragua to drop all charges against Medardo Mairena, Pedro Joaquín Mena, and Victor Manuel Diaz, and release them safely. CIVICUS also calls for the release of all the rural leaders, students and activists currently detained for exercising their right to protest.
Nicaragua has been added to a watchlist of countries which are experiencing an alarming escalation in threats to fundamental freedoms. The watchlist is compiled by the CIVICUS Monitor, an online platform that tracks threats to civil society in countries across the globe.
