civic space

• SIERRA LEONE: ‘We advocate for a civic space where people can protest with no risks’

  CIVICUS speaks about recent protests in Sierra Leone with Andrew Lavali, Executive Director of the Institute for Governance Reform, a civil society organisation (CSO) that advocates for good governance in Sierra Leone.

  What triggered the recent protests in Sierra Leone?

  Sierra Leone has many underlying issues that have greatly contributed to the recent protests. First, political polarisation has grown tremendously since the change of power in 2018. Fights over limited public sector jobs have made politics a zero-sum game.

  For the past 15 years we have seen this happen as groups in power try to appease their support bases by employing people from a certain region, who then risk losing their jobs when the government changes. To an extent, preaching hate and stoking polarisation have become a political strategy used by parties to either stay in power or propel themselves to leadership.

  It appears the opposition party has not fully embraced the result of the 2018 election and it may have fuelled the protests, judging by the fact that these broke out only in areas where the opposition have a strong presence and not throughout the country. The fact that protests are focused in certain places makes one to think that they are not just about socio-economic issues but there are also underlying political issues.

  At the same time, there are genuine concerns about economic hardship. COVID-19 restrictions and the Russian-Ukraine war have resulted in rising prices of essential commodities, especially for people living in urban areas. Socio-economic issues such as high youth unemployment and poor access to essential services are real problems. Protesters are demanding the president’s resignation due to the economic hardship they are experiencing.

  How have the authorities responded?

  During the protests both civilians and police officers were attacked, and some were killed, revealing an ongoing tension between citizens and the police. Evidence shows that the protests were in no way peaceful. They were leaderless and faceless. Some Sierra Leoneans living abroad used social media to call for protest. According to the police, they only heard about the protest on social media. They did not receive any official request from an identifiable person for police clearance.

  As soon as the violence erupted and the situation became unsafe for those not protesting, the government imposed a curfew. There were also internet restrictions imposed because protesters were coordinating their actions via social media platforms. Security presence on the streets has increased since then. These measures helped to scale down the violence and improve safety and security.

  The government also responded by making arrests. A leading youth activist in an opposition area was killed during a police raid. The response raised concerns about how police are trained to handle protests. The police have not sat down with interest groups to see how future protests can be organised. There are legitimate fears that given Sierra Leone’s recent history of violence, high youth unemployment and economic hardship, protests can easily get out of control and become very difficult to handle.

  Do you think the response will deter people from protesting?

  People will certainly be timid for a while, but I don’t think the police response will stop them mobilising in the long run. There are too many issues citizens want the government to address and if it fails to do so, protests will inevitably keep breaking out. Regardless of protests being instrumentalised for political purposes, there is a general situation of hardship that needs to be addressed. As civil society we will continue to monitor the situation and try to bring citizen voices into policy conversations.

  Protest restriction has a long history in Sierra Leone. For the past 15 years police have failed to grant permission to protest. This strained relationship with the police has culminated in a case against the police being brought to the Supreme Court by civil society. Civil society is currently documenting the events that are taking place and will then get together to discuss the situation and try to find a way to advocate for more open civic space in which people can protest without risking their lives.

  What assistance is needed from the international community?

  We need the international community to help us promote democracy, the rule of law and effective governance. International allies should support open platforms for dialogue between the police and various interest groups on the rights and responsibilities of protesters and the role of the police in securing their rights. The international community could help CSOs create awareness and provide training so that the security forces will protect the rights of citizens to exercise their right to protest safely.

  Civic space in Sierra Leone is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor. 
  Get in touch with the Institute for Government Reform through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@GovernanceFor on Twitter.

• Singapore must expand civic space and end undue restrictions on fundamental freedoms: UN Human Rights Council Side Event

  Amidst emerging threats to civic space, representatives from civil society called on Singapore’s Government to abide by its international legal obligations and commitments to respect fundamental freedoms in a Human Rights Council side event held on 29 September, a day before the adoption of the outcomes from Singapore’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR).

• SINGAPORE: ‘Being a human rights lawyer has had a huge personal cost’

  CIVICUS speaks with constitutional lawyer and human rights advocate M. Ravi about civic space, human rights and his activism against the death penalty in Singapore.

  A prominent anti-death penalty advocate, Ravi is a founding member of the Anti‐Death Penalty Asia Network and the Singapore Anti‐Death Penalty Campaign community group. Due to his work, he has faced harassment from the Singaporean authorities.

  Over the past few years, Ravi has also worked on business and human rights, sustainability and environmental, social and governance issues. He is a founding member of the Malaysian Association of Public Advocacy for Nature.

  What is the current state of civic space in Singapore?

  Civic space is highly restricted as a result of the repressive measures taken by the government, which has curtailed freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly for years. The authoritarian ‘rule by law’ has reached a toxic state in which the average Singaporean feels terribly alienated. The upside of this is the growth of an opposition force determined to remove the ruling People’s Action Party from power.

  How did you start working on death penalty cases?

  In 2003, I was instructed in a last-ditch attempt by the family of a young Malaysian death row inmate, Vignes Mourthy, to save him from execution. The case came to me through JB Jeyaretnam, a leading opposition politician at the time. I faced procedural hurdles against reopening the case, and on the eve of the execution I asked Chief Justice Yong Pung How whether an innocent man can be hanged due to procedural reasons, to which he responded that he could. That response shook my conscience, so I started campaigning against the death penalty. I founded an organisation, the Singapore Anti-Death Penalty Campaign, to support the families of death row inmates and ultimately end the death penalty.

  What challenges have you faced?

  I took up a number of human rights constitutional cases and death penalty cases on a pro bono basis. The demanding nature of the work and the emotional aspect of death penalty cases also affected my wellbeing. Being a human rights lawyer has had a huge personal cost.

  This work has also been highly taxing on my resources. The Attorney General has filed several complaints with the Law Society and I have been prosecuted as a result. The courts slammed me with adverse personal cost orders to the tune of S$70,000 (US$ 52, 661) in my representation of death penalty cases. I had to raise funds to settle.

  A complaint that the Law Society lodged against me with the Court of Appeal in a death penalty case is now before a Disciplinary Tribunal. I have recently been suspended for five years for criticising the conduct of the prosecution of another Malaysian citizen, Gobi Avedian, who would have been executed if not for my late-stage application, in response to which the Court of Appeal acknowledged that there had been a miscarriage of justice. But for my advocacy for Gobi, I paid a huge price in the form of a five-year suspension.

  I have been often subjected to intimidation and state harassment. I have recently been investigated by the police over Facebook posts in relation to campaigns on death penalty cases as constituting contempt of court.

   

  How has this impacted on your work?

  All these repressive moves have greatly impeded my work. Lawyers in Singapore are cowed into passivity and fear, contributing to a weak legal profession. This has deprived me of the support of my peers and only increased my vulnerability. Fortunately, I have received a great deal of support from my international network of lawyers and civil society activists.

  In 2020 and 2021 I was handling almost all death row cases. I represented 26 inmates at one go and most of this work was pro bono. But the personal cost orders against me had a chilling effect on the profession: lawyers were increasingly unwilling to get involved in late-stage applications for fear of state reprisals. After my suspension, 24 inmates I represented filed an application in court and appeared on their own, as they had no lawyers to argue their cases. Some of them have already been executed. My suspension has deprived them of a voice in court. Fear is crippling the legal profession.

  Has any progress been made towards the end of the death penalty?

  There has been progress. As a result of the various legal challenges, I and others brought to court in the case of Yong Vui Kong, another young Malaysian on death row, between 2010 and 2012 an indirect moratorium was placed on death penalty cases. This contributed to the amendment to the law in respect of the mandatory death penalty, giving judges discretion in death penalty cases. Yong was saved from the death penalty, along with two of my clients and several others.

  The vigorous campaign held across Malaysia to save Yong also precipitated a call for reform of death penalty laws in Malaysia. Executions were also halted, culminating in the recent abolition of the mandatory death penalty in Malaysia. A recent campaign and legal challenges to save another client of mine, Nagenthren, from being executed further strengthened calls by civil society, media, lawyers, politicians and others to abolish the death penalty in Malaysia.

  What can civil society and the international community do to support human rights activists in Singapore?

  They can issue solidarity statements and bring the human rights violations levelled against human rights activists to the United Nations and other international bodies. It is time for such cases to be brought to international courts or to the national courts of states such as France and the USA, which have universal jurisdiction. For example, the USA’s Alien Tort Statute gives US federal courts jurisdiction over certain international human rights law violations that occurred on foreign soil and plaintiffs affected can file a claim against a foreign country in the USA. This means that Singapore can be sued in countries which has universal jurisdiction laws for its egregious human rights violations in death penalty cases.

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  Civic space inSingaporeis rated ‘repressed’by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Follow@MRavilaw on Twitter.

• SINGAPORE: ‘Opposition parties were given unfavourable coverage by the state media and had difficulty accessing voters’

  CIVICUS speaks to human rights defender Jolovan Wham about the recent elections in Singapore, which were held in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. TheCIVICUS Monitor has documented the use of restrictive laws in Singapore against civil society activists, human rights defenders, lawyers, independent online media outlets and members of the political opposition, who face prosecution, including through defamation suits and contempt of court charges.

  

   

  Has there been any disagreement around whether elections should be held, when, or how?

  Yes. Opposition parties were largely against it as the COVID-19 pandemic had not abated and holding the elections might pose a public health threat. They were also concerned that physical rallies and door-to-door visits would be disallowed, which would hinder their campaign efforts.

  And indeed, it was more difficult to connect face to face with voters when a one-metre distance had to be maintained during walkabouts and door-to-door visits. Everyone had to give their speeches and connect with voters online.

  Some changes were introduced so elections would proceed in the context of the pandemic. Voting time was extended by two hours to take the longer queues caused by social distancing into consideration. But the possibility of online voting was not discussed. And older people and those who were frail may have not participated for fear of getting infected with COVID-19.

  What was the state of civic freedoms ahead of the elections?

  The ruling People’s Action Party’s (PAP) control of all public institutions is a major civic freedom issue. It means it gets to shape the political discourse according to its agenda and set the rules of the game to its advantage. For example, the elections department, which draws electoral boundaries, reports to the prime minister himself. Most civil society groups are afraid of engaging in the elections in a meaningful way for fear of being seen as ‘partisan’. If a civil society association is associated with an opposition party, it may lose funding, support and patronage for its work.

  A recent report by the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Parliamentarians for Human Rights documented structural flaws that prevented the election from being fair, including the prime minister’s broad powers over the entire electoral process without any effective oversight. The environment in which the Singaporean people were able to exercise their right to participate in public life was heavily restricted. Key opposition candidates had been targeted with lawsuits by members of the PAP, and voters in opposition-led constituencies fear reprisals for not voting for the PAP. Fundamental freedoms, which are intrinsically linked to free elections, are limited as the government controls the media and uses restrictive laws against dissenting and critical voices.

  How did this affect the chances of the opposition?

  Opposition candidates and parties had to rely solely on social media to get their message out, because of unfavourable coverage by state media. They also had difficulty accessing voters because of the PAP’s monopoly, manipulation and control of national grassroots groups, unions and organisations, on top of the difficulties involved in holding physical rallies in the context of the pandemic.

  The elections were held on 10 July. The PAP secured 83 parliamentary seats but faced a setback as the opposition made minor but historic gains. The Workers’ party, the only opposition party in parliament, increased its seats from six to 10 – the biggest result for the opposition since independence. The PAP popular vote dipped to 61 per cent.

  What were the main issues the campaign revolved around?

  For the PAP, the campaign revolved around smearing opposition candidates, accusing them of peddling falsehoods and of having nefarious agendas and engaging in character assassination. Scaremongering tactics were also used: the electorate were told that only the PAP could get Singaporeans out of the COVID-19 pandemic and that having more opposition members in parliament would thwart these efforts.

  Opposition parties, on the other hand, focused on telling the electorate that they were in danger of being wiped out of parliament as they held fewer than 10 elected seats out of almost 90. Issues such as the high cost of living and immigration were other key issues raised by the opposition.

  Civic space in Singapore is rated as ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

• SINGAPORE: ‘The entrenched system instils fear, making progress for civil society slow and difficult’

  CIVICUS speaks about Singapore’s recent leadership change with Kirsten Han, an independent writer, journalist and member of the Transformative Justice Collective (TJC).

  The TJC is a group that works to demystify and challenge Singapore’s criminal punishment system, including by calling for the abolition of the death penalty.

  Who is new prime minister Lawrence Wong and what are the implications of his recent appointment?

  Lawrence Wong is a long-time civil servant who served as the principal private secretary to former prime minister Lee Hsien Loong before entering politics. He’s seen as a stable and reliable leader rather than a maverick. His political approach has so far emphasised continuity and stability, and there’s been little indication that significant changes in human rights and civil liberties will occur under his leadership. This suggests the status quo will largely be maintained, which isn’t positive for civil society.

  We expect a general election to be held relatively soon, but the exact timing is uncertain and will be determined by Wong. There’s speculation the election could take place around September or, failing that, before the end of the year, but no date has been set. This will be the first election with the fourth generation of the People’s Action Party (PAP) officially at the helm.

  The PAP has been in power since 1959 and has undergone three generational changes so far. While there may not be the same level of enthusiasm or reverence for this new generation of leaders, dramatic shifts in the political landscape are unlikely. Any change is expected to be gradual, with the PAP possibly losing more of its vote share, but I don’t expect major upheavals.

  There’s currently little information on Lawrence Wong’s policy agenda. He’s not yet laid out anything very specific about his administration’s priorities across domestic and foreign policy. Every new prime minister in Singapore has promised a more open Singapore, but this hasn’t materialised, particularly not in greater respect for fundamental rights like freedom of expression or assembly. While Wong’s leadership style may differ from his predecessor’s, what really matters is the substance. And I haven’t seen much to be hopeful about for civil society on this front.

  What are people’s expectations?

  There’s considerable public concern about the cost of living and housing. Property and rental prices have risen significantly, making housing a major issue Wong will have to address.

  Among politically engaged young Singaporeans, there’s increasing discussion about Singapore’s role and relationship with Israel, an issue the government is reluctant to address publicly. The government has imposed strict controls on public organising and activism on the Israel–Palestine issue, including blanket bans on public activities and restrictions on the use of Speaker’s Corner, a traditional space for public discourse. Several activists have been put under police investigation for activities in solidarity with Palestine.

  Young Singaporeans are also concerned about racism and racial justice, and would like to see greater openness to differing political views. There’s growing pressure for change and an increasing desire for political plurality, in general and in parliament.

  The government has so far been able to manage a lot of this pressure, including by investigating activists and maintaining tight controls. The entrenched system, with its many levers of power and control, continues to instil fear among people, making progress for civil society groups gradual and challenging. Nevertheless, momentum for change is slowly building.

  What’s Wong’s position on thedeath penalty?

  As far as I know, Wong has not publicly stated his position on the death penalty. This issue remains primarily the responsibility of the Minister for Home Affairs and Law, who retained his position in Wong’s cabinet reshuffle. I don’t expect the government’s stance on the death penalty to change any time soon. If Wong has a different opinion from what the minister has expressed, we’ve not seen any evidence of it. Personally, even if a difference did exist, I’m not convinced Wong’s position would prevail over the status quo.

  Progress has been extremely difficult for the abolitionist movement. It has become increasingly hard for death row prisoners to find legal representation for post-appeal applications. Many represent themselves, and even then, they are often accused of abusing the legal process. In May, the Minister for Home Affairs and Law said in parliament that they’re looking into how to tackle what they say are cases of abuses of legal process, suggesting it will become even more difficult for death row prisoners to file applications.

  This could have repercussions for activists who support them. In the same speech, the minister publicly highlighted my involvement in helping the mother of a death row prisoner file an application. He read out my email address in parliament, accusing me of helping abuse the court.

  In addition, the government is aggressively promoting its pro-death penalty narrative. It has declared an annual Drug Victims Remembrance Day and launched extensive campaigns to highlight the harm caused by drugs to argue that a war on drugs is needed. This narrative basically frames death penalty abolitionists as endangering or betraying Singapore by undermining its war on drugs. The implication is that activists are opposing the country’s efforts to protect people from the dangers of drugs.

  While this response from the government suggests our campaigning has had some impact, it also indicates a strong resistance to change. At present, there’s no sign the government is moving away from the death penalty; in fact, it’s doubling down on its position. The campaign for abolition remains an uphill battle.

  Do you expect the situation of civil society to change under Wong?

  Civil society in Singapore is under considerable pressure. Over the past decade, conditions have tightened and people continue to be investigated for exercising their right to freedom of assembly. As far as we can see, this trend is likely to continue. While there can always be hope that Wong will prove us wrong once he settles into his role, right now there’s no indication anything is going to improve.

  We continue to hear about people being called in for police investigations. Recently, a migrant worker who’d been the victim of harassment, Uddin MD Sharif, was unjustly repatriated. After police closed their investigation without finding the harasser, Sharif was forced to return to Bangladesh because he no longer had a work permit and was no longer needed for the investigation. He appealed to Wong, who Sharif said promised to convey the appeal to the immigration authorities, but nothing changed and Sharif was still sent back.

  This suggests that either Wong has little influence over discretionary policy or he did not prioritise a case that was so clearly unjust. This doesn’t inspire confidence Wong will be more progressive or active in defending human rights and workers’ rights, so I don’t expect civil society to have an easier time under his leadership.

  Civic space in Singapore is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the TJC through itswebsite,Facebook orInstagram page, and follow@kixes and@tjc_singapore on Twitter.

• Six countries added to watchlist of countries where civic freedoms are under serious threat

  New #civicspace watchlist - Six countries to keep an eye on: https://t.co/E5ih0npWYM pic.twitter.com/gWwAzUCHrz

  — CIVICUS (@CIVICUSalliance) August 20, 2018

  • Bangladesh, Maldives, Cameroon, DRC, Guatemala, Nicaragua join global watchlist
  • Escalating rights violations include killings, attacks on protesters, media, opposition
  • Neighbours, international community must pressure governments to end repression

  Six countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa have been added to a watchlist of countries which have seen an escalation in serious threats to fundamental freedoms in recent weeks and months.

  The new watchlist released by the CIVICUS Monitor, an online platform that tracks threats to civil society across the globe, identifies growing concerns in Bangladesh,  Maldives, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Activists and civil society organisations in these countries are currently experiencing a severe infringement of civic freedoms, as protected by international law.

  Violations include brutal attacks by police on peaceful protests in Nicaragua and Bangladesh; the murder of human rights defenders in Guatemala; the killing of protesters and a brutal state campaign against activists and the political opposition in the DRC; and the prosecution of human rights defenders and journalists on fabricated charges in Cameroon, amidst an escalating civil conflict.

  “It is deeply concerning to see escalated threats to basic rights in these countries,” said Cathal Gilbert, CIVICUS Civic Space Research Lead.

  “It is crucial that these six governments wake up to their failure to respect international law and take swift action to respect their citizens’ most basic freedoms in a democratic society,” Gilbert said.

  “We also call upon neighbouring states and international bodies to do put pressure on these countries to end the repression.”

  Over the past year, authorities in Bangladesh have used repressive laws to target and harass journalists and human rights defenders, restrict freedom of assembly and carry out the enforced disappearances of opposition supporters. The human rights situation has deteriorated further ahead of national elections scheduled for late 2018. Members of the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL), the student wing of the ruling party Bangladesh Awami League (BAL), have attacked student activists, academics and journalists with impunity.

  In Nicaragua, at least 300 people have been killed since protests began in April 2018, with hundreds more kidnapped or missing. The demonstrations were initially sparked by regressive changes to the social security system but grew to include calls for President Daniel Ortega to resign in the wake of his brutal repression of peaceful protests. While large-scale marches have subsided in recent days, some continue amid a tense political situation as the Ortega government continues to silence critics despite agreements struck with international bodies, and an undertaking to allow an IACHR investigation into the violence. Attacks on protestors are perpetrated both by state forces and armed groups aligned with the government.

  This year, between January and July alone, at least 18 human rights defenders (HRDs) were killed in Guatemala. There were also two assassination attempts and 135 other attacks, with 32 of those aimed at women HRDs. In early August, United Nations Special Rapporteurs issued a statement raising the alarm at the spike in killings in 2018. Reports from Guatemala indicate that the space for civil society has worsened due to land disputes and actions by corporate interests, the source of targeted violence against specific groups of activists.

  Despite the announcement that Congolese president Joseph Kabila will not run for a third term, tensions are still high in the DRC, ahead of scheduled elections in December.  In recent months, protestors, youth movements, human rights defenders, journalists and the political opposition have all faced widespread state repression, including arrests. In June this year, CSOs and UN Special Rapporteurs expressed serious concerns about a planned new law that would give authorities power to dissolve non-governmental organisations (NGOs) over public order or national security concerns.

  In Maldives, a widespread crackdown on dissent began in February 2018 when a court ordered the release of opposition leaders. This decision led to the arbitrary arrest of judges, scores of opposition politicians and activists as well as the use of unnecessary force by police to disperse peaceful demonstrations. There are also documented cases of people being ill-treated in detention. With elections due on 23rd September 2018, civic space is likely to become increasingly contested. Already in May 2018, the Electoral Commission moved to bar four opposition leaders from running in the upcoming presidential elections.

  In Cameroon, an escalating conflict in the country’s Anglophone regions between armed separatists and the government has sparked a mounting humanitarian crisis. It began as protests in 2016, resulting in state repression of protests and the arrest and prosecution of protest leaders. The conflict intensified in recent months with killings and human rights violations committed by both sides. At least 100 civilians, 43 security officers and an unknown number of armed separatists have reportedly been killed, according to an International Crisis Group report. NGOs and human rights defenders have also been targeted.

  In the coming weeks, the CIVICUS Monitor will closely track developments in each of these countries as part of efforts to ensure greater pressure is brought to bear on governments. CIVICUS calls upon these governments to do everything in their power to immediately end the ongoing crackdowns and ensure that perpetrators are held to account.

  ENDS.

  For more information, please contact:

  Cathal Gilbert

  Grant Clark

• SLOVENIA: ‘The government has taken advantage of the pandemic to restrict protest’

  CIVICUS speaks about the recent right-wing shift in Slovenia with Brankica Petković, a researcher and project manager at the Peace Institute in Ljubljana. Founded in 1991, the Peace Institute-Institute for Contemporary Social and Political Studies is an independent, non-profit research institution that uses research and advocacy to promote the principles and practices of an open society, critical thought, equality, responsibility, solidarity, human rights and the rule of law. It works in partnership with other organisations and citizens at the local, regional and international levels.

• Solidarity with Palestine repressed: Trends and case studies
  • Pro-Palestinian protests met with restrictions: bans, arrests, excessive force
  • Student pro-Palestine activism repressed, particularly in western countries
  • Activists, CSOs, journalists targeted with reprisals for expressing solidarity with Palestine

  On 7 October 2023, Hamas forces launched an unprecedented attack on Israel, killing over 1,100 people and taking more than 200 hostages. This was followed by Israel’s devastating military offensive on Gaza, in which more than 41,431 people, the majority of them civilians, have been killed. Gaza’s entire population of 2.1 million people now requires humanitarian aid. Almost all, including around a million children, lack adequate access to food, water, shelter and medical care. Some 60 percent of Gaza's buildings have been destroyed, including civilian facilities such as hospitals, schools and places of worship. Despite diplomatic efforts to broker a ceasefire, Israel continues its offensive.

  Palestine’s already constrained civic space has deteriorated, with many human rights violations documented. Israeli forces are deliberately targeting humanitarian aid convoys and killing aid workers: 304 have been killed so far, and more UN aid workers have been killed in Gaza than in any other conflict in the organisation’s history. Israel’s bombardment is also destroying civil society buildings and killing civil society staff. Suspensions of funding for UNRWA – the UN’s agency for Palestine – and civil society organisations (CSOs) have further impeded vital humanitarian efforts. 

  Over 130 journalists have been killed by Israeli forces in Gaza, and others have been attacked, injured and detained, while recurring telecommunications blackouts have limited people’s access to vital information and hindered the humanitarian response.

  The civic space implications go beyond Palestine. The CIVICUS Monitor, a collaborative research initiative that tracks the health of civic freedoms, has documented violations across the globe that restrict people’s right to express solidarity with Palestine. 

  In numerous countries – including Australia, Egypt, France, Kenya and Malaysia – freedom of peaceful assembly has been restricted for people wishing to gather to show solidarity with Gaza and demand a ceasefire. Restrictive measures taken by authorities include protest bans, arrests of protesters and organisers and excessive use of force. For example, in Sweden in May 2024, police used pepper spray and forcibly removed and detained protesters during a sit-in near Malmö Arena where the Eurovision Song Contest was taking place. In Kenya, protesters marching peacefully in solidarity with Palestine have been arrested and violently dispersed by the police, including in protests held in October 2023 and January 2024. In Malaysia, peaceful protesters have been hauled before the police for questioning after organising or participating in solidarity protests for Palestine.

  In Europe and the USA, authorities have repressed pro-Palestine activism by university students. At the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands, police violently broke up a student encampment to demand that the university administration cut ties with Israeli-affiliated institutions. Police used batons, pepper spray, police dogs and bulldozers against protesters. Clashes broke out as protesters resisted eviction, with a protester and a police officer injured. Police detained 169 protesters.

  In the USA, at least 3,000 people – students and university faculty and staff – have been detained as a result of raids. CSOs have reported a troubling pattern of institutions scrutinising pro-Palestinian students for alleged ‘material support for terrorism’, despite a lack of evidence, and proposing discriminatory measures such as visa cancellations and deportations. Universities in the UK have been accused of collaborating with the police to monitor and potentially criminalise students taking part in pro-Palestine protests or expressing solidarity with Palestine on social media. On 19 November 2023, police visited a University of York student at home due to a social media post supporting Palestine. 

  People expressing solidarity with Palestine have been targeted with reprisals, including activists and journalists who have been dismissed or suspended from their jobs. In Canada for example, Global News dismissed journalist Zahraa Al-Akhrass October 2023, over social media posts expressing her critical views on Israel’s violence in Gaza. A month later, the University of Ottawa temporarily suspended Yipeng Ge, a physician, over social media statements that referenced ‘apartheid’ and ‘settler colonialism’. In Egypt, the BBC arbitrarily suspended Sally Nabil, its bilingual correspondent, in February 2024, after Nabil liked a tweet expressing solidarity with Palestine.

  CSOs have also been targeted. In October 2023, the Belgian Minister of Culture asked his administration to investigate two CSOs because they had published statements on the situation in Gaza. Even after they were cleared of wrongdoing, the minister stated that he wanted to keep the organisations under ‘heightened scrutiny’. In Germany, Berlin police deployed around 200 officers in December 2023 to conduct raids on homes and premises connected to members of Zora, a pro-Palestinian anti-fascist feminist collective. The raid was prompted by a statement the group posted on its Instagram account on 12 October that said ‘No liberation of women without the liberation of Palestine’.

  Recommendations

  • The Israeli government must immediately agree to a permanent ceasefire, a peace process and unimpeded humanitarian access.
  • States should respect the right of people to protest for Palestinian rights and refrain from violence, arrests and vilification.
  • University and police authorities should respect the right of students to protest peacefully.
  • Authorities should stop conflating legitimate criticism of the Israeli state with antisemitism and extremism.

  Additional resources:

  Recommendations for universities worldwide for the second semester of 2024: Safeguarding the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association on campuses in the context of international solidarity with the Palestinian people and victims - Gina Romero, UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association (FoAA).

  Analysis by the European Civic Forum examines how European governments have repeatedly cracked down on individuals and organisations expressing solidarity with the Palestinian people in marches, demonstrations and cultural activities. See report, Restrictions on Palestine Solidarity (May 2024).

• SOUTH AFRICA: ‘We want to live in an environment that respects women and recognises our human rights’

  

  As part of the #16DaysOfActivism campaign, CIVICUS speaks with Amanda Nomnqa about civil society efforts to eradicate gender-based violence (GBV) in South Africa.

  Amanda is the founder of SheIsBrave, a South African civil society organisation that provides mentorship and empowers young girls and women to gain independence and overcome GBV.

  The 16 Days of Activism against Gender-Based Violence is an annual international campaign that kicks off on 25 November, the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, and runs until 10 December, Human Rights Day.

  How big a problem is GBV South Africa?

  GBV is the worst pandemic South Africa continues to face. The country exhibits very high rates of GBV that affect not only women but also children and LGBTQI+ people. The social, political and economic situation so many of them live in exposes them to GBV. This violence has robbed many of their lives, freedom, dignity and more. It is a human rights violation that has a huge impact on the social and development progression of survivors.

  The criminal justice system doesn’t support victims and survivors. The national police systematically fails to help them: it doesn’t channel enough resources to help victims, and the available resources are misused due to lack of expertise in using them. Analysing DNA takes them too long and many police officers don’t know how to use a rape kit properly. All this perpetuates GBV and makes the fight against it even more difficult. And there is no political will to implement measures and policies to tackle the problem.

  What work does your organisation do?

  SheIsBrave is an organisation led by womxn and young people founded and registered in 2018, seeking to empower girls and young women by providing formal and non-formal skills so they can successfully compete in the job market and become independent. Most GBV victims become hopeless and we want to make sure they still feel valuable, can acquire skills and can use them to improve their lives. We want them to have access to socio-economic opportunities so they can overcome situations of GBV and escape their damaging consequences.

  We also support survivors by helping them get counselling. Getting professional help is very important for mental wellbeing so we want to provide that kind of help.

  We also have programmes for young girls and children to teach them about GBV. We provide activities for them to work on their talents and allow them a space to express themselves. Our aim is to show them that certain situations are not normal and are wrong, and empower them so they are confident enough to speak up if they are facing such situations. We also try to equip them so they can carry on the same kind of advocacy work in the future.

  We also mobilise in protest to make noise and draw attention to the scourge of GBV in our communities so that those in power finally do something about it.

  What challenges do you face?

  Our main challenge is the lack of financial and material resources to work with our target communities. Lack of funding has limited the scope of our work because we are forced to focus mostly on zero-budget activities. We depend on fundraising and sometimes have to contribute funds from our own pockets.

  There aren’t enough funds in place to support civil society in South Africa, and most of what’s available doesn’t reach the organisations doing the work due to mismanagement and corruption. During the pandemic we saw a rise in GBV cases but the government failed to provide enough funding for shelters, medical help and legal aid to victims and survivors. Lack of government funding affected most organisations that provide support to victims. Unfortunately, this is what most organisations including ours are still going through. Organisational growth has really been limited as a result.

  What will you be doing for the 16 Days of Activism campaign?

  This year we will be working on the ground. We are hosting public meetings with activists working on the same issues as us. We want to bring awareness about GBV in general and femicide in particular. SheIsBrave is based in a community that considered one of the top three biggest hotspots for GBV in South Africa. So we are taking advantage of this opportunity to share information among community members on how people experiencing abuse can report cases, seek medical attention and access shelters.

  We hope that as a result more people will know what to do if they need help. We want them to know that help is available and they should never shy away from reaching out.

  We also hope our work will inspire other organisations working on these issues to reach out so we can collaborate in the future. If we speak in one voice, we will be more consistent and more powerful and we stand a better chance of making the government and other stakeholders see that they must urgently address the problem.

  We are aware that on this date many other organisations are mobilising to push the government to enact better laws and implement better policies to address GBV and we hope this year our voices will be heard. We want to live in an environment that respects women and recognises our human rights. Our government should commit to helping us in our struggle.

  ---

  Civic space in the South Africais rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor

  Get in touch with SheIsBrave through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@sheisbrave_za on Twitter.

• SOUTH KOREA: ‘North Korean defectors and activists face increasing pressure to stay silent’

  CIVICUS speaks with Ethan Hee-Seok Shin, a legal analyst with the Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG), a Seoul-based civil society organisation (CSO) founded by human rights advocates and researchers from five countries. Founded in 2014, it is the first Korea-based CSO focused on transitional justice mechanisms in the world’s most repressive regimes, including North Korea. TJWG aims to develop practical methods for addressing massive human rights violations and advocating justice for victims in pre and post-transition societies. Ethan works on TJWG’s Central Repository project, which uses a secure platform to document and publicise cases of enforced disappearances in North Korea. He uses legislative and legal action to raise awareness about North Korean human rights issues.

   

  Can you tell us about the work being done by South Korean civil society groups about the human rights situation in North Korea?

  There is a rather broad range of CSOs working on North Korean human rights issues. TJWG has been working to prepare the ground for transitional justice in North Korea, in line with its core mission of human rights documentation.

  TJWG’s flagship project has resulted in a series of reports mapping public executions in North Korea, based on interviews with escapees living in South Korea. We record the geospatial information of killing sites, burial sites and record storage places, including courts and security service facilities, by asking our interviewees to spot the locations on Google Earth. The report’s first edition was released in July 2017 and was based on 375 interviews, and its second edition was launched in June 2019 after conducting 610 interviews.

  We are also currently in the process of creating an online database of abductions and enforced disappearances in and by North Korea, called FOOTPRINTS. This uses Uwazi, a free, open-source solution for organising, analysing and publishing documents, developed by HURIDOCS, a CSO. When launched to the public, FOOTPRINTS will provide an easily accessible and searchable platform to track individuals taken and lost in North Korea.

  Other than documentation and reporting work, we have been active in international and domestic advocacy. Jointly with other human rights CSOs, TJWG drafted and submitted an open letter urging the European Union to strengthen the language and recommendations in the annual human rights resolutions adopted by the United Nations’ (UN) General Assembly and Human Rights Council on North Korea. We have also made case submissions to the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and other UN human rights experts.

  In July 2020, the South Korean government revoked the registration of two CSOs and issued a notice of administrative review and inspections of ‘defector-run’ groups working on human rights in North Korea. Why are these groups being targeted?

  The direct catalyst was the June 2020 provocations by North Korea. On 4 June, Kim Yo-Jong, sister of supreme leader Kim Jong-Un and the first vice department director of the Workers’ Party of Korea’s Central Committee, criticised the ‘anti-DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] leaflets’ flown to North Korea by ‘North Korean escapees’ and threatened the cessation of Mount Kumgang tourism, the complete demolition of the Kaesong industrial region, the closure of the inter-Korean liaison office, or the termination of the 9/19 military agreement (the 2018 agreement to create demilitarised buffer zones) unless the South Korean authorities took ‘due measures’.

  Just four hours after Kim Yo-Jong’s early morning bombshell, the South Korean Ministry of Unification (MOU) announced that it would prepare legislation banning the distribution of leaflets to North Korea. This was a complete reversal of the government’s longstanding position, which consistently avoided such legislation for fear of infringing upon the freedom of expression.

  On 10 June 2020, the MOU announced that it would file criminal charges against Park Sang-Hak and Park Jung-Oh, two defectors from North Korea, for violating article 13 of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act, which requires prior approval of any inter-Korean exchange of goods, and would revoke the incorporation of their organisations, Fighters For Free North Korea (FFNK) and KuenSaem, for sending leaflets in air balloons and rice-filled PET bottles on sea currents to North Korea, as they did on 31 May 2020.

  While the North Korean government eventually toned down its rhetoric, the South Korean government began to take actions against North Korean human rights and escapee groups, viewed as a hindrance to inter-Korean peace.

  On 29 June 2020 the MOU held a hearing and on 17 July it announced the revocation of the legal incorporation of FFNK and KuenSaem for contravening incorporation conditions by grossly impeding the government’s reunification policy, dispersing leaflets and items to North Korea beyond the stated goals of their incorporation and fomenting tension in the Korean peninsula under article 38 of the Civil Code, a relic from the authoritarian era. 

  The MOU also launched ‘business inspections’ of other North Korean human rights and escapee settlement support groups among the over 400 associations incorporated by MOU’s permission, possibly with a view to revoking their incorporation. On 15 July 2020, the Association of North Korean Defectors received a notice from the MOU that it would be inspected for the first time since its incorporation in 2010. The following day, MOU authorities informed journalists that they would first conduct business inspections on 25 incorporated North Korean human rights and escapee settlement support groups, 13 of them headed by North Korean defectors, with more to be inspected in the future. While acknowledging that the leaflet issue triggered the inspections, the MOU added that the business inspections would not be limited to those involved in the leaflet campaign.

  How many groups have been reviewed or inspected after the announcements were made?

  Because of the international and domestic uproar caused by the obviously discriminatory nature of the inspections targeting North Korean human rights and escapee groups, the MOU has somewhat toned down its approach, and has belatedly begun to argue that it is focusing on all CSOs registered under the MOU.

  On 6 October 2020, the MOU told reporters that it had decided to inspect 109 out of 433 CSOs for failing to submit annual reports or for submitting insufficient documentation. According to the information provided, 13 of the 109 groups to be inspected are headed by North Korean escapees; 22 (16 working on North Korean human rights and escapee settlement, five working in the social and cultural fields and one working in the field of unification policy) have already been inspected and none has revealed any serious grounds for revocation of registration; and the MOU intends to complete the inspection for the remaining 87 CSOs by the end of 2020.

  In any case, the government appears to have already succeeded in its goal of sending a clear signal to North Korea that it is ready to accommodate its demands in return for closer ties, even if it means sacrificing some fundamental principles of liberal democracy. The government has also sent a clear signal to North Korean human rights and escapee groups with the intended chilling effect.

  How has civil society responded to these moves by the government?

  Civil society in South Korea is unfortunately as polarised as the country’s politics. The ruling progressives view the conservatives as illegitimate heirs to the collaborators of Japanese colonial rule between 1910 and 1945, and post-independence authoritarian rule up to 1987. The previous progressive president, Roh Moo-Hyun, who served from 2003 to 2008, killed himself in 2009 during a corruption probe, widely seen as politically motivated, under his conservative successor. The incumbent Moon Jae-In was elected president in 2017, riding a wave of public disgust at his right-wing predecessor’s impeachment for corruption and abuse of power.

  Most CSOs are dominated by progressives who are politically aligned with the current Moon government. The progressives are relatively supportive of the human rights agenda but are generally silent when it comes to North Korean human rights because of their attachment to inter-Korean rapprochement. The same people who talk loudly about Japanese ‘comfort women’ – women forced into sexual slavery by Imperial Japan before and during the Second World War – or authoritarian-era outrages readily gloss over present North Korean atrocities in the name of national reconciliation.

  Most North Korean human rights groups are formed around North Korean escapees and the Christian churches of the political right that passionately characterise leftists as North Korean stooges. Many are also generally hostile to contemporary human rights issues such as LGBTQI+ rights, which is rather ironic as Australian judge Michael Kirby, the principal author of the 2014 UN report that authoritatively condemned the grave human rights violations in North Korea as crimes against humanity, is gay.

  The largely progressive mainstream CSOs have not been on the receiving end of persecution by the government led by President Moon; on the contrary, prominent civil society figures have even been appointed or elected to various offices or given generous grants. Some do privately express their dismay and concern at the government’s illiberal tendencies, but few are ready to publicly raise the issue because of the deep political polarisation.

  Is the space for civil society – structured by the freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression – becoming more restrictive in South Korea under the current administration?

  The Moon government has displayed worryingly illiberal tendencies in its handling of groups that it views as standing in its way, such as North Korean human rights and escapee groups, who have faced increasing pressure to stay silent and cease their advocacy. 

  President Moon has reopened a dialogue with the North Korean government to establish peaceful relations, neutralise the North’s nuclear threat and pave the way for family reunification, along with other estimable goals.

  However, along with US President Donald Trump, President Moon has employed a diplomatic strategy that downplays human rights concerns. Notably, neither the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration between North and South Korea nor the Joint Statement issued after the 2018 Trump-Kim summit in Singapore make any mention of the North’s egregious human rights abuses.

  In the weeks before President Moon met North Korean leader Kim in Panmunjom, there were reports that North Korean defector-activists were being prevented from carrying out their activism. In October 2018, South Korea acquiesced to North Korea’s demand to exclude a defector journalist from covering a meeting in North Korea. On 7 July 2019, there was an extraordinary rendition of two defectors, fishers who were allegedly fugitive murderers, to North Korea five days after their arrival without any semblance of due process.

  The Moon government has resorted to illiberal tactics on other perceived opponents as well. A man who put up a poster mocking President Moon as ‘Xi Jinping’s loyal dog’ (referring to the Chinese president) at the campus of Dankook University on 24 November 2019 was prosecuted and fined by court on 23 June 2020 for ‘intruding in a building’ under article 319 (1) of the Penal Code, even though the university authorities made clear that they did not wish to press charges against him for exercising his freedom of expression. Many criticised the criminal prosecution and conviction as a throwback to the old military days.

  The government has also moved to exercise ever more control over state prosecutors. The Minister of Justice, Choo Mi-ae, has attacked prosecutors who dared to investigate charges of corruption and abuse of power against the government, claiming a conspiracy to undermine President Moon.

  Another worrying trend is the populist tactic by ruling party politicians, notably lawmaker Lee Jae-jung, of using the internet to whip up supporters to engage in cyberbullying against reporters.

  What can the international community do to support the groups being targeted?

  In April 2020 the ruling party won the parliamentary elections by a landslide, taking 180 of 300 seats, thanks to its relative success in containing the COVID-19 pandemic. The opposition is in disarray. All this has emboldened rather than humbled the government, and its illiberal tendencies are likely to continue. Due to the severe political polarisation, ruling party politicians and their supporters are not likely to pay much heed to domestic criticism.

  The voice of the international community will therefore be crucial. It is much more difficult for the government to counter concerns raised by international CSOs as politically motivated attacks. A joint statement or an open letter spearheaded by CIVICUS would be helpful in forcefully delivering the message that human rights in North Korea are of genuine concern for the international community.

  Furthermore, South Korea will soon be submitting its fifth periodic report to the UN Human Rights Committee in accordance with the list of issues prior to reporting (LOIPR). Because North Korea-related issues and concerns are not included in the LOIPR, it would be extremely helpful if international CSOs joined forces to include them in the oral discussion with the members of the Human Rights Committee and in their concluding observations.

  In the shorter run, country visits to South Korea by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders would be excellent opportunities to internationalise the issue and put pressure on our government.

  Even progressives may support a reform of the outdated law on CSO registration, for instance, as a matter of self-interest, if not of principle, in case of change of government.

  Civic space inSouth Korea is rated ‘narrowed’by the CIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with the Transitional Justice Working Group through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@TJWGSeoul on Twitter.

• South Korea: Civic space regresses under President Yoon

  한국어로 읽기

  CIVICUS, a global civil society alliance, is concerned about the erosion of civic freedoms since President Yoon Suk-yeol took office in May 2022, especially actions taken to stifle the media, freedom of expression and to target trade unions. These actions, highlighted in a brief published today, are inconsistent with commitments made by South Korea to the UN Human Rights Council. They also contravene its international human rights obligations guaranteed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

  More than two years after President Yoon was elected, press freedom has deteriorated in South Korea. The country has dropped in global press freedom rankings. There have been raids on media outlets such as Joongang Tongyang Broadcasting Company (JTBC) and online news outlet Newstapa as well as the homes of journalists. Defamation charges have also been filed against the media by Yoon’s administration and his political allies.

  The restrictive National Security Act has been continuously used as a means to censor and cast a chilling effect on those who exercise their right to freedom of expression. In November 2023, the UN Human Rights Committee stated that it remains concerned about prosecutions under the law and in particular under the excessively vague wording of Article 7 that bans ‘praising or propagating activities of any anti-state organisation’.

  “The Yoon government must halt its efforts to stifle the media and file defamation charges against journalists, just for undertaking their work. Instead, it should decriminalise defamation and end its harassment and intimidation of journalists. The authorities must also amend the National Security Act, so that it complies with international human rights law and is not used to harass, intimidate, arrest, or prosecute those peacefully exercising their rights to freedoms of opinion and expression,” said Josef Benedict, Asia researcher at CIVICUS.

  CIVICUS is also alarmed about the harassment and intimidation of trade unions. Over the last two years, their offices have been raided by the police and National Intelligence Service (NIS) and some unionists have also been arbitrarily arrested. There have also been allegations of ill-treatment of trade unionists by the police. Unions have criticised President Yoon’s use of union-bashing rhetoric, to vilify them and put them at risk of attacks.

  There are also concerns about the policing of protests in South Korea and restrictions in law and practice that are not consistent with international human rights law and standards. The UN Human Rights Committee stated in 2023 that the banning of a significant number of rallies to ensure the smooth flow of traffic, particularly in the vicinity of the President’s office, is not in conformity with the principles of proportionality and necessity.

  “The authorities must put an end to the stigmatisation, interference and judicial harassment of trade unions, and instead foster an enabling environment for the exercise of their right to freedom of association. It must also adopt best practices on freedom of peaceful assembly and review the Assembly and Demonstration Act to ensure that protests are not restricted by law enforcement officials,” said Benedict.

  As South Korea pursues membership of the UN Human Rights Council for the term 2025-2027 in October 2024 and seeks to be an advocate for democracy regionally and globally, it must take effective steps to improve its record on civic freedoms at home.

  Download the South Korea research brief here.

  Civic space in South Korea is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

  About the CIVICUS Monitor

  Over twenty organisations collaborate on the CIVICUS Monitor to provide an evidence base for action to improve civic space on all continents. Civic freedoms in 198 countries and territories are categorised as either ‘closed,’ ‘repressed ,’ ‘obstructed ,’ ‘narrowed ’ or ‘open ,’ based on a methodology that combines several data sources on the freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression

• SPAIN: ‘Democratic rules are being used to promote an anti-rights ideology’

  CIVICUS speaks about the recent election in Spain with Núria Valls, president of the Ibero-American League of Civil Society Organisations (Liga Iberoamericana), a platform that brings together 29 civil society organisations from 17 Ibero-American countries, specialising in human, social and community development. Legally incorporated in Spain, the Ibero-American League has worked on childhood, youth, education and labour issues from a human rights perspective for 20 years, by providing advice to governments, monitoring and evaluating programmes and building networks and doing public policy advocacy at the local, domestic and international levels.

  

  What were the causes of the political instability that required Spain to hold two elections in 2019?

  The widespread rejection of the political system that was established following the transition from dictatorship to democracy in the 1970s led to a significant deterioration of the two traditional parties: the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) and the Popular Party (PP). These political parties were very used to bipartisanship and ruling with the support of large majorities. When other parties appeared on stage, pacts and coalitions became necessary, which until then had only been a feature of local politics. It became necessary to include more minority parties and nationalist parties from the country’s periphery, which does not always pay electorally.

  In addition, the political conflict in Catalonia had radicalised the positions of parties present at the state level, which entered into a sort of competition to show who was the most Spanish. Even leftist parties do not dare to speak in recognition of Spain’s national plurality because the media, and particularly those from the capital, Madrid, criticise them aggressively.

  In the first elections of 2019, held in May, the PSOE felt uncomfortable when negotiating with the leftist and independent parties that had supported the motion of censure leading to the replacement of the conservative government led by the PP. On top of this, the personal ambitions of the leaders of both the PSOE and Unidas Podemos, the left-wing coalition formed in 2016 by the Podemos political movement and several other political forces, made a pact impossible at that time.

  The PSOE misread the polls and believed that a second election would give them the majority, and therefore the possibility of governing alone. But ahead of the November elections, people were angry because, as they saw it, due to their leaders’ personal egos parties had not done their job, and instead had made us waste time and money. All of this further deepened dissatisfaction with politics.

  Would you say that the extreme right party Vox benefited from this?

  Vox was one of the parties that benefited the most from the second election. It doubled its number of votes and became the third most represented party, with 52 seats, right behind the two major parties.

  Traditionally in Spain it was considered that there was no extreme right because the PP encompassed the entire right wing. But Vox emerged with great force and with a Francoist, aggressive anti-human rights discourse, presenting itself as the guarantor of the unity of Spain against separatism. In fact, the way the situation in Catalonia has been handled has been a breeding ground for the acceptance of increasingly right-wing discourse, justified in the need to preserve the unity of Spain.

  Another electoral result worth mentioning is that of Ciudadanos, a seemingly liberal party, which not long ago thought it would soon be in government, but which practically disappeared given its meagre results. Ciudadanos had focused its discourse on territorial conflict and on the unity of Spain. Voters who prioritised this issue preferred Vox, which has a more radical stance.

  Despite the good results obtained by Vox, however, it was the left that won the elections and this time they worked fast. In just 24 hours a pact between the PSOE and Unidas Podemos was forged, which had previously been impossible to achieve. Citizens found it hard to understand why what a few months ago had been impossible was now possible. But what is important is that the formation of a government was prioritised against the feeling of instability and paralysis that has prevailed in recent years. Faced with this broad pact among leftist parties, the right wing reacted with a very aggressive discourse, strongly rooted in the Francoist tradition.

  Finally, due to the abstention of Catalan pro-independence parties, it was possible to form a government. Governing will not be easy, but it promises to be a very interesting experience, which offers the possibility of creating change. It will be a very broad government, with 22 ministerial portfolios, notably characterised by gender parity.

  How would you characterise Vox as a political force and ideological trend?

  Vox is a far-right party that does not hide its xenophobic anti-human rights discourse. It prioritises two major issues: the unity and centralisation of Spain, and the elimination of gender policies.

  This is a worrying phenomenon that is not only happening in Spain. Extreme right parties arise in times of citizen frustration in the face of economic and social inequalities in a globalised world. There is an international movement – which spans Brazil, France, Italy, Norway, the USA and many other countries – that focuses on stigmatising and criminalising migration and so-called ‘gender ideology’. The support for these speeches by some religious congregations should also be analysed.

  These parties use democracy’s rules to promote an anti-human rights ideology. It is paradoxical that democracy, which was born under the values ​​of participation and respect for rights, is currently being used to strengthen and foster an ideology that is totally opposed to those values.

  How did this right turn take place just a few years after so many people had taken part in protests for economic and social justice?

  An element of this turn has to do with the anger that a section of the population feels toward politics. Corruption of political parties has had a great impact on society, as people think that politicians are in politics only to enrich themselves. There is no idea of politics in the broader sense as linked to the common good.

  In particular, there is a bloc of young people who see a very difficult future for themselves. They have very low expectations and view a vote for Vox is an anti-system choice. This is the vote of those who think that migration will deprive them of jobs and state resources, and that gender policies are an exaggeration. Vox is very apt at using social media with direct messages often based on falsehoods but that are reaching the population.

  The territorial conflict between Spain and Catalonia has also functioned as a catalyst for this anger. The message of ‘we’ll go after them (‘A por ellos’) used to despatch police units from the rest of Spain towards Catalonia to try to prevent the referendum on 1 October 2017, later reinforced by a message from the King, aroused an anti-Catalan sentiment. The right bloc, and especially Vox, appropriated the defence of the monarchy against republican leftist parties.

  How is this process being experienced by civil society? Do you think that the space for civil society is being degraded in Spain?

  Organised civil society was caught a little off guard. On the one hand, we did not believe that electoral support for Vox would be so strong, and on the other hand, we had a debate about whether we should respond to them, and therefore give them more media coverage, or whether it was best to ignore them. The second option prevailed, among political parties as well. And the strategy of ignoring them contributed to the increase in votes for Vox. There was nobody left to respond to their expressions bluntly and with clear arguments.

  Now civil society debate revolves around the need to defend human rights clearly and forcefully and respond to any expression that hurts or stigmatises any population group.

  In the territories where it is governing together with the PP and Ciudadanos, such as Andalusia, Madrid and Murcia, one of Vox's first actions has been to press for the end of aid to organisations working with women or vulnerable groups.

  We are experiencing a risk of regression in freedoms and therefore it is necessary for us to work in a more united way than ever as civil society. A clear communication strategy must be developed to reach all people. Often we in civil society remain locked in our own spheres and find it hard to take our message beyond our circles.

  Another strategy used by the right wing, and especially by Vox and the PP, is to use the justice system to settle political disagreements. Much of the judiciary in Spain is still very ideological, since many conservative judges remain as heirs of the Franco regime. As a result, sentences have abounded against the freedom of expression on social media, including censorship of songs. And many people have also been convicted for protesting publicly, especially in Catalonia.

  How has the situation in Catalonia evolved since the 2017 referendum?

  The referendum of 1 October 2017 was an act of empowerment by a section of the Catalan population that participated very actively, with a collective sentiment of civil disobedience, to achieve a better future against a state that did all it could to prevent it from happening. The violent state repression unleashed during the referendum and afterwards increased the collective feeling of a big section of the population in favour of independence, and especially in favour of the right to decide through elections.

  After the referendum, repression against Catalan pro-independence groups increased, and the state put all its police and judicial machinery in motion. In addition, it launched article 155 of the Constitution, which provides the state with a coercive mechanism to bind the autonomous communities that breach constitutional or legal obligations or seriously undermine Spain’s ‘general interest’. Article 155 suspended the autonomy of Catalonia from 27 October 2017 until 2 June 2018, when new regional elections were held. It amounted to almost a year of political, financial and administrative paralysis in Catalonia.

  Previously, on 16 October 2017, the leaders of the two most representative Catalan pro-independence groups, Jordi Cuixart and Jordi Sánchez, had been imprisoned for mediating in a spontaneous and peaceful demonstration in front of a building of the Generalitat, the Catalan government, where the police were conducting a search. They were imprisoned preventively, with no possibility of release before their trial.

  Following these arrests, judicial repression against the government of Catalonia increased, culminating in the detention of the vice president and five government ministers plus the president of the parliament of Catalonia, all of whom were placed in pre-trial detention. For his part, the president of the Generalitat went into exile in Belgium along with four more ministers, and two other politicians went into exile in Switzerland. The government of Spain made statements affirming that it had decapitated the pro-independence movement.

  This entire judicial and repressive process further complicated the political situation in Catalonia. The ruling issued on 14 October 2019, which sentenced independence leaders to prison terms of between nine and 13 years, amounting to a total of 100 years, caused new street protests to break out.

  Unlike all previous pro-independence demonstrations since 2012, the latest protests caused many riots and faced police repression. In addition, young people were the protagonists and adopted a more radical attitude towards repression. In that context, the anonymous Democratic Tsunami movement emerged. Inspired by the Hong Kong protests, this movement uses social media to call for large peaceful mobilisations in various locations, such as the border or the airport. The police have tried to discover who is behind this movement, but it really is just an instance of collective empowerment by pro-independence civil society.

  At present, following the latest Spanish elections in which the PSOE and Unidas Podemos required the abstention of the pro-independence party Republican Left of Catalonia to be able to form a government, the picture has changed. The government has pledged to initiate a dialogue with the government of Catalonia and to bring any agreements reached through dialogue to a citizen vote. This will not be easy because right-wing parties, using any judicial remedy at their disposal, are trying to boycott the process. An effort must be made to find a solution for the situation of pro-independence prisoners that facilitates a peaceful and political way out and allows a process of real dialogue to begin.

  Civic space in Spain is rated as ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with La Liga Iberoamericana through itswebsite andFacebook page, or follow@LigaIberoamOSC on Twitter.

   

• SPAIN: ‘We demand legal and safe channels for migration; attempts to stop it will only cause more suffering’

  CIVICUS speaks with Solidary Wheels about the deadly consequences of European governments’ anti-migrant policies, in light of the deaths of migrants at an attempted crossing of the Spain-Morocco border on 24 June.

• Squeezing civil society hurts India’s economy and democracy

  By Mandeep Tiwana

  India played a key moral role in international affairs during the anti-colonial struggles and as a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement during the cold war. What happened then?

  Read on: Open Democracy

   

• Sri Lanka government must respect the rule of law and protect civic space

  CIVICUS, the global civil society alliance and The Innovation for Change South Asia Hub are extremely concerned about the political crisis in Sri Lanka and its impact on the rule of law and civic space in the country.

  We are gravely concerned that President Maithripala Sirisena has undermined the rule of law by unconstitutionally removing the sitting Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and replacing him with former President and current Member of Parliament Mahinda Rajapaksa overnight. Rajapaksa’s administration was implicated in serious violations during the final stages of Sri Lanka’s civil war and the suppression of freedoms of the media, expression, and association.

  This was followed by a decision to undemocratically suspend Parliament denying Members of Parliament, who exercise sovereignty on the peoples’ behalf, the ability to assemble at this crucial time. We demand that the Parliament be reconvened immediately allowing representatives of the people to decide the way forward and to prevent the nation from plunging into a state of political instability and impunity.

  Our organisations are also alarmed by reports of the forcible take-over of state media institutions and intimidation of journalists disrupting the free flow of information to the public. We condemn such actions and call on the authorities to ensure that press freedom, a crucial component of a democracy is respected.

  We are also concerned that these political developments may put the civic freedom of Sri Lankans at risk. Citizens must be allowed to exercise their rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association.

  We hope that Sri Lanka’s democratic gains of the past several years will not be lost and we stand in solidarity with civil society and human rights defenders from Sri Lanka at this difficult time.

  Contact:

  Omid Salman (I4C South Asia Communications Specialist):

  Josef Benedict (CIVICUS Research officer):

• SRI LANKA: ‘Media control gave the government a definite advantage’

  CIVICUS speaks to Sandun Thudugala, Head of Programmes at the Law and Society Trust (LST), about the legislative elections held in Sri Lanka on 5 August 2020, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. LST is a legal research and advocacy organisation founded in 1982 in Colombo, Sri Lanka, with the goal of promoting legal reforms to improve access to justice, the justiciability of rights and public accountability.

  Ahead of the August 2020 elections, the CIVICUS Monitordocumented that human rights lawyers and journalists in Sri Lanka faced arrests, threats and harassment. Areport by the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, published in May 2020, also showed that civil society faced challenges in registering and operating along with various barriers to protest.

  

  What was the situation for civic freedoms and civil society ahead of the elections?

  As in many other countries, the situation of civic freedoms and the space for civil society has always been in a vulnerable situation in Sri Lanka. Even under the previous government, which was supposed to be more supportive towards civil society and the human rights agenda, efforts to introduce new draconian laws to control civil society and the undermining of basic freedoms in the name of counterterrorism continued.

  The situation got worse with the election of Gotabaya Rajapaksa as the new president in November 2019. His election campaign, which was built on the ideas of Sinhala Buddhist supremacy, disciplined society and enhanced national security, was supported by an overwhelming majority, especially from the Sinhala Buddhist community. This result was seen as a mandate given to the government to undermine basic freedoms and civic space in the name of national security and development.

  There have been signs of an increased militarisation of every aspect of society and the undermining of democratic institutions, such as the appointment of members of Presidential Task Forces – which are accountable only to the president – to handle key governance functions. There has also been a clear message of unwillingness to cooperate with the state’s international obligations, including by complying with UN Human Rights Council Resolution 30/1, which the previous government had co-sponsored and which was aimed at promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka after the 1983-2009 internal conflict, as well as with local human rights mechanisms.

  There have been increased surveillance of civil society activities and arrests of social media activists. This has clearly reflected a trend of undermining civic freedoms and civic space before the elections. The situation was exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The need to deal with the virus has been used as an excuse to increase militarisation and the concentration of power in the hands of the president.

  What were the main issues the campaign revolved around?

  The government led by newly elected President Rajapaksa, of the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna party (SLPP), was seeking a two-thirds majority in parliament to be able to amend the current constitution and give the president additional powers. That’s been the major election campaign goal of the SLPP. The need to have a strong government to protect the aspirations of the Sinhala Buddhist majority, defend national sovereignty and foster economic development were therefore among their major campaign themes. The popularity the president gained after winning the presidential election was used to mobilise voters to support the SLPP.

  The main opposition parties were divided, and their internal conflict was more prominent in the election campaign than their actual election messages. One of their major promises was to provide economic assistance for poor people who were most affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns.

  Issues such as the need to strengthen democratic governance systems, justice for war victims, longer-term solutions to ethnic issues or the root causes of rural poverty, indebtedness and inequality were not highlighted during the election campaign by any of the major parties. 

  Was there any debate around whether the election should be held during the pandemic? 

  The government wanted to conduct the election as soon as possible. It was willing to hold the election in April 2020, as planned, even at the height of the pandemic. Almost all opposition parties were against holding the election in April. The Election Commission subsequently decided to postpone it to August 2020 due to the health risks it might entail. By August, the situation had got considerably better and there was no major opposition to conducting the elections, which took place on 5 August.

  As far as I know, online voting was not considered as an option for this election. I do not think that Sri Lanka has the infrastructure and capacity to adopt such an option at this moment. More than 70 per cent of eligible voters cast votes and apart from the people who are still in quarantine centres, people experienced no major barriers in casting their votes. There were however incidents of some private factories denying leave for their employees to vote.

  Was it possible to have a normal campaign in the context of the pandemic?

  Health guidelines were issued by the Election Commission, which imposed significant controls on election campaigning. No major rallies or meetings were allowed, but the government and the main opposition parties violated these health guidelines by convening public rallies and other meetings openly, without any repercussions. It was clear that the parties with power had a clear advantage in overstepping certain rules. Additionally, candidates from major political parties, who had more money to use for electronic and social media campaigns, had a definite advantage over the others.

  Due to its control over state media and the support it received from most private media, both electronic and print, the government had a definite advantage over the opposition during the election campaign. The smaller opposition political parties were at the most disadvantageous position, as they did not get any significant airtime or publicity in mainstream media.

  This surely impacted on the election results, in which the SLPP, led by President Rajapaksa and his brother, former president Mahinda Rajapaksa, won 145 seats in the 225-member parliament. The opposition Samagi Jana Balavegaya party, which was established in early 2020 as a breakaway from the right-wing United National Party, won 54 seats. The Illankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi party, which represents the Tamil ethnic minority, won 10 seats, and 16 other seats were split among 12 smaller parties. As a result, on 9 August, Mahinda Rajapaksa was appointed Prime Minister of Sri Lanka for the fourth time.

  Was civil society able to engage in the election in a meaningful way? 

  Apart from being engaged in election monitoring processes, the engagement of independent civil society in the election was minimal. This is a drastic change when compared to the 2015 election, in which civil society played a key role in promoting a good governance and reconciliation agenda within the election campaign. Divisions within the opposition and the COVID-19 context made it difficult for civil society organisations to engage effectively in the process. Some organisations tried to create a discourse on the importance of protecting the 19th amendment to the Constitution, which curbed presidential powers while strengthening the role of parliament and independent institutions and accountability processes, but didn’t get any significant spaces within the media or any other public domains to discuss these issues.

  Civic space in Sri Lanka is rated as ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with the Law and Society Trust through itswebsite orFacebook page and follow@lstlanka and@SandunThudugala on Twitter.

• SRI LANKA: ‘We’ve held Pride celebrations since 2004; we’re very proud of what we have achieved’

  CIVICUS speaks about the status of LGBTQI+ rights and progress being made towards decriminalising homosexuality in Sri Lanka with Rosanna Flamer-Caldera, founder and Executive Director of EQUAL GROUND.

  Founded in 2004, EQUAL GROUND is the oldest LGBTQI+ civil society organisation (CSO) in Sri Lanka. It fights for the recognition and realisation of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and focuses on empowerment, wellbeing and access to health, education, housing and legal protection services for Sri Lanka’s LGBTQI+ people.

  How has the situation of LGBTQI+ rights in Sri Lanka recently changed?

  We still have laws inherited from British colonial times that date back to 1883. These are articles 365 and 365A of the Penal Code, which criminalise ‘carnal intercourse against the order of nature’ and ‘acts of gross indecency’. Both of these target LGBTQI+ people.

  Sri Lanka is among over 40 former British colonies that also criminalise same-sex sexual relationships between women. In 2018, I filed a complaint with the United Nations (UN) Committee for the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. In its decision, finally taken in February 2022, the Committee requested that the Sri Lankan government decriminalise homosexuality in general and between consenting same-sex women specifically.

  Soon after, in August 2022, a private member’s bill to decriminalise homosexuality was put forward in parliament. In February 2023, in response to Sri Lanka’s Universal Periodic Review at the UN Human Rights Council, where most LGBTQI+ organisations requested the repeal this legislation, the Sri Lankan Minister of Foreign Affairs said that Sri Lanka would follow this recommendation, while making clear it would not legalise same-sex marriage. We understand that’s a fight for another day.

  In the meantime, the bill reached the attorney general of Sri Lanka, who released an order that both articles of the Penal Code were to be repealed rather than amended, which made us very happy. But as soon as the bill started being discussed in parliament, a petition was filed claiming it was unconstitutional. There were more than 12 intervening petitions filed to counter this petition, and in response the Supreme Court issued a ground-breaking decision stating that the bill amending the Penal Code to decriminalise consensual same-sex behaviour does not violate the Constitution of Sri Lanka. The case specifically touched upon the concepts of human dignity and privacy underlying equal rights for all, because the preamble of our constitution recognises the value of dignity. The Supreme Court of India used a similar argument in a 2018 case on the right to equality, saying that ‘life without dignity is like a sound that is not heard. Dignity speaks, it has its sound, it is natural and human’.

  Now, the bill is up for a parliamentary vote, and all it needs to pass is a simple majority. While the government has said it will decriminalise homosexuality, there are still homophobes in the government. But we hope that the vote will turn out positively. 

  What role has civil society played in the case?

  EQUAL GROUND was among the organisations that submitted petitions in the case that was filed with the Supreme Court. Not only LGBTQI+ organisations, but many other CSOs and individuals also took part in the process. Petitions were also filed by a former UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women and by professors, lawyers, activists and people from all walks of life. The was a lot of positive media coverage, on top of civil society work to create awareness and take to the media to promote the issue.

  Of course, there has also been backlash, with some members of parliament attacking the bill and others reconsidering support following a recent Pride march that many thought was not appropriate to Sri Lankan culture due to partial nudity and problematic messaging.

  How would you describe relations between Sri Lanka’s LGBTQI+ people and state authorities?

  The police have played a huge role in subjugating LGBTQI+ people in Sri Lanka. Not coincidentally, the first event at Colombo Pride 2023 will be devoted to discussing the more than 200 human rights violations against LGBTQI+ people that have been recently recorded in Sri Lanka. In most cases the perpetrator has been linked to the police.

  In 2021, EQUAL GROUND filed a case against the police for hiring a motivational speaker who propagated among officers a narrative connecting child abuse and homosexuality. We won the case and the police have been forced to distribute instructions to all police stations alerting officers to be very mindful of their treatment of LGBTQI+ people, particularly transgender people. This has made it clear that asking for sexual favours, blackmailing LGBTQI+ people and stopping them on the streets with no probable cause is against the law.

  With the aim of protecting LGBTQI+ people from police brutality, we reopened the case, and the police have recently promised to the court that they will change the terminology to make it inclusive of all LGBTQI+ people. Our strategy was to engage only three LGBTQI+ people along with several heterosexual people, to show the court this was an issue for everyone and not just LGBTQI+ people. Doing it with straight support also showed that not everyone shared anti-LGBTQI+ prejudice. The fact that we filed these cases and got some form of commitment from the authorities was ground-breaking.

  Our upcoming Pride march has been sanctioned by the police. We sought their permission, and we’re proud to say that we have been the first organisation to officially get it. Right now, we have a very good Inspector General of Police, he’s easy to talk to, but there’re rumours he will be replaced in three months. I would say there are mixed elements in the current relations between LGBTQI+ people and the authorities.

  How does EQUAL GROUND advocate for LGBTQI+ rights?

  Our fight, even after decriminalisation is achieved, will continue to aim to integrate LGBTQI+ people into our society. This is the cause we have been working on for the last 19 years.

  We’ve held sensitising and educational programmes around the country. We’ve run a lot of social media and mainstream media campaigns, produced research backing our claims regarding the number of people who identify as LGBTQI+ in Sri Lanka and the kind of challenges they face, and have created self-help books for families and allies of LGBTQI+ people. We have an ongoing campaign that has been running for over a year called ‘Live with Love‘, targeted at people who are not haters but are rather neutral or in-between, and could be swayed either way.

  All that’s happened over the last 19 years has given rise to many other LGBTQI+ organisations in Sri Lanka that have become involved in advocacy and the struggle for non-discrimination and decriminalisation. When we established our organisation back in 2004, we were the only ones fighting for all LGBTQI+ people, and we remained alone in this journey for a very long time. Only after 2015 did other organisations and people start coming out and getting involved. Until then we lived under a dictatorship and it was difficult to be open, but we have held Pride celebrations since 2004. Our Pride celebrations are turning 19 this year, and so is EQUAL GROUND. We’re very proud of what we have achieved so far.

  What forms of international support are Sri Lanka’sLGBTQI+ organisations receiving, and what further support would you need?

  We are quite underfunded due to inflation and the ever-rising cost of living, so we aren’t sure that we can retain good staff considering the scale of wages we’re able to pay. We’ve also lost funding due to the fluctuating exchange rate. The state of the economy is one of our major issues, so funding is always welcome.

  EQUAL GROUND has been constantly involved in various networks internationally that have opened up avenues of funding and learning, including the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) and ILGA Asia, Innovation for Change (I4C), and the Commonwealth Equality Network, a network of Commonwealth countries and their LGBTQI+ organisations.

  Civic space in Sri Lanka is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with EQUAL GROUND through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@EQUALGROUND_ on Twitter.

• Statement at the UN Human Rights Council: Global trends on civic space

  37th Session of the Human Rights Council
  Oral statement

  Across the globe, CIVICUS has observed a pattern of judicial persecution, smear campaigns, threats, intimidation, physical assaults and killings targeting human rights defenders.

  We remain deeply concerned by the relentless and unwarranted restrictions on fundamental freedoms and attacks on civil society leaders, members of unions and members of the political opposition that have expressed criticism of government policies and practices.

  These attacks are particularly prevalent before, during and after politically charged periods like elections as recently observed in Gabon, where the movements of members of the political opposition and threats to human rights defenders have continued after the violence that followed the 2016 elections. Sadly, this is a trend we observe in many countries.

  We are alarmed by the growing tendency of states to use restrictive legislation and policies to pre-empt peaceful protests by citizens and civil society under the pretext of national security.

  Many states deploy armed security forces who use violence and live ammunition to disperse demonstrations. Protesters are killed and some are injured. As observed in Benin, these actions are often followed by arrests and detention of protesters, some of whom have reported being tortured.

  We call on states to uphold and protect the rights of citizens to freely assemble and express themselves in line with national and international human rights standards.

• Statement to the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights: Countries on the civic space watchlist

  37th Session of the Human Rights Council
  Oral statement at Interactive Dialogue with UN High Commissioner on Human Rights

  CIVICUS commends the High Commissioner for his report, and for his commitment to standing alongside victims of the world's most egregious human rights violations by continuously bringing attention of their plight to this Council.

  Mr President, CIVICUS shares the High Commissioner's grave concern over growing restrictions on civic space in Cambodia, Cameroon, Poland, Tanzania and Honduras. We note that these five countries have been placed on the CIVICUS Monitor's Watch List, which draws attention to countries where there are serious and ongoing threats to civic space.

  In Cameroon, reports of renewed violence against protesters have emerged as the authorities have shut down internet access in Anglophone regions of the country. The government has also taken sharp measures to control and limit freedom of expression by suspending journalists’ activities and radio and television stations’ operations.

  In the run-up to Cambodia’s 2018 general elections, the government has attempted to silence the opposition and suppress civic space, shutting down independent media and arresting activists. Repression of dissenting voices makes it highly unlikely that elections will take place in a transparent and democratic manner.

  Poland’s current trajectory has caused grave concern as the government seeks to restrict civil and political freedoms and control the judiciary and civil society organisations. Worringly, a new body closely related to the office of the president has been created to control the flow of funding to civil society organisations, which could result in only pro-government groups being funded.

  Peaceful protests following Honduras´ recent elections, which were criticised by the opposition and international observers, were met by security forces using excessive force. Several protesters were killed and many others injured and arbitrarily detained.

  Tanzania has remained on the Monitor Watch List and CIVICUS echoes the High Commissioner’s concern over the authorities’ unrelenting attacks on the media, civil society and the LGBTI community in particular.

  Mr President, restrictions on civic space are often a bellwether for further violations of human rights and allow states to act with impunity. CIVICUS asks the High Commissioner how his office intends to support local civil society fighting for human rights on the ground to respond to this global crackdown.

• Strict legal restrictions on foreign funding hit India’s NGOs

  CIVICUS interviews Mathew Jacob on the restrictions on freedom of association and attacks on civil society in India including laws on foreign funding. Jacob is the National Coordinator of Human Rights Defenders Alert – India (HRDA). HRDA is a national platform of human rights defenders for human rights defenders. Mathew is also a PhD scholar at the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai.