civil society
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The human rights situation continues to worsen amid increasing hostility against civil society
Statement at the 50th Session of the UN Human Rights Council
Interactive Dialogue with International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia
Delivered by Sibahle Zuma
Thank you Mr. President, and thank you to the Commission of Experts for this initial briefing.
Your mandate is critical: as the conflict continues in Tigray and Amhara regions, the human rights situation continues to worsen. Restrictions to civic space have increased; the Ethiopian government has become more hostile to civil society including humanitarian organisations, and human rights defenders have been the targets of torture and intimidation. The arrest of journalists Sabontu Ahmed, Bekalu Alamirew and Meaza Muhamed in May 2022 brought the total of journalists and media personnel detained since the beginning of the conflict to 19, and their whereabouts is unknown.
We are seriously alarmed by reports of crimes against humanity amidst a wide range of human rights violations, including mass killings, sexual violence, and military targeting of civilians. On 18 June more than 200 people, mostly from the Amhara ethnic community, were reportedly killed in an attack in the country's Oromia region. About 12 journalists were arrested and detained incommunicado. Two have been reported murdered.
Freedom of religion and belief is at further risk throughout the country: police used teargas to disperse Muslims during prayers marking the end of Ramadan in Addis Ababa.
It is imperative that the Ethiopian government protects civic space, and we call on the Ethiopian government to cease all forms of intimidation of human rights defenders, journalists and other media actors. We ask the Commission of Inquiry what States can do to protect civil society on the ground and to ensure their ability to operate safely.
We thank you.
Civic space in Ethiopia is rated as "Repressed" by the CIVICUS Monitor.
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THE NETHERLANDS: ‘People are beginning to realise that we need real and systemic change’
CIVICUS speaks with Sieger Sloot, an actor and climate activist from a Dutch branch of Extinction Rebellion (XR), about climate protests and the criminalisation of climate activism in the Netherlands.XR is a global decentralised network of climate activists working to compel governments to address climate change and prevent biodiversity loss and ecological collapse through the use of non-violent civil disobedience tactics.
What forms of protests has XR deployed in the Netherlands, and what have you achieved?
In the Netherlands, XR organised over 300 protests in 2022 alone. One of the most successful was a blockade of the A12 highway in The Hague city centre. We were 30 people when we started blocking the road last June, and since then, the number of participants doubled or tripled every time, so we grew exponentially. On 11 March 2023, around 4,000 protesters blocked the same spot.
It is XR’s strategy to use non-violent disruptive actions like blockades to draw attention to the climate crisis, and especially to the €30 billion (approx. US$32.9 billion) annual fossil fuel subsidies provided by the government. These attract way more media coverage than regular protests. The Dutch law allows a great deal of protesting and XR is actively investigating the limits of what is allowed.
These forms of protest have had a huge effect on Dutch society. For the first time we witness mainstream media talking about fossil fuel subsidies. Some 400 Dutch economists wrote an op-ed on why and how fossil fuel subsidies should be terminated. Members of parliament are making proposals for ending fossil fuel subsidies. The Dutch Secretary for Climate has announced a press conference on the climate crisis. A wave of famous musicians, actors, writers and directors are joining the XR movement. So our tactics are proving to be quite effective.
What are your demands to the Dutch government, and how has the government reacted?
The Dutch government promised to end fossil fuel subsidies in 2020 but still hasn’t done it, so with every blockade XR demands it end all fossil fuel subsidies immediately, or otherwise the protesters won’t leave. Until now, the government hasn’t complied with our demand. Instead, police have arrested protesters who weren’t willing to leave and fined others. They also used water cannon to disperse crowds and tried to infiltrate XR.
Over the past months, between 40 and 50 climate activists have been prosecuted in the Netherlands. The accusations vary from vandalism, which can be just about spray paint, to not following police orders and trespassing, all the way to sedition.
This included eight activists arrested for sedition because they posted on social media about their intention to go to the protest and block the highway. This had never happened before: it is a totally unprecedented attack on free speech and freedom of assembly. This provoked a lot of anger among Dutch people, since according to both Dutch and European Union law it’s allowed to block roads while protesting. Over 70 civil society organisations showed their solidarity with XR following the arrest of those eight activists by joining the A12 protest.
I think the Dutch government is criminalising climate activists just to ‘restore law and order’, but it has totally backfired on them. The District Attorney (DA) is prosecuting the eight activists, probably to make a case that not all ways of protesting are allowed – even though XR’s actions are always non-violent. We’ve had some quite violent farmers’ protests in recent years, but it seems that the DA didn’t dare to make a case against them. Of course they have tractors and aren’t as easy to target as climate activists.
What kind of support are your receiving from international allies?
We get a lot of international support online, which is absolutely awesome. Right now, I think we’re really thriving and growing rapidly. It feels as if XR is becoming more and more accepted and mainstream every day. Along with other activists I’ve started giving ‘Headed for Extinction’ talks to all kinds of people, which translated into more attention for our story from people in power and in the media. More and more people are now joining us because they see it’s the logical thing to do. A lot of powerful and smart people are beginning to realise that we need change, real and systemic change.
Civic space in the Netherlands is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with XR through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@ExtinctionR onTwitter.
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The UN’s NGO Committee Defers Rights Groups
- More than half of NGOs had their applications for NGO status deferred, even though no specific objections were made to their applications
- Organisations working on human rights, gender equality, sexual and reproductive health, and migration are repeatedly obstructed
- India, Nigeria and Sudan routinely block applications from NGOs working in their respective countries
- The longest waiting organisation, the International Dalit Solidarity Network, has had its application delayed since 2007.
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Togo’s violations of the press are out of step with democratic norms
CIVICUS speaks toKoffi Déla Frack Kepomey, the executive director of Concertation Nationale de la Société Civile du Togo (CNSC-Togo) concerning the recent closure of a television and radio station by the regulatory authority as well as the torture of a journalist.
1. Two independent media outlets, LCF television station and radio City FM, were closed by the media regulatory authority High Authority for Audio-Visual and Communication (HAAC) on 6 February 2017. Can you detail these closures?
The High Authority for Audio-Visual and Communication (HAAC) issued a communiqué on 19 September and 26 December 2016 respectively saying that it had informed media outlets LCF and City FM which are under the media group Sud Média, of irregularities and invited them to comply with the rules before 5 February 2017. A failure to comply would lead to the withdrawal of their licenses the HAAC said.
During a press conference convened by the president of the HAAC, Pitang Tchalla, on 3 February 2017, he declared that he was not aware of the existence of documents constituting a file of the Sud Média group and announced they will be closed after 5 February 2017.
The director of the Sud Média group, Luc Abaki, confirmed that the Sud Média group complied with the rules and that all documents had been provided to the then HAAC president Philippe Evegno.
Some questions remain to be clarified after the closure such as what exactly is the Sud Média group being blamed for? What are the underlying and unsaid reasons for this case?
Although it is the HAAC that attributes frequencies to radio and television stations, and gives authorisation to the written press, the HAAC also does not have the authority to cancel frequencies from those with legal existence. This power belongs to the justice arm of the state. Article 130, title IX of the Constitution states, among others that “… the HAAC has the competence to grant authorisations to new installations of private television and radio stations”. Additionally, article 24 of the Organic Law establishing the HAAC specifies that the HAAC has the competence to grant authorisations for the installation and operation of television and radio stations. Analysing these two situations shows clearly that the powers that be have decided to muzzle the press.
CNSC remains particularly concerned about the increasing restrictions for the freedom of expression and freedom of the press in Togo.
2. Journalist Robert Avotor was violently attacked on 7 February 2017 and tortured for two hours by security forces when reporting on a land dispute in Akato-Viépé. What happened?
The journalist Robert Avotor was carrying out his reporting work when he was arrested, handcuffed and tortured. This happened in Akato-Viépé, a suburb of Lomé, where he was reporting on a land dispute.
According to the journalist there is a land dispute in Akato-Viépé following a decision of the Supreme Court ruled that some buildings had to be demolished. Gendarmes came to force people from the area. There were about one hundred men in combat uniforms. Robert went there to do a report. He had his press vest and his press card. He descended from his motorcycle and approached the gendarmes and presented himself and requested to speak with the chief of the gendarmes.
Here are the facts as described by the journalist in his own words: “One of them asked me who I am and I repeated to him that I am a journalist. They responded that there was no chief among them, that they were all chiefs. After this, they asked me to show my press card, which I did. Afterwards they said: ‘We don’t eat cards here’. One of them ordered me to leave the premises. He had hardly finished saying that when he started to beat me. I ran but other gendarmes caught me and started clubbing me. They then handcuffed me, put me in a corner and walked away. Some minutes later, they came back and asked me for which press organisation I work for. I told them I came from L’Alternative. They asked me who the director was. I said it was Ferdinand Ayité. They responded, ‘This time, we have you. We always come across this name. We will make you feel what we are capable of. When you are in the crowd, you make noise. Today, it’s you alone.’ They left me in the corner. They handcuffed my hands behind my back. From time to time they came back to tighten my handcuffs. This hurt my wrists.
At a certain point, I felt the need to relieve myself. I asked them if they would permit me to urinate. They categorically refused. I then urinated in my pants and this amused them. They also brought in another person that they had discovered filming the eviction. I was there, handcuffed, for more than two hours. They then handcuffed us together (with the other person that had also been arrested), and we got into their vehicle. Once we arrived at the Gendarmerie of Sagbado, they erased all the images in our phones and on our devices. They gave us back our phones and asked us to leave. They took note of our identity numbers and we left around 14.30.”
According to Ferdinand Ayité, director of L’Alternative, journalist Robert Avotor has been subject to anonymous calls and harassment since the attack on 7 February. On the night of 19 February, while going home by motorcycle, he was followed by a car that sped up and hit the rear of his motorcycle, leading him to fall.
The Minister of Security, Yak Damehame, has received the journalist a couple of days later, together with the director of l’Alternativenewspaper and other media actors, in which he reassured to take the necessary sanctions to those responsible.
3. How would you describe the situation of freedom of expression in Togo?
The closure of these two independent media described above and the attack on and torture of journalist Robert Avotor by security forces are incidents that bear a heavy cost for freedom of expression in Togo.
The mission of the High Authority for Audio-Visual and Communication (HAAC) is “to guarantee and ensure the freedom and protection of the press and other ways of mass communication” and the first article of Organic Law 2004-021/PR of 15 December 2004 regulating the HAAC, modified by Organic Law 2009-029 of 22 December 2009 and Organic Law 2013-016 of 8 July 2013 says the HAAC is an “independent institution, independent of the administrative authorities, of all political power, of all associations and pressure groups”. The HAAC does not have the calling/ vocation to close media.
Togo has ratified international agreements, and in particular, it has ratified the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and also its Constitution does not permit torture.
These incidents constitute an obstacle to the exercise of the freedom of press and the freedom of expression, also protected by the Togolese Constitution and are an attack on human rights. They risk to annul all the efforts the government has implemented in that sense, and above all eligibility for different programmes of the Millenium Challenge Corporation.
4. How has Togolese civil society reacted to these developments?
Confronted with these events, civil society in Togo has mobilised to express their indignation through press statements, open letters and public marches. A public march was organised on 25 February in Lomé by CSOs and press organisations, joint by certain political parties, to condemn the closure of LCF and City FM. Although the march was authorised by municipal authorities, the crowd was dispersed by security forces using teargas grenades and batons, and chased protestors into the compound of the University of Lomé. CSOs and press organisations condemned strongly this violation of peaceful assembly.
Joint press statements were organised to denounce the violations of the freedom of expression, and open letters were written to government structures to use their influence to guarantee the freedom of expression. For example, CNSC has written to the MCA Cell, a structure put in place by the government to assist Togo to benefit from the Treshold and Compact of the Millenium Challenge Corporation.
5. Can you tell us some more about the environment for civil society in Togo?
At the moment we can say that there is a beginning of awareness within Togolese civil society in terms of mobilisation that needs to be encouraged. However, civic space is still under threat and there is need for more sensitisation and capacity enhancement to preserve civil society.
6. What support can international and regional groups offer to CNSC-Togo and other civil society organisations in the country?
Togolese CSOs not only need capacity enhancement for the effective preservation of civic space but also institutional support. There is a need to strengthen CSOs and activists on the preservation of civic space by accentuating the use of technology and including them in regional and international networks in order to share experiences and information.
Institutional support is a big need of CSOs in Togo, for them to achieve increased effectiveness and sustainability. Additionally regional and international groups must advocate, to the international community and the partners for Togo to respect regional and international instruments in practice.
Confronted with this situations, CNSC-Togo has addressed a communication to the Coordinator of the Cell MCA – Togo, a cell that was set up by the state to improve the indexes of development, freedom, corruption in order for Togo to benefit from the Millenium Challenge Corporation. We have asked the cell to use its influence to bring the president of the HAAC to reconsider its decision to withdraw the authorisation to close the LCF and City FM stations of the Sud Média group.
- For more information on CNSC-Togo and their activities, visit their website,www.cnsctogo.org
- Please describe in one paragraph what CNSC-Togo does.CNSC (Concertation de la Société Civile du Togo) is a Togolese civil society network with 72 member organisations, working mainly on the themes of democracy, good governance, and the promotion and protection of individual and collective rights of Togolese citizens.
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Treaty pushes for environmental justice in Latin America and the Caribbean
By Danny Sriskandarajah, CIVICUS Secretary General
Despite closing space for civil society, the new Escazú Agreement—which offers protection measures for environmental groups and defenders—is a shining example of citizens organizing in creative ways to fight for social justice.
Read on: Open Global Rights
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Trends and Challenges in Global Civil Society
Bernadette Johnson interviews CIVICUS’ Secretary General Danny Sriskandarajah on broad trends affecting civil society spaces globally.
We know it’s a cliché, but the world continues to shrink. Events, trends, and emerging ideas in other countries have the potential to affect us all. This is just as true for charities and nonprofits as it is for other parts of society. Whether it’s proposals to end the restriction on partisan activities by charities in the United States, potential curbs on lobbying by charities in the UK, limits on charities accepting foreign funding in Russia, or the day-to-day challenges organizations face in countries like Turkey or Venezuela, we can learn from – and in some cases be warned by – the happenings outside our own borders.
Raed on: Imagine Canada
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TUNISIA: ‘Civil society is not yet under direct threat, but we believe that our turn is coming’
CIVICUS speaks about the prospects for democracy in Tunisia following the president’s July 2021 power grab with Amine Ghali, director of Al Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center (KADEM). KADEM is a civil society organisation (CSO) aimed at promoting civil society’s contribution to democracy and transitional justice in Tunisia and the wider region, through awareness-raising, capacity-strengthening and documentation. -
TUNISIA: ‘The new constitution will guarantee the president extensive powers, enabling further violations’
CIVICUS speaks about Tunisia’s 25 July constitutional referendum with Amine Ghali, director of Al Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center (KADEM).
KADEM is a civil society organisation (CSO) that aims to promote civil society’s contribution to democracy and transitional justice in Tunisia and the wider Middle East and North Africa region, through awareness-raising, capacity-building and documentation.
Why is President Kais Saied holding a constitutional referendum on 25 July?
Changing the constitution or revising it is part of the president’s private project – a plan he didn’t announce either when running for the presidency in 2019 or during his first two years in office. This all started with President Saied dismissing the prime minister and suspending parliament in July 2021.
At that time, he didn’t even announce the revision of the constitution. It was only in mid-December that the president had to spell out a roadmap under international and local pressure. At the heart of Saied’s roadmap is a new constitution.
Unlike the 2014 constitution, which was based on broad consensus, the process leading to a constitutional referendum didn’t gain public support. When people were asked their opinion on revising the constitution, as part of online consultation organised in early 2022, only around 30 per cent of respondents agreed. Still, the president has gone ahead with the constitutional review process, with a referendum campaign asking Tunisians to vote ‘yes’ to ‘correct the course of the revolution’.
To what extent has civil society engaged in the process leading to the upcoming referendum?
Civil society has gone through unprecedented times in recent months. When it comes to its stance on the issue, in broad terms civil society has mostly been either silent or supportive.
At the start of the president’s July 2021 power grab, some civil society activists who were fed up with problems we have encountered in the past few years, with an inefficient democracy, saw Saied’s move as a political attempt to correct the trajectory of our democracy. One of Saied’s early promises was to fight corruption and bad governance.
But as soon as the president revealed his intention to change the constitution, political parties, influential people and some civil society groups started to oppose him.
Civil society is not one group or in one position – of course there is some diversity. The most vocal and influential groups are critical of him, especially since the planned new constitution was shared with the public; they realised its aim is not to ‘restore democracy’, but rather attack it. Now many are trying to stop the referendum process happening.
How has civil society organised against the referendum?
Although civil society’s response is late, they have recently used a range of means to oppose the referendum. Coalitions have been built, civil society has published position papers, conferences have been held.
Some groups are calling for a boycott of the referendum while others are trying to bring a case to court, although they do so in the face of presidential attack on justice: in June the president fired 57 judges, accusing them of corruption and protecting ‘terrorists’. In protest against judicial interference, Tunisian judges went on strike, only returning to work very recently.
The Tunisian League of Human Rights, a prominent CSO, has called on the president to withdraw his proposal and instead enter a wider dialogue with Tunisian society.
How free and fair might the referendum be?
When democratic transition took place in 2011 our country strived to create independent institutions such as the electoral commission and an anti-corruption body, among others. The proposed constitution dissolved almost all these independent bodies.
The only one it keeps is the electoral commission, which President Saied seized control of in May by firing its members and appointing new ones. In February he dissolved the High Judicial Council, as well as sacking the judges in June.
Given that context, the independence of this ‘independent commission’ running the referendum, and the integrity of the whole election, must be questioned.
What are your expectations for the results, and what impact will they have on the quality of democracy?
By examining the latest polls on President Saied’s approval ratings, he still has huge public support. But this is the result of his populism. He is a populist president and populism – at least in its early years – has many supporters. But once a populist president fails to deliver on their promises, they lose popularity and support. In Tunisia, we are still going through the early stages of populism.
Despite his popularity, I believe that his upcoming referendum will have a very low participation rate. With a small turnout, the legitimacy of the result will be questioned.
But the president and his regime don’t care about legitimacy. For example, when the national consultation took place months ago, it was a complete failure in terms of the participation rate. Yet President Saied used it as a justification to hold this referendum.
If the referendum is approved, it will be followed by parliamentary elections in December, according to his roadmap; parliament was dissolved in April. Meanwhile, there will probably be several ‘reforms’ and new laws. I am afraid to say that the next phase is quite scary because the president has the ultimate power to change laws without any checks and balances, in the absence of an independent judiciary, constitutional court and parliament.
Democracy means the separation of powers, checks and balances, and participation, but all of these have been cancelled by the president since July 2021. He has tightened his grip over the entire executive body, the entire legislative body, and even part of the judiciary. With an attack on the judiciary, we can count less on judges to be the ultimate defenders of rights and freedoms. Our democracy is probably at its worst level since the 2010 revolution that ousted autocrat Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali.
The human rights situation is worsening with the decline of democracy. We have witnessed several human rights violations, some of which reminded us of the kind of abuses that were committed during the early years of the revolution. The difference between that time and now is the absence of any accountability. The president hasn’t been held accountable for any decision he has made during the last year.
From our side, civil society has condemned these violations, but it was not enough, so we have been trying to network with various defenders of democracy in Tunisia as well as abroad. In the next phase, civil society will continue its pressure and mobilise against any deviations from democracy, given that the new constitution will guarantee the president extensive powers and open the doors for further violations.
How has the international community responded?
We feel the international community has left Tunisia behind. The international community is offering a very weak response to this attack on democracy and the loss of a democratic country. The community of democratic countries is not putting in much effort to keep Tunisia within its family.
Many of us are very disappointed by their reactions to the closure of parliament and what followed. The result is a very bad draft constitution that will probably cancel Tunisia’s democracy. But there has been no solid response from democratic friends of Tunisia.
In this way, they encourage the president to commit more violations. These countries are back to their policies of the past decades in prioritising security and stability over democracy and human rights in our region.
Civic space in Tunisia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with KADEM through itswebsite or itsFacebook page. -
TURKEY: ‘All critical voices are repressed under the pretext of combating disinformation’
In the run-up to Turkey’s general election, CIVICUS speaks with Fatih Polat, editor-in-chief of Evrensel, about the state of press freedoms and the Turkish government’s attacks on critical media.Founded in 1995, Evrensel is an independent daily newspaper. In August 2022, the Turkish Press Advertisement Agency permanentlybanned all public announcements and advertisements with Evrensel despite the Turkish Constitutional Court’s decision that advertisement bans on Evrensel and other newspapers violated freedom of expression and press freedom.
What are the conditions for the exercise of journalism in Turkey?
In Turkey state representatives routinely refuse to answer journalists’ questions. In any developed western democracy, this would be a serious matter and would be considered an obstruction of journalistic work. But in Turkey, this is no longer seen as a problem. For a very long time, the government has routinely imposed a variety of obstacles both on the critical Turkish press and on our foreign colleagues covering Turkey for international press organisations.
Ever since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) gained power 21 years ago, independent media have been in trouble. The government pressures critical media both financially and politically. It seeks to financially asphyxiate them by blocking the flow of official announcements and advertisements and imposing fines for alleged infractions concerning news, commentaries or television programmes. Political pressures range from lawsuits filed against individual journalists and newspaper managers to the detention, arrest and use of torture against journalists.
Critical television channels can also be subjected to temporary screen blackouts. Online media, which have developed significantly over the past 20 years, experience pressures ranging from court-ordered removal of content to lawsuits. Even cartoonists are subjected to punishment and arrest. Moreover, journalists are frequently exposed to police violence and detained while following the news on the streets.
On top of this, if the government is uncomfortable with the publication of a newspaper, a state official calls the agency that distributes advertisements and makes veiled threats to stop the flow of private advertisements. In contrast, newspapers and TV channels supporting the government receive serious financial aid from the state.
How has Evrensel been specifically targeted?
Evrensel is a 28-year-old, well-established newspaper that stays afloat thanks to readers’ contributions and advertisements placed by municipalities run by the opposition. On 22 August 2022, the Turkish Press Advertisement Agency, whose budget comes from tax money, banned Evrensel from receiving any public announcements and advertisements. This tactic is aimed at making a newspaper financially unviable. In response we filed a lawsuit, which is currently underway.
The new press law, which was recently introduced by the government under the pretext of ‘combating disinformation’, has led to a new period of repression of anyone who expresses a critical stance towards the regime. Lawsuits are filed against us for news and articles published in our print newspaper and on our website. Our website is frequently subjected to access-blocking orders.
Are journalists from certain groups particularly vulnerable?
The Kurdish media are under particularly strong attack. There is an ongoing conflict between the state and various Kurdish insurgent groups who demand either separation from Turkey or greater autonomy within Turkey. The government has increased pressure on Kurdish media, and on all Kurdish actors, after putting an end to negotiations. For example, Kurdish journalists have been arrested alongside legislators and politicians of the pro-minority People’s Democratic Party (HDP), including the HDP’s co-presidents Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, and mayors have been replaced by trustees. In April and early May alone, 34 Kurdish journalists and press workers have been arrested.
How has the repression of press freedoms affected the popularity of the ruling regime?
Your question reminds me of another important element of repression. In Turkey, insulting the president is punishable with prison sentences of up to six years. I am among the many journalists who have been tried for insulting the president; I was acquitted in 2019. This has been applied not only against journalists but also against social media users.
But for a significant segment of AKP voters, media censorship or corruption allegations against the president are not that important. Only bad economic performance can result in the erosion of their support.
On 14 May Turkey will hold a critical general election, both for president and parliament. The unity of the opposition has brought hope for a change. Right now, the prospect of a time when we will be able to breathe a little more freely again seems within reach.
What kinds of domestic or international support do Turkish independent media and journalists currently receive, and what would help?
There are several domestic journalists’ organisations in Turkey. For example, I am a member of the Journalists’ Union of Turkey and the Journalists’ Association of Turkey, the largest press unions in the country. In the last 15 to 20 years, various international journalists’ organisations have also provided important support, standing in solidarity with the independent press and journalists from Turkey, spreading awareness and advocating for our rights. It is very valuable for us that they follow the many cases of repression of critical media and include them in their countries’ political agenda.
Civic space in Turkey is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Evrensel through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@EvrenselDaily and@fpolat69 onTwitter.
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TURKEY: ‘Civilian refugees should not be used as political bargaining chips’
CIVICUS speaks with Bassam Alahmad, co-founder and executive director of Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ), about the Turkish plan to return one million refugees to Syria.STJ is a civil society organisation (CSO) dedicated to documenting human rights violations to contribute to the prospects for justice, as well as training human rights activists and building capacity in areas including digital security and civic engagement.
Why is the Turkish government making plans to return a million Syrian refugees to Syria?
We do not know the exact reason behind the plan to return a million Syrians to Turkish-administered regions of Syria. But there are several possible reasons we can think of. First, Turkey will hold general elections next year, and every time elections approach, the ruling Justice and Development Party will try to draw attention outside Turkey in any way possible – by attacking other nations, creating problems with neighbouring countries or groups of people – to hide domestic failures.
Second, the decision may be part of a wider strategy by the Turkish government concerning its engagement with northeast and northwest Syria, which aims to decrease the presence of Kurds and other populations who it doesn’t view as ‘Turkey’s allies’ – people that Turkey does not like having at its borders. To achieve this, Turkey will make claims that these populations are ‘terrorists’.
The decision announced to return a million Syrians from Turkey back to Syria therefore hits two birds with one stone. It would allow the Turkish government to show its domestic opposition that it is tackling the ‘problem’ while also using Syrians against Syrians in the northeast and northwest parts of Syria.
To sum up, there is no specific reason we know of, but we can assume that demographic engineering in northeast and northwest Syria and Turkey’s domestic politics are all at play.
How has this announcement impacted on Syrian refugees in Turkey?
This policy has really affected Syrian refugees in Turkey. Every single day there is at least one case of assault against a Syrian person – sometimes more. Incidents of racism and cases of deportation and violence at the border, and even of murder, have been verified. Hundreds of organisations and media outlets have verified racist attacks against Syrians.
Why are these attacks happening? Because the Turkish government is telling people that it has already spent too much on Syrians, and Turkish citizens are resenting it. The Turkish government is also telling people that it has freed areas in Syria from terrorists and they are now safe for return, so Turkish citizens are increasingly putting pressure on Syrian refugees to leave. Turkish public opinion turning against Syrians makes them vulnerable to racism and deportation.
The discourse that Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is disseminating is affecting Syrian refugees very negatively. And the problem is that it is not true. The United Nations, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Amnesty International and many others have all said that Syria is not safe.
How do you assess Turkey’s immigration policy?
Many countries and organisations say that Turkey should be thanked for its treatment of Syrian refugees; however, Turkey’s 2016 agreement with the European Union was a really bad one, because as a result Syrian refugees were trapped or detained in Turkey so that the Turkish government could receive money for hosting them.
Syrian refugees and asylum seekers have been used as political game pieces ever since. Following this agreement, in which Europeans agreed to pay money to Turkey to keep Syrians from advancing through Greece and further into Europe, there have been multiple instances of disagreements between Europe and Turkey leading to threats against refugees.
This is not good. You can’t keep using civilian refugees as political bargaining chips, using them against Turkey, or against the Kurds in northeast and northwest Syria, or against the Americans in northeast Syria. But the 2016 agreement gave the Turkey government leverage to use refugees as a political card, and they have used it. And by the way, Turkey is not the only country using refugees this way, and Syrian refugees are not the only refugees who have been used. Afghan, Iraqi and other refugees have had similar experiences, but this is especially true for Syrian refugees.
Do you think the attitude of the Turkish government points to a broader European pattern?
Of course, the Turkish refugee policy has a lot in common with refugee policies around the world. I do not want to say that all European governments treat refugees the same way as the Turkish government, but occasionally there are similarities.
In particular, we all saw how European governments treated Ukrainian refugees – this was good. But they don’t treat Syrian refugees the same way. European countries gave Turkey money to keep Syrian refugees in Turkey, while they opened their doors to Ukrainian refugees.
We do not want to paint all the Turkish and European politicians and policies with the same brush, but there are patterns of racist refugee policies and racist attacks against refugees that are important to recognise.
How has Syrian civil society responded to the announcement by the Turkish government?
Unfortunately, the civil society response has not been unified. Many Syrian CSOs that do not have employees or offices in Turkey have published reports about this plan; however, Syrian CSOs in Turkey have not been able to speak out, for a number of reasons. In some cases, organisations are politically aligned with Turkey and welcome these policies. But many others want to speak out against these policies – the racism, the deportations, the military actions against Syrians within Syria – but they are unable to for security reasons.
In other words, some people don’t want to speak up because they are essentially in agreement with Turkish policies, while others would want to but cannot because it is dangerous, as they are in Turkey, where speaking out may result in deportation or arrest. There are also some Turkish organisations that address these issues, but many do not have the interests of Syrian refugees in mind.
It is key for Turkish organisations to speak out and insist that Syria is not safe for refugees to return. There has been limited discussion about Turkey’s rights violations against Syrians, and this should not be the case. Both domestic and international civil society should speak out against violations occurring in Turkey and committed by Turkey.
Civic space in Turkey is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Syrians for Truth and Justice through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@STJ_SYRIA_ENG and@BassamAlahmed on Twitter. -
TURKEY: ‘For the embattled LGBTQI+ movement, simply persisting in taking to the streets is an achievement’
CIVICUS speaks about 2023 Pride and the civil society response to the Turkish government’s anti-LGBTQI+ campaign with Damla Umut Uzun, international relations and fundraising officer atKaos Gay and Lesbian Cultural Research and Solidarity Association (Kaos GL).Founded in 1994, Kaos GL is one of the oldest and largest LGBTQI+ organisations in Turkey, dedicated to creating visibility and understanding and promoting LGBTQI+ human rights.
How have Turkish authorities reacted to Prideevents?
Since 2015, Pride events have been increasingly banned by city governors. The first ban was introduced in Istanbul, which in 2014 had the largest Pride gathering, with at least 50,000 participants. But despite the growing number of bans, the number of Pride events across the country has also consistently increased.
This year in Istanbul, several Pride events were banned by district governor offices, resulting in detentions, police brutality and restrictions on journalists. A Pride movie event organised by the University Feminist Collective in Şişli was banned for ‘potentially causing societal resentment’ and ‘threatening social peace’. The screening of the film ‘Pride’, scheduled by the cinema collective, and a tea gathering event organised by the LambdaIstanbul LGBTQI+ Solidarity Association were banned in Kadıköy district. The police detained and later released at least eight people who came to watch the film, using physical violence. The LGBTQI+ group Queer Baykuş of Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University had their posters violently confiscated by the university’s security units before a planned press release. On 18 June, during the Trans Pride Parade in Beyoğlu district, the police handcuffed and detained 10 people, including a child, and released them later that day after taking police statements. Journalists were prevented from taking pictures during the intervention.
The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey compiled a detailed report of rights violations in the context of 2023 Pride events between 2 June and 10 July 2023. Various Pride celebrations, including parades, picnics and press statements, were banned by multiple governorships and disrupted due to targeted threats and societal reactions in Adana, Ankara, Antalya, Eskişehir, Izmir, Kocaeli and Muğla. A total of 241 people, including four minors and seven lawyers, were detained on the grounds of Article 2,911 of the law on gatherings and demonstrations. The main reasons cited by authorities were non-compliance with regulations, disruption of public order and violation of ban decisions. Although most detainees were typically released on the same day, they might face prosecution and lawsuits months later.
Police interventions during Pride events are a reflection of the government’s hostility towards LGBTQI+ people. They are waging a kind of war against us. The recurring violence is fuelled by a sense of impunity: the fact that law enforcement officials face no consequences for harming, insulting or harassing LGBTQI+ people further emboldens them.
Why is the Turkish government hostile towards LGBTQI+ people?
Oppression of the LGBTQI+ community in Turkey is not new: the government’s crackdown first intensified following the 2016 attempted coup. But the main reason behind the increasing hatred is the attempt of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to mobilise conservative segments of society. To mask the effects of its corrupt rule and economic mismanagement, the government is employing populist rhetoric and polarisation tactics, seeking to designate an enemy to blame.
Repression hasn’t been limited to LGBTQI+ people but rather targeted at any opposition or independent views. Dissenting voices, including those of Kurdish people, feminists and human rights defenders, are labelled as ‘terrorists’.
Among these groups, LGBTQI+ people are a particularly easy target due to societal conservatism and religious tendencies. Censorship and rights violations of LGBTQI+ people affect all aspects of life, including access to goods and services, education, healthcare and housing and media representation. In line with the global anti-gender trend, the government has employed a rhetoric focused on ‘protecting the sacred Turkish family structure against perversion’, using LGBTQI+ people and feminists as scapegoats.
What role did anti-LGBTQI+ rhetoric play in the2023 presidential elections?
Anti-LGBTQI+ rhetoric played a significant role in the election campaigns of the AKP government and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, aimed at mobilising conservative voters, including those on the left side of the political spectrum. Former Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu openly mobilised hate speech against LGBTQI+ people at public events. President Erdoğan used similar rhetoric, accusing the opposition of being ‘pro-LGBTQI+’.
Unfortunately, two radical Islamist parties, Hüdapar and New Welfare, have entered parliament, and their primary election promise was to close down LGBTQI+ organisations. They are now working actively towards this goal, and we anticipate that such rhetoric and efforts will intensify in the run-up to local elections in a few months.
How are LGBTQI+ organisations, including Kaos GL,responding to these attacks?
Despite facing oppressive conditions and lack of opportunities, the LGBTQI+ movement in Turkey remains resilient and strong. Alongside feminists, we are the only groups that continue to take to the streets and demonstrate for our rights, showing immense bravery in the face of police violence and detention. Simply persisting in organising demonstrations is an achievement in itself.
In addition to street activism, Turkish LGBTQI+ organisations are actively engaged in advocacy, the promotion of visibility and capacity building. We recognise that we won’t be able to change policies at the national level due to the AKP’s absolute majority, so we focus our efforts on grassroots societal transformation. We educate professionals who encounter LGBTQI+ people in their daily work, such as doctors, nurses, teachers, lawyers and social and municipal workers, to increase their understanding and capacity to work with LGBTQI+ people and respond to their needs in the respectful manner.
We document human rights violations and hate crimes, providing a factual basis for our advocacy campaigns. We also report on the situation of LGBTQI+ employees in the public and private sectors. Other organisations focus on reporting the challenges faced by LGBTQI+ students, people living with HIV, elderly people and refugees.
We also organise cultural events, including queer film festivals such as Pink Life Queer Fest and exhibitions and art programmes like the Ankara Queer Art Programme and the Women-to-Women storytelling contests, aimed at fostering expression and community engagement.
What obstacles do you encounter in your work, and what supportdo you need?
Since the attempted coup, the government has intensified its crackdown on civil society organisations (CSOs), subjecting them to frequent state audits to identify alleged mistakes, impose fines or even shut them down. Laws such as the Law on the Prevention of the Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction have made it increasingly difficult for CSOs to receive funds, further hindering their work.
Turkish LGBTQI+ organisations maintain close contact with European human rights organisations, Council of Europe representatives, the European Union (EU) delegation and United Nations mechanisms. We regularly update them about the developments and shrinking human rights space in Turkey, and in turn, they issue statements expressing deep concern about the government’s actions. However, these efforts have proven ineffective as the AKP government demonstrates a complete lack of regard and even fails to implement decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.
Turkish LGBTQI+ organisations have generally benefitted from EU funding, but this has started to decrease. It appears that the EU has somewhat given up on Turkey, since the government is making no effort to improve human rights standards. Additionally, the fact that Turkey is keeping millions of refugees out of Europe has limited the EU’s consistency in supporting human rights in Turkey.
As LGBTQI+ individuals living in Turkey, we are constantly pressured to hide our identities, pushed to the margins of society and silenced. But as LGBTQI+ organisations we continue to fight for our rights and freedoms. To advance our cause, we need more systematic financial resources, increased collaboration with international organisations, more vocal campaigns and international pressure on the Turkish government.
Civic space in Turkey is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Kaos GL through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@KaosGL on Twitter.
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TURKEY: ‘It is just not possible to respond to such a large-scale disaster effectively without civil society’
CIVICUS speaks with Gözde Kazaz, Communications Officer at Support to Life, about the way Turkish civil society has responded to the recent earthquakes and the support it needs to provide an effective emergency response.Support to Life is an independent humanitarian civil society organisation (CSO) that helps disaster-affected communities meet their basic needs and advance their rights by providing emergency assistance, refugee support, child protection and capacity building. Founded in 2005, it adheres to the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence and accountability in delivering aid.
What damage have the recent earthquakes caused, and what has been the Turkish government’s response?
The recent earthquakes affected 11 Turkish cities encompassing nearly 15 million people. This means the disaster affected roughly one in five people in Turkey. As of today, causalities have surpassed 44,000.
In a disaster of such magnitude, public institutions had a problem in meeting needs and establishing coordination among the various state agencies involved. This was particularly the case in the first 72 hours, when search and rescue efforts are of the most vital importance. One of the reasons for this may be that infrastructure in the region was badly damaged and communication lines were cut off. The sites and staff of public institutions were themselves also affected. We are currently seeing some improvements in coordination, but meeting the emerging needs in this vast disaster area is still very difficult. It is of great importance that the state, private sector and civil society work together on the basis of a healthy division of labour.
How has civil society responded?
Many CSOs that have useful expertise and work on disasters, Support to Life included, came together to form the Turkish Local NGO Humanitarian Forum (TIF) to coordinate delivery of aid and help meet the enormous needs we see in the field. Dividing responsibilities for various response areas according to each one’s expertise was an effective way to avoid duplication and deploy resources effectively.
In addition, another coalition, the Disaster Platform, is active in the response. It is just not possible to respond to such a large-scale disaster effectively without civil society, and particularly without grassroots organisations active at the local level.
Responding to disasters is one of the main things Support to Life does, so our emergency aid teams arrived in Hatay, one of the most affected provinces, right after the earthquakes hit on 6 February. We immediately deployed a humanitarian aid operation in the cities of Adana, Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa, and particularly in Hatay. Soon after, we expanded towards Adıyaman and Kahramanmaraş.
We worked with partners to conduct needs assessments in affected areas, which we continue to carry out on an ongoing basis in order to monitor the response. Since the outset, the Greenpeace Mediterranean and Amnesty International call centre teams were particularly helpful in enabling the general due diligence and rapid needs assessment required in disaster-affected rural areas.
We have focused much of our efforts on WASH – water, sanitation and hygiene – by working to establish water and sanitation infrastructure in temporary shelters. We have also prioritised shelter, food security and the provision of mental health and psychosocial support.
What reception have you had from the government?
As a CSO working in the field, we have not encountered any government-imposed restriction. We have permission from the Ministry of Family and Social Services to deliver mental health and psychosocial support services in the disaster area. We provide WASH services in tent areas established and maintained by the Ministry of the Interior’s Disaster and Emergency Management Authority. We participate in coordination meetings with local authorities. In other words, we have a collaborative relationship and we at least have not faced any obstacles when doing our work.
What role is international solidarity and support playing in responding to the emergency?
This disaster once again showed the importance of international solidarity and international support channelled through both government and civil society. Responding to a disaster of this magnitude is only possible if there is a great deal of international solidarity that translates into resources.
Ten days after the earthquake, the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) launched a three-monthflash appeal for US$1 billion for Turkey, aimed at supporting the government-led response and enabling humanitarian agencies to help more than five million people affected by the disaster. As of 27 February, barely seven per cent of the US$1 billion of the flash appeal, roughly US$73 million, has materialised.
TIF formed immediately after the UN appeal and has since played an important role in coordinating civil society humanitarian efforts and helping local CSOs access resources, including by engaging with the OCHA system. Support to Life regularly attends strategic meetings under the coordination of OCHA, representing TIF.
But three weeks on from the earthquake, serious humanitarian needs remain in the most severely affected areas, especially emergency shelter, WASH, food and non-food items such as plastic sheeting, cooking sets, blankets, jerry cans, sleeping mats and sanitary items.
What further support do Turkish CSOs need to keep doing this work?
What Turkish CSOs working to respond to the disaster need right now is as much financial support as they can get.
Humanitarian CSOs working in the field, Support to Life included, have noted that this is not a one-off or short-term but a continuous, long-term situation. We need to think about recovery, which will require lots of resources. This means a lot more financial support will be needed.
As an independent humanitarian CSO, Support to Life carries out its operations with funding that comes mostly from international donors such as UN agencies including UNICEF – the UN Children’s Fund – and UNHCR – the UN Refugee Agency – and theDirectorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, the Danish Refugee Council, Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe – a German faith-based humanitarian assistance agency – Save The Children and Terre des Hommes, among others. We are working with our donors to revise our ongoing projects so that we can redirect resources towards disaster response.
Civic space in Turkey is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Support to Life through itswebsite,Instagram orFacebook page, and follow@Support2Life on Twitter.
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TURKEY: ‘Refugees are the perfect scapegoat in times of crisis’
CIVICUS speaks with Dilan Akbayır, a social worker who works with Syrian refugees, about Turkey’s plan to send refugees back to Syria and the rise of anti-refugee sentiment and racism against Syrians in Turkey.Dilan collaborates with several Istanbul-based civil society organisations (CSOs), including the Women’s Health and Planning Foundation.
What prompted the Turkish government to announce a plan to send a million Syrian refugees back to Syria?
I think the change in the government’s position on immigration has a lot to do with the 2023 general elections and the context of severe economic crisis that Turkey is going through, with very high inflation and the Turkish lira falling to its lowest level in history. Both the ruling party and the opposition have already started their campaigns, which are also taking place in a context of increased restrictions on personal rights and freedoms, severe inhibition of the freedom of expression, and the use of unlawful evidence in judicial proceedings.
Turkey is the country with the world’s highest population of migrants and refugees. More than six million Syrians were forcibly displaced after the Syrian revolution broke out in 2011, and most of them flew to neighbouring Turkey. The official number of Syrian refugees in Turkey is over 3.7 million, but the total is estimated to be over five million.
It is not surprising that migration and the future of refugees have become the main agenda item in Turkish politics. Refugees are the perfect scapegoat in times of crisis. Politicians are using the issue to redirect people’s anger towards refugees instead of blaming the politicians who have not been able to address their concerns. Opinion polls are showing that the only thing that unites Turkish society is anger towards refugees – anti-refugee sentiment is the glue that keeps the new Turkey together. People are driven to believe refuges are responsible for everything that is wrong in the country and given the illusion that everything will be okay if refugees are taken out of the way.
In the context of an election campaign, any politician who most believably promises they will take care of this issue is likely to win. This is not exceptional to Turkey: we are seeing similar situations throughout Europe, as was recently the case with the French elections. Far-right politics are rising globally thanks to hostility towards refugees, immigrants and other minorities.
Are there any legal grounds for the new anti-refugee policy?
There are no legal grounds for the new anti-refugee policy. The international conventions to which Turkey is a state party, and Turkey’s domestic legislation, all stipulate the prohibition of refoulement. This means that refugees should not be sent back to countries where there is a danger of persecution, war, crisis, ill-treatment or torture. If this is not legal, then why have Turkish authorities and politicians announced a plan to return a million Syrians back to their country?
There is a lot of confusion about the legal situation of Syrian refugees in Turkey, which has been under discussion for years. When the mass flow of Syrians began there was a legal gap that was later filled by two new laws: the 2013 Law on Foreigners and International Protection and the 2014 Temporary Protection Regulation. As a result, Syrians’ presence in Turkey began to be referred to as ‘temporary’. People started saying that Syrians are just passing by, waiting to move on to a third, more developed country.
For the past decade, politicians have systematically emphasised the ‘temporary’ status of refugees living in Turkey – but in the meantime, refugees have made a life here, and they want to stay. Moreover, even if they remain under temporary protection, it still holds that certain conditions must be met before they can be sent back to Syria. The United Nations (UN) Refugee Agency has established that the return of asylum seekers must be dignified, safe and voluntary.
For refugees to be returned, the UN should declare the region a safe zone for return, which has not happened. The UN considers Syria to be unsafe due to the ongoing violence, human rights violations and desperate humanitarian situation: 14.6 million people need humanitarian assistance and more than 12 million are struggling to find enough food. Ninety per cent of the population is below the poverty line and the country is on the verge of famine.
As reported by Amnesty International, between 2017 and 2021 some Syrians were returned from Jordan and Lebanon, and returnees faced serious human rights violations, including arbitrary detention, kidnapping, torture, sexual assault and extrajudicial killings. Returnees may even be charged with treason or terrorism for having fled. Although armed conflict has decreased, the environment is still not safe.
Do you think this is part of a broader pattern?
It is not only in Turkey that migration and refugees have become highly charged political topics; this is happening in many European countries. More developed countries in particular were supposed to side with human rights and take much more responsibility in hosting refugees fleeing wars in Syria and other Middle East countries. But their policies have been mostly exclusionary and discriminatory.
We just saw the rise of far-right politics hostile toward refugees, immigrants and minorities in the 2022 French election. In Denmark, a country of 5.8 million, only 35,000 of 500,000 refugees are Syrian, but in 2021 the Danish government decided not to renew their residence permits claiming that parts of Syria are safe. It is also planning to start processing asylum petitions in Uganda, in a plan very similar to the British government’s plan to process theirs in Rwanda.
Following a UN resolution, the international community agreed to share responsibilities for the resettlement of refugees, but numbers tell a different story: the rate of resettlement in European countries is quite low compared to Turkey. This exposes the European Union’s externalisation policy, aimed at preventing irregular migration into Europe by ensuring that refugees stay in Turkey. This is not fair and causes more problems for developing countries such as Turkey, which experience more pronounced economic, social and political crises.
How has the announcement of the new policy impacted on Syrian refugees living in Turkey?
A majority of Syrians in Turkey don’t want to return to their country. Even as they are being increasingly scapegoated, over the years they have changed their view on a possible return. In 2017, 60 per cent of Syrian refugees surveyed in Turkey said they wanted to return to their country as soon as the war is over. Currently, 80 per cent say they do not want to go back because they have already established life in Turkey, and they think life will not go back to normal in Syria even if the war ends.
However, many do not feel so safe in Turkey anymore. The political rhetoric around sending back Syrian refugees goes hand in hand with growing anti-refugee sentiment fuelled by the increased visibility of Syrians in Turkish society. The majority live in big cities such as Ankara and Istanbul, and as the refugee population grows, they start to be seen as a problem or a threat.
In contrast, when Syrians started to arrive in Turkey in 2012, society welcomed them. At that time, a major factor leading to acceptance was emphasis on their ‘temporary’ status, supported by the authorities’ discourse referring to them as ‘guests’. Eleven years later, growing socio-economic problems that the government has not taken seriously began to reflect on Syrian refugees.
As exclusionary nationalist discourse spiked, Syrians were placed at the root of domestic problems. According to a recent report by the Center for Migration Studies at Ankara University, 85 per cent of surveyed people in Turkey want Syrians to be returned or isolated, as they view them as potentially causing more problems in the future.
Moreover, anti-refugee groups are using the media to disseminate xenophobic propaganda. They stir feelings of national and racial superiority and raise concerns regarding cultural integration, presenting attacks on refugees as a way to defend the homeland. They insist the presence of Syrians is having negative effects on public safety and the country’s demography and economic prospects. Syrian refugees are blamed for growing restrictions on women’s freedoms and increasing rates of murder and rape. These issues are easily used to manipulate the public.
How has Turkish civil society responded?
In the face of increasing anti-refugee rhetoric, some civil society groups and activists, including women’s rights organisations, artists and academics, have expressed solidarity through public statements and by holding events such as anti-racist panels.
However, given the wider anti-refugee political climate, many CSOs did not make any statements against anti-refugee discourse. Sadly, some institutions working with refugees stopped their activities in response to increasing hostility. Others decided to continue their work more quietly. Civic space in getting narrower for us.
Civic space in Turkey is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
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TURKEY: ‘The government does not tolerate opinions different from its own’
CIVICUS speaks with lawyer Eren Keskin, chair of the Human Rights Association (IHD), about the Turkish government’s attacks on critical media and the state of press freedoms in the context of Turkey’s current elections.Founded in 1986, IHD is one of Turkey’s oldest and largest human rights civil society organisations. It documents human rights violations and campaigns for the protection of human rights and civic freedoms in Turkey.
What are the conditions for journalism in Turkey?
Problems in the area of freedom of expression have existed in Turkey since the foundation of the republic. From the very beginning there were issues that the republic’s official ideology of Turkish-Islamic synthesis prohibited speaking about. Issues such as the Kurdish conflict, the 1915 Armenian Genocide and, later on, Turkey’s military presence in Cyprus, have long been forbidden topics.
What’s changed under the present government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party is that the opposition’s freedom of expression has been severely restricted across the board. As a result, obstacles have mounted for opposition journalists to express their views.
The government does not tolerate opinions different from its own. It recklessly issues arrest warrants for articles, speeches and social media messages if they express diverging opinions. The state of Turkey recognises freedom of expression in its domestic legislation and is bound to respect it as a state party to the European Convention on Human Rights, but it continues to violate its own laws and the international conventions and covenants it has signed.
What tactics does the government use against independent media and how have you been affected?
Because it does not tolerate any kind of diverging opinion, the government is extremely aggressive towards independent media and the free press, the majority of which are Kurdish media outlets.
Dissident journalists are commonly charged with making propaganda for an illegal organisation. Particularly with news reports on the Kurdish war, most lawsuits are filed on charges of making propaganda for the Kurdish political movement or Kurdish armed forces. Apart from this, a large number of cases are filed on charges of insulting the president, insulting the forces of the state and inciting the public to hatred and enmity.
Many journalists are under arrest or subject to international travel bans merely for expressing their thoughts in writing. There is almost no journalist who is not being subjected to judicial control.
I was once the volunteer editor-in-chief of the daily Özgür Gündem, one of the newspapers that has faced the most repression, and have stood trial in 143 cases just because my name appeared on the newspaper as volunteer editor-in-chief.
I’ve been sentenced to a total of 26 years and nine months in prison for alleged crimes such as membership of an illegal organisation, making propaganda for an illegal organisation and insulting the president, even for articles I did not write. These sentences are pending a decision of the Court of Cassation. As soon as they are final, I may go to prison. I have also been unable to travel abroad for six years now because of an international travel ban.
Has the intensification of repression affected the popularity of the president in any way?
Considering that the ruling regime is the main culprit for all the rights violations currently taking place in Turkey, and that power is concentrated in the hands of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, it must be admitted that the main perpetrator of rights violations is the president himself. The judiciary is completely dependent on the president. Judges and prosecutors render compliant decisions out of fear. Where judges and prosecutors are afraid, it is unthinkable for the judiciary to be independent.
The president’s attitude towards the press, especially the opposition press, and the language of hatred and violence he uses, does not detract from his popularity but is instead a major reason his followers support him. However, we think that a large part of society, hopefully a growing part, is also disturbed by his blatant violations of freedom of expression.
What do you make of the results of the 14 May general election?
The AKP had relative success in the presidential and parliamentary elections held on 14 May. The president did better than expected, considering the economic situation and the criticism he’s faced over the response to the earthquakes in February. His party has maintained control of parliament. But he didn’t win re-election outright: he received 49.5 per cent of the vote while his opposition challenger, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) received almost 45 per cent. Now there’s going to be a runoff on 28 May.
None of this should come as a surprise. Society has become extremely polarised, especially as a result of Erdoğan’s rhetoric of fear, hatred and violence. We also witnessed many practices that violated the constitution and electoral laws, such as government ministers becoming parliamentary candidates without resigning and therefore using state resources for campaigning. The ruling party monopolises a large part of the media and used it exclusively on its own behalf. The elections were therefore held under extremely unequal conditions.
It’s hard to predict what the outcome of the runoff will be. The election may end in favour of Erdoğan or Kılıçdaroğlu. Much will depend on the practices that develop during the election.
How will the situation of vulnerable minorities in Turkey be affected by the election results?
Erdoğan uses language that is completely against human rights and the AKP has retained its parliamentary majority by coalescing with an extremist party. The situation will become dangerous if Erdoğan wins once again, especially for women, LGBTQI+ people and Kurdish people.
Withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention – the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence – has already affected the feminist movement a lot. Now Law No. 6,284 on violence against women is being questioned. This poses a great danger for women and LGBTQI+ people.
Similarly, if Erdoğan wins again, pro-security approaches to the Kurdish issue will continue to dominate, preventing progress towards peace.
As for Syrian asylum-seekers, the AKP presents itself as having provided a good environment for them, but it is not really the case. Asylum-seekers in Turkey do not qualify as refugees because of the state’s reservation to the 1951 Refugee Convention. They are subjected to racist attacks. They work as cheap labour in extremely difficult conditions. Women and girls live under permanent risk of violence. An AKP win will not give them a chance.
But it must be noted that the CHP’s proposal regarding refugees is not any more democratic or inclusive, and its discourse also has racist overtones. Therefore, first and foremost, the discriminatory, double-standard approach to the Refugee Convention should be questioned.
What kinds of domestic or international support do Turkish independent media and journalists currently receive, and what more would you need?
Journalists working in independent media in Turkey, and especially in Kurdistan, are clearly not receiving sufficient international support. The Republic of Turkey is a state party to many international conventions that guarantee freedoms of expression and the press. The state has committed to respecting them on paper, but it violates them in practice. All these conventions have monitoring mechanisms, but unfortunately, they are not being properly implemented for Turkey. In this sense, the European Union has left Turkey alone.
We believe that Turkey should be questioned more, especially by western media organisations and by Turkey’s co-signatory states of international rights conventions, to contribute to the lifting of repressive measures against the dissident press.
Civic space in Turkey is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with the Human Rights Association through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@ihd_genelmerkez on Twitter.
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TURKMENISTAN: ‘There is nothing resembling real civil society – and no conditions for it to emerge’
CIVICUS speaks with Farid Tukhbatullin, founder and director of the Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights (TIHR), about the upcoming election and the environment for civil society in Turkmenistan.TIHR is a civil society organisation (CSO) based in Austria, where Farid lives in exile, that collects information from sources inside Turkmenistan to report internationally on human rights and civic space violations and advocate for democratic change.
What is the state of the space for civil society in Turkmenistan?
In the early 1990s, several independent CSOs appeared in Turkmenistan. The fingers of one hand were enough to count them. These included our organisation, Dashoguz Ecological Club.
But by the late 1990s, the first president of the country, Turkmenbashi, viewed them as a danger to the system he was building. Independent CSOs were liquidated and only a few quasi-CSOs remained - the Union of Women, the Union of Veterans and the Union of Youth, all of which were remnants of the Soviet era.
Turkmenistan not only lacks anything resembling real civil society – it also does not meet the minimal preconditions for its emergence.
There are no independent media outlets in Turkmenistan. Not surprising, in Reporters Without Borders’ Press Freedom Index, the country constantly ranks second-to-last or last, next to North Korea.
People who dare express opinions critical of the government publicly, through YouTube or on social media, end up in prison. Recent examples include Murat Dushemov and Nurgeldy Khalykov, both sentenced to four years in prison, and Pygamberdy Allaberdiyev, who received a six-year sentence.
Special services also harass relatives of activists who are working or studying abroad and run opposition blogs from outside the country. They try to silence them by threatening their families back home.
What have been the implications of Turkmenistan’s policy of insisting it has no COVID-19 cases?
Unfortunately, there is no reliable information regarding the real impact of the pandemic in Turkmenistan, and of course no assistance for those who have been badly hit. According to our sources, the number of people hospitalised is now decreasing. But before this there was a large number of deaths. Small towns were holding several funerals a day. According to local traditions, a large part of the local population takes part in funeral rites, so the whole town knows who died and when.
Why has President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov called an early election, and what is its likely outcome?
President Berdimuhamedov started promoting his son Serdar as his heir quite a long time ago. We became aware of the planning of an extraordinary meeting of the People’s Council, the upper house of parliament, in November 2021. The idea of holding early presidential elections was voiced at this meeting; that’s when preparations for the next step for a formal change of power began.
But there is no reason to believe this process will trigger real political change in Turkmenistan. No one doubts that on 12 March the younger Berdimuhamedov will become the country’s next president. But his father is not going to give up the reins. In violation of the constitution, he is now both president and leader of the People’s Council. After the election, he will retain his second position.
Moreover, it has already been announced that changes will be made to the constitution. We have no details yet, but changes will surely create further opportunities for father and son to lead the country in tandem.
Even leaving the presidency to his son frightens President Berdimuhamedov. The younger Berdimuhamedov will certainly want to make changes in the cabinet of ministers, replacing some with proxies of a younger age, and this may create some turbulence in the highest spheres of power. So Gurbanguly will most likely remain the real ruler at the beginning, with Serdar’s leadership a formality.
How is civil society, and TIHR specifically, working to defend human rights and monitor violations in Turkmenistan?
A CSO, the Helsinki Group of Turkmenistan (HGT), was founded in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, in July 2002 to monitor the human rights situation on the ground. HGT was the predecessor organisation to TIHR. It operated underground and its members were systematically persecuted and repressed. I was detained on 23 December 2002 and sentenced to three years in prison for my peaceful activism. Fortunately, the campaign ran by international CSOs and pressure from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) paid off and I was pardoned and released on 2 April 2003. I left the country in June and received refugee status in Austria in November 2003. I led the establishment and registration of TIRH in Austria in November 2004.
TIHR has the vision of a democratic Turkmenistan based on the rule of law, respect for human rights and cooperation with civil society. We work to create the conditions that would allow for the emergence and evolution of a so far non-existent civil society and to raise citizens’ legal awareness, particularly regarding human rights.
We collect, analyse and publish information on various human rights issues, including prison conditions, the treatment of ethnic minorities, child labour, the education system and restrictions on the freedom of association. Our reporting is based on information from sources inside Turkmenistan whose identities we must keep confidential to protect them and their families.
In 2006 we established a website, Chronicle of Turkmenistan, which provides first-hand information in English, Russian and Turkmen and has become one of the most widely cited sources on Turkmenistan. And in 2007 we started making YouTube videos. We have so far published 244, which have overall reached almost 50 million views.
This format has allowed us to use humour effectively as a political tool. For instance, in August 2017 we published one of our many satirical videos about President Berdimuhamedov, based on official state TV footage of his meetings with military personnel Rambo-style. The video instantly became a meme on social media and was republished by leading global media outlets. The president with the ‘hard-to-pronounce last name’ became a YouTube star and we gained millions of viewers.
The popularity snowball effect reached the USA with Trevor Noah’s The Daily Show, which in February 2018 awarded President Berdimuhamedov the prize for ‘best performance by a dictator in a propaganda video’. And in August 2019, it further snowballed when John Oliver reused our content in a Last Week Tonight episode about the Turkmen president, amassing 10 million clicks. Finally, in December 2019 Netflix released the action movie ‘6 Underground’, about the overthrow of the dictator of the fictional state of Turgistan, which very much resembled Turkmenistan.
We do all this to shed light on the human rights violations that continue to happen in this very isolated country. We have submitted several shadow reports – 16 since 2008 – to the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council and to nearly all UN treaty bodies, often together with other human rights organisations. We have also submitted dozens of analytical reports and briefing papers to intergovernmental organisations, and have published countless statements and open letters, often in cooperation with other CSOs. In 2020 alone, we published 10 analytical reports, four briefing papers, two press statements and six open letters.
Our analytical reports include a series focusing on civic space, which since 2017 we have published quarterly together with CIVICUS and the International Partnership for Human Rights. We cooperate with all major international human rights CSOs, all of which rely – at least partly – on our work when it comes to Turkmenistan.
What can the international community, including international civil society, do to support civic space and human rights in Turkmenistan?
What helps the most is targeted advocacy at the international level and reporting to inform, shape and guide the policies of outside actors – international institutions such as the European Union, OSCE and UN, but also individual governments and others that have political or economic interests in the country – with respect to human rights issues in Turkmenistan.
Civic space in Turkmenistan is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with TIHR through the Chronicles of Turkmenistanwebsite orFacebook page. -
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS: ‘Advancing LGBTQI+ rights requires advocacy, awareness-raising and a concerted effort to foster a culture of inclusion’
CIVICUS speaks with Tim Prudhoe, a lawyer with Stanbrook Prudhoe, about a legal challenge brought against discriminatory legislation against LGBTQI+ people and the struggle for equal rights of same-sex married partners in Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI).
Stanbrook Prudhoe is a law firm specialising in complex and cross-border cases in the Caribbean region.
What legal action are you involved in?
Since 2021 we have been representing Tim Haymon, a US citizen, and Richard Sankar, a Turks and Caicos Islander, in legal proceedings against the TCI government. The case is now up on appeal after findings of breaches of rights protected under the TCI constitution. The couple married in Florida in 2020, but Tim has been denied an exemption from the need to obtain a work permit, although that exemption is available to the spouse of a Turks and Caicos Islander. There is no definition of ‘spouse’ under the relevant immigration legislation and the definition used in the letter of refusal referenced the marriage legislation. The Marriage Ordinance treats same-sex marriages as void.
The refusal of the spousal exemption was by the Director of Immigration. Tim and Richard brought proceedings against him alleging breaches of the protected rights of equality before the Law, the right to family and private life and freedom from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
The trial took place in November 2022 and the decision was delivered in March 2024. The TCI Supreme Court upheld two of our three claims, finding violations of the constitutional rights to private and family life and to protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. However, the court did not uphold the claim of equality before the law. That is the subject of an appeal that will be heard on 23 and 24 October.
The government has also appealed. Although it relied on no evidence during the trial, it now disputes any findings of constitutional breach. The government’s legal team remains headed by Ivan Hare KC of Blackstone Chambers in London, UK. Colours Caribbean, an LGBTQI+ rights organisation, successfully applied to join the appeal as an interested party.
Before the claims were first started, Tim and Richard offered to abandon their legal action if the government enacted civil partnership legislation giving same-sex couples the same rights and benefits as opposite-sex couples. Unfortunately, this offer was ignored. Our appeal document itself repeats that offer. When we first made that offer, we even provided the government with a copy of the Cayman Islands legislation recognising civil partnerships as a precedent they could work from. But, again, no response.
The Supreme Court’s decision was a significant step forward for LGBTQI+ rights in TCI. Former TCI Premier Michael Misick criticised it publicly, calling for Richard to have his Turks and Caicos Islander status revoked. If successful, the government’s appeal would be a major setback for equality. Either way, the outcome will have broader implications for LGBTQI+ rights across the Caribbean.
What’s the status of LGBTQI+ rights in TCI, and what difference have recent Privy Council rulings made?
The status of LGBTQI+ rights in TCI has a long way to go still. The government’s reliance on traditional moral standards and recent rulings on marriage issues by the UK Privy Council, the final court of appeal for TCI and other British Overseas Territories, are significant barriers to the advancement of LGBTQI+ rights.
Recent Privy Council rulings on same-sex marriage in Bermuda and the Cayman Islands have significantly influenced the discourse on LGBTQI+ rights in TCI. The combined appeal on the right to marry in the Ferguson case in Bermuda and the Bodden Bush case in the Cayman Islands is particularly noteworthy.
In Bermuda, same-sex couples had the right to marry for a period before the law was changed. Marriages already performed remained valid, but no new marriages could be celebrated – a situation that led to a case being taken to the European Court of Human Rights on the grounds that those left out were in practical effect facing discrimination. The Privy Council ruled that marriage was a unique legal institution and those jurisdictions could decide the scope of marriage without violating their constitutions.
This gave us an insight into the Privy Council’s position. However, we distinguished our case in TCI by focusing on recognition of equivalent legal rights rather than the establishment of a right to marry. The government argued we were trying to introduce the right to marry via the back door, because of the attempt to invoke the spousal exemption from immigration restrictions.
The Privy Council’s decision, which confirmed that jurisdictions can define marriage, wasn’t that surprising. TCI’s constitution, like Cayman’s, includes a preamble about TCI being a God-fearing nation. The government’s arguments in TCI appeal rely heavily on this. This is pretty odd, in light of the fact that it failed to present any actual evidence at trial.
Despite these challenges, the LGBTQI+ community and its advocates continue to press for equality and recognition, reflecting a wider struggle in many small jurisdictions.
What are the challenges for LGBTQI+ activism in TCI?
A major challenge is stigma, which is keenly felt in a place as small as TCI. Despite the presence of people who identify as LGBTQI+, there isn’t a well-developed community infrastructure such as gay pubs or clubs. There’s been a slight improvement in visibility following recent decisions, but it hasn’t yet become a significant movement. For example, there’s now anticipation for an upcoming gay pride event, a notable first for the TCI, albeit modest, as a boat trip during Gay Pride Week in June.
Living as an LGBTQI+ person in TCI often means necessarily leading a discreet life. While there are both locals and expatriates in same-sex relationships, such partnerships are not flaunted or embraced as a popular lifestyle choice. Rather, they tend to remain private, perhaps implicitly acknowledged by the community but not openly discussed.
There’s a complex interplay between legal processes and government responses. Despite government appeals against decisions concerning LGBTQI+ rights, such actions are influenced by political dynamics, particularly when elections are approaching. The electorate consists solely of Turks and Caicos Islanders and has strong opinions on issues such as same-sex marriage, which politicians must navigate with caution.
Constitutional protections theoretically guard against discrimination, but practical enforcement is uncertain. While legal recourse exists in principle, instances of intimidation and hostility, such as aggressive media commentary or social media harassment, deter people from pursuing anti-discrimination cases.
In essence, while there is a legal framework to combat discrimination, the challenges of social stigma, political sensitivities and intimidation hinder progress towards full LGBTQI+ equality in TCI.
What role has civil society played in the case?
We’ve worked with the Pride group that’s recently emerged. Although not gay myself, I was pleased to attend their meeting to have a chance to explain relevant parts of the legal challenge. I have been a friend of Richard for many years, and more recently Tim as well.
The only outside group involved was Colours Caribbean, whose involvement in the Cayman case I had been aware of for some time. When they heard of our legal victory, despite ongoing appeals from both sides, they approached us to join the proceedings. We don’t control their involvement, but the fact that we haven’t objected to it apparently influenced the court’s decision to give them a speaking role in the October appeal.
What are your expectations?
I expect that Tim and Richard will win their appeal on the failure by the judge to deal with the equality before the law claim. Whatever the outcome of the government’s appeal, I expect that the British government will have to exercise its power of override, as it did in the Cayman Islands context, to introduce civil partnership recognition legislation. In TCI, the Governor, a British-appointed official, has a constitutional power to legislate in the best interests of the jurisdiction. For example, previous governors have forced through legislation decriminalising same-sex sexual activity – a move still resisted in other parts of the Caribbean.
I think our success will primarily relate to the anti-discrimination aspect of the lower court judge’s decision. Right now, we are in a perplexing situation: the judge has agreed with our argument that Richard and Tim’s constitutionally protected rights are being violated but he stopped short of implementing the necessary remedial measures.
This creates a glaring inconsistency: existing violations are acknowledged but no remedy is provided. So if another same-sex couple were to seek spouse treatment, they would be denied the exemption, even though the Court has recognised this as a breach of constitutional rights. It is unlikely that the Court of Appeal will accept this situation. We argue that the judge made a fundamental mistake in finding breaches but not proposing remedies. Moreover, the judge’s criticism of our approach fails to recognise alternative ways of remedying the situation, such as amending immigration laws to include same-sex couples in the eligibility criteria for spousal exemptions.
The delay in the judge’s decision, despite mounting pressure, suggests a rushed outcome in the end. It appears that in his haste, the judge failed to thoroughly explore possible solutions to the violations identified. I therefore anticipate that the Court of Appeal will scrutinise the lower court’s handling of the case and consider remedies in line with constitutional obligations.
What are the next steps?
The trajectory of progress depends heavily on the outcome of the Court of Appeal hearing. It’s unlikely a decision will be made immediately after the hearing, given the complexity and scale of the case. As we have argued that the lower court judge erred in his decision, the matter could be escalated to the Privy Council for constitutional review.
However, in terms of broader progress and the continued advancement of LGBTQI+ rights, increased visibility and public awareness are paramount. The greater the exposure and discussion surrounding the case, particularly at the appellate level, the more likely it is that attitudes will evolve positively. Increased awareness fosters confidence within the LGBTQI+ community, encouraging people to live more openly and authentically.
Historically, many people who identify as LGBTQI+ have felt compelled to leave TCI and seek more accepting environments abroad, primarily in cities in the UK or the USA. This trend underscores the prevailing reluctance to accept LGBTQI+ identities in the local context. It will undoubtedly take time to overcome this suspicion and foster a culture of acceptance, but progress is evident and ongoing.
It is my hope as a legal practitioner that church groups engage in this discussion in a constructive and inclusive way, avoiding regressive interpretations of religious doctrine. Such interpretations, rooted in outdated beliefs, only serve to hinder progress. It’s worth noting that TCI, essentially a tourist destination, relies heavily on its reputation as a progressive and welcoming place. Failure to address LGBTQI+ rights risks tarnishing this image, with negative implications for tourism and therefore for economic prospects.
Advancing LGBTQI+ rights in the TCI requires ongoing advocacy, awareness-raising and a concerted effort to foster a culture of inclusion and acceptance within the local community and wider society.
Get in touch with Stanbrook Prudhoe through itswebsite and connect with Tim Prudhoe onLinkedin.
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TUVALU: ‘We share Taiwan’s democratic principles, values and struggles for sovereignty’
CIVICUS speaks about the prospects following the inauguration of a new government in Tuvalu with Kiali Molu, a PhD candidate in Politics and International Affairs at the University of Bergen in Norway and at the University of the South Pacific.Kiali is a native Tuvaluan and his research, currently funded by the government of Norway, focuses on Tuvalu’s strategies to maintain its statehood and sovereignty as its territory is threatened by sea-level rise.
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UGANDA: ‘Closure of the UN office will result in the loss of a crucial player in the field of human rights’
CIVICUS speaks about the human rights situation and the closure of the United Nations (UN) office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Uganda with Dr Livingstone Sewanyana, founder and Executive Director of the Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI) andUN independent expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order.Founded in 1991, FHRI is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) working to advance democratic development and fundamental freedoms in Uganda.
What were the achievements of the UN human rights office in Uganda, and why is it closing?
The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights was established in Uganda during a period of conflict that particularly affected northern Uganda, with a head office in Kampala and regional offices based in north and northeastern Uganda. Its main objective was to promote reconciliation and peacebuilding, which was successfully achieved.
The UN office played a key role in creating awareness among communities about their rights and ways to defend them. It conducted extensive human rights monitoring to expose violations and contributed significantly to building the capacity of the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) – the national human rights institution – and various local CSOs through technical assistance and, at times, financial support for their programmes.
After the goal of rebuilding northern Uganda was achieved, the agreement was extended multiple times, with 2023 agreed as a potential cut-off. The Ugandan authorities cite the achievement of its goals as a reason not to prolong the UN office’s mandate. Civil society groups, however, think its closure will result in the loss of a crucial player in the field of human rights, given the critical role it played in terms of democratisation in Uganda, capacity development, technical assistance and human rights monitoring.
How do you assess the work of the UHRC?
The UHRC is entrusted with a broad mandate, encompassing both promotional and protective functions, along with a tribunal for handling human rights complaints. As the national human rights institution, it consistently submits annual reports to parliament.
While the UHRC’s promotional efforts are commendable, challenges arise in its protective role because this requires goodwill from the state. Insufficient resources and lack of political will, particularly on controversial issues, hinder its ability to function effectively.
The UHRC’s independence has always been questioned. Although the authorities may not interfere directly with its work, the lack of executive action on its recommendations undermines its potential and credibility. The UHRC needs more space to execute its mandate effectively.
How does FHRI defend and promote human rights?
For over 32 years, we’ve monitored, documented and reported human rights abuses. Our reports reach various stakeholders, including government, parliament, international bodies, the media and civil society. We also engage with young people through university programmes, fostering an understanding of rights and obligations. We actively assist victims of human rights violations through our legal aid programme, which handles over 1,000 cases every year, and provide mediation and administrative support services.
Our campaigns include a 30-year effort to abolish the death penalty. Although Uganda has retained it, the death penalty is now restricted to the most ‘serious crimes’, and opportunities for a prerogative of mercy have been established. If someone who’s been sentenced to death is not executed within three years, their sentence is automatically commuted to life imprisonment. We have consistently challenged the application of the death penalty in the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court.
We also engage in legislative advocacy, analysing bills and voicing our position on their human rights implications, as seen in our response to the Anti-Homosexuality Act 2023, which unfortunately retained a provision for the death penalty. However, we succeeded in securing the removal of the mandatory death penalty provision by parliament.
We actively report to the UN Human Rights Council and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. As a UN independent expert, I recently presented my sixth report to the Human Rights Council, sharing findings from my visit to the Republic of Georgia.
In sum, our work cuts across community, district, national and international divides. Taking a holistic approach, we conduct awareness raising, capacity development and advocacy campaigns and provide legal protection to victims of abuse through recourse to courts. We are affiliated with the World Coalition Against the Death Penalty and the International Federation of Human Rights Defenders.
What challenges do Ugandan human rights organisations face?
Civic space is getting more and more restricted and civil society is becoming more apprehensive. We have limited funding to carry out our work and regularly face legislative challenges, such as the restrictive Public Order and Management Act of 2013, which constrains assemblies and public meetings.
Civil society groups are confined to operating within the narrow framework of the law, and it’s difficult to expand the frontiers of your work. Recently, 54 CSOs have had to suspend their operations due to non-compliance with the NGO Act 2016.
To ensure the sustainability of our day-to-day operations we need expertise, and retaining experienced staff is difficult due to the potential lure of international organisations.
There’s a need to broaden civic space and ensure an enabling environment for everyone to exercise their rights. For this to happen, the state must implement recommendations from the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review process and UN treaty bodies.
What international support do you receive, and what support do you need?
CIVICUS has been instrumental in supporting our human rights monitoring and reporting work. We have submitted several joint reports to the UN Human Rights Council and UN Human Rights Committee.
We also require assistance in capacity development to promote better understanding of the human rights architecture. Most crucially, financial support is needed to empower human rights defenders to participate in forums and carry out their work effectively. In a society grappling with poverty and high unemployment, the demand for technical and financial assistance is high, and human rights organisations are often looked upon as potential providers.
Civic space in Uganda is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with FHRI through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@FHRI2 and@LSewanyana onTwitter.
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UGANDA: ‘Hate speech against LGBTQI+ people comes from religious, traditional and political leaders’
CIVICUS speaks about the situation of LGBTQI+ rights in Uganda and the ongoing impacts of the British colonial legacy with Opio Sam Leticia, founder and Executive Director of Queer Youth Uganda (QYU).
QYU is a civil society organisation founded in 2006 that advocates for the rights of young LGBTQI+ people.
What is the current situation of LGBTQI+ people in Uganda?
The absence of laws that protect LGBTQI+ people makes for a delicate situation in Uganda. The LGBTQI+ community faces discrimination in many aspects. People are still being denied their right to housing in some places because of their sexual orientation and gender identity. They continue to suffer assaults, sexual violence and ‘corrective rape’ as a way of trying to change them into what those perpetrating abuses think is the African way of life, with the LGBTQI+ ‘lifestyle’ still viewed as an imposition of ‘western ideology’. We have had several cases of LGBTQI+ activists who have been evicted by their landlords as a result of their community advocacy work.
Discrimination in workplaces is still rampant: many people who openly identify as LGBTQI+ find it challenging to get employed. The unemployment rate in the LGBTQI+ community is high because there are not enough job opportunities. In addition, some LGBTQI+ people do not have the skills needed for the job market due to their higher school dropout rates. Parents play a significant role in this because when they discover their kids’ sexual orientation they often deny them access to education and even throw them out of their homes.
The breakout of the COVID-19 pandemic revealed the underlying issues that people in the LGBTQI+ community deal with. During the pandemic, several homeless shelters for LGBTQI+ people were raided by the police. As a result, many people were left homeless and others were jailed for three months, sometimes more than once.
Despite the work done to ensure access to health services as a need, there is still discrimination at public health centres meant to provide free healthcare for all people in Uganda. Discrimination in access denies LGBTQI+ people this basic right.
Does Ugandan legislation discriminate against LGBTQI+ people?
The Ugandan constitution stipulates equality for all people, but every single day there are cases of assault and rights violations of LGBTQI+ people.
The law is used as an instrument to oppress LGBTQI+ people instead of promoting their human rights. Same-sex marriage is illegal and same-sex relations are criminalised with harsh penalties, including life imprisonment under Penal Code Act 145. Despite the existence of mechanisms such as the Uganda Human Rights Commission and the Equal Opportunities Commission, it is clear that the rights of LGBTQI+ people continue to be systematically violated.
The government of Uganda continues to enforce the 1950 Penal Code, which prohibits same-sex relations and threatens to imprison LGBTQI+ activists. Parliament has continued to pass bills against sexual minorities, such as the recent Sexual Offences Bill 2021. The current legislation threatens our work environment and our very existence as an LGBTQI+ organisation in Uganda.
To what do you attribute the recent tightening of legislation criminalising LGBTQI+ people?
Uganda is a highly religious country where traditional cultural beliefs or norms take centre stage. LGBTQI+ people see their basic human rights violated because of deeply embedded cultural and religious beliefs. That is why political advocacy does not have an impact: politicians are quick to play the morality card to please their constituencies and sideline the issues raised by LGBTQI+ organisations.
The government should work to integrate the LGBTQI+ community into Ugandan society, not least because we can play a pivotal role in the country’s economic and social development. We can contribute by paying taxes and creating jobs, among other things.
But instead, the LGBTQI+ community faces hate speech coming from religious, traditional and political leaders who promote homophobia. Far from receiving mass support and recognition from the state and citizens, LGBTQI+ activists and organisations have faced increasing human rights abuses and attacks.
What work does your organisation do?
QYU is an LGBTQI+ youth-led community-based organisation that advocates for the rights of young LGBTQI+ people in rural and peri-urban areas of Uganda. QYU operates in the four regions of Uganda: the Eastern, Southern, Western and Bunyoro Kitara/Albertine regions. We have five key programmes that we run in communities to offer safe spaces and promote the participation of LGBTQI+ people in human development: human rights awareness and advocacy, sexual reproductive health rights and services, emergency housing and accommodation, economic empowerment, and advocacy, alliance building and partnerships.
Through implementing these programmes, we want to create a legal and policy environment where the rights of LGBTQI+ people are upheld and respected. The high numbers of rape cases and arbitrary arrests have pushed us to advocate for equal and inclusive reproductive health rights and access to sexual and reproductive health services and to set up safe spaces at community health centres so that LGBTQI+ people can access healthcare facilities without the trauma of being harassed.
In addition, QYU responds to urgent housing needs of LGBTQI+ people who are victims of social stigma and discrimination from their families and the public. We also mobilise and empower LGBTQI+ people, particularly young people, by providing them with practical skills, knowledge and appropriate information regarding employment and social entrepreneurship and developing their personal and professional skills for the labour market. Through partnership building, advocacy and referral, we work with like-minded organisations to advocate for and advance the rights and freedoms of LGBTQI+ people at both the national and international levels.
But we have faced several challenges that make it difficult to carry out our work. We have continued to suffer office break-ins from unknown individuals, causing fear among our staff members. We also have limited funding, which impacts the scope of our work because we can only do so much with the funds we have.
What should Commonwealth states do to promote LGBTQI+ rights?
Commonwealth states should work together since most have the same codes that criminalise LGBTQI+ people, dating back to the colonial era. So many years later, they are still making daily life miserable for LGBTQI+ people in the countries that are part of the Commonwealth. I think member countries should use the various organs of the Commonwealth to provide a platform for LGBTQI+ voices. Those that have decriminalised same-sex relations should support those fighting toward that goal.
The international community fighting for similar causes should also use their platforms to raise awareness on the kind of struggles we are facing. Their mobilisation will hopefully pressure our governments to create policies that will benefit all members of society regardless of their gender identity or sexual orientation.
Civic space in Uganda is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Queer Youth Uganda through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@QueerYouth2006 on Twitter. -
UGANDA: ‘No candidate can possibly win the election without young people’s votes’
CIVICUS speaks with Mohammed Ndifuna, Executive Director of Justice Access Point-Uganda (JAP). Established in 2018, JAP aims to kickstart, reignite and invigorate justice efforts in the context of Uganda’s stalled transitional justice process, its challenges implementing recommendations from its first and second United Nations Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Reviews and the backlash by African states against the International Criminal Court.
Mohammed is an experienced and impassioned human rights defender and peacebuilder with over 15 years of activism in human rights and atrocity prevention at the grassroots, national and international levels. He was awarded the 2014 European Union Human Rights Award for Uganda, has served on the Steering Committee of The Coalition for the Criminal Court (2007-2018) and the Advisory Board of the Human Rights House Network in Oslo (2007-2012), and currently serves on the Management Committee of The Uganda National Committee of Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities.
What is the state of civic space in Uganda ahead of the much-anticipated 2021 elections?
Civic space in Uganda may be characterised as harassed, stifled and starved. It would seem like civil society has been on a slippery slope of sorts, with things turning from bad to worse. For instance, civil society organisations (CSOs) have witnessed a wave of brazen attacks against their physical space in the form of office break-ins and broad-daylight workplace raids. In the meantime, there seems to be no let-up in the waves of attacks against CSOs, and especially against those involved in human rights and accountability advocacy. Over the past few years, an array of legislation and administrative measures has been unleashed against CSOs and others, including the Public Order Management Act (2012) and the NGO Act (2016).
Ahead of the general and presidential elections, which will be held on 14 January 2021, the Minister of Internal Affairs has ordered all CSOs to go through a mandatory validation and verification process before they are allowed to operate. Many CSOs have not been able to go through it: by 19 October 2020, only 2,257 CSOs had successfully completed the verification and validation exercise, including just a few that do mainstream advocacy work on governance.
Ugandan CSOs are largely donor-dependent and had already been struggling with shrinking financial resources, severely affecting the scope of their work. This situation became compounded by the COVID-19 outbreak and the lockdown that was imposed in response, all of which impaired CSO efforts to mobilise resources. Therefore, these three forces – harassment, restrictions and limited access to funding – have combined to weaken CSOs, pushing most of them into self-preservation mode.
The stakes for the 2021 elections seem to be higher than in previous years. What has changed?
The situation started to change in July 2019, when Robert Kyagulanyi, better known by his stage name, Bobi Wine, announced his bid to run for president as the candidate of the opposition National Unity Platform. Bobi Wine is a singer and actor who is also an activist and a politician. As a leader of the People Power, Our Power movement, he was elected to parliament in 2017.
Bobi’s appeal among young people is enormous, and let’s keep in mind that more than 75 per cent of Uganda’s population is below the age of 30. This makes young people a significant group to be wowed. No candidate can possibly win the Ugandan election without having the biggest chunk of young people’s votes. In the upcoming presidential race, it is Bobi Wine who appears most able to galvanise young people behind his candidature. Although not an experienced politician, Bobi is a charismatic firebrand who has been able to attract not just young people but also many politicians from traditional political parties into his mass movement.
Bobi Wine, long known as the ‘Ghetto President’, has taken advantage of his appeal as a popular music star to belt out political songs to mobilise people, and his roots in the ghetto also guarantee him an appeal in urban areas. It is believed that he has motivated many young people to register to vote, so voter apathy among young people may turn out to be lower in comparison to past elections.
Given the ongoing cut-throat fight for young people’s votes, it is no surprise that the security apparatus has been unleashed against young people in an apparent attempt to stem the pressure they are exerting. Political activists linked to People Power have been harassed and, in some instances, killed. People Power’s political leaders have been intermittently arrested and arraigned in courts or allegedly kidnapped and tortured in safe houses. In an apparent attempt to make in-roads into the ranks of urban young people, President Yoweri Museveni has appointed three senior presidential advisors from the ghetto. This raises the spectre of ghetto gangster groups and violence playing a role in the upcoming presidential elections.
Restrictions on the freedom of expression and internet use have been reported in previous elections. Are we likely to see a similar trend now?
We are already seeing it. Restrictions on the freedoms of expression and information are a valid concern not just because of hindsight, but also given recent developments. For instance, on 7 September 2020 the Uganda Communications Commission (UCC) issued a public notice stating that anyone wishing to publish information online needs to apply for and obtain a licence from the UCC before 5 October 2020. This will mostly affect online users, such as bloggers, who are paid for published content. Obviously, this is meant to stifle young people’s political activities online. And it is also particularly concerning because, as public gatherings are restricted due to COVID-19 prevention measures, online media will be the only method of campaigning that is allowed ahead of the 2021 elections.
There is also increasing electronic surveillance, and the possibility of a shutdown of social media platforms on the eve of the elections may not be too remote.
How has the COVID-pandemic affected civil society and its ability to respond to civic space restrictions?
The COVID-19 pandemic and the measures taken in response have exacerbated the already precarious state in which the CSOs find themselves. For instance, civil society capacity to organise public assemblies and peaceful demonstrations in support of fundamental rights and freedoms or to protest against their violation has been restricted by the manner in which COVID-19 standard operating procedures (SOPs) have been enforced. This has resulted in the commission of blatant violations and onslaughts against civic space. For instance, on 17 October 2020, the Uganda Police Force and the Local Defense Units jointly raided thanksgiving prayers being held in Mityana district and wantonly tear gassed the congregation, which included children, women, men, older people and religious leaders, for allegedly flouting COVID-19 SOPs.
As the enforcement of COVID-19 SOPs gets intertwined with election pressure, it is feared that the clampdown on the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association will be aggravated. Regrettably, CSOs already find themselves restricted.
How can international civil society help Ugandan civil society?
The situation in which Ugandan civil society finds itself is such that it requires the urgent support and response of the international community. There is a need to turn the eyes towards what is happening in Uganda and to speak up to amplify the voices of a local civil society that is increasingly being stifled. More specifically, Ugandan CSOs could be supported so they can better respond to blatant violations of freedoms, mitigate the risks that their work entails and enhance their resilience in the current context.
Civic space inUganda is rated ‘repressed’by the CIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Justice Access Point through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@JusticessP on Twitter.
