corruption

• PANAMA: ‘Protests reflect structural inequalities and frustration at blatant corruption’

  CIVICUS speaks about recent protests in Panama with Eileen Ng Fábrega, Executive Director of the Panamanian Chamber of Social Development (CAPADESO). CAPADESO is a network of civil society organisations (CSOs) that promote social development in Panama. Its main aim is to highlight the contributions of civil society, strengthen civil society and foster alliances to influence public policies.

• PANAMA: ‘We’ll have to stay vigilant and resist any attempt to curtail rights and freedoms’

  

  CIVICUS discusses the results of Panama’srecent presidential election with Olga de Obaldía, executive director of the Foundation for the Development of Civic Freedom.

  The Foundation for the Development of Civic Freedom is a civil society organisation working to defend fundamental freedoms, empower citizens for democratic participation and strengthen democracy by promoting transparency and the struggle against corruption.

  Who is José Raúl Mulino, and why did he win the election?

  Mulino won the election in large part due to the popularity and charisma of former President Ricardo Martinelli, and also in part due to the peculiarities of the Panamanian electoral system.

  Martinelli campaigned despite being disqualified from running for or holding public office after being convicted of money laundering in a major corruption scheme involving overpriced road construction. He initially tried to register his wife as his running mate, presumably in order to give her his place if his legal troubles made it impossible for him to run. But he abandoned the plan because the constitution forbids the president appointing close relatives.

  Instead of his wife, he appointed Mulino, his security minister between 2009 and 2014. Martinelli’s conviction became final in February: he was sentenced to more than 10 years in prison and, in order to avoid prison, he sought asylum in the Nicaraguan embassy. The Electoral Court allowed Mulino to take Martinelli’s place. This decision was appealed on the grounds of unconstitutionality, but two days before the election the Supreme Court upheld the Electoral Court’s decision.

  Convicted or not, Martinelli maintained his enormous popularity and, from his embassy confinement, launched a media campaign based on the slogan ‘Mulino is me’, an attempt to transfer his core electoral support, estimated at between 30 and 35 per cent, to Mulino.

  Since Panama elects its president by a simple majority of votes, without a runoff, and there were eight candidates, Mulino won with 34 per cent of the vote.

  This electoral system should be revised to ensure the popular will is respected. However, it’s worth noting that Panamanians were civic-minded and accepted the result peacefully even though most had voted against the president-elect.

  What were Mulino’s campaign promises?

  Among other things, Mulino promised to ‘put money in people’s pockets’ and build infrastructure, notably a train linking the city of David, in the far east of the country, with Panama City. This was justified on the grounds that it would improve transport between the interior and capital and stimulate economic development in remote and neglected regions.

  Another recurring theme in Mulino’s campaign was the need to put an end to what was characterised as ‘judicial persecution’. Martinelli’s party contains many people indicted for corruption during his administration. Several of them have been elected to the Central American Parliament, which grants them immunity from prosecution under a treaty that equates their privileges with those of national deputies.

  During the election campaign, the possibility of ‘closing’ the Darién Gap, the border with Colombia, was also mentioned as a way of stemming the flow of migrants through the jungle. However, the feasibility and impact of this measure are unclear. Previous bans aimed at stopping migration have only encouraged clandestine approaches and exacerbated humanitarian problems. The situation in the Darién is complex and need far-reaching solutions.

  These promises were clearly popular with some parts of the public, but their feasibility and potential consequences should be carefully considered.

  Finally, another promise was to ‘help’ former President Martinelli. It is not yet clear what form this help will take. The president-elect has said his government will follow the rule of law, and his first major test will be to resolve the ex-president’s impasse in the Nicaraguan embassy, from where he continues to try to influence national politics.

  What should the new government do to address the country’s key social and economic challenges?

  The new government will have to make critical decisions in a context of deep economic crisis. One of them is to save the social security system.

  Panama is one of the most unequal countries in the world. Informal labour has reached 55 per cent, with 20,000 jobs not recovered since the pandemic. The social security system is on the verge of bankruptcy: it covers 80 per cent of people, but only 30 per cent pay contributions. The pension system now lacks the funds to meet its future obligations and could collapse.

  Economic problems are compounded by falling investment. Public debt has risen to US$49 billion, with no clear investment in infrastructure or job creation. The state is due to make its first major debt payment in three months, but does not appear to have sufficient funds to meet it.

  The president-elect has announced he will seek to form a government of national unity. It is unclear what form this will take, but it’s clear that given the scale of the problems, a coalition government or some form of cross-sectoral cooperation is the only way forward. According to the president-elect’s statements, business would be his natural ally in finding solutions.

  Under what conditions does civil society operate in Panama, and can changes be expected under the new government?

  As elections approached, our small civil society faced a recurring phenomenon: an exodus towards partisan political activity. While some civil society organisations like ours are professionalised – with a board, administrative staff, a budget and defined structures – most rely on volunteers. Traditionally, a reverse exodus from non-winning political parties towards civil society organisations happens after elections.

  In addition, few organisations focus their work on advocacy for civil and political rights and freedoms and democratic governance. Most focus on poverty alleviation or the provision of social services such as health and education. In these roles, they tend to be partners with the state in the implementation of official programmes. In recent years, however, we have witnessed an increase in activism and the formation of new identity-based groups demanding equal rights, while new youth groups have arisen at the national level as a political and social force largely responsible for the success of national mobilisations against open-pit mining in October and November 2023.

  In the 2024 electoral campaign, while civil society participation remained limited, since there are few organisations dedicated to promoting civic values or fundamental freedoms, we saw several non-partisan initiatives to enable informed voting, and several organisations, including us, joined together in this effort.

  We don’t know what will happen under the new government, but we are concerned about the Martinelli administration’s record of restricting civic space through intimidation of critical organisations and the judicial harassment of activists and journalists. It is unclear what trajectory the Mulino government will follow, but we’ll have to stay vigilant and resist any attempt to curtail fundamental rights and freedoms or restrict civic space.

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  Civic space in Panama is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Foundation for the Development of Civic Freedom through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow @libertciudadana onInstagram andTwitter.

• SLOVAKIA: ‘The election result may reinforce the country’s image as a problematic EU member’

  CIVICUS speaks with Michal Piško, Director of Transparency International Slovensko, about Slovakia’s recent first-round presidential election and the upcoming runoff.

  Transparency International Slovensko is a Slovak civil society organisation aimed at increasing institutional transparency and combatting corruption.

  What’s at stake in this presidential election?

  Slovakia’s presidency holds limited powers, although it has strong legitimacy arising from its direct popular election. Its most significant powers include vetoing laws – which a parliamentary majority can relatively easily overcome – and appointing some key state positions, such as constitutional judges.

  However, it can become a key player in critical junctures, as seen at the beginning of 2024. The governing coalition pushed for a harmful amendment to the Criminal Code in a fast-track legislative procedure. The new rules would have complicated the investigation and punishment of serious corruption cases by significantly shortening penalties and statutes of limitations. The current president, Zuzana Čaputová, challenged the amendment in the Constitutional Court, which partially suspended it coming into effect.

  The role of the president is also crucial beyond their formal competencies, particularly in significant public debates.

  What are the main campaign issues and the candidates’ positions? 

  The first round of the presidential election was held on 23 March. Čaputová decided not to run for re-election. Ivan Korčok, a pro-European former foreign minister who emerged as a civic candidate that was later backed by opposition parties, challenged Prime Minister Robert Fico’s ally and current speaker of parliament, Peter Pellegrini. Representing the opposition and the government coalition respectively, they will now compete in the runoff that will take place on 6 April.

  The central campaign Issue is the role of the president: whether they are meant to be closely aligned with the government or provide a counterbalance. Given that the current administration is led by a four-time Prime Minister known for his aggressive rhetoric and actions undermining the rule of law, it has been key to have a critical president playing an active role. If Pellegrini wins, it would bolster the government’s capacity to implement its controversial policies.

  How free and fair has the election process been so far?

  Transparency International Slovakia, a well-known anti-corruption organisation, has been actively monitoring the transparency and fairness of election campaigns and financing for a long time.

  Unfortunately, the current campaign cannot be considered transparent or fair, particularly because of Pellegrini’s failure to disclose donor information and the significant lack of information on his campaign expenses.

  The process has also been marred by negative campaigning orchestrated by politicians or hidden sources targeting Korčok, portraying him as a war promoter. It has also been distorted by the parallel election campaign for the European Parliament, in which both coalition and opposition parties indirectly support or criticise presidential candidates.

  What can we expect in the runoff?

  In the first round, pre-election opinion polls generally underestimated voter turnout and Korčok’s performance. Despite expectations, first-round voter turnout exceeded 50 per cent, a notable increase compared to previous years. Another surprise was Korčok’s relatively significant result, with more than 42 per cent of the vote and a 5.5-point lead over Pellegrini. Most pollsters expected more balanced results.

  However, the situation could still change in the runoff, as Pellegrini may receive the support of third-placed candidate Štefan Harabin’s anti-west and anti-system voters.

  Right now, both candidates seem to have fairly balanced chances of success. While Pellegrini is primarily targeting his messaging at anti-system voters, Korčok is attempting to mobilise pro-European voters.

  It is still unclear which candidate most Hungarian voters, who make up almost 10 per cent of Slovakia’s population, will support. Historically, they have leaned towards pro-European and democratic politicians, but their decision may also be influenced by the fact that Hungary’s authoritarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, is aligned with the current Slovak government.

  Despite Pellegrini not being openly pro-Russia, his victory would strengthen the current government’s position and reinforce Slovakia’s image as a problematic country with anti-democratic tendencies within the European Union. It would also intensify the existing division within the Visegrad Group, a Central European alliance of four countries, two of which – the Czech Republic and Poland – would continue leaning towards the west, while Hungary and Slovakia would further lean towards Russia.

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  Civic space in Slovakia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Transparency International Slovensko through itswebsite orFacebook,Instagram andLinkedin pages, and follow@transparencysk on Twitter and@TISlovensko on Youtube.