freedom of association

• MEXICO: ‘Civil society is a retaining wall against government malpractice’

  CIVICUS speaks with Carlos G Guerrero Orozco, a Mexican lawyer and co-founder and president of Human Rights and Strategic Litigation-Mexico (DLM Mexico), about a recent victory of Mexican civil society in defence of civic space.

  DLM Mexico is a civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes human rights and the strengthening of the rule of law in Mexico by providing strategic litigation advice and promoting accountability.

  What constraints does civil society experience in Mexico, and how is it working to preserve civic space?

  Historically, Mexican civil society has been a retaining wall against government malpractice. For playing this role, which the authorities can find uncomfortable, it has been subjected to restrictions, particularly denial of legal recognition of organisations and their functions.

  The state has reacted to the work of civil society by limiting its ability to act as a monitor, watchdog and check on power. In the legal area, it has sought to limit its capacity to undertake legal processes and generate accountability. One way of doing this is by disregarding the legal standing that allows CSOs to initiate appeals for protection and other proceedings to protect rights.

  Under Mexican law, CSOs whose mission is to defend the human rights of groups such as children, Indigenous people, survivors of gender-based violence, victims of corruption or public mismanagement and people deprived of their liberty can claim legal standing by virtue of these groups’ special situation with the legal system.

  DLM Mexico provides advice to CSOs, collectives, citizen groups, citizen participation committees and human rights defenders involved in strategic litigation cases, providing them with tools to strengthen their capacities in court and overcome obstacles they may face in proving their legal standing in the case.

  Another way of constraining civil society is to target CSO authorities and hold them criminally liable for actions taken in the course of their work. This is what happened with a recent reform of the Mexico City Penal Code. The reformed code’s article 256 equated CSO leaders with public officials and specified that public servants – and therefore also CSO leaders – could be liable for corruption offences. By including CSO directors and managers in the definition of ‘public servants’, it extended to them the criminal liability public servants are under.

  A particular concern was about the broad and imprecise wording of the definition of the crime of corruption as the conduct of anyone who ‘performs or fails to perform what the law requires them to perform or refrains from performing what the law forbids, in order to obtain an undue advantage of any nature, including financial, for themselves or for a third party’. This undoubtedly opened the door to arbitrary treatment.

  The publication of the reformed Penal Code brought concern from various quarters, but particularly civil society, which issued a joint communiqué expressing its alarm.

  DLM Mexico filed a request with the Mexico City Human Rights Commission to exercise its power to challenge laws deemed unconstitutional. Days later, the Human Rights Commission filed an action of unconstitutionality before the Mexican Supreme Court.

  How was the case resolved, and what do you think its impact will be?

  This month the Supreme Court discussed and resolved the case, declaring article 256 unconstitutional and void.

  The Court established that, according to article 108 of the Constitution, it is not permissible to extend the definition of public servant to people who do not hold a position within the structure of the state. It also considered that the classification of CSO directors and managers as public officials was potentially prejudicial to their rights and freedoms because it created undue criminal consequences for private individuals. It clarified that the fact they receive public funds does not justify extending the penalties applicable to public servants to private individuals who manage CSOs.

  This decision safeguards the rights of CSO leaders and ensures they can continue their work without fear of unfair criminal repercussions.

  Although the case focused on Mexico City’s legislation, the ruling put a brake on other states’ intentions to include in their legislation sanctions against CSO staff for their activities, used to silence the voices of civil society. This is particularly relevant in a country where the judiciary is neither robust nor independent.

  The Court’s decision is testament to the power of civil society advocacy and the importance of protecting civic space. It is a reminder of our collective ability to challenge and overturn laws that threaten our democratic freedoms.

  What other issues are on civil society’s agenda when it comes to the rule of law and democratic freedoms?

  Unfortunately, under the current administration there have been several issues that both civil society and the private sector have had to address. The president and members of his party use aggressive discourse towards civil society that is openly restrictive of civic space and hostile to judicial independence and autonomous bodies. The government has restricted access to public information, de-emphasised the protection of personal data, undermined the National Anti-Corruption System and downplayed Mexico’s crisis of enforced disappearances at the hands of organised crime.

  DLM Mexico’s agenda has focused on strengthening the National Anti-Corruption System by addressing the problem of underreporting of corruption, calling for registration and transparency of beneficial ownership of companies and training officials to better investigate acts of corruption in civil and administrative matters.

  Civil society’s reaction to defend against institutional erosion and the deterioration of the separation of powers was recently seen on the streets when many people mobilised in Mexico City and other cities across the country in the ‘March for Democracy’. A few weeks before the start of the June presidential election campaign, people mobilised against the government’s attacks on the National Electoral Institute, in defence of the independence of the judiciary and autonomous bodies and against the president’s undue influence on the electoral competition and his polarising attitudes.

  Although there was no shortage of opposition politicians who tried to exploit it for political gain, the mobilisation was basically a defensive reaction by civil society to government abuses. Before marching, protesters presented a list of demands. However, far from providing any response, the government has hardened its positions even further.

  Fortunately, Mexico still has strong institutions, as well as strong private and social sectors that take an interest in public issues. This tempers the risks to our democracy regardless of which party’s candidate wins the presidential election.

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  Civic space in Mexico is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with DLM Mexico through itswebsite and follow@DLM_Mx on Twitter and@dlmx on LinkedIn.

• MOLDOVA: ‘There are attempts to replace the pro-European government with a pro-Kremlin puppet regime’

  CIVICUS speaks about recent political changes in Moldova in the context of the global energy crisis withVictoria Nemerenco, coordinator of the Europeanization, Foreign and Security Policy Program at the Institute for European Policies and Reforms (IPRE). Founded in 2015, IPRE isan independent, non-partisan and non-profit action centre for research and analysis. Its mission is to accelerate Moldova’s European integration by promoting systemic reforms, increasing participatory democracy and strengthening the role of citizens in decision-making processes at the national and local levels.

• MOZAMBIQUE: ‘The new NGO Law will be the death of the civic movement’

  

  Portuguese

  CIVICUS discusses the state of civic space and new restrictions being imposed on civil society in Mozambique with Paula Monjane, Executive Director of the Civil Society Learning and Capacity Building Centre (CESC).

  CESC is a non-partisan, non-profit civil society organisation (CSO) founded in 2009 with the mission of strengthening the capacity of citizens and communities to participate actively in socio-economic and political development processes, investing in knowledge sharing, learning tools, monitoring and advocacy for public policies that respond to people’s needs.

  What are the current conditions for civil society in Mozambique?

  The legal, political, institutional and practical conditions under which civil society operates in Mozambique have deteriorated over time. Over the past 10 to 15 years, despite having a constitution and laws that safeguard and recognise fundamental universal rights, we have witnessed increasing curtailment of freedoms of expression and information, press freedom and freedoms of assembly and public participation. This curtailment has been practised in violation of both the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique and the global and African human rights instruments Mozambique has signed. Currently, legislation is being proposed to silence dissenting voices and people fighting for better governance of public affairs and the protection of human rights.

  Freedom of the press and expression has been marked by intimidation, kidnappings and disappearances of journalists, illegal detentions and physical violence, including killings perpetrated with impunity, mainly by police officers and other security forces. In 2021 alone, the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) recorded 23 cases of violations.

  In addition to these actions, there have been legislative onslaughts to limit press freedoms. In 2018, Decree 40/2018 introduced inexplicably high taxes for the licensing and registration of media companies and the accreditation of national and foreign press correspondents. In 2020 the decree was repealed due to pressure by MISA and the fact that the Constitutional Council declared it unconstitutional. But in December 2021, the government introduced a bill on media and broadcasting that would further restrict the exercise of press freedoms.

  Attempts to deny permission for peaceful protests and control and suppress them have also increased. In 2022, several peaceful protests organised by feminist activists that had been notified to the relevant institutions were interfered with. In many cases activists were rounded up at police stations for no clear reason. People defending human rights have suffered reprisals, ranging from verbal and bodily threats to murder.

  Elections, which have never been free or fair, have been the scene of systematic fraud, with violence committed before, during and after voting, and impunity for the state agents involved in it.

  Spaces for people’s participation, which became popular in the 2000s, have been losing steam in the face of an increasingly closed political regime. People’s participation in state planning has become dependent on the will of the state official who oversees the area and the locality in question. In addition, we are witnessing a rise in controls imposed on CSOs that scrutinise the government in the areas of democracy, governance and human rights and threats they will be ‘blacklisted’.

  Other restrictive measures have included changes introduced in the Criminal Code in 2014, defining defamation of senior state officials as a crime against state security and the approval of the 2022 Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Act, which overregulates CSOs.

  Under the pretext of fighting terrorism, yet another proposal that restricts a fundamental right, that of freedom of association, was approved by the Council of Ministers in September 2022 and sent to the Assembly of the Republic, Mozambique’s parliament, for approval in October.

  How will this new law affect CSOs in Mozambique?

  The draft law establishes a legal regime for the creation, organisation and functioning of CSOs and contains several norms that violate freedom of association, despite this right being safeguarded by the constitution and international human rights treaties. It gives the government absolute and discretionary powers to ‘create’, control the functioning of, suspend and extinguish CSOs.

  If the bill is approved, it will legitimise already existing practices restricting civic space, allowing the persecution of dissenting voices and organisations critical of the government, up to banning them from continuing to operate. It will be the death of the civic movement, as only organisations aligned to the ruling party will survive. Party leagues affiliated with opposition political parties and opposition political parties themselves may be at risk of extinction.

  Among other things, if passed, the new law would require that statutory changes that involve changes in objectives, activities or even the name of a CSO be approved by the regulatory body, without imposing any deadline for it to issue a decision. It would impose a single template for the bylaws of all CSOs, including details on authorities, mandates, forms of operation, reporting and members’ rights, easily allowing for the criminalisation of their leaders. It would reverse the burden of proof: CSOs will have to prove they are fulfilling their objectives and functioning properly through an annual report submitted every first quarter, and will risk suspension or termination if they fail to submit two reports. This law is intrusive in an area regulated by private law as established by the constitution and also ignores the variety of associations that exist in Mozambique. In addition, it gives the government the authority to conduct monitoring visits, audit accounts, visit implementation sites, demand periodic reports and request additional documentation whenever it sees fit.

  Under the guise of preventing money laundering and terrorism financing, the draft law treats CSOs as criminals from the get-go. It is also unclear how these excessive controls could actually result in greater success in the fight against terrorism financing.

  Why is the Mozambican government regulating CSOs as part of the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing?

  The argument that this law aims to combat money laundering does not hold up, first of all because another law was passed in July 2022, law 11/2022, which deals specifically with money laundering and terrorism financing. CSOs must comply with it and it contains a specific article dedicated to them.

  Out of the 40 recommendations issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for states to adopt in the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing, only one – recommendation 8 – pertains to CSOs, and focuses on the possible need to adapt the legal framework based on risk assessment, in order to identify the sub-sector at risk, understand possible risks and develop adequate measures for mitigation and supervision based on and proportional to risk.

  Additionally, the FATF has attached an extensive interpretative note to recommendation 8 and has produced a report on best practices, which mentions the need to respect international human rights law, indicates that measures should not disrupt or discourage legitimate charitable activities and notes that actions taken against non-profit organisations suspected of engaging in terrorism financing should minimise the negative impact on the innocent and legitimate beneficiaries of their services.

  In October 2022, Mozambique was put on the FATF grey list, but the only action it needed to take in relation to CSOs was to conduct a terrorism financing risk assessment in line with FATF standards and use this as the basis for developing a disclosure plan. These recommendations are also in line with the assessment conducted in 2021 by the East and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, the FATF’s regional partner organisation for East and Southern Africa. But instead, the Mozambican government has presented parliament with a bill to restrict the work of CSOs. The question then is, what are its real intentions?

  The Mozambican government is not alone in attempting to pass an anti-civic space law. Several African states are using FATF recommendations and international pressure as an excuse to legitimise breaches of international and regional human rights instruments and their constitutions, relying on the indifference and sometimes even the protection of some bodies that should be defending these rights.

  Over the past two decades, in a context of democratic regression and a growing prevalence of authoritarian governments, the African continent has seen many laws and measures passed or proposed that restrict universal rights and civic space. According to Freedom House’s 2022 report, 24 African countries have attempted to pass anti-civil society measures and laws. Twelve have succeeded in passing them, six have failed or given up and six have initiatives pending, including Mozambique.

  How is civil society responding?

  Soon after the surprise approval of the draft NGO law, national, provincial and district CSOs came together in what is now a movement fighting for the right to freedom of association. Aware that this process is not merely technical, but mainly political, we embraced multiple tactics, from lobbying and advocacy with decision makers in government, parliament and national and international human rights institutions to campaigns to deepen people’s understanding of the implications of this law’s approval.

  We also conducted several technical analyses and promoted national and international debates. After many efforts and difficulties, we were able to hold a two-day meeting with relevant parliamentary working committees in November 2022. This resulted in the important decision that there was need for a broad consultation with citizens and social organisations at the national level, as universal and fundamental rights are at stake. Consultations were held in all 10 provinces between 6 and 16 February 2023, organised by the Assembly of the Republic alongside the Movement of CSOs In Defence of the Right and Freedom of Association, and included the participation of over 600 CSOs that were unanimous in rejecting the draft law.

  Despite these important steps, we remain concerned about the link made between the urgency to approve the law and Mozambique’s removal from the FATF grey list. This means that even if it does not correspond to what is required of Mozambique, parliament will approve the law as soon as it resumes work next March. Given the defects of the draft law, we think the time is too short for a proper revision that ensures it doesn’t violate the fundamental and universal right to freedom of association.

  If it is passed, we will push for it to be declared unconstitutional. We also expect more visible action from international and regional bodies, including CSOs. Given the dimension of the problem, in Mozambique as in the continent, and because it falls under their mandates, we expect urgent condemnation from the African Union, through the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and from the United Nations, through the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on counterterrorism and human rights.

  On behalf of CSOs fighting for human rights and democracy, we hope that the solidarity already shown will continue and that we will join efforts to push back against anti-civic space initiatives such as this.

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  Civic space in Mozambique is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with CESC through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@CescMoz on Twitter.

• NICARAGUA: ‘The regime seeks to annihilate all forms of autonomous citizen organisation’

  CIVICUS speaks with María Teresa Blandón, a Nicaraguan human rights defender and director of Feminist Programme La Corriente, a civil society organisation (CSO) whose legal status was recently cancelled by the authoritarian regime led by President Daniel Ortega and Vice President Rosario Murillo.

  

  What is the reason for the current wave of intensified in repression in Nicaragua?

  Repression increased on the eve of the fraudulent 2021 elections, when the state specifically targeted the leaders of the main opposition groups who had been building alliances to participate in the elections, because even though they knew that conditions were extremely adverse, they insisted that this was the way out of the crisis.

  From January 2022 onwards, the Ortega-Murillo regime further escalated its offensive, possibly due to a failure in its political calculations: it had thought that once the electoral fraud had been consummated and the opposition was thrown in jail, the opposition would abdicate its role and the regime would obtain the endorsement of the international community.

  But neither of these things happened: the opposition did not resign itself and there was no international support; on the contrary, the regime’s isolation only deepened. The Nicaraguan opposition continued to constantly denounce the establishment of a de facto police state and to call for the regime’s exit through civic means. The CSOs that managed to remain in the country continued to denounce systematic human rights violations and repression, hence the approval of new laws to strip them of their legal status and assets.

  Faced with a lack of legitimacy, the Ortega-Murillo regime has deepened its strategy of annihilating any form of citizen organisation that is not subordinate to its interests. To date, more than 1,600 CSOs have been eliminated by the National Assembly and in many cases their assets have been confiscated through the application of laws that openly violate our country’s constitution, which recognises the right to free association and expressly prohibits confiscation.

  Until very recently, the power to cancel an organisation’s legal personality was in the hands of the National Assembly, but a new law assigned it to the Ministry of the Interior, which now has the absolute power to decide who has the right to associate and who does not. The procedure has been expedited and there is no recourse to appeal, which clearly speaks of the situation of defencelessness Nicaraguan civil society finds itself in.

  The judiciary has remained silent in the face of the unconstitutionality appeals filed in 2021, following the approval of the Law on Foreign Agents, which obliges CSOs that receive funds from international cooperation sources to report their activities at a level of detail that makes it practically impossible for them to operate.

  This way, the regime eliminates all forms of autonomous participation, leaves activists and human rights defenders in a more precarious situation, and obtains the resources it needs to feed the clientelist practices that are its trademark.

  One of the problems faced by the regime is precisely its lack of resources to sustain the community development projects carried out by many of the eliminated CSOs. It can no longer count on support from Venezuela, nor can it continue to expand the family businesses that the Ortega-Murillo clan has built while in power. Many of these companies have been sanctioned, including the one that monopolises the fuel business, which has forced them to carry out various manoeuvres to keep them active.

  What work does your organisation do?

  Feminist Programme La Corriente has existed for almost 30 years and was born with the aim of contributing to generating critical thought and encouraging new forms of participation by women in Central America. Over the last 15 years we have expanded our work with young people and sexual and gender dissident collectives.

  Throughout our journey, we have contributed to challenging heterosexism, misogyny and macho violence and built vital networks for the defence of rights. We have prioritised issues related to the prevention of violence, voluntary motherhood, women’s right to decide about their bodies and respect for sexual and gender diversity.

  Efforts to research the reality experienced by women, young people and dissident bodies have been key to the development of training and public communication programmes. For us it is of vital importance to strengthen collective action through social movements capable of thinking and acting on the changes required by Nicaraguan society. We are also part of Central American and Latin American networks and alliances, from where we contribute to advocacy processes with governments and global institutions.

  Precisely because we generate critical thought and defend rights, in May this year the National Assembly cancelled our legal status and in early July the police took over our facilities.

   

  On what grounds was the organisation ordered to shut down?

  Generally speaking, the arguments put forward by the Sandinista deputies who control parliament include an unfounded accusation that CSOs are potential money launderers because they receive funding from foreign sources, deliberately ignoring the fact that these sources are linked to governments and duly established cooperation agencies.

  They also cite alleged bureaucratic infractions such as the expiry of the term of the board of directors, failure to update statutes and refusal to provide information requested by the Ministry of the Interior. On the latter point, it is worth highlighting the abusive ministry’s intervention: in accordance with the new law, it requires CSOs to submit detailed information on each activity to be carried out and personal data of the people with whom they work.

  Such demands denaturalise the meaning of CSOs, turning them into an extension of the state, clear evidence of the totalitarian zeal of this regime. It is clearly an attempt to impose a model of absolute control that requires the dismantling of all forms of autonomous civil society participation.

  Likewise, by shutting down CSOs that work with low-income groups of the population, the regime is trying to regain control of what it thinks of as its social base, which it seeks to recover or retain by means of clientelist policies. This is why it has eliminated organisations that promote access to education for low-income children and young people, fulfil the needs of people with disabilities, promote access to land and other resources for rural and Indigenous women and provide sexual and reproductive health services and support for women who are victims of violence, among others. 

  CSOs that work in the field of citizen participation from a rights-based perspective and with a clear focus on the defence of democratic values have also been closed. They have been declared opponents of the regime and their representatives have been subjected to surveillance, threats, exile and imprisonment. It is also a kind of revenge for generating evidence that contradicts the official discourse and denouncing the systematic violation of rights by the Sandinista regime.

  Why has the regime specifically targeted feminist organisations?

  Hostility against Nicaraguan feminists dates back to the 1980s. The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), as a guerrilla force turned into party that came to power, never really reflected on the patriarchal logics of power, but simply replicated them unceremoniously.

  The feminists of my generation had to endure an authoritarian and abusive relationship with the Sandinista government, which at different times expressed discomfort with the existence of women’s organisations, because from their perspective this weakened the unity of revolutionary forces.

  They exercised their veto power to prevent women’s collectives from placing demands related to macho violence and sexual and reproductive rights on the public agenda. The leaders of these collectives were silenced and forced to take on the priorities set by the ruling party leadership.

  The watershed that marked the feminist movement’s definitive break with the FSLN occurred in the late 1990s, when Zoilamérica Narváez, daughter of Rosario Murillo, who is both Daniel Ortega’s wife and Vice President, denounced the abuses committed by her stepfather for more than 20 years. When feminists clearly stood on the victim’s side it meant a break with the FSLN leadership, which has since perceived us as enemies. Zoilamérica’s denunciation encouraged further accusations involving other members of the FSLN national leadership, including the late Tomás Borge.

  Additionally, during the 2005-2006 electoral campaign, part of the feminist movement participated in an electoral alliance of opposition parties that included the Sandinista Renovation Movement, now UNAMOS, which the FSLN considers traitors to the revolution for having demanded democratisation of the party and questioned Ortega’s authoritarian and strongman leadership.

  As he returned to power in 2007, it immediately became clear that Ortega’s strategy was to dismantle feminist networks, which by that point had increased their capacity to put forward ideas and influence Nicaraguan society. The stigmatisation campaign began with a speech by Murillo in which she accused feminists of trafficking in women’s suffering and of wanting to impose a way of life alien to Nicaraguan culture. That same year, the government began to pressure international aid agencies to suspend their support for feminist collectives, causing many of them to leave the country.

  Among the main strands of the Ortega-Murillo regime’s discourse was its supposed commitment to gender equality: they proclaimed as a key advance the achievement of gender parity in all branches of government. This idea was taken up by United Nations (UN) bodies and multilateral financial institutions, but feminists provided clear evidence confirming the persistence of inequalities and the absence of public policies to address women’s demands.

  The absolute criminalisation of abortion, the absence of policies to prevent and punish macho violence, including sexual abuse against girls and adolescents, which is prevalent in Nicaragua, the absence of sex education, the failure to comply with the law that established the creation of a fund to distribute land to rural women and the violation of the labour rights of workers in foreign factories are among the many problems that remain unresolved by a regime that dares to compare itself with the countries that have made the most progress in terms of gender equality in the world.

  What should donors, and the international community in general, do to help Nicaraguan civil society?

  In such turbulent times and with so many hotspots of tension in the world, it is hard to appeal for solidarity with Nicaraguan society, which continues to bet on civic and peaceful change to move away from this new dictatorship and lay the foundations for the country’s democratisation.

  However, we must continue to appeal to democratic governments, regardless of their ideology, so they do not look away from what is happening in Nicaragua and support our just demands for the immediate release of political prisoners, the suspension of the police state, an end to the persecution of CSOs and the Catholic Church and the full restoration of our rights.

  We call for a coherent position on the part of democratic governments, UN agencies, multilateral financial institutions, regional integration blocs and political party forums to avoid any action that could contribute to prolonging the stay of the Ortega-Murillo dictatorship in power.

  At this point it is inadmissible that they denounce the regime’s systematic human rights violations, including the commission of crimes against humanity, while at the same time voting in favour of granting loans to the very same regime, which in addition to increasing a debt that is already greater than the country’s GDP gives it greater room for manoeuvre to remain in power.

  Active support for human rights defenders, independent journalists and CSOs is vital to sustain hope for democratic change that does not impose further suffering on the Nicaraguan people.

  Civic space in Nicaragua is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with La Corriente through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@LaCorrienteNica on Twitter. 

• NORTH KOREA: ‘Since Kim Jong-un came to power, the surveillance and security system has increased dramatically’

  CIVICUS speaks about activism in the closed civic space of North Korea with Bada Nam, Secretary General of People for Successful Corean Reunification (PSCORE).

  Founded in 2006 and based in South Korea, PSCORE is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) that works to improve human rights in North Korea, assist North Korean escapees settling in South Korea and address barriers to reunification of the two Koreas.

  Is there anything resembling civil society in North Korea?

  North Korea values organisational activities, requiring every citizen to participate simultaneously in several groups such as the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea, North Korea’s Socialist Women’s Union and the Socialist Patriotic Youth League. All of them are government-organised and exert control over people rather than encourage critical thinking. Mentioning civic organisations from the outside world is strictly forbidden.

  Congregating and engaging in activism in any way critical to the regime is a serious criminal offence, with punishments that can extend to the death penalty. As a result, any such activity must be covert, and it’s difficult to obtain accurate information on the existence of an underground civil society.

  North Korea is a surveillance state, where people are always cautious about what they say, even to close friends and family members. It’s impossible to gather colleagues and engage in civic activities because everyone is made to monitor each other and failure to report treasonous crimes to the authorities would also result in severe punishment. Public criticism sessions and public executions are also examples of how the regime strikes fear into the population.

  People are deterred from opposing the government not only because of the extreme punishment they would face but also due to North Korea’s policy of guilt by association, which puts their close relatives at risk. The ‘Songbun’ class system classifies people according to their political loyalties, as ‘loyal’, ‘wavering’ or ‘hostile’, and family members may be demoted in this classification system, affecting their life opportunities, including career options and access to food rations. In serious cases, entire families may be sent to political camps and die from forced labour or starvation. Therefore, North Koreans don’t dare imagine opposing the government.

  Have there been any recent changes in the ways the North Korean regime responds to dissent?

  The North Korean government has always responded to dissent in an extreme manner. However, since Kim Jong-un came to power in 2011, the surveillance and security system has increased dramatically, making it nearly impossible to escape from North Korea. Extra security measures are in place along the borders and a shoot-to-kill policy is enforced against those trying to escape. The situation was exacerbated further during the COVID-19 pandemic when the China-North Korea border was closed, both halting trade and also impeding the flow of defectors.

  Information poses the greatest threat to the North Korean regime, especially due to the influence of the recent ‘Korean wave’ that has made South Korean popular culture increasingly prevalent. Most people in North Korea have been exposed to South Korean dramas and music, leading some to adopt South Korean manner of speech and fashion style. In response, the government has intensified monitoring, enacted strict laws and imposed severe punishments for consuming or distributing foreign media. The Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act, enacted in January 2023, explicitly prohibits the use of foreign languages and specifically bans South Korean terms such as ‘oppa’, which translates as ‘older brother’ and is used as a form of endearment for a boyfriend.

  How do people manage to escape North Korea?

  Most North Koreans escape across the border with China, often with the help of a broker. Brokers reach out to wealthy families in North Korea or help those who have escaped to China get to South Korea. Defectors in South Korea sometimes contact a broker to help other family members flee.

  China has a policy of forced repatriation for North Korean refugees, and its advanced surveillance system makes it extremely difficult to travel in China undetected. If apprehended and returned to North Korea, defectors and their families face severe punishment.

  Most North Korean refugees must travel through several countries before reaching safety. From China, they might flee to Mongolia and Southeast Asian countries such as Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. Many North Koreans end up seeking asylum in Thailand, where the government assists them and helps organise their journey to South Korea.

  What help do escapees receive?

  The assistance available to North Korean refugees depends on the laws and diplomatic relations of countries with North and South Korea. Civil society, including PSCORE, helps North Korean defectors settle in South Korea by teaching essential life skills. Thanks to our volunteer teachers, we focus on providing educational support, including English lessons and vocational workshops. In the past, we also assisted escapees in reaching South Korea but, unfortunately, this became impossible due to China’s growing securitisation and the impact of COVID-19.

  Once in South Korea, North Koreans must undergo a 12-week training programme at the Hanawon rehabilitation centre, where they learn various skills to adapt to the South Korean lifestyle and have access to medical treatment and mental health services. While the South Korean government has implemented programmes to assist refugees, the process of fully integrating into South Korean society is still difficult for people who have previously lived under the totalitarian regime. Psychological trauma from refugees’ journey to freedom may have lasting effects on their lives.

  How do escapees work to raise awareness and advocate for change in North Korea?

  There are many CSOs, mainly based in South Korea, that support North Koreans inside the country and abroad. Some organisations send messages, information, K-dramas and K-pop to North Korea using USB sticks. South Korean news outlets, such as Daily NK and NK News, have sources in North Korea that provide insights into the current situation. PSCORE and other North Korean human rights groups conduct interviews with defectors and publish reports based on their testimonies.

  Our primary activities involve organising public awareness campaigns through seminars and events. We also share short catchy videos on various North Korea-related topics via our social media channels. Our large international team of interns plays a crucial role in advocacy by translating our social media content into various languages. This makes our mission and content visible to the rest of the world.

  PSCORE was granted special consultative status with the United Nations (UN) Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 2012, facilitating our engagement with the international community. We hold an annual side event at the UN Human Rights Council to share the latest information on North Korea’s human rights situation. We leverage international pressure to try to bring about change.

  What further international support do diaspora activists need?

  The topic of North Korean human rights is seen as a very political issue in South Korea. This means that CSOs are affected by each change of government, as policies toward North Korea shift with every administration. While PSCORE’s objective is centred on achieving peace and improving human rights in North Korea, we receive limited support compared to other CSOs due to the interpretation of our activities as politically charged, even though PSCORE is a non-partisan and non-religious CSO. Increased media exposure could help us secure more funding.

  Insufficient funding is a common challenge for North Korean human rights organisations. It hinders the potential to raise awareness and support refugees in South Korea. North Korean activists need more platforms to amplify their voices and continue advocating for change. Still, we hope that more donations will come as the international community becomes more interested in the cause of human rights in North Korea.

  Civic space in North Korea is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with PSCORE through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@PSCORE911 on Twitter.

• NORTHERN CYPRUS: ‘Civil society is not involved in decision-making and is considered a nuisance’

  CIVICUS speaks with DeryaBeyatlı, Director of the Human Rights Platform,about the space for civil society in Northern Cyprus and the prospects for reunification in the context of the 2023 Cyprus and Turkish presidential elections.

  Established in 2021, theHuman Rights Platform isa Turkish-Cypriot civil society umbrella organisation bringing together seven human rights organisations guided by the vision of an egalitarian, democratic and inclusive society where human rights and fundamental freedoms are protected and accessible for everyone.

  What do you make of the results of the Cyprus presidential election?

  In the latest presidential election, held in February 2023, we saw a rise of nationalist and racist rhetoric. In response to losing ground, the left-wing Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) supported a candidate who was more nationalistic than the party itself, but was still defeated in the runoff by Nicos Christodoulides, who was backed by centrists and right-wing parties.

  It is clear to me that over the past few years Cyprus has been affected by the same shift towards radical right-wing politics that we’ve seen elsewhere in Europe.

  What does the Human Rights Platform work on?

  One of the main objectives of the Human Rights Platform is to document human rights violations committed by the government of Northern Cyprus, which is largely controlled by the Turkish authorities. I have observed that both society and the local authorities are becoming more racist, largely in reaction to the inflow of Black students who are lured with the promise of a job in Europe and trafficked into the northern part of Cyprus. Only in 2020 was human trafficking recognised as a crime in Northern Cyprus, and yet more than two years later, there has been only one court verdict in a case involving this crime. The authorities are unwilling to deal with human trafficking crimes and other human rights violations and keep blaming the victims instead.

  What is the current state of reunification talks?

  Ever since 1974, Cyprus has been split along ethnic lines, with Greek and Turkish Cypriots living on either side of the Green Line, a buffer zone under United Nations (UN) control. Christodoulides assumed that reunification talks might resume due to Turkey’s rapprochement with the west in search of relief to address damage caused by recent earthquakes and right after being elected said that the reunification of Cyprus is his priority. However, I think neither him nor Ersin Tatar, the current president of Northern Cyprus, who has strongly advocated for a two-state solution for many years, nor the Turkish and Greek guarantors are actually interested in the reunification of Cyprus.

  The two-state formula currently advocated by Tatar was put on the table back in 2002 by Rauf Denktash, the founding president of Northern Cyprus, and was widely rejected by UN member states, with the exception of Turkey. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly expressed his support for the two-state solution, so I don´t think his re-election changes anything.

  Reunification talks are currently on hold and I’m afraid we’re headed towards permanent division. Neither Turkey nor the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) are eager to give up the power they exercise and share it with Turkish Cypriots. We are in a sandwich position, where Turkey interferes with the local matters of Northern Cyprus and the RoC discriminates against Turkish-speaking citizens of the island.

  One of the numerous human rights implications of the division of Cyprus is that there are around 30,000 children of mixed marriages who cannot get RoC citizenship and hence become European Union (EU) citizens. Despite Turkish language being an official language of the RoC, official documents and legislation are all in the Greek language, leaving Turkish Cypriots out. Turkish Cypriots cannot open a bank account or establish an association unless they live in government-controlled areas. And the list goes on.

  What obstacles does civil society face in Northern Cyprus?

  The division of the island creates challenging civic space conditions in Northern Cyprus, where the Human Rights Platform is registered. We face many obstacles due to the fact that we work in areas not under the effective control of the government of RoC. It’s very difficult to make our voices heard and get access to funding available to EU member states because we are not legally registered in a member state. Yet we cannot do so, since we do not reside in the government-controlled areas. Our only funding opportunity is the Financial Aid instrument of the European Commission (EC), which is highly competitive and offers limited funds to civil society.

  The local authorities of Northern Cyprus prefer directing EU funds towards infrastructure and economic development, and regard supporting civil society as unnecessary and therefore a complete waste of funds. Turkish Cypriot civil society organisations (CSOs) aren’t involved in decision-making mechanisms and are considered a nuisance. Meanwhile, local public funds are only available to government-sponsored non-governmental organisations, also known as GONGOs, that are under the effective control of the Turkish Embassy and the Turkish Cypriot political leadership.

  Perceived by local authorities as a threat, Turkish Cypriot civil society is silenced and sometimes attacked on mainstream media. Public TV, radio and news agencies are almost inaccessible for us. CSOs working to protect human rights and safeguard democracy in Northern Cyprus are systematically marginalised. Since we maintain relationships with the EC, EU member states and the USA, we are often regarded as ‘foreign agents’ and threatened and blackmailed, sometimes openly but mostly discreetly. A widely used tactic is the use of fake social media accounts promoting extremely nationalistic content and blaming Turkish Cypriot civil society activists for trading the country to the Greeks or to imperialistic powers.

  What international support do Turkish Cypriot human rights CSOs need?

  Most international intergovernmental organisations and their agencies prefer to ignore our presence. Since we are in a place the existence of which they don’t recognise, they refuse to even meet with us, let alone hear us out. We need both political and financial support in order to get stronger and become more effective in our struggle to uphold democracy and human rights in Northern Cyprus.

  ---

  Civic space in Cyprus is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Human Rights Platform through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@ihp_hrp and@DBeyatli on Twitter.

• Open Letter to president of Venezuela regarding the proposed International Cooperation Bill
  Presidente de la República
  S.E. Hugo Chávez Frías
  Palacio de Miraflores, Caracas,
  Venezuela
  Fax:+58.212.806 3698
  E-mail: 
   
  Your Excellency,
   
  Re: Proposed International Cooperation Bill
   
  I write as the Secretary General of CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, an international alliance of civil society with members and partners in over a hundred countries. CIVICUS works to strengthen civil society and citizen action throughout the world.
   
  We at CIVICUS, our members and partners, are deeply concerned about your recent comments urging National Assembly members to adopt a "severe" law to effectively stop international funding for NGOs. We would like to emphasise that Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) play an extremely important role in national life. Their constructive criticism and quest for greater accountability in public life are important assets for the nation. We therefore urge your government to respect expressions of legitimate dissent and unequivocally uphold civil society's rights to express, associate and assemble freely.
• Over 100 Global foundations & donors pledge solidarity with blacklisted Palestinian civil society groups

  Philanthropic leaders urge governments to uphold democracy and human rights by protecting civil society against repressive policies

  ---

  More than 100 global foundations and donors, most of them U.S.-based, have signed on to an open letter expressing solidarity with Palestinian civil society after six leading human rights organisations were designated as so-called “terrorist organisations” by Israeli Defense Minister Benjamin Gantz. The list of signatories includes foundations and funder networks across the U.S. and Europe that support environmental justice, feminist movements, and human rights -- all areas that the six banned nonprofit organisations focus on.

  “The cynical weaponisation of anti-terrorism laws poses an existential threat both for Palestinian human rights defenders and those defending human rights globally,” said Lara Friedman, president of the Foundation for Middle East Peace, a philanthropic organisation that promotes a just resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. “The breadth of signers of this letter underscores funders’ shared recognition of the urgency of challenging this dangerous tactic, and of the moral obligation to defend partners on the ground who, in essence, have been singled out for attack because they have done their work defending human and civil rights too well.”

  The six targeted organisations provide essential services for more than five million Palestinians living under Israeli military occupation. The list includes Addameer, Al-Haq, Bisan Center for Research and Development, Defense for Children International - Palestine, the Union of Agricultural Work Committees and the Union of Palestinian Women’s Committees.

  “The philanthropic community must not be silent,” said Latanya Mapp Frett, Global Fund for Women President and CEO. “Palestinian women, girls, and gender diverse and nonconforming people face multiple sources of violence—from the Israeli military occupation to a society dominated by patriarchy. The groups targeted by the Israeli government as ‘terrorists’ are activists. Women human rights defenders are fighting worldwide to end the widespread impunity for violence against women, sexual and gender-based violence, and femicide. We are honored to be part of a group of philanthropists who recognise their role in supporting movement leaders on the forefront of social justice.”

  International human rights and intergovernmental bodies rely on the targeted groups for documentation of Israeli rights violations, such as the government’s plan to construct more than 3,100 new illegal settlement units on Palestinian lands, announced just days after the six organisations were banned.  

  "The exposure of illegal spying on peaceful Palestinian human rights defenders, coming on top of baseless terrorism claims against internationally respected human rights organisations, underscores how important it is that the international community continue supporting their legitimate work," said Andrew Anderson, executive director of Front Line Defenders, which protects human rights defenders at risk globally. "Surely this episode will serve as a stark warning against any deployment of the term 'terrorist' against human rights defenders anywhere in the world, and renew efforts to rein in the use of spyware against human rights defenders, journalists and other civil society activists."

  The philanthropy open letter urges the U.S. government, European Union, and other governments around the world to protect Palestinian civil society by taking the following actions:  

  • Denounce all smear campaigns against Palestinian civil society organisations and press the Israeli government to immediately and fully rescind Gantz’s designation of “terrorist organization” against the six prominent Palestinian human rights organisations;
  • Hold the Israeli government accountable to adhere to international law and human rights standards; and;
  • Ensure that any philanthropic funds designated toward civil society organisations in Palestine reach them without interference by the Israeli government or financial institutions.

  “These designations mark a crescendo, not an opening salvo, in the Israeli government’s long-standing campaign to suppress Palestinian civil society,” said Kay Guinane, founder and senior advisor at the Charity & Security Network, a resource and advocacy center that protects the ability of nonprofits to carry out peacebuilding, humanitarian, and human rights missions. “For over a decade, Israel has been working with a network of legal outfits and disinformation groups to distract, defund, and delegitimise organisations in Palestine and internationally that work to support Palestinian needs and end Israel’s human rights abuses. Now, in addition to supporting disinformation and spurious lawsuits, the Israeli government is simply outlawing those who stand up to its abuses.”

  Pamela Kohlberg, who sits on the board of the Radical Imagination Family Foundation, added: “It is especially important for us, as Jews, to stand up for the human rights of the Palestinian community. Uniting as progressive funders to protest the targeting of these important civil society groups is critical. Future work for stability in the region will require relationships and cooperation with these organisations.”

  The full text of the letter and latest list of signatories may be found here.

  ---

  Civic space in Palestine is rated as "Repressed"by the CIVICUS Monitor.

  Civic space in Israel is rated as "Obstructed"by the CIVICUS Monitor. 

• Pakistan shuts down and kicks out 18 International NGOs, with 20 others facing expulsion
  •  Pakistan has expelled 18 international non-governmental organisations (INGOs)
  • Another 20 organisations are also at risk of expulsion
  • Pakistan’s policy on INGOs effectively hampers the registration and functioning of international humanitarian and human rights groups

  Global human rights groups have expressed grave concern over the expulsion of 18 international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) from Pakistan.

  The Pakistani authorities ordered the INGOs to leave the country after rejecting their final appeals to remain. According to reports, all 18 expelled organisations, with the exception of two that are still trying to overturn their ouster in court, have closed their operations in Pakistan. Another 20 groups are reportedly also at risk of expulsion following the authorities’ singling out of a total of 38 international aid groups for closure a few months ago.  

  Global civil society alliance, CIVICUS, said this was a regressive move that will have a negative impact on thousands of ordinary Pakistani families that have been assisted by these organisations to claim their rights and build a better life.

  “The Pakistani government's closure of international organisations is a clear violation of the fundamental right to freedom of association,” said David Kode, CIVICUS’s Advocacy and Campaigns Lead.

  “It shows a disturbing disregard for the well-being of ordinary Pakistanis who rely on and benefit from the assistance and support provided by these groups," said Kode.

  On October 3, Pakistan’s Interior Ministry ordered 18 INGOs, including Action Aid, Plan International, International Alert and Safer World, to wind up their operations within 60 days. This followed the Ministry’s rejection of their applications for re-registration, without offering reasons, in November 2017.

  Pakistan has the world’s sixth largest population, a fifth of which live in poverty. In 2017 alone, the INGO sector reached an estimated 34 million people with humanitarian relief and development assistance. The INGOs affected by the closure order are engaged in supporting access to healthcare, education and good governance.

  These expulsions come three years after the previous government ordered all INGOs operating in Pakistan to re-register with the Interior Ministry, under a new policy that worked to hamper the registration and functioning of international humanitarian and human rights groups.

  The new policy and registration process required the submission of detailed accounts of INGOs’ current and past project funding. Even more concerning, all INGOs working in the country are required to sign a new Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which prohibits any participation in ‘political activity,’ such as campaigning and advocacy activities, as well as distribution of materials deemed to negatively affect social, cultural and religious sentiments. The MoU also prevents INGOs from appealing the government’s decisions in court.

  CIVICUS said the removal of these INGOs violates the right to freedom of association enshrined in Article 17 of Pakistan’s Constitution and guaranteed by Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Pakistan is a party to. Any restriction on the right to freedom of association must be in strict compliance with international human rights law. In particular, any restriction shall be prescribed by law and must have a legitimate aim. Furthermore, the law concerned must be precise, certain and foreseeable. It shall also be adopted through a democratic process that ensures public participation and review. The recent actions fulfill none of these criteria.

  “The Pakistani government must reconsider its decision to expel these groups and halt any further plans to shut down other civil society organisations.” Said Kode.

  “Instead, as part of its reform agenda, it should take steps to revise its policy on INGOs to avoid contravening the rights to freedom of expression and association and ensure the policy cannot be misused to restrict organisations’ legitimate work.” said Kode.

  CIVICUS has urged the government to create an enabling environment for civil society and human rights defenders to operate, in accordance with the rights enshrined in the Constitution of Pakistan, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, among others.

  The CIVICUS Monitor, an online platform that tracks threats to civil society in countries across the globe, rates civic space – the space for civil society – in Pakistan as repressed.

  ENDS

  For more information or to arrange an interview, please contact:

  David Kode - email:

  CIVICUS Media –

• PALESTINE: ‘The counter-terrorism law is used to restrict political work in Palestine & shrink civic space in Israel’

  CIVICUS speaks withEinat Fogel-Levin, International Advocacy Coordinator for the Human Rights Defenders Fund (HRDF), about growing restrictions on Palestinian civil society. HRDF is an Israeli civil society organisation (CSO) working to protect Palestinian and Israeli human rights defenders (HRDs) by providing legal aid and defence to those facing various forms of legal persecution and fending off attacks on their bodies, persons and work.

• People power under attack: just 3% of people live in countries where fundamental civic freedoms are fully respected
  • Almost six billion people live in 106 countries where there are serious violations of freedoms of expression, assembly, and association
  • This first ever global dataset on civic space shows that countries with fewer fundamental civic rights restrictions have less inequality

  Johannesburg, 4 April 2017 –Just three percent of people live in countries where the rights to protest, organise and speak out are respected, protected and fulfilled. This is according to the CIVICUS Monitor, which today releases the first-ever global dataset on civic space, a concept central to any open and democratic society which means that states have a duty to protect people's’  fundamental rights to associate, assemble peacefully and express views and opinions. CIVICUS also finds that serious violations of these rights are taking place in 106 countries - well over half of all UN Member States.

  The CIVICUS Monitor rates how open civic space is in countries based on how well they uphold the three fundamental civic freedoms that enable people to act collectively and make change: freedom of association, freedom of peaceful assembly, and freedom of expression.

  Of the 195 rated, it finds that civic space in 20 countries - Bahrain, Burundi, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran, Laos, Libya, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Vietnam -  is closed, a rating characterised by an atmosphere of fear and violence, and severe punishment for those who dare to disagree with authorities.

  A further 35 countries are rated repressed. Fifty-one countries are rated obstructed and 63 narrowed. Just 26 countries are rated as open, meaning the state safeguards space for people in the country to share their views, participate in public life and influence political and social change.

  Click here for responsive visualisations of all of our findings: https://monitor.civicus.org/findings

  In order to highlight countries of immediate concern to us, today CIVICUS is also launching our new Watch List. This advocacy tool enables us to highlight up to five countries on the CIVICUS Monitor where there is a serious and rapid decline in the ability of people to actively engage in a country’s social and political processes, and have their voices heard. Countries on the first iteration of this Watch List include: Cameroon, Macedonia, Myanmar, the USA, and Turkey.

  “Our research shows that restrictions on fundamental civic freedoms are truly a worrying global phenomenon affecting almost 6 billion people,” said CIVICUS Secretary General and CEO Danny Sriskandarajah. “They cut across established democracies and repressive states, undermining participatory democracy, sustainable development and efforts to reduce inequality.”

  The CIVICUS Monitor provides updates on attacks against civil society organisations and activists every weekday.  Analysis of almost 500 updates published on the CIVICUS Monitor over the past four months has found:

  • Detention of activists, use of excessive force against protesters, and attacks on journalists were the three most common violations of civic freedoms.
  • Activists were most likely to be detained over criticism of authorities, human rights monitoring or demands for social or economic needs to be met.
  • Excessive force was most likely to be used against protesters who criticise government decisions or corruption, call for action on human rights abuses or call for basic social or economic needs to be met.
  • Journalists were most likely to be attacked for political reporting, covering protests or conflicts, or because of their ethnicity, religious or political affiliation.
  • In the majority of cases, the state is the perpetrator of violations, although non-state actors also frequently attack journalists, with many of these crimes going unpunished.

  “Swift action should be taken by authorities and the international community to address the rapid decline in respect for civic space in the five countries on our Watch List,” said CIVICUS Monitor lead researcher Cathal Gilbert. “Escalating attacks on protest rights in the United States, the repression of activists in Anglophone areas of Cameroon and Turkey’s all-out assault on dissent must end without delay.”

  CIVICUS Monitor ratings and daily updates are based on a combination of inputs from local activists, regional civil society experts and research partners, existing assessments by national and international civil society organisations, user-generated input and media-monitoring. The CIVICUS Monitor now provides ratings for all UN Member States and regular updates from a network of twenty research partners around the world.

  ****

  Annex I – CIVICUS Monitor ratings, 4th April 2017

  Closed (20 countries): Bahrain, Burundi, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran, Laos, Libya, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.

  Repressed (35 countries): Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Djibouti, Egypt, Gambia, Iraq, Liberia, Mauritania, Mexico, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Republic of the Congo, Russia, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

  Obstructed (51 countries): Armenia, Bhutan, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire
  Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Fiji, Gabón, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tanzania,
  Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Ukraine and Zambia.

  Narrowed (63 countries): Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Comoros, Costa Rica, Croatia, Dominica, El Salvador, France, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guyana, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Kosovo, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Montenegro, Namibia, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Romania, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, St Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay and Vanuatu.

  Open (26 countries): Andorra, Barbados, Belgium, Cape Verde, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Sweden, Switzerland and Tuvalu.

  Regional breakdown

  	Africa	Americas	Asia	Europe	Oceania
  Closed	9	1	10	0	0
  Repressed	15	3	14	3	0
  Obstructed	18	9	19	3	2
  Narrowed	10	21	3	19	10
  Open	2	1	0	21	2

  ****

  Notes to editors:

  The CIVICUS Monitor is available at https://monitor.civicus.org. If you have a question about the CIVICUS Monitor - see our FAQ page here.

  For more information or to set up interviews with CIVICUS staff and research partners, please contact Deborah Walter, Communication Manager, CIVICUS on or . Tel: +27 - 11 - 8335959

  CIVICUS is a global alliance of over 3,600 civil society organisations and activists dedicated to strengthening citizen action and civil society around the world.

  www.civicus.org

  www.twitter.com/CIVICUSalliance

  www.facebook.com/CIVICUS

  #CIVICUSMonitor 

• PHILIPPINES: ‘Increased US military aid will worsen the already dire human rights situation’

  CIVICUS discusses the human rights impacts of US aid to the Philippines with Cristina Palabay, Secretary General of Karapatan.Founded in 1995, Karapatan isa coalition of civil society activists and organisations working to promote and protect human rights in the Philippines.

  The USA recently pledged US$500 million in military aid to the Philippines amid tensions with China. This could bolster the authoritarian government of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, already responsible for extrajudicial killings, disappearances and aerial bombing and artillery attacks on civilian areas on the basis that they’re suspected of supporting armed revolutionary movements. The additional aid, along with a proposed 51 per cent increase in the Philippines’ defence budget for 2025, heightens concerns about corruption and rights abuses.

  What’s behind growing tensions between the Philippines and China, and how is the USA involved?

  Growing tensions between the Philippines and China stem from territorial disputes in the West Philippine Sea, particularly over the Kalayaan archipelago and Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal). These disputes were exacerbated by the implementation of the 1994 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which grants rights to a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf, including the right to explore and exploit fisheries, petroleum and other marine resources.

  On the surface, this is about the Chinese Coast Guard preventing Filipino fishermen from accessing the EEZ or confronting the Philippine Coast Guard. Behind the scenes, however, are increasing provocations by the USA as part of its broader geopolitical and military strategy in Asia. The USA seeks to maintain its influence in the region to counterbalance China’s expanding economic reach both in Asia and globally.

  As well as asserting its navigational rights within the EEZ in 2023 and 2024, the USA conducted numerous joint military exercises with the Armed Forces of the Philippines aimed at countering Chinese aggression in the disputed waters. Instead of easing tensions, this is exacerbating them. These provocations threaten to overshadow legitimate claims and could undermine efforts to resolve maritime disputes between the Philippines and China peacefully.

  Has the relationship between the Philippines and the USA changed since Ferdinand Marcos Jrbecame president?

  There has been no significant change beyond the absence of the crass and offensive rhetoric associated with former President Rodrigo Duterte. The Philippines’ dependence has allowed the USA to maintain its presence and influence in the country’s national defence and security affairs, serving its economic and political interests.

  The USA-Philippines 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty and the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement are longstanding but one-sided agreements that have allowed the USA to maintain a military presence in the Philippines, despite having closed its bases in 1991 following public protests. The presence of US troops was further expanded by the 2014 Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement. Other additional bilateral defence agreements with NATO allies such as France, Germany and Japan have also bolstered the USA’s strategic position in the region.

  The US position could become more aggressive if Donald Trump returns to office. This could further escalate tensions in the region, particularly over the West Philippine Sea dispute. This in turn could lead to increased US military intervention in the Philippines through existing agreements and so-called military assistance.

  What is US military aid being used for, and how does it affect human rights?

  On 30 July 2024, following a meeting between US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, US Secretary of Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin and Philippines’ government officials, the US government announced a US$500 million foreign military financing package for the Philippines to reinforce ‘cooperation’ on the West Philippine Sea disputes.

  Since 2019, the Philippines has been the largest recipient of US military and security aid, with US$273.2 million provided over the past five years. US military aid has historically been used to support the country’s military operations, including the provision of hardware, financial assistance for acquiring military equipment and technical advisory services. In practice, however, this aid has often been used to suppress political dissent and social movements in the Philippines. The funds have been used to support air, naval and ground military operations that have resulted in bombings, detentions, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, illegal arrests and other serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.

  The new US military aid comes on top of a proposed 51 per cent increase in the national defence budget for 2025, which includes a six per cent increase for the Armed Forces, a four per cent increase for the Philippine National Police, approximately US$104.4 million for the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict and US$95.4 million for the Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan Programme, a counter-insurgency initiative for conflict-prone areas.

  We believe that the so-called aid and overall increase in security and military budgets indicate a shift towards warmongering that will worsen the Philippines’ already dire human rights situation. The government is prioritising its military efforts over people’s urgent economic and social needs, even though people are struggling with rising prices, inadequate social services and lack of decent work.

  How has the state of civic space evolved in recent years?

  Civic space in the Philippines has narrowed significantly, with fundamental rights such as freedoms of association, expression and peaceful assembly under constant threat. Counter-terrorism laws, such as the 2020 Anti-Terrorism Act and the 2012 Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act, have further restricted humanitarian work and civil liberties. These laws were meant to target terrorism but are being used to stifle political dissent and silence civil society.

  Instead of protecting rights, the anti-terrorism laws are being used to violate them, with activists falsely accused of being involved in violent conflict. So far, 37 petitions have been filed challenging the constitutionality of these laws, but the Supreme Court has largely upheld them.

  To date, Karapatan has documented that at least 112 human rights defenders face criminal charges under these laws, 32 of whom are currently detained after being arbitrarily labelled as terrorists. Those arbitrarily designated as terrorists include peace consultants, Indigenous rights defenders and a community health worker.

  Despite these challenges, civil society and social movements continue to resist. Our strategies include mass campaigns such as #DefendTheDefenders, which aims to educate people about fundamental rights and freedoms and denounce their erosion through the weaponisation of terror laws. We’ve also built local networks to support human rights defenders and mobilised international solidarity to amplify their voices, highlight the realities on the ground and counter the official narrative that falsely claims human rights have improved under the current government.

  Civic space in the Philippines is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Karapatan through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@karapatan on Twitter. Connect with Cristina onFacebook orTwitter.

• PHILIPPINES: ‘We fear the democracy those before us fought so hard for will be erased’

  CIVICUS speaks about the recent presidential election in the Philippines with Marinel Ubaldo, a young climate activist, co-founder of the Youth Leaders for Environmental Action Federation and Advocacy Officer for Ecological Justice and Youth Engagement of Living Laudato Si’ Philippines (LLS).

  Founded by Catholic lay people, LLS began in 2018 as an interfaith movement calling on Filipino financial institutions to divest from coal-related operations and other environmentally harmful activities. It aims to empower people to adopt lifestyles and attitudes that match the urgent need to care for the planet. It promotes sustainable development and seeks to tackle the climate crisis through collective action.

  

  From your perspective, what was at stake in the 9 May presidential election?

  The 2022 election fell within the crucial window for climate justice. As stated in the latest report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, we need to keep global warming below 1.5 degrees Celsius or we will suffer terrible consequences, such as a rise in sea levels that will submerge much of the currently populated land, including the Philippines. Upcoming leaders will serve for the next six years –and possibly beyond. They have the immense responsibility of putting a climate change mitigation system in place for our country and urging more countries to do the same.

  As shown by Super Typhoon Rai that hit the Philippines in December 2021, climate change affects all of us. Whole communities lost their loved ones and their homes. Young people will reap the fruits, or pay the consequences, for whatever our incoming leaders do in response to this crisis. This is why climate anxiety is so prevalent among young people.

  How did young people mobilise around this election?

  Young people campaigned house to house. We also went to grassroots communities to educate voters on how to vote wisely. Alongside other organisations that form the Green Thumb Coalition, our organisation produced a Green Scorecard and we used our social media platforms to promote the ‘green’ candidate.

  One of the biggest youth initiatives around the elections was ‘LOVE, 52’, a campaign aimed at empowering young people and helping them engage with candidates and make their voices heard in demand of a green, just, and loveable future through better governance. We wanted to shift the focus from candidates’ personality and patronage politics to a debate on fundamental issues, and to help young people move traditional powerholders towards a people-centred style of policymaking.

  We called this initiative ‘LOVE, 52’ in reference to the fact that young people – people under 40 – comprise 52 per cent of the Philippines’ voting population. We sought to appeal to younger voters’ emotions, and our central theme was love because a frequent response to the question ‘why vote?’ is to protect what we love: our families, our country, and our environment. The main element of this campaign was a ‘love letter’ drafted by several youth organisations and addressed to the country. It contained young people’s calls to incoming leaders, including those of prioritising environmental and social issues, coming up with a coherent plan to address the climate crisis, and supporting a vibrant democracy that will enable climate and environmental justice. We gathered all the love letters people wrote, put them in one envelope, and delivered them physically to the presidential candidates’ headquarters.

  What are the implications of the election results for civil society and civic freedoms?

  The results of these elections will have a lot of implications for the Filipino people. They will have a direct impact on civil society and our freedoms of association, expression and peaceful assembly.

  The winning candidate, senator Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos Jr., the son and namesake of a former dictator, has said that he will include his family in his administration. Just today, I saw the new president’s spokesperson on the news saying Marcos will make his own appointments, bringing in the people he trusts. I think he will really try to control the government with people who follow him unconditionally. He will put such people in all the positions available, so everyone will tell him what he wants to hear and no one will disagree with him. I think this is the scariest part of it all.

  I fear in a few months or years we will be living under a dictatorship. Marcos may even be able to stay in power for as long as he wants. After trying to reach power for so long, he has finally won, and he won’t let go of power easily.

  It’s very scary because the human rights violations that happened during his father’s dictatorship are not even settled yet. More human rights violations are likely to happen. It’s a fact that the Filipino people won’t be allowed to raise their voices; if they do so, they may risk being killed. This is what happened under martial law during Ferdinand Marcos’s dictatorship.

  This will definitely affect civil society. It will be very difficult for humanitarian workers to respond to any crisis since Marcos will likely aspire to micro-manage everything. We fear the democracy those before us fought so hard for will be erased.

  Regarding the specifics of policymaking, we don’t really know what the plan is. Marcos campaigned on vague promises of national unity and implied that all problems would be solved if people unite behind his leadership. Needless to say, he never mentioned any policy to tackle climate change and the environmental crisis.

  Against all signals, I keep hoping the new administration will be receptive to people’s demands. I really hope our new president listens to the cries of the people. Our leaders must reach out to communities and listen to our issues. I doubt Bongbong Marcos is capable of doing that, but one can only hope.

  What support does Filipino civil society need from international civil society and the international community?

  We need to ensure the international community sends out a consistent message and stands by our side when oppression starts. We also need them to be ready to rescue Filipinos if their safety is at risk. We activists fear for our lives. We have doubts about how receptive and accepting the new administration will be toward civil society. 

  Today is a gloomy day in the Philippines. We did our best to campaign for truth, facts, and hope for the Philippines. Vice President Leni Robredo campaigned for public sector transparency and vowed to lead a government that cares for the people and bolsters the medical system. If she had won the elections, she would have been the third woman to lead the Philippines after Cory Aquino and Macapagal Arroyo.

  Leni’s loss is the loss of the Philippines, not just hers. There are still too many people in the Philippines who believe Marcos’s lies. I don’t blame the masses for believing his lies; they are victims of decades of disinformation. Our system sadly enables disinformation. This is something that needs to be urgently tackled, but the next administration will likely benefit from it so it will hardly do what’s needed.

  We now fear every day for our lives and for the future of our country.

  Civic space inthe Philippinesis rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Living Laudato Si’ Philippines through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@LaudatoSiPH on Twitter and@laudatosiph on Instagram. 

• Re: Proposed International Cooperation Bill
  Presidente de la República
  S.E. Hugo Chávez Frías
  Palacio de Miraflores, Caracas,
  Venezuela
  Fax:+58.212.806 3698
  E-mail:
   

  Your Excellency,

   
   

  Re: Proposed International Cooperation Bill

   
   
   
  I write as the Secretary General of CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, an international alliance of civil society with members and partners in over a hundred countries. CIVICUS works to strengthen civil society and citizen action throughout the world.
   
   
  We at CIVICUS, our members and partners, are deeply concerned about your recent comments urging National Assembly members to adopt a "severe" law to effectively stop international funding for NGOs. We would like to emphasise that Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) play an extremely important role in national life. Their constructive criticism and quest for greater accountability in public life are important assets for the nation. We therefore urge your government to respect expressions of legitimate dissent and unequivocally uphold civil society's rights to express, associate and assemble freely.
   
   

  We would like to draw your attention to the International Cooperation Bill, currently being discussed by law makers. We believe that the bill has been drawn up without adequate consultation with civil society. Moreover, we are deeply apprehensive that that passage of the Bill in its current form will severely curtail civil society space in the following ways:

  1. Subjecting CSOs to additional layers of bureaucracy by requiring them to register with the government in order to receive funds from international sources could increase the possibility of subjective denial of registration to CSOs who have been critical of official actions.
  2. The creation of an official fund for International Cooperation and Assistance for the collection of monetary grants from overseas and their subsequent disbursement by the government is likely to impede international cooperation activities between Venezuelan CSOs and their counterparts abroad. Moreover, it will lead to government ownership and prioritisation of international cooperation funds rather than democratic ownership by CSOs and local communities.
  3. By increasing executive discretion to monitor CSO affairs through the creation of an Agency for International Cooperation, limits of whose powers and have not been clearly defined, raising apprehension of increased restrictions on CSO affairs. 

  We believe that the registration and funding requirements of the Bill, given their ambiguity, have the potential to breach the right to freedom of association embodied in the Venezuelan Constitution, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Defenders Declaration. 

  We urge you to use your executive powers and influence to carry out consultations with civil society with regard to the need for an international cooperation law as well as the principles that should underpin any regulatory mechanism for civil society.

  Sincerely,

  Ingrid Srinath
  Secretary General
  CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation

• Russia: Human Rights Council must respond to crackdown on civil society

  Joint statement ahead of the 46th Session of the Human Rights Council, condemning Russia (a new member of the body) for recent attacks against protestors (over 12,000 detained since late January).

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• SENEGAL: ‘After being an example of democracy in Africa, we are increasingly tending towards authoritarianism’

  CIVICUS speaks with Abdou Aziz Cissé, Advocacy Officer at AfricTivistes, about President Macky Sall’s decision to postpone the presidential election that was due on 25 February and its implications for democracy in Senegal.

  AfricTivistes is a pan-African civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes and defends democratic values, human rights and good governance through civic tech. It aims to empower African people to become active players in building their societies and holding their governments to account.

  Why did President Sall postpone the 25 February presidential election?

  This latest crisis in Senegal began with a solemn address by President Sall on 3 February, the day before the planned day for the start of the campaign for the 25 February election, in which his successor was to be elected. He repealed the decree convening the electoral body, which had set the presidential election for 25 February.

  He cited three reasons: a supposed institutional crisis between the National Assembly and the Constitutional Council concerning an alleged case of corruption of judges, the need to set up a parliamentary commission to investigate suspected irregularities in the process of verifying sponsorships for the election and the revelation that one of the candidates vetted by the Constitutional Council has dual nationality.

  It should be noted that Karim Wade, son of former president Abdoulaye Wade and candidate for the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), was not on the final list of candidates for the presidential election announced on 20 January. To contest this decision by the Constitutional Council, PDS members of parliament called for the creation of a parliamentary commission of enquiry to shed light on the process of candidacy verification. They also accused two Constitutional Council magistrates of corruption. Parliament approved the establishment of this commission on 31 January.

  On 5 February, a bill to postpone the presidential election until 15 December was passed after opposition legislators were ejected from parliament by security forces. It should be remembered that on 3 July 2023, after stating that he would not seek a third term in office, Sall promised to hand over power on 2 April following free, inclusive and transparent elections.

  Why has this decision been described as a ‘constitutional coup’?

  Sall’s actions have been described as a constitutional coup because he is not allowed to interrupt an electoral process that has already begun. The postponement of an election is the exclusive prerogative of the Constitutional Council.

  Sall’s decision also violates other articles of the constitution, notably article 27, which provides for a five-year presidential term and a limit of two consecutive terms, which means the president cannot extend his term of office. There is also article 103, which states that ‘the republican form of the state, the method of election, the duration and number of consecutive terms of office of the President of the Republic may not be revised’.

  I would like to emphasise that in accordance with article 52 of the constitution, the president can only interrupt the process ‘when the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity of the national territory or the fulfilment of international commitments are threatened in a serious and immediate manner’. However, all institutions of the republic were operating regularly. The establishment of a parliamentary commission of enquiry and the passage of a bill clearly proved it.

  By making this illegal decision, Sall became the first president in Senegal’s history not to organise a presidential election on its due date since 1963.

  What has the reaction of civil society been?

  The reaction of civil society was spontaneous. Several CSOs, including AfricTivistes, condemned this anti-democratic act in press releases and media statements. The nation’s other driving forces, such as trade unions from all professions, also voiced their disagreement.

  On social networks, citizens shared their indignation, internationalising their anger at the decision.

  On 4 February, 19 candidates held a press conference, joined by members of civil society, to reaffirm their willingness to campaign together.

  Another demonstration was declared for 5 February, the day of the parliamentary vote, but could not take place because all the strategic roads leading to the National Assembly were cordoned off. Since June 2023, the administrative authorities have systematically banned demonstrations, even peaceful ones.

  The ‘Aar Sunu Election’ (‘Let’s protect our election’) platform brought together more than a hundred CSOs to reject the postponement of the election. The pressure paid off, because on the evening of 15 February, the Constitutional Council declared the presidential decree of 3 February and the law passed by the National Assembly on 5 February invalid.

  How has the government reacted?

  The government began by cracking down on the demonstrations that took place on 4 February, the day after the president’s announcement and the day on which the election campaign was due to begin. Censorship was also imposed that day, with the internet via mobile data cut off, according to the minister in charge, to stop ‘the dissemination of hateful and subversive messages’. The same reasons had been provided to justify acts of internet censorship in June, July and August 2023. Mobile data was restored on 7 February, then restricted to specific time slots on 13 February.

  Internet blackouts and other forms of online restrictions violate the constitution and several international conventions ratified by Senegal. They are violations of freedom of expression, access to information and economic freedoms. According to Senegalese telecoms unions, censorship has caused losses amounting to 3 billion CFA francs (approx. US$ 4.9 million).

  With this in mind, AfricTivistes and two Senegalese journalists are taking the state of Senegal to the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States, the regional organisation, to seek an end to untimely cuts in mobile internet data.

  In addition, the licence of the Walfadjri television station was suspended at the height of the protests following the announcement of the postponement of the election. Walfadjri has been subjected to a relentless attack by the authorities. Its signal was restored on 11 February.

  On 9 February, a peaceful rally held by numerous organisations on the Place de la Nation in Dakar was dispersed by the police. People mobilised throughout the country, particularly in the northern city of Saint-Louis. Peaceful protesters were violently repressed with disproportionate use of force, resulting in three deaths and several people injured, some of whom were not even taking part in demonstrations, along with over 200 arrests.

  The press was also prevented from covering the demonstrations and providing people with fair and accurate information. Journalists, most of them women, were teargassed, arrested and roughed up in the same way as protesters. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, at least 25 journalists were attacked, detained or teargassed during the demonstrations. Journalist Absa Anne, of the news website Seneweb, was dragged into a police vehicle and beaten unconscious, becoming a symbol of the indiscriminate crackdown on the press that took place that day.

  A silent march announced by the ‘Let’s protect our election’ platform was banned on 13 February by the administrative authorities. However, another march on 17 February was authorised, and people came together in huge numbers to enjoy their long-threatened constitutional freedoms. This national moment of communion was proof that when authorised by the administrative authorities, demonstrations go off peacefully.

  How do you see the future of democracy in Senegal?

  After being an example of democracy and political stability in Africa, with peaceful democratic alternation in power in 2000 and 2012, Senegal is increasingly tending towards authoritarianism, symbolised by the restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms.

  Even if the release, since 15 February, of more than 600 political detainees arrested for crimes of opinion or belonging to the opposition is helping to ease the political climate, the crisis that we are currently experiencing does not augur a bright future for Senegalese democracy.

  But I am optimistic, because even if the political class is engaged in a fierce power struggle, civil society is strong and has a considerable ability to assert itself in all areas of the country’s social life. Not to mention the new force of protest that has emerged with the advent of civic technologies. Social media amplifies citizens’ voices and gives them an international dimension, hence the moves by the authorities to try to silence the voices that express themselves through online tools.

  Senegal also has strong justice and administrative systems, which have always played their role as a counterweight. We must also take into account that, like all democratic systems, Senegal’s needs to be perfected. It has made significant progress, albeit with ups and downs like those we are currently experiencing. And we must bear in mind that it is from crises that opportunities emerge.

  What should the international community do to help solve this crisis?

  The international community can play an important role in supporting a transparent and fair democratic process by sending election observation missions.

  As well as supporting civil society, international partners can exert diplomatic pressure, as Antony Blinken, the US Secretary of State, Joseph Borell, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights have done, calling for independent investigations to shed light on the killings of protesters. All this goodwill can help to encourage an inclusive dialogue. This could foster a search for consensual solutions.

  The international community must condemn all political violence and reiterate the importance of respecting fundamental human rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of peaceful assembly.

  How do you assess the state of democracy in West Africa, and how is AfricTivistes working to help activists in countries affected by coups?

  Over the past three years democracy in the region has declined. Between 2020 and 2022, West Africa experienced five coups against a backdrop of terrorism in the Sahel and anti-imperialist rhetoric. Civil society plays a crucial role in shaping democracy, but civic space is stifled in countries where the military has taken over.

  However, each country has its own historical and political dynamics. Democratic trends vary considerably depending on historical, cultural and socio-economic factors. Countries that have succeeded in implementing institutional reforms to combat corruption have generally seen the quality of their democracy improve, as seen in Cabo Verde, West Africa’s champion of good governance.

  Several countries have maintained relative political stability, such as Senegal before the latest developments. The last country to hold a presidential election was Côte d’Ivoire, following post-election incidents and the violation of the Ivorian constitution, which also limits the number of presidential terms to two.

  With a large community enabling us to internationalise our advocacy, AfricTivistes provides moral support to democracy activists by publishing press releases to point out the illegality of their arrest and censorship.

  We also provide them with technical support so they can circumvent the censorship they face in their countries. To date, we have supported seven democracy activists and journalists in danger.

  ---

  Civic space in Senegal is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with AfricTivistes through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@afric_tivistes and@frican_excellency on Instagram and@AFRICTIVISTES and@AbdouJCisse on Twitter.

• SENEGAL: ‘The restriction of civic space remains civil society’s greatest concern’

  CIVICUS speaks with Malick Ndome, senior policy adviser and board member at the Council of Non-Governmental Organisations in Support of Development (CONGAD), about the recent election in Senegal.

  CONGAD was founded in 1982 by civil society organisations (CSOs) working in Senegal to coordinate relations with the state and other partners. CONGAD provides training for CSOs, local authorities and the media. It also advocates for a stronger civil society capable of influencing public policy.

  What was the significance of the victory of opposition candidate Bassirou Diomaye Faye in the recent presidential election?

  Faye’s first-round victory was difficult to predict. However, it is important to recognise the impact of his release from prison, as well as that of Ousmane Sonko, the leader of his party, Senegal’s Patriots (PASTEF), just 10 days before the election.

  Sonko had been barred from standing following a controversial conviction for youth corruption and defamation in 2023. Faye was nominated as a candidate in his place, but was also sent to prison for criticising the court’s decision in the Sonko case. Their release galvanised the support of PASTEF supporters and activists, and young people in general, who appreciated their message of change and their anti-corruption aura. In contrast, there seems to have been a noticeable lack of enthusiasm for the government coalition.

  In addition, there was much speculation and a lot of rumours about President Macky Sall’s lack of support for his party’s presidential candidate, which undoubtedly influenced the electoral landscape.

  Given the circumstances, the clear victory of an opposition candidate has profound implications for the strength of Senegalese democracy. First, it signifies a strengthened commitment to the rule of law, guaranteeing every Senegalese citizen a fair chance of access to the highest office. It also demonstrates the resilience of Senegal’s electoral institutions in the face of challenges. Further, despite persistent concerns about voter turnout, Senegalese citizens demonstrated a commendable level of confidence in electoral processes, underlining their commitment to democratic principles. Voter turnout was 61 per cent.

  This provides an opportunity for a comprehensive review of the electoral law and the electoral code, with a focus on correcting the main shortcomings identified by political stakeholders and civil society. It is imperative to review the role and effectiveness of institutions such as the National Autonomous Electoral Commission in overseeing elections, ensuring that it has the resources and capacity to fulfil its mandate impartially and effectively.

  In sum, while Faye’s victory may have been unexpected, it marks a crucial moment in Senegal’s democratic journey, highlighting both strengths and areas for improvement in its political system.

  Was civic space restricted before the election? What challenges did this pose and what can be expected in the future?

  Significant restrictions were observed in February, when Sall’s announcement of the postponement of the election led to violent demonstrations and deaths. The Constitutional Council’s positive response in favour of holding the election helped ease tensions, leading to the lifting of the suspension of TikTok and the restriction of Facebook, which had an impact on digital industries and small-scale workers in the informal sector.

  The restriction of civic space has been strongly criticised by various groups and people. Under the new government, we expect to see restrictions on civic space lifted, but I can’t prejudge that. It remains a strong demand from civil society and the political arena.

  How did civil society contribute to a free and fair election?

  Civil society’s actions were analysed and perceived differently depending on whether you were in the opposition or the presidential camp. There were many citizens’ initiatives to ensure that the electoral timetable was respected and free and transparent elections were held.

  Civil society initiatives included the setting up of digital platforms to facilitate communication and citizen mobilisation. Civil society formed groups to voice citizens’ concerns and influence political decisions. It organised forums to raise awareness and mobilise the population to ensure the electoral timetable was respected and the election was transparent.

  In addition, civil society organised meetings with presidential candidates to ask them questions and hear their proposals. It also helped to inform the public by publishing press articles and sharing information on electoral issues.

  In addition, civil society interacted with stakeholders in sensitive spheres such as religious leaders to promote a climate of peace and stability during the election period. It also facilitated the hosting and coordination of the local, regional and sub-regional structures responsible for overseeing the election, thus ensuring effective and transparent monitoring of the electoral process.

  What are civil society’s expectations of the new government?

  Civil society has a number of expectations and is advocating several policy measures to protect civic space and human rights and promote good governance.

  According to the information available to me, there has not yet been any formal request from civil society. However, it is clear that the restriction of civic space remains civil society’s greatest concern.

  Among the political measures advocated are the passing of a press code to provide a better framework for the exercise of journalism and the publication of implementing decrees, as well as the revision of article 80 of the Constitution concerning offences against the head of state. Civil society is also calling for the adoption of a law to protect whistleblowers and human rights defenders, as well as the publication of reports by the Court of Audit and the prosecution of offenders.

  Civil society calls for institutional change in the governance of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, and for the establishment of a financial prosecutor’s office with broad responsibilities.

  Finally, the fight against corruption and for better governance is a major concern for civil society, which hopes that the new government will take effective measures in this direction.

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  Civic space in Senegal is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with CONGAD through itswebsite.

• SLOVAKIA: ‘We hope the government’s attempts to stifle activism will ultimately fail’

  CIVICUS discusses democracy, civic space and media freedoms in Slovakia with Rasto Kužel, Executive Director of MEMO 98, a leading media monitoring organisation with 25 years of experience. MEMO 98’s mission is to provide people with fair and comprehensive information on public affairs, empowering them to engage in their communities and hold authorities accountable.

  The Slovak government recently proposed major changes to public television and radio, sparking condemnation from civil society, journalists’ organisations, the political opposition, international media organisations and regional institutions. Media freedoms have been in the spotlight since the 2018 murder of journalist Jan Kuciak, which led to the resignation of pro-Russian populist Prime Minister Robert Fico and the election of a short-lived anti-corruption government. However, Fico and his Smer partyreturned to power in 2023, and an ally of the prime minister was elected president in April 2024. In a polarised political environment, Fico was the target of an assassination attempt on 15 May.

  How is the government proposing to change the media system and why is this controversial?

  The new government proposes significant changes to the public television and radio system. These changes include restructuring the management of the public broadcaster RTVS, which currently generally enjoys editorial independence.

  Initial criticism, particularly from the European Union and Slovak journalists and civil society, led to some revisions of the draft law, which, if passed, would mean the end of RTVS. However, the aim remains the same – to designate a government-friendly director and increase government control over the public broadcaster. This would effectively turn public television and radio into state-controlled entities.

  While never fully free from political pressure, RTVS has performed its public service duties generally well, in line with the existing legislation. The media regulator didn’t find its news and current affairs programmes breached impartiality or objectivity rules. There’s no need to replace the current management. This is just a politically motivated move to replace RTVS’s independent director with someone loyal to the government.

  This pattern of media capture mirrors developments in neighbouring countries such as Hungary and Poland, where it’s been used to control state institutions and democratic processes. Critics argue that proposed changes in Slovakia are part of a wider strategy to undermine democratic institutions, including an independent judiciary, free media and civil society.

  What other concerns have been raised by civil society and the opposition?

  Since this government took office, democratic institutions and the rule of law have been seriously threatened. The government is actively trying to obstruct legal proceedings against its members, including Fico and his defence minister, who are accused of involvement in criminal activities. Legal and parliamentary manoeuvres have been used to block corruption charges. The General Prosecutor has invoked special provisions in the Penal Code to stop legal charges against people close to the ruling coalition, and parliament failed to strip Fico of his immunity when he was a regular member of the previous parliament. This sparked widespread protests, particularly against the dismantling of the special prosecutor’s office investigating corruption.

  This year, the focus has shifted to concerns about civic space and media freedom. The government is pushing through a law requiring organisations that receive over €5,000 (approx. US$5,400) in foreign funding to disclose their sources. This is reminiscent of tactics used by authoritarian regimes such as Russia to stifle dissent.

  Public and private broadcasters involved in critical reporting have been targeted. A big protest is being planned at a major private TV station, where it has emerged that the owners are pressuring the station to tone down its coverage critical of the government. This channel, known for its critical and objective journalism, faces threats against its ability to fulfil this role.

  The government’s pro-Russian stance is particularly worrying given Slovakia’s proximity to the conflict in Ukraine. This shift towards Russia has already damaged Slovakia’s standing in the European Union (EU) and NATO, particularly after Fico revealed sensitive information to please pro-Russian groups at home. There’s wider concern that Slovakia’s security will be compromised if Russia isn’t stopped in Ukraine. Despite strong public support for the EU and NATO, the government is undermining efforts to support Ukraine and uphold democratic values. Its vague talk of peace suggests a reluctance to provide military support and puts Slovakia’s credibility and security at risk.

  How have foreign policy disputes exacerbated political polarisation, and with what consequences?

  Slovakia’s 2024 presidential election exacerbated existing divisions, driven by tactics to mobilise voters through fear and disinformation. The ruling parties targeted the opposition candidate, an independent and former foreign minister known for his strong pro-European and pro-Atlantic stance, by falsely portraying him as pro-war. They claimed that a vote for him would drag Slovakia into the Ukraine conflict, suggesting that Slovak people would be drafted and sent to war. This narrative was misleading and manipulative.

  The campaign was marked by negativity and fuelled polarisation, a strategy that has become a hallmark of the current government. Smear campaigns targeted not only political opponents but also the media. Fico has frequently used derogatory language, referring to his opponents as ‘pigs’ and ‘prostitutes’, further inflaming tensions.

  This toxic political environment culminated in a shocking event: an assassination attempt on Fico. The government had adopted a tactic of holding meetings with supporters outside the capital. During one of these meetings, in the small town of Handlová, a 71-year-old pensioner with controversial affiliations opened fire on Fico, hitting him four times. This violent incident underlines the dangerous consequences of embracing such a divisive and aggressive rhetoric.

  What was the public reaction to the assassination attempt, and what are its implications?

  The assassination attempt was a deplorable event and was condemned by many sectors of Slovak society. MEMO 98 and many other civil society groups immediately condemned the violence, describing it as an attack on democracy. Despite our political disagreements with Fico’s pro-Russian policies, we strongly believe violence has no place in a democracy. The government was democratically elected and its authority should not be undermined by such violent attacks. We called for a moment of reflection and urged society and politicians not to exploit this incident for political gain.

  But this wasn’t an isolated incident. It followed a series of tragic, violent events, including the murder of journalist Jan Kuciak and his fiancée in 2018 and the murder of two LGBTQI+ people. These crimes shocked the nation and highlighted the dangerous levels of polarisation and hatred that political rhetoric has fuelled.

  The attempt on Fico’s life has already led to heightened tensions and a blame game between political factions. Members of the ruling coalition have accused the opposition and media of creating a climate of hatred despite their own history of using inflammatory, derogatory and divisive language.

  It’s also contributing to the further deterioration of democratic institutions. We are already seeing increased attacks on independent media and civil society. The government is using the incident to justify further crackdowns on dissent. Journalists are being accused of escalating tensions simply for asking probing and critical questions.

  There’s urgent need for a return to civil discourse and a renewed commitment to democratic principles. It’s vital for society to promote healing and rebuild trust in our democratic institutions.

  What is civil society doing to protect democracy, and how can the international community support its efforts?

  Civil society working to protect democracy is astonished at the speed with which the government has been dismantling institutions and targeting its critics. While we saw this coming, we were still surprised by these attempts to dismantle democratic institutions and have been forced to hold the line and engage in activism. But we are committed to upholding the rule of law and maintaining democratic institutions, and we hope the government’s attempts to stifle activism will ultimately fail.

  The international community’s support and attention will be crucial. Current illiberal, populist and authoritarian trends transcend borders and require a global response. The challenges posed by the growing influence of social media and the decline of independent media require collective action. There’s a great need for solidarity and effective sharing and coordination, particularly at the regional level. International allies can support our efforts by raising awareness, providing platforms for our voices and fostering a network of solidarity and shared strategies.

  Civic space in Slovakia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with MEMO 98 through itswebsite orInstagram page, and follow@memo98slovakia and@rastokuzel on Twitter.

• Sri Lanka: Civil society subjected to intensified military surveillance and other restrictions

  Joint Statement at the 44th session of the Human Rights Council

  Interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association

  ---

  Thank you, Madam President.

  As the Special Rapporteur’s report demonstrates, the space for Sri Lankan civil society is rapidly shrinking. For several months now, civil society organisations have been subject to intensified military surveillance and questioning by different government authorities.

  Worryingly, the COVID-19 pandemic has been exploited by the Sri Lankan government to impose restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, resulting in the arrest and detention of social media commentators like Ramzy Razeek. Senior lawyer and minority and civic rights activist, Hejaaz Hizbullah, who was arrested and detained on suspicion of offences under the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act, has now been detained for close to three months without being produced before a judge, after having been misled to believe that the authorities were visiting his house to discuss his potential exposure to COVID-19.

  Since January 2020, the Government of Sri Lanka has established multiple Presidential Task Forces. Decisions have been taken with no oversight by Parliament. The Presidential Task Force to build a “Secure Country, Disciplined, Virtuous and Lawful Society” is fully comprised of security sector personnel and given an ambiguous mandate. Sri Lankan civil society has raised a serious concern that the task force can extend military control over civilian life. Its power can be abused to curtail dissenting voices which are deemed to be “harmful to the free and peaceful existence of society”. The increased deployment of military personnel along with the police, and the disproportionate use of force against peaceful protesters, as observed recently, are also alarming.

  Considering growing concerns over shrinking space for dissent domestically, the Council remains effectively the only forum where Sri Lankan civil society has the possibility to engage openly in dialogue with the Government and other States on human rights concerns in Sri Lanka, and even this space is increasingly under threat due to deepening risks of reprisals against Sri Lankan civil society actors who speak at the Council. Those human right defenders are increasingly vilified as “traitors” in both mainstream and social media.

  Given Sri Lanka’s announced withdrawal from its commitments to the implementation of resolution 30/1, and the clear and consistent recommendations by the OHCHR that the Council should monitor progress towards accountability, the Council needs to take a more robust approach on Sri Lanka. Against this backdrop, we encourage the Special Rapporteur to continue to follow up on the situation and urge the Human Rights Council to enhance its monitoring of Sri Lanka’s compliance with international human rights law, including to ensure that human rights are protected throughout the forthcoming general elections.

  Amnesty International
  CIVICUS
  Forum Asia
  Franciscans International
  Human Rights Watch
  International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism
  ISHR
  Minority rights group international

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  Civic space in Sri Lanka is currently rated as Obstructed by the CIVICUS Monitor

  Current council members:

  Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Eritrea, Fiji, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Libya, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Slovakia, Somalia, Sudan, Spain, Togo, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela

  Civic space ratings from the CIVICUS Monitor

  OPEN	NARROWED	OBSTRUCTED	REPRESSED	CLOSED

   

• SUDAN: ‘We are back to the situation that preceded the revolution’

  CIVICUS speaks about Sudan’s situation under military rule with Nazik Kabalo, a woman human rights defender (HRD) from Sudan. Nazik has worked in human rights advocacy, research and monitoring, with a focus on women’s rights, for the past 15 years.

  What happened to Sudan’s transition to democracy?

  Sudan is now facing the consequences of the major problems of the deal made by the military and civilian leaders in August 2019. Following the revolution, this deal initiated a transitional government in Sudan, a partnership between civilians and the military council. But this partnership was never equal: the military and former regime forces – including paramilitaries, militias, tribal militias and the security apparatus – had more economic and political power. They had controlled the country for 30 years, after all.

  On the other hand, for 30 years political parties and civil society had been under so much pressure that they only managed to stay together with the momentum of the revolution, to defeat the former regime. But the Sudanese democracy movement has too many internal divisions.

  Ours is an unfinished political transition that is missing transitional justice and mechanisms to limit the power of military and other armed groups. All armed groups had been involved in very severe human rights violations and remained partners with civilians in the new government. To be honest, I think the military coup was bound to happen. The political deal achieved in 2019 gave the presidency to the military for almost one and a half years. The coup happened on 25 October 2021, only few weeks before the date the military was expected to hand over the Supreme Council presidency to civilian leaders. But we always knew civilians didn’t really have a chance to lead the country.

  How has the situation evolved after the coup?

  Following the coup, the amount of violence and human rights violations was quite overwhelming. Violence is to be expected from the Sudanese military; it has led civil wars for 50 years and killing people is basically all it knows.

  Seven months after the coup, at least 102 people have been killed in peaceful protests, more than 4,000 have been injured, and over 5,000 have been detained. There have been attacks on the freedoms of association and expression. Journalists are being attacked: at least three female journalists have been prosecuted or arrested in the past couple of days. The military coup has completely destroyed the civic space and freedoms created after the revolution. Our military is learning from our neighbour, Egypt, to effectively crush the civic movement.

  For the past seven months we have lived under a state of emergency that was only lifted three weeks ago. But the lifting of the state of emergency made no difference to military practices on the ground. The international community has put some pressure on the government and the military but has not been able to stop the violence and civic space and human rights violations.

  An aspect to consider is that Sudan has three conflict areas: Blue Nile, Darfur and Nuba Mountains. As well as western and southern Sudan, there’s also inter-communal violence in eastern Sudan. The coup hasn’t been able to provide security, although this is always the main excuse for the military to take power. Violence in urban areas, including the capital, has increased, especially for women. Members of the security forces, including the Central Reserve Police (CRP), have perpetrated gang rapes and sexual assaults against women; for this reason, the CRP has been recently sanctioned by the USA. A peace agreement was signed in October 2020 with several armed groups but hasn’t been effectively implemented. 

  Sudan’s economy has been in a freefall since the coup. We expected to have our debt cancelled by this year, but because of the coup, the Paris Club, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank decided not to move forward. Instead, the IMF, the World Bank and international donors have frozen over two billion dollars in economic aid, which is directly affecting the general humanitarian situation. Recent reports from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimate at least half of Sudanese people will need humanitarian aid this year.

  Another impact of the coup was the internet shutdown. For at least seven weeks, HRDs lived under a complete communications shutdown. This has now been partially lifted, but internet and phone communications continue to be cut off on every day of protest – which means it has happened every single day for several weeks. Internet access is under very harsh surveillance, so no Sudanese activist feels safe to use the phone for work. Sudan has one of the worst cybercrime laws in the world: you can be prosecuted, tried and sentenced to five years in jail just for posting something on Facebook. A couple of months ago, a female HRD who reported the sexual violence that took place during protests was sent to jail, accused of posting ‘fake news’. She may be punished with up to 20 years in prison. The military have used this law to threaten activists both inside and outside Sudan.

  We are back to the situation that preceded the revolution. We feel that the old regime is back; in fact, the military has started appointing people from the former regime everywhere, from national television to the Humanitarian Commission, which is responsible for managing the work of civil society organisations (CSOs) inside Sudan. So CSOs are back to needing to request authorisation to hold meetings at venues outside our offices and are under constant surveillance. Activists, journalists and lawyers are being silenced because power went back to the military.

  What are protesters’ demands?

  Following the revolution, the deal reached between the military and civilians never satisfied the protest movement, which includes a high proportion of young people and women. They have never stopped protesting, not even during the transitional period, from August 2019 to October 2021. There have been at least 20 killings of HRDs since the transition began, but this hasn’t stopped them. So when the coup happened, people were instantly in the streets, even before an official announcement of the coup was made.

  Since 2018, protesters have demanded real democracy and civilian rule. We have had military governments 90 per cent of the time since we became independent: 59 years out of 64. After the regime fell on 11 April 2019, people started a sit-in in front of the military’s headquarters. This continued for two months and ended with the Khartoum Massacre on 3 June 2019, with attacks perpetrated by militias and security forces. Two hundred people were killed and at least 60 women were gang-raped. In August a deal was reached with the military, despite the massacre that literally happened outside their headquarters! This was a stab in the heart for many democracy groups.

  Right now, the protest movement wants to make sure civilians are the ones ruling the country. Military leaders should go back to guarding the borders and shouldn’t have anything to do with running the government anymore. The 2019 deal didn’t work, which means our only option is demanding radical change that puts power in people’s hands. Resistance committees have a slogan of ‘three nos’: no partnership, no negotiation or compromise, and no legitimacy. A process of dialogue and negotiations led by some political parties is currently taking place, but resistance committees refuse to engage. Unfortunately, this has not been welcomed by some international actors, but it comes as a direct result of recent Sudanese experience.

  Who are the people on the streets?

  Protesters have built an amazing grassroots movement; resistance committees have formed in every neighbourhood, even every block. Those who participate in them are ordinary people who have nothing to lose, so unlike the civilian elites, they are willing to continue the struggle until the end. They organise street protests every single day and are creating new ways of protesting, such as strikes, stand-ups, music, movies and poems. They use every tool available, including recreating Sudanese traditions and bringing our cultural heritage to the streets.

  Women and feminist movements are doing an amazing job, breaking so many norms. During the revolution, many young women were on the frontlines. The Angry, a protest group that stays on the frontlines of every protest, protecting other people and leading clashes with the police, includes lots of young women.

  Women are also working to provide medical care and trauma support. After 50 years of civil war, you will definitely be a traumatised country, but this has intensified following the past five years of revolt. Before, one was able to distinguish between people from war zones and people from cities. Right now, the whole country is a war zone. There are machine guns everywhere, firing bullets into neighbourhoods, and children are dying inside their own homes because bullets go through their roofs.

  Diaspora activism has also been key. Activists from the diaspora have been super effective in spreading the word, and during the internet shutdown they were online 24/7 to get information out to the world, not only sharing it on social media but also connecting people inside Sudan, who could receive international calls but not domestic ones.

   What kind of work are pro-democracy groups doing?

  The pro-democracy camp is very diverse. There are longstanding CSOs that have always promoted and advocated for human rights and continue to document violations, advocate, engage and build capacity inside the democracy movements. There are also new grassroots groups, the resistance committees, thar right now are the key movement leaders: other CSOs will follow their lead since they express the majority view. Professional organisations and trade unions are also a major group; they are key in organising mobilisations in urban areas. Doctors, lawyers, engineers and similar roles play an important role in putting pressure through strikes and civil disobedience. 

  Unfortunately, for the time being there’s not a single unified network or body that can represent the democracy movement in Sudan. This is the movement’s main weakness. Resistance committees are trying to produce a unified political declaration and how to unify this movement while including all of Sudan, even conflict areas, is being discussed.

  What international support do Sudanese HRDs need?

  Our country must not be forgotten. The international community must take action and support the democracy movement’s demands for fundamental change. International human rights bodies must put make Sudan a priority. Sudanese civil society is fighting to get Sudan on top of their agenda, especially since the war started in Ukraine and most attention is going that way.

  Neglecting building democracy in Sudan and leaving power in the hands of the military would be a big mistake. What’s going on here isn’t disconnected from what’s going on in Ukraine. Reports indicate the involvement of the Sudanese military and militias in smuggling gold that supports the Russian economy during this conflict. Moreover, many reports have exposed the strong relations of Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) leaders with Russian leadership; they were in Russia the week the war started to ensure the flow of gold. RSF militias have relations with other African countries like Chad and the Central Africa Republic, which are sources of blood gold and blood diamonds entering Russia through Sudan. 

  Sanctions would be an important tool. A couple of days ago, the International Bar Association called on the UK to apply Magnitsky sanctions in Sudan. International CSOs should move ahead with similar actions.

  It’s understandably hard for the international community to deal with the people in the absence of an actual government or elite they could deal with. But young university students are the democracy movement’s leaders, and they represent us. Protests have continued for eight months now and will probably continue for many more, and activists need a lot of help.

  Because of persecution and violence, many CSOs and local groups have had to move their operations outside Sudan, and activists have had to relocate. Those working inside Sudan are having a very low-profile and using all the digital and physical security strategies available. Access to funding has also been increasingly challenging. The military wants to find out where funding for the democracy movement is coming from and has therefore increased surveillance, which makes it very risky to receive funds inside Sudan. Organisations working at grassroots levels and in conflict areas are suffering the most.

  Civic space in Sudan is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Follow@nazik_kabalo on Twitter.