government

• SINGAPORE: ‘The entrenched system instils fear, making progress for civil society slow and difficult’

  CIVICUS speaks about Singapore’s recent leadership change with Kirsten Han, an independent writer, journalist and member of the Transformative Justice Collective (TJC).

  The TJC is a group that works to demystify and challenge Singapore’s criminal punishment system, including by calling for the abolition of the death penalty.

  Who is new prime minister Lawrence Wong and what are the implications of his recent appointment?

  Lawrence Wong is a long-time civil servant who served as the principal private secretary to former prime minister Lee Hsien Loong before entering politics. He’s seen as a stable and reliable leader rather than a maverick. His political approach has so far emphasised continuity and stability, and there’s been little indication that significant changes in human rights and civil liberties will occur under his leadership. This suggests the status quo will largely be maintained, which isn’t positive for civil society.

  We expect a general election to be held relatively soon, but the exact timing is uncertain and will be determined by Wong. There’s speculation the election could take place around September or, failing that, before the end of the year, but no date has been set. This will be the first election with the fourth generation of the People’s Action Party (PAP) officially at the helm.

  The PAP has been in power since 1959 and has undergone three generational changes so far. While there may not be the same level of enthusiasm or reverence for this new generation of leaders, dramatic shifts in the political landscape are unlikely. Any change is expected to be gradual, with the PAP possibly losing more of its vote share, but I don’t expect major upheavals.

  There’s currently little information on Lawrence Wong’s policy agenda. He’s not yet laid out anything very specific about his administration’s priorities across domestic and foreign policy. Every new prime minister in Singapore has promised a more open Singapore, but this hasn’t materialised, particularly not in greater respect for fundamental rights like freedom of expression or assembly. While Wong’s leadership style may differ from his predecessor’s, what really matters is the substance. And I haven’t seen much to be hopeful about for civil society on this front.

  What are people’s expectations?

  There’s considerable public concern about the cost of living and housing. Property and rental prices have risen significantly, making housing a major issue Wong will have to address.

  Among politically engaged young Singaporeans, there’s increasing discussion about Singapore’s role and relationship with Israel, an issue the government is reluctant to address publicly. The government has imposed strict controls on public organising and activism on the Israel–Palestine issue, including blanket bans on public activities and restrictions on the use of Speaker’s Corner, a traditional space for public discourse. Several activists have been put under police investigation for activities in solidarity with Palestine.

  Young Singaporeans are also concerned about racism and racial justice, and would like to see greater openness to differing political views. There’s growing pressure for change and an increasing desire for political plurality, in general and in parliament.

  The government has so far been able to manage a lot of this pressure, including by investigating activists and maintaining tight controls. The entrenched system, with its many levers of power and control, continues to instil fear among people, making progress for civil society groups gradual and challenging. Nevertheless, momentum for change is slowly building.

  What’s Wong’s position on thedeath penalty?

  As far as I know, Wong has not publicly stated his position on the death penalty. This issue remains primarily the responsibility of the Minister for Home Affairs and Law, who retained his position in Wong’s cabinet reshuffle. I don’t expect the government’s stance on the death penalty to change any time soon. If Wong has a different opinion from what the minister has expressed, we’ve not seen any evidence of it. Personally, even if a difference did exist, I’m not convinced Wong’s position would prevail over the status quo.

  Progress has been extremely difficult for the abolitionist movement. It has become increasingly hard for death row prisoners to find legal representation for post-appeal applications. Many represent themselves, and even then, they are often accused of abusing the legal process. In May, the Minister for Home Affairs and Law said in parliament that they’re looking into how to tackle what they say are cases of abuses of legal process, suggesting it will become even more difficult for death row prisoners to file applications.

  This could have repercussions for activists who support them. In the same speech, the minister publicly highlighted my involvement in helping the mother of a death row prisoner file an application. He read out my email address in parliament, accusing me of helping abuse the court.

  In addition, the government is aggressively promoting its pro-death penalty narrative. It has declared an annual Drug Victims Remembrance Day and launched extensive campaigns to highlight the harm caused by drugs to argue that a war on drugs is needed. This narrative basically frames death penalty abolitionists as endangering or betraying Singapore by undermining its war on drugs. The implication is that activists are opposing the country’s efforts to protect people from the dangers of drugs.

  While this response from the government suggests our campaigning has had some impact, it also indicates a strong resistance to change. At present, there’s no sign the government is moving away from the death penalty; in fact, it’s doubling down on its position. The campaign for abolition remains an uphill battle.

  Do you expect the situation of civil society to change under Wong?

  Civil society in Singapore is under considerable pressure. Over the past decade, conditions have tightened and people continue to be investigated for exercising their right to freedom of assembly. As far as we can see, this trend is likely to continue. While there can always be hope that Wong will prove us wrong once he settles into his role, right now there’s no indication anything is going to improve.

  We continue to hear about people being called in for police investigations. Recently, a migrant worker who’d been the victim of harassment, Uddin MD Sharif, was unjustly repatriated. After police closed their investigation without finding the harasser, Sharif was forced to return to Bangladesh because he no longer had a work permit and was no longer needed for the investigation. He appealed to Wong, who Sharif said promised to convey the appeal to the immigration authorities, but nothing changed and Sharif was still sent back.

  This suggests that either Wong has little influence over discretionary policy or he did not prioritise a case that was so clearly unjust. This doesn’t inspire confidence Wong will be more progressive or active in defending human rights and workers’ rights, so I don’t expect civil society to have an easier time under his leadership.

  Civic space in Singapore is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the TJC through itswebsite,Facebook orInstagram page, and follow@kixes and@tjc_singapore on Twitter.

• SLOVAKIA: ‘The election result may reinforce the country’s image as a problematic EU member’

  CIVICUS speaks with Michal Piško, Director of Transparency International Slovensko, about Slovakia’s recent first-round presidential election and the upcoming runoff.

  Transparency International Slovensko is a Slovak civil society organisation aimed at increasing institutional transparency and combatting corruption.

  What’s at stake in this presidential election?

  Slovakia’s presidency holds limited powers, although it has strong legitimacy arising from its direct popular election. Its most significant powers include vetoing laws – which a parliamentary majority can relatively easily overcome – and appointing some key state positions, such as constitutional judges.

  However, it can become a key player in critical junctures, as seen at the beginning of 2024. The governing coalition pushed for a harmful amendment to the Criminal Code in a fast-track legislative procedure. The new rules would have complicated the investigation and punishment of serious corruption cases by significantly shortening penalties and statutes of limitations. The current president, Zuzana Čaputová, challenged the amendment in the Constitutional Court, which partially suspended it coming into effect.

  The role of the president is also crucial beyond their formal competencies, particularly in significant public debates.

  What are the main campaign issues and the candidates’ positions? 

  The first round of the presidential election was held on 23 March. Čaputová decided not to run for re-election. Ivan Korčok, a pro-European former foreign minister who emerged as a civic candidate that was later backed by opposition parties, challenged Prime Minister Robert Fico’s ally and current speaker of parliament, Peter Pellegrini. Representing the opposition and the government coalition respectively, they will now compete in the runoff that will take place on 6 April.

  The central campaign Issue is the role of the president: whether they are meant to be closely aligned with the government or provide a counterbalance. Given that the current administration is led by a four-time Prime Minister known for his aggressive rhetoric and actions undermining the rule of law, it has been key to have a critical president playing an active role. If Pellegrini wins, it would bolster the government’s capacity to implement its controversial policies.

  How free and fair has the election process been so far?

  Transparency International Slovakia, a well-known anti-corruption organisation, has been actively monitoring the transparency and fairness of election campaigns and financing for a long time.

  Unfortunately, the current campaign cannot be considered transparent or fair, particularly because of Pellegrini’s failure to disclose donor information and the significant lack of information on his campaign expenses.

  The process has also been marred by negative campaigning orchestrated by politicians or hidden sources targeting Korčok, portraying him as a war promoter. It has also been distorted by the parallel election campaign for the European Parliament, in which both coalition and opposition parties indirectly support or criticise presidential candidates.

  What can we expect in the runoff?

  In the first round, pre-election opinion polls generally underestimated voter turnout and Korčok’s performance. Despite expectations, first-round voter turnout exceeded 50 per cent, a notable increase compared to previous years. Another surprise was Korčok’s relatively significant result, with more than 42 per cent of the vote and a 5.5-point lead over Pellegrini. Most pollsters expected more balanced results.

  However, the situation could still change in the runoff, as Pellegrini may receive the support of third-placed candidate Štefan Harabin’s anti-west and anti-system voters.

  Right now, both candidates seem to have fairly balanced chances of success. While Pellegrini is primarily targeting his messaging at anti-system voters, Korčok is attempting to mobilise pro-European voters.

  It is still unclear which candidate most Hungarian voters, who make up almost 10 per cent of Slovakia’s population, will support. Historically, they have leaned towards pro-European and democratic politicians, but their decision may also be influenced by the fact that Hungary’s authoritarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, is aligned with the current Slovak government.

  Despite Pellegrini not being openly pro-Russia, his victory would strengthen the current government’s position and reinforce Slovakia’s image as a problematic country with anti-democratic tendencies within the European Union. It would also intensify the existing division within the Visegrad Group, a Central European alliance of four countries, two of which – the Czech Republic and Poland – would continue leaning towards the west, while Hungary and Slovakia would further lean towards Russia.

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  Civic space in Slovakia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Transparency International Slovensko through itswebsite orFacebook,Instagram andLinkedin pages, and follow@transparencysk on Twitter and@TISlovensko on Youtube.

• SLOVAKIA: ‘We hope the government’s attempts to stifle activism will ultimately fail’

  CIVICUS discusses democracy, civic space and media freedoms in Slovakia with Rasto Kužel, Executive Director of MEMO 98, a leading media monitoring organisation with 25 years of experience. MEMO 98’s mission is to provide people with fair and comprehensive information on public affairs, empowering them to engage in their communities and hold authorities accountable.

  The Slovak government recently proposed major changes to public television and radio, sparking condemnation from civil society, journalists’ organisations, the political opposition, international media organisations and regional institutions. Media freedoms have been in the spotlight since the 2018 murder of journalist Jan Kuciak, which led to the resignation of pro-Russian populist Prime Minister Robert Fico and the election of a short-lived anti-corruption government. However, Fico and his Smer partyreturned to power in 2023, and an ally of the prime minister was elected president in April 2024. In a polarised political environment, Fico was the target of an assassination attempt on 15 May.

  How is the government proposing to change the media system and why is this controversial?

  The new government proposes significant changes to the public television and radio system. These changes include restructuring the management of the public broadcaster RTVS, which currently generally enjoys editorial independence.

  Initial criticism, particularly from the European Union and Slovak journalists and civil society, led to some revisions of the draft law, which, if passed, would mean the end of RTVS. However, the aim remains the same – to designate a government-friendly director and increase government control over the public broadcaster. This would effectively turn public television and radio into state-controlled entities.

  While never fully free from political pressure, RTVS has performed its public service duties generally well, in line with the existing legislation. The media regulator didn’t find its news and current affairs programmes breached impartiality or objectivity rules. There’s no need to replace the current management. This is just a politically motivated move to replace RTVS’s independent director with someone loyal to the government.

  This pattern of media capture mirrors developments in neighbouring countries such as Hungary and Poland, where it’s been used to control state institutions and democratic processes. Critics argue that proposed changes in Slovakia are part of a wider strategy to undermine democratic institutions, including an independent judiciary, free media and civil society.

  What other concerns have been raised by civil society and the opposition?

  Since this government took office, democratic institutions and the rule of law have been seriously threatened. The government is actively trying to obstruct legal proceedings against its members, including Fico and his defence minister, who are accused of involvement in criminal activities. Legal and parliamentary manoeuvres have been used to block corruption charges. The General Prosecutor has invoked special provisions in the Penal Code to stop legal charges against people close to the ruling coalition, and parliament failed to strip Fico of his immunity when he was a regular member of the previous parliament. This sparked widespread protests, particularly against the dismantling of the special prosecutor’s office investigating corruption.

  This year, the focus has shifted to concerns about civic space and media freedom. The government is pushing through a law requiring organisations that receive over €5,000 (approx. US$5,400) in foreign funding to disclose their sources. This is reminiscent of tactics used by authoritarian regimes such as Russia to stifle dissent.

  Public and private broadcasters involved in critical reporting have been targeted. A big protest is being planned at a major private TV station, where it has emerged that the owners are pressuring the station to tone down its coverage critical of the government. This channel, known for its critical and objective journalism, faces threats against its ability to fulfil this role.

  The government’s pro-Russian stance is particularly worrying given Slovakia’s proximity to the conflict in Ukraine. This shift towards Russia has already damaged Slovakia’s standing in the European Union (EU) and NATO, particularly after Fico revealed sensitive information to please pro-Russian groups at home. There’s wider concern that Slovakia’s security will be compromised if Russia isn’t stopped in Ukraine. Despite strong public support for the EU and NATO, the government is undermining efforts to support Ukraine and uphold democratic values. Its vague talk of peace suggests a reluctance to provide military support and puts Slovakia’s credibility and security at risk.

  How have foreign policy disputes exacerbated political polarisation, and with what consequences?

  Slovakia’s 2024 presidential election exacerbated existing divisions, driven by tactics to mobilise voters through fear and disinformation. The ruling parties targeted the opposition candidate, an independent and former foreign minister known for his strong pro-European and pro-Atlantic stance, by falsely portraying him as pro-war. They claimed that a vote for him would drag Slovakia into the Ukraine conflict, suggesting that Slovak people would be drafted and sent to war. This narrative was misleading and manipulative.

  The campaign was marked by negativity and fuelled polarisation, a strategy that has become a hallmark of the current government. Smear campaigns targeted not only political opponents but also the media. Fico has frequently used derogatory language, referring to his opponents as ‘pigs’ and ‘prostitutes’, further inflaming tensions.

  This toxic political environment culminated in a shocking event: an assassination attempt on Fico. The government had adopted a tactic of holding meetings with supporters outside the capital. During one of these meetings, in the small town of Handlová, a 71-year-old pensioner with controversial affiliations opened fire on Fico, hitting him four times. This violent incident underlines the dangerous consequences of embracing such a divisive and aggressive rhetoric.

  What was the public reaction to the assassination attempt, and what are its implications?

  The assassination attempt was a deplorable event and was condemned by many sectors of Slovak society. MEMO 98 and many other civil society groups immediately condemned the violence, describing it as an attack on democracy. Despite our political disagreements with Fico’s pro-Russian policies, we strongly believe violence has no place in a democracy. The government was democratically elected and its authority should not be undermined by such violent attacks. We called for a moment of reflection and urged society and politicians not to exploit this incident for political gain.

  But this wasn’t an isolated incident. It followed a series of tragic, violent events, including the murder of journalist Jan Kuciak and his fiancée in 2018 and the murder of two LGBTQI+ people. These crimes shocked the nation and highlighted the dangerous levels of polarisation and hatred that political rhetoric has fuelled.

  The attempt on Fico’s life has already led to heightened tensions and a blame game between political factions. Members of the ruling coalition have accused the opposition and media of creating a climate of hatred despite their own history of using inflammatory, derogatory and divisive language.

  It’s also contributing to the further deterioration of democratic institutions. We are already seeing increased attacks on independent media and civil society. The government is using the incident to justify further crackdowns on dissent. Journalists are being accused of escalating tensions simply for asking probing and critical questions.

  There’s urgent need for a return to civil discourse and a renewed commitment to democratic principles. It’s vital for society to promote healing and rebuild trust in our democratic institutions.

  What is civil society doing to protect democracy, and how can the international community support its efforts?

  Civil society working to protect democracy is astonished at the speed with which the government has been dismantling institutions and targeting its critics. While we saw this coming, we were still surprised by these attempts to dismantle democratic institutions and have been forced to hold the line and engage in activism. But we are committed to upholding the rule of law and maintaining democratic institutions, and we hope the government’s attempts to stifle activism will ultimately fail.

  The international community’s support and attention will be crucial. Current illiberal, populist and authoritarian trends transcend borders and require a global response. The challenges posed by the growing influence of social media and the decline of independent media require collective action. There’s a great need for solidarity and effective sharing and coordination, particularly at the regional level. International allies can support our efforts by raising awareness, providing platforms for our voices and fostering a network of solidarity and shared strategies.

  Civic space in Slovakia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with MEMO 98 through itswebsite orInstagram page, and follow@memo98slovakia and@rastokuzel on Twitter.

• SOMALIA: ‘Civil society is playing key roles in the ongoing constitutional process’

  CIVICUS speaks with Mahad Wasuge, executive director of Somali Public Agenda (SPA), about recent constitutional change and its implications for Somali civil society.

  SPA is a non-governmental, non-partisan think tank based in Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital. It focuses on producing independent, high-quality research and analysis on public policy issues in Somalia. Its work encompasses governance, security, economic development, social issues and public service delivery. SPA aims to inform policy decisions and improve the quality of governance and public services through evidence-based research.

  What’s the state of civic space, democratic institutions and the rule of law in Somalia?

  Civic space in Somalia is not particularly strong. It falls short of standards due to the country’s fragility and the state of its public institutions. Weak public institutions mean civic freedoms are not enforced as they should be. While several civil society organisations (CSOs) focus on governance issues and support dialogue, there are many that are closely aligned with the government and therefore lack a critical approach.

  Some CSOs, including SPA, conduct independent analysis and facilitate dialogue between politicians and civil society actors. In Mogadishu and other parts of the country, freedom of speech is generally respected. People can express their views without fear of government retaliation. There are various radio and TV stations in Mogadishu covering national stories.

  But the overall quality of civic space is lacking. Institutions that should uphold freedoms face numerous challenges, including lack of funding and limited independence due to political interference.

  How have recent constitutional changes impacted on this situation?

  The constitutional amendments haven’t had a significant impact yet, as they were only approved on 30 March. Parliament went into two months of recess after approving them, and civil society has so far had little time to work on the amendments made and the related challenges, including around implementation.

  The main change is that the president will now be elected by popular vote and will appoint a prime minister, who the president will be able to remove at their discretion. Previously, the president was elected by parliament and the prime minister was approved by parliament after being appointed by the president, and could only be removed through a parliamentary no-confidence motion. The change shifts the system of government from semi-parliamentary to semi-presidential. Some argue that it represents a disruption of the existing power-sharing system, which has been a source of political stability.

  The change hasn’t been fully supported by key opposition groups. It has also caused friction with the semi-autonomous state of Puntland. Lack of broad acceptance among key stakeholders will create challenges to implementation. The federal government’s limited authority and Puntland’s effective control over its jurisdiction pose specific implementation challenges. There’s a chance that the constitutional amendments and the current stalemate could lead to political crisis and worsen centre-periphery relations.

  How did civil society engage with the constitutional amendment process?

  Civil society engaged in several ways. For instance, we organised dialogues and invited the chair of the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission to a forum so he could explain the process. We invited policymakers involved in the amendment process onto our podcasts and authored papers on the topic. We also participated in a two-day conference organised by the government to gather civil society views on the amendments.

  Other CSOs held dialogues. Women’s groups advocated for a 30 per cent parliamentary quota for women, while journalists’ associations focused on freedom of speech and expression.

  Many CSOs and activists tried to influence and contribute to the process. The constitution has 15 chapters, with only four amended so far, leaving 11 chapters untouched. These include critical issues such as the devolution of power, the roles of the president, prime minister and cabinet, the judiciary, financial governance and independent commissions. Civil society should play a role in influencing and contributing to these discussions as well.

  For the first four chapters of the constitution that were amended and approved recently, changes were made following parliamentary debates and societal input. For instance, it was established that the requested gender quota will be addressed by special legislation. The minimum age for membership in the election management body was reduced from 40 to 35 years, making it more inclusive. It can be challenging to attribute specific changes made to civil society, as similar views may have been expressed in parliamentary debate. However, it's clear that civil society’s advocacy played a key role in shaping the final version of the amendments.

  What are the potential consequences of Puntland’s rejection of the constitutional changes?

  Puntland’s rejection of the constitutional changes would mean limited legitimacy due to lack of representation from key regions, as is already the case with the breakaway region of Somaliland.

  This is why the role of civil society in the upcoming period will be crucial. We have discussed the situation internally at SPA, thinking of how to create a space for dialogue between the federal government and Puntland. We’re trying to facilitate discussions on critical political issues, although we are a non-political CSO and can only create a space for dialogue when stakeholders are willing to sit together and discuss issues.

  The present priority should be to engage with key stakeholders, hearing their perspectives and potentially making further amendments, particularly on contentious issues such as power-sharing and elections. Mediation is essential. International actors, notably the United Nations, have been working to bring the federal government and Puntland together for dialogue. Civil society also plays a role in bridging the gap and facilitating communication. A compromise could address key grievances and offer solutions to both parties.

  If direct dialogue is not possible, civil society can still share written views and recommendations with the relevant authorities to suggest potential solutions for the rift between the federal government and Puntland. Other member states of Somalia may also oppose the federal government if they disagree with the constitutional amendments, although they have not yet clarified their position on these.

  What international support does Somali civil society need to continue playing these roles?

  The international community has supported Somali civil society over the years, but broader instability continues posing challenges to civil society. Many civil society actors who could be effective at the societal level have joined the government, partly because the government requires their expertise. Civil society also struggles with funding, a common problem for civic institutions worldwide, as they rely on domestic and international financial support rather than profits.

  International actors can help by facilitating interactions among different civil society groups. They could promote dialogue and establish strong relationships between them, enabling these groups to collaborate and advocate collectively for common causes. This type of coordination is currently lacking in Somalia, as many organisations operate independently without joining forces. International organisations could play a key role in fostering these connections and promoting unity among civil society groups.

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  Civic space in Somalia is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Somali Public Agenda through itswebsite and follow@somalipubagenda and@MahadWasuge on X, formerly Twitter.

• SPAIN: ‘The LGBTQI+ community fears both legal and social backlash’

  CIVICUS speaks about the situation of LGBTQI+ people in the context of Spain’s election withEmilio de Benito, spokesperson for Health and Seniors of the LGTB+ Collective of Madrid (COGAM).

  Founded in 1986, COGAM is a civil society organisation (CSO) working for LGBTQI+ equality. It is one of the founding organisations of the Spanish State Federation of Lesbians, Gays, Transsexuals and Bisexuals and one of the promoters of equal marriage, legalised in 2005.

  What recent changes have occurred in the situation of LGBTQI+ people in Spain?

  Following the approval this March of the Trans Law, the situation in Spain is, at least on paper, one of the best in the world. The Trans Law allows free choice of registered sex based solely on each person’s will, prohibits conversion therapies and imposes measures for diversity in education and employment.

  We have a problem, however, namely the rise of hate speech propagated by the far right, represented by Vox, and even by the more traditional conservative party, the Popular Party (PP). This election campaign has been plagued by expressions of homophobia and transphobia. We have seen politicians refuse to address trans people in a manner consistent with their gender identity and threaten to abolish laws that have enshrined rights, such as the Equal Marriage Law and the Trans Law. This has reflected in an increase in harassment of LGBTQI+ people both in the classroom and on the streets. According to official data, last year hate crimes in Spain increased by 45 per cent, although real figures may be much higher, because people do not always report these crimes. The LGBTQI+ community fears both legal and social backlash.

  Why did LGBTQI+ rights become a campaign issue?

  Over the past year, there has been much debate about the Trans Law, which was only passed in February. That is why several political parties have the issue on their agenda. This law is possibly the most shocking for the far right and it affects very few people, so even if they don’t try to repeal it, they will certainly try to amend it. In other words, in the best-case scenario, a medical diagnosis pathologising transsexuality will again be required and minors will not receive treatment or will face many obstacles.

  As for the Equal Marriage Law, I doubt that the PP will be able to repeal it, although Vox calls for it. Instead, the party is more likely to seek to put obstacles in the way of adoption or registration of a partner’s child.

  Unfortunately, the Trans Law has also been very strongly rejected by a segment of left-wing feminism, which has given an additional advantage to the right. I believe, however, that this is a philosophical rather than a legal debate. We can debate as much as we like about what makes us identify as male or female, but we must still recognise the right of each person to express their identity.

  Did the LGBTQI+ movement align with any electoral choice?

  We do not align ourselves with any political party, but we do point out that there are parties, such as Vox, with messages and proposals that threaten our rights. This has not been without controversy. The State Federation of Lesbians, Gays, Transsexuals and Bisexuals of Spain has mounted a campaign calling on people not to vote for the right, but some have expressed disagreement with this because in principle one can be right-wing in economic matters without being homophobic. But in our case, the two things overlap.

  Pedro Zerolo, a very important gay activist who was at the forefront of the struggle for equal marriage, used to say that rights must not only be won and enjoyed, but also defended. Clearly we are now in the phase where we must defend our victories.

  So all LGBTQI+ collectives have been involved in the election campaign. We have done so during Madrid Pride, which is one of the most important in the world, because of its duration – it lasts four days – and the number of people it attracts, including many non-LGBTQI+ people, and also because of the many cultural and social activities it includes. We have also participated in debates with political parties: COGAM, for instance, held a debate with representatives of four parties. Not all of them were left-wing parties, although these are the ones who always want to meet with us, listen to us and learn our opinion. But we did not invite the far right, because there is no point in us giving them a voice.

  What are the possible post-election scenarios?

  The PP has opposed all laws that recognised rights for LGBTQI+ people as well as women’s rights, even taking them to the Constitutional Court. But when the Constitutional Court has concluded that these laws do not infringe any constitutional norms, PP governments have not repealed them. But they will likely attack the Trans Law. One of the great achievements of this law is that it listens to minors. When minors know perfectly well who they are and want to be, it makes no sense to repress them until they are of age. It’s the same with abortion: in the past, minors under 16 were required to have their parents’ permission, but then this requirement was removed because there are cases, such as incest, where it was highly problematic. I think they are going to try to go back on these rights as far as minors are concerned.

  They could also go back to requiring trans women to undergo two years of diagnostic psychological treatment. Transgender men have been erased from the debate altogether, as if they don’t exist. There is too much concern about what might happen if a trans woman enters a women’s locker room, but no one is concerned about what might happen to a trans man in the gym.

  In the field of education, very serious setbacks are likely to occur – for instance, we could lose the space that allows us to explain the reality of LGBTQI+ people in schools. For an LGBTQI+ adolescent or pre-adolescent it is essential that someone tells them that what is happening to them is not the usual thing, but it is not abnormal either, and that they can indeed be happy. But they are trying to erase this message.

  Even structures such as equality departments, the local and regional government’s equality bodies, are in many places disappearing or being diluted, renamed ‘family agencies’ when taken over by the far right. Obviously, when LGBTQI+ CSOs need state support for our campaigns, we will receive a very weak response, if any at all.

  The LGBTQI+ movement has pushed for important legal changes. How have you worked to build public support for these?

  Most LGBTQI+ organisations in Spain are political actors and not just welfare organisations. We advocate with parties, lawmakers and public officials. But in my opinion, our main work is about creating visibility.

  The Pride events that take place in Spain, particularly those in Barcelona, Madrid and Valencia, give us the kind of visibility that brings other people closer to us. There is now a trans senator. We campaign in the media. We use social media intensively because it allows us to do two things: reach out to LGBTQI+ teenagers and pre-teens and project a proactive and positive image to society as a whole.

  But we are aware that visibility also exposes us. Every year after Pride events there are cases of guys returning from Chueca, the neighbourhood where Madrid Pride events are concentrated, to their neighbourhoods on the outskirts and being beaten up as soon as they come out of the metro. It happens because they come back from the city centre feeling like the kings of the world. They have been happy, integrated, free. In that euphoria, they don’t realise that they have entered a dangerous zone, where hatred messaging has penetrated deep. And these days there are fewer qualms about insulting LGBTQI+ people. A few years ago, people wouldn’t do it or would do so in a whisper, but now they are emboldened so they are loud, as if they were showing off.

  What links do you maintain with LGBTQI+ organisations internationally?

  At the national level, Spanish CSOs are organised in the State Federation, which maintains relations with ILGA, the International LGBTI Association. Several Spanish organisations are also very focused on Latin America and other Spanish-speaking countries such as Equatorial Guinea. In this former Spanish colony in Africa, for instance, they have just launched a campaign.

  Another form of collaboration involves working with LGBTQI+ migrants from Latin America. The main foreign population groups in Spain are from Romania, Morocco and then Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador. We are a place of refuge. It is culturally easy, and also many have a Spanish background, which makes it easier for them to stay and can even give them access to citizenship. We play a clear role in this. As our websites are in Spanish, they are very easily consulted by Latin American organisations and our messages reach them without any barrier.

  However, as the situation stands, it is more about us campaigning to support others, than about others supporting us. Within Europe, for instance, we are among the countries that are doing relatively well, so it seems logical that the focus should be on countries like Hungary and Poland. But in any case, working at the European level is the most effective way to resist the conservative backlash, so that countries that break laws or withdraw rights come under pressure from the European Union.

  How do you see the future?

  Right now, at this crossroads, I see it with fear. I was a teenager at the time of Franco’s dictatorship and I lived through it in fear. Now I fear the idea that we might be headed back to that.

  In recent decades many people have accepted us, but they have not all done it for the same reasons. Many people have done so because they did not dare to express their rejection, because it was frowned upon. But now the part of the population in which rejection is well regarded is growing.

  The other day in a public debate a trans girl who is a member of a party was called ‘chronically ill’. Members of regional parliaments insist on addressing trans women lawmakers in masculine terms. Until recently, those who thought these things kept quiet because they were frowned upon and feared social rejection. But now there is a public emboldened to express their hatred. And this will continue regardless of the outcome of the election, because the groups that promote hatred have a public presence that transcends parliament. So I fear for the fate of egalitarian laws, but I fear the streets even more.

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  Civic space in Spain is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with COGAM through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@COGAM and@emiliodebenito on Twitter.

• SRI LANKA: ‘We’ve held Pride celebrations since 2004; we’re very proud of what we have achieved’

  CIVICUS speaks about the status of LGBTQI+ rights and progress being made towards decriminalising homosexuality in Sri Lanka with Rosanna Flamer-Caldera, founder and Executive Director of EQUAL GROUND.

  Founded in 2004, EQUAL GROUND is the oldest LGBTQI+ civil society organisation (CSO) in Sri Lanka. It fights for the recognition and realisation of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and focuses on empowerment, wellbeing and access to health, education, housing and legal protection services for Sri Lanka’s LGBTQI+ people.

  How has the situation of LGBTQI+ rights in Sri Lanka recently changed?

  We still have laws inherited from British colonial times that date back to 1883. These are articles 365 and 365A of the Penal Code, which criminalise ‘carnal intercourse against the order of nature’ and ‘acts of gross indecency’. Both of these target LGBTQI+ people.

  Sri Lanka is among over 40 former British colonies that also criminalise same-sex sexual relationships between women. In 2018, I filed a complaint with the United Nations (UN) Committee for the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. In its decision, finally taken in February 2022, the Committee requested that the Sri Lankan government decriminalise homosexuality in general and between consenting same-sex women specifically.

  Soon after, in August 2022, a private member’s bill to decriminalise homosexuality was put forward in parliament. In February 2023, in response to Sri Lanka’s Universal Periodic Review at the UN Human Rights Council, where most LGBTQI+ organisations requested the repeal this legislation, the Sri Lankan Minister of Foreign Affairs said that Sri Lanka would follow this recommendation, while making clear it would not legalise same-sex marriage. We understand that’s a fight for another day.

  In the meantime, the bill reached the attorney general of Sri Lanka, who released an order that both articles of the Penal Code were to be repealed rather than amended, which made us very happy. But as soon as the bill started being discussed in parliament, a petition was filed claiming it was unconstitutional. There were more than 12 intervening petitions filed to counter this petition, and in response the Supreme Court issued a ground-breaking decision stating that the bill amending the Penal Code to decriminalise consensual same-sex behaviour does not violate the Constitution of Sri Lanka. The case specifically touched upon the concepts of human dignity and privacy underlying equal rights for all, because the preamble of our constitution recognises the value of dignity. The Supreme Court of India used a similar argument in a 2018 case on the right to equality, saying that ‘life without dignity is like a sound that is not heard. Dignity speaks, it has its sound, it is natural and human’.

  Now, the bill is up for a parliamentary vote, and all it needs to pass is a simple majority. While the government has said it will decriminalise homosexuality, there are still homophobes in the government. But we hope that the vote will turn out positively. 

  What role has civil society played in the case?

  EQUAL GROUND was among the organisations that submitted petitions in the case that was filed with the Supreme Court. Not only LGBTQI+ organisations, but many other CSOs and individuals also took part in the process. Petitions were also filed by a former UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women and by professors, lawyers, activists and people from all walks of life. The was a lot of positive media coverage, on top of civil society work to create awareness and take to the media to promote the issue.

  Of course, there has also been backlash, with some members of parliament attacking the bill and others reconsidering support following a recent Pride march that many thought was not appropriate to Sri Lankan culture due to partial nudity and problematic messaging.

  How would you describe relations between Sri Lanka’s LGBTQI+ people and state authorities?

  The police have played a huge role in subjugating LGBTQI+ people in Sri Lanka. Not coincidentally, the first event at Colombo Pride 2023 will be devoted to discussing the more than 200 human rights violations against LGBTQI+ people that have been recently recorded in Sri Lanka. In most cases the perpetrator has been linked to the police.

  In 2021, EQUAL GROUND filed a case against the police for hiring a motivational speaker who propagated among officers a narrative connecting child abuse and homosexuality. We won the case and the police have been forced to distribute instructions to all police stations alerting officers to be very mindful of their treatment of LGBTQI+ people, particularly transgender people. This has made it clear that asking for sexual favours, blackmailing LGBTQI+ people and stopping them on the streets with no probable cause is against the law.

  With the aim of protecting LGBTQI+ people from police brutality, we reopened the case, and the police have recently promised to the court that they will change the terminology to make it inclusive of all LGBTQI+ people. Our strategy was to engage only three LGBTQI+ people along with several heterosexual people, to show the court this was an issue for everyone and not just LGBTQI+ people. Doing it with straight support also showed that not everyone shared anti-LGBTQI+ prejudice. The fact that we filed these cases and got some form of commitment from the authorities was ground-breaking.

  Our upcoming Pride march has been sanctioned by the police. We sought their permission, and we’re proud to say that we have been the first organisation to officially get it. Right now, we have a very good Inspector General of Police, he’s easy to talk to, but there’re rumours he will be replaced in three months. I would say there are mixed elements in the current relations between LGBTQI+ people and the authorities.

  How does EQUAL GROUND advocate for LGBTQI+ rights?

  Our fight, even after decriminalisation is achieved, will continue to aim to integrate LGBTQI+ people into our society. This is the cause we have been working on for the last 19 years.

  We’ve held sensitising and educational programmes around the country. We’ve run a lot of social media and mainstream media campaigns, produced research backing our claims regarding the number of people who identify as LGBTQI+ in Sri Lanka and the kind of challenges they face, and have created self-help books for families and allies of LGBTQI+ people. We have an ongoing campaign that has been running for over a year called ‘Live with Love‘, targeted at people who are not haters but are rather neutral or in-between, and could be swayed either way.

  All that’s happened over the last 19 years has given rise to many other LGBTQI+ organisations in Sri Lanka that have become involved in advocacy and the struggle for non-discrimination and decriminalisation. When we established our organisation back in 2004, we were the only ones fighting for all LGBTQI+ people, and we remained alone in this journey for a very long time. Only after 2015 did other organisations and people start coming out and getting involved. Until then we lived under a dictatorship and it was difficult to be open, but we have held Pride celebrations since 2004. Our Pride celebrations are turning 19 this year, and so is EQUAL GROUND. We’re very proud of what we have achieved so far.

  What forms of international support are Sri Lanka’sLGBTQI+ organisations receiving, and what further support would you need?

  We are quite underfunded due to inflation and the ever-rising cost of living, so we aren’t sure that we can retain good staff considering the scale of wages we’re able to pay. We’ve also lost funding due to the fluctuating exchange rate. The state of the economy is one of our major issues, so funding is always welcome.

  EQUAL GROUND has been constantly involved in various networks internationally that have opened up avenues of funding and learning, including the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) and ILGA Asia, Innovation for Change (I4C), and the Commonwealth Equality Network, a network of Commonwealth countries and their LGBTQI+ organisations.

  Civic space in Sri Lanka is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with EQUAL GROUND through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@EQUALGROUND_ on Twitter.

• ST VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES: ‘We advocate for the repeal of anti-gay laws as a matter of human dignity’

  CIVICUS speaks about struggles for LGBTQI+ rights and a recent legal setback in St Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG) with Jeshua Bardoo, founder and Executive Officer of Equal Rights, Access and Opportunities SVG (ERAO SVG).

  ERAO SVG is an intersectional human rights civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes equality and non-discrimination in SVG. It conducts research and monitors human rights and social justice issues affecting women, children, LGBTQI+ people and people with disabilities. It carries out public awareness campaigns, advocates with local and national authorities, as well as in regional and international rights forums, convenes like-minded organisations, organises consultations and provides training on human rights issues affecting its target populations.

  How do LGBTQI+ organisations in SVG, including ERAO SVG, defend and promote the rights of LGBTQI+ people?

  Human rights advocacy, particularly for LGBTQI+ rights, has limited visibility in SVG. There are few organisations working for LGBTQI+ rights, and ERAO SVG is among the main ones. Other groups, such as VincyChap and Care SVG, work on HIV/AIDS and contribute indirectly to supporting LGBTQI+ people. Notably, VincyChap participates as an interested party in consolidated court cases challenging anti-LGBTQI+ laws. ERAO SVG, while not involved at the inception, now supports the case.

  Focusing on education and awareness, ERAO SVG conducts in-person and online events to sensitise people on queer rights and focuses on tackling stigma. Last year we organised historic Pride celebrations alongside the Resident British Commissioner’s Office. Events included a Pride SVG reception, workshop, panel discussion and a social media campaign.

  Despite the challenges and risks, our efforts seek visibility for LGBTQI+ people in SVG. Collaborations with local, regional and international organisations enhance our impact. As part of our commitment to bringing about change, we worked with Human Rights Watch to produce a report that highlights the community’s challenges and issues a series of recommendations.

  Have you experienced backlash?

  I have faced significant backlash in my activism for LGBTQI+ rights, both online and offline. Negative reactions, to the point to trigger depression, intensified in 2019 after I published an article, ‘Do black LGBTQ+ Vincentian lives matter?’. Despite the discouragement, I went back to writing and advocating for human rights and queer rights.

  Public events, especially Pride celebrations, always trigger backlash, particularly from members of the Thusian Seventh Day Adventists, a Christian group, who continuously publicly call me out on social media. Also, someone on the radio called for my arrest following the recent court ruling that upheld anti-LGBTQI+ laws in SVG.

  Social media posts warning LGBTQI+ visitors about the risks they would face in SVG helped us get some attention but also attracted criticism. Despite the online hostility, to date I have faced no actual physical harm, although the threats I received right after the court ruling made me fear I would. To protect my mental wellbeing, I now try to avoid reading negative comments I receive on social media.

  The backlash and how busy I became after the recent ruling took a toll on me mentally, making me physically exhausted. I plan to take a break to recover but I remain committed to my advocacy. My experiences growing up as a queer person in a hostile environment, including discrimination in school and religious settings, have shaped my resilience. I now choose a religion that predicates love, distancing myself from past religious affiliations.

  How much of a setback is the recent legal court ruling that upheld anti-LGBTQI+ laws in SVG?

  It was very disappointing. In 2019, two gay Vincentians, Javin Johnson and Sean MacLeish, challenged SVG’s so-called anti- LGBTQI+ laws, sections 146 and 148 of the Criminal Code. Both petitioners live abroad. Johnson sought asylum in the UK while MacLeish lives in the USA. Their petition argued that their constitutional rights were being violated, including the rights to privacy, personal liberty and protection from discrimination. They claimed they had left SVG due to the severity of its anti-LGBTQI+ legislation, which made it impossible for them to live in the country as gay men.

  CSOs such as VincyChap in SVG supported the case, while the UK-based organisation Human Dignity Trust played a role in the background.

  However, on 16 February 2024 the court questioned the claimants’ standing and ruled that none of their rights had been violated. It deemed the LGBTQI+ laws justifiable, citing public health concerns related to HIV and morality. As it dismissed their claims, the court didn’t offer any remedy and ordered each claimant to pay EC$7,500 (approx. US$2,800) to the state in legal costs.

  There are still other legal cases in the region awaiting decisions, and despite setbacks, civil society activists and organisations remain committed to challenging discriminatory laws.

  What are the next steps following this disappointment?

  After studying the ruling and the justifications it offers, the lawyers and claimants in the case will decide whether to appeal. They need to weigh whether loopholes or weaknesses in the ruling provide grounds for a potentially successful appeal. Personally, having followed the virtual court proceedings, I find many of its statements absurd and believe the case should be appealed or otherwise new cases should be filed.

  We are disappointed that Prime Minister Ralph Gonsalves has failed to address the issue, which I think reflects state-sanctioned homophobia. Despite past condemnations of violence against LGBTQI+ people, there has been no practical action. It is disheartening to see politicians so focused on keeping the support of Christian voters who are allegedly in the majority. It is worth noting that churches were deeply involved in the judicial case. The judge’s open expression of religious sentiments and allegiances in court raised serious doubts about her impartiality.

  Governments should prioritise people’s wellbeing, and in the case of LGBTQI+ people, this requires at the very least repealing criminalising provisions. The state should also enact comprehensive legislation protecting people from discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity and expression. There is nothing like this in SVG, so there is a lot of work to be done. As a first step, ERAO SVG will continue to advocate for the repeal of discriminatory laws as a matter of human dignity.

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  Civic space in St Vincent and the Grenadines is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with ERAO SVG through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@eraosvg on Instagram.

• SUDAN: ‘The only way out of this mess is through civilian rule’

  CIVICUS speaks about thewar in Sudan and its repercussions for women and civil society with Reem Abbas, a Sudanese feminist activist, writer and fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP).

  Founded in 2013, TIMEP is a civil society organisation that works to centre advocates and experts from and in the Middle East and North Africa in policy discourse to foster more fair and democratic societies.

  What’s the current humanitarian situation in Sudan?

  Active conflict persists in around 60 per cent of Sudan’s territory. The continuous fighting entails targeting of civilians and mass displacement. In some states, much of the civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, markets, schools and universities, has been damaged. In Khartoum and West Darfur states, about 70 per cent of hospitals have been damaged or partially destroyed.

  Civilians and civil society activists are unsafe. The situation greatly restricts people’s freedom of movement, their ability to sustain a livelihood and their capacity to express their opinions freely. There are pockets of relative security in Eastern and Northern Sudan, but even in areas deemed secure displacement persists and schools remain closed because internally displaced people are living in them and other public buildings.

  Many livelihoods have totally collapsed, leaving people increasingly dependent on aid. We are already witnessing cases of famine, particularly affecting children, resulting in deaths.

  How has the conflict impacted on women and girls?

  Women have always been targeted in conflicts in Sudan. Political violence, rife in Sudan given its volatile political history, has also often taken aim at women. There’s rarely any accountability for sexual and gender-based violence. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – the militias that are fighting against the army – are abducting women and selling them as sexual slaves in markets or holding them captive for extended periods. Families are left in distress, unsure of the whereabouts of their daughters, and are sometimes embezzled for money.

  This is a war on women. Part of it stems from structural factors that place women in subordinate positions, but there’s also a punitive element directed at women for their pivotal role in the 2019 revolution that overthrew dictator Omar al-Bashir. During the revolution, women were out there, highly visible on the frontlines, and now it feels like they’re being punished for it.

  The targeting of women is tearing the social fabric apart. As public spaces become unsafe for women, fewer women are participating in public life, including in economic activities and activism. This will have long-term consequences.

  What roles is civil society playing in this context, and what challenges does it face?

  It’s important to recognise that civil society in Sudan isn’t a monolithic entity, but rather a complex mix of different layers. Some were heavily involved during the transitional period that followed the revolution, getting deeply integrated with government structures at the time. Then there are women’s groups, each with their own focus and agenda. Alongside them, there are more formal organisations such as non-governmental organisations and trade unions. And let’s not overlook the revolutionary elements, such as the resistance committees and emergency responserooms, decentralised and horizontal structures working to shelter displaced people, support hospitals and secure food and water supplies.

  The more formal parts of civil society are currently heavily involved in politics, while its revolutionary segments are deeply engaged in grassroots humanitarian efforts. They’re essentially functioning as local governments in areas where official governance structures are absent.

  Despite its crucial role, civil society faces numerous challenges. The organic growth of grassroots movements is stunted by conflict and dictatorship. The polarising effects of war have led to divisions along political, ethnic and regional lines, further fragmenting civil society. Activists are increasingly targeted by the RSF or the army, threatening their ability to operate.

  In an environment where conformity to mainstream opinions is increasingly enforced, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain dissenting voices. This situation underscores the urgent need to safeguard the diversity and autonomy of civil society in Sudan.

  However, attention and funding often gravitate towards already well-funded organisations, leaving grassroots initiatives to rely solely on community support. While funding alone doesn’t create a functional organisation, it’s important for organisations and groups to grow in an organic way and be able to garner support from the community.

  How is civil society advocating for peace and democracy?

  Right now, the conversation is all about security and getting things back to normal. People are doubting whether we can even think about democracy after all this chaos. The situation’s tough, with militarisation and conflict everywhere. But the only way out of this mess is through civilian rule. We need to figure out how to link the peace process to a long-term political solution that puts us back on track for democracy.

  Unfortunately, the focus of the political elite appears to be more on preserving its positions rather than addressing urgent issues. There are concerns that the largest political coalition has developed close ties with the militia, causing unease among those involved in the revolution. Without a bigger political group that really listens to people and leads responsibly, we’re going to be stuck with military rule for ages. Right now, it should be all about finding common ground and putting the focus on the people who’ve suffered most from this war – not about politicians trying to claw back power or siding with the military.

  There’s a lot of talk about how the transitional government messed up and led to the coup and the war. People are sceptical about civilian rule and whether it can fix things. It’s easier to sell the idea of a military-run government when people are feeling scared and vulnerable. Even though it’s militarisation that got us into this mess in the first place, it’s understandable because people just want to feel safe again.

  What should the international community do to address Sudan’s dire security and humanitarian situation?

  It’s time for the international community to stop sticking to one side of the story and start listening to everyone involved. They’re pumping all their funds into one camp and ignoring a whole bunch of other perspectives. We need more humanitarian aid, particularly considering the famine situation. Millions of people are at risk, with nowhere to turn and nothing to support themselves with.

  Investment in basic infrastructure like hospitals and water plants is crucial too. People need services, and they need them now. Some areas haven’t had clean water for months because water plants are getting caught in the crossfire.

  The international community must also demonstrate political determination. People’s lives are on the line. We need clear plans and urgent action to stop this war.

  I want to emphasise the significance of civil society solidarity. This is crucial when our governments show ambivalence towards our concerns. In such situations, we must become each other’s voices and amplify our collective message. We must seek ways to connect, demonstrate solidarity and collaborate effectively.

  It’s important to learn from one another and work together towards shared objectives. Collaboration with civil society groups and networks across the world is greatly appreciated. It’s through such partnerships that we can make a meaningful impact and bring about positive change.

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  Civic space in Sudan is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with TIMEP through itswebsite or itsFacebook andLinkedIn pages, and follow@TimepDC and@ReemWrites on Twitter.

• TAIWAN: ‘China has tried to intimidate voters and pressure Taiwanese civil society organisations’

  CIVICUS discusses Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election with Brian Hioe, one of the founders of New Bloom Magazine.

  New Bloom is an online magazine that covers activism and youth politics in Taiwan and Asia and the Pacific. A former fellow at the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, Brian is currently a non-resident fellow at the University of Nottingham’s Taiwan Research Hub.

  What’s at stake in the 2024 election?

  Taiwan’s elections consistently capture global attention due to the anticipation surrounding China’s response. Typically, elections feature two candidates representing the two major parties. One of them, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), is historically pro-independence and the other, Kuomintang (KMT), is historically pro-unification. This pattern persists in the current election, although there are other parties in the race.

  Traditionally, Taiwanese voters opt for what they perceive as the safest choice in terms of safeguarding their hard-earned democratic freedoms. The overarching concern is to avoid actions that might trigger backlash from China.

  Now it looks like the centre-left candidate of the ruling DPP is going to win because the pro-unification camp is very divided. But with multiple candidates running, fragmentation is to be expected, potentially affecting the outcome.

  What are the most relevant domestic campaign issues?

  There is a lot of dissatisfaction with the current government’s inability to address pressing economic issues. Young people’s salaries are very low, working hours are among the world’s longest and most people cannot afford to buy a house. We also have a declining birthrate and a growing older population.

  Dissatisfaction has translated into some support for the pro-China party. The KMT is the historic Chinese nationalist party and was the ruling party during Taiwan’s authoritarian era, from 1949 to 1987. Its campaign centres on deepening economic relations with China, promising to bring back the good old days of economic success.

  Environmental issues, and particularly air pollution, also weigh heavily on voters. The question of Taiwan’s future energy needs is key, as a balance is sought between maintaining a stable energy supply and minimising pollution. There is heated debate around nuclear energy. Taiwan’s environmental movement is anti-nuclear, as is the DPP, unlike the KMT. There are concerns about what to do with nuclear waste. People are worried that the frequent earthquakes that hit Taiwan could cause a potential catastrophe, as happened in Fukushima, Japan in 2011.

  Past elections also featured debate on culture-war issues such as same-sex marriage, which the DPP pushed for but the KMT opposed. But these have now taken a back seat to economic and environmental issues.

  However, the defining matter remains the cross-strait issue – the question of what kind of relations Taiwan will maintain with China.

  What are the positions of the main candidates?

  DPP candidate Lai Ching-te, the current vice president and expected winner, previously served as mayor of Taiwan’s historical capital Tainan and Taiwan’s premier. He is perceived as more conservative than the incumbent and is strongly pro-independence, although as he has climbed in the polls he has tempered his position in fear that strong rhetoric could provoke a reaction from the military or China. Despite his comparatively conservative background, he has signalled openness to progressive ideas, notably by becoming the first presidential candidate to participate in the Pride parade this October.

  KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih is the current mayor of New Taipei and a former police chief with a record of involvement in the arrest of political dissidents during the authoritarian period. He is more moderate than other KMT candidates on unification issues, which is perceived to improve the KMT’s chances. However, his choice of running mate signalled a potential shift towards a more dogmatic position on unification.

  The third candidate is former Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je, the leader of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), a new party leaning towards unification. He has gained some support from young people, who tend not to support the KMT. He has a populist style, often making gaffes or misspeaking. He has faced criticism for making misogynistic and homophobic comments, but this hasn’t affected his popularity.

  How do young people feel about this election?

  There seems to be a notable decrease in enthusiasm and engagement with the election process. The 2020 election came around the same time of the protest wave in Hong Kong, which gave many young people a glimpse of what the future could look like for Taiwan if it were to become part of China.

  Now the context is different and what prevails among people is dissatisfaction with the DPP due to challenging circumstances, which has resulted in the rise of the third-party anti-establishment candidate. Ko Wen-je is, ironically, a candidate opposed to progressive causes such as LGBTQI+ rights, but many young people are still attracted by his anti-establishment message.

  In contrast, the DPP is perceived as the status quo and despite its recent progressivism under the Tsai administration has not managed to win over young people. Broadly, while millennials may still support it, Gen Z does not.

  What role are foreign powers playing in the election process?

  China’s persistent efforts to interfere in Taiwan’s political processes have resulted in recent arrests of people accused of operating in favour of China to influence the election, with efforts made to stiffen sentences for espionage. Ten military officials have, for example, been arrested in connection with these interference attempts.

  A tactic employed to influence the election is paint the DPP as overly provocative towards China or overly reliant on the USA, suggesting that this may lead to adverse consequences. The DPP has indeed strengthened relations with the USA, while the KMT, once the US-backed authoritarian ruling party, has shifted its position. The KMT now argues that growing too close to the USA might provoke China, questions arms sales and civic exchanges and disseminates conspiracy theories regarding fictional US plans to destroy Taiwan in the event of a war.

  The other side of the political aisle attacks the KMT for being too close to China and criticises its attempts to revive trade agreements such as the Cross Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA), opposition to which led to the 2014 Sunflower Movement.

  Have there been any concerns about the integrity of civic space?

  Taiwan is the only country in Asia rated by the CIVICUS Monitor as having open civic space. There are questions about how civil society engages with both major political parties and concerns about potential co-optation. Civil society faces the challenge of balancing relations with political parties and maintaining a critical position without being perceived as partisan. Civil society is often closer to the DPP, because it is more centre-left and suspicious of China.

  But there haven’t been government attempts to restrict civic space. The government does take actions to curb Chinese influence but to date has not infringed on civil society rights.

  China in contrast has tried to pressure Taiwanese civil society organisations (CSOs), particularly those focusing on cross-strait issues. Five years ago, a Taiwanese CSO worker was arrested in China on vague national security charges, in what seemed aimed at sending a warning to Taiwanese civil society not to meddle with China.

  China has also tried to intimidate voters. In a recent example, a person who purchased a book on the possibility of a Chinese invasion received a suspicious phone call from someone impersonating a customer service representative asking them about it.

  What are your expectations for the post-election period?

  Unless something unexpected happens, a DPP victory is the likeliest outcome. China is unlikely to take any drastic actions before the election, as such moves might inadvertently strengthen support for the DPP.

  Following the election, however, China is expected to respond with intimidation tactics, possibly through military exercises, to signal its opposition to a new DPP administration. The intensity of these exercises may be influenced by China’s relations with the USA at the time.

  In terms of civic space, should the DPP continue in power, civil society may need to broaden its outreach, both regionally and internationally, to build resilience and avoiding being sucked in by the two-party dynamics.

  However, were the KMT to win, civil society would likely refocus on domestic concerns. It may regroup to resist, particularly in the face of potential attempts to reintroduce trade agreements such as the CSSTA.

  If the status quo is maintained, Taiwan will continue strengthening ties with the USA and the west while actively reaching out to southeast Asian countries, a strategy aimed at reducing economic reliance on China and diversifying political ties.

  The geopolitical landscape will play a crucial role in shaping Taiwan’s future, and the actions and reactions of both China and Taiwan will be closely watched on the international stage.

   

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  Civic space in Taiwan is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with New Bloom Magazine through itswebsite, contact Brian Hioe through hisFacebook page and follow @brianhioe onTwitter orInstagram.

  The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

• TANZANIA: ‘The human rights of the Maasai people are violated through involuntary assimilation and relocation’

  CIVICUS speaks about the unlawful eviction of Maasai people from their ancestral lands with Joseph Moses Oleshangay, a Tanzanian human rights lawyer and activist for democracy and Indigenous peoples’ land rights. Joseph is currently working with the Legal and Human Rights Centre to raise awareness of human rights violations and promote good governance in Tanzania.

  Why are Maasai people being evicted from their land in Tanzania?

  The Maasai eviction is largely caused by the government’s lust for money. The tourism and hunting business promises to bring a lot of capital, and unfortunately, that can only happen if the Maasai are removed from their native land. The government is currently planning to evict Maasai people living in Loliondo and Ngorongoro to establish a game-controlled area in Loliondo and potentially change the status of a conservation area in Ngorongoro to a game reserve.

  The government has proposed to establish game reserves in every single district ancestrally occupied by Maasai communities. The way this project is being carried out is unethical and threatens many lives and the cultural survival of the Maasai.

  Sadly, to gain public support and trust the government has created a narrative that this is a nature conservation project. But it has been scientifically proved that Maasai pastoralism is compatible with environmental and wildlife conservation. While the government generally accuses the Maasai as threatening tourism in Ngorongoro, 70 per cent of tourists in Tanzania in 2019 visited Ngorongoro, with the remaining 22 national parks and game reserves attracting only 30 per cent of the tourist inflow. Ngorongoro also contributes 52 per cent of the earnings from tourism. It is the only conservation area in Tanzania where humans – Maasai – are legally allowed to coexist with wildlife. As well as being by far the best tourism destination in Tanzania, it has the highest wildlife population density in the world. This shows that the government’s claim that the Maasai are threatening wildlife conservation and tourism is a completely false narrative.

  In Ngorongoro over 80,000 people are facing the threat of eviction, which the government justifies by claiming the population has exceeded the carrying capacity of the land. But according to the latest census, Ngorongoro has a human population density of 10 people per square kilometre, compared to a national average of 60.

  The tourism industrial complex is pushing the government to forcefully evict Maasai people from their land because they think the Maasai don’t add value to the business and will disrupt the activities they want to undertake in Loliondo, Ngorongoro and the neighbouring Serengeti National Park. The authorities know that wildlife massacre, one of the key businesses planned, won’t be possible under the Maasai’s watch and their pastoralism livelihoods will not fit the overall hunting and hotel aesthetic they are trying to create.

  The government has an obligation to take care of the environment and ensure the safety of all who live in it. If Maasai people are allowed to stay in the newly created game reserves, they will witness wildlife massacre and will inevitably suffer harm. The government cannot risk this being exposed.

  So without consulting with the Maasai community, the government has started its eviction plan in a manner that will force their integration with the majority community in the coastal region. To facilitate relocation, on 31 March the government withdrew all funds previously allocated to health, education and other key services. In 2021 the government threatened to demolish nine government primary schools and six health centres. In April 2022 the government’s chief spokesperson recognised that life-saving services were prolonging the Maasai presence in the Ngorongoro so there was a need to dismantle them.

  What human rights violations have been reported?

  Many human rights violations have been reported, and they are reaching a level we had not seen since our independence. They are more brutal than what our people experienced in the colonial era. Never before has our country witnessed a campaign targeting a specific community as we are now seeing in Ngorongoro. The Maasai are being portrayed as primitive people whose ancestral land is elsewhere, and the president has said they are new arrivals in Tanzania, so in case of a forceful relocation, the authorities can claim the Maasai have no attachment to Ngorongoro.

  In early June, the authorities installed beacons in the place destined to become a game-controlled area, against Tanzanian law and in violation of an order issued by the East Africa Court of Justice in 2018. In 2017 a Maasai representative filed a complaint at the Tanzanian Human Rights and Good Governance Commission against the planned eviction and submitted a case to the East Africa Court of Justice seeking intervention against violent operations that ended with at least 349 Maasai homesteads being set ablaze.

  Despite the temporary orders issued by the Court directing the government to halt relocation pending a final decision on the case, on 17 June 2022, just five days before the date set for delivery of a judgment, the government declared the contested land as a game-controlled area. Surprisingly, four days later the Court issued a notice that the decision would be delayed until September, giving the government leeway in executing atrocities in Loliondo.

  The demarcated area includes not only village land, which is forbidden by the law, but also people’s homesteads. The police have used teargas and guns, wounding 31 Maasai people. Before beacons were installed, all elected political leaders were arrested and detained incommunicado for seven days before being arraigned in court on murder charges – for a murder that happened one day after they were arrested.

  There are currently 27 Maasai people charged with murder and over 80 detained under the accusation of being unlawful immigrants. Some have been subjected to torture. Over 2,000 people have reportedly crossed the border with Kenya for security reasons.

  Since June, Maasai livestock have been killed or impounded by security forces and a large-scale operation is ongoing to silence anyone who speak against the situation in Ngorongoro and Loliondo.

  How will this eviction affect Maasai people?

  To understand how Maasai people will be impacted upon, one needs to understand who the Maasai are. They are a semi-nomadic pastoral people who move from one place to another in search of their livelihood. They have lived alongside wildlife for centuries and know how to preserve their environment. They have established their cultural practices and spiritual sites that define them as a distinct society.

  Relocation will disturb their culture. There is a place called Oldoinyo Lenkai (‘Mountain of God’) where the Maasai believe their god lives and usually conduct sacrifices during times of scarcity and crisis. If this land becomes a conservation area with restricted access their right to spirituality will be taken away. Ultimately, relocation has a strong chance of leading to their extinction as a people.

  One of the government’s justifications of the relocation process is what they call the need for forced civilisation of the Maasai people, who would have a better life if they coexisted with people from different backgrounds. But this will force them to adopt a culture that is not their own. Involuntary assimilation and relocation are the greatest human rights violations and generally fall under the accepted meaning of genocide under the Rome Statute that established the International Criminal Court.

  How are civil society activists and organisations fighting back?

  We are fighting this in many ways. We are challenging the government by debunking its narrative. The government is spreading propaganda to get public support, so what we do is inform people about the dangers of these evictions and that they are founded on false narratives. We also use our various platforms to highlight that the Maasai add value to both nature conservation and tourism, providing accurate information to counter false claims.

  We also have filed a court case against eviction. The law is one of the strongest tools we are using in fighting injustice in this battle. We can use the law to hold the government accountable and demand it halts the planned eviction. We are trying to make sure that the truth about what is happening is known not only internally but also by the international community.

  We have been fortunate enough to have regional and international organisations such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and United Nations human rights experts publicly condemn the actions of the Tanzanian government and urge it to stop unlawful evictions.

  But we have faced challenges, including the lack of functional legal processes in Tanzania. The 2018 court order requiring a halt to the operations have not been respected. Our government thinks it is above the law and this is affecting our progress in fighting the eviction. As activists our lives are in danger. The government threatens us and many activists had fled the country for safety.

  What kind of assistance do you need from international civil society?

  We need international organisations and activists to help us expose what is happening in Tanzania, because if this is known about internationally the government might be pressured to do better. International allies should use their platforms to highlight the gruesome violations of rights experienced by the Maasai people and keep people informed about our activities.

  Civic space in Tanzania is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Follow@Oleshangay on Twitter.

• THAILAND: ‘Marriage equality is likely to pass – and inspire change in other Asian countries’

  

  CIVICUS speaks about the progress being made toward legalising same-sex marriage in Thailand with Mookdapa Yangyuenpradorn, an LGBTQI+ activist and Human Rights Associate at Fortify Rights.

  Founded in 2013, Fortify Rights is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) working to bring laws, policies and practices in line with human rights standards through evidence-based research, strategic truth-telling and empowerment.

  Why are there currently four different bills in parliament aimed at legalising same-sex marriage?

  LGBTQI+ marriage is such a significant issue in Thailand today that bills to legalise it have been submitted to parliament simultaneously by the government and other political groups. It is unusual and encouraging to see political parties competing to propose changes that would benefit LGBTQI+ people.

  Out of the four bills up for consideration, one was submitted by the government, two were submitted by political parties, the Move Forward Party and Democratic Party, and another was submitted by civil society. The one submitted by the cabinet and approved by the prime minister takes precedence over the rest.

  The civil society bill was initiated by the Rainbow Coalition for Marriage Equality, which brings together numerous CSOs. It was developed at the grassroots level and drafted and submitted on behalf of Thailand’s LGBTQI+ people. It successfully made its way into parliament, with its authors securing seats in the readings as discussions progressed. It is uncommon for a bill proposed by civil society to enter parliament, so this is a very positive development.

  The civil society bill is also more progressive than the other three because it ensures parental rights for LGBTQI+ people and proposes a transitional procedure to allow LGBTQI+ couples to register their marriages and enjoy spousal rights while other relevant laws are still being revised and amended, rather than make them wait until all of the process is finished.

  Still, the primary objective is consistent across all four bills: they all seek to amend the civil and commercial code, which now defines marriage as a union between man and woman and grants them the status of ‘husband and wife’, by replacing these gendered words with the gender-neutral expressions ‘individuals’ and ‘spouses’. This simple change will enable LGBTQI+ people to register their marriages.

  How have LGBTQI+ activists advocated forthe bill?

  The constitution establishes that if a bill is proposed by a group of citizens or civil society groups, representatives from the initiating group should be involved with the parliamentary committee working on the bill. This provided space for LGBTQI+ activists to participate in the legislative process and advance their agenda. The Rainbow Coalition for Marriage Equality has played a crucial role in presenting a unified and consolidated stance on marriage equality in parliament. The activists currently engaged in discussions have been advocating for this bill for over a decade.

  As an advisor to the committee drafting the marriage equality bill, I provide expert opinions from the perspective of human rights law and international standards. For instance, I make sure the bill aligns with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, among other international conventions and treaties, and incorporates good practices and advanced protections found in the laws of countries with marriage equality.

  What are the prospects of the same-sex marriage bill being passed?

  The bill will likely be passed, although it will take some time. The legislative process in Thailand involves three readings in the House of Representatives, the elected 500-member lower house of the National Assembly, followed by three readings in the Senate, the appointed upper house. Proposed legislation then undergoes scrutiny by the Constitutional Court and is ultimately signed into law by the king, then published in the Royal Gazette.

  The marriage equality bill is currently in its initial stage in the lower house. It successfully passed its first reading in December 2023 and is now undergoing its second reading. All four bills are now being examined and consolidated into a single version. The second reading is expected to finish by early March, after which the final bill will proceed to the third reading in the lower house before advancing to the Senate.

  The bill’s adoption seems highly likely because civil society’s decade-long public campaigning has succeeded in getting marriage equality included on Thailand’s main political agenda. Despite some challenges, prospects for adoption have gradually and steadily increased. The prime minister and cabinet have expressed their support and opposition to the bill has decreased. I believe it is just a matter of time until the bill becomes law and comes into force.

  What impact would the passage of this law have for LGBTQI+ struggles?

  Marriage equality is a lot more than a mere administrative process of signing papers. It’s about securing the rights of LGBTQI+ couples to adopt children together and be recognised as legal parents. It’s also a matter of life and death if an LGBTQI+ person is in an accident and their partner must give permission for them to undergo surgery or other medical procedures. Ultimately, the fight for marriage equality is about enabling LGBTQI+ people to live normal lives and form families. This is the true meaning of marriage equality that we are fighting for and the message we strive to convey to society.

  The legalisation of LGBTQI+ marriage would further raise awareness about LGBTQI+ issues in society, setting a solid stage for advancing other LGBTQI+ rights. It would be a firm first step towards full legal recognition of the rights of LGBTQI+ people, including parenting and inheritance rights, as well as equal social rights and other benefits currently enjoyed only by heterosexual couples. Moreover, a gender recognition bill is in line for parliamentary consideration.

  I also hope that the achievement of marriage equality in Thailand will inspire change in other Asian countries. We learned a lot from the experience of Taiwanese LGBTQI+ activists, who were the first to achieve legalisation of same-sex marriage in Asia, and I hope others will be able to learn from us too.

  Do you expect conservative backlash to happen?

  During the previous government led by the military junta, the regime attempted to project an image of Thailand as open to LGBTQI+ people, but reality told otherwise, as it disregarded LGBTQI+ rights and treated LGBTQI+ people as a deviant group with special needs. A 2021 constitutional court ruling even referred to LGBTQI+ people as a ‘special species’ that needs to be singled out and studied. This reflected the state’s views of LGBTQI+ people. Similar attitudes are occasionally present among the public, particularly among older generations, who still need to understand and get used to society becoming more inclusive and open.

  Islamic parties are likely to pose the biggest threat of conservative backlash. They have so far either abstained or voted against the marriage equality bill in parliament, but their current representation is low. However, in southern Thailand, where Islamic beliefs have significant political and cultural influence, there is potential for unequal implementation of the bill once it is passed.

  On a positive note, public attitudes toward LGBTQI+ people have improved over the past few years and discussions about LGBTQI+ rights, gender equality and social inclusion have become common on social media platforms. This positive shift can be attributed to the continuous efforts of LGBTQI+ activists in running public awareness campaigns.

  What international support do you need to further advance LGBTQI+ rights in Thailand?

  Based on my experience of organising protests on the ground, access to resources is key to advancing our cause, since these are scarce at the grassroots level of LGBTQI+ activism. Local activists, often students and young people who are not affiliated with renowned human rights organisations, play a crucial role as change-makers. However, limited funds hinder many young activists from becoming full-time human rights defenders, threatening the sustainability of the LGBTQI+ movement. I believe that for the movement to move forward sustainably, it is crucial to establish connections with international donors and explore ways to form a coalition of Thai LGBTQI+ activists to amplify our voices on the international stage.

  We are all passionate about claiming our rights, but passion alone is not enough. LGBTQI+ activism needs resources and support to continue to mobilise and sustain the movement.

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  Civic space in Thailand is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Fortify Rights through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@FortifyRights and@mdpyy on Twitter.

• THAILAND: ‘People understood election monitoring was important to ensure checks and balances’

  CIVICUS speaks about the 14 Mayelection in Thailand with Yingcheep Atchanont, executive director ofInternet Law Reform Dialogue (iLaw).

  Founded in 2009, iLaw is a civil society organisation (CSO) that campaigns for democracy, freedom of expression and a fair and accountable justice system in Thailand. Alongside Amnesty International Thailand, in 2020 iLaw developed the websiteMob Data Thailand that compiles protest data and jointly with other groups it exposed the use ofPegasus spyware against prominent leaders of Thailand’s pro-democracy protests.

• TURKEY: ‘All critical voices are repressed under the pretext of combating disinformation’

  In the run-up to Turkey’s general election, CIVICUS speaks with Fatih Polat, editor-in-chief of Evrensel, about the state of press freedoms and the Turkish government’s attacks on critical media.

  Founded in 1995, Evrensel is an independent daily newspaper. In August 2022, the Turkish Press Advertisement Agency permanentlybanned all public announcements and advertisements with Evrensel despite the Turkish Constitutional Court’s decision that advertisement bans on Evrensel and other newspapers violated freedom of expression and press freedom.

  What are the conditions for the exercise of journalism in Turkey?

  In Turkey state representatives routinely refuse to answer journalists’ questions. In any developed western democracy, this would be a serious matter and would be considered an obstruction of journalistic work. But in Turkey, this is no longer seen as a problem. For a very long time, the government has routinely imposed a variety of obstacles both on the critical Turkish press and on our foreign colleagues covering Turkey for international press organisations.

  Ever since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) gained power 21 years ago, independent media have been in trouble. The government pressures critical media both financially and politically. It seeks to financially asphyxiate them by blocking the flow of official announcements and advertisements and imposing fines for alleged infractions concerning news, commentaries or television programmes. Political pressures range from lawsuits filed against individual journalists and newspaper managers to the detention, arrest and use of torture against journalists.

  Critical television channels can also be subjected to temporary screen blackouts. Online media, which have developed significantly over the past 20 years, experience pressures ranging from court-ordered removal of content to lawsuits. Even cartoonists are subjected to punishment and arrest. Moreover, journalists are frequently exposed to police violence and detained while following the news on the streets.

  On top of this, if the government is uncomfortable with the publication of a newspaper, a state official calls the agency that distributes advertisements and makes veiled threats to stop the flow of private advertisements. In contrast, newspapers and TV channels supporting the government receive serious financial aid from the state.

  How has Evrensel been specifically targeted?

  Evrensel is a 28-year-old, well-established newspaper that stays afloat thanks to readers’ contributions and advertisements placed by municipalities run by the opposition. On 22 August 2022, the Turkish Press Advertisement Agency, whose budget comes from tax money, banned Evrensel from receiving any public announcements and advertisements. This tactic is aimed at making a newspaper financially unviable. In response we filed a lawsuit, which is currently underway.

  The new press law, which was recently introduced by the government under the pretext of ‘combating disinformation’, has led to a new period of repression of anyone who expresses a critical stance towards the regime. Lawsuits are filed against us for news and articles published in our print newspaper and on our website. Our website is frequently subjected to access-blocking orders.

  Are journalists from certain groups particularly vulnerable?

  The Kurdish media are under particularly strong attack. There is an ongoing conflict between the state and various Kurdish insurgent groups who demand either separation from Turkey or greater autonomy within Turkey. The government has increased pressure on Kurdish media, and on all Kurdish actors, after putting an end to negotiations. For example, Kurdish journalists have been arrested alongside legislators and politicians of the pro-minority People’s Democratic Party (HDP), including the HDP’s co-presidents Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, and mayors have been replaced by trustees. In April and early May alone, 34 Kurdish journalists and press workers have been arrested.

  How has the repression of press freedoms affected the popularity of the ruling regime?

  Your question reminds me of another important element of repression. In Turkey, insulting the president is punishable with prison sentences of up to six years. I am among the many journalists who have been tried for insulting the president; I was acquitted in 2019. This has been applied not only against journalists but also against social media users.

  But for a significant segment of AKP voters, media censorship or corruption allegations against the president are not that important. Only bad economic performance can result in the erosion of their support.

  On 14 May Turkey will hold a critical general election, both for president and parliament. The unity of the opposition has brought hope for a change. Right now, the prospect of a time when we will be able to breathe a little more freely again seems within reach.

  What kinds of domestic or international support do Turkish independent media and journalists currently receive, and what would help?

  There are several domestic journalists’ organisations in Turkey. For example, I am a member of the Journalists’ Union of Turkey and the Journalists’ Association of Turkey, the largest press unions in the country. In the last 15 to 20 years, various international journalists’ organisations have also provided important support, standing in solidarity with the independent press and journalists from Turkey, spreading awareness and advocating for our rights. It is very valuable for us that they follow the many cases of repression of critical media and include them in their countries’ political agenda.

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  Civic space in Turkey is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Evrensel through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@EvrenselDaily and@fpolat69 onTwitter.

• TURKEY: ‘For the embattled LGBTQI+ movement, simply persisting in taking to the streets is an achievement’

  CIVICUS speaks about 2023 Pride and the civil society response to the Turkish government’s anti-LGBTQI+ campaign with Damla Umut Uzun, international relations and fundraising officer atKaos Gay and Lesbian Cultural Research and Solidarity Association (Kaos GL).

  Founded in 1994, Kaos GL is one of the oldest and largest LGBTQI+ organisations in Turkey, dedicated to creating visibility and understanding and promoting LGBTQI+ human rights.

  How have Turkish authorities reacted to Prideevents?

  Since 2015, Pride events have been increasingly banned by city governors. The first ban was introduced in Istanbul, which in 2014 had the largest Pride gathering, with at least 50,000 participants. But despite the growing number of bans, the number of Pride events across the country has also consistently increased.

  This year in Istanbul, several Pride events were banned by district governor offices, resulting in detentions, police brutality and restrictions on journalists. A Pride movie event organised by the University Feminist Collective in Şişli was banned for ‘potentially causing societal resentment’ and ‘threatening social peace’. The screening of the film ‘Pride’, scheduled by the cinema collective, and a tea gathering event organised by the LambdaIstanbul LGBTQI+ Solidarity Association were banned in Kadıköy district. The police detained and later released at least eight people who came to watch the film, using physical violence. The LGBTQI+ group Queer Baykuş of Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University had their posters violently confiscated by the university’s security units before a planned press release. On 18 June, during the Trans Pride Parade in Beyoğlu district, the police handcuffed and detained 10 people, including a child, and released them later that day after taking police statements. Journalists were prevented from taking pictures during the intervention.

  The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey compiled a detailed report of rights violations in the context of 2023 Pride events between 2 June and 10 July 2023. Various Pride celebrations, including parades, picnics and press statements, were banned by multiple governorships and disrupted due to targeted threats and societal reactions in Adana, Ankara, Antalya, Eskişehir, Izmir, Kocaeli and Muğla. A total of 241 people, including four minors and seven lawyers, were detained on the grounds of Article 2,911 of the law on gatherings and demonstrations. The main reasons cited by authorities were non-compliance with regulations, disruption of public order and violation of ban decisions. Although most detainees were typically released on the same day, they might face prosecution and lawsuits months later.

  Police interventions during Pride events are a reflection of the government’s hostility towards LGBTQI+ people. They are waging a kind of war against us. The recurring violence is fuelled by a sense of impunity: the fact that law enforcement officials face no consequences for harming, insulting or harassing LGBTQI+ people further emboldens them.

  Why is the Turkish government hostile towards LGBTQI+ people?

  Oppression of the LGBTQI+ community in Turkey is not new: the government’s crackdown first intensified following the 2016 attempted coup. But the main reason behind the increasing hatred is the attempt of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to mobilise conservative segments of society. To mask the effects of its corrupt rule and economic mismanagement, the government is employing populist rhetoric and polarisation tactics, seeking to designate an enemy to blame.

  Repression hasn’t been limited to LGBTQI+ people but rather targeted at any opposition or independent views. Dissenting voices, including those of Kurdish people, feminists and human rights defenders, are labelled as ‘terrorists’.

  Among these groups, LGBTQI+ people are a particularly easy target due to societal conservatism and religious tendencies. Censorship and rights violations of LGBTQI+ people affect all aspects of life, including access to goods and services, education, healthcare and housing and media representation. In line with the global anti-gender trend, the government has employed a rhetoric focused on ‘protecting the sacred Turkish family structure against perversion’, using LGBTQI+ people and feminists as scapegoats.

  What role did anti-LGBTQI+ rhetoric play in the2023 presidential elections?

  Anti-LGBTQI+ rhetoric played a significant role in the election campaigns of the AKP government and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, aimed at mobilising conservative voters, including those on the left side of the political spectrum. Former Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu openly mobilised hate speech against LGBTQI+ people at public events. President Erdoğan used similar rhetoric, accusing the opposition of being ‘pro-LGBTQI+’.

  Unfortunately, two radical Islamist parties, Hüdapar and New Welfare, have entered parliament, and their primary election promise was to close down LGBTQI+ organisations. They are now working actively towards this goal, and we anticipate that such rhetoric and efforts will intensify in the run-up to local elections in a few months.

  How are LGBTQI+ organisations, including Kaos GL,responding to these attacks?

  Despite facing oppressive conditions and lack of opportunities, the LGBTQI+ movement in Turkey remains resilient and strong. Alongside feminists, we are the only groups that continue to take to the streets and demonstrate for our rights, showing immense bravery in the face of police violence and detention. Simply persisting in organising demonstrations is an achievement in itself.

  In addition to street activism, Turkish LGBTQI+ organisations are actively engaged in advocacy, the promotion of visibility and capacity building. We recognise that we won’t be able to change policies at the national level due to the AKP’s absolute majority, so we focus our efforts on grassroots societal transformation. We educate professionals who encounter LGBTQI+ people in their daily work, such as doctors, nurses, teachers, lawyers and social and municipal workers, to increase their understanding and capacity to work with LGBTQI+ people and respond to their needs in the respectful manner.

  We document human rights violations and hate crimes, providing a factual basis for our advocacy campaigns. We also report on the situation of LGBTQI+ employees in the public and private sectors. Other organisations focus on reporting the challenges faced by LGBTQI+ students, people living with HIV, elderly people and refugees.

  We also organise cultural events, including queer film festivals such as Pink Life Queer Fest and exhibitions and art programmes like the Ankara Queer Art Programme and the Women-to-Women storytelling contests, aimed at fostering expression and community engagement.

  What obstacles do you encounter in your work, and what supportdo you need?

  Since the attempted coup, the government has intensified its crackdown on civil society organisations (CSOs), subjecting them to frequent state audits to identify alleged mistakes, impose fines or even shut them down. Laws such as the Law on the Prevention of the Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction have made it increasingly difficult for CSOs to receive funds, further hindering their work.

  Turkish LGBTQI+ organisations maintain close contact with European human rights organisations, Council of Europe representatives, the European Union (EU) delegation and United Nations mechanisms. We regularly update them about the developments and shrinking human rights space in Turkey, and in turn, they issue statements expressing deep concern about the government’s actions. However, these efforts have proven ineffective as the AKP government demonstrates a complete lack of regard and even fails to implement decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.

  Turkish LGBTQI+ organisations have generally benefitted from EU funding, but this has started to decrease. It appears that the EU has somewhat given up on Turkey, since the government is making no effort to improve human rights standards. Additionally, the fact that Turkey is keeping millions of refugees out of Europe has limited the EU’s consistency in supporting human rights in Turkey.

  As LGBTQI+ individuals living in Turkey, we are constantly pressured to hide our identities, pushed to the margins of society and silenced. But as LGBTQI+ organisations we continue to fight for our rights and freedoms. To advance our cause, we need more systematic financial resources, increased collaboration with international organisations, more vocal campaigns and international pressure on the Turkish government.

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  Civic space in Turkey is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Kaos GL through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@KaosGL on Twitter.

• TURKEY: ‘It is just not possible to respond to such a large-scale disaster effectively without civil society’

  CIVICUS speaks with Gözde Kazaz, Communications Officer at Support to Life, about the way Turkish civil society has responded to the recent earthquakes and the support it needs to provide an effective emergency response.

  Support to Life is an independent humanitarian civil society organisation (CSO) that helps disaster-affected communities meet their basic needs and advance their rights by providing emergency assistance, refugee support, child protection and capacity building. Founded in 2005, it adheres to the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence and accountability in delivering aid.

  What damage have the recent earthquakes caused, and what has been the Turkish government’s response?

  The recent earthquakes affected 11 Turkish cities encompassing nearly 15 million people. This means the disaster affected roughly one in five people in Turkey. As of today, causalities have surpassed 44,000.

  In a disaster of such magnitude, public institutions had a problem in meeting needs and establishing coordination among the various state agencies involved. This was particularly the case in the first 72 hours, when search and rescue efforts are of the most vital importance. One of the reasons for this may be that infrastructure in the region was badly damaged and communication lines were cut off. The sites and staff of public institutions were themselves also affected.  We are currently seeing some improvements in coordination, but meeting the emerging needs in this vast disaster area is still very difficult. It is of great importance that the state, private sector and civil society work together on the basis of a healthy division of labour.

  How has civil society responded?

  Many CSOs that have useful expertise and work on disasters, Support to Life included, came together to form the Turkish Local NGO Humanitarian Forum (TIF) to coordinate delivery of aid and help meet the enormous needs we see in the field. Dividing responsibilities for various response areas according to each one’s expertise was an effective way to avoid duplication and deploy resources effectively.

  In addition, another coalition, the Disaster Platform, is active in the response. It is just not possible to respond to such a large-scale disaster effectively without civil society, and particularly without grassroots organisations active at the local level.

  Responding to disasters is one of the main things Support to Life does, so our emergency aid teams arrived in Hatay, one of the most affected provinces, right after the earthquakes hit on 6 February. We immediately deployed a humanitarian aid operation in the cities of Adana, Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa, and particularly in Hatay. Soon after, we expanded towards Adıyaman and Kahramanmaraş.

  We worked with partners to conduct needs assessments in affected areas, which we continue to carry out on an ongoing basis in order to monitor the response. Since the outset, the Greenpeace Mediterranean and Amnesty International call centre teams were particularly helpful in enabling the general due diligence and rapid needs assessment required in disaster-affected rural areas.

  We have focused much of our efforts on WASH – water, sanitation and hygiene – by working to establish water and sanitation infrastructure in temporary shelters. We have also prioritised shelter, food security and the provision of mental health and psychosocial support.

  What reception have you had from the government?

  As a CSO working in the field, we have not encountered any government-imposed restriction. We have permission from the Ministry of Family and Social Services to deliver mental health and psychosocial support services in the disaster area. We provide WASH services in tent areas established and maintained by the Ministry of the Interior’s Disaster and Emergency Management Authority. We participate in coordination meetings with local authorities. In other words, we have a collaborative relationship and we at least have not faced any obstacles when doing our work.

  What role is international solidarity and support playing in responding to the emergency?

  This disaster once again showed the importance of international solidarity and international support channelled through both government and civil society. Responding to a disaster of this magnitude is only possible if there is a great deal of international solidarity that translates into resources.

  Ten days after the earthquake, the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) launched a three-monthflash appeal for US$1 billion for Turkey, aimed at supporting the government-led response and enabling humanitarian agencies to help more than five million people affected by the disaster. As of 27 February, barely seven per cent of the US$1 billion of the flash appeal, roughly US$73 million, has materialised.

  TIF formed immediately after the UN appeal and has since played an important role in coordinating civil society humanitarian efforts and helping local CSOs access resources, including by engaging with the OCHA system. Support to Life regularly attends strategic meetings under the coordination of OCHA, representing TIF.

  But three weeks on from the earthquake, serious humanitarian needs remain in the most severely affected areas, especially emergency shelter, WASH, food and non-food items such as plastic sheeting, cooking sets, blankets, jerry cans, sleeping mats and sanitary items. 

  What further support do Turkish CSOs need to keep doing this work?

  What Turkish CSOs working to respond to the disaster need right now is as much financial support as they can get.

  Humanitarian CSOs working in the field, Support to Life included, have noted that this is not a one-off or short-term but a continuous, long-term situation. We need to think about recovery, which will require lots of resources. This means a lot more financial support will be needed.

  As an independent humanitarian CSO, Support to Life carries out its operations with funding that comes mostly from international donors such as UN agencies including UNICEF – the UN Children’s Fund – and UNHCR – the UN Refugee Agency – and theDirectorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, the Danish Refugee Council, Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe – a German faith-based humanitarian assistance agency – Save The Children and Terre des Hommes, among others. We are working with our donors to revise our ongoing projects so that we can redirect resources towards disaster response.

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   Civic space in Turkey is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Support to Life through itswebsite,Instagram orFacebook page, and follow@Support2Life on Twitter.

   

• TURKEY: ‘The government does not tolerate opinions different from its own’

  CIVICUS speaks with lawyer Eren Keskin, chair of the Human Rights Association (IHD), about the Turkish government’s attacks on critical media and the state of press freedoms in the context of Turkey’s current elections.

  Founded in 1986, IHD is one of Turkey’s oldest and largest human rights civil society organisations. It documents human rights violations and campaigns for the protection of human rights and civic freedoms in Turkey.

  What are the conditions for journalism in Turkey?

  Problems in the area of freedom of expression have existed in Turkey since the foundation of the republic. From the very beginning there were issues that the republic’s official ideology of Turkish-Islamic synthesis prohibited speaking about. Issues such as the Kurdish conflict, the 1915 Armenian Genocide and, later on, Turkey’s military presence in Cyprus, have long been forbidden topics.

  What’s changed under the present government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party is that the opposition’s freedom of expression has been severely restricted across the board. As a result, obstacles have mounted for opposition journalists to express their views.

  The government does not tolerate opinions different from its own. It recklessly issues arrest warrants for articles, speeches and social media messages if they express diverging opinions. The state of Turkey recognises freedom of expression in its domestic legislation and is bound to respect it as a state party to the European Convention on Human Rights, but it continues to violate its own laws and the international conventions and covenants it has signed.

  What tactics does the government use against independent media and how have you been affected?

  Because it does not tolerate any kind of diverging opinion, the government is extremely aggressive towards independent media and the free press, the majority of which are Kurdish media outlets.

  Dissident journalists are commonly charged with making propaganda for an illegal organisation. Particularly with news reports on the Kurdish war, most lawsuits are filed on charges of making propaganda for the Kurdish political movement or Kurdish armed forces. Apart from this, a large number of cases are filed on charges of insulting the president, insulting the forces of the state and inciting the public to hatred and enmity.

  Many journalists are under arrest or subject to international travel bans merely for expressing their thoughts in writing. There is almost no journalist who is not being subjected to judicial control.

  I was once the volunteer editor-in-chief of the daily Özgür Gündem, one of the newspapers that has faced the most repression, and have stood trial in 143 cases just because my name appeared on the newspaper as volunteer editor-in-chief.

  I’ve been sentenced to a total of 26 years and nine months in prison for alleged crimes such as membership of an illegal organisation, making propaganda for an illegal organisation and insulting the president, even for articles I did not write. These sentences are pending a decision of the Court of Cassation. As soon as they are final, I may go to prison. I have also been unable to travel abroad for six years now because of an international travel ban.

  Has the intensification of repression affected the popularity of the president in any way?

  Considering that the ruling regime is the main culprit for all the rights violations currently taking place in Turkey, and that power is concentrated in the hands of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, it must be admitted that the main perpetrator of rights violations is the president himself. The judiciary is completely dependent on the president. Judges and prosecutors render compliant decisions out of fear. Where judges and prosecutors are afraid, it is unthinkable for the judiciary to be independent.

  The president’s attitude towards the press, especially the opposition press, and the language of hatred and violence he uses, does not detract from his popularity but is instead a major reason his followers support him. However, we think that a large part of society, hopefully a growing part, is also disturbed by his blatant violations of freedom of expression.

  What do you make of the results of the 14 May general election?

  The AKP had relative success in the presidential and parliamentary elections held on 14 May. The president did better than expected, considering the economic situation and the criticism he’s faced over the response to the earthquakes in February. His party has maintained control of parliament. But he didn’t win re-election outright: he received 49.5 per cent of the vote while his opposition challenger, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) received almost 45 per cent. Now there’s going to be a runoff on 28 May.

  None of this should come as a surprise. Society has become extremely polarised, especially as a result of Erdoğan’s rhetoric of fear, hatred and violence. We also witnessed many practices that violated the constitution and electoral laws, such as government ministers becoming parliamentary candidates without resigning and therefore using state resources for campaigning. The ruling party monopolises a large part of the media and used it exclusively on its own behalf. The elections were therefore held under extremely unequal conditions.

  It’s hard to predict what the outcome of the runoff will be. The election may end in favour of Erdoğan or Kılıçdaroğlu. Much will depend on the practices that develop during the election.

  How will the situation of vulnerable minorities in Turkey be affected by the election results?

  Erdoğan uses language that is completely against human rights and the AKP has retained its parliamentary majority by coalescing with an extremist party. The situation will become dangerous if Erdoğan wins once again, especially for women, LGBTQI+ people and Kurdish people.

  Withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention – the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence – has already affected the feminist movement a lot. Now Law No. 6,284 on violence against women is being questioned. This poses a great danger for women and LGBTQI+ people.

  Similarly, if Erdoğan wins again, pro-security approaches to the Kurdish issue will continue to dominate, preventing progress towards peace.

  As for Syrian asylum-seekers, the AKP presents itself as having provided a good environment for them, but it is not really the case. Asylum-seekers in Turkey do not qualify as refugees because of the state’s reservation to the 1951 Refugee Convention. They are subjected to racist attacks. They work as cheap labour in extremely difficult conditions. Women and girls live under permanent risk of violence. An AKP win will not give them a chance.

  But it must be noted that the CHP’s proposal regarding refugees is not any more democratic or inclusive, and its discourse also has racist overtones. Therefore, first and foremost, the discriminatory, double-standard approach to the Refugee Convention should be questioned.

  What kinds of domestic or international support do Turkish independent media and journalists currently receive, and what more would you need?

  Journalists working in independent media in Turkey, and especially in Kurdistan, are clearly not receiving sufficient international support. The Republic of Turkey is a state party to many international conventions that guarantee freedoms of expression and the press. The state has committed to respecting them on paper, but it violates them in practice. All these conventions have monitoring mechanisms, but unfortunately, they are not being properly implemented for Turkey. In this sense, the European Union has left Turkey alone.

  We believe that Turkey should be questioned more, especially by western media organisations and by Turkey’s co-signatory states of international rights conventions, to contribute to the lifting of repressive measures against the dissident press.

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  Civic space in Turkey is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Human Rights Association through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@ihd_genelmerkez on Twitter.

• TUVALU: ‘We share Taiwan’s democratic principles, values and struggles for sovereignty’

  CIVICUS speaks about the prospects following the inauguration of a new government in Tuvalu with Kiali Molu, a PhD candidate in Politics and International Affairs at the University of Bergen in Norway and at the University of the South Pacific.

  Kiali is a native Tuvaluan and his research, currently funded by the government of Norway, focuses on Tuvalu’s strategies to maintain its statehood and sovereignty as its territory is threatened by sea-level rise.

• UGANDA: ‘Shrinking civic space means affected communities are not able to make their voices count’

  
  CIVICUS discusses the hopes and roles of civil society at the forthcoming COP28 climate summit with Ireen Twongirwe, a climate activist and CEO of Women for Green Economy Movement Uganda (WoGEM).

  WoGEM is a community-based civil society organisation (CSO) dedicated to advocating for and promoting women’s and girls’ participation in a greener economy. It brings together vulnerable women and girls and equips them with knowledge and capacities to engage in the search for sustainable community livelihoods and climate change mitigation and resilience efforts.

• UGANDA: ‘We’ll participate in COP28 to pressure world leaders to divert funding away from oil and gas’

  
  CIVICUS speaks about recent developments involving the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) project and civil society’s efforts to stop it with Zaki Mamdoo, Campaign Coordinator of Stop EACOP.

  Established in 2020, Stop EACOP is a coalition of Ugandan environmental and climate justice organisations that oppose the pipeline project due to the significant threats it poses to protected ecosystems, water resources and community lands across Tanzania and Uganda.

  What are your coalition’s aims?

  Our aim is to halt the construction of EACOP to avert the catastrophic environmental and climate consequences associated with the pipeline and safeguard human rights and communal territories.

  To achieve this, we employ a multifaceted strategy: heightening public awareness, exerting pressure on financial institutions and raising their reputational costs so they distance themselves from the project, mobilising impacted communities and rallying to force governments and oil corporations to suspend the project.

  A cornerstone of our approach is engaging with young people. Our partner programmes in both Tanzania and Uganda are focused on youth. We proactively seek out young people in various initiatives, including security training sessions. Recently, we’ve identified student leaders from various universities who had organised to spread awareness about the project’s impacts among their peers. We are actively pursuing funding and other opportunities to bolster their efforts.

  Internally, we give space to youth representatives to contribute their perspectives. We’re committed to amplifying young voices and offering avenues for their growth and development as activists. A reflection of this is that I am 26 years old and trusted with the leadership as campaign coordinator.

  How has the situation evolved since welast spoke over a year ago?

  There have been significant changes over the past year. Drilling has started in one of the most important biodiversity hotspots. One of the companies leading the project, French energy conglomerate Total Energies, has launched oil drilling in Uganda’s Murchison Falls National Park, home to diverse animal and bird species, including elephants, giraffes and lions. Its ecological significance is heightened by the presence of the Murchison Falls-Albert Delta Wetland System, essential for Lake Albert fisheries.

  The pipeline threatens the park’s biodiversity and tourism appeal. It will also have economic impacts, as the park is a major contributor to Uganda’s economy, accounting for 59 per cent of exports and having generated over US$1 billion in revenue in 2022.

  Negative consequences are already evident, with displaced elephants damaging crops and posing threats to human lives in nearby communities. Tragic incidents involving elephants have already occurred in Buliisa district, where the park is located.

  This is clearly just another a case in which profit is prioritised over environmental and socioeconomic considerations.

  Our demands, however, remain unaltered: we adamantly call for the project’s complete cancellation due to its intolerable environmental and human risks. And while governmental authorities have largely remained unresponsive, we’ve achieved progress with financial institutions. Remarkably, 27 banks have already denied funding for EACOP, and an additional 23 major insurers and reinsurers have declined to support the pipeline.

  What restrictions do Stop EACOP activists face?

  We operate in fairly restrictive environments in which the freedom to protest is often violated. Recently, for instance, four of our activists were forcibly arrested on charges of ‘inciting violence’, transported in police vehicles and kept in jail overnight for protesting against the pipeline in Kampala, Uganda’s capital.

  The activists, three women and one man, were protesting peacefully, but their arrests were unnecessarily violent. It must be emphasised that only four protesters were involved, so the degree of force applied was clearly excessive, yet not entirely unexpected. Historically, Ugandan authorities have responded aggressively to any demonstrations perceived as anti-government, in line with a dictatorial regime indifferent to public sentiments or alternate viewpoints. This reaction is not unprecedented, although it’s intriguing that the government seems threatened by even small-scale protests like this four-person event.

  But this won’t stop us: we will continue to demonstrate peacefully. Several of our members maintain a fund to secure bail or engage lawyers whenever activists are arrested. We arrange legal representation and explore the possibility of anticipatory bail when possible. However, given the sporadic nature of these protests, support is often provided post-arrest. We’ve also partnered with organisations that specialise in security training so that we can provide tools for advocates to voice their concerns without jeopardising their personal safety.

  How do you connect with the global climate movement?

  We connect with climate activists worldwide by sharing experiences and strategies and providing each other with support across borders. Global solidarity strengthens our efforts, so we appreciate any form of international backing for our cause.

  What lies ahead remains uncertain, but as demonstrated in numerous instances globally, when we come together to back local communities as they advocate for their rights and a more promising tomorrow, there is a potential to counter even the largest of corporate giants effectively.

  More than a million people have already raised their voices against EACOP. We believe that together we can stop it.

  Are you planning to engage with the upcoming COP28 climate summit?

  We’re deliberating on the optimal way to participate in COP28 to pressure world leaders to address the pipeline project directly and divert funding away from new oil and gas developments. I will be there to represent the campaign.

  Despite controversies surrounding the summit’s leadership and lack of an enabling civic space in the host country, the United Arab Emirates, we are hopeful that substantive progress will be made. But we recognise that lasting change will require continued people-powered mobilisation. We’re committed to sustaining our fight for climate justice and environmental preservation in East Africa.

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  Civic space in Uganda is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Stop EACOP through itswebsite and follow@stopEACOP on Twitter.

• UK: ‘The anti-boycott bill is the latest government attempt to stifle civil liberties’

  CIVICUS speaks with Daniel Lubin, co-founder of Na’amod (British Jews Against Occupation), about the UK government’s proposed anti-boycott bill that would prevent public bodies from using divestment as a strategy to meet human rights responsibilities and obligations.

  Na’amod is a movement of British Jews seeking to end its community’s support for apartheid and occupation and mobilising for dignity, freedom and democracy for all Israelis and Palestinians.

  What are the goals and contents of the proposed anti-boycott bill?

  The Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill, also known as the anti-boycott bill, would ban public institutions from participating in boycotts or divesting from companies or countries that are committing, or are complicit in committing, human rights abuses when such actions would diverge from current British foreign policy. Although the bill would affect many international issues, such as the situation of the Uyghur minority in China or fossil fuel divestment, Israel is the only country explicitly mentioned in the bill, and most government statements so far have justified the bill as a tool to tackle anti-Israel sentiment and even antisemitism.

  Further, the bill doesn’t differentiate between Israel proper and the Occupied Palestinian Territories – East Jerusalem, Gaza and the West Bank – which conflates Israel’s sovereign territory with the land it occupies illegally under international law.

  And domestically, this bill is just the latest UK government attempt to stifle civil liberties, following the Nationality and Borders Act, the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act and the Public Order Act.

  The Nationality and Borders Bill 2022 contains provisions about nationality, asylum, immigration, victims of slavery and human trafficking. The government claimed its goal was to save lives and stop people smuggling, but it introduces a treatment of refugees that is incompatible with international law.

  The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, also known as the ‘policing bill’, expanded police access to private education and healthcare records and gave police sweeping powers, such as the authority to conduct ‘stop and searches’ without suspicion and criminalise trespassing. This expansion of powers further targets groups already disproportionately affected by over-policing, such as young Black men. Similarly, the trespassing provisions, which make ‘residing on land without consent in or with a vehicle’ a criminal offence, effectively criminalises Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities.

  The Public Order Act 2023, also referred to as the anti-protest bill, stifled the right to protest by giving law enforcement agencies greater powers against protests deemed ‘disruptive’ such as those used by climate protesters.

  The anti-boycott bill follows in the footsteps of these draconian pieces of legislation. It clearly does nothing to combat antisemitism. This claim is merely a fig leaf to shroud the government’s long-term campaign against civil rights in the UK.

  What will be the consequences of the anti-boycott bill?

  Public institutions – including councils and universities – will not be able to boycott or withdraw funds from countries or companies complicit in human rights violations. It will also bind their financial decisions to the policy of the government of the time and impede public sector workers’ right to freedom of expression.

  In less tangible terms, the fact that the bill and rhetoric around it conflate criticism of Israel with antisemitism will contribute to the chilling effect that makes rights advocates feel less able to criticise Israel for fear of being labelled antisemitic. In the long term, by setting up Jews and Jewish safety in opposition to other civil and human rights struggles, this bill will end up pitting minority communities against each other.

  What is civil society, including your organisation, doing to prevent the bill’s approval?

  Civil rights groups and multiple Jewish organisations, including Na’amod, have voiced their opposition to the anti-boycott bill. Na’amod started campaigning it in May 2022, when it was first announced in the Queen’s Speech and the legislative process began. Last October we protested against the bill at the Conservative Party Conference and have since been raising awareness through direct action and campaigning as a part of the Right to Boycott coalition, formed by trade unions, charities and faith, climate justice, human rights, cultural, campaigning and solidarity organisations.

  The coalition advocates for the right of public bodies to decide not to purchase or procure from, or invest in, companies involved in human rights abuses, abuses of workers’ rights, destruction of our planet, or any other harmful or illegal acts. We highlight the key historical role that boycott, divestment and sanctions campaigns have played in applying economic, cultural and political pressure that has led to changes in abusive, discriminatory or illegal policies. This includes the bus boycotts of the US civil rights movement, the arms embargoes used against apartheid in South Africa and divestment from fossil fuel companies to advance climate action.

  As the bill returns to the House of Commons this month and faces a series of amendments, we will continue to speak out and mobilise our community against it. We cannot lose such powerful tool for progressive change.

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  Civic space in the UK is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Na’amod through itswebpage orFacebook page, and follow @naamoduk onTwitter andInstagram.