human rights

• Guatemala: the international community must play an assertive role in protecting Guatemalans’ civic freedoms

  Statement at the 52nd Session of the UN Human Rights Council 

  Item 2 General Debate

  Delivered by Nicola Paccamiccio

  Thank you Mr. President,

  CIVICUS welcomes the report of the High Commissioner on Guatemala and shares the concerns over the widespread impunity and the relentless deterioration of civic space.

  Anti-corruption prosecutors, judges and journalists, who have investigated and exposed corruption, human rights violations, and the abuse of power, are criminalised by the authorities and face spurious criminal charges. Many of them have been forced to flee the country and are now living in exile.

  Civil society groups are subjected to a climate of increasing hostility, harassment, and persecution. Over the last three years, attacks on human rights defenders (HRDs) rose sharply, with more than 2000 cases of defamation, harassment, intimidation, and criminalisation. Women human rights defenders, land and environmental defenders, along with HRDs working on peace and justice are the most targeted.

  Freedom of association has been consistently undermined. Human rights organisations, especially those in defence of anti-corruption activists, have faced digital attacks and threats. The 2021 NGO Law provides the State with wide discretionary powers to dissolve NGOs in complete violation of international human rights standards.

  These acts are part of a concerted effort to erode civic space and the rule of law, create a climate of fear, as well as to co-opt the judicial system to guarantee impunity for human rights violations.

  Ahead of the June 2023 elections and due to the lack of independence of key institutions charged with overseeing the electoral process, we ask the international community to play an assertive role in protecting Guatemalans’ civic freedoms by monitoring the pre-electoral period and electoral process.

  Thank you.

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   Civic space in Guatemala is rated as "Obstructed" by the CIVICUS Monitor

• HAITI: ‘Civil society must get involved because political actors cannot find a solution to our problems’

  CIVICUS speaks about Haiti’s ongoing crisis and calls for foreign intervention with Monique Clesca, a journalist, democracy advocate and member of the Commission to Search for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis (Commission pour la recherche d’une solution haitienne a la crise, CRSC). CRSC, also known as the Montana Group, is a group of civic, religious and political organisations and leaders that got together in early 2021. Following the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, it promoted theMontana Accord, calling for a two-year provisional government to take over from acting Prime Minister Ariel Henry and hold elections as soon as possible, as well as a road map to reduce insecurity, tackle the humanitarian crisis and respond to social justice demands. The Monitoring Office of the Montana Accord continues to follow up on this roadmap.

  What are the causes of Haiti’s current crisis?

  People seem to associate the crisis with the assassination of President Moïse, but it started way before that, because there were various underlying issues. It is a political crisis but also a much deeper social crisis. The majority of people in Haiti have suffered the effect of profound inequalities for many decades. There are huge gaps in terms of health and education so there is a need for basic social justice. The problem goes far beyond the more visible political, constitutional and humanitarian issues.

  Over the past decade, we have had governments that tried to undermine state institutions so that a corrupt system could prevail: there have not been transparent elections and no alternation of power, with three successive governments of the same political party. Former president Michel Martelly postponed the presidential elections twice. He ruled by decree for more than a year. In 2016, fraud allegations were made against Moïse, his successor. In his time in office, Moïse dissolved parliament and never organised elections. He fired several Supreme Court judges and politicised the police.

  He also put forward a constitutional referendum, which has been repeatedly postponed, that is clearly unconstitutional. The 1987 Constitution defines how it should be amended, so by trying to rewrite it, Moïse went the unconstitutional way.

  By the time Moïse was killed, Haiti was left with his legacy of weak institutions, massive corruption and the lack of elections and renewal of the political class. After Moïse’s assassination the situation worsened further, because now there was no president and no functioning judiciary and legislative body. We had, and continue to have, a full-blown constitutional crisis.

  Ariel Henry, the current acting prime minister, clearly has no mandate. Moïse selected him as the next prime minister two days before he was killed and didn’t even leave a signed nomination letter.

  What has the Montana Group proposed as a way out of this crisis?

  The Montana Group formed in early 2021 out of the realisation that civil society must get involved because political actors could not find a solution to Haiti’s problems. A forum of civil society then put together a commission that worked for six months creating dialogue and trying to build consensus by speaking to all political actors, as well as to civil society organisations. As a result of all this input, we came up with a draft agreement that was finalised and signed by almost a thousand organisations and citizens: the Montana Accord.

  We put together a two-part plan: a governance plan and a social justice and humanitarian roadmap, which was signed as part of the agreement. To get consensus with wider participation, we proposed the creation of a checks and balances body that would carry out the role of the legislative branch and also an interim judiciary during the transition. Once Haiti can have transparent elections, there would be a proper elected legislative body and the government could go through the constitutional process to name the high-level judiciary body, the Supreme Court. That is the governance that we’ve envisioned for the transition, one that is closer to the spirit of the Haitian Constitution.

  Earlier this year, we met several times with Henry and tried to start negotiations with him and his allies. At one point, he told us he didn’t have the authority to negotiate. So he closed the door to negotiations.

  What are the challenges to holding elections in the current context?

  The main challenge is the massive insecurity. Gangs are terrorising the population. Kidnappings are rampant, people are being assassinated. People can’t go out of their homes: they can’t go to the bank, to the stores, to the hospital. Children can’t go to school: classes were supposed to start in September, then in October and now the government is silent on when they will start.

  There is also the dire humanitarian situation, only made worse when gangs blocked the main oil terminal of Varreux in Port-au-Prince. This impacted on power supply and water distribution, and therefore on people’s access to basic goods and services. Amid a cholera outbreak, health facilities were forced to reduce their services or shut down.

  And there is political polarisation and massive mistrust. People don’t only mistrust politicians; they also mistrust one another.

  Because of the political pressure and gang activity, citizen mobilisations have been up and down, but since late August there have been massive demonstrations calling for Henry’s resignation. People have also marched against rising fuel prices, shortages and corruption. They have also clearly rejected any foreign military intervention.

  What is your position regarding the prime minister’s call for foreign intervention?

  Henry has no legitimacy to call for any military intervention. The international community can help, but it is not up to them to decide whether to intervene or not. We first need to have a two-year political transition with a credible government. We have ideas, but at this point, we need to see a transition.

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  Civic space in Haiti is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Contact theCommission to Search for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis through itsFacebook page, and follow@moniclesca on Twitter.

• HAITI: ‘Gangs control the country instead of the authorities’

  CIVICUS speaks with freelance journalist Nancy Roc about the increase in gang violence and the political situation in Haiti.

  With 38 years of experience, Nancy is a Haitian-born journalist renowned for her work for press freedom. She is the recipient of numerous awards, including UNESCO’s Jean Dominique Prize for Press Freedom.

  What’s the current security situation in Haiti?

  The situation is untenable, to use the exact words of Volker Türk, the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights. Despite a state of emergency and a succession of curfews the government has declared since 4 March to try to regain control of the capital, Port-au-Prince, not a week goes by without kidnappings. Violence is a daily occurrence.

  People are holed up in their homes, most schools are closed and economic activity is severely affected. The same goes for roads, where gangs have been imposing their law for more than three months and many drivers are out of work. Virtually all the capital’s infrastructure has been destroyed or seriously affected by gang attacks.

  An attack on the National Penitentiary on 2 March came as a great shock to Haitians, even though they are used to living under the constant threat of violence. More than 4,500 inmates are believed to have escaped, including prominent gang members and people arrested in connection with the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021. There have been widespread looting and attacks, particularly against the National Library, which was stormed on 3 April.

  On the evening of 2 April, heavily armed bandits looted dozens of homes and seized private vehicles in the villages of Tecina and Théodat, in Tabarre municipality, northeast of Port-au-Prince. The vast majority of the population, already living in extreme poverty, have now been plunged into hell and left to fend for themselves.

  As for the police, despite some efforts, they are neither equipped nor numerous enough to deal with such a situation of urban guerrilla warfare against heavily armed gangs. There are currently around 23 gangs operating in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, divided into two major coalitions: G-Pèp, led by Gabriel Jean Pierre, known as Ti Gabriel, and G9 Family and Allies, led by Jimmy Chérizier, alias Barbecue. However, UN experts estimate there are between 150 and 200 gangs throughout Haiti.

  According to the UN, since the start of the year, 1,193 people have been killed and 692 injured as a result of gang violence. The health system is on the verge of collapse, and hospitals often lack the capacity to treat the injured. The economy is suffocating as the gangs impose restrictions on people’s movements. The main supplier of drinking water has stopped deliveries. The situation has led to a major food crisis: almost half of Haiti’s 11 million inhabitants need some form of food assistance.

  How did the gangs become so powerful?

  The gangs have powerful backers in government and the private sector. Under former de facto Prime Minister Ariel Henry, who resigned in March, the government funded 30 per cent of the members of the G9. It wouldn’t be surprising if some people, both in the private sector and former senior government officials, have continued to fund them, particularly those who have been sanctioned by the international community.

  A UN expert report published in 2023 also singled out former president Michel Martelly, in power between 2011 and 2016, as well as several prominent business leaders and legislators, as providing resources to armed gangs, whether in kind or in cash.

  The proliferation of gangs began under Martelly and intensified after Moïse’s assassination. By 2019, some 162 armed groups had been identified, more than half of them operating in the metropolitan area. In total, they are said to potentially have over 3,000 soldiers armed with firearms, including adolescents and children.

  Under Moïse, numerous massacres took place, such as the La Saline massacre in 2018, the Bel Air massacre in 2019 and the Cité Soleil massacre in 2020. All took place in neighbourhoods with significant electoral power where members of the opposition lived, and these crimes all went unpunished.

  In 2020, the situation worsened when Chérizier, a former police officer, federated the gangs with the G9 Family, allied to the nine most powerful gangs in the region. This enabled him to control a large part of Port-au-Prince – all while being covertly financed by high-ranking government officials.

  The federation of gangs was even hailed by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Haiti, who claimed that federating the gangs had reduced the number of homicides by 12 per cent in three months. This caused such a scandal that she was forced to retract her statement, describing it as a ‘misinterpretation‘.

  A year after the assassination of Moïse, as the situation worsened, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution establishing a sanctions regime that targeted gang leaders and those who financed them. Chérizier was the only gang leader named in an annex to the resolution, but to date no action has been taken against him.

  On 29 February 2024, the situation in the capital took a decisive turn for the worse when Chérizier announced, in a video posted on social media, the reconstitution of the coalition of armed groups known as Viv Ansanm (Living Together). In the video, he claimed responsibility for the tensions that have shaken Port-au-Prince and declared that the gangs’ primary objective was to overthrow the government. He also stated that a hunt was now on for ministers and the Director General of the National Police. He wanted to arrest them and prevent Henry, who was in Puerto Rico, returning to the country. Police officers were killed, police stations were attacked and several flights were cancelled following an assault by gangs at Toussaint Louverture international airport, which has since been closed.

  Chérizier claims to be launching a revolution to liberate the Haitian people from the authorities and the oligarchs. But the gangs have targeted every stratum of society, as well as the poor districts of Port-au-Prince and many state structures that serve the poor, such as the main public hospital. The destruction is such that the UN refers to Haiti as ‘a state on the brink of collapse’.

  By December 2023, more than 310,000 people had been displaced within Haiti. According to the International Organization for Migration, more than 50,000 people left Port-au-Prince in three weeks in March 2024. The scale of the disaster is staggering, and all the countries that had promised police or military aid are absent. Haiti has been abandoned to its sad fate and gangs are controlling the country instead of the authorities.

  Why hasn’t the government reacted to the growing gang threat?

  Four years ago, the Haitian National Police officially had a force of 15,498 police officers, among them only 1,711 women, although the actual number of officers was estimated to be much lower. Moreover, the humanitarian programme put in place by the Biden-Harris administration to make it easier for Haitians to live in the USA has put the police at risk of losing up to a third of its workforce to emigration.

  Against this backdrop, chaos and violence have reached unprecedented levels. Since Moïse’s assassination, the government has been unable to establish order with the police, and the army has only had around 2,000 soldiers. No legislative or general elections have been held since 2016. As a result, there are no longer any elected representatives, as the terms in office of the previously elected ones have expired. Critics of Henry, who was very unpopular, considered his government illegitimate.

  In October 2022, Henry appealed to the international community, requesting the intervention of a foreign force. Given his unpopularity, this aroused public mistrust, as people feared this intervention would strengthen an illegitimate government accused of colluding with gangs. What’s more, the composition of this mission turned into a headache.

  Almost a year later, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution authorising the use of force by an international security assistance mission in Haiti. Neither Canada nor the USA wanted to intervene directly, stressing that the solution had to come from Haitians themselves. But Haitians have been unable to reach agreement, and what’s more, they fear foreign intervention, given the catastrophic interventions led by the UN since 2004. Canada, which had been asked by the USA to take the lead in the intervention, withdrew in March 2023, passing the leadership on to Kenya.

  Deployment of a multinational intervention force was due to begin on 1 January 2024. Last July, Kenya offered to lead the mission with a thousand police officers. Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas and Jamaica had pledged to send security personnel, and more recently Belize and Guyana did as well. Canada has also pledged to participate in the mission. For its part, the US government pledged to fund the mission to the tune of at least US$100 million.

  As the gangs extended their hold over Port-au-Prince and formed an alliance with the declared aim of overthrowing Henry, he planned to travel to Kenya to sign a reciprocity agreement. While he was away, Chérizier’s criminal gangs launched their attacks on police stations, the airport and prisons. They threatened civil war if Henry returned to Haiti. He resigned on 11 March 2024. The next day, Kenya suspended the dispatch of police to Haiti.

  Who is in charge today, and what are the chances of democracy being restored?

  In the wake of Henry’s resignation, the government declared a state of emergency. On the same day, it was announced that a Presidential Transitional Council (PTC) had been formed to restore order. The Council is made up of nine members: seven voting members and two observers. It includes representatives of the main political parties, civil society and the private sector. Its 22-month mandate is due to end on 7 February 2026 after it has organised ‘democratic, free and credible elections’.

  There are already a number of obstacles to achieving this goal. First, how can security be re-established when the gangs are still receiving weapons from the USA? The latest twist is that when Henry issued the decree announcing the formation of the PTC, it didn’t include any of the members’ names. Since then, the organisations of the PTC’s appointed representatives have expressed their disagreement with the government decree published in the official gazette on 12 April 2024. Finally, the decree formalising the appointment of PTC members was published on 16 April.

  In addition, the Council wishes to be sworn in at the National Palace before the nation, even though the Palace has been targeted by gangs on several occasions. Who will provide security? How can peace be restored to Haiti in a context of such political uncertainty and economic fragility? Will the members of the Council, some of whom are frenemies, be able to look beyond their own interests for the benefit of the nation? And who will rebuild the country after so many young people have left? Will the diaspora finally be called upon?

  Further, the possibility of famine looms on the horizon and the World Food Programme fears that its food stocks will run out by the end of April.

  Finally, how can gangs be persuaded to lay down their arms when they are making millions from kidnappings and arms sales? Crime is a very lucrative business for gangs and for citizens facing great poverty.

  How can we restore justice and punish those who have committed so many crimes against humanity? As the saying goes, no justice, no peace. Finally, what about the gangs’ political ambitions? On 11 March, Chérizier declared that it would be ‘the Viv Ansanm alliance, along with the Haitian people, who will elect the person who will lead the country’. Will the PTC have to negotiate with the gangs?

  The challenges facing the PTC are therefore significant, and one of the most arduous will be to find a way of articulating a request for external aid without losing Haiti’s sovereignty.

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  Civic space in Haiti is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Nancy Roc on herFacebook page and follow@TheNancyRoc on Twitter.

• HAITI: ‘If the mission succeeds, the authorities won’t have to turn again to the international community to maintain peace’

  CIVICUS speaks with Haitian lawyer Rosy Auguste Ducéna about the situation in Haiti and the prospects for a newly deployed international mission.

  Rosy is Head of Programmes at the National Human Rights Defence Network (RNDDH), a civil society organisation working to support the establishment of the rule of law in Haiti.

  Following the resignation of de facto prime minister Ariel Henry in April, a Transitional Presidential Council was appointed to try to start the process of restoring peace in gang-besieged Haiti. Riven by internal divisions, it took until June for the council to appoint a new prime minister, academic and development practitioner Garry Conille. In the same month, the first contingent of a long-delayed Kenya-led United Nations Multinational Security Support Mission began to arrive. Given the long history of failed international interventions in Haiti, civil society is sceptical, and demands that the mission has a strong human rights focus.

  What has changed since the resignation of de facto prime minister Ariel Henry?

  After supporting him throughout his government, the international community finally withdrew its support for Henry, who resigned in disgrace. He was a human rights predator, so we are glad to see him go, even if it wasn’t in the way we would have liked.

  A Transitional Presidential Council was set up with the involvement of the international community through the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the regional organisation. It’s made up of people who don’t inspire confidence among Haitian people. The only woman on the Council has an observer role, and all the candidates for prime minister it interviewed were men.

  A month after the council was established, with Haitian people ravaged by insecurity and armed gangs, a prime minister was finally chosen: Garry Conille, backed by the international community. The next logical step is to set up a transitional government.

  What does civil society expect from the new prime minister?

  We expect the new prime minister to keep his first promise: to form a government where women don’t play a symbolic role but are in positions of power. And we hope women will be chosen with an agenda to fight for women’s rights in the context of the transition. It’s important to respect the minimum 30 per cent quota of women in decision-making bodies – without this being the ceiling, since over half of Haiti’s population is female – but it’s also important that the women who occupy these positions be involved in the fight against sexual and gender-based violence, discrimination and the social injustices suffered by women.

  We hope the new government’s decisions will take people’s priorities into account’: fighting against insecurity and against the impunity that benefits armed bandits, putting the victims of insecurity at the centre of decision-making and organising elections.

  And since this transition must produce results, everything must be done to ensure the roadmap drawn up by the Council and prime minister is implemented.

  What’s the security and human rights situation like?

  The human rights situation on the ground is very concerning: robberies, murders, rapes, gang rapes, massacres, armed attacks, kidnappings for ransom and the burning of people’s homes and vehicles are commonplace.

  Two large coalitions of armed gangs, formerly at war with each other – G-9 an Fanmi e Alye, led by Jimmy Chérizier, alias Barbecue, and G-Pèp, led by Gabriel Jean Pierre, alias Ti Gabriel or Gabo – have joined forces and are attacking civilians as they seek to consolidate their power.

  The consequences for the lives and security of Haitian people are enormous: armed bandits control the movement of goods and services, including fuel and medical supplies, and sow terror. Some areas have been completely emptied of their population. The victims of insecurity are living in overcrowded camps, in promiscuity, exposed to all kinds of abuse and contagious diseases.

  Not all schools are functioning. Thousands of school-age children and young people who should be attending university have lost an academic year. Hospitals and health centres have been forced to close due to insecurity. Warnings of an acute food crisis have been issued. Haiti is facing an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. And if nothing is done about it, it will only get worse.

  In an impoverished country where the education system was already not inclusive and social rights have always been seen as commodities to be bought, the gap in access to education and quality healthcare is widening. Women, children and people with physical, sensory or cognitive disabilities have been the first to suffer the harmful consequences of the chaos created by armed bandits, with the complicity of the police and Henry’s government.

  Against this backdrop of massive and continuing human rights violations, the Transitional Presidential Council has yet to demonstrate that it understands the need to act quickly.

  How was the new international mission set up and how does it differ from its predecessors?

  On 6 October 2022, Henry called for a ‘robust force’ to be sent, in his words, ‘to combat insecurity, restore peace and conduct elections’. Almost a year later, on 2 October 2023, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution authorising the deployment of a force called the Multinational Security Support Mission, after Kenya agreed to take the lead.

  Setting up the mission has taken a long time. It is now up and running, but we remain sceptical.

  This will be the 11^th mission since 1993. All its predecessors have been implicated in human rights violations against the Haitian people, including summary executions, beatings and attacks on physical and mental integrity, sexual trafficking and rape of minors and women. The only punishment for these violations has been repatriation.

  The United Nations brought cholera, the spread of which caused the deaths of over 10,000 people, and paid only lip service to its responsibility. Promises of reparations have never been fulfilled.

  The results of the various missions to Haiti, which have cost millions of dollars, have been meagre. The police and judicial institutions, and the electoral body they were supposed to strengthen, have never been more dysfunctional. The cost-benefit calculation of these missions and their involvement in human rights abuses suggest they are counterproductive.

  However, it must be acknowledged that many people, tired of the insecurity that robs them of their lives and their humanity, and having lost confidence in the Haitian criminal justice system, are pinning their hopes on this international force. At present, the police don’t pursue notorious bandits and the courts don’t try them, even in absentia, despite the fact that several hundred victims of massacres, supported by RNDDH, have filed complaints against their attackers. On the rare occasions they are arrested, they escape or spend years in prison without charges against them ever being cleared up and without their victims receiving justice.

  How can the international mission contribute to sustainable peace?

  Alongside six other Haitian civil society organisations, we have reflected on this question and come up with several recommendations. These include defining the mission’s objectives and ensuring the concerns of human rights organisations are taken into account in the development of the mission’s legal framework and strategic security plan.

  As the United Nations’ resolution is silent or says little on some important issues, we stress the need to address the obligations of security agents in relation to water management, ethical standards and transparency, as well as mechanisms for monitoring and following up on their conduct.

  We also recommend the establishment of mechanisms to prevent human rights abuses and a means for victims to have complaints heard. It is essential that countries that provide those coming to Haiti commit themselves to doing everything possible to ensure abuses are punished and the legal guarantees of victims are protected and respected.

  Above all, we hope the mission will carry out its operations on the ground with the participation of Haitian police officers, who will benefit from training in tactics to fight armed gangs, so when the mission leaves, Haitian authorities won’t have to turn again to the international community to maintain peace and security.

  Civic space in Haiti is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with RNDDH through itswebsite orFacebook page, follow@RnddhAyiti and@AugusteRosy on Twitter, and contact Rosy Auguste Ducéna on herInstagram account orFacebook page.

• HAITI: ‘The international community has never addressed the root causes of the crisis’

  CIVICUS speaks with Nixon Boumba, a human rights activist and member of Kolektif Jistis Min nan Ayiti (Haiti Justice in Mining Collective), about the political situation in Haiti following the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse. Formed in 2012, Haiti Justice in Mining Collective is a movement of Haitian civil society organisations, individuals and partners pushing for transparency and social and environmental justice in the face of growing international interest in Haiti’s mining sector. It educates affected communities on the consequences of mining in five areas: the environment, water, work, agriculture and land.

• HAITI: ‘There is opportunity for a meaningful shift from foreign interference to true leadership of Haitian people’

  CIVICUS speaks with Ellie Happel, professor of the Global Justice Clinic and Director of the Haiti Project at New York University School of Law. Ellie lived and worked in Haiti for several years, and her work continues to focus on solidarity with social movements in Haiti and racial and environmental justice.

  What have been the key political developments since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021?

  As an American, I want to begin by emphasising the role the US government has played in creating the present situation. The history of unproductive and oppressive foreign intervention is long.

  To understand the context of the Moïse presidency, however, we have to at least go back to 2010. Following the earthquake that devastated Haiti in January 2010, the USA and other external actors called for elections. People did not have their voting cards; more than two million people had lost their homes. But elections went ahead. The US government intervened in the second round of Haiti’s presidential elections, calling for candidate and founder of the PHTK party, Michel Martelly, to be put into the second round. Martelly was subsequently elected.

  During the Martelly presidency we saw a decline in political, economic and social conditions. Corruption was well documented and rampant. Martelly failed to hold elections and ended up ruling by decree. He hand-selected Moïse as his successor. The US government strongly supported both the Martelly and Moïse administrations despite the increasing violence, the destruction of Haitian government institutions, the corruption and the impunity that occurred under their rule.

  Moïse’s death is not the biggest problem that Haiti faces. During his tenure, Moïse effectively destroyed Haitian institutions. Haitian people rose up against the PHTK regime in protest, and they were met with violence and repression. There is evidence of government implication in mass killings – massacres – of people in areas that were known to oppose PHTK.

  Two weeks prior to Moïse’s assassination, a prominent activist and a widely known journalist were murdered in Haiti. Diego Charles and Antoinette Duclair were calling for accountability. They were active in the movement to build a better Haiti. They were killed with impunity.

  It is clear that the present crisis did not originate in Moïse’s assassination. It is the result of failed foreign policies and of the way the Haitian government repressed and halted opposition protests demanding accountability for corruption and violence, and demanding change.

  What currently gives me hope is the work of the Commission for Haitian Solution to the Crisis, which was created prior to Moïse’s assassination. The Commission is a broad group of political parties and civil society organisations (CSOs) that came together to work collectively to rebuild the government. This presents an opportunity for a meaningful shift from foreign interference to true leadership of Haitian people.

  What is your view on the postponement of elections and the constitutional referendum, and what are the prospects of democratic votes taking place?

  In the current climate, elections are not the next step in addressing Haiti’s political crisis. Elections should not occur until the conditions for a fair, free and legitimate vote are met. The elections of the past 11 years demonstrate that they are not an automatic means of achieving representative democracy.

  Today, there are many hurdles to holding elections. The first is one of governance: elections must be overseen by a governing body that has legitimacy, and that is respected by the Haitian people. It would be impossible for the de facto government to organise elections. The second is gang violence. It’s estimated that more than half of Port-au-Prince is under the control of gangs.  When the provisional electoral council was preparing for elections a few months back, its staff could not access a number of voting centres due to gang control. Third, eligible Haitian voters should have voter ID cards.

  The US government and others should affirm the right of the Haitian people to self-determination. The USA should neither insist on nor support elections without evidence of concrete measures to ensure that they are free, fair, inclusive and perceived as legitimate. Haitian CSOs and the Commission will indicate when the conditions exist for free, fair and legitimate elections.

  Is there a migration crisis caused by the situation in Haiti? How can the challenges faced by Haitian migrants be addressed?

  What we call the ‘migration crisis’ is a strong example of how US foreign policy and immigration policy towards Haiti have long been affected by anti-Black racism.

  Many Haitians who left the country following the earthquake in 2010 first moved to South America. Many have subsequently left. The economies of Brazil and Chile worsened, and Haitian migrants encountered racism and a lack of economic opportunity. Families and individuals have travelled northward by foot, boat and bus towards the Mexico-USA border.

  For many years now, the US government has not allowed Haitian migrants and other migrants to enter the USA. They are expelling people without an asylum interview – a ‘credible fear’ interview, which is required under international law – back to Haiti.

  The US government must stop using Title 42, a public health provision, as a pretext to expel migrants. The US government should instead offer humanitarian assistance and support Haitian family reunification and relocation in the USA.

  It is impossible to justify deportation to Haiti right now, for the same reasons that the US government has advised US citizens not to travel there. There are estimates of nearly 1,000 documented cases of kidnapping in 2021. Friends explain that anyone is at risk. Kidnappings are no longer targeted, but school kids and street merchants and pedestrians are being held hostage to demand money. The US government has not only declared Haiti unsafe for travel, but in May 2021, the US Department of Homeland Security designated Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, allowing eligible Haitian nationals residing in the USA to apply to remain there because Haiti cannot safely repatriate its nationals.

  The USA should halt deportations to Haiti. And the USA and other countries in the Americas must begin to recognise, address and repair the anti-Black discrimination that characterises their immigration policies.

  What should the international community, and especially the USA, do to improve the situation?

  First, the international community should take the lead of Haitian CSOs and engage in a serious and supportive way with the Commission for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis. Daniel Foote, the US special envoy for Haiti, resigned in protest eight weeks into the job; he said that his colleagues at the State Department were not interested in supporting Haitian-led solutions. The USA should play the role of encouraging consensus building and facilitating conversations to move things forward without interfering.

  Second, all deportations to Haiti must stop. They are not only in violation of international law. They are also highly immoral and unjust.

  Foreigners, myself included, are not best placed to prescribe solutions in Haiti: instead, we must support those created by Haitian people and Haitian organisations. It is time for the Haitian people to decide on the path forward, and we need to actively support, and follow.

  Civic space in Haiti is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Follow@elliehappel on Twitter.

• Harmonisation, Participation and Coherence are Key to Realising the 2030 Agenda

  By Mandeep Tiwana and Tor Hodenfield 

  Two challenges – overlapping reporting requirements and less than universal compliance with human rights obligations – could be addressed by involving civil society more meaningfully in substantive processes. Furthermore, it is essential that positions on human rights matters that are taken at the UN Human Rights Council are followed up at the UN General Assembly and, most importantly, are implemented at the local level.

  Read on: International Institute for Sustainable Development

• HONDURAS: ‘We demand environmental justice in the face of corrupt interests insensitive to local needs’

  CIVICUS discusses community resistance to mining mega-projects in Honduras with Juana Esquivel, representative of the Municipal Committee for the Defence of Common and Public Goods of Tocoa. The committee is made up of local organisations and communities that oppose extractive projects that threaten the environment and common and public goods.

  On 13 June, an open council meeting convened by the Tocoa mayor’s office approved a petroleum coke thermoelectric plant, despite a legal appeal by the local community. It is feared the project will cause deforestation, sedimentation and pollution of the Guapinol River. A similar conflict took place in 2014 when, without consulting communities, the authorities granted permits for a mine in a protected national park affecting the Guapinol and San Pedro rivers. In response to their peaceful protests against the project, many activists were criminalised and eight were imprisoned for long periods.

  Why do you oppose the Tocoa thermoelectric plant project?

  We oppose the thermoelectric plant because its impact on human health and the environment would be devastating. The fact that it is less than 150 metres from some communities significantly increases the risks. But these are not reflected in the environmental impact studies the company presented, which contain deliberate errors that minimise the project’s real damage.

  The plant would use pet coke, a substance derived from coal and oil that is not regulated for energy production in Honduras. It would require huge amounts of water to operate, threatening the drinking water supply of local communities. Waste would be discharged into the Guapinol River, seriously affecting aquatic life and the ecosystem. The company’s studies absurdly claim that the fish in the river will adapt to the warm water coming from the plant.

  Our demands are clear: the project must not go ahead because of its serious environmental and health impacts. We demand that our rights be respected and our environment protected.

  Why did you object to the calling of a public town hall meeting on 13 June?

  Civil society objected to the meeting because of the history of manipulation and lack of transparency in the implementation of mega-projects in the area. The thermoelectric plant is part of a mega-project known as Los Pinares/Ecotek, owned by the Emco Holdings group, which has six other components: two mining concessions in the core zone of the Carlos Escalera National Park, an iron oxide processing plant and three water concessions on the Guapinol, Quebrada de Ceibita and San Pedro rivers.

  The municipality issued a falsified document stating it had carried out a community consultation to validate the project. The project is being presented to the community as a solution to its energy problems, when in fact it is designed to supply energy to the iron oxide processing plant, not the community.

  In December 2023, we attended a public town hall meeting where between 2,500 and 3,000 people expressed their opposition to the project. Faced with this massive opposition, the mayor suspended the event, citing security reasons, and in January he unilaterally called another town hall meeting, without the support of municipal institutions, which was suspended following a legal appeal we filed. Finally, in the town hall meeting of 13 June, the mayor manipulated the situation, holding the open town hall meeting against the will of the community and listening only to those who support the project, who are representatives of boards of trustees controlled by the mining company.

  How has the community organised against this mega-project, and what reprisals have people faced?

  We have been fighting against the Los Pinares/Ecotek mega-project since 2014. We have carried out numerous protests, including holding permanent popular assemblies in front of municipal offices and mass protests. Thanks to these we managed to have Tocoa declared a mining-free municipality and the core zone of the Carlos Escaleras National Park restored.

  In 2018, we set up a camp under the banner ‘For Water and Life’, which lasted 88 days. This direct action triggered a wave of criminalisation and persecution. Repression against environmental activism has been fierce, with 32 prosecutions and eight comrades imprisoned for almost three years.

  Activists have been murdered and there’s a climate of constant threats and harassment. Hundreds of families have been displaced by threats and the use of excessive force by the authorities and armed groups hired by the company.

  Despite these challenges, we continue to fight against the corruption and state and corporate violence that has affected our communities for more than a decade.

  Has thegovernment of President Xiomara Castro fulfilled its promises regarding Guapinol?

  The government’s actions on this issue have been negligent and have exacerbated polarisation and conflict. Although the government has made Guapinol a central issue on its political agenda, the release of imprisoned environmental defenders has been the result of years of community mobilisation and resistance rather than direct intervention by central authorities.

  A significant government debt to Tocoa and Guapinol remains: the complete cancellation of the Los Pinares/Ecotek megaproject. A decree was issued in February 2024 to protect areas of the Carlos Escalera National Park, but it is crucial to ensure its effective implementation and the repair of the environmental damage already caused.

  The community remains vigilant and active, demanding environmental justice and the preservation of its natural resources in the face of corrupt economic and political interests insensitive to local needs.

  Civic space in Honduras is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Municipal Committee for the Defence of Common and Public Goods through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@guapinolre on Twitter.

• HONDURAS: ‘We must address the roots of the conflict: the handing over of natural resources’

  CIVICUS speaks about the criminalisation of environmental, land and territorial defenders in Honduras with Edy Tábora, director of the law firm Justicia para los Pueblos (Justice for the Peoples) and coordinator of the group of defence lawyers of eight defenders of the Guapinol river who were recently released from detention.

  Why were the Guapinol defenders criminalised?

  The case of the eight Guapinol comrades deprived of their freedom is one of the most revealing expressions of the conflicts around mining and energy and the dispossession of land and natural resources in Honduras. Along with that of Berta Cáceres, the Guapinol case is one of the most significant ones.

  Berta’s case, which culminated in her assassination, was the first in a new wave of criminalisation surrounding dispossession projects following the 2009 military coup. Her case displayed all the typical elements: stigmatisation, surveillance, rupture of the social fabric, criminalisation. The same pattern can be seen in many parts of Honduras.

  After the coup, there was a privately conducted exploration of mineral deposits and businesspeople realised there was a lot of money to be made here. In the case of Guapinol, the process kicked off with the granting of an iron oxide mining concession – one of the largest in the country – to Los Pinares, a holding company registered in Panama, owned by an extremely wealthy Honduran family. Its mining business was developed jointly with the US company Nucor.

  Nucor claims to have withdrawn from the project in late 2019 due to the conflict triggered by the criminalisation of the Guapinol defenders, but there is no evidence of this and we do not believe it to be true. Los Pinares is simply the mining arm of a company whose power comes from airport concessions at home and abroad. It is a company with high-level political connections, and with so much power that in 2013 it succeeded in getting the National Congress to change the delimitation of the core zone of a national park.

  On 22 April 2013, the day before a new mining law came into force, applications were submitted for the two mining concessions related to the Guapinol case, both located in the core zone of the Montaña de Botaderos National Park. This had been declared a national park in 2012, as part of a ‘friendly settlement’ with the relatives of Carlos Escaleras, a social leader and environmental defender active in the 1980s and 1990s, who was assassinated for defending this mountain. The statute of the national park, which bears the name of Carlos Escaleras, prohibited the granting of mining concessions in its core zone and even its buffer zone.

  However, in 2014, engineers began to arrive on the mountain to collect information and check how deep down metal was deposited. People noticed this, began to demand an explanation and organised in the Municipal Committee of Public and Common Goods of Tocoa.

  In June 2016 they began to file complaints; some were filed by the Guapinol defenders who ended up in prison. They requested information from the institutions in charge of granting mining permits but only obtained some information in November 2019, after three years of back and forth. Tired of not getting answers, in June 2018 people started protesting at the Municipality of Tocoa Colón. It was then that systematic surveillance by the national police and Los Pinares security began.

  In August 2018, the Honduran Council of Private Enterprise held press conferences in which it complained to the government about an alleged loss of 20 billion dollars caused by ‘vandals’ protesting in various parts of Honduras.

  Criminalisation was a nationwide strategy, but the criminalisation of the Guapinol comrades was the most serious case. On 8 September 2018, the Public Prosecutor’s Office presented the first accusation against 18 comrades for the crimes of usurpation, damage and usurpation of public space. Los Pinares appeared in the hearings as the accuser. Fourteen comrades were put on trial and all their cases were closed, but the fact that they were accused enabled the illegal eviction, in October 2018, of the Camp for Water and Life, one of many set up around Honduras. This was one of four charges brought by the Public Prosecutor’s Office as part of the strategy to criminalise resistance movements against mining and energy projects.

  In January 2019, in response to a complaint filed by Los Pinares, the Public Prosecutor’s Office filed another indictment against 32 people, including eight Guapinol comrades. The nature of the charges changed: it was no longer about usurpation of public space but about organised crime. Human rights defenders were now treated as taking part in organised crime, with charges including criminal association, theft, damage, unjust deprivation of liberty and aggravated arson. The case was assigned to the Specialised Court for Organised Crime, which meant it was transferred from local to national jurisdiction, in violation of the right to be tried by one’s natural judge. 

  Of the 32, a first group voluntarily submitted to trial in February 2019 and was kept in prison for only 10 days before the accusations against them were dismissed. The Guapinol eight, however, despite having voluntarily submitted to trial, were subjected to arbitrary detention from 26 August 2019 until 24 February 2022, when they finally regained their freedom.

  What did civil society do to secure their release?

  During the pandemic, Guapinol was one of the most high-profile cases globally. Not even the pandemic could stop our comrades’ defence. We quickly moved our activities online, and by late April 2020 we were already filing habeas corpus writs for our comrades’ right to health, alongside international organisations. Even under these conditions, we managed to set up discussions with important organisations, and three months after the pandemic began, we restarted our advocacy work, which meant that by the time the trial started, the case had become very well known around the world.

  Initially the case was promoted by the Coalition Against Impunity, which brings together more than 50 Honduran civil society organisations (CSOs). Later, many CSOs joined a kind of international support group for the case.

  First, we publicly denounced the violence and criminalisation against the Municipal Committee. Second, before our comrades were imprisoned, we documented the irregular granting of concessions for natural resources. Third, alongside several Honduran CSOs, we organised our comrades’ legal defence. A working group was then organised including national and international CSOs to support the defence. A lot of advocacy work was done, both nationally and internationally, to convince the public that this was a very important case and to counter the company’s account of the violence allegedly committed by our comrades.

  Documentary and testimonial work was crucial to expose our comrades’ real activism. We had many meetings with international CSOs. Canadian, US and European organisations and academics reported on the concession and the legal process. International CSOs filed amicus curiae – friend of the court – briefs with Honduran courts. We participated in multiple forums with national and international organisations.

  Many actions converged to create a powerful wave of demands for our comrades’ release. CIVICUS’s and Amnesty International’s campaigns, for example, allowed us to reach wider audiences. When the trial came, the case was widely known, and less than 24 hours after the end of the trial, in which our comrades were convicted with two thirds of the court’s votes, the Supreme Court of Justice annulled the whole process and ordered them to be released.

  This was an unprecedented decision, surely motivated by the strength of the demand for their freedom and by the evidence presented, both in and out of court, which demonstrated that our comrades were innocent and that they fight for a just cause that is of great interest to humanity.

  Are there other cases like the Guapinol case in Honduras?

  There are many defenders criminalised for defending land, including some from the Garífuna people, a marginalised minority, but they are not in prison. Many comrades were also imprisoned for defending democracy in the aftermath of 2017’s electoral fraud: around 30 people were imprisoned in maximum security prisons, but they are currently free. Most pending cases are being closed as a result of an amnesty issued by the National Congress in February 2022.

  In that sense, the Guapinol case was an exception, because this amnesty did not apply to them. What’s important about this case is that we managed to close the process by defending ourselves even with the highly questionable tools offered by the Honduran judicial system.

  However, there were other cases at the same time as Guapinol, such as that of the Indigenous comrades of the Lenca people in the department of La Paz, who were accused of forced displacement. They were imprisoned for more than a year for a crime that is the craziest thing I have ever heard: they were accused of displacing landowners. The Public Prosecutor’s narrative uses the made-up concept of ‘reverse racism’, according to which Indigenous peoples can also commit discrimination against minorities within their communities – the minority in this case being the landowners.

  Do you view Guapinol as part of a pattern of criminalisation against environmental defenders?

  We have detected patterns of criminalisation by sector in the cases we have monitored. For example, between 2011 and 2016 one of the most criminalised sectors was the student movement mobilised in defence of public education. Some 350 students, mostly university students, were criminalised.

  In the case of environmental defenders, we were able to document several patterns of criminalisation. Again and again, prosecutions were initiated only a few days after pronouncements by companies or employers’ organisations. The behaviour of the police and the Public Prosecutor’s Office has also been similar in all cases, with an initial focus on eviction and accusations changing over time following the same pattern. The narrative peddled by companies is always the same as well, often because they share the same lawyers.

  Criminalisation follows different patterns depending on the interests affected. The crimes people are accused of when challenging mining interests differ from those used to dispossess communities of land for the construction of tourism megaprojects or the plantation of African palm in the Atlantic zone, and from those used against peasants claiming access to land and crops.

  However, all the groups criminalised over the past 15 years have something in common: their resistance to the project, promoted since the 2000s, of handing over natural resources to private companies. Land grabbing was politically supported the state following the coup: from that moment on, national regulations were made more flexible to facilitate dispossession and the national police and the security forces of the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the judiciary were placed at the service of the private sector, which used them to criminalise land rights defenders.

  Has there been any improvement in the situation of environmental defenders since the new government came to power in January 2022?

  The new government brought several positive changes. First, while we had already achieved the closure of several emblematic cases, it decreed an amnesty that resulted in the closure of most legal proceedings against defenders, although there are still some cases pending.

  Second, the new government has put an end to the state’s stigmatisation of land struggles, which used to make use of information obtained by state security forces. And third, for the time being the government has not tackled conflicts with violence. People who protest are not being repressed.

  In recent years state violence was deployed to manage social protest, private violence was reflected in the assassination of defenders, and hybrid violence was seen in the area of surveillance. Over the four years of the current government we may no longer witness violent management of social protests, but there is a chance that state violence will be replaced by private corporate violence.

  What are the challenges ahead?

  The challenge right now is to address the causes of criminalisation. We have worked to defend and support our comrades criminalised by the state and private companies, but we have never been able to address what’s at the root of the conflict: the handing over of natural resources. Preventing the criminalisation of defenders is a big step, but we must address the issue of concessions, which in fact continue. Approved projects are waiting to be implemented. If we don’t seize the moment to address this problem, then when the government’s political colour changes, private companies will come back stronger and criminalisation will intensify.

  Moreover, social movements are worn out after 12 years of resistance against the handing over of natural resources. There must be accountability, reparations for victims and guarantees of legal security for defenders to be able to do their work. The hostile legal framework for exercising rights and defending human rights that has been established in recent decades must be reversed.

  Civic space in Honduras is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Learn more about the Guapinol case on itswebsite and follow@Edy_Tabora on Twitter.

• Honduras: 100+ orgs call for access to justice & measures of non-repitition

  Honduras: One month after the murder of two defenders of the Guapinol and San Pedro Rivers, CIVICUS joins human rights organisations calling for compliance with international obligations to guarantee access to justice and measures of non-repetition

• Honduras: Submission to the UN Human Rights Committee on the deterioration of civic space

  A new research brief submitted by CIVICUS and Bufete Justicia para los Pueblos (BJP) to the UN Human Rights Committee outlines serious concerns about the civic space situation in Honduras. It highlights ongoing challenges despite legal frameworks intended to protect fundamental civic freedoms. The submission is part of the third periodic review of Honduras’ obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) at the Committee’s 141st session. 

  Key Concerns

  The submission raises serious concerns about the violence and harassment faced by journalists, human rights defenders (HRDs) and civil society organisations (CSOs). Despite national protection mechanisms, these groups remain at significant risks. 

  The 2015 Law on the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, Journalists, Social Communicators, and Justice Operators, along with the National Protection System established in 2016, is designed to protect these professions. However, the National Protection System suffers from critical deficiencies, including inadequate funding, staffing and coordination.

  In 2023, at least 13 HRDs were killed, with most of these deadly attacks linked to land and environmental conflicts. Notably, HRDs such as Óscar Oquelí Domínguez and Juana María Martínez were murdered amidst ongoing violence and threats. The criminalisation of HRDs, particularly through charges of ‘usurpation,’ has intensified evictions and legal actions against those defending land rights. Additionally, attacks on the Garífuna community and OFRANEH members illustrate the systemic violence and impunity faced by HRDs.

  Although the Honduran Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, journalists operate in a hostile environment with widespread impunity for human rights violations. Recent incidents, including the killings of journalists and media workers, threats and smear campaigns, underscore severe challenges to press freedom.

  The situation is further exacerbated by the ongoing state of emergency declared by President Xiomara Castro in November 2022, which has been persistently renewed. Initially aimed at addressing gang violence, this state of emergency has led to the suspension of fundamental rights, such as freedoms of association and assembly, and allows for arrests and raids without warrants. In this context, authorities have failed to uphold these freedoms, as evidenced by reported cases of intimidation and surveillance targeting HRDs during protests.

  Additionally, the state of emergency has been used as a tool for repression, particularly against rural communities and HRDs. For example, the submission details how the police and military have used the emergency powers to harass the peasant farming and fishing community of Tulito in Choluteca. These actions have led to a state of perpetual distress and criminalisation of HRDs, with many facing charges such as ‘usurpation.’

  Recommendations

  The brief concludes with several recommendations for the Honduran government:

  • Prevention and Accountability: The government should take effective measures to prevent violence against journalists and HRDs and ensure that such acts are thoroughly investigated, with perpetrators held accountable.
  • Strengthening Protection Mechanisms: The National Protection System should be strengthened to better safeguard journalists and HRDs.
  • Lifting of Emergency Measures: The government should lift the state of emergency and restore constitutional guarantees, ensuring that any measures taken for public security do not infringe on human rights.

  The submission underscores the urgent need for Honduras to address these human rights challenges to comply with its international obligations under the ICCPR.

  Civic space in Honduras is rated Repressed by the CIVICUS Monitor.

  About the CIVICUS Monitor

  Over twenty organisations collaborate on the CIVICUS Monitor to provide an evidence base for action to improve civic space on all continents. Civic freedoms in 198 countries and territories are categorised as either ‘closed,’ ‘repressed ,’ ‘obstructed ,’ ‘narrowed ’ or ‘open ,’ based on a methodology that combines several data sources on the freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression.

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• Hong Kong: Free human rights defender Chow Hang-Tung, end use of solitary confinement

  

  CIVICUS, a global civil society alliance, calls on Hong Kong authorities to immediately end the repeated use of solitary confinement and free lawyer and activist Chow Hang-Tung. Chow has faced solitary confinement six times in the last four months and has been unjustly targeted for exercising her freedom of expression.

• HONG KONG: ‘Any activism that the government dislikes can be deemed a national security violation’

  CIVICUS speaks about the persecution faced by Hong Kong activists in exile with Anouk Wear, research and policy adviser at Hong Kong Watch.

  Founded in 2017, Hong Kong Watch is a civil society organisation (CSO) based in the UK thatproduces research and monitors threats to Hong Kong’s autonomy, basic freedoms and the rule of law. Itworks at the intersection between politics, academia and the media to help shape the international debate about Hong Kong.

  What challenges do Hong Kong activists in exile face?

  Hong Kong activists in exile face the challenge of continuing our activism without being in the place where we want and need to be to make a direct impact. We put continuous effort into community-building, preserving our culture and staying relevant to the people and situation in Hong Kong today. 

  When we do this, we face threats from the Chinese government that have drastically escalated since the National Security Law (NSL) was imposed in 2020.

  This draconian law was enacted in response to the mass protests triggered by the proposed Extradition Bill between Hong Kong and mainland China in 2019.

  The NSL broadly defines and criminalises secession, subversion, terrorist activities and collusion with a foreign country or with external elements. The maximum penalty is life imprisonment. In 2022, the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee concluded that the NSL is ‘vague and ambiguous’.

  In practical terms, any activism the Hong Kong government dislikes, including meeting a foreign politician, organising an event and publishing an article, can be deemed a violation of the NSL, according to the government’s interpretation. This means we don’t know what is legal and what is not, and many people end up self-censoring to protect themselves.

  On 3 July 2023, the government issued new arrest warrants for eight activists in exile, including three in the UK – Nathan Law, Finn Lau and Mung Siu-tat – and offered bounties of around £100,000 (approx. US$130,000) each for anyone providing information leading to their arrest. All of them are accused of breaching the NSL. Despite having no legal basis for applying the NSL in the UK, the Hong Kong government continues to threaten and intimidate activists abroad.

  To what extent are civil society and independent media in exile able to continue doing their work?

  Since the imposition of the NSL, over 60 CSOs, including political parties, trade unions and media groups, have disbanded. Many have relocated abroad, including over 50 CSOs that signed a joint statement urging government action following the Hong Kong National Security arrest warrants and bounties this month. 

  There is a strong network of Hong Kong activists in exile, and activists in exile are still able to do their work. However, we have great difficulty collaborating with activists still in Hong Kong because of the risks they face. For example, last week, five people in Hong Kong were arrested for alleged links to activists in exile who are on the wanted list. Collaborations must now be even more careful and discreet than they already were.

  What kind of support do Hong Kong activists and journalists in exile receive, and what further international support do you need?

  In November 2022, Hong Kong journalists who relocated to the UK collaborated with the National Union of Journalists of the UK and Ireland to launch the Association of Overseas Hong Kong Media Professionals. They pledged to focus on freedom of the press in Hong Kong and provide mutual assistance for professionals who have relocated overseas.

  There is also extensive support among Hong Kong activists and CSOs in exile, from civil society of host countries and from the international community, as can be seen in the joint response to the arrest warrants and bounties issued on 3 July.

  However, more coordinated action is needed to respond to Beijing’s threats, particularly from the governments of host countries. There needs to be more assurance and action to reiterate that Beijing and Hong Kong do not have jurisdiction abroad and there will be serious consequences to their threats. 

  Hong Kong activists in exile are now making submissions to the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review process, which will review China’s human rights record since 2018.

  We urge UN member states, CSOs and journalists to use this opportunity to highlight the drastic changes that have taken place in Hong Kong and to continue supporting our fight for democracy, rights and freedom.

  ---

  Civic space in Hong Kong is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Hong Kong Watch through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@hk_watch and@anoukwear onTwitter.

• HONG KONG: ‘This is a leader-full movement, ran by countless small networks of talented people’

  CIVICUS speaks about the protests that have rocked Hong Kong since June 2019 with Johnson Ching-Yin Yeung, democracy movement organiser and chairperson of the Hong Kong Civil Hub. The Hong Kong Civil Hub works to connect Hong Kong civil society with like-minded international stakeholders willing to help promote the rule of law, democracy and human rights in Hong Kong. 

  What triggered the mass protests that have taken place for several months?

  The protests had both short and long-term causes. When Hong Kong was decolonised in 1997, China signed an international treaty promising that people in Hong Kong would enjoy a high degree of autonomy. In other words, Hong Kong would have its own government, legislation, courts and jurisdiction. But, long story short, China is not fulfilling that promise and Hong Kong is slowly becoming more like China due to Chinese intervention in our government and judiciary. Following the2014 Umbrella Movement, there have been increasing restrictions on the freedom of association, and for the first time in decades the government made use of colonial-era laws and outlawed organisations that advocated for Hong Kong’s independence. We expect restrictions on association, funding and exchanges with international organisations and civil society to increase over the next few years.

  Political participation has also been under attack. In 2017, for the first time since 1997, a few lawmakers were disqualified and expelled from the legislature. In the past three elections there have been disqualifications of candidates. This is becoming a major tactic used by China, based on claims that certain candidates are not respecting the law or they will not be loyal to Beijing. This explains why at some point people decided to take their grievances to the streets, given that most institutional channels for political demands are shut down.

  People took to the streets in 2014, under the Umbrella Movement. But protest is being severely punished. In April 2019, several pro-democracy leaders weresentenced to eight to 16 months in prison. Local leaders who advocate for political independence have also been punished with up to seven years of imprisonment.

  The current protests began in June 2019. On 9 June,more than a million people mobilised against the Extradition Bill, aimed at establishing a mechanism for transfers of fugitives to mainland China,  currently excluded in the existing law. Three days later, the legislature decided to continue the legislation process regardless of the opposition seen on the streets, so people besieged the parliamentary building, to which the Hong Kong police reacted with extreme brutality, firing teargas and rubber bullets, shooting into people’s heads and eyes.

  Amnesty International made a comprehensive report on the incidents of 12 June and concluded that the police had used excessive force, even though the protest had been authorised by the Hong Kong government.

  What changed after the repression of 12 June?

  There was a huge outcry because we had never experienced this kind of repression before, and two million people – almost one quarter of the population of Hong Kong – took part in the protests that took place four days after.

  From then on, protesters had a few additional demands on top of the initial demand that the extradition agreement be withdrawn, something that happened three months after the first protest. Protesters demanded the release of the arrested demonstrators and the withdrawal of the characterisation of the protests as riots, which is cause enough to hold someone and convict them: all it takes is for a defendant to have been present at the protest scene to face up to 10 years in prison for rioting. Protesters also demanded an independent inquiry into police activity. Over the past six months we’ve documented a lot of torture during detentions. Excessive force is used all the time against peaceful protests, so people really want the police to be held accountable. A recent survey showed that 80 per cent of the population support this demand. But the government is relying solely on the police to maintain order, so they cannot risk such investigation. Last but not least, there is the demand of universal suffrage and democratic rights, without which it is difficult to foresee anything else changing for real.

  What did not change was the government reaction and the police repression.Over the next few months, around 7,000 people were arrested – 40 per cent of them students, and 10 per cent minors – and around 120 people were charged. The fact that only 120 out of the 7,000 people arrested were charged shows that there have been lots of arbitrary arrests. The police would arrest people on grounds of illegal assembly. I was arrested in July when I was just standing in front of the corner line. I complied with police instructions, but I still got arrested.

  Thousands of people were injured during the protests. The official number is around 2,600 but this is a very conservative estimate because more than half of the injured people were not brought to public hospitals and did not seek medical assistance because they were afraid they would be arrested. Some doctors and nurses organised underground settlements to treat serious injuries like infections or rubber bullet injuries. But they had to remain anonymous and there simply were not enough of them and they didn’t have enough medical supply. There have been at least 12 suicides related to the protest movement. Lots of people have gone missing. Students and activists who are arrested are often deprived of their right to a lawyer and a phone call, and no one knows where they are detained. In many cases, it’s hard to verify whether people are in fact missing or have fled the country.

  Analysts have claimed that the strength of the current protests lies in their ‘leaderless’ character, something that prevents the government stopping the movement by jailing leaders. Do you agree with this characterisation?

  Many observers have seen the way we have used technology to coordinate the protests and they have concluded that our movement has no leaders. It is true that our movement is characterised by the decentralisation of communications and mobilisation. But this does not mean it is aleaderless movement. On the contrary, the Hong Kong protest movement is a leader-full movement: it is full of leaders and is run by countless small networks of talented people capable of organising and coordinating action on their own.

  While the demography of the protests is quite diverse in terms of age, background and social class, more than the 50 per cent of protesters are female, and the major force of the protests are people aged 20 to 49. There is also a strong presence of highly educated people: more than 85 per cent of protesters have tertiary education or above.

  But a notable characteristic of this disparate protest movement has been its unity, which may have resulted from the longstanding repression of civil society. When the leaders of the 2014 protests – most of them young students – were sentenced to prison, older people showed up at the protests because they felt that they had not been doing enough. People also united against police brutality, because there was no previous history of such a serious crackdown on protesters and people felt morally responsible to show up in support.

  Can you tell us more about how the protest movement has used technology for organising and coordinating action?

  During the first few months at least, people would rely on their cellphones and the Telegram app. People would have strategic discussions and channel these discussions into a Telegram channel. These are not the safest communication tools but they can hold more than 3,000 subscribers, which means that you can speak to 3,000 people at the same time, you can share action timetables, the site of protests or the location of the police with a huge number of people. We use a live map to inform protesters where the police are and where the protests are taking place, so they can avoid being arrested. Another app shows which businesses and stores are supportive of the movement. Pro-democracy businesses appear in yellow, while pro-government ones appear in blue.

  We also use Telegram bots for international advocacy. A group of people is dedicated to disseminating information on Twitter and Interact.

  We also use social media as a recruitment tool because after an action is held, people use social media to reflect about the strategies used and assess the outcomes. But after a few months, people started using online apps less and less. They would instead form their own groups and organise their own actions. There are frontier leaders, first leaders, people working on documentation, people who organise street protests – each is doing their own thing while at the same time warning others about clashes and organising timetables. This is how we use civic tech.

  How has the movement managed to grow and thrive in adverse conditions?

  Several elements explain why people keep showing up and why the movement is so resilient against government repression. First, people deploy their actions in their own neighbourhoods. We disperse action rather than concentrate it, because when we use concentration tactics, such as holding a protest in front of a government building, we become an easy target for the police. In the face of dispersed actions, the police would try to disperse protesters but would often end up attacking passers-by or people going about their business in their own neighbourhoods. For many people not involved directly in the protests, this was also a wake-up call and functioned as a recruitment mechanism: police brutality ceased to be a far-away problem; instead, it hit home and became personal, triggering a protective reaction.

  A tactic commonly used by protesters is the Lennon Wall, in which people post messages in public spaces, which creates a sense of community and helps organise public support. Lennon Walls appear in various places and people use them to send and receive information about the protests. People also put posters in bus stops so when people are waiting for the bus they can get information about the protests. People sing in protest in shopping malls. This way, people use their lunchtime to sing a song and protest while going about their business, and they reach people who don’t read the news and don’t pay much attention to politics. That is one of the key lessons here.

  Another key lesson concerns the importance of the unity between the moderate side and the radical front of the protests. Given that even authorised protests would be dispersed with teargas for no reason, some people began resorting to more militant actions to combat the police and protect their space. Some social movement analysts claim that radical incidents diminish popular support for the movement, but this does not seem to be happening in Hong Kong. In a recent survey, more than 60 per cent of respondents said they understood the use of violence by the people. I suppose that one reason why people do not reject militant actions is that they view the government and the police as responsible for most of the violence, and view violence by protesters as a fairly understandable response. Another reason is that radical protesters have been careful not to target ordinary people but only the police and pro-government businesses.

  What else have you learned in the process?

  A big lesson that we’ve learned concerns the effectiveness of creativity and humour to offset government repression. Protesters used laser tags to disable cameras used for the surveillance of protesters, so people started to get arrested for buying laser tags. After a student was arrested for possessing a laser tag, hundreds of thousands of people gathered in a public space and used laser tags to point at a public building. Another example of an effective response took place in early October 2019. There is a law that states that people can be jailed for a year if they wear a mask or anything covering their faces, so people responded in defiance, forming a human chain in which everyone was wearing some kind of mask.

  We’ve also come to understand the importance of global solidarity and leveraging geopolitics. The Hong Kong diaspora has organised a lot of lobbying and advocacy in various cities around the world. We have also lobbied foreign governments and supported the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, a bill that was introduced in the US Congress following the Umbrella Movement in 2014, but that was only passed in November 2019. This law requires the US government to impose sanctions against Chinese and Hong Kong officials responsible for human rights abuses in Hong Kong, and requires the US Department of State and other agencies to conduct an annual review to determine whether changes in Hong Kong's political status – namely its relationship with mainland China – justify changing the unique and favourable trade relations between the USA and Hong Kong. This is huge, and we are trying to replicate this in other countries, including Australia, Canada, Italy and New Zealand.

  We have also done advocacy at the United Nations (UN), where some resolutions about police brutality have been passed. But the UN is quite weak at the moment, and aside from the documentation of human rights violations there is not much they can do. Any resolution regarding the protests will be blocked by China at the UN Security Council. That said, a thorough UN investigation on police brutality would send a strong message anyway. We have been communicating with human rights civil society organisations to do more advocacy at the UN.

  We are also looking for alternative tactics such as working with unions in France, because water cannons are manufactured in France and we hope something can be done about it.

  What have the protests achieved so far?

  The democratic camp has made a lot of progress. In November 2019 we had elections for the District Council. True, the District Council doesn’t have any real political power because it carries out neighbourhood duties, like garbage collection and traffic management. Still, in the latest election 388 out of 452 seats went to the pro-democracy camps, whereas back in 2015 they were only 125 pro-democracy representatives, compared with 299 who were pro-Beijing.

  That said, I don’t think the pro-democracy movement should put too much of its energy into institutional politics because the District Council is not a place where the political crisis can be solved. However, the elections served as a solid foundation for organisers to organise people at the local level.

  According to the polls, almost 90 per cent of the people supported independent investigation of human rights violations, more than 70 per cent demanded the resignation of the Hong Kong Chief Executive, Carrie Lam, and 75 per cent supported universal suffrage. That kind of popular support has remained stable for several months, which is pretty amazing.

  What are the challenges ahead?

  While there is no sign of protests calming down, there is also no sign of the government making concessions anytime soon. Violence is escalating on both sides, and the protest movement might lose public support if some demonstrators decide to go underground. The Chinese government will not let itself be challenged by protesters, so it is infiltrating organisations and tightening the grip on civil society. Organised civil society is relatively weak, and Beijing can easily interfere with academic institutions, schools and the media by appointing more allies and dismissing those who are critical of the government. The next five years will likely be tough ones for civil society and democracy in Hong Kong, and we will have to work to strengthen civil society’s resilience.

  Another important issue is that a lot of young protesters are traumatised by the violence they have witnessed and experienced. We have support groups with social workers and psychologists, but they cannot provide support in their official capacity or they would find themselves under pressure by their employers who take money from the government. Social workers are also at risk and the police constantly harass them. To strengthen self-care and gain resilience for the battle ahead, we need to train more people and create support groups to help people cope, control their stress and share their stories.

  Another potential challenge is the limited sustainability of global solidarity. Right now Hong Kong is in the spotlight, but this will not last long. Our struggle is for the long haul, but the world will not be paying attention for much longer. So we will need to build more substantial and permanent alliances and partnerships with civil society groups around the world. We need to empower local groups and give people new skills regarding international law, advocacy and campaigning. The protest movement is not going anywhere. It’s going to be a long struggle so we will have to train more organisers. We will disseminate the knowledge gained by the protesters, so when they are sent to jail others will take over.

  Civic space in China is rated as ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Hong Kong Civil Hub through itswebsite and follow@hkjohnsonyeung on Twitter.

• HONG KONG: ‘We urge governments to protect exiled human rights defenders within their jurisdictions’

  

  CIVICUS speakswith Anouk Wear, research and policy adviser at Hong Kong Watch, about recent district council elections held in Hong Kong amid an ongoing crackdown on dissent.

  Founded in 2017, Hong Kong Watch is a civil society organisation (CSO) based in the UK thatproduces research and monitors threats to Hong Kong’s autonomy, basic freedoms and rule of law. Itworks at the intersection between politics, academia and the media to shape the international debate about Hong Kong.

   

  What was the significance of Hong Kong’s 2023 district council elections?

  On 11 December 2023, Hong Kong held elections spanning 18 district councils with a total of 479 seats. District councillors advise the Hong Kong government on local issues within their districts and have funding to promote recreational, cultural and community activities.

  These elections were especially significant because following the previous round, held in 2019 and won by pro-democracy candidates by a landslide, the Hong Kong government introduced several changes to ensure that the pro-China camp would maintain the majority in future elections.

  The 2023 election was marked by a record-low voter turnout of just 27.5 per cent. Many people abstained because they felt a sense of despair given that all candidates had to be vetted and approved by the Chinese state. This left no opposition voices to vote for, diminishing the significance of the election.

  We want genuine universal suffrage, not a ‘democracy with Chinese characteristics’, as the founding chairman of Hong Kong’s Democratic Party, Martin Lee, aptly warned in 2014. Unfortunately, the situation has only worsened since then.

  What tactics did the government use to control the election?

  As analysed in a briefing we published recently, the election fit into a broader trend of democratic erosion in Hong Kong.

  In 2021, changes to Legislative Councils were introduced under the slogan ‘Patriots Governing Hong Kong’,  aimed at screening out democrats and ensuring that only pro-establishment candidates aligned with Beijing could run for seats. To that effect, candidates are now required to pass two major political barriers before participating in the election.

  First, they must secure nominations from all five sectors of the Election Committee, a 1,500-member electoral college made up of representatives of various constituencies, including industry, professions, grassroots organisations, the government and Hong Kong representation in Chinese bodies. Second, they are screened by the Candidate Eligibility Review Committee, mainly composed of government officials. Candidates who don’t have a strong pro-China agenda can be disqualified on grounds of not being ‘patriotic’ enough.

  A similar approach was applied to district council candidates. In April 2023, Chief Executive John Lee announced that upcoming district council elections would be open exclusively to patriots, with only a certain number of ‘depoliticised’ seats focused on administrative tasks elected by the public. He added that people who love the country and are willing to serve can participate in district councils through ‘various other ways’. In line with these reforms, only 88 seats were directly elected by the public, compared to 452 in the previous election, with 179 to be appointed by the chief executive.

  Moreover, in the lead-up to the elections, three members of the League of Social Democrats were followed and arrested for planning a protest against the election, which they called a ‘birdcage’, stating that ‘Hong Kong people’s right to vote and to be elected seems to be absent’.

  What should be done to restore democratic freedoms in Hong Kong?

  Civil space has drastically shrunk since the 2019 district council elections. Following the imposition of the National Security Law in 2020, over 60 organisations have been disbanded, including CSOs, political parties, trade unions and media outlets. Many organisations have relocated abroad, while others have adjusted the scope of their work to protect their members who remain in Hong Kong.

  It’s crucial that discussions are continued, the human rights situation is monitored and detailed reports are provided as steps towards restoring democratic freedoms in Hong Kong. We shouldn’t accept new repressive laws as the norm but instead stay vocal about any regressive legislation and rights violation.

  It’s important to keep speaking up for people in Hong Kong and human rights defenders in exile. For example, recently the Hong Kong national security police issued five arrest warrants offering HK$1 million (approx. US$ 128,000) bounties for exiled pro-democracy Hong Kong activists based in the UK and USA. We strongly condemn this illegal attack against our friends and colleagues. We urge governments to take a stand and protect Hong Kong human rights defenders within their jurisdictions.

  How is Hong Kong Watch working towards this end, and what international support do you need?

  We work to inform and educate legislators, policymakers and the media, as well as raise awareness among the wider public about violations of human rights, basic freedoms and the rule of law in Hong Kong. We advocate for actions to assist victims of rights violations through a combination of in-depth research reports, opinion editorials, monthly media briefings, interviews and advocacy campaigns.

  It’s crucial to hold Hong Kong and China accountable for their violations of international human rights law and urge them to fulfil their obligations. For instance, the 2022 review of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee, tasked with monitoring compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), found that Hong Kong violated its international legal obligations and recommended that the authorities take tangible steps, with a clear timeline, to introduce universal suffrage and reform the electoral system in compliance with the ICCPR.

  We’re engaging in this effort through submissions to the Human Rights Committee and other treaty bodies, including the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as to the upcoming Universal Periodic Review at the UN Human Rights Council.

  We deeply appreciate the support we receive from governments, legislators, civil society and people worldwide. But we need more international solidarity, particularly at the governmental level, to pressure Hong Kong authorities to comply with their obligations under international law and ensure that other states refrain from conducting business as usual with Hong Kong, in view of the grave and systematic nature of human rights violations the current regime commits.

   

  ---

  Civic space in Hong Kong is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Hong Kong Watch through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@hk_watch and@anoukwear onTwitter.

  The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

• Hong Kong: A year on, the National Security Law has crushed civic freedoms

  New research on the state of civic freedoms in Hong Kong - a look at restrictions over the past year

  CIVICUS, the global civil society alliance, is extremely concerned about the alarming regression of civic freedoms in Hong Kong. One year one from the passage of the draconian National Security Law, our research shows it has been weaponised to target dozens of pro-democracy activists and has created a chilling effect within civil society.

  The National SecurityLaw (NSL) punishes four types of activities: secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with “foreign forces”, all carrying a maximum sentence of life in prison.These offences are vaguely defined and can easily become catch-all offences to prosecute activists and critics with potentially heavy penalties.

  TheNSLestablishes new national security bodieswhich are partially or fully controlled by People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials, in violation of the Basic Law.It gives Hong Kong police sweeping new powers including to conduct warrantless searches and covert surveillance, and to seize travel documents of those suspected of violating the security law. The law also contravenes the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary and undermines the right to a fair trial by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, guaranteed under Article 14 of the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

  "The national security law has become the most dangerous threat to civic freedoms in Hong Kong and has allowed for any form of dissent to be criminalised. The law has increased the climate of fear in Hong Kong and has been weaponised to target government critics, including people who are merely expressing their views or protesting peacefully”,said David Kode, Head of Advocacy at CIVICUS

  Morethan ahundred people have been arrested underthe National Security Law including pro-democracyactivists,formerlawmakers,lawyers,journalists and students.Activists have been accused of inciting or abetting secession or subversion just for showing leaflets and banners with reference to Hong Kong Independence or for their social media posts. 

  In January2021, 55 people,including pro-democracy activists,opposition candidates, former lawmakers and lawyers, were arrested and detained under law for ‘subversion’ for holding and participating in primaryelections held by Hong Kong’s pro-democratic party in July 2020. 47 of the activists have been charged.

  TheNSL has alsodramatically changed the environment for civil society in Hong Kong, greatly impeding the ability of civil society to carryout their work.Some have quit on the eve of the law’s introduction while others have exercised greater caution in their activities. The chilling effect of the crackdown on the entire sector cannot be overstated.

  The lawhas also been deployed against the media. Media owner Jimmy Lai, the founder of Apple Daily, a major pro-democracy newspaper, has been detained since December2020. He is facing multiple charges, including ‘colluding with foreign forces’. In May 2021, authorities announcedthey had frozen assets belonging to Lai under the national security law marking the first time a company has been targeted by the controversial legislation.  On 17 June, six of the newspaper’s staff and executives were arrested for their role inthe publication of more than 30 articles that called on foreign countries to impose sanctions. All were charged under the NSL. Apple Daily ceased operations on 26 June.

  “The use of the national security law to silence activism is a violation of international law. The repression against pro-democracy activists and other critics has led to the dismantling of civil society in Hong Kong, forcing many to flee the territory. The international community must not remain silent in the face of such abuses but must stand up and stand in solidarity with those defending human rights” said David Kode.

  Since 2019, theHong Kong authorities have also deployed other laws to criminalise peaceful protests in particular the Public Order Ordinance which has been used to charge activists holding and participating in an ‘unauthorised assembly’, It carries a maximumfive-year sentence.  The UN Human Rights Committee has criticised the law, saying that “it may facilitate excessive restriction” to basic rights. 

  Pro-democracyactivist Joshua Wong was sentenced to 13 and a half months in December 2020 for a mass protest outside a police station in June 2019. Wong’slong-time fellow activists Agnes Chow and Ivan Lam were also sentenced to 10 and seven months in prison for ‘incitement,’ referring to their use of a megaphone to shout slogans during the protest. 

  In April 2021,the courts sentenced ten pro-democracy activists to between eight and 18 months in prison for gatherings that were part of a series of mass protests triggeredby the proposed Extradition Bill. In May 2021, eight activists were sentenced for organising a protest in October 2019. More recently, On 4 June 2021, the authorities bannedthe annual Tiananmen massacre vigil for a second straight year and arrested barrister and activist Chow Hang Tung for breaching section 17A(1D) of the Public Order Ordinance by ‘promoting an unauthorised assembly’. 

  ---

  More information

  Download the Hong Kong research brief here.

  ---

  Interviews

  To arrange interviews, please contact Josef Benedict, CIVICUS Asia-Pacific Civic Space Researcher  and 

• Hong Kong: A year on, the National Security Law has crushed civic freedoms

  New research on the state of civic freedoms in Hong Kong - a look at restrictions over the past year

  CIVICUS, the global civil society alliance, is extremely concerned about the alarming regression of civic freedoms in Hong Kong. One year one from the passage of the draconian National Security Law, our research shows it has been weaponised to target dozens of pro-democracy activists and has created a chilling effect within civil society.

  The National SecurityLaw (NSL) punishes four types of activities: secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with “foreign forces”, all carrying a maximum sentence of life in prison.These offences are vaguely defined and can easily become catch-all offences to prosecute activists and critics with potentially heavy penalties.

  TheNSLestablishes new national security bodieswhich are partially or fully controlled by People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials, in violation of the Basic Law.It gives Hong Kong police sweeping new powers including to conduct warrantless searches and covert surveillance, and to seize travel documents of those suspected of violating the security law. The law also contravenes the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary and undermines the right to a fair trial by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, guaranteed under Article 14 of the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

  "The national security law has become the most dangerous threat to civic freedoms in Hong Kong and has allowed for any form of dissent to be criminalised. The law has increased the climate of fear in Hong Kong and has been weaponised to target government critics, including people who are merely expressing their views or protesting peacefully”,said David Kode, Head of Advocacy at CIVICUS

  Morethan ahundred people have been arrested underthe National Security Law including pro-democracyactivists,formerlawmakers,lawyers,journalists and students.Activists have been accused of inciting or abetting secession or subversion just for showing leaflets and banners with reference to Hong Kong Independence or for their social media posts. 

  In January2021, 55 people,including pro-democracy activists,opposition candidates, former lawmakers and lawyers, were arrested and detained under law for ‘subversion’ for holding and participating in primaryelections held by Hong Kong’s pro-democratic party in July 2020. 47 of the activists have been charged.

  TheNSL has alsodramatically changed the environment for civil society in Hong Kong, greatly impeding the ability of civil society to carryout their work.Some have quit on the eve of the law’s introduction while others have exercised greater caution in their activities. The chilling effect of the crackdown on the entire sector cannot be overstated.

  The lawhas also been deployed against the media. Media owner Jimmy Lai, the founder of Apple Daily, a major pro-democracy newspaper, has been detained since December2020. He is facing multiple charges, including ‘colluding with foreign forces’. In May 2021, authorities announcedthey had frozen assets belonging to Lai under the national security law marking the first time a company has been targeted by the controversial legislation.  On 17 June, six of the newspaper’s staff and executives were arrested for their role inthe publication of more than 30 articles that called on foreign countries to impose sanctions. All were charged under the NSL. Apple Daily ceased operations on 26 June.

  “The use of the national security law to silence activism is a violation of international law. The repression against pro-democracy activists and other critics has led to the dismantling of civil society in Hong Kong, forcing many to flee the territory. The international community must not remain silent in the face of such abuses but must stand up and stand in solidarity with those defending human rights” said David Kode.

  Since 2019, theHong Kong authorities have also deployed other laws to criminalise peaceful protests in particular the Public Order Ordinance which has been used to charge activists holding and participating in an ‘unauthorised assembly’, It carries a maximumfive-year sentence.  The UN Human Rights Committee has criticised the law, saying that “it may facilitate excessive restriction” to basic rights. 

  Pro-democracyactivist Joshua Wong was sentenced to 13 and a half months in December 2020 for a mass protest outside a police station in June 2019. Wong’slong-time fellow activists Agnes Chow and Ivan Lam were also sentenced to 10 and seven months in prison for ‘incitement,’ referring to their use of a megaphone to shout slogans during the protest. 

  In April 2021,the courts sentenced ten pro-democracy activists to between eight and 18 months in prison for gatherings that were part of a series of mass protests triggeredby the proposed Extradition Bill. In May 2021, eight activists were sentenced for organising a protest in October 2019. More recently, On 4 June 2021, the authorities bannedthe annual Tiananmen massacre vigil for a second straight year and arrested barrister and activist Chow Hang Tung for breaching section 17A(1D) of the Public Order Ordinance by ‘promoting an unauthorised assembly’. 

  ---

  More information

  Download the Hong Kong research brief here.

  ---

  Interviews

  To arrange interviews, please contact Josef Benedict, CIVICUS Asia-Pacific Civic Space Researcher  and 

   
• Human rights at risk for ASEAN citizens

  By Ichal Supriadi (Asia Democracy Network) and Josef Benedict (CIVICUS)

  As the 10 heads of state from ASEAN gather for the group’s latest summit in Singapore this week to discuss security, trade, and tensions in the South China Sea, the state of human rights and democracy in the region will once again be sidelined. 

  Read on: The Jakarta Post 

   

• Human Rights Council should adopt meaningful resolution to address spiralling rights crisis in Cambodia

  

  To: Permanent Representatives of Member and Observer States of the UN Human Rights Council

  RE: Human Rights Council should adopt meaningful resolution to address spiralling rights crisis in Cambodia

  Excellencies,

  We, the undersigned civil society organisations, are writing to alert your government to the worsening human rights crisis in Cambodia, and to appeal to you for your support for a resolution strengthening and extending scrutiny of the situation to be adopted at the 54^th regular session of the UN Human Rights Council (the “Council”).

  Human rights violations perpetrated in the context of general elections held on 23 July mark a new low in the two years of continual decline in the overall situation of human rights in Cambodia since the last Council resolution on the country in October 2021.^[1] There has been no tangible progress, and the Cambodian government has failed to demonstrate any political will towards meeting the 20 benchmarks presented to the Council in October 2022 by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia “to help promote human rights implementation in the country.”^[2]  

  The High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk described the environment leading up to the July general elections as “a severely restricted space that negatively impacted on the rights of Cambodians to participate fully and equally in all aspects of the electoral process.”^[3] Similarly, a joint statement by at least seven UN human rights experts said that “[t]he lead up to recent elections […] and its results are extremely disconcerting.”^[4] They further said that “[a] range of serious human rights violations and severe restrictions on civic and political space […] including a ban on the main opposition party, media restrictions and blockages and the harassment of perceived opponents of the ruling elite….”^[5]

  The government engaged in serious attacks on political opposition in the lead-up to the elections, with violent rhetoric, and arbitrary arrests and detention of political activists. The non-independent, politically biased National Election Committee^[6] disqualified two opposition parties, including the Candlelight Party,^[7] which was widely considered to be the most credible opposition party. Days before the election, the government ordered internet service providers to block access to the websites and social media accounts of at least three news outlets perceived to be critical of the government.^[8]

  The government has continued a policy of systematic and relentless persecution of human rights defenders, environmental and land rights defenders, trade unionists, political opposition, and independent media and media workers through judicial harassment including mass trials and legal action, as detailed in the annex to this letter.

  The conviction and sentencing to 2-years’ imprisonment of trade unionist and labour rights activist Chhim Sithar along with eight labour activists in May 2023, the conviction of 10 land rights defenders in Koh Kong in August 2023, and the conviction and 27-year prison sentence against opposition leader Kem Sokha in March 2023 are emblematic of the continuing pattern of criminalisation and judicial harassment of human rights defenders and political opposition. A judiciary that lacks independence from the executive branch renders the prospect of fair trials and due process guarantees virtually non-existent for those perceived to be critical of, or a threat to, the interests of the ruling elites.

  The Cambodian authorities have demonstrated a systematic and growing intolerance of independent media. The latest example is the arbitrary revocation of the media license of the Voice of Democracy,run by the Cambodian Center for Independent Media, which, as a group of UN human rights experts concluded, “leaves virtually no free media outlets operating in the country.”^[9]

  Laws are routinely misused to restrict human rights, undermine and attack civil society, and criminalise individuals for their exercise of freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association. Provisions of the Criminal Code, especially article 305 on defamation, article 453 on ‘plotting’ against the government, and articles 494 and 495 on incitement to commit felony and disturb social security have been routinely used against human rights defenders and political opponents. The Law on Non-Governmental Organisations, Law on Trade Unions, and Law on Political Parties continue to pose serious challenges for civic and political freedoms in Cambodia, while draft laws being contemplated by the government on cybercrime and on public order would provide further tools of repression.

  Over the past years, the Special Rapporteur on Cambodia has played a vital role in adding an independent and respected voice to verify and bring attention to the reporting of human rights groups and activists on the ground. The government’s restriction of civic of space and crackdown on the exercise of freedom of expression, and reporting by independent and critical voices makes the role of the Special Rapporteur even more vital in the promotion of respect for human rights and ensuring protection of fundamental freedoms and vulnerable populations in the country.  

  It is imperative that the Council seizes the moment and takes effective action at its 54^th session to address the government’s continuing systematic repression, restriction of civic and political space and clampdown on human rights in Cambodia. The Council should send a clear message to newly appointed Prime Minister Hun Manet and the government that there is a cost for continuing the ruling Cambodian People’s Party’s (CPP’s) past systematic approaches to silencing the media and targeting dissenting voices. The message sent now should be clear – that the international community will hold the government accountable for their human rights commitments and obligations. To this end, the Human Rights Council should ensure adequate monitoring and reporting, and track progress (or lack thereof) against the concrete benchmarks that have been elaborated by the Special Rapporteur.

  In this regard, our organisations urge the Council to adopt a resolution that:

  • Renews the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia for a further two years to ensure continued monitoring and reporting on the situation in the country as well as to provide technical assistance and capacity building, with a view to fully implementing Cambodia’s international human rights obligations;
  • Welcomes, and mandates enhanced monitoring and reporting on the progress in the implementation of, the 20 benchmarks presented by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia to the 51^st session of the Council;^[10]
  • Substantively and accurately reflects the situation on the ground as documented in the report of the Special Rapporteur that will be presented to the 54^th session of the Council, as well as concerns expressed by the High Commissioner and other Special Procedures in relation to, among others, the persecution of human rights defenders and political opposition including Kem Sokha, and restrictions on the rights to freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly and of association.

  We further urge your government, during the 54^th session of the Council, to speak out strongly and unequivocally against the continuing pattern of violations of human rights in Cambodia, to send a clear message that impunity for human rights violations will not be tolerated.

  We remain at your disposal for any further information.

  Sincerely,

  Amnesty International

  ARTICLE 19

  Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)

  CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation

  Human Rights Watch

  International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)

  International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)

  World Organisation against Torture (OMCT)

  ---

  ANNEX: Key developments since the adoption of the Council’s last resolution on Cambodia (HRC resolution 48/23) in October 2021:

  Trade Unionists, Peaceful Protestors and Human Rights Defenders

  In May 2023, the Phnom Penh Municipal Court convicted union leader Chhim Sithar, alongside eight members of the Labour Rights Supported Union of Khmer Employees of NagaWorld (LRSU), of “incitement to commit a felony or disturb social security” under articles 494 and 495 of the Criminal Code. Sithar was sentenced to two years in prison while others were sentenced to one to one and half years in prison and received suspended sentences or judicial supervision. Their convictions stem from peaceful strike action in December 2021 and January 2022 demanding higher wages and the reinstatement of hundreds of union members who were laid off by NagaWorld Casino.

  On 15 August 2023, the Koh Kong Provincial Court convicted 10 land rights activists of malicious denunciations and incitement to disturb social security and were sentenced to one year imprisonment and ordered to collectively pay 40 million riel (approximately USD 9,600) in compensation.^[11] These convictions follow convictions of three other Koh Kong land activists of criminal charges including defamation, incitement and malicious denunciations in relation to their peaceful defence of their communities’ land rights.^[12]

  In November 2022, the Supreme Court upheld a five-year prison term for five current and former workers of the Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC), on bribery charges that human rights groups believe to be politically motivated.

  Crackdown on and harassment of political opposition

  Cambodian authorities have pursued politically motivated prosecutions against more than 150 opposition party leaders and members, some of whom have fled the country fearing reprisals. There are at least 50 political prisoners behind bars in Cambodia.^[13]

  In March 2023, opposition leader Kem Sokha was convicted on charges of treason or conspiracy with a foreign power and was sentenced to 27 years in prison.^[14] UN human rights experts, in a joint statement, said that Sokha’s conviction was “politically motivated” and was “evidence of an ongoing pattern of the misapplication of laws to target political opponents and any critic of the Government.”^[15] They further said the entire judicial process against Sokha “has been fraught with irregularities and failed to meet the standard of either Cambodian or international human rights law.”

  Following Sokha’s conviction, the Supreme Court in March 2023 in a mass trial upheld the March 2022 conviction of 12 members of the arbitrarily dissolved Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) and a former government official on charges of ‘incitement’ and ‘plotting,’ and sentenced each to 5 years in prison with 16 months suspended sentences.

  In another mass trial in December 2022, the Phnom Penh Municipal Court convicted 36 former leaders, members and supporters of the CNRP of plotting under article 453 of the Criminal Code for allegedly assisting attempts by exiled members of the opposition movement to return to the country. This was the fourth verdict in five mass trials that have been initiated against a total of 158 leaders and supporters of the former CNRP since November 2020.^[16]

  In May 2023, months before the national elections, the National Election Committee disqualified the main opposition, the Candlelight Party – which was widely considered to be the only credible opposition to the ruling Cambodia People’s Party – from contesting in the elections in July 2023. The party was alleged to have failed to fulfil documentation including missing original paperwork proving its registration with the Ministry of Interior.

  The Candlelight Party’s disqualification was a major step in the deepening harassment and intimidation against the party and its leadership by authorities. In July 2022, Soy Chhay, a Vice President of the party, was charged with defamation under article 305 of the Criminal Code for criticising the conduct of the commune elections and the National Elections Committee. In January 2023, Thach Setha, a Vice President of the Candlelight Party, was arrested for allegedly issuing worthless cheques in a case his party said was politically motivated.

  Following the ban on the Candlelight Party, and in the lead up to the elections, Cambodian authorities intensified the attacks and harassment, including with trumped criminal charges and detention, of party members.^[17] This escalation of attacks followed the threat of physical violence against the opposition by the then Prime Minister Hun Sen in a video posted on his own Facebook page which resulted in the removal of the video by Meta.^[18]   

  Days before the election, 4 activists of the Candlelight Party were arrested and 17 other opposition activists and politicians who were fined and barred from holding political office for 20 years for allegedly spoiling ballots, encouraging people to destroy ballots, and ‘disturbing the peace’.^[19]

  Freedom of expression, media freedoms and freedom of association

  The Cambodian government has demonstrated a growing intolerance for human rights including freedom of expression, with a continuing pattern of systematic repression and criminalisation of critical voices and independent media.

  This is most clearly illustrated by the cancellation of the broadcast licence of Voice of Democracy (VoD) in February 2023. A group of UN human rights experts expressed alarm at “the revocation of VoD’s license without due process” further adding that “the revocation leaves virtually no free media outlets operating in the country.”^[20]

  In January 2023, the authorities ordered the removal of a music video by a popular rap music artist that recounts a deadly government crackdown on a workers’ protest nine years ago.^[21] The government reportedly ordered the police to prevent the dissemination of the video alleging that its “inciting contents that can contribute to instability and social disorder.”

  The cybercrime police questioned the operations director of prominent human rights NGO, LICADHO, over the group’s alleged involvement in releasing the video, as well as other NGO leaders. LICADHO removed the video from its Facebook to avoid further legal action. The authorities have not confirmed that this investigation has closed and charges could still arise from this incident.

  Further, the restrictive 2015 Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organizations (LANGO) continues to be used to restrict civil society groups. Its onerous registration requirements, reporting obligations and broad grounds for denial of registration provide opportunities for government actors to put pressure on CSOs for politically motivated reasons.

  Cambodia is currently rated “Repressed” by CIVICUS Monitor^[22] and was recently added to its Watchlist for rapid decline in civic freedoms.

  ----------------------------

   

  ^[1] A/HRC/RES/48/23 (adopted on 11 October 2021).

  ^[2] A/HRC/51/66 (18 August 2022).

  ^[3] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/07/cambodia-un-human-rights-chief-regrets-elections-held-restrictive.

  ^[4] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/08/cambodias-shrinking-democratic-space-affected-credibility-national-elections.

  ^[5] Ibid.  

  ^[6] https://forum-asia.org/?p=38445.

  ^[7] https://forum-asia.org/?p=38159.

  ^[8] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/07/cambodia-un-human-rights-chief-regrets-elections-held-restrictive

  ^[9] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/02/cambodia-un-experts-call-reinstatement-voice-democracy-say-free-media.

  ^[10] A/HRC/51/66

  ^[11] https://www.licadho-cambodia.org/flashnews.php?perm=340&english

  ^[12] https://www.licadho-cambodia.org/flashnews.php?perm=339

  ^[13] https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/interactive/political-prisoners-cambodia

  ^[14] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/03/cambodia-kem-sokha-conviction/

  ^[15] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/cambodia-un-experts-condemn-verdict-against-opposition-leader-kem-sokha

  ^[16] https://www.licadho-cambodia.org/articles/20221222/179/index.html

  ^[17] https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/07/19/cambodia-harassment-arrests-opposition-activists

  ^[18] https://forum-asia.org/?p=38382

  ^[19] https://forum-asia.org/?p=38450

  ^[20] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/02/cambodia-un-experts-call-reinstatement-voice-democracy-say-free-media

  ^[21] https://forum-asia.org/?p=37768

  ^[22] https://monitor.civicus.org/

  ---

   

• Human Rights Council: Restrictions on civil society will curtail any chance of building back better

  Statement at the 46th Session of the UN Human Rights Council

  Thank you, Madame President; High Commissioner.

  We welcome your update and strongly agree that recovering better requires ensuring participation for all. In this very difficult year, we are encouraged that civic activism has continued as people have mobilised to demand their rights.

  But across the world, civil society has been impeded in its work.  The CIVICUS Monitor shows that in the context of COVID-19 measures, protest rights have been violated and restrictions on freedom of expression continue as states enact overly broad emergency legislation that limits human rights.

  We reiterate that restrictions on civil society will curtail any chance of building back better. States should indeed be investing in protecting and promoting a free and independent civil society at this crucial time.

  The Council has the opportunity to act immediately on a number of situations where civic space is being threatened. In Sri Lanka, attacks against civil society are compounding grave failures of accountability. In Nicaragua, where ahead of elections, restrictions on civic space and expressions of dissent are likely to escalate. Myanmar, where we are inspired by the courage of people who risk lives and freedom every day to protest the coup, who continue to fear violent crackdown on dissenting voices. In India, where the government has continued its persecution of human rights defenders, student leaders, journalists and other critics, including through restrictive laws, prolonged pre-trial detention and excessive force perpetrated against protesters. 

  We call on the Council this Session to take measures to support civil society by acting now, on the situations brought before it. Situations which require immediate action.