human rights

MOZAMBIQUE: ‘The new NGO Law will be the death of the civic movement’

Portuguese

CIVICUS discusses the state of civic space and new restrictions being imposed on civil society in Mozambique with Paula Monjane, Executive Director of the Civil Society Learning and Capacity Building Centre (CESC).

CESC is a non-partisan, non-profit civil society organisation (CSO) founded in 2009 with the mission of strengthening the capacity of citizens and communities to participate actively in socio-economic and political development processes, investing in knowledge sharing, learning tools, monitoring and advocacy for public policies that respond to people’s needs.

What are the current conditions for civil society in Mozambique?

The legal, political, institutional and practical conditions under which civil society operates in Mozambique have deteriorated over time. Over the past 10 to 15 years, despite having a constitution and laws that safeguard and recognise fundamental universal rights, we have witnessed increasing curtailment of freedoms of expression and information, press freedom and freedoms of assembly and public participation. This curtailment has been practised in violation of both the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique and the global and African human rights instruments Mozambique has signed. Currently, legislation is being proposed to silence dissenting voices and people fighting for better governance of public affairs and the protection of human rights.

Freedom of the press and expression has been marked by intimidation, kidnappings and disappearances of journalists, illegal detentions and physical violence, including killings perpetrated with impunity, mainly by police officers and other security forces. In 2021 alone, the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) recorded 23 cases of violations.

In addition to these actions, there have been legislative onslaughts to limit press freedoms. In 2018, Decree 40/2018 introduced inexplicably high taxes for the licensing and registration of media companies and the accreditation of national and foreign press correspondents. In 2020 the decree was repealed due to pressure by MISA and the fact that the Constitutional Council declared it unconstitutional. But in December 2021, the government introduced a bill on media and broadcasting that would further restrict the exercise of press freedoms.

Attempts to deny permission for peaceful protests and control and suppress them have also increased. In 2022, several peaceful protests organised by feminist activists that had been notified to the relevant institutions were interfered with. In many cases activists were rounded up at police stations for no clear reason. People defending human rights have suffered reprisals, ranging from verbal and bodily threats to murder.

Elections, which have never been free or fair, have been the scene of systematic fraud, with violence committed before, during and after voting, and impunity for the state agents involved in it.

Spaces for people’s participation, which became popular in the 2000s, have been losing steam in the face of an increasingly closed political regime. People’s participation in state planning has become dependent on the will of the state official who oversees the area and the locality in question. In addition, we are witnessing a rise in controls imposed on CSOs that scrutinise the government in the areas of democracy, governance and human rights and threats they will be ‘blacklisted’.

Other restrictive measures have included changes introduced in the Criminal Code in 2014, defining defamation of senior state officials as a crime against state security and the approval of the 2022 Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Act, which overregulates CSOs.

Under the pretext of fighting terrorism, yet another proposal that restricts a fundamental right, that of freedom of association, was approved by the Council of Ministers in September 2022 and sent to the Assembly of the Republic, Mozambique’s parliament, for approval in October.

How will this new law affect CSOs in Mozambique?

The draft law establishes a legal regime for the creation, organisation and functioning of CSOs and contains several norms that violate freedom of association, despite this right being safeguarded by the constitution and international human rights treaties. It gives the government absolute and discretionary powers to ‘create’, control the functioning of, suspend and extinguish CSOs.

If the bill is approved, it will legitimise already existing practices restricting civic space, allowing the persecution of dissenting voices and organisations critical of the government, up to banning them from continuing to operate. It will be the death of the civic movement, as only organisations aligned to the ruling party will survive. Party leagues affiliated with opposition political parties and opposition political parties themselves may be at risk of extinction.

Among other things, if passed, the new law would require that statutory changes that involve changes in objectives, activities or even the name of a CSO be approved by the regulatory body, without imposing any deadline for it to issue a decision. It would impose a single template for the bylaws of all CSOs, including details on authorities, mandates, forms of operation, reporting and members’ rights, easily allowing for the criminalisation of their leaders. It would reverse the burden of proof: CSOs will have to prove they are fulfilling their objectives and functioning properly through an annual report submitted every first quarter, and will risk suspension or termination if they fail to submit two reports. This law is intrusive in an area regulated by private law as established by the constitution and also ignores the variety of associations that exist in Mozambique. In addition, it gives the government the authority to conduct monitoring visits, audit accounts, visit implementation sites, demand periodic reports and request additional documentation whenever it sees fit.

Under the guise of preventing money laundering and terrorism financing, the draft law treats CSOs as criminals from the get-go. It is also unclear how these excessive controls could actually result in greater success in the fight against terrorism financing.

Why is the Mozambican government regulating CSOs as part of the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing?

The argument that this law aims to combat money laundering does not hold up, first of all because another law was passed in July 2022, law 11/2022, which deals specifically with money laundering and terrorism financing. CSOs must comply with it and it contains a specific article dedicated to them.

Out of the 40 recommendations issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for states to adopt in the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing, only one – recommendation 8 – pertains to CSOs, and focuses on the possible need to adapt the legal framework based on risk assessment, in order to identify the sub-sector at risk, understand possible risks and develop adequate measures for mitigation and supervision based on and proportional to risk.

Additionally, the FATF has attached an extensive interpretative note to recommendation 8 and has produced a report on best practices, which mentions the need to respect international human rights law, indicates that measures should not disrupt or discourage legitimate charitable activities and notes that actions taken against non-profit organisations suspected of engaging in terrorism financing should minimise the negative impact on the innocent and legitimate beneficiaries of their services.

In October 2022, Mozambique was put on the FATF grey list, but the only action it needed to take in relation to CSOs was to conduct a terrorism financing risk assessment in line with FATF standards and use this as the basis for developing a disclosure plan. These recommendations are also in line with the assessment conducted in 2021 by the East and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, the FATF’s regional partner organisation for East and Southern Africa. But instead, the Mozambican government has presented parliament with a bill to restrict the work of CSOs. The question then is, what are its real intentions?

The Mozambican government is not alone in attempting to pass an anti-civic space law. Several African states are using FATF recommendations and international pressure as an excuse to legitimise breaches of international and regional human rights instruments and their constitutions, relying on the indifference and sometimes even the protection of some bodies that should be defending these rights.

Over the past two decades, in a context of democratic regression and a growing prevalence of authoritarian governments, the African continent has seen many laws and measures passed or proposed that restrict universal rights and civic space. According to Freedom House’s 2022 report, 24 African countries have attempted to pass anti-civil society measures and laws. Twelve have succeeded in passing them, six have failed or given up and six have initiatives pending, including Mozambique.

How is civil society responding?

Soon after the surprise approval of the draft NGO law, national, provincial and district CSOs came together in what is now a movement fighting for the right to freedom of association. Aware that this process is not merely technical, but mainly political, we embraced multiple tactics, from lobbying and advocacy with decision makers in government, parliament and national and international human rights institutions to campaigns to deepen people’s understanding of the implications of this law’s approval.

We also conducted several technical analyses and promoted national and international debates. After many efforts and difficulties, we were able to hold a two-day meeting with relevant parliamentary working committees in November 2022. This resulted in the important decision that there was need for a broad consultation with citizens and social organisations at the national level, as universal and fundamental rights are at stake. Consultations were held in all 10 provinces between 6 and 16 February 2023, organised by the Assembly of the Republic alongside the Movement of CSOs In Defence of the Right and Freedom of Association, and included the participation of over 600 CSOs that were unanimous in rejecting the draft law.

Despite these important steps, we remain concerned about the link made between the urgency to approve the law and Mozambique’s removal from the FATF grey list. This means that even if it does not correspond to what is required of Mozambique, parliament will approve the law as soon as it resumes work next March. Given the defects of the draft law, we think the time is too short for a proper revision that ensures it doesn’t violate the fundamental and universal right to freedom of association.

If it is passed, we will push for it to be declared unconstitutional. We also expect more visible action from international and regional bodies, including CSOs. Given the dimension of the problem, in Mozambique as in the continent, and because it falls under their mandates, we expect urgent condemnation from the African Union, through the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and from the United Nations, through the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on counterterrorism and human rights.

On behalf of CSOs fighting for human rights and democracy, we hope that the solidarity already shown will continue and that we will join efforts to push back against anti-civic space initiatives such as this.

Civic space in Mozambique is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with CESC through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@CescMoz on Twitter.
Myanmar remains at crisis point and impunity still persists
Statement at the 51st Session of the UN Human Rights Council

Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar

Delivered by Kyaw Win

Thank you, Mr President, and thank you Special Rapporteur for the update.

Myanmar remains at crisis point in terms of human rights, especially the assault on civic freedoms. Both the UN and human rights groups have documented allegations of crime against humanity and war crimes perpetrated by the junta, with more than two thousand individuals unlawfully killed since the attempted coup in 2021.

Peaceful expression of dissent have been met with arbitrary arrest and detention by the junta. Criminalisation of activists, journalists and lawyers on fabricated charges ranging from ‘incitement’, sedition and terrorism has persisted. Political detainees have reported the frequent use of torture and extra-judicial executions in military bases, police stations and other places of detention. Burmese Muslims on the Thai-Burma border have been rendered stateless. The junta are consistently breaching ICJ provision measures.

Despite these documented crimes, impunity still persists and we call on the Council to ensure advancement of accountability.

Despite the appalling executions of four pro-democracy activists by the junta in August this year and the global outrage, more political prisoners are at risk of facing the death penalty and human rights violations have continued unabated. In this environment, civil society requires even more support and protection from the international community.

We ask the Special Rapporteur of strategies he has identified to enhance civic space protection inside the country, and particularly the role of UN agencies and UN member states in supporting both your mandate and supporting local civil society and human rights defenders.

Civic space in Myanmar is rated as "Repressed" by the CIVICUS Monitor
Myanmar: As the atrocities mount, so must the momentum towards ensuring accountability
Statement at the 50th Session of the UN Human Rights Council

Interactive Dialogue with the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar

June 2022

Delivered by Kyaw Win, Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN)

Thank you, Mr. President and Special Rapporteur.

Since the attempted coup on 1 February 2021 by the Myanmar military junta, the criminalisation of activists and journalists on trumped up charges of incitement, sedition and terrorism by secret military tribunals has persisted. Human rights groups have documented the increasing use of torture or cruel, inhumane and degrading punishment of political prisoners in detention.

Rohingya and Muslim minorities have also been subjected to tightened restrictions on their fundamental freedoms and are increasingly at risk of being subjected to further atrocity crimes. The junta and its supporters continue to use divisive and hateful rhetoric aimed at marginalising and inciting violence against the Rohingya and Muslim minorities.

The junta continues to deny the Rohingya the ability to live free and dignified lives by further restricting their freedom of movement. Every year, the junta has arrested and detained nearly a thousand Rohingya people, including women and children, for fleeing oppression in Arakan state. A safe and dignified return for Rohingya refugees will not be possible while these conditions are in place.

Despite previous findings by the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar showing widespread and systematic human rights violations, some amounting to crimes against humanity and genocide, impunity remains nearly absolute. As long as this remains so, unyielding repression of activists and oppression of minority communities will continue unabated.

We call on the UN and its member states to take all possible measures to hold General Min Aung Hlaing, other senior military leaders and members of SAC accountable for their crimes and to cut off the junta from all revenue and weapons streams which allow it to continue its genocidal operations.

We ask the Special Rapporteur what immediate actions he suggests for States to protect those on the ground and further accountability.

We thank you.

Civic space in Myanmr is rated as "Repressed" by the CIVICUS Monitor.
Myanmar: Civic space regresses further after three years of sustained junta repression
A model of Insein prison, where thousands of political prisoners have been detained, is seen at the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) office in Mae Sot, Thailand. REUTERS/Soe Zeya Tun

Three years on from the Feb 2021 coup, the assault on civic space by the junta has persisted. In 2023, the CIVICUS Monitor documented the ongoing criminalization of activists and protesters, the silencing of journalists and increasing control of the media, the targeting of lawyers and torture and ill-treatment of political prisoners. Our organisation has also documented digital repression by the junta, the blocking of humanitarian workers and continued violations against the Rohingya. As a result of this, Myanmar’s civic space rating was downgraded from ‘repressed’ to ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor in March 2023.

Criminalisation of activists

Over the year, the CIVICUS Monitor continued to document the criminalization of activists for terrorism, incitement and high treason.

In February 2023, a military court sentenced Ko Hein Htet aka Ko Po Po, a student activist of the North Okkalapa students’ union, to life in prison for ‘incitement’ and terrorism.   In the same month former student leader and democracy activist Ko Lin Htet Naing, aka Ko James was given an additional five years in prison for terrorism. On 22 March, a court inside Insein Prison sentenced Ko Kaung Sett Paing, a member of Yangon’s North Okkalapa students’ union, to life imprisonment for ‘incitement’. He was then sentenced to death on 25 April for terrorism.

In April 2023, the junta sentenced jailed protest leader Ko Wai Moe Naing (pictured above) to an additional 20 years in prison on trumped up charges of robbery, rioting and carrying a deadly weapon in a crowd. On 19 May 2023, he was sentenced to another 20 years’ imprisonment for committing high treason.

In April 2023, Kachin Baptist leader Reverend Hkalam Samson was sentenced to six years in prison on charges of terrorism, unlawful association and inciting opposition to the military regime. In May 2023, a court in Insein Prison sentenced student activist Banyar Soe Htet to an additional 10 years in prison for funding terrorism , meaning he is set to serve a total of 84 years.

In June 2023, the junta sentenced a male LGBTQI+ activist to 10 years in prison for terrorism. Justin Min Hein was the president of the LGBTQ Union in the country’s central Mandalay region,   and was a leader of several anti-junta activities. In July 2023, the Eastern Yangon District Court sentenced a student activist, Nyan Win Htet to a further five years in prison for alleged terrorism.

In October 2023, the Monywa Prison Court sentenced human rights defender Man Zar Myay Mon to 11 years in prison, on three counts under the Counter-Terrorism Law. He is an environmental and land rights defender, a leading figure of peaceful anti-coup protests in Chaung-U Township, Sagaing Region, following the military coup.

Arrest and jailing of protesters

Protesters continued to mobilise over the year despite the restrictive environment. Some faced arrests and prosecution for their activism.

In March 2023, a junta court sentenced 13 youth activists to three years of hard labour in prison each for “incitement” after they organised a flash protest in September 2022 against military rule that authorities broke up by ploughing into them with vehicles.

According to Burma Coup Watch, the junta arrested at least 165 people throughout the country for allegedly joining the “Flower Strike” to celebrate State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s 78th birthday on 19 June 2023. Among those arrested are women who were wearing flowers.

On 8 August 2023, civilians across Myanmar commemorated the 35th anniversary of the pro-democracy uprising as they held protests against the ruling military junta. Protesters gathered in Yangon, Sagaing, Mandalay and Tanintharyi regions holding red umbrellas, putting up posters with anti-regime slogans, and burning mock-ups of the newly issued 20,000-kyat note to mark the anniversary of “8888.” Three protesters were arrested in Sagaing Region’s Monywa Township when the junta opened fire on six young activists commemorating the anniversary.

Silencing of journalists and increasing control of the media

Journalists and media outlets have continued to be targeted by the junta. Kyaw Min Swe (picture above), the editor-in-chief of The Voice Weekly magazine was charged in April 2023 with ‘incitement’. In June 2023, the junta revoked the Ayeyarwaddy Times’ media license for allegedly breaching Article 8 of the Publishing Act, which bans disseminating information that “disrupts public peace and tranquility”.

In June 2023, the Western Yangon District Court sentenced Thaung Win, The Irrawaddy’s publisher, to five years in prison under Article 124-A of the penal code, which covers penalties for the crime of sedition. In September 2023, a military tribunal sentenced photojournalist Sai Zaw Thaike of independent news outlet Myanmar Now to 20 years in prison with hard labour over his coverage of the aftermath of a deadly cyclone after convicting him on various charges, including sedition. Sai Zaw Thaike was provided with no legal representation throughout his detention. There were no court hearings or other proceedings held inside the Insein Prison compound before his conviction.

On 30 October 2023, soldiers arrested Development Media Group reporter Htet Aung while he was taking photos of soldiers making donations to Buddhist monks during a religious festival in the Rakhine State capital, Sittwe. On 11 December 2023, Aung San Oo and Myo Myint Oo, two Myanmar journalists from the news agency Dawei Watch, were arrested at their home in the middle of the night by several police and military officers in the southern town of Mergui.

In November 2023, the junta took control of the authority in charge of overseeing television and radio media. It also amended the law without discussion to take control of the Broadcasting Council, the authority in charge of overseeing television and radio media.

Lawyers targeted

In June 2023, Human Rights Watch published a report  highlighting a pattern of harassment, surveillance, arrests, and in some cases torture, of lawyers since the coup, particularly those taking on political cases.

At least 32 lawyers have been arrested and placed in pre-trial detention with little evidence supporting the charges against them. Many have been charged with incitement and terrorism in summary trials that do not meet international fair trial standards.

Lawyers also reported ill treatment or torture of detained colleagues. Inside special courts, lawyers and their clients face numerous problems, including being forbidden to privately communicate or discuss their cases prior to hearings. Lawyers said that junta officials frequently obstructed or prevented them from carrying out their professional duties, denying suspects their rights to due process and a fair trial.

Torture and ill-treatment of political prisoners

Political prisoners continued to face harsh treatment in prisons. A report by AAPPB published in July 2023 highlighted that from the moment of their arrest they are subjected to interrogation which amounts to torture and inhumane treatment. It also found that even after their release, political prisoners are often left traumatised.

In August 2023, Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported that prison guards at Thayarwady prison beat 31 political prisoners for marking the country’s Martyrs’ Day, with four having to be treated for their injuries in the prison hospital. In the same month at least 20 political prisoners in Mandalay Region’s Myingyan Prison were tortured while in solitary confinement. The prison authorities also used tasers to inflict further injuries on the prisoners.

In September 2023, Myanmar Now reported that authorities had been abusing political prisoners after moving them to Mandalay’s Obo Prison from facilities elsewhere in Myanmar. After they were transferred from Monywa Prison, located 80 miles west of Mandalay, 90 male and 11 female inmates were beaten and tortured. Prison authorities allegedly kicked inmates in the face while wearing army boots, shocked them with tasers and beat them with batons. At least 50 were left with lasting injuries.

Digital repression by the junta

Activists have also been targeted online for their activism. In March 2023, UN experts said that the military junta was orchestrating an online campaign of terror, and weaponising social media platforms to harass and incite violence against activists. Women have been targeted and severely harmed. They noted that women are often targets of so-called “doxxing”, the act of publishing private information, including names and addresses, about individuals without their consent. These attacks are frequently accompanied by calls for violence or arrest by junta forces. “Doxxed” women have also been accused of having sexual relations with Muslim men or supporting the Muslim population – a common ultranationalist, discriminatory and Islamophobic narrative in Myanmar.

Some activists have also been criminalised for their online expression. In June 2023, the junta arrested and prosecuted 50 people for allegedly posting anti-regime content on social media platforms. According to junta announcements, people had been prosecuted under antiterrorism laws for comments they made on Facebook, Telegram and TikTok.

Freedom House, in October 2023 said that the Myanmar junta “continued to repress internet freedom in the face of ongoing civil disobedience, political opposition, and armed resistance during the coverage period.” The groups said that “localized internet shutdowns, data price hikes, online trolling, and arbitrary prosecutions that result in long prison terms have created a high-risk and hostile online space for the public at large.

Blocking of humanitarian workers

The junta obstructed humanitarian aid in May 2023 following Cyclone Mocha, putting thousands of lives at risk. According to HRW, junta authorities refused to authorise travel and visas for aid workers, release urgent supplies from customs and warehouses, or relax onerous and unnecessary restrictions on lifesaving assistance.

HRW interviewed aid workers and people in affected communities who described how the junta’s failed relief response has been deliberate. Many aid workers, local activists and villagers expressed the view that the junta used the cyclone response to legitimise and bolster its control.

On 8th June 2023, after weeks of appeals by humanitarian organisations for unrestricted access, the junta formalised its obstruction by issuing a blanket suspension of travel authorisations for aid groups in Rakhine State, reversing initial approvals granted in early June.

Rohingyas at risk

Human rights groups said that the junta is continuing to ignore the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) orders to protect the Rohingya as “state policies are pushing hundreds of thousands of people to the brink of bare survival in Rakhine State”. Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK) said in a new report published in November 2023 that Rohingya people 'live increasingly desperate lives amid widespread restrictions on humanitarian aid by the junta as well as their freedom of movement, access to healthcare and livelihoods. At the same time, the junta and armed groups have tortured, killed and arbitrarily detained Rohingya people'.

Actions from the international community

ASEAN has continued to fail to address the human rights violations in Myanmar. The five-point consensus agreement decided by Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) leaders in Jakarta in April 2021 has seen no tangible progress in addressing the crisis and violations by the junta. In May 2023, civil society organisations, launched a position paper to call for a review and reframing of the five-Point Consensus and the bloc’s current approach. In September 2023, ASEAN established a troika mechanism that would allow the immediate past, current and incoming ASEAN chairs to manage the crisis.

The UN on the other hand has done more to document violations and seek to hold the junta accountable. In March 2023, a report published by the UN Human Rights Office found that the junta has created a perpetual human rights crisis through the continuous use of violence, including the killing, arbitrary arrest, torture and enforced disappearance of anti-coup opponents. In April 2023, a resolution was adopted by the UN Human Rights Council by consensus that unequivocally condemned the junta’s continuing violence against civilians and the democratic resistance. However, the resolution failed to explicitly call for a comprehensive arms embargo;

In July 2023, Volker Türk, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, said Myanmar was in deadly freefall into even deeper violence. He highlighted how the voices of civil society and journalists are being strangled and that arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances and torture continue unabated. In September 2023, Nicholas Koumjian, head of the investigation team of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) said "the frequency and intensity of war crimes and crimes against humanity has only increased in recent months.” In October 2023, Tom Andrews, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, highlighted in his report to the UN General Assembly the junta’s attacks against civilians, including reports of mass killings, beheadings, torture, sexual and gender-based violence, forced labour, and the use of human shields by junta forces. In December 2023, the UN Special Rapporteur urged UN Member States to “save lives endangered by an intensifying military conflict in Myanmar by taking immediate measures to stop the flow of weapons that the military junta is using to commit probable war crimes and crimes against humanity.”.

A number of countries have also imposed sanctions. In February 2023, the European Union issued sanctions targeting the military and associates facilitating their crimes. In March 2023, The United States Treasury Department announced additional sanctions on Myanmar to prevent supplies of jet fuel from reaching the military in response to airstrikes on populated areas and other atrocities.

In June 2023, the US imposed sanctions on Myanmar’s defence ministry and two banks while in July 2023, the EU imposed a seventh round of restrictive measures against six individuals and one entity In August, the United States allowed for sanctions to be imposed on any foreign individual or entity determined to be operating in the jet fuel sector of Myanmar’s economy.

In October 2023, the US imposed a ban on financial transactions involving the Myanmar state-owned oil company, the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE). The US also announced additional sanctions on five individuals and three entities involved in the junta’s abuses, in coordination with Canada and the United Kingdom. In November 2023, the EU approved additional restrictive measures against four persons and two companies generating income for the military regime and providing arms and other equipment used by the armed forces.

Recommendations to ASEAN and the international community:
- Call upon the junta to release all individuals arbitrarily detained, human rights defenders, journalists, protesters, politicians and civil society members and refrain from using violence, halt arbitrary arrests against protesters which violates the rights to peaceful assembly under international law;
- Call on the junta to immediately end and prevent further crimes under international law and other human rights violations, including all forms of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
- Raise concerns publicly in multilateral fora including the upcoming Human Rights Council, and renew the Human Rights Council resolution on the situation of human rights in Myanmar to maintain the crucial UN Special Rapporteur mandate;
- Refrain from any attempt to further legitimise the junta and instead engage with the National Unity Government (NUG) as the legitimate government of Myanmar, including in multilateral fora such as the UN Human Rights Council and General Assembly;
- Urge the Security Council to immediately impose a comprehensive arms embargo on Myanmar, refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court and impose targeted financial sanctions against senior officials suspected of responsibility for crimes under international law and serious violations;
- Exercise universal and other forms of jurisdiction to investigate any person who may reasonably be suspected of committing crimes against humanity, war crimes or other crimes under international law;
- Immediately suspend the direct and indirect supply, sale, and transfer, including transit, and brokering of arms and aviation fuel to the junta and impose targeted sanctions against individuals and entities involved in the arms and aviation fuel supply chain;
- Take proactive steps in providing humanitarian assistance, particularly in ethnic and ceasefire areas and condemn blockades by the junta;
- Provide material and diplomatic support to civil society, journalists and activists at risk and support multilateral initiatives which ensure international scrutiny on Myanmar and further accountability and justice for crimes under international law.
Civic space in Myanmar is rated as "Closed" by the CIVICUS Monitor
Myanmar: civil society groups raise concern over ASEAN’s approach to the ongoing human rights crisis
To: ASEAN Leaders

H.E. Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Mu’izzaddin Waddaulah, Prime Minister of Brunei Darussalam
H.E. Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia
H.E. Joko Widodo, President of the Republic of Indonesia
H.E. Thongloun Sisoulith, Prime Minister of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic
H.E. Dato’ Sri Ismail Sabri bin Yaakob, Prime Minister of Malaysia
H.E. Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos, Jr., President of the Republic of the Philippines
H.E. Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore
H.E. Prayut Chan-o-cha, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand
H.E. Phạm Minh Chính, Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam

Subject: Open letter from civil society organizations concerning ASEAN’s approach to the ongoing political, human rights and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar

Your Excellencies,

We, the 457 undersigned Myanmar, regional and international civil society organizations, call on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (‘ASEAN’) to cease inviting all political and non-political representatives of the Myanmar military junta to all summits and meetings, and revise the mandate of the Special Envoy to Myanmar. We further call on ASEAN under the Indonesian Chairship, as a regional bloc and as individual states, to move beyond the failed Five-Point Consensus (‘5PC’), enable effective humanitarian assistance, and publicly recognize the National Unity Government.

For the past 20 months since the failed coup, ASEAN has been largely ineffective in responding to the escalating crisis in Myanmar. ASEAN’s “dialogue” demonstrates a selective approach to the 5PC and yields no results to stop the ongoing crisis in Myanmar. Despite being put on notice for non-compliance with the 5PC in a joint communique in August 2022, the junta has continued committing atrocity crimes against the Myanmar people. Just one month after the warning, the junta’s airstrikes on a school in Sagaing Region killed 11 children.

The exclusion of the junta from ASEAN Summits in October 2021 and November 2022 was a step in the right direction. We also note positive stances taken by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore, and welcome the bloc’s statement in July 2022. Nevertheless, any engagement with the junta is in breach of the ASEAN Charter. The crimes that are being committed by the Myanmar military amount to acts of a terrorist organization under international legal definitions and Myanmar’s domestic laws. The Myanmar military stands accused of atrocity crimes at the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, and under a universal jurisdiction case in Argentina. We are alarmed that this illegal entity holds sway in ASEAN’s actions.

READ THE FULL LETTER

Civic space in Myanmar is rated as "Repressed" by the CIVICUS Monitor
Myanmar: Execution of four democracy activists highlights junta’s brutality
We, the undersigned, strongly condemn the execution carried out by the military junta against four pro-democracy activists in Myanmar. We call on the international community, including ASEAN states, to publicly denounce these grave violations committed by the junta and to hold them accountable for their crimes.
Myanmar: International action needed to restore democracy and protect rights

🇲🇲#Myanmar: International action needed to restore democracy and protect rights.

🇺🇳Our statement at #HRC46 - country is currently on the @CIVICUSMonitor Watchlist | @RapporteurUn @YangheeLeeSKKU @EUMyanmar @forum_asia @cvdom2021 pic.twitter.com/PP6mBQ3OjP
— CIVICUS (@CIVICUSalliance) March 12, 2021

Statement at the 46th Session of the UN Human Rights Council
Myanmar: Restrictions on civil society hamper humanitarian action
Statement at the 53rd Session of the UN Human Rights Council

Interactive Dialogue on written update of the High Commissioner on Myanmar

Delivered by Kyaw Win

Thank you Mr. President,

CIVICUS and the Burma Human Rights Network thank the High Commissioner for his report on the human rights impact of the denial of humanitarian access in Myanmar.

Since the coup, more than a million people, especially from ethnic and religious minority communities, have been displaced by the military junta’s indiscriminate airstrikes and systematic atrocities. During the past two years when humanitarian needs have been acute, the junta has routinely and deliberately blocked, confiscated, and destroyed lifesaving aid to prevent it from reaching people in need. Further, the junta’s amendments to the 2014 NGO registration law formalised further restrictions on civil society and humanitarian actions including banking, procurement of aid items and movement of aid workers.

Compounding these issues, on 14 May, Cyclone Mocha devastated communities in Chin, Rakhine, Kachin states and Magway and Sagaing Regions, impacting over 1.6 million people. The most severely hit areas were Rathedaung and Sittwe townships in Rakhine State. In the wake of the cyclone, the junta issued a notice blocking humanitarian organisations from delivering deliver life-saving aid to impacted communities in Rakhine State where 130,000 Rohingya remain trapped under apartheid like conditions. The cyclone has provided the junta with an opportunity to continue its genocidal campaign against the Rohingya.

Despite these restrictions, civil society groups, diaspora communities, Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations and the National Unity Government have been at the forefront to effectively provide emergency aid risking death, arrest, torture, and harassment. They must be supported to continue to do so.

BHRN and CIVICUS call on the Council and the UN to take steps to protect humanitarian groups and provide flexible direct funding to them to support their ability to assist the population-in-need.

We thank you.

Civic space in Myanmar is rated as "closed" by the CIVICUS Monitor
Myanmar: The root causes of violations against the Rohingya & other minorities cannot be addressed without accountability
Statements at the 50th Session of the UN Human Rights Council

CIVICUS and our partner, Burma Human Rights Network delivered two statements on the situation of Rohingya and other minorities in and outside Myanmar, please read them below:

Interactive Dialogue on High Commisioner Oral update on Myanmar

Delivered by Kyaw Win, Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN)

Thank you, Mr. President.

CIVICUS and the Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN) thanks the High Commissioner for her update.

We remain deeply concerned about the situation and lack of accountability for violations against the Rohingya and other minorities inside and outside Myanmar.

Monitoring by BHRN has found that arbitrary arrests and restriction of movement continue to occur. On 31 March, ten Rohingyas were arrested on a bus at a checkpoint in Ann Township in Rakhine State by a joint team of military, police, and immigration officials. On 29 April, four Rohingya Muslim women were arrested at a checkpoint in the same township.

BHRN has documented a steady increase in anti-Muslim hate speech and disinformation in the country. On 2 April, a post on the social media site Facebook included fabricated information, suggesting that jihadists support the pro-democratic activities in Myanmar. The post was liked by hundreds of Facebook users. On 21 April another post on Facebook accused the pro-democracy group People Defence Force (PDF) of killing Buddhist monks with the support of Muslims.

It is abundantly clear that the conditions are not in place for the safe voluntary return of displaced Rohingya communities, and will not be so as long as the military junta holds power, and we call on the Council to support a resolution which reflects these serious concerns.

We further call on States to take proactive steps in providing humanitarian assistance through local networks, particularly in ethnic and ceasefire areas, protect new Rohingya asylum seekers and provide material and diplomatic support to civil society, journalists and activists at risk.

Thank you.

The root causes of violations against the Rohingya and other minorities cannot be addressed without accountability

Panel discussion on the situation of Rohingya and other minorities in Myanmar

Delivered by Kyaw Win

Thank you, Mr President, and thank you to the panellists.

CIVICUS and the Burma Human Rights Network are deeply concerned about the situation of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar.

The Burmese military has increased its attacks on marginalised minorities throughout the country since the coup in February 2021. It frequently uses arson attacks on minority areas. Civilians have regularly been shot arbitrarily by the military in areas where no conflict or armed groups are present. Hatred and hate speech against Rohingya Muslims and other minorities has persisted.

If mass atrocities, including genocide, can be perpetrated by the military against the Rohingya, other minorities are at risk. Tensions in Chin State, too, have escalated since the coup, with the junta building up their troop presence in the state. Chin State is majority Christian and ethnic minority.

The efforts by the international community so far have not altered the junta’s course or stopped them from attacking civilians and the restrictions, arrests and attacks on civil society and journalists has made it increasingly difficult to monitor and document these crimes.

We call on the international community to stem the flow of arms and finances towards the military junta by imposing sanctions on all enterprises that the military directly profits from, particularly the energy sector, and to support a global arms embargo to prevent the military from resupplying weapons that they will use to harm and kill innocent civilians and target minority groups.

We stress again that the conditions for safe, dignified voluntary return are not in place, and have no prospect of being so while the junta remains in a position of power. The root causes of violations against the Rohingya and other minorities cannot be addressed without accountability.

We ask panellists what immediate steps can be taken to protect minority groups in Myanmar and to support civil society groups working on this?

Civic space in Myanmar is rated as "Repressed" by the CIVICUS Monitor.
Negotiations for a Binding Treaty on Business and Human Rights
Background:
The intergovernmental working group was mandated to elaborate an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights.
NETHERLANDS: ‘A strong sense of solidarity endures with those who are left-behind’
CIVICUS speaks about snap elections taking place in the Netherlands on 22 November with Niels Hoogerheijde, Policy Advisor at Partos, the Dutch membership body for civil society organisations (CSOs) working in international development.
NETHERLANDS: ‘No government should allow transfers of weapons to a state committing war crimes’
CIVICUS speaks with Frank Slijper, Arms Trade project lead at PAX, about a recent court victory in a case brought jointly with Oxfam Novib and the Rights Forum against the Dutch government for exporting arms to Israel that are being used in the assault on Gaza.

PAX is the largest peace organisation in the Netherlands. It works to protect civilians against acts of war, end armed violence and build inclusive peace.

Why did you bring a lawsuit against the Dutch government?

We brought this lawsuit to stop our government exporting military equipment to Israel. PAX does research into the arms trade in countries that violate human rights and approaches those who finance it by appealing to their social responsibility. Oxfam and the Rights Forum share our values, so we decided to sue the government together. We had previously called on it to stop giving Israel free rein in Gaza but the government had not acted on our calls, choosing instead to continue supplying Israel with F-35 fighter jet parts despite the rapidly deteriorating situation.

No government should allow transfers of weapons to a state committing war crimes. If there was ever a clear case of why this is so, this is it.

Given the urgency of the situation we had to act quickly, and so we did, Merely four weeks after we learned about these exports to Israel, through a government leak posted by the NRC newspaper, we were in court making our case.

What did the court decide?

On 12 February, the Court of Appeal in The Hague ordered the Dutch government to stop all transfers of F-35 fighter jet parts to Israel within seven days, given the clear risk of violations of international humanitarian law by Israel. The court ruled that after 7 October 2023 the minister of Foreign Affairs was obliged to reassess the licence for the export and transit of F-35 parts to Israel and that this assessment should conclude that further export and transit must no longer be permitted. In addition, the court stated that such an assessment cannot be ‘weighed’ against other interests such as potential damage to diplomatic relations or economic interests. It also made clear that any ‘general’ arms transfer licence for an indefinite period must include a reassessment trigger in case the situation changes drastically, because otherwise the very idea of arms export controls would be undermined.

The court also made clear that violations of international humanitarian law don’t need to be proved and that a ‘clear risk’ of such violations suffices. It found it ‘sufficiently plausible’ that F-35 fighter jets were involved in violations of international humanitarian law while also pointing out that there’s no requirement to prove a direct link between a specific weapons transfer and the alleged violations of international humanitarian law.

Importantly, the court rejected claims by the government that information provided by human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and by United Nations (UN) special rapporteurs could not be credibly verified. Instead, it said that such sources must be taken ‘extremely seriously’.

It also reaffirmed the very important role of civil society organisations in monitoring and ensuring the implementation of state obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

The government had a week to comply with the court ruling and said it would do so. Sadly, however, it didn’t agree with the Appeals Court verdict and announced it would take the case to the Supreme Court for a final decision.

Are you taking any further steps in relation with the Dutch government’s approach to the Israel-Palestine conflict?

The Dutch government claims it is taking a balanced approach, speaking to both sides, when in fact it has refused to clearly condemn Israel, voted alongside the USA against UN resolutions that condemn Israel and demand an immediate ceasefire, and has refused to stop supplying weapons to Israel. Yes, it has enabled airdrops of medical supplies, but that is nothing more than a basic humanitarian obligation.

In all the years our government has taken this supposedly balanced approach, not much has been achieved and a solution has not come any closer. More Palestinians have been forcibly displaced and illegal Israeli settlements have grown. We keep advocating for practical steps and measures to stop these violations and for an end to military cooperation between the Netherlands and Israel.

For now, we are awaiting the last part of the legal process, and we have no choice other than keep defending our case, as we have successfully done so far.

Do you expect this court ruling to have any international repercussions?

The Appeals Court’s broad analysis of states’ obligations under the ATT and the European Union Common Position on Arms Exports makes this ruling an important source for any other organisation considering litigation. This case has been incredibly important for the future of arms export control, because it is the first time Dutch judges have set out so clearly and in such detail the government’s obligations to implement export controls. Governments that export arms must ensure that their exports comply with obligations under the ATT.

Civic space in the Netherlands is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with PAX through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow it onTwitter andInstagram.
NETHERLANDS: ‘We call on potential coalition partners to stand up for our country’s international reputation’
CIVICUS speaks about thefar-right victory in the snap elections that took place in the Netherlands on 22 November with Niels Hoogerheijde, Policy Advisor at Partos, the Dutch membership body for civil society organisations (CSOs) working in international development.

Did the election victory of the far right come as a surprise?

It did come as a surprise. Usually the far-right Party for Freedom (PVV) achieves increasingly good results in the final days of the election campaign only to underperform on election day. This is what we expected to happen this time, so when we saw a PVV poll surge in the days prior to 22 November, we thought the numbers were inflated and its victory was not a realistic possibility – just as with previous elections. This year, however, the PVV did perform as the polls forecasted.

The result may be viewed as part of a wider regional trend. As far as Europe goes, far-right politicians are using migration or blaming migrants for all the crises that their countries are going through. The government of Italy is led by Giorgia Meloni of Brothers of Italy. Support for Marine Le Pen’s National Rally is growing in France. Reform UK, the party launched by Nigel Farage, is also rising in the polls. The common denominator of all of these is the use of a negative narrative about migrants to win people over – and it is working.

How have civil society and progressives reacted to the election results?

The day after the election results were announced, there were various demonstrations across the country in favour of human rights and in solidarity with asylum seekers, LGBTQI+ people and particularly the Dutch Muslim community, who have been the PVV’s main target for years.

The PVV has put forward despicable proposals that are not only unconstitutional but also truly inhumane. People, including in civil society, have strong fears about what could happen to Dutch Muslims, asylum seekers and other excluded groups if we get a government led by the PVV.

In addition, there are worries about the Netherlands’ international reputation. The PVV wants a Dutch exit from the European Union and wants to abolish the entire budget for development cooperation.

How much leeway would a coalition government led by PVV leader Geert Wilders have to implement its promised policies?

Throughout the campaign – and his whole political career – Wilders has made outrageous and even unconstitutional promises of what he will do if elected. But we shouldn’t forget that he will not govern alone. He will need to reach agreements to form a working majority in parliament.

What he is able to do will truly depend on the composition of the government. It is too early to tell because the elections were only three weeks ago. But the government formation process started that same week. Many things have happened since, involving many politicians. I think three parties on top of the PVV are bound to be involved in the new government in some way.

It is very unlikely that the largest party in the current caretaker government, the conservative People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, will not have any role in the future government. It used to be the main ruling party, and even as a junior coalition partner, its presence will still be important. The other two relevant parties are the New Social Contract (NSC) and the Farmers and Citizens Party (BBB).

We might see the formation of a majority coalition including the four of them, or a minority coalition government composed of only some of these parties, seeking the support of other parties on specific topics. For the moment, politicians from all parties are making statements on conditions to work with other parties. Such statements are all part of the negotiation process so they should not be taken at face value but with the strategic goals of the respective party in mind.

What can be done to prevent regressive policies materialising?

Wilders’ proposals range from the ridiculous to the outrageous. They include an entry ban for asylum seekers, the closure of mosques and Islamic schools and outlawing the Quran. In the past, he has also proposed to create a Ministry of Deportation, to introduce a tax on women wearing hijab and to shoot young criminals of Moroccan descent in the knees. All of this is very well documented and most of it is unconstitutional.

His key issue, the one that has made him most popular, concerns migrants and asylum seekers. Wilders wants to shut down the asylum system and not let any new asylum seekers into the Netherlands. By doing this, the Netherlands would breach its obligations under international law to provide safe haven for refugees.

It is crazy to think if he had received a majority of parliamentary seats, these policies would have already materialised. As he lacks such a majority, Wilders must negotiate with other parties. And this is where we and other civil society groups come in, talking with party representatives about policy priorities and people’s needs and concerns. Potential coalition partners can play a crucial role, which is why Partos is calling on the BBB and NSC to stand up for the Netherlands’ international reputation.

We have always been an outward-looking country that prides itself on its international reputation and tries to uphold international law. The city of The Hague, the site of our national government, profiles itself as the capital of international law, peace and justice. If you are truly committed to those values, you cannot abolish development cooperation altogether or do away with international treaties. You must respect the rule of law, the Dutch Constitution and our country’s international commitments.

Civic space in the Netherlands is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Partos through itswebpage and follow @PartosNL onLinkedIn andTwitter.
NEW CALEDONIA: ‘The French parliamentary elections will have an impact on our future’
CIVICUS speaks with Nathalie Tehio, president of the Human Rights League, aboutrecent protests against electoral changes imposed by the French government in New Caledonia.

In May 2024, protests broke out in New Caledonia after the French parliament passed a law that would have allowed more non-Indigenous people to vote. The French government presented the measure as a democratic reform, but many Indigenous Kanaks, who make up around 40 per cent of the population, saw the prospects of independence receding. When clashes between pro-independence protesters and police led to riots, the French authorities declared a state of emergency, deployed troops and banned TikTok. The French government suspended the electoral changes, but has recently detained some pro-independence leaders, and the situation remains tense.

What is New Caledonia’s political status and what how does this mean for its governance?

The 1988 Matignon-Oudinot Accords, the 1998 Nouméa Accords and the 1999 Organic Law gave New Caledonia special status within the French Republic, transferring many powers other than those of sovereignty – the army, the police, the judiciary and the currency – as part of a scheme of ‘shared sovereignty’. A title on ‘transitional provisions for New Caledonia’ was added to the French Constitution.

This title provided for the freezing of the electorate for three planned referendums on self-determination and provincial elections, which determine the composition of the Congress that elects the government of New Caledonia. To vote in provincial elections, you have to be born before 1998 and have lived in New Caledonia for 10 years. Other elections follow French national rules.

What led to recent protests?

The Nouméa Accord provided for a gradual transfer of sovereignty, with three referendums on self-determination to be held in 2018, 2020 and 2021. The pro-independence Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS) had called for the third referendum but then rejected the proposed date because of the pandemic that hit New Caledonia late. In 2021, many families were in mourning and a campaign could not be properly conducted due to restrictions.

The French government maintained the date of the referendum, and the FLNKS called for a boycott. This call was widely followed by Kanak people, resulting in a turnout of only 43.90 per cent, compared to 85.64 per cent for the second referendum in 2020. In the Loyalty Islands, 95.46 per cent of voters, mainly Kanak people, abstained, and in the Northern Province 83.38 per cent did so. Despite this, the French government recognised the results and declared the Nouméa Accord null and void, urging local politicians to reach a new agreement, specifically on the composition of the electoral body.

In the absence of an agreement, the government decided to change the make-up of the electorate by amending the constitution, allowing anyone who has lived in New Caledonia for 10 years to vote in provincial elections. This caused tensions as Kanak people, already in a minority as a result of colonisation and the nickel boom of the 1970s, saw this as a threat to their representation in institutions and the conclusion of the decolonisation process.

After the 2021 referendum, the Caledonian Union, a FLNKS member, set up a mobilisation group, the Field Action Coordinating Cell (CCAT), which has organised protests against the electoral change. The French government ignored our warnings about the dangers of forcefully passing the amendment, and protests degenerated into blockades and fires in and around the capital, Nouméa, leading to the imposition of a curfew, a state of emergency and the blocking of TikTok. The army was deployed. There are reports of police abuse and people forming anti-Kanak militias.

How did Kanak leaders react?

Kanak leaders called for calm but were not listened to, nor were traditional leaders or the president of the government.

The FLNKS refused to talk to the three senior officials who accompanied French president Emmanuel Macron on a whirlwind visit and called for a political solution to the conflict.

The president of the Southern Province and a former deputy made fiery statements on the question of links with France. Another current in the loyalist – anti-independence – camp, represented by another ex-deputy and the mayor of Nouméa, is in favour of dialogue and the search for a new institutional agreement. Some independence supporters back dialogue with this faction of the Loyalist Party. The Oceanian Awakening party, which represents people from the Wallis and Futuna islands, considers the 2021 referendum to be ‘political nonsense’ and could play a role in dialogue if the French government adopts a position of neutrality, as promised in the preamble to the Nouméa Agreement.

How is civil society promoting peace in New Caledonia?

The Human Rights League was instrumental in the signing of the Matignon Accords at a time when civil war had claimed over 90 lives. But recently the Minister of the Interior criticised us and ignored our warnings. We hope the next government will listen to voices for peace.

The unrest has so far mostly been confined to Nouméa and the surrounding communes, leaving the islands and northern provinces largely untouched. This shows that the peace process has forged links between communities. In 2022, a statue symbolising the handshake between loyalist politician Jacques Lafleur and pro-independence leader Jean-Marie Tjibaou was unveiled in the Place de la Paix (Koo We Joka). Women called for a peace rally on that square.

New Caledonian civil society, which is deeply attached to this country, can still work towards a common destiny if France respects its commitment to the decolonisation process as set out in the Nouméa Accord.

France must carry out impartial investigations to restore peace through legal channels. Both pro-independence and loyalist politicians must commit themselves to rebuilding a common destiny and fighting the social inequalities at the root of the revolt of young Kanaks.

Civil society must influence elected representatives to work towards this goal and demand impartial justice. The decision to transfer CCAT leaders to provisional detention in France, more than 17,000 km away, to the detriment of their private and family lives and their rights to defence, was followed by new riots, this time in the north and on one of the Loyalty Islands.

The French parliamentary elections will have an impact on the future of New Caledonia, and it’s vital to encourage and seek dialogue and agreement on a common destiny.

Get in touch with the Human Rights League through itswebsite and follow@LDH_Fr and@nathalietehio on Twitter.
New Head of UN Human Rights needs to visit Bangladesh
Joint letter to UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michele Bachelet, on the deterorating human rights situation in Bangladesh

Your Excellency:

Congratulations on your new role as United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. As you take up your new mandate, the undersigned organizations urge you to make Bangladesh a focus of your efforts in the coming months and to undertake an official visit to Bangladesh as soon as possible. It is our understanding that your predecessor, Prince Zeid bin Ra’ad Zeid al-Hussein, was in advanced talks with the Government of Bangladesh regarding a visit to the country. We strongly urge you to resume that discussion and schedule a visit without delay.

In your opening remarks to the 39th Session of the UN Human Rights Council on September 10, 2018, you rightly commended Bangladesh for its role hosting Rohingya refugees and for making significant development advancements. But you were also right to make it clear that Bangladesh’s human rights record in recent years has been deeply concerning. In addition to the crackdown on peaceful student protests and the violent anti-drug campaign that you referenced in your remarks—both of which warrant close attention—the Government of Bangladesh has also engaged in attacks against independent media and journalists, human rights defenders, and opposition figures. These abuses are further enabled by the recent passage of the Digital Security Act, [1] which criminalizes the legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression and the right to freedom of association. Enforced disappearances continue to occur at an alarming rate (34 people were reportedly disappeared in September alone), [2] and reports of torture in custody continue to surface despite passage of the Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention) Act 2013. [3]

In addition, the government is cracking down on political dissidents and opposition activists. The opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) reports that, over the past two months, police have registered 3,736 cases, resulting in charges against 313,130 party leaders and activists. The BNP insists that all of these cases and charges are politically motivated; the Awami League Government disputes this characterization. The spree of criminal cases against opposition figures is being conducted in such a fashion that the police have filed several cases against opposition leaders who have died or have been living abroad for years. [4] In trials widely condemned as politically motivated, top opposition leaders have been sentenced to death or lengthy prison sentences prior to the upcoming general election, which is expected to take place in December 2018. [5]
The UN Human Rights Committee noted concerns in its 2017 Concluding Observations regarding:
- The “reported high rate of extrajudicial killings by police officers, soldiers and Rapid Action Battalion force members and at reports of enforced disappearances, as well as the excessive use of force by State actors”;
- The absence of “ongoing investigations into cases of torture in the State party…[despite] information that torture and ill-treatment by law enforcement or military personnel is widespread in the State party during interrogations to extract confessions”; and
- The “limitations on the rights of journalists, bloggers, human rights defenders and civil society organizations in the State party to exercise their right to freedom of opinion, expression and association”.
These concerns were exhaustively raised by members of the UN Human Rights Council earlier this year during Bangladesh’s 3rd cycle Universal Periodic Review. Bangladesh failed to accept a number of key recommendations, including to ratify the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; to issue a standing invitation to all UN Special Procedures; to amend or repeal laws that do not comply with international standards by restricting legitimate expression or association; and to fight against impunity by committing to investigate alleged human rights abuses by security forces.

Although serious concerns have been raised by non-governmental organizations, as well as by UN bodies and UN Member States, there have been only four visits by UN Special Procedures mandate-holders in the last ten years. These were the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief (2016); the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (2013); and a joint visit by the UN Independent Expert on Human Rights and Extreme Poverty and the UN Independent Expert on the Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation (2010). These are welcomed visits, and important mandates and issues for Bangladesh. But at this critical juncture, the Government of Bangladesh must grant broader access to UN Special Procedures.

In addition to undertaking an official visit to Bangladesh yourself, we urge you to press the Government of Bangladesh to accept visit requests from the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders; the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression; the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Assembly and Association; the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture; the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions; the UN Working Group on Enforced Disappearances; and the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. These are the mandates that can most directly address many of the core issues raised by UN Member States during the UPR, the UN Human Rights Committee, and by you in your opening remarks to the UN Human Rights Council.
Your office has a critical role to play. Bangladesh remains a close partner of the UN and particularly the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Bangladesh is also one of the largest contributors of military personnel to UN Peacekeeping missions. But it must also be a closer partner of the UN human rights mechanisms. In previous election cycles there has been a marked increase in violence and repression. Attention from your office and other UN human rights bodies can help reverse this trend. We are committed to working with you and your office, as well as with the Government of Bangladesh, to ensure that a visit can take place soon.

Sincerely,
1. 350.org
2. Asian Human Rights Commission
3. Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
4. Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL)V
5. Association For Human Rights in Ethiopia (AHRE)
6. Сenter for Civil Liberties, Ukraine
7. CIVICUS
8. Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI), India
9. Freedom Now
10. Human Rights Concern, Eritrea
11. Human Rights Defenders Network, Sierra Leone
12. International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
13. Karapatan, The Philippines
14. Lokataru Foundation, Indonesia
15. Odhikar, Bangladesh
16. Phenix Center for Economic Studies, Jordan
17. Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights
18. Sudanese Development Initiative (SUDIA), Sudan
19. The Article 20 Network
20. Transparency International
21. World Organisation against Torture (OMCT)
22. MARUAH, Singapore
23. Transparent Election Foundation of Afghanistan (TEFA)
24. Citizen Congress Watch (CCW), Taiwan
25. Uganda National NGO Forum
1 See, Dhaka Tribune, “Bangladesh signs Digital Security Bill into Law,” October 8, 2018, available at, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2018/10/08/president-signs-digital-security-bill-into-law;seealsoForum Asia, Digital Security Act English translation (2016), available at, https://www.forum- asia.org/uploads/wp/2016/08/Digital-Security-Act-English-09.03.2016.pdf.

2 See,Odhikar “Human Rights Monitoring Report of September 2018”; see also, New Age, “Enforced Disappearances Double: Odhikar Report,” October 3, 2018, available athttp://www.newagebd.net/article/52199/enforced-disappearance-doubles-odhikar-report.

3 According to data gathered by Odhikar, at least 125 persons were tortured to death by law enforcement agencies from January 2009 to May 2018.

4 See e.g., Prothom Alo, "Police sue another dead man for sabotage," October 9, 2018, available at, https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/184686/Police-sue-another-dead-man-for-sabotage.

5 See e.g., NewAge Bangladesh, “Babar, Pintu, 17 others to die, Tarique, Harris, 17 others jailed for life,” October 10, 2018, available at, http://www.newagebd.net/article/52831/aug-21-grenade-attack-19-get- death-penalty-tariqe-among-17-life-term.
NGO letter to EU Ministers on rule of law and human rights situation in Poland
As the EU General Affairs Council prepares to hold a hearing on 22 February on the rule of law in Poland under the Article 7.1 TEU procedure, the undersigned civil society organisations would like to draw your attention to some alarming developments. Since the Council last discussed the situation in June 2021, a severe and steady decline in the respect for EU values in Poland has continued unabated. Despite the numerous actions undertaken by EU institutions since the procedure was launched in 2017, the Polish government has continued to systematically infringe upon those standards and ignore EU recommendations and the EU Court’s rulings.
NICARAGUA: ‘For the government, these fraudulent elections were a total failure’
CIVICUS discusses the recent elections in Nicaragua, characterised by the banning of candidates, fraud and repression, with a woman human rights defender from a national platform of Nicaraguan civil society, who requested anonymity for security reasons.

What was the political context in which the 7 November presidential election took place?

The context began to take shape in 2006, with the pact between the leaders of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), Daniel Ortega, and the then-ruling Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC), led by former president Arnoldo Alemán. The aim of the so-called ‘Alemán-Ortega pact’ was to establish a two-party system dominated by both leaders, which did not work out for both: it resulted in a complete restructuring of the political system, including a reform of the constitution and the modification of election dates, which allowed the FSLN – which had failed to win the presidency on several occasions – to win the 2006 election with 38 per cent of the vote, never to leave power since.

Once in power, the FSLN carried out several constitutional and electoral law reforms ordered by Daniel Ortega, in collusion with legislative, judicial and electoral institutions, to impose a constitution tailored to its needs and to allow himself to be re-elected indefinitely.

Since the most recent package of electoral changes, carried out in May 2021, the electoral stage was already set so that the current government would win the election. The changes gave the FSLN control of the entire electoral structure, gave the police the power to authorise or ban opposition political rallies and took away funding for candidates.

Already in December 2020, the National Assembly had passed a law to neutralise opposition candidacies: under the pretext of rejecting foreign interference in Nicaragua’s internal affairs, it prohibited the candidacies of people who had participated in the 2018 protests, labelled by the government as an attempted coup d’état financed by foreign powers.

All these laws were applied by state institutions in a way that resulted in the banning of all democratic candidates who could in any way be viewed as positioned to defeat the FSLN candidate. The result was an election lacking all real competition.

Was there any attempt to postpone the election until the proper conditions were met?

First, in the context of the 2018 protests, which were heavily repressed and resulted in hundreds of deaths, several groups, including the Nicaraguan Bishops’ Conference, proposed holding an early election to resolve the crisis. Some also considered the possibility of forcing the resignation of the president due to his responsibility for the systematic human rights violations committed in the context of the 2018 protests.

But Ortega refused to call an early election, and instead challenged the alleged ‘coup perpetrators’ protesting against him to get the people’s vote in the 2021 election. In the meantime, instead of proceeding with the electoral reform that had been demanded for years, he set about preparing the ground so that no one could challenge him in the elections.

With the 2021 electoral process already underway, and in view of the fact that there would be no real competition, voices from civil society recommended suspending and rescheduling an election that would be clearly illegitimate and lacking in credibility, but this call was not echoed.

How do you assess the election results?

Clearly the overwhelming majority of Nicaraguan citizens viewed these elections as illegitimate, since only about 10 per cent of eligible voters turned out to vote. Some of those who did vote are government supporters, while others – such as members of the military and police and public servants – were compelled by fear and their work circumstances.

These claims are supported by polling data from various civil society groups inside and outside Nicaragua, such as Coordinadora Civil, Mujeres Organizadas and Urnas Abiertas. On election day, some of these organisations did a quick poll on the ground, twice – morning and afternoon – and documented. through photos, videos and testimonies by some election observers invited by the government, that the majority of the population did not turn out to vote.

From civil society’s perspective, these elections were a complete failure for the government, as they gave us all the elements to demonstrate at the international level that the president does not meet the minimum conditions of legitimacy to remain in office. It is not only Nicaraguans who do not recognise the results of these elections: more than 40 countries around the world have not recognised them either. The government conducted a fraudulent election to gain legitimacy, but it failed to do so because no one recognises it at the national or international level.

What is the outlook for Nicaraguan civil society following the election?

The panorama has not changed. What awaits us is more of the same: more repression, more persecution, more kidnappings, more political prisoners, more exiles. At the same time, this unresponsive and unaccountable government is completely incapable of solving any of Nicaragua’s problems, so poverty, unemployment and insecurity will also continue to deepen.

In response, we can do nothing but sustain resistance and try to break the chains of fear, because fear is what this illegitimate government rules through.

What kind of international support does Nicaraguan civil society need?

Nicaraguan civil society needs all kinds of support, from support for building and strengthening alliances to amplify our voices, so we can publicise the political situation in Nicaragua and demand action in international forums, to financial and in-kind support to equip us with the tools with which to do our work, sustain our organisations and provide protection for human rights defenders who are being persecuted and attacked.

Civic space in Nicaragua is rated as ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor. Nicaragua is currently on ourWatch List, which includes cases in which a severe and abrupt deterioration in the quality of civic space is taking place.
NICARAGUA: ‘María Esperanza’s case is part of a growing process of criminalisation of social protest’
CIVICUS speaks with Ana Lucía Álvarez, Nicaragua officer of the Mesoamerican Initiative of Women Human Rights Defenders (IM-Defensoras), about the case of María Esperanza Sánchez, unjustly imprisoned in Nicaragua since March 2020, and the ongoing campaign for her release.

IM-Defensoras is a network of activists and organisations from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua that seeks to provide a comprehensive, regional response to the increasing violence against women human rights defenders in Mesoamerica. Founded in 2010, it seeks to empower and connect women defenders involved in various organisations and social movements to strengthen networks of protection and solidarity among them and to increase the visibility, recognition and impact of their human rights work.

How long has María Esperanza been in prison, and why?

María Esperanza was captured on 26 January 2020. She is an activist who for a long time accompanied relatives of political prisoners. I believe she began her activism and her organisation after the citizens’ uprising of April 2018. She was already being persecuted, so she was staying in a safe house. The police illegally and arbitrarily raided the house, without a search warrant, and arrested her. She was accused of trafficking narcotics, psychotropics and other controlled substances to the detriment of public health. Her trial is being handled by lawyer Julio Montenegro, who specialises in cases of criminalisation of protest and judicial prosecution of activists and human rights defenders.

Do you consider María Esperanza’s case to be part of a broader attack on civic space in Nicaragua?

There is definitely a growing process of criminalisation of social protest in Nicaragua. The first upsurge in criminalisation came after Operation Clean-up, which ended around August 2018. This was a pseudo-military operation carried out by police and para-police forces to dismantle any organisation of territorial protection that the population had built through barricades in neighbourhoods and roadblocks around the country.

Once Operation Clean-up was over, the criminalisation of those who had taken part in the civic struggle began. More than 800 people became political prisoners, before being released in 2019 by unilateral decision of the government through the Amnesty Law.

María Esperanza had already been persecuted, harassed, put under surveillance and threatened before she was imprisoned for her human rights work. Her arrest and trial, like those of so many others, were plagued by irregularities. Violations of due process are systematic. In Nicaragua, the justice system is totally co-opted. It has collapsed and is under the control of the presidential couple: President Daniel Ortega and his vice-president and wife, Rosario Murillo.

How has the situation of civil society changed since the 2018 wave of protests?

More than 350 people were killed in a span of six months during the 2018 protests. The symbolic and emotional weight of that death toll in a country that has experienced civil wars, dictatorships and armed uprisings has been tremendous. In Nicaragua there has never been accountability, there have always been policies of wiping the slate clean, which has deepened the wounds.

In addition to the suffering of the 350 dead, there were over 800 people imprisoned for political reasons, and while many have since been released from prison, we purposefully say that they have been released rather than that they are free, because after their release, political persecution has not ended for them. Systematic harassment by police and para-police forces continues, and it becomes an obstacle to the enjoyment of many rights, including the right to work.

For these people, the effects of the economic crisis that the country is currently experiencing are compounded by the difficulties brought about by political persecution. They often cannot leave their home because there is a patrol outside, or they go out and they are followed, and then those who follow them learn the names of their employers and start to harass them as well.

Persecution happens at the local, neighbourhood level. The ruling party, the Sandinista National Liberation Front, has established various structures that are used to maintain territorial control through surveillance and repression: Councils of Citizen Power, Family Cabinets and Sandinista Leadership Committees. If you are an opponent or a human rights defender, there will always be a neighbour of yours who is involved in one of these structures and informs the regime and the police of what you are doing, and then you start to be persecuted and harassed, and maybe at some point you get arbitrarily arrested.

Harassment and hypervigilance cause psychological damage not only to the persecuted individual but also to their family. This has had an impact on the increase in emigration, which is a dual phenomenon, caused by both political persecution and social need. Since 2018, 120,000 people have left Nicaragua, a huge number for a country of just six million.

The 2021 presidential election openly exposed the regime’s lack of legitimacy. On what basis does the government stand?

In the run-up to the 2021 election, persecution was only exacerbated. In order to carry out the electoral farce of November, the government imprisoned 10 presidential pre-candidates and many people with a key role in the electoral process and in the formation of alternatives. This sent a very clear message, as a result of which there is still a lot of self-censorship.

Daniel Ortega has continued to concentrate and consolidate his power. We are currently living under a regime that has become totalitarian, where all freedoms are totally restricted. This is the only way the government can sustain itself, because it has no legitimacy. That is why repression and social control continue to increase rather than decrease. In the absence of such levels of repression and social control, the very high level of popular rejection of the regime would make it impossible for it to maintain political control.

As a result, repression, territorial control, neighbourhood repression, the criminalisation of protest and social dissent, and the closing of spaces for the exercise of the freedom of expression and media freedoms can be expected to continue.

Now a combination of laws has been passed that includes a Cybercrime Law. And we have already seen the first political prisoner convicted under this law, which does nothing other than criminalise the freedom of opinion.

What the government is looking for with political prisoners is to use them as hostages. Among the people arrested recently are presidential candidates, businesspeople, bankers, lawyers, activists and human rights defenders. The government is trying to negotiate their release to gain legitimacy and international approval.

The truth is that the government has no international support. The only foreign leaders who attended the presidential inauguration were Cuba’s Miguel Díaz-Canel, Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro and outgoing Honduran president Juan Orlando Hernández.

How can the international community support Nicaraguan civil society in its struggle for the recovery of democracy and human rights?

We need to amplify denunciations of violations and sharpen accountability mechanisms. Civil society in Nicaragua has made a tremendous effort not only to document human rights violations but also to identify their perpetrators. Given that the justice system in Nicaragua has collapsed, and that civil society is doing everything within its power, the onus is on the international community to push for accountability and punishment of those responsible.

Daniel Ortega’s regime is no longer a political project but an economic enterprise. Its control of the state allows Ortega to use corruption networks to his advantage. In the light of this, the international community should fine-tune its mechanisms, review economic sanctions and identify the companies that continue to do business, not always entirely legally, with the Ortega regime. Since many association agreements have democratic and anti-corruption clauses, they need to be made operational. Personal sanctions must also be imposed on the architects of corruption and repression.

What kind of pressure should be exerted to get María Esperanza Sanchez released?

María Esperanza was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Everything that has happened to her and to the rest of the political prisoners is completely arbitrary; that is precisely why we consider them to be political prisoners. What we demand is the unconditional and guaranteed release of them all.

What happens to them will depend to a large extent on the strength with which the opposition and the international community manage to exert pressure, and on the correlation of forces that is established between the Nicaraguan government and the human rights movement.

We must campaign and keep up the pressure. We must continue to put our finger on all the arbitrariness, illegalities and human rights violations. There are still people in Europe and other parts of the world who think Ortega is the idealistic revolutionary of the past, and not the despot he has become. The best way to expose dictators and human rights abusers is to keep communicating the truth on the basis of well-documented evidence.

Civic space in Nicaragua is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor. Nicaragua is currently on theCIVICUS Monitor Watch List, which identifies countries in which a severe and abrupt deterioration in the quality of civic space is taking place.
Get in touch with IM-Defensoras through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@IM_Defensoras on Twitter.
NICARAGUA: ‘The regime seeks to annihilate all forms of autonomous citizen organisation’
CIVICUS speaks with María Teresa Blandón, a Nicaraguan human rights defender and director of Feminist Programme La Corriente, a civil society organisation (CSO) whose legal status was recently cancelled by the authoritarian regime led by President Daniel Ortega and Vice President Rosario Murillo.

What is the reason for the current wave of intensified in repression in Nicaragua?

Repression increased on the eve of the fraudulent 2021 elections, when the state specifically targeted the leaders of the main opposition groups who had been building alliances to participate in the elections, because even though they knew that conditions were extremely adverse, they insisted that this was the way out of the crisis.

From January 2022 onwards, the Ortega-Murillo regime further escalated its offensive, possibly due to a failure in its political calculations: it had thought that once the electoral fraud had been consummated and the opposition was thrown in jail, the opposition would abdicate its role and the regime would obtain the endorsement of the international community.

But neither of these things happened: the opposition did not resign itself and there was no international support; on the contrary, the regime’s isolation only deepened. The Nicaraguan opposition continued to constantly denounce the establishment of a de facto police state and to call for the regime’s exit through civic means. The CSOs that managed to remain in the country continued to denounce systematic human rights violations and repression, hence the approval of new laws to strip them of their legal status and assets.

Faced with a lack of legitimacy, the Ortega-Murillo regime has deepened its strategy of annihilating any form of citizen organisation that is not subordinate to its interests. To date, more than 1,600 CSOs have been eliminated by the National Assembly and in many cases their assets have been confiscated through the application of laws that openly violate our country’s constitution, which recognises the right to free association and expressly prohibits confiscation.

Until very recently, the power to cancel an organisation’s legal personality was in the hands of the National Assembly, but a new law assigned it to the Ministry of the Interior, which now has the absolute power to decide who has the right to associate and who does not. The procedure has been expedited and there is no recourse to appeal, which clearly speaks of the situation of defencelessness Nicaraguan civil society finds itself in.

The judiciary has remained silent in the face of the unconstitutionality appeals filed in 2021, following the approval of the Law on Foreign Agents, which obliges CSOs that receive funds from international cooperation sources to report their activities at a level of detail that makes it practically impossible for them to operate.

This way, the regime eliminates all forms of autonomous participation, leaves activists and human rights defenders in a more precarious situation, and obtains the resources it needs to feed the clientelist practices that are its trademark.

One of the problems faced by the regime is precisely its lack of resources to sustain the community development projects carried out by many of the eliminated CSOs. It can no longer count on support from Venezuela, nor can it continue to expand the family businesses that the Ortega-Murillo clan has built while in power. Many of these companies have been sanctioned, including the one that monopolises the fuel business, which has forced them to carry out various manoeuvres to keep them active.

What work does your organisation do?

Feminist Programme La Corriente has existed for almost 30 years and was born with the aim of contributing to generating critical thought and encouraging new forms of participation by women in Central America. Over the last 15 years we have expanded our work with young people and sexual and gender dissident collectives.

Throughout our journey, we have contributed to challenging heterosexism, misogyny and macho violence and built vital networks for the defence of rights. We have prioritised issues related to the prevention of violence, voluntary motherhood, women’s right to decide about their bodies and respect for sexual and gender diversity.

Efforts to research the reality experienced by women, young people and dissident bodies have been key to the development of training and public communication programmes. For us it is of vital importance to strengthen collective action through social movements capable of thinking and acting on the changes required by Nicaraguan society. We are also part of Central American and Latin American networks and alliances, from where we contribute to advocacy processes with governments and global institutions.

Precisely because we generate critical thought and defend rights, in May this year the National Assembly cancelled our legal status and in early July the police took over our facilities.

On what grounds was the organisation ordered to shut down?

Generally speaking, the arguments put forward by the Sandinista deputies who control parliament include an unfounded accusation that CSOs are potential money launderers because they receive funding from foreign sources, deliberately ignoring the fact that these sources are linked to governments and duly established cooperation agencies.

They also cite alleged bureaucratic infractions such as the expiry of the term of the board of directors, failure to update statutes and refusal to provide information requested by the Ministry of the Interior. On the latter point, it is worth highlighting the abusive ministry’s intervention: in accordance with the new law, it requires CSOs to submit detailed information on each activity to be carried out and personal data of the people with whom they work.

Such demands denaturalise the meaning of CSOs, turning them into an extension of the state, clear evidence of the totalitarian zeal of this regime. It is clearly an attempt to impose a model of absolute control that requires the dismantling of all forms of autonomous civil society participation.

Likewise, by shutting down CSOs that work with low-income groups of the population, the regime is trying to regain control of what it thinks of as its social base, which it seeks to recover or retain by means of clientelist policies. This is why it has eliminated organisations that promote access to education for low-income children and young people, fulfil the needs of people with disabilities, promote access to land and other resources for rural and Indigenous women and provide sexual and reproductive health services and support for women who are victims of violence, among others.

CSOs that work in the field of citizen participation from a rights-based perspective and with a clear focus on the defence of democratic values have also been closed. They have been declared opponents of the regime and their representatives have been subjected to surveillance, threats, exile and imprisonment. It is also a kind of revenge for generating evidence that contradicts the official discourse and denouncing the systematic violation of rights by the Sandinista regime.

Why has the regime specifically targeted feminist organisations?

Hostility against Nicaraguan feminists dates back to the 1980s. The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), as a guerrilla force turned into party that came to power, never really reflected on the patriarchal logics of power, but simply replicated them unceremoniously.

The feminists of my generation had to endure an authoritarian and abusive relationship with the Sandinista government, which at different times expressed discomfort with the existence of women’s organisations, because from their perspective this weakened the unity of revolutionary forces.

They exercised their veto power to prevent women’s collectives from placing demands related to macho violence and sexual and reproductive rights on the public agenda. The leaders of these collectives were silenced and forced to take on the priorities set by the ruling party leadership.

The watershed that marked the feminist movement’s definitive break with the FSLN occurred in the late 1990s, when Zoilamérica Narváez, daughter of Rosario Murillo, who is both Daniel Ortega’s wife and Vice President, denounced the abuses committed by her stepfather for more than 20 years. When feminists clearly stood on the victim’s side it meant a break with the FSLN leadership, which has since perceived us as enemies. Zoilamérica’s denunciation encouraged further accusations involving other members of the FSLN national leadership, including the late Tomás Borge.

Additionally, during the 2005-2006 electoral campaign, part of the feminist movement participated in an electoral alliance of opposition parties that included the Sandinista Renovation Movement, now UNAMOS, which the FSLN considers traitors to the revolution for having demanded democratisation of the party and questioned Ortega’s authoritarian and strongman leadership.

As he returned to power in 2007, it immediately became clear that Ortega’s strategy was to dismantle feminist networks, which by that point had increased their capacity to put forward ideas and influence Nicaraguan society. The stigmatisation campaign began with a speech by Murillo in which she accused feminists of trafficking in women’s suffering and of wanting to impose a way of life alien to Nicaraguan culture. That same year, the government began to pressure international aid agencies to suspend their support for feminist collectives, causing many of them to leave the country.

Among the main strands of the Ortega-Murillo regime’s discourse was its supposed commitment to gender equality: they proclaimed as a key advance the achievement of gender parity in all branches of government. This idea was taken up by United Nations (UN) bodies and multilateral financial institutions, but feminists provided clear evidence confirming the persistence of inequalities and the absence of public policies to address women’s demands.

The absolute criminalisation of abortion, the absence of policies to prevent and punish macho violence, including sexual abuse against girls and adolescents, which is prevalent in Nicaragua, the absence of sex education, the failure to comply with the law that established the creation of a fund to distribute land to rural women and the violation of the labour rights of workers in foreign factories are among the many problems that remain unresolved by a regime that dares to compare itself with the countries that have made the most progress in terms of gender equality in the world.

What should donors, and the international community in general, do to help Nicaraguan civil society?

In such turbulent times and with so many hotspots of tension in the world, it is hard to appeal for solidarity with Nicaraguan society, which continues to bet on civic and peaceful change to move away from this new dictatorship and lay the foundations for the country’s democratisation.

However, we must continue to appeal to democratic governments, regardless of their ideology, so they do not look away from what is happening in Nicaragua and support our just demands for the immediate release of political prisoners, the suspension of the police state, an end to the persecution of CSOs and the Catholic Church and the full restoration of our rights.

We call for a coherent position on the part of democratic governments, UN agencies, multilateral financial institutions, regional integration blocs and political party forums to avoid any action that could contribute to prolonging the stay of the Ortega-Murillo dictatorship in power.

At this point it is inadmissible that they denounce the regime’s systematic human rights violations, including the commission of crimes against humanity, while at the same time voting in favour of granting loans to the very same regime, which in addition to increasing a debt that is already greater than the country’s GDP gives it greater room for manoeuvre to remain in power.

Active support for human rights defenders, independent journalists and CSOs is vital to sustain hope for democratic change that does not impose further suffering on the Nicaraguan people.

Civic space in Nicaragua is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with La Corriente through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@LaCorrienteNica on Twitter.
Nicaragua: Growing human rights violations require UN scrutiny to continue
UN Human Rights Council – Intersessional Activity

Interactive Dialogue on the interim oral update by the High Commissioner on the human rights situation in Nicaragua

🇳🇮#SOSNicaragua: Nos preocupa el creciente número de desplazados forzosos y los + de 240 presos políticos recluidos en condiciones degradantes y tratados cruelmente en las cárceles del país.
¡Pedimos urgentemente la libertad de todxs lxs presxs políticxs! https://t.co/07AZzoF28z pic.twitter.com/mBpfAoBcSV
— CIVICUS Español (@CIVICUSespanol) December 15, 2022

Delivered by Amaru Ruiz Aleman, Asociación Red Local

I make this statement on behalf of the Asociación Red Local, a member of the Nicaraguan Platform of NGO Networks.

We express our concern about the situation of the more than 240 political prisoners who are being held in degrading conditions and receive cruel treatment in various prisons in the country.

In the recent municipal elections, the Ortega government secured control of the 153 municipalities of the country in an arbitrary and non-transparent manner, thus restricting the civil and political rights of Nicaraguan citizens.

Due to the various human rights violations, more than 150,000 Nicaraguans are living in exile without being able to return to Nicaragua and more than 3206 civil society organisations and 55 media outlets have been shut down in a concerted effort by the Nicaraguan government to eliminate all dissenting voices.

We call on the members of the Council to support and strengthen the resolution on Nicaragua at the March 2023 Human Rights Council session to give continuity to the efforts of the Group of Experts and to the monitoring mandate of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, paying special attention to the restrictions of civic space, the conditions of political prisoners and the situation of forcibly displaced families.

Freedom for all political prisoners in Nicaragua!

Civic space in Nicaragua is rated as "Closed" by the CIVICUS Monitor

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