human rights

• Nicaragua: la violencia y la represión continúan

  42 reunión del Consejo de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas
  -Diálogo en el informe del Alto Comisionado sobre Nicaragua

  Ha pasado más de un año desde que empezó la crisis en Nicaragua y la violencia y la represión no cesan. Miles de personas han sido detenidas arbitrariamente y centenares han sido criminalizadas por ejercer su derecho a la protesta. Un informe de la Articulación de Movimientos Sociales de Nicaragua, identifica dos nuevas fases de represión durante el 2019: Hostigamientos y restricción a las libertades públicas y Ejecuciones extrajudiciales.

  La mayoría de los prisioneros políticos fueron excarcelados recientemente bajo una Ley de Amnistía, aprobada unilateralmente por diputados del Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN), misma que perpetúa la impunidad para los responsables de la violencia letal de la que se valió el Estado para reprimir las protestas, pues establece que no se realizará ninguna investigación respecto de estos crímenes. Además, el informe de la Articulación de Movimientos Sociales de Nicaragua señala existen aun 121 presos y presas políticas en manos del Estado Nicaraguense, 54 de los cuales corresponden capturas realizadas en 2018 y 67 a capturas que se han presentado en 2019.

  Los ataques contra el espacio cívico continúan. La Unidad Nacional Azul y Blanco en Nicaragua ha denunciado como el Gobierno de Nicaragua continúa criminalizando a ciudadanos por motivos políticos o por su participación en protestas u otras iniciativas.  La represión de voces disidentes a través del arresto, el cierre de protestas y el cierre de organizaciones representan una alarmante falta de voluntad del gobierno para comprometerse y escuchar a quienes gobierna.

  La situación de violación de derechos humanos también se presenta en los territorios rurales y transfronterizos  del país, los que viven situaciones de incertidumbre y zozobra debido a la militarización de comunidades, persecución de ciudadanos que participaron en las protestas, asedios por parte de la Policía Nacional, y hostigamiento a autoridades de las municipalidades opositoras, entre otros.

  Al igual que a la Alta Comisionada, nos preocupa ver como en Nicaragua no hay disposición de las autoridades para garantizar verdad, justicia y reparación para las víctimas de la represión y sus familiares; ni garantías de que se reiniciarán las negociaciones, las cuales fueron canceladas de manera unilateral por el gobierno, o de que se cumplirán los compromisos acordados entre las partes. En este clima, el escrutinio internacional sobre Nicaragua sigue siendo tan crucial ahora como siempre. Nicaragua no cumple con su responsabilidad de garantizar la rendición de cuentas y la justicia. Acogemos con beneplácito la continua supervisión e informes del ACNUDH sobre Nicaragua y pedimos al Consejo que establezca un mecanismo de investigación independiente como los primeros pasos hacia la rendición de cuentas por los crímenes  ocurridos y justicia para los afectados.
   

• Nicaragua: lack of engagement with UN mechanisms outlines contempt for human rights obligations

  Statement at the 51st Session of the UN Human Rights Council 

  Interactive Dialogue with the High Commissioner on Nicaragua

  Delivered by Nicola Paccamiccio

  Thank you Mr President, and thank you Deputy High Commissioner for this report, which outlines Nicaragua’s contempt for its human rights obligations.

  Civic space restrictions remain of fundamental concern. Since the elections last year, Nicaragua has experienced a redoubling of repression, with the aim of eliminating any form of autonomous organisation and monopolising power.

  The repression has encompassed the widest possible range of violations of the freedoms of association and expression: harassment, threats and physical attacks, kidnapping and detention of human rights defenders, journalists and members of the opposition, their torture under custody, their criminalisation under fabricated charges, their prosecution and conviction without due process guarantees, and their confinement in inhumane conditions.

  The process accelerated in May, with a new General Law on the Regulation and Control of Non-profit Organisations which makes it more difficult for CSOs to register and maintain legal status. Anti-money laundering laws have been instrumentalised to obstruct the operation of independent civil society groups.

  These new requirements have been applied to justify mass CSO closures which have wiped out hundreds of organisations, including organisations dedicated to urban and municipal development, business and professional associations, children’s rights and youth groups, and environmental and feminist organisations.

  We call on the government of Nicaragua to immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners and to restore full respect for the fundamental civic freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression. We ask the High Commissioner: in light of Nicaragua’s complete lack of engagement with Human Rights Council mechanisms, how can States protect civil society inside the country and support them in their efforts to further human rights?

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   Civic space in Nicaragua is rated "Closed" by the CIVICUS Monitor.

  Photo: Jorge Mejía peralta

• Nicaragua: The Council must establish an investigation and accountability mechanism at its next Session

  High Commissioner’s intersessional update on Nicaragua

  Delivered by Debora Leao, CIVICUS Monitor Research Officer for the Americas

• Nicaragua: the Council must renew the mandate of the Group of Human Rights Experts

  Statement at the 52nd Session of the UN Human Rights Council

  Interactive Dialogue with the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua

  Delivered by Amaru Ruiz

  Thank you, Mr. President.

  CIVICUS and Fundación del Rio welcome the report of the Group of Human Rights Experts.

  We very much welcome the release of 222 political prisoners, but we are alarmed by the decision to banish and strip them and 95 other government critics, journalists, and human rights defenders of Nicaraguan citizenship, and the confiscation of their assets. I am one of these 317 citizens who are now stateless. Let’s not forget the 38 political prisoners still arbitrarily detained by the government, including Monsignor Rolando Álvarez.

  The status of civic space in the country is dire and further deteriorating due to the Government’s concerted effort to stifle every form of dissenting opinion. Since early 2022, the Ministry of Interior has cancelled the legal status of over 3,200 non-governmental organizations, representing 45% of existing legal entities prior to April 2018.

  The situation is further worsened by the government’s complete refusal to cooperate and engage with international human rights bodies. The many recommendations received by the Government to end impunity for grave abuses and to desist from using arbitrary detentions as a mean to suppress dissent, have been shamefully and deliberately disregarded by the Government. The government has also ignored calls repeal legal frameworks that violate civil and political rights.

  In light of the appalling human rights violations and impunity, and of lack of cooperation, the Group of Experts and the OHCHR’s mandates are more important than ever as they remain the only mechanisms able to gather evidence of and report on human rights violations and provide recommendations for necessary action. We urge the Council to renew the mandate of the Group of Expert for two years and extend OHCHR mandate.

  We thank you.

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   Civic space in Nicaragua is rated as "Closed" by the CIVICUS Monitor 

• Nicaragua: Violence and repression continue

  42nd Session of the UN Human Rights Council
  -Interactive dialogue on the High Commissioner’s report on Nicaragua
  -Joint statement from CIVICUS & RedLad

  It has been more than a year since the crisis began in Nicaragua, and violence and repression continue unabated. Thousands have been arbitrarily detained and hundreds have been criminalized for exercising their right to peaceful assembly. A recent report, “The Articulation of Social Movements of Nicaragua,” identifies two new phases of political repression during 2019: harassment of activists, restriction of public freedoms and extrajudicial executions.

  CIVICUS and REDLAD welcome the recent release of political prisoners. However, the Amnesty Law under which they were released establishes that no investigation will be carried out to investigate the use of lethal violence by the State to repress the protests, perpetuating impunity for those responsible for these crimes. The report of the Articulation of Social Movements of Nicaragua indicates that there are still 121 political prisoners and prisoners held by the Nicaraguan State.

  Further attacks on civic space are ongoing. Repression of dissenting voices through arrest, shutting down of protests and closing of organisations represent an alarming unwillingness of the government to engage with and listen to those it governs.

  Human rights violations remain widespread in rural and cross-border territories of the country.  The environment for those who live in communities under militarized police forces is particularly dire, resulting in persecution of citizens who participate in protests, sieges by the National Police, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, and harassment of authorities of opposition municipalities.

  Like the High Commissioner, we are concerned at the lack of political will to guarantee truth, justice and reparation for the victims of repression and their families. There are no guarantees that the negotiations will be restarted, which were canceled unilaterally by the government, or that the commitments agreed between the parties will be fulfilled.

  In this climate, international scrutiny on Nicaragua remains as crucial now as ever. Nicaragua is falling far short on its responsibility to ensure accountability and justice. We welcome the OHCHR’s continued monitoring and reporting on Nicaragua and call on the Council to establish an independent investigative mechanism as the first step towards accountability for crimes and redress for those affected.

• NIGERIA: ‘Many families prefer to keep their daughters at home to ensure their safety’

  CIVICUS speaks with activist Jeff Okoroafor about Nigeria’s security situation, including the trend of kidnappings of schoolchildren by rebel groups.

  Jeff is spokesperson for #BringBackOurGirls, a diverse citizen group that advocates for the effective search and rescue of all abducted children and the containment and neutralisation of insurgency in Nigeria.

  What’s the security situation in Nigeria’s Kaduna state?

  The security situation in Kaduna state is alarming and continues to deteriorate. Kidnappings for ransom and other forms of violence are on the rise. Those primarily responsible for these criminal activities appear to be Fulani herders, organised in bandit groups that have reportedly become affiliated with the Boko Haram insurgency. They are creating widespread chaos and terror in northern Nigeria.

  The state’s inability to curb such criminal activity and protect its citizens was reflected in the recent abduction of 287 students. A whole decade after Boko Haram kidnapped 276 high school girls in Chibok, a town in northeast Nigeria, the security situation remains precarious and has even worsened.

  Kaduna’s state authorities have proven ineffective in addressing these challenges. Instead of taking decisive action to dismantle these groups, they have opted to pay off insurgents to temporarily halt the violence. This is ultimately counterproductive, as the government submits to blackmail by rebel groups, further undermining security and leaving people vulnerable.

  During the recent Eid al-Fitr festival, a video emerged of over 100 armed Fulani herders conducting prayers in Kaduna. Gatherings of such size cannot happen without security agents being aware, pointing to possible complicity by the authorities. This lack of reaction fosters an environment of fear and insecurity.

  The ongoing cycle of violence, displacement and ransom-taking disrupts the lives of local communities, contributing to food insecurity as farmers cannot safely work their lands. It is crucial for the government to take a more strategic and robust approach to restore order and protect people.

  How have kidnappings affected the situation of girls and women?

  Right after the abduction of the Chibok girls, efforts were made to develop strategies to improve security in schools and safeguard girls and women in society. A task force involving community members and government representatives, including the then Minister of Finance, initiated the Safe School Initiative.

  This programme proposed to enhance security in schools by installing CCTV cameras, bringing in security agents, putting up perimeter fences and providing secure transportation. However, it never materialised.

  Today, many families prefer to keep their daughters at home to ensure their safety rather than risk sending them to school. In northern Nigeria, over 13.8 million children aren’t attending school, and the number continues to increase. Lack of formal education only exacerbates existing inequalities that disproportionately affect women and girls. The situation demands urgent action, but unfortunately the government is not doing much.

  What’s the government’s approach to securing the safe return of abducted people?

  The government doesn’t have a specific approach. The fact that mass abductions have continued, including the kidnapping of 300 female students in Zamfara state in 2021 and 100 schoolchildren in Kebbi state a few months later, highlights the lack of a real strategy to address the issue. Between January and April 2024 alone, 599 people were kidnapped.

  The government is largely reactive rather than proactive, which is concerning. It has not clearly communicated any specific measures. This indicates a significant gap in leadership and a disconnect between its goals and people’s needs.

  Civil society, which often operates close to affected communities, is calling on the government to adopt more effective strategies. These include developing a comprehensive plan for the safe return of the remaining 91 Chibok girls and other abducted people. Civil society also proposes establishing a military situation room with civil society participation to enhance information sharing and collaboration in addressing security challenges.

  We also demand an end to political interference in security matters, as this has been a barrier to effective action in states like Kaduna. The Nigerian military and police have the capacity to tackle these challenges, yet there seems to be a lack of political will to take decisive action.

  There is a pressing need for the government to adopt a comprehensive, coordinated strategy to address the security crisis and protect the lives and properties of its citizens. This includes collaborating with civil society, improving information sharing and taking decisive military and law enforcement actions to dismantle insurgent groups.

  How is civil society working to address the problem, and what obstacles does it face?

  Civil society organisations are making significant efforts to raise awareness and urge government action, but progress has been slow. Overall, there have been 80 new attacks on schools since the Chibok girls were abducted, resulting in the kidnapping of 1,800 students and 64 teachers.

  Nigerian civil society faces significant challenges in doing this work. Freedom of speech is not fully guaranteed, and those who speak out often face threats or retaliation. For instance, members of Bring Back Our Girls, including myself, have faced arrests and harassment for advocating for justice and the safe return of abducted girls.

  Ethnicity and religion also divide Nigerian society, making it difficult for people to unite in pursuit of common goals. People tend to support leaders from their own ethnic or religious groups, even when they don’t act in the best interests of the country.

  Advocacy work isn’t just challenging due to these obstacles – it’s also costly. Organisations must carefully plan and execute their strategies with very limited resources. In the past, strong international partnerships helped support civil society efforts, but these relationships have weakened over time.

  Still, civil society continues pushing for change and striving to hold the government accountable.

  What forms of international support does Nigerian civil society need?

  In the early days of the Bring Back Our Girls movement, prominent figures such as then-President Barack Obama and First Lady Michelle Obama raised awareness by publicly supporting the cause. Hollywood celebrities, musicians and news networks also played a crucial role in amplifying the movement.

  We need to achieve a similar level of international support and visibility. The Nigerian government tends to be more responsive to international pressure, so we encourage world leaders and organisations to keep the conversation alive and help us hold the Nigerian government accountable. This includes asking about the whereabouts of the 91 remaining Chibok girls and demanding action from Nigerian officials.

  We urge people around the world to use their platforms to put the Nigerian government under the spotlight and keep these issues alive.

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  Civic space in Nigeria is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Bring Back our Girls through itswebsite and follow@BBOG_Nigeria and@JeffOkoroafor on Twitter.

• NIGERIA: ‘The global anti-racist protests renewed the call for police accountability’

  CIVICUS speaks to Nelson Olanipekun, a human rights lawyer and the founder and team lead of Citizens’ Gavel, a Nigerian civic tech organisation that works to increase the pace of the delivery of justice by promoting access to justice, citizens’ engagement and the use of digital technologies. Citizens’ Gavel was founded in 2017 in reaction to the lack transparency and accountability in the justice sector.

  

  What kind of work does Citizens’ Gavel do?

  Citizens’ Gavel is a civil society organisation (CSO) based in Nigeria. It was established three years ago to tackle the slow pace of the delivery of justice, promote accountability, and provide legal support. Our main goal is to increase the effectiveness of the delivery of justice through tech, advocacy, and strategic lobbying, and to reduce human rights violations through policy and legal advocacy. At the moment we are working jointly with other CSOs on legal reform. In doing so, we are trying to become a major player in policy-making processes that affect the fundamental rights of Nigerians.

  We work with cases involving issues that range from mass incarceration to the lack of digitised processes in the justice sector. The justice delivery process in Nigeria is one of the slowest in Africa and it results in a high percentage of people incarcerated while awaiting trial. About 70 percent of the people who are in prison are awaiting trial; only 30 percent have been convicted. In 2017 we filed a class action suit for more than 500 people who were awaiting trial in prison in Oyo State. These people had already spent several years in prison, although the law establishes that people can be held for a maximum of 28 days before being taken to court. We also digitised cause lists in over 30 courts across Nigeria, and focused on improving cooperation among stakeholders in the justice sector.

  We provide pro bono legal representation for pre-trial detainees who can’t afford a lawyer. We have developed programmes and apps for human rights abuse victims and their families to reach out for legal help easily. One of them is Podus, a tech platform that enables victims of pre-trial detention to connect with the pro bono lawyer nearest to their location. This platform was created specifically for young people, who don’t have easy access to lawyers or justice programmes. We have over 160 lawyers across 24 states in Nigeria and a rapid response legal team of seven lawyers. So far we have resolved 1,500 cases. Another tech-for-justice app we developed is Justice Clock, a tech platform that helps calculate the amount of time inmates spend in detention and the number of days suspects spend on trial vis-a-vis the appropriate provisions of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act and other laws. The platform also offers a space where actors in the justice sector – the judiciary, the police, prosecutors and prison officials – can stand at par with international best practices, and in doing so can make their work easier. We have worked hand in hand with Ogun State to successfully deploy the Justice Clock so that the justice sector, specifically the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Commissioner for Justice of Ogun State, ensures that it respects the constitutional time limits for which inmates awaiting trial can be imprisoned.

  We track cases that involve sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), take cases of police brutality, monitor anti-corruption campaigns and anti-corruption cases to provide relevant information to the public, and advocate for people living in extreme poverty and connect them through tech. Our concern about this population originally arose from the growing number of poor people who are imprisoned while awaiting trial. If they don’t receive any help, poor defendants spend a long time in jail for minor offences, just because they cannot afford to either pay bail or bribe the police. They are also vulnerable and can be coerced into confessing to crimes they did not commit and end up spending even longer periods in prison.

  Citizens’ Gavel also works on police brutality. What is the situation in Nigeria, and how did the global protests triggered by the death of George Floyd in the USA resonate locally?

  Police brutality is a big issue in Nigeria and we have worked on it for some time. In April 2019, for instance, we challenged the Nigerian Police Force to conduct mental health assessments on officers who had committed abuses or killings, or otherwise face legal action.

  The global protests triggered by the death of George Floyd renewed the call for police accountability in Nigeria and people started sharing stories of their encounters with police officers. Coupled with pre-existing local issues, the US incident that resonated globally enhanced the local voices who were speaking up against police brutality. We were able to contribute by addressing the complaints that citizens reported to us and continuing to work to ensure culpable officers are held accountable.

  In what ways have human rights issues worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic?

  As the pandemic started there was an increase in police brutality related to the enforcement of lockdown measures and compliance with sanitary protocols. Interactions between citizens and police officers increased and resulted in more complaints against police officers. By April 2020, it appeared that police officers had killed more people than COVID-19. Additionally, the brutalities committed by the Special Anti-Robbery Squad Unit of the Nigerian Police Force continued during the pandemic, and the authorities continued failing to prosecute officers who committed torture and violent crimes, mostly against young men from low-income backgrounds.

  Another longstanding epidemic, that of SGBV, flourished under the pandemic. Before the pandemic, about 30 percent of women and girls between the ages of 15 and 49 had experienced sexual abuse. While preventing outbreaks of the virus, lockdown measures represented a heightened threat to the safety of girls and women, as victims of SGBV remained locked in with their abusers. Between March and April 2020, reports of SGBV increased by 149 percent. The lockdown also compromised the availability of and access to services, as many centres and shelters for victims of SGBV closed or reduced the range of services they provided. As a result, these essential services were lacking precisely when survivors needed them the most.

  In response to this situation, Citizens’ Gavel increased the number of SGBV cases we manage. We are doing as much as we can, taking into account that physical meetings and legal interventions were suspended and our team members had to work remotely for several months. Fortunately, this was relatively easy to pivot to because we are a civic tech organisation and our staff had already been trained to use online tools.

  What kind of support from international civil society would help your work?

  We would appreciate training opportunities to enhance our skills to better serve the local communities we work with. We would also like to know about the strategies that work best to curb human rights abuses in other environments.

  Citizens’ Gavel is big on using tech to solve some of the local justice issues and has been able to develop some tech tools; however, we would like to learn more about technologies that work in other contexts. Accessing international platforms through which we can hold the government accountable is also key to our strategy.

  Civic space in Nigeria is rated as ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Citizens’ Gavel through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@citizen_gavel on Twitter.

   

• NORTH KOREA: ‘It is time for the international community to adopt a ‘human rights up front’ approach’

  CIVICUS speaksabout the activism of North Korean escapees with Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK).Founded in 2001 and based in the USA, HRNK is a human rights organisationwith the principal objective of raising international awareness of North Korea's human rights situation.

  Is it possible to carry out any form of activism in North Korea?

  No form of activism is possible in North Korea. There is no civil society due to an overwhelming and unprecedented level of coercion, control, surveillance and punishment. The markets that emerged following the famine of the 1990s and the newly created domestic mobile phone network allow North Koreans to engage in limited forms of market activity, but even this is subject to state surveillance and control. Every North Korean, regardless of whether they are a member of the ruling party or a government official, belongs to a party-controlled organisation, such as the Youth League or the Women’s Union. Anecdotal information from sources inside the country suggests that there is sporadic opposition and resistance to state agents at the local level, but the regime has gone to extreme lengths to prevent the emergence of any organised opposition.

  Have there been any recent changes in how the North Korean regime responds to dissent?

  Under the pretext of COVID-19 prevention, the North Korean regime has intensified its crackdown on those attempting to smuggle in information from the outside world or attempting to access such information. In December 2020 the Supreme People’s Assembly, North Korea’s highest legislative body, passed the ‘Anti-Reactionary Ideology and Culture Law’. This law imposes severe criminal penalties on those who access or disseminate foreign content, including movies, dramas, music and books. The penalties are especially severe, up to a life sentence of hard labour, for those who smuggle in or disseminate South Korean media.

  How do people manage to escape North Korea?

  Leaving the country without official authorisation is regarded as treason in North Korea. To escape, North Koreans need the assistance of religious networks, international civil society organisations (CSOs) and brokers who operate in the China-North Korea border region. The author and journalist Melanie Kirkpatrick has called this escape route ‘Asia’s underground railroad’. In some cases, family members or relatives who have already escaped pay brokers to arrange the escape. The most common route is through China and Southeast Asia. Upon arrival in Thailand, the escapees either choose to go to South Korea or apply for asylum in other countries.

  However, since Kim Jong-un came to power in late 2011, the North Korean regime has intensified border security. The Chinese government has also taken steps that make it more difficult for the escapees to move inside China. In addition, the Chinese government has a longstanding policy of forced returns, whereby it repatriates any North Korean refugees arrested in its territory. This violates China’s obligations as a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, since North Korean refugees face a credible fear of persecution upon return.

  This, combined with the COVID-19 border lockdown, means the number of escapees reaching South Korea has plummeted. The highest annual recorded number of arrivals to South Korea was 2,914 in 2009, but this fell to only 67 in 2022. The easing of COVID-related measures is likely to result in a greater number of attempts to flee.

  What kind of help do escapees receive?

  Most escapees choose to go to South Korea, as they are granted citizenship upon arrival under South Korea’s constitution. The South Korean government provides various forms of economic, educational and job training assistance to North Korean refugees. International and local CSOs also help them adjust to life in South Korea.

  The situation is still difficult for many escapees, given how different the two societies have become in over seven decades of division. According to the latest available data from South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, a total of 34,000 escapees have resettled in South Korea to date. Refugees who choose to go to other countries, including the UK and the USA, primarily receive help from CSOs and other escapees who have already relocated there.

  How do escapees work to document and denounce human rights violations in North Korea?

  North Korean escapees play a critical role, given their first-hand experience of life under the regime. Many refugees, including those who are survivors of North Korea’s detention facilities, provide vital testimony to CSOs that seek to document and raise awareness of human rights violations in North Korea. Escapee testimony has also played a critical role in the work of the United Nations (UN) Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea, whose 2014 report concluded that the North Korean regime has committed crimes against humanity pursuant to policies determined at the highest levels of the state. Both the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea and the Seoul office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights continue to work closely with North Korean escapees.

  Some refugees operate their own organisations. In addition to documenting and raising global awareness of the human rights situation in North Korea, they are often involved in sending outside information to North Korean people. Methods they use include radio broadcasts, leaflet balloons flown across the Korean demilitarised zone and rice and micro-SD cards in plastic bottles that are floated across the maritime border between the two Koreas. It is also common for individual escapees to send money to family members in North Korea with the help of brokers.

  How does HRNK support escapees?

  HRNK works closely with North Korean escapees to document and raise awareness of the human rights situation in North Korea. Given the lack of on-the-ground access inside North Korea, we employ a methodology that combines satellite imagery analysis, witness testimony and open-source investigation.

  Testimonies are often given by escapees who have already resettled in South Korea, although HRNK has sometimes obtained information through refugees with contacts inside North Korea. HRNK has held consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council since April 2018 and reports to various UN bodies and hosts side events in Geneva and New York. We have facilitated the participation of North Korean escapees at these events to amplify their voices on the international stage.

  What further international support do diaspora activists need?

  North Korean activists need support from both private and public sources of funding. In general, North Korean human rights activists are overworked and underfunded. ‘Like-minded’ governments such as those of Japan, South Korea, the USA and others display interest in the issue but have often sidelined human rights concerns to focus solely on negotiating military, political and security matters. It is time for the international community to adopt a ‘human rights up front’ approach to North Korea, ensuring that human rights concerns are integrated into every aspect of its interactions with North Korea. Escapee activists will play a critical role in this effort.

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  Civic space in North Korea is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with HRNK through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@committeehrnk onTwitter.

• NORTH KOREA: ‘Many women escape to experience the freedoms they are denied’

  CIVICUS speaks with Kyeong Min Shin, researcher with Korea Future, about the situation in North Korea and the challenges faced by North Korean women in exile in South Korea.Korea Future is a civil society organisation that investigates human rights violations in North Korea and works with governments, national commissions, parliamentary bodies, civil society, diaspora groups and legal experts and organisations across the world to hold those most responsible accountable for their crimes.

  What proportion of North Korean exiles are women, and what specific challenges do they face due to their gender?

  Of the 33,834 North Koreans who have escaped the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), most of whom have found refuge in the Republic of Korea (South Korea), 72 per cent are women and girls, and around 60 per cent are women in their 20s and 30s.

  South Korea is a liberal democracy. However, women continue to experience structural, direct and indirect discrimination across the political, economic and social spheres. For North Korean women exiled in South Korea, these challenges are magnified. Our research has found that 43 per cent of exiled North Korean women had experienced identity-based discrimination, grounded in historical prejudices, in addition to gender-based and indirect forms of discrimination. This has led to the social, economic and political marginalisation of exiled North Korean women in the diaspora and wider South Korean society.

  What kind of conditions are these women escaping from, and how do they manage to escape?

  In North Korea, the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea implements policies and oversees practices that are openly hostile to women. Legislation designed to protect women is inadequate and unenforced. Acts of sexual and gender-based violence are perpetrated against women of every class, age and status. The persistence of economic violence targeted at women forces many to adopt perilous activities, which in turn leads to further and more severe human rights violations, including human trafficking, forced marriage, forced abortions and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence.

  While individual motives to escape North Korea differ, I would highlight two distinct patterns. First, many women have told me they escaped to experience the freedoms they were denied in North Korea, to reunite with family members in South Korea who had previously escaped their homeland, and to be able to earn a living and feed their families. Second, we found that many women are forced to enter China through economic necessity. There, many fall victim to human trafficking and are sold into either prostitution or forced marriages in rural areas. While escape is difficult owing to China’s policy of returning refugees, some are successful and travel through China and southeast Asia before finding sanctuary in South Korea.

  How are they received in South Korea, and what challenges do they face?

  Upon their entry into South Korea, North Korean exiles often receive South Korean citizenship and are not considered refugees. However, exiled North Koreans who have settled in South Korea face unique forms of identity-based discrimination, grounded in historical prejudices about North Korea as dangerous and communist and North Korean exiles as disloyal, idle, unthankful or ill-mannered. According to our survey, 43 per cent of respondents have experienced at least one form of identity-based discrimination since arriving in South Korea. Across the diaspora, 18 per cent of North Korean women and men experienced discrimination in South Korea in 2020.

  North Korea maintains clandestine agents in many countries, including South Korea. If the presence of exiles in South Korea is established by these agents, remaining family members in North Korea can be subject to extortion and punishment under the principle of ‘guilt by association’. There have also been cases where exiles in South Korea have been coerced by North Korean state agents to return to North Korea, although this is less common.

  How is your organisation working to respond?

  Korea Future is a non-profit, non-governmental organisation investigating human rights violations in North Korea in support of justice and accountability. We were founded in London in 2017 and expanded from a long-running civil society and diaspora collective that had documented human rights violations and provided assistance to North Korean refugees who were exiled in Europe. Today, we are a diverse team of professionals with over 30 years of combined experience working on North Korea with offices in Seoul, London and The Hague.

  We primarily undertake detailed in-person interviews with North Korean survivors, perpetrators and witnesses of human rights violations and advocate for justice and accountability. We also source internal documents and photographic and video evidence from inside North Korea as part of our ongoing investigations. More recently, we used digital modelling to recreate the internal architecture of a North Korean detention centre. This was the first time anyone had been able to see inside a North Korean penal facility.

  Much of our information is stored in the North Korean Prison Database, a growing and comprehensive archive of international human rights law violations and atrocities that have transpired in the North Korean penal system. The database is freely available to legal practitioners, policymakers, researchers, civil society organisations, journalists and more.

  We also engage in capacity strengthening of exiled North Korean women to increase their involvement in and leadership of human rights investigations, documentation and organisations. I recently completed a two-year project with exiled women, exploring how the human rights movement, particularly grant-makers, can deploy their resources to better support the active participation and leadership of exiled women and exiled women-led organisations.

  How should the South Korean government engage with North Korea? And what should the international community do?

  We encourage and support all states and the wider international community to work toward justice and accountability solutions for North Korea. It is well established that crimes against humanity are ongoing in North Korea, and this should inform how states approach the situation. Human rights cannot be divorced from other diplomatic initiatives or approaches to North Korea’s nuclear proliferation. The reality today is that there are no international mechanisms to investigate North Korea, nor are there any ongoing international or domestic court cases. It is too easy to assume that a problem like North Korea is too difficult to solve. A solution has to start somewhere, and failing a referral of North Korea to the International Criminal Court or the formation of an international tribunal, we encourage the examination of other approaches, such as investigation under the principle of universal jurisdiction and targeted human rights sanctions. While North Korea is probably the largest crime base in modern history, it should be seen as remarkable that it remains the least documented and understood as well.

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  Civic space in North Korea is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Korea Future through itswebsite and follow@KFuturexhr on Twitter.

• NORTH KOREA: ‘Since Kim Jong-un came to power, the surveillance and security system has increased dramatically’

  CIVICUS speaks about activism in the closed civic space of North Korea with Bada Nam, Secretary General of People for Successful Corean Reunification (PSCORE).

  Founded in 2006 and based in South Korea, PSCORE is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) that works to improve human rights in North Korea, assist North Korean escapees settling in South Korea and address barriers to reunification of the two Koreas.

  Is there anything resembling civil society in North Korea?

  North Korea values organisational activities, requiring every citizen to participate simultaneously in several groups such as the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea, North Korea’s Socialist Women’s Union and the Socialist Patriotic Youth League. All of them are government-organised and exert control over people rather than encourage critical thinking. Mentioning civic organisations from the outside world is strictly forbidden.

  Congregating and engaging in activism in any way critical to the regime is a serious criminal offence, with punishments that can extend to the death penalty. As a result, any such activity must be covert, and it’s difficult to obtain accurate information on the existence of an underground civil society.

  North Korea is a surveillance state, where people are always cautious about what they say, even to close friends and family members. It’s impossible to gather colleagues and engage in civic activities because everyone is made to monitor each other and failure to report treasonous crimes to the authorities would also result in severe punishment. Public criticism sessions and public executions are also examples of how the regime strikes fear into the population.

  People are deterred from opposing the government not only because of the extreme punishment they would face but also due to North Korea’s policy of guilt by association, which puts their close relatives at risk. The ‘Songbun’ class system classifies people according to their political loyalties, as ‘loyal’, ‘wavering’ or ‘hostile’, and family members may be demoted in this classification system, affecting their life opportunities, including career options and access to food rations. In serious cases, entire families may be sent to political camps and die from forced labour or starvation. Therefore, North Koreans don’t dare imagine opposing the government.

  Have there been any recent changes in the ways the North Korean regime responds to dissent?

  The North Korean government has always responded to dissent in an extreme manner. However, since Kim Jong-un came to power in 2011, the surveillance and security system has increased dramatically, making it nearly impossible to escape from North Korea. Extra security measures are in place along the borders and a shoot-to-kill policy is enforced against those trying to escape. The situation was exacerbated further during the COVID-19 pandemic when the China-North Korea border was closed, both halting trade and also impeding the flow of defectors.

  Information poses the greatest threat to the North Korean regime, especially due to the influence of the recent ‘Korean wave’ that has made South Korean popular culture increasingly prevalent. Most people in North Korea have been exposed to South Korean dramas and music, leading some to adopt South Korean manner of speech and fashion style. In response, the government has intensified monitoring, enacted strict laws and imposed severe punishments for consuming or distributing foreign media. The Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act, enacted in January 2023, explicitly prohibits the use of foreign languages and specifically bans South Korean terms such as ‘oppa’, which translates as ‘older brother’ and is used as a form of endearment for a boyfriend.

  How do people manage to escape North Korea?

  Most North Koreans escape across the border with China, often with the help of a broker. Brokers reach out to wealthy families in North Korea or help those who have escaped to China get to South Korea. Defectors in South Korea sometimes contact a broker to help other family members flee.

  China has a policy of forced repatriation for North Korean refugees, and its advanced surveillance system makes it extremely difficult to travel in China undetected. If apprehended and returned to North Korea, defectors and their families face severe punishment.

  Most North Korean refugees must travel through several countries before reaching safety. From China, they might flee to Mongolia and Southeast Asian countries such as Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. Many North Koreans end up seeking asylum in Thailand, where the government assists them and helps organise their journey to South Korea.

  What help do escapees receive?

  The assistance available to North Korean refugees depends on the laws and diplomatic relations of countries with North and South Korea. Civil society, including PSCORE, helps North Korean defectors settle in South Korea by teaching essential life skills. Thanks to our volunteer teachers, we focus on providing educational support, including English lessons and vocational workshops. In the past, we also assisted escapees in reaching South Korea but, unfortunately, this became impossible due to China’s growing securitisation and the impact of COVID-19.

  Once in South Korea, North Koreans must undergo a 12-week training programme at the Hanawon rehabilitation centre, where they learn various skills to adapt to the South Korean lifestyle and have access to medical treatment and mental health services. While the South Korean government has implemented programmes to assist refugees, the process of fully integrating into South Korean society is still difficult for people who have previously lived under the totalitarian regime. Psychological trauma from refugees’ journey to freedom may have lasting effects on their lives.

  How do escapees work to raise awareness and advocate for change in North Korea?

  There are many CSOs, mainly based in South Korea, that support North Koreans inside the country and abroad. Some organisations send messages, information, K-dramas and K-pop to North Korea using USB sticks. South Korean news outlets, such as Daily NK and NK News, have sources in North Korea that provide insights into the current situation. PSCORE and other North Korean human rights groups conduct interviews with defectors and publish reports based on their testimonies.

  Our primary activities involve organising public awareness campaigns through seminars and events. We also share short catchy videos on various North Korea-related topics via our social media channels. Our large international team of interns plays a crucial role in advocacy by translating our social media content into various languages. This makes our mission and content visible to the rest of the world.

  PSCORE was granted special consultative status with the United Nations (UN) Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 2012, facilitating our engagement with the international community. We hold an annual side event at the UN Human Rights Council to share the latest information on North Korea’s human rights situation. We leverage international pressure to try to bring about change.

  What further international support do diaspora activists need?

  The topic of North Korean human rights is seen as a very political issue in South Korea. This means that CSOs are affected by each change of government, as policies toward North Korea shift with every administration. While PSCORE’s objective is centred on achieving peace and improving human rights in North Korea, we receive limited support compared to other CSOs due to the interpretation of our activities as politically charged, even though PSCORE is a non-partisan and non-religious CSO. Increased media exposure could help us secure more funding.

  Insufficient funding is a common challenge for North Korean human rights organisations. It hinders the potential to raise awareness and support refugees in South Korea. North Korean activists need more platforms to amplify their voices and continue advocating for change. Still, we hope that more donations will come as the international community becomes more interested in the cause of human rights in North Korea.

  Civic space in North Korea is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with PSCORE through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@PSCORE911 on Twitter.

• NORTHERN CYPRUS: ‘Civil society is not involved in decision-making and is considered a nuisance’

  CIVICUS speaks with DeryaBeyatlı, Director of the Human Rights Platform,about the space for civil society in Northern Cyprus and the prospects for reunification in the context of the 2023 Cyprus and Turkish presidential elections.

  Established in 2021, theHuman Rights Platform isa Turkish-Cypriot civil society umbrella organisation bringing together seven human rights organisations guided by the vision of an egalitarian, democratic and inclusive society where human rights and fundamental freedoms are protected and accessible for everyone.

  What do you make of the results of the Cyprus presidential election?

  In the latest presidential election, held in February 2023, we saw a rise of nationalist and racist rhetoric. In response to losing ground, the left-wing Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) supported a candidate who was more nationalistic than the party itself, but was still defeated in the runoff by Nicos Christodoulides, who was backed by centrists and right-wing parties.

  It is clear to me that over the past few years Cyprus has been affected by the same shift towards radical right-wing politics that we’ve seen elsewhere in Europe.

  What does the Human Rights Platform work on?

  One of the main objectives of the Human Rights Platform is to document human rights violations committed by the government of Northern Cyprus, which is largely controlled by the Turkish authorities. I have observed that both society and the local authorities are becoming more racist, largely in reaction to the inflow of Black students who are lured with the promise of a job in Europe and trafficked into the northern part of Cyprus. Only in 2020 was human trafficking recognised as a crime in Northern Cyprus, and yet more than two years later, there has been only one court verdict in a case involving this crime. The authorities are unwilling to deal with human trafficking crimes and other human rights violations and keep blaming the victims instead.

  What is the current state of reunification talks?

  Ever since 1974, Cyprus has been split along ethnic lines, with Greek and Turkish Cypriots living on either side of the Green Line, a buffer zone under United Nations (UN) control. Christodoulides assumed that reunification talks might resume due to Turkey’s rapprochement with the west in search of relief to address damage caused by recent earthquakes and right after being elected said that the reunification of Cyprus is his priority. However, I think neither him nor Ersin Tatar, the current president of Northern Cyprus, who has strongly advocated for a two-state solution for many years, nor the Turkish and Greek guarantors are actually interested in the reunification of Cyprus.

  The two-state formula currently advocated by Tatar was put on the table back in 2002 by Rauf Denktash, the founding president of Northern Cyprus, and was widely rejected by UN member states, with the exception of Turkey. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly expressed his support for the two-state solution, so I don´t think his re-election changes anything.

  Reunification talks are currently on hold and I’m afraid we’re headed towards permanent division. Neither Turkey nor the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) are eager to give up the power they exercise and share it with Turkish Cypriots. We are in a sandwich position, where Turkey interferes with the local matters of Northern Cyprus and the RoC discriminates against Turkish-speaking citizens of the island.

  One of the numerous human rights implications of the division of Cyprus is that there are around 30,000 children of mixed marriages who cannot get RoC citizenship and hence become European Union (EU) citizens. Despite Turkish language being an official language of the RoC, official documents and legislation are all in the Greek language, leaving Turkish Cypriots out. Turkish Cypriots cannot open a bank account or establish an association unless they live in government-controlled areas. And the list goes on.

  What obstacles does civil society face in Northern Cyprus?

  The division of the island creates challenging civic space conditions in Northern Cyprus, where the Human Rights Platform is registered. We face many obstacles due to the fact that we work in areas not under the effective control of the government of RoC. It’s very difficult to make our voices heard and get access to funding available to EU member states because we are not legally registered in a member state. Yet we cannot do so, since we do not reside in the government-controlled areas. Our only funding opportunity is the Financial Aid instrument of the European Commission (EC), which is highly competitive and offers limited funds to civil society.

  The local authorities of Northern Cyprus prefer directing EU funds towards infrastructure and economic development, and regard supporting civil society as unnecessary and therefore a complete waste of funds. Turkish Cypriot civil society organisations (CSOs) aren’t involved in decision-making mechanisms and are considered a nuisance. Meanwhile, local public funds are only available to government-sponsored non-governmental organisations, also known as GONGOs, that are under the effective control of the Turkish Embassy and the Turkish Cypriot political leadership.

  Perceived by local authorities as a threat, Turkish Cypriot civil society is silenced and sometimes attacked on mainstream media. Public TV, radio and news agencies are almost inaccessible for us. CSOs working to protect human rights and safeguard democracy in Northern Cyprus are systematically marginalised. Since we maintain relationships with the EC, EU member states and the USA, we are often regarded as ‘foreign agents’ and threatened and blackmailed, sometimes openly but mostly discreetly. A widely used tactic is the use of fake social media accounts promoting extremely nationalistic content and blaming Turkish Cypriot civil society activists for trading the country to the Greeks or to imperialistic powers.

  What international support do Turkish Cypriot human rights CSOs need?

  Most international intergovernmental organisations and their agencies prefer to ignore our presence. Since we are in a place the existence of which they don’t recognise, they refuse to even meet with us, let alone hear us out. We need both political and financial support in order to get stronger and become more effective in our struggle to uphold democracy and human rights in Northern Cyprus.

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  Civic space in Cyprus is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Human Rights Platform through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@ihp_hrp and@DBeyatli on Twitter.

• Observations on the quest to build back better

  SDG Knowledge Hub’s interview with Mandeep Tiwana, Chief Programmes Officer

  • Five years since the passage of the SDGs, the impulse in many quarters is still to scale up existing approaches, rather than to push for fundamental changes in how our societies and economies function to better realize rights.
  • In addition, there are worrying signs that COVID-19 emergency restrictions could be used as a smokescreen for a broader crackdown on dissent, which would undermine accountability for the 2030 Agenda.
  • Countries that appear to have done better are ones that have empathetic leaders who have been inclusive in their policy responses and have involved civil society in decision making.

  The SDG Knowledge Hub spoke with Mandeep Tiwana, Chief Programmes Officer at CIVICUS, about his assessment of responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and impacts on the 2030 Agenda. Mandeep highlights the persistence of “MDG mindsets” and an increase in censorship and surveillance. He also suggests five ways to build a better post-pandemic world.

  Read full interview in SDG Knowledge Hub

• OLYMPICS: ‘This was supposed to be a unifying event, but the reality is always more complicated’

  CIVICUS discusses the political, economic, social and human rights implications of the recent Olympic Games with UK-based academic, journalist and author David Goldblatt, whose latest book isThe Games: A Global History of the Olympics.

  The Olympics have long been a global celebration of sport and unity, but recent editions have sparked intense debate about their impact on human rights. While the Paris 2024 Games sought to highlight gender inclusivity, environmental initiatives and urban development, they also generated significant controversies. The exclusion of Russia and Belarus but not Israel and the displacement of people from excluded groups raised questions about consistency, fairness and respect for human rights. As the focus shifts to Los Angeles 2028, concerns remain about the lasting effects of the extensive security measures put in place for the Games.

  What are the Olympics for, and why are they important?

  The purpose of the Olympic Games has evolved over time. In the original model conceived by Pierre de Coubertin in the late 19th century, they were a neo-Hellenic celebration of Victorian athletic amateurism and a space for personal diplomacy among the elite. More than 120 years on, both sport and society have changed, and so has the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) vision of the Games. Today, they are a cosmopolitan celebration of humanity through sport.

  Since abandoning amateurism in 1992, the IOC has linked the Games to several international issues, including support for universal human rights, international peace-making through the idea of an Olympic Truce, environmental sustainability with a focus on carbon neutrality and progressive urban development. Whether it succeeds in all these areas is another matter.

  The Olympic Games have also made significant progress in terms of gender inclusiveness, as they are no longer a male-only event. In recent years, there have been particular efforts to include more women as competitors and in television coverage, with Paris 2024 the first gender-equal Olympics. However, the issue of how transgender athletes should be treated remains unresolved, with highly controversial cases such as the Algerian boxer whose gender was questioned. This is a global sports problem, not just an IOC problem, and there isn’t a clear way out.

  The Games are supposed to be a unifying event, but the reality is always more complicated. The fact that Belarus and Russia were banned from taking part while Israel was accepted caused a great deal of controversy. It also seemed the focus of the event wasn’t on the athletes. Apart from global stars like Simone Biles and Léon Marchand, much of the attention was given to rapper Snoop Dogg, which is questionable for a multi-billion-dollar sporting event. The Games seem to be moving away from de Coubertin’s original vision and turning into a commercial television spectacle.

  What were the 2024 Olympics criticised for?

  The exclusion of Belarus and Russia raised questions of consistency, particularly in the light of Israel’s participation. While Israel argues it hasn’t violated international law and should therefore be treated differently to Russia, most of the world – and particularly the global south – disagrees. The IOC needs to rethink its criteria for participation, as there will always be ongoing conflicts and there should be clear rules about who can and can’t participate.

  Despite these problems, France handled protests reasonably well. Compared to the 2022 World Cup in Qatar, where pro-Iranian, pro-migrant worker and pro-LGBTQI+ protesters were severely repressed, pro-Palestinian protesters were allowed to make a statement with their T-shirts and flags. And it was definitely better than the 2008 Olympics in China, where there was no room for any kind of protest, even as the human rights situation was getting worse.

  Paris 2024 also showcased a diverse, multicultural and multiracial France, both through its athletes and in the opening ceremony. This display of diversity drew criticism from conservative groups and the French far right. But one thing is clear: once the Games began, attention shifted away from these issues, making it difficult for them to gain media visibility.

  What is your overall assessment of the event?

  It’s a complex assessment. One of the biggest problems with the Olympics is that they tend to cost much more than is budgeted for. But Paris 2024 managed to keep the budget under control. France aimed for a more modest Olympics, with a budget of around US$9 billion, making it one of the cheapest editions compared to London, Rio and Tokyo. Half of the money came from public funds and the rest from IOC sponsorship and ticket sales.

  Another positive aspect of Paris 2024 was that, unlike many other Olympic Games, it was explicitly linked to an existing urban development project. The only other notable case was Barcelona 1992, which was integrated into a wider urban plan. While the Paris model was not as comprehensive as Barcelona’s, it definitely stood out. Development plans focused on Saint Denis, France’s poorest region, with new public transport links and social housing in the Olympic Village expected to benefit the area.

  However, the extent to which these developments will contribute to a greener, more equitable Paris is still under debate. Houses in the Olympic Village are likely to be sold at prices local people can’t afford, and it’s not clear that the new jobs will benefit the people of Saint Denis. It’s likely to end up with a process of gentrification similar to what happened in Vancouver and London, where most of the housing is now owned by the Qatar Investment Authority and sold at prices locals can’t afford.

  What was the environmental cost of these Olympics?

  Paris made considerable efforts to reduce its carbon footprint. Although we don’t have the final data yet, it’s likely to be a significant improvement on previous editions – with the sole exception of Tokyo, where the COVID-19 pandemic prevented many people travelling. The Paris venues were powered by renewable energy, high environmental standards were applied to the construction of the Olympic Village and car use in the city was severely restricted during the event.

  However, air travel is still a problem. Hosting an international event such as the Olympics involves people travelling from all over the world and results in a very large carbon footprint, estimated at 1.5 million tonnes or more. Attempts have been made in the past to offset this by planting forests or investing in renewable energy, but the carbon credit market has proved ineffective. We must ask whether it’s justifiable to burn as much carbon as a Caribbean island consumes in a year just to host a global sporting event and transport dressage horses. Yet this is an issue no one in the global sports industry or any other major international event is willing to address.

  Were there any major human rights concerns?

  There are at least two major areas of concern. One is the large number of unhoused or poorly housed people evicted from the city in the run-up to the Games. At least 12,500 migrant workers and residents of temporary camps were moved to other parts of France, far from their communities and jobs. This number is likely to have increased in recent months and the situation remains a tragedy.

  Clearing the streets to create the illusion that there isn’t a housing problem before staging a global event is simply wrong. But this wasn’t the first time – there have been similar evictions in Tokyo and even more in Rio. With Los Angeles 2028 on the horizon, we can expect an even higher number of evictions given the city’s large unhoused population.

  Civil society organisations advocating for the unhoused made their voices heard in the run-up to the Games, with much media coverage. But once the spectacle began, they struggled to make headlines and advocacy was quickly overshadowed by the sport.

  Another human rights issue concerns the extensive security measures for the Paris Olympics, which involved a complex process of zoning Paris, with strict policing and rules about who could enter certain areas near the venues. If you lived in one of these areas, you needed a QR code. It was a very complicated and intrusive system, but for all the grumbling, it worked reasonably well. More worrying was the use of artificial intelligence, CCTV cameras and facial recognition technology to control crowds, raising questions about privacy and the long-term use of these measures.

  The French government and police promised to dismantle all these special security measures after the Games, but there is reason for scepticism. Similar measures were introduced for previous Olympics, such as Athens 2004 and London 2012, and remain in place today. And the enormous amount of money spent on Rio’s various police and paramilitary forces for riot control ahead of the 2016 games wasn’t returned either.

  What are your expectations for the next Olympics?

  We’re going to have another four years of global warming, so Los Angeles 2028 is going to be very hot. Extreme heat could have a significant impact on events and spectators, as seen at Tokyo 2020, where a marathon had to be cancelled due to the weather.

  The high number of unhoused people in Los Angeles is another major concern. While Mayor Karen Bass has plans to address the ‘issue’, the situation is likely to worsen in the run-up to the Games, with multiple evictions, as we’ve seen in Paris.

  On the positive side, Los Angeles 2028 has promised to be a car-free Olympics. It’s difficult to see how this could be achieved in a country with such a strong car culture. But Los Angeles has public transport and a light rail network, so it’s a question of getting locals out of their cars and onto trains and buses. Whether this ambitious goal can be achieved remains to be seen, but it could be an opportunity for a lasting change in habits and more sustainable urban development.

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  Civic space in France is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Follow@davidsgoldblatt on Twitter.

• Oman: Adoption of Universal Periodic Review on Human Rights

  Statement at the 47th Session of the UN Human Rights Council

  CIVICUS, the Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR) and the Omani Association for Human Rights (OAHR) welcome the participation of Oman in the UPR process. In our UPR submission, we noted that since its last review, Oman has not implemented or taken any concrete steps to implement most of the recommendations relating to civic space since 2015.

  The Omani authorities continue to use restrictive legislation, including the Press and Publications Law and the Telecommunications Act to stifle freedom of expression and online freedoms and to target journalists, bloggers and online activists. In addition, the Omani authorities routinely suspend the social media accounts of activists and ban other internet platforms that facilitate communication.

  These laws are also used to ban publications and restrict travel for human rights defenders. In addition, the Penal Code (2018) has broad provisions which are used to restrict freedom of expression and criminalize criticism of the Sultan and impose harsh prison terms to those deemed to publish information that may harm the prestige of the state.

  Human rights defenders continue to be subjected to arbitrary arrests and judicial persecution for raising concerns over human rights violations or for questioning decisions made by the Sultanate. Environmental rights defenders continue to be targeted for their peaceful advocacy. In March 2021 for example Ahmed Issa Qatan was sentenced to six months in prison for his peaceful campaigns protecting the environment.

  Madame President, CIVICUS, GCHR and OAHR call on the Government of Oman to take proactive measures to address these concerns and implement recommendations to create and maintain, in law and in practice, an enabling environment for civil society.

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  Civic space in Oman is rated is Repressed by the CIVICUS Monitor.

• One Year of Arbitrary Detention: Human Rights Organisations Call for Release of Kashmiri Human Rights Defender Khurram Parvez

  The undersigned organisations call for the immediate and unconditional release of Kashmiri human rights defender Khurram Parvez, who was arrested one year ago on November 22, 2021 on politically motivated terrorism and other charges.

  Parvez, the Coordinator of the Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS) and Chairperson of the Asian Federation Against Involuntary Disappearances (AFAD), has been a champion of human rights advocacy, documentation, and investigations including in the Jammu and Kashmir region, for over 20 years.

  On November 22, 2021, India’s counterterrorism body, the National Investigation Agency (NIA), raided Parvez’s home and office for approximately 14 hours, seizing his and his family members’ laptop, mobile phone, and books. He was then called in for questioning at the NIA office where he was arrested on the basis of a First Information Report lodged by the NIA on November 6, 2021. The arrest memo stated that Parvez was being charged under the Indian Penal Code and the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), India’s abusive counterterrorism law, which makes release on bail difficult. Specifically, he was charged with “criminal conspiracy,” “waging, or attempting to wage war, or abetting waging of war, against the Government of India,” “punishment for conspiracy to wage war against the Government of India,” “raising funds for terror activities,” “punishment for conspiracy,” “recruiting any person or persons for commission of a terrorist act,” “offence relating to membership of a terrorist organisation,” and “offence of raising funds for terrorist organisations.” In May 2020, United Nations (UN) experts raised concerns about various provisions in the UAPA that are inconsistent with international human rights law and standards.

  Indian authorities have repeatedly targeted Khurram Parvez for his human rights work in an attempt to silence him and intimidate others. Over the years, the NIA and other law enforcement agencies have accused him of “carrying out secessionist and separatist activities” in the region and have conducted raids at his home and offices. In 2016, authorities barred him from travelling to Switzerland to attend the UN Human Rights Council session, and then jailed him for 76 days under the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act (PSA). In December 2021, UN experts urged the Indian authorities to stop targeting Parvez.

  On May 13, 2022, after 173 days of detention, the NIA filed a preliminary charge sheet before the NIA Special Court in New Delhi against Parvez and stated that they will continue investigating this case. The NIA accused Parvez of “running a network of over ground workers of the [Pakistan-based armed militant organisation] Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) for furthering activities of LeT and to commit terrorist attacks in India”, according to the press release published by the NIA on May 13, 2022. His detention has since then been extended at least five times by the NIA Special Court in New Delhi under Section 43D(2)(b) of the UAPA, which allows for the extension of the detention period for up to 180 days if the investigating agency is unable to complete the investigation of a case within a 90-day period.

  Parvez has now been in detention for one year. His arbitrary detention is part of a longstanding list of human rights violations committed by Indian authorities against human rights defenders, civil society organisations, journalists, and activists in Jammu and Kashmir. Rather than working towards accountability for these violations, authorities have targeted and arrested those who have exposed and sought justice for such violations. Indian authorities have also clamped down on media freedom and shut down the internet to quash peaceful protests and restrict access to information. This has caused a chilling effect, further shrinking civic space in a region that is already facing an increasing clampdown on dissent since the Indian Parliament revoked Jammu and Kashmir’s special autonomous status in August 2019.

  The Indian authorities must release Parvez immediately and unconditionally, and all charges against him must be dropped, as they are a reprisal for his peaceful human rights work. Human rights defenders should be protected, not persecuted. The Indian authorities must stop criminalising the work of human rights defenders and end all attempts to silence and intimidate human rights defenders and others critical voices of the government. Instead, Indian authorities should prioritise ending impunity for the human rights violations that human rights defenders have bravely documented and exposed, especially in Jammu and Kashmir, and ensure human rights defenders can work in a safe and enabling environment without fear of reprisals.

  Signed:

  Amnesty International

  Asian Federation Against Involuntary Disappearances (AFAD)

  CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation

  FORUM-ASIA

  Front Line Defenders (FLD)

  Human Rights Watch

  International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)

  International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), in the framework of the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders

  International Service for Human Rights (ISHR)

  Minority Rights Group International

  Stichting The London Story

  World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), in the framework of the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders

  Press Contacts

  For Amnesty International:

  For CIVICUS:

  For FORUM-ASIA:

  For Human Rights Watch:

  For FIDH:

  For Stichting the London Story:

  For OMCT:

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  Civic space in India is rated as "Repressed" by the CIVICUS Monitor 

• Ongoing violations of fundamental rights require Council’s continued scrutiny

  Statement at the 50th Session of the Human Ricghts Council 

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  Interactive Dialogue on High Commssioners report on Venezuela

  Delivered by Carlos Correa, Espacio Público 

  Espacio Público and CIVICUS reiterate the need to continue documentation of the human rights situation in Venezuela. The crisis continues with severe consequences for the most vulnerable people.

  Civil liberties violations impact economic and social rights guarantees. Restrictions on freedom and circulation of information seek to prevent legitimate criticism of public administration. Illegal blockades of digital media remain in place in an ecosystem dominated by state-controlled radio and television stations.

  A private telephone and internet service provider reported that in 2021 more than 1.5 million lines were tapped. And since 2016, over 1300 websites were blocked. There is a pattern of mass surveillance that violates the right to privacy.

  Civil society is at risk and nominal ‘new spaces for dialogue’ have done little to assuage this. The draft International Cooperation bill would restrict CSOs operation and access to funding. Human rights defenders continue to be intimidated, criminalised and arbitrarily detained.

  We urge you to maintain scrutiny on Venezuela; extend resolution 45/20 that enables this report, consolidate the presence of the High Commissioner's office in the country, support the renewal of the mandate of the Fact-Finding Mission and any initiative to accompany victims in their quest for justice.

  Thank you very much.

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   Civic space in Venezuela is rated as "Repressed" by the CIVICUS Monitor 

• Open Letter to ASEAN Defence Ministers

  To:
  H.E. General Tea Banh, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence, Cambodia 

  His Majesty Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Mu'izzaddin Waddaulahibni Al-Marhum, Minister of Defense, Brunei Darussalam

  H.E. Prabowo Subianto, Minister of Defence, Indoensia

  H.E. General Chansamone Chanyalath, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence, Lao PDR

  The Honourable Dato' Seri Hishammuddin bin Tun Hussein, Senior Minister of Defence, Malaysia

  H.E. Delfin N. Lorenzana, Secretary of National Defense, Philippines

  H.E. Dr Ng Eng Hen, Minister for Defence, Singapore

  H.E. General Prayut Chan-o-cha, Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Thailand

  H.E. General Phan Van Giang, Minister of National Defence, Viet Nam

   

  June 15 2022

  Re: Myanmar junta participation in ADMM

  Your Excellencies,

  We, the undersigned 677 Myanmar, regional and international civil society organizations, appeal to you not to extend an invitation to the Myanmar military junta's Minister of Defence at the upcoming ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM). 

  The Myanmar military junta's acts meet the definition of terror under international and national law and are responsible for ongoing violations of international human rights and humanitarian law following the military's illegal coup attempt. Since the military's illicit attempt coup, almost 700,000 people have been forcibly displaced as the junta waged a terror campaign against the Myanmar people. In the face of mass public resistance, the junta has murdered more than 1,900 people, arbitrarily arrested over 14,000 more, committed widespread torture, indiscriminate airstrikes and shelling, burnt villages and looted public property. 

  In the upcoming 16th ADMM, scheduled for June 22, we understand that the Junta defence minister General Mya Tun Oo will be representing Myanmar. General Mya Tun Oo plays a leading role in managing the military, responsible for committing ongoing atrocity crimes with total impunity. Mya Tun Oo's direct responsibility for international law violations has been recognized by the USA, U.K., EU, Canada and New Zealand, which sanctioned him. In its designation, the U.K. stated that Mya Tun Oo has "command responsibility for these violations and can therefore be held responsible for these actions." Mya Tun Oo is also a member of the State Administration Council (SAC). The E.U. recognized that "as a member of the SAC, General Mya Tun Oo has been directly involved in and responsible for decision making concerning state functions and is therefore responsible for undermining democracy and the rule of law". Mya Tun Oo should be held accountable for his role in the military's attempted coup and the junta's atrocity crimes and not rewarded through participation in ADMM.

  We welcome ASEAN's exclusion of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing from the 2021 ASEAN Summit and the exclusion of the junta foreign minister Wunna Maung Lwin from the 2022 Foreign Ministers' Retreat. However, we note with concern that ADMM has invited the junta to participate in meetings, including at the ministerial level, since its illegal coup attempt, which is inconsistent with decisions made by ASEAN not to invite General Min Aung Hlaing and Wunna Maung Lwin. ADMM's engagement with the junta, which has included military exercises, may likely amount to aiding and abetting the junta's war crimes and crimes against humanity.  

  It is imperative that ASEAN does not award legitimacy to the Myanmar military junta, upholds its charter and respects international human rights and humanitarian law by excluding the junta from ADMM. In allowing the junta to participate in ADMM, ASEAN is further risking complicity in the junta's atrocity crimes by providing support and legitimacy to the military and encouraging a military that is waging a nationwide campaign of terror. 

  As ASEAN defence ministers, we appeal to you to disinvite Mya Tun Oo from the 16th ADMM and all future meetings. Engage with the National Unity Government as the legitimate government of Myanmar, and work to resolve the crisis in Myanmar. 

  For any further inquiries, please contact:

  Khin Ohmar, Progressive Voice,  

  Debbie Stothard, ALTSEAN-Burma,  

  Salai Za Uk Ling, Chin Human Rights Organization,  

   

  List of Signatories

  The list of signatories below includes 299 Myanmar, regional and international organizations and 378 Myanmar civil society organizations that have chosen not to disclose their names.

  Signed by: 

  1. "Do" farmer Organization

  2. 8888 Generation (New Zealand)

  3. 8888 New Generation (Mohnyin)

  4. Action Against Myanmar Military Coup (Sydney)

  5. Action Committee for Democracy Development

  6. Active Youths (Kalaymyo)

  7. Ah Nah podcast- Conversation with Myanmar

  8. Ah. La. Ka (12) Hta Khwe, Primary Education Student Union

  9. All Arakan Students and Youths' Congress

  10. All Burma Democratic Face in New Zealand

  11. All Burma Student Democratic Front - Australia Branch

  12. All Religions Strike Column

  13. All Young Burmese League (AYBL)

  14. Alliance for Free Burma Solidarity

  15. Alternative Solutions for Rural Communities (ASORCOM)

  16. ALTSEAN-Burma

  17. Anti Dictatorship in Burma DC Metropolitan Area

  18. Anti-Myanmar Dictatorship Movement

  19. Anti-Myanmar Military Dictatorship Network (AMMDN)

  20. Arakan CSO Network

  21. Arakan Humanitarian Coordination Team- AHCT

  22. ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR)

  23. Asia Justice and Rights (AJAR)

  24. Asia Pacific Solidarity Coalition

  25. Asian Cultural Forum on Development (ACFOD) Philippines

  26. Asian Cultural Forum on Development Foundation (ACFOD) Thailand

  27. Asian Dignity Initiative

  28. Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development

  29. Association for Advancement of Freedom of Religion or Belief in Vietnam (AAFORB-VN)

  30. Association of Human Rights Defenders and Promoters

  31. Athan - Freedom of Expression Activist Organization

  32. Auckland Kachin Community N.Z.

  33. Auckland Zomi Community

  34. Aung Myay Thar Zan Education Schools Strike Column

  35. Aung Pin Lae Main Strike Column

  36. Australia Burma Friendship Association, Northern Territory

  37. Australia Karen Organization WA Inc.

  38. Australia Myanmar Doctors, Nurses and Friends

  39. Australia Myanmar Youth Alliance (AMYA)

  40. Australian Burmese Muslim Organisation

  41. Australian Chin Community (Eastern Melbourne Inc)

  42. Australian Karen Organisation (AKO)

  43. Australian Karen Organisation Inc

  44. Back Pack Health Workers Team

  45. Bamar Community Tasmania

  46. BCC (စစ်ကိုင်း)

  47. Blood Money Campaign

  48. Buddhist Solidarity Association

  49. Burma Action Ireland

  50. Burma Campaign U.K. 

  51. Burma Human Rights Network

  52. Burma Lawyers' Council (BLC)

  53. Burma Medical Association

  54. Burma Soumalaiset (Finland)

  55. Burmese Community - South Australia

  56. Burmese Community Development Collaboration (BCDC)

  57. Burmese Community Group (Manawatu, N.Z.)

  58. Burmese Community Support Group (BCSG)

  59. Burmese Friendship Association

  60. Burmese Medical Association Australia (BMAA)

  61. Burmese Rohingya Organisation U.K. 

  62. Burmese Rohingya Welfare Organisation New Zealand

  63. Burmese Women's Union

  64. Cambodian Americans and Friends for Democracy and Human Rights Advocate

  65. Campaign for a New Myanmar

  66. Canberra Karen Association

  67. CDM Support Team Mandalay (CSTM)

  68. Chan Mya Thar Si Township People Strike Column

  69. Chin Community - South Australia

  70. Chin Community of Auckland

  71. Chin Community of Western Australia Inc.

  72. Chin Community Tasmania

  73. Chin Human Rights Organization

  74. Chin MATA Working Group

  75. Chin Resources Center

  76. Chin Youth Organization (Matupi)

  77. Citizen of Burma Award - New Zealand

  78. CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation

  79. Committee Representing Mandalay Region Hluttaw

  80. Cooperative University Student Strike Column 

  81. CRPH & NUG Supporters Ireland

  82. CRPH Funding Ireland

  83. CRPH Support Group, Norway

  84. CRPH, NUG Support Team Germany - Deutschland

  85. CRPH/NUG support group Australia

  86. Dawei Development Association

  87. Dawei Probono Lawyer Network

  88. Democracy for Myanmar - Working Group (N.Z.)

  89. Democracy, Peace and Women's Organization

  90. Democratic Youth Council

  91. Doh Atu - Ensemble pour le Myanmar

  92. Dragon Dawn

  93. Education and health care for Myanmar-Thailand Association

  94. Education Family (Anti - Fascists Education Strike Columns Coordination Committee) 

  95. Educational Initiatives Myanmar

  96. Equality Myanmar

  97. Ethnic Youth General Strike Committee

  98. Falam Community - South Australia

  99. Federal Myanmar Benevolence Group (N.Z.)

  100. Foundation of Khmer Samaki

  101. Free Burma Campaign (South Africa)

  102. Free Expression Myanmar (FEM)

  103. Free Rohingya Coalition

  104. Future Light Center

  105. Future Thanlwin

  106. General Strike Committee of Nationalities - GSCN

  107. Generation Wave

  108. Generations (မျိုးဆက်)

  109. GenY For Revolution Japan

  110. German Solidarity with Myanmar Democracy e.V.

  111. Global Myanmar Spring Revolution 

  112. Global Myanmar Spring Revolution - Japan

  113. Global Myanmar Spring Revolution - Korea

  114. Golden Heart Organization

  115. Grass-root People

  116. Human Rights Educators' Network

  117. Human Rights Foundation of Monland

  118. In Defense of Human Rights and Dignity Movement (iDEFEND) Philippines

  119. India For Myanmar

  120. Industrial Training Centre (ITC) Family Sydney

  121. Info Birmanie

  122. Initiatives for International Dialogue

  123. Institute for Asian Democracy

  124. Inter Pares

  125. Interfaith Youth Coalition on Aids in Myanmar (IYCA-Myanmar)

  126. International Campaign for the Rohingya

  127. International Karen Organisation

  128. JASS Southeast Asia

  129. Joint Action Committee for Democracy in Burma (JACDB)

  130. Justice 4 Myanmar - Hope & Development

  131. Justice Movement for Community-Innlay

  132. Justice For Myanmar

  133. Kachin Association Australia

  134. Kachin Association of Australia WA Inc.

  135. Kachin Human Rights Watch

  136. Kachin State Women Network

  137. Kachin Women's Association Thailand

  138. Kachin Women's Union

  139. Kadu Youth Development Association (KYDA)

  140. Kalyarna Metta Association (Khin U)

  141. Kanbung Youth (Matupi)

  142. Kanpetlet Land Development Organization

  143. Karen Community - South Australia

  144. Karen Human Rights Group

  145. Karen Peace Support Network

  146. Karen Swedish Community (KSC)

  147. Karen Women's Organization

  148. Karenni Community of Western Australia Inc.

  149. Karenni Federation of Australia

  150. Karenni Human Rights Group

  151. Karenni Society New Zealand

  152. Kayan Internally Displacement Supervising Committee (KIDSC)

  153. Kayan Women’s Organization

  154. Kayin Community Tasmania

  155. Keng Tung Youth

  156. Khanthar Farmers Network

  157. Khumzup Local Development Committee

  158. Kurawal Foundation

  159. Kyauktada Strike Committee

  160. LA COMMUNAUTÉ BIRMANE DE FRANCE

  161. LGBTIQ Strike of Mandalay

  162. Maha Aung Myay Township People Collective Strike Column

  163. Mandalar University Student Strike  Column 

  164. Mandalay Alliance Strike Collective Column 

  165. Mandalay Based People Strike Column 

  166. Mandalay Civil Society Organizations 

  167. Mandalay Engineer Group

  168. Mandalay Engineer United Force

  169. Mandalay University Student Alumni Union 

  170. Mandalay Wholesale Strike Column

  171. Mandalay Youth Association

  172. Mandalay Youth Strike Column

  173. MATA Sagaing Region

  174. Matu Chin Community - South Australia

  175. Matu Forum Committee

  176. Matu Women Association

  177. Medical Family – Mandalay

  178. Metta Campaign Mandalay

  179. MIIT Student Strike Column

  180. MilkTeaAlliance Calendar

  181. MilkTeaAlliance Galleries

  182. Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute Foundation, Inc. (MPI)

  183. Mindat Chin Community NSW

  184. Mindat Community - South Australia

  185. Mindat Emergency Response Team (MERT)

  186. Mizo Community - South Australia

  187. Mon Families Group

  188. Mon National Council (MNC)

  189. Mung Chying Rawt Jat (MRJ) 

  190. Muslim Youth Network

  191. Muslim Youth Union 

  192. Mya Taung Strike Column

  193. Myanmar Accountability Project

  194. Myanmar Action Group Denmark

  195. Myanmar Alliance for Transparency and Accountability 

  196. Myanmar Buddhist Community of South Australia

  197. Myanmar Community Coffs Harbour (MCC)

  198. Myanmar Cultural Research Society (MCRS)

  199. Myanmar Democracy and Peace Committee (Australia)

  200. Myanmar Democratic Movement (MDM)

  201. Myanmar Diaspora Group Finland

  202. Myanmar Engineering Association of Australia (MEAA)

  203. Myanmar Engineers - New Zealand

  204. Myanmar Gonye (New Zealand)

  205. Myanmar People Alliance (Shan State)

  206. Myanmar People from Ireland

  207. Myanmar People Residing in Canberra

  208. Myanmar Professionals Association Australia (MPAA)

  209. Myanmar Railway, Region (3) CDM Strike Column

  210. Myanmar Students' Association Australia (MSAA)

  211. Myanmar Students' Union in New Zealand

  212. Netherlands Myanmar Solidarity Platform

  213. Network for Advocacy Action

  214. Network for Human Rights Documentation Burma (ND-Burma)

  215. New Zealand Doctors for NUG

  216. New Zealand Karen Association

  217. New Zealand Zo Community Inc.

  218. NLD Solidarity Association (Australia)

  219. No 7 State High School Alumni Strike Column 

  220. No Business With Genocide

  221. Northern Spectrum Youth Association

  222. NSW Karenni (Kayah) Communities

  223. OCTOPUS (Youth Organization)

  224. Open Development Foundation

  225. Overseas Mon Association, New Zealand

  226. Pan Pa Wash People Strike Column

  227. Patriotic War Vetrans of Burma (PWVB)

  228. Peace and Culture Foundation

  229. People's Hope Spring Revolution

  230. Phayagye Peace Strike Column

  231. Private Pre-school Teachers Association 

  232. Progressive Voice

  233. Pusat Komas 

  234. Pyi Gyi Ta Gon Strike 

  235. Pyithu Gonye (New Zealand)

  236. Queensland Kachin Community (QKC)

  237. Queensland Myanmar Youth Collective (QMYC

  238. Queensland Rohingya Community

  239. Rohingya Action Ireland

  240. Rvwang Community Association New Zealand

  241. Sangha Samaga Strike Column

  242. Save and Care Organization for Women at Border Areas

  243. SAVE MYANMAR - USA

  244. Save Myanmar Fundraising Group (New Zealand)

  245. Sein Pan Strike Column

  246. Shan Community (New Zealand)

  247. Shan MATA

  248. Shan Women Development Network

  249. Shape-Sea

  250. Shwe Youth Democratic Alliance (SYDA)

  251. Shwechinthae Farmers Network

  252. Sisters 2 Sisters

  253. Sitt Nyein Pann Foundation

  254. Social Garden 

  255. Southeast Asia Freedom of Expression Network (SAFEnet)

  256. Southern Youth Development Organization

  257. Strike Column of Representatives of Arbitrarily Arrested People

  258. Strike Column of Teachers from Universities and Degree Colleges of Mandalay 

  259. Students & Youth Congress of Burma (SYCB)

  260. Support for Myanmar

  261. Swedish Burma Committee

  262. Swedish Foundation for Human Rights

  263. Sydney Friends for Myanmar Unity

  264. Ta'ang Women's Organization

  265. Taekwando Sport Association 

  266. Tanintharyi MATA

  267. Tanintharyi Nationalities Congress

  268. Tanintharyi People's Voice

  269. Tanintharyi Women's Network

  270. Thai Action Committee for Democracy in Burma (TACDB)

  271. Thapaynyo News Letter

  272. The Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KontraS)

  273. The Institution of Professional Engineers Myanmar (IPEM)

  274. Together Thanlyin

  275. Twitter Team for Revolution

  276. U.S. Campaign for Burma

  277. Uakthon Local Social Development Organization

  278. United Myanmar Community of South Australia  

  279. Victorian Burmese Care Community (VBCC)

  280. Victorian Myanmar Youth (VMY)

  281. Way Way Nay

  282. We Pledge CDM (Australia)

  283. Western Australia Myanmar Community (WAMC)

  284. Western Australia Myanmar Democratic Network (WAMDN)

  285. Winemaw Civil Society Network

  286. Winemaw Lisu Development Association

  287. Women Activists Myanmar (WAM)

  288. Women Advocacy Coalition-Myanmar

  289. Women's League of Burma

  290. Women's Peace Network

  291. Zo Community - South Australia

  292. Zomi Association Australia Inc.

  293. Zomi Community - South Australia

  294. Zomi Community Queensland

  295. ခုနစ်စင်ကြယ်အဖွဲ့

  296. ဒို့မြေကွန်ရက် (LIOH)

  297. ဒေါင်းစစ်သည်

  298. ပွင့်ဖြူလယ်ယာမြေကွန်ရက်

  299. ပဲခူး MATA

• Open Letter to President of Kazakshtan about 30 Uzbek refugees

  8 September 2010
  
  To
  H.E. President Nursultan Nazarbayev
  President of Kazakhstan
  Ak-Korda, President Residence
  Astana
  Kazakhstan
  
  Your Excellency,
  
  I write as the Secretary General of CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, an international alliance of civil society with members and partners in over a hundred countries. Together with the undersigned partners, we are deeply concerned about the imminent decision of the Kazakhstan government on whether to extradite 30 Uzbek refugees to their country of origin. In their country, these individuals have been accused of involvement in terrorist activities, and will be at a serious risk of torture and inhumane treatment upon extradition.

• Open Letter urging UN Human Rights Council members to discuss the report on human rights situation in Xinjiang

  Re: Proposed Human Rights Council Decision on Xinjiang

  Dear Minister,

  We, the undersigned human rights organizations, are writing to urge you to support a decision at the current session of the United Nations Human Rights Council enabling the Council to discuss the recent report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China.

  Meticulous and detailed, the High Commissioner’s report lays bare a systematic campaign by the Chinese government to target Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim minorities for the peaceful exercise of their rights to freedom of religion and expression and to enjoy their own culture. Strikingly, in addition to other sources, the report relies extensively upon the Chinese government’s own policy documents to demonstrate that the authorities’ sweeping crackdown on Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities is discriminatory in both purpose and effect.

  Notably, the High Commissioner’s report concludes that the extent of these violations may constitute international crimes, “in particular crimes against humanity,” requiring “urgent attention by the United Nations intergovernmental bodies and human rights system.” Dozens of UN Special Procedure mandates issued a joint statement reinforcing these concerns and calling on the Human Rights Council to urgently address the human rights situation in China.

  High Commissioner’s Findings

  The report details Chinese authorities’ religious profiling of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang as “extremists,” based on indicia such as “wearing hijabs and ‘abnormal’ beards,” “closing restaurants during Ramadan,” “giving one’s child a Muslim name,” and other conduct that the High Commissioner described as “nothing more or less than personal choice in the practice of Islamic religious beliefs and/or legitimate expression of opinion.”

  The report sets out how those deemed “at risk of extremism” are subject to serious violations by the authorities, including arbitrary detention, torture, involuntary medical treatment, forced labor, family separation, interference with reproductive rights, as well as intimidation, threats and reprisals.

  The authorities have transferred large numbers of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities to detention centers for indefinite periods without charge and without any effective means to challenge their detention. The authorities euphemistically refer to these as “vocational education and training centres,” but refused to provide the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights with any curriculum for this so-called “education.” Detainees were prohibited from practicing their religion, praying, or speaking their language. Instead, there was a strong emphasis on “political teachings” and rehabilitation through self-criticism. As one former detainee said, “we were forced to sing patriotic song after patriotic song every day, as loud as possible and until it hurts, until our faces became red and our veins appeared on our face.”

  Detainees also reported being subject to torture and other ill-treatment, including “being beaten with batons, including electric batons while strapped in a so-called ‘tiger chair’; being subjected to interrogation with water being poured in their faces; prolonged solitary confinement; and being forced to sit motionless on stools for prolonged periods of time.” Many reported being shackled, constant hunger and weight loss, and being forced to take white pills, which made them drowsy.

  Ahead of visits by foreign delegations, former detainees indicated they were “explicitly told by guards to be positive about their experience,” fearing that their detention would be further prolonged or that family members would face reprisals if they failed to comply.

  The report also details a broader program to suppress Uyghur language, culture, religion and identity outside of detention centers, noting that “alongside the increasing restrictions on expressions of Muslim religious practice are recurring reports of the destruction of Islamic religious sites, such as mosques, shrines and cemeteries.” “Homestay” programs, involuntary in nature, placed government officials in many Uyghur homes, where families reported being under constant surveillance and “not allowed to pray or speak their own language.” Even children are not safe: Chinese authorities have reportedly placed the children of those detained in state-run child welfare institutions and boarding schools without parental consent, and with similar restrictions on their ability to practice their religion or speak their language.

  Proposed UN Human Rights Council Resolution

  The proposed resolution is very modest in scope, merely calling for the High Commissioner’s report to be discussed at the Human Rights Council. It takes no position on the issues addressed, takes no position with respect to China, and does not prejudge the outcome of such a discussion. As a human rights organization, we would have preferred that a resolution go much further, heeding the call by some 50 UN Special Procedures and hundreds of nongovernmental organizations from more than 60 countries for an international mechanism to monitor and report on the situation on an ongoing basis. A resolution to discuss the report is the bare minimum response that can be credibly expected from the Human Rights Council when faced with a report of this magnitude.

  Despite China’s stated commitment to “dialogue,” it has made every effort to suppress the report and prevent discussion of its contents. Such an approach, if it prevailed, would undermine the institutional integrity of the Human Rights Council by placing the human rights situation in one country alone uniquely beyond international scrutiny. This would only empower China to pursue its campaign of repression against Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim minorities with impunity.

  We trust we can count on your government’s support for the proposed resolution.

  Sincerely,

  ACAT Belgium

  ACAT Germany

  ACAT UK

  Access Now

  Alliance des Avocats pour les Droits de l'Homme

  Amnesty International

  Article 19

  Centro de Documentación en Derechos Humanos "Segundo Montes Mozo SJ" (SMM)

  Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights

  CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation

  Coalition for Genocide Response

  Comité pour la Liberté à Hong-Kong

  Coordination des Associations et des Particuliers pour la Liberté de Conscience

  DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project)

  Defense Forum Foundation

  East Turkistan Australian Association

  European Union of Jewish Students

  EXCUBITUS Derechos Humanos

  Families of the Disappeared

  Federal Association of Vietnamese Refugees in the Federal Republic of Germany

  Frankfurt Stands with Hong Kong

  Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect

  Human Asia

  Human Rights Defenders Network-SL

  Human Rights Watch

  Humanists International

  Humanitarian China

  Institute for Asian Democracy

  International Christian Concern

  International Coalition to End Transplant Abuse in China (ETAC)

  International Commission of Jurists

  International Service for Human Rights

  Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights

  Judicial Reform Foundation

  Justice For North Korea

  Lesbian and Gay Association of Liberia (LEGAL)

  LGBT+ initiative group "Revers"

  Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies

  Network of the independent Commission for Human rights in North Africa CIDH AFRICA

  NK Watch

  Northern California Hong Kong Club

  People for Successful Corean Reunification- PSCORE

  Persatuan Sahabat Wanita Selangor

  Planet Ally

  René Cassin, the Jewish voice for human rights

  Reporters Without Borders (RSF)

  Réseau Ouest Africain des Défenseurs des Droits Humains/West African Human Rights Defenders' Network

  Safeguard Defenders

  Scholars at Risk

  The Rights Practice

  Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG)

  Uyghur Association of Victoria, Australia

  Viet Tan

  Vietnam Human Rights Network

  Women's Action Network

  World Uyghur Congress

  YUHU Indonesia

  ---

   Civic space in the China is rated as "Closed" by the CIVICUS Monitor

• Open letter: Ensure continued monitoring of the human rights situation in Eritrea

  To Permanent Representatives of Member and Observer States of the United Nations Human Rights Council

  Excellency,

  We, the undersigned human rights organizations, are writing to urge you to support the adoption of a resolution at the upcoming 41st session of the UN Human Rights Council (“Council”) to maintain a monitoring and reporting mandate on the human rights situation in Eritrea.

  The human rights situation in Eritrea remains dire, notwithstanding recent developments, including the Eritrea-Ethiopia Summit, the reopening of the border between the two countries, and the signing of a tripartite agreement between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia.

  A free and independent press continues to be absent from the country and 16 journalists remain in detention without trial, many since 2001. Eritrean authorities are yet to produce evidence that those arbitrarily jailed are alive. Throughout the country, authorities have restricted and suppressed civic space. At the Council’s 40th session in March 2019, the UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights highlighted impunity for past and ongoing human rights violations, including arbitrary arrests and incommunicado detention, violations of the right to a fair trial, lack of information on the fate and whereabouts of disappeared persons, lack of access to justice, lack of enforcement of the 1997 Constitution, the imposition of severe restrictions to the enjoyment of human rights, including the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association, and religion or belief, and the continued use of indefinite national service involving torture, sexual violence and forced labour. She stressed: “[A]s far as [the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, OHCHR] is aware, the actual human rights situation for the people of Eritrea has not improved in the past year.” Ongoing severe violations, including their gendered impact and generalised impunity, call for a high level of monitoring and public reporting.

  This is the wrong time for the Council to relax scrutiny of the situation in Eritrea. In its resolution 38/15, adopted by consensus in July 2018, the Council invited the Special Rapporteur to “assess and report on the situation of human rights and the engagement and cooperation of the Government of Eritrea with the Human Rights Council and its mechanisms, as well as with the Office of the High Commissioner, and, where feasible, to develop benchmarks for progress in improving the situation of human rights and a time-bound plan of action for their implementation.”

  The Special Rapporteur will present her report on reform benchmarks at the upcoming Council session. These provisions, which offer a constructive way forward, outline an expectation of continued attention to, and engagement with, the country. The Council should now ensure adequate follow-up. Failure to do so would doubtless be interpreted by Eritrea as an endorsement of the status quo, further entrenching systemic rights violations. Discontinuation of the mandate should only occur when and if these benchmarks are met and there is demonstrable and concrete progress in the promotion, protection and realisation of human rights.

  As a newly-elected member of the Council, Eritrea has an obligation to “uphold the highest standards in the promotion and protection of human rights” and to “fully cooperate with the Council” (UN General Assembly resolution 60/251). Eritrea has not adhered to its membership obligations and has neither invited the Special Rapporteur nor accepted her request to visit the country. Eritrea is one of only 22 countries that have never received a country visit from any Special Procedure, despite requests from numerous mandate-holders.

  Obstructionist behavior should not be rewarded. Eritrea’s membership in the Council should be fully leveraged for improvements in the country’s human rights situation and cooperation with the Council and its mechanisms. The Council should urge Eritrea to change course and engage with the UN human rights system.

  At its 41st session, the Council should make clear that membership does not prevent, but rather triggers an enhanced responsibility to accept, scrutiny. It should adopt a resolution maintaining a Special Procedure mandate and a high level of monitoring and public reporting, to ensure that the grave and systemic human rights violations identified by OHCHR and the Council’s own mechanisms are addressed and accountability for these violations is achieved.

  We thank you for your attention to these pressing issues and stand ready to provide your delegation with further information.

  Sincerely,

  Signatories: 

  AfricanDefenders (the Pan-African Human Rights Defenders Network)

  Amnesty International

  ARTICLE 19

  Association for Human Rights in Ethiopia (AHRE)

  Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies

  Center for Reproductive Rights

  CIVICUS

  Civil Rights Defenders

  Committee to Protect Journalists

  CSW (Christian Solidarity Worldwide)

  DefendDefenders (the East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project)

  Eritrea Focus

  Eritrean Diaspora in East Africa (EDEA)

  Eritrean Law Society (ELS)

  Eritrean Movement for Democracy and Human Rights (EMDHR)

  Front Line Defenders

  Geneva for Human Rights / Genève pour les Droits de l’Homme

  Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect

  Human Rights Concern - Eritrea (HRCE)

  Human Rights Defenders Network - Sierra Leone

  Human Rights Institute of South Africa (HURISA)

  Human Rights Watch

  International Commission of Jurists

  Information Forum for Eritrea (IFE)

  International Refugee Rights Initiative

  International Service for Human Rights

  Network of Eritrean Women (NEW)

  Odhikar, Bangladesh

  One Day Seyoum

  Release Eritrea

  Reporters Without Borders

  World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT)