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• SRI LANKA: ‘Trolls accusing people of being traitors are organised and political’

  Ahead of the Sri Lankan presidential elections on 16 November 2019, CIVICUS spoke with Sandya Ekneligoda, a human rights defender and campaigner for justice for families of people who have been disappeared. Sandya is the wife of disappeared cartoonist Prageeth Ekneligoda and has been subjected to a barrage of hate, abuse, intimidation, harassment and death threats on social media.

  

  Photo: Ravindra Pushpakumara

  Can you tell us about the campaign on enforced disappearances in Sri Lanka and how you became involved in it?

  My husband Prageeth Ekneligoda was abducted in January 2010. Since that terrible day, I have campaigned for the truth behind his disappearance. When domestic efforts failed, I traveled to the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva to press for justice. During my activism journey, I have worked with other mothers of the disappeared to raise awareness. We have asked the government to deliver on the truth behind the thousands of disappearances in our country. We also want the authorities to give support to families who often struggle with their livelihoods once a family member has been taken.

  There has been some progress with the International Convention on Disappearances, signed in 2007 and in effect since 2010, but much work needs to be done to find the truth and support the victims. The Convention has not yet resulted in relevant domestic legislation. To keep momentum going on Prageeth’s case I have attended court over a hundred times tracking the habeas corpus case. Meanwhile, in the north, hundreds of mothers have been protesting on the streets seeking answers about their children. Justice for those disappeared remains a critical issue for the country to resolve.

  What threats have you faced for your advocacy?

  I have faced a number of different threats. I have been called a traitor and received hate speech on Facebook. In 2016, Prageeth and myself became the targets of a defamation campaign that took many forms, including public speeches and posters smearing my name. I believe this was an organised smear campaign by the Rajapaksa clan, the clan of former President Mahinda Rajapaksa. I have also been targeted by nationalistic Buddhist monks. Venerable Gnanasara Thero, General Secretary of the Bodu Bala Sena, a Buddhist nationalist organisation, threatened me as I was monitoring Prageeth’s court case. I filed a case against him, and he was found guilty by the court in Homagama in 2019. After this decision I got a lot of vicious threats, including threats to kill me and my children.

  In 2018, I managed to navigate my way through one of the Rajapaksa clan’s attempts to lure me into a trap. They sent one of their men, a former air force officer, to meet me. He offered to disclose information on chemical weapons in return for safe passage to the USA. I do not believe this was genuine; it was a way of distracting me from my important work to seek justice for Prageeth. These obstacles have not stopped me fighting for justice but they make life as an activist challenging.

  What is the situation for civil society in Sri Lanka a decade after the end of the conflict?

  Between 2010 and 2015 the situation for civil society in Sri Lanka was terrible. Repression was so severe we faced imminent threats of being forcibly disappeared or killed if we spoke out. We saw the state using the Prevention of Terrorism Act to try to silence activists. An example of this was the 2014 unlawful detention of Balendran Jeyakumary, an activist campaigning for the disappeared.

  After political change in 2015 the situation improved. There have been some incidents but space to talk about issues has increased. Recently, however, we have seen more clampdowns on the freedom of expression, including the arrest of Shathika Sathkumara, an award-winning writer, as well as of journalist Kusul Perera. This really troubles me. Although the environment is calmer, we see toxic elements appearing in social media. Trolls accusing people of being traitors and disseminating hate speech have emerged on Facebook and other social media platforms. This is organised and political.

  Are there any particular issues affecting civil society and the space for civil society that you are concerned about ahead of the elections?

  The participation in the elections of Gotabaya Rajapkasa, former defence chief and brother of Mahinda Rajapkasa, has re-energised racists and nationalists, who had been a bit dormant after 2015. These elements are now becoming quite vocal and issue threats. For example, following a petition filed by Gamini Viyingoda and Chandragupta Thenuwara querying Gotabaya’s eligibility for elections, Madumadawa Aranvinda, a politician, posted the comment that roughly translated as “there was a name which sounds like Viyangoda which was Ekneligoda and best wishes to you both and good luck.” As my husband was disappeared for speaking out, this was clearly a threat to the petitioners to stay silent.

  Ahead of the elections there’s a looming possibility that violence will erupt. There have already been some examples. When Gotabaya’s legal team won the petition, a Gotabaya supporter set fire to the house of a United National Party supporter. In a highly polarised context, with the two bigger parties fielding strong candidates, it’s possible that the parties will encourage proxies to incite violence. This violence could also turn against civil society activists raising issues. I feel wary of the path ahead as impunity prevails, as reflected in the little progress experienced in mine and other cases.

  What support does Sri Lankan civil society need from the international community and international civil society to help build greater respect for human rights and democratic freedoms?

  If Gotabhaya comes into power there will be a surge in threats. International civil society groups should be ready to help those most at risk, like myself, who have named and shamed him. This is an important time for international civil society to show its solidarity with activists in Sri Lanka and check in with friends and colleagues on protection needs. It’s also really important that organisations continue to work with the victims who raised awareness about the need for truth following the end of the war despite the threats they faced. Civil society organisations must stay vigilant and keep pushing on investigations for important justice cases in Sri Lanka, such as my fight for the truth about what happened to my husband, Prageeth.

  Civic space in Sri Lanka is rated as ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  This interview was undertaken by independent researcher Yolanda Foster on behalf of CIVICUS.

• THAILAND: ‘Part of our success in claiming LGBTQI+ rights came from intersecting with the democracy movement’

  CIVICUS discusses Thailand’s legalisation of same-sex marriage with Matcha Phornin, founder of Sangsan Anakot, an ethnic minority and Indigenous LGBTQI+ feminist organisation working to empower Indigenous women, girls and young LGBTQI+ people.

  Thailand has just become Southeast Asia’s first country, and only the third in Asia, to legalise same-sex marriage. Passed by the Senate with 130 votes for and only four against, the bill now just needs formal royal assent to become law, which is expected within 120 days. The new law grants LGBTQI+ couples the same legal rights as heterosexual couples, including inheritance, adoption and healthcare rights. This milestone comes after over two decades of activism and is expected to enhance Thailand’s reputation as an inclusive destination for LGBTQI+ people and inspire wider regional acceptance of their rights.

  What were the key factors leading to the legalisation of same-sex marriage?

  Our success was due to a combination of factors: intersectional collaboration, international advocacy, education reform, political representation and media engagement. It can be traced back 20 years ago, when despite a lack of any political support, Thai LGBTQI+ people began to advocate for changes to restrictive laws that denied them the right to form families. We got inspiration from progress elsewhere, including in the USA in 2015 and Taiwan in 2019.

  We’ve had a long journey, including periods of democratic regression and military rule. A significant part of our success came from intersecting with other movements, particularly democracy movements. When democracy is compromised, it becomes difficult to advocate for LGBTQI+ rights. That’s why many LGBTQI+ activists are also pro-democracy activists, which makes our movement more united and therefore stronger.

  Links with the broader gender justice movement have also been crucial. Many young LGBTQI+ activists identify as feminists. To address the toxic masculinity and homophobia that are so common in activist circles, we work to create a safer and more inclusive movement.

  We advocate for broader rights beyond marriage equality. We seek gender recognition, the decriminalisation of sex work and land rights for Indigenous peoples. The use of international human rights mechanisms, such as the United Nations Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review process, has been instrumental in holding our government to account and pushing for legislative change.

  A key component of our advocacy has been the concept of the rainbow family. In 2017, we hosted the Asia Pacific Rainbow Family Conference in Hong Kong, bringing together families from across the region to share experiences and support each other. This helped build a strong, supportive network to advocate for marriage equality and other rights.

  We’ve also worked with educational institutions to protect young LGBTQI+ people from bullying and discrimination. Ten years ago, there was no protection for LGBTQI+ students in the Thai education system. Since then, we have worked with organisations such as UNESCO to make schools safer and more inclusive.

  Many of our activists have also entered politics, increasing our visibility and influence. For example, there’s a transgender member of parliament who tirelessly promotes LGBTQI+ rights.

  The media has also played an important role. Over the past decade, we’ve worked to shift media narratives from stigmatisation to positive portrayals of LGBTQI+ people and families. This has helped change public perceptions and build wider support for our movement.

  What challenges have you faced?

  We’ve faced individual and collective challenges. Many activists have made significant personal sacrifices, including imprisonment and loss of life. LGBTQI+ organisations have limited resources, particularly as the LGBTQI+ community is marginalised. The fact that many activists work full-time without pay makes it difficult to sustain the movement. Lack of resources has often led to internal conflict – but it’s also fuelled creativity and resilience, as we’ve compensated for limited resources by using humour and other innovative means to gain visibility and support.

  Another key challenge has been political instability. The disruption of democratic processes by coups has hindered progress on LGBTQI+ rights. However, the democracy movement, which includes many young LGBTQI+ activists, has been instrumental in pushing for legislative change.

  Patriarchal, hierarchical and ethnocentric societal norms have been a major challenge. For example, when six years ago, my wife, daughter and I built our house using traditional methods with the help of friends from various countries, we faced hostility from homophobic people who tried to burn our house down. We reported it to the police but there was minimal intervention.

  There is an entrenched gender binary system that only recognises men and women, ignoring those who don’t fit either category. This is the case even in social movements, many of which are led by men who don’t acknowledge their privilege and can be sexist or homophobic, excluding women and LGBTQI+ people. We need to deconstruct these hierarchies by ensuring equal access to spaces and decision-making power for young people, women and LGBTQI+ people. This effort must extend beyond our movement to society as a whole, linking to democratic processes and parliamentary representation. Currently, women and LGBTQI+ people make up under 20 per cent of members of parliament, making it challenging to pass inclusive legislation.

  Feminism plays a crucial role in addressing these issues, both theoretically and practically. Our movement needs an intersectional approach and a strong feminist presence to move forward.

  Do you foresee any challenges in implementing the new law?

  This law will have a significant impact on the daily lives of LGBTQI+ people, as it will give them greater protection and recognition in society. It will set a precedent for future generations and other countries to follow. In the region, it will likely inspire countries such as the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam to achieve marriage equality.

  But implementation won’t be without obstacles. It will be crucial to ensure government officials and judges are trained and understand the importance of this law so they apply it inclusively. The law will also need to be understood by those in the education and health systems and in society as a whole, and comprehensive manuals and training programmes will be needed. There may be resistance in religious areas, particularly among Muslim communities. Proactive measures will be needed to ensure compliance and prevent discrimination.

  What’s next on the LGBTQI+ advocacy agenda?

  LGBTQI+ people continue to face several challenges, including the lack of resources to mobilise a strong movement, the lack of recognition for transgender and non-binary people and a very limited understanding of intersectionality.

  Transgender and non-binary people often have to use names and pronouns that don’t align with their gender identities. That’s why we push for the passage of a law supporting gender self-determination.

  The education system also often violates the rights of children who don’t conform to traditional gender norms. LGBTQI+ and gender non-conforming children need protection in schools so they aren’t bullied for their sexual orientation or gender identity.

  In addition, the LGBTQI+ community is not homogeneous: many LGBTQI+ people face overlapping discrimination due to their intersectional identities. Such is the case for Muslim LGBTQI+ people, LGBTQI+ people with disabilities and LGBTQI+ people from Indigenous communities. We must defend not only LGBTQI+ rights but also the rights of other excluded groups, including those disproportionately affected by climate change and environmental crises.

  The advocacy agenda should aim for a holistic approach that includes several key elements: strengthening marriage equality laws to ensure they are inclusive, widely understood and properly implemented, promoting gender recognition laws, reforming education and addressing the needs of LGBTQI+ people with intersecting identities.

  Civic space in Thailand is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Sangsan Anakot through itsFacebook page and follow@SangsanAnakot and@Matcha_Phornin on Twitter.

• TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS: ‘Advancing LGBTQI+ rights requires advocacy, awareness-raising and a concerted effort to foster a culture of inclusion’

  

  CIVICUS speaks with Tim Prudhoe, a lawyer with Stanbrook Prudhoe, about a legal challenge brought against discriminatory legislation against LGBTQI+ people and the struggle for equal rights of same-sex married partners in Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI).

  Stanbrook Prudhoe is a law firm specialising in complex and cross-border cases in the Caribbean region.

  What legal action are you involved in?

  Since 2021 we have been representing Tim Haymon, a US citizen, and Richard Sankar, a Turks and Caicos Islander, in legal proceedings against the TCI government. The case is now up on appeal after findings of breaches of rights protected under the TCI constitution. The couple married in Florida in 2020, but Tim has been denied an exemption from the need to obtain a work permit, although that exemption is available to the spouse of a Turks and Caicos Islander. There is no definition of ‘spouse’ under the relevant immigration legislation and the definition used in the letter of refusal referenced the marriage legislation. The Marriage Ordinance treats same-sex marriages as void.

  The refusal of the spousal exemption was by the Director of Immigration. Tim and Richard brought proceedings against him alleging breaches of the protected rights of equality before the Law, the right to family and private life and freedom from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.

  The trial took place in November 2022 and the decision was delivered in March 2024. The TCI Supreme Court upheld two of our three claims, finding violations of the constitutional rights to private and family life and to protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. However, the court did not uphold the claim of equality before the law. That is the subject of an appeal that will be heard on 23 and 24 October.

  The government has also appealed. Although it relied on no evidence during the trial, it now disputes any findings of constitutional breach. The government’s legal team remains headed by Ivan Hare KC of Blackstone Chambers in London, UK. Colours Caribbean, an LGBTQI+ rights organisation, successfully applied to join the appeal as an interested party.

  Before the claims were first started, Tim and Richard offered to abandon their legal action if the government enacted civil partnership legislation giving same-sex couples the same rights and benefits as opposite-sex couples. Unfortunately, this offer was ignored. Our appeal document itself repeats that offer. When we first made that offer, we even provided the government with a copy of the Cayman Islands legislation recognising civil partnerships as a precedent they could work from. But, again, no response.

  The Supreme Court’s decision was a significant step forward for LGBTQI+ rights in TCI. Former TCI Premier Michael Misick criticised it publicly, calling for Richard to have his Turks and Caicos Islander status revoked. If successful, the government’s appeal would be a major setback for equality. Either way, the outcome will have broader implications for LGBTQI+ rights across the Caribbean.

   

  What’s the status of LGBTQI+ rights in TCI, and what difference have recent Privy Council rulings made?

  The status of LGBTQI+ rights in TCI has a long way to go still. The government’s reliance on traditional moral standards and recent rulings on marriage issues by the UK Privy Council, the final court of appeal for TCI and other British Overseas Territories, are significant barriers to the advancement of LGBTQI+ rights.

  Recent Privy Council rulings on same-sex marriage in Bermuda and the Cayman Islands have significantly influenced the discourse on LGBTQI+ rights in TCI. The combined appeal on the right to marry in the Ferguson case in Bermuda and the Bodden Bush case in the Cayman Islands is particularly noteworthy.

  In Bermuda, same-sex couples had the right to marry for a period before the law was changed. Marriages already performed remained valid, but no new marriages could be celebrated – a situation that led to a case being taken to the European Court of Human Rights on the grounds that those left out were in practical effect facing discrimination. The Privy Council ruled that marriage was a unique legal institution and those jurisdictions could decide the scope of marriage without violating their constitutions.

  This gave us an insight into the Privy Council’s position. However, we distinguished our case in TCI by focusing on recognition of equivalent legal rights rather than the establishment of a right to marry. The government argued we were trying to introduce the right to marry via the back door, because of the attempt to invoke the spousal exemption from immigration restrictions.

  The Privy Council’s decision, which confirmed that jurisdictions can define marriage, wasn’t that surprising. TCI’s constitution, like Cayman’s, includes a preamble about TCI being a God-fearing nation. The government’s arguments in TCI appeal rely heavily on this. This is pretty odd, in light of the fact that it failed to present any actual evidence at trial.

  Despite these challenges, the LGBTQI+ community and its advocates continue to press for equality and recognition, reflecting a wider struggle in many small jurisdictions.

   

  What are the challenges for LGBTQI+ activism in TCI?

  A major challenge is stigma, which is keenly felt in a place as small as TCI. Despite the presence of people who identify as LGBTQI+, there isn’t a well-developed community infrastructure such as gay pubs or clubs. There’s been a slight improvement in visibility following recent decisions, but it hasn’t yet become a significant movement. For example, there’s now anticipation for an upcoming gay pride event, a notable first for the TCI, albeit modest, as a boat trip during Gay Pride Week in June.

  Living as an LGBTQI+ person in TCI often means necessarily leading a discreet life. While there are both locals and expatriates in same-sex relationships, such partnerships are not flaunted or embraced as a popular lifestyle choice. Rather, they tend to remain private, perhaps implicitly acknowledged by the community but not openly discussed.

  There’s a complex interplay between legal processes and government responses. Despite government appeals against decisions concerning LGBTQI+ rights, such actions are influenced by political dynamics, particularly when elections are approaching. The electorate consists solely of Turks and Caicos Islanders and has strong opinions on issues such as same-sex marriage, which politicians must navigate with caution.

  Constitutional protections theoretically guard against discrimination, but practical enforcement is uncertain. While legal recourse exists in principle, instances of intimidation and hostility, such as aggressive media commentary or social media harassment, deter people from pursuing anti-discrimination cases.

  In essence, while there is a legal framework to combat discrimination, the challenges of social stigma, political sensitivities and intimidation hinder progress towards full LGBTQI+ equality in TCI.

   

  What role has civil society played in the case?

  We’ve worked with the Pride group that’s recently emerged. Although not gay myself, I was pleased to attend their meeting to have a chance to explain relevant parts of the legal challenge. I have been a friend of Richard for many years, and more recently Tim as well.

  The only outside group involved was Colours Caribbean, whose involvement in the Cayman case I had been aware of for some time. When they heard of our legal victory, despite ongoing appeals from both sides, they approached us to join the proceedings. We don’t control their involvement, but the fact that we haven’t objected to it apparently influenced the court’s decision to give them a speaking role in the October appeal.

  What are your expectations?

  I expect that Tim and Richard will win their appeal on the failure by the judge to deal with the equality before the law claim. Whatever the outcome of the government’s appeal, I expect that the British government will have to exercise its power of override, as it did in the Cayman Islands context, to introduce civil partnership recognition legislation. In TCI, the Governor, a British-appointed official, has a constitutional power to legislate in the best interests of the jurisdiction. For example, previous governors have forced through legislation decriminalising same-sex sexual activity – a move still resisted in other parts of the Caribbean.

  I think our success will primarily relate to the anti-discrimination aspect of the lower court judge’s decision. Right now, we are in a perplexing situation: the judge has agreed with our argument that Richard and Tim’s constitutionally protected rights are being violated but he stopped short of implementing the necessary remedial measures.

  This creates a glaring inconsistency: existing violations are acknowledged but no remedy is provided. So if another same-sex couple were to seek spouse treatment, they would be denied the exemption, even though the Court has recognised this as a breach of constitutional rights. It is unlikely that the Court of Appeal will accept this situation. We argue that the judge made a fundamental mistake in finding breaches but not proposing remedies. Moreover, the judge’s criticism of our approach fails to recognise alternative ways of remedying the situation, such as amending immigration laws to include same-sex couples in the eligibility criteria for spousal exemptions.

  The delay in the judge’s decision, despite mounting pressure, suggests a rushed outcome in the end. It appears that in his haste, the judge failed to thoroughly explore possible solutions to the violations identified. I therefore anticipate that the Court of Appeal will scrutinise the lower court’s handling of the case and consider remedies in line with constitutional obligations.

  What are the next steps?

  The trajectory of progress depends heavily on the outcome of the Court of Appeal hearing. It’s unlikely a decision will be made immediately after the hearing, given the complexity and scale of the case. As we have argued that the lower court judge erred in his decision, the matter could be escalated to the Privy Council for constitutional review.

  However, in terms of broader progress and the continued advancement of LGBTQI+ rights, increased visibility and public awareness are paramount. The greater the exposure and discussion surrounding the case, particularly at the appellate level, the more likely it is that attitudes will evolve positively. Increased awareness fosters confidence within the LGBTQI+ community, encouraging people to live more openly and authentically.

  Historically, many people who identify as LGBTQI+ have felt compelled to leave TCI and seek more accepting environments abroad, primarily in cities in the UK or the USA. This trend underscores the prevailing reluctance to accept LGBTQI+ identities in the local context. It will undoubtedly take time to overcome this suspicion and foster a culture of acceptance, but progress is evident and ongoing.

  It is my hope as a legal practitioner that church groups engage in this discussion in a constructive and inclusive way, avoiding regressive interpretations of religious doctrine. Such interpretations, rooted in outdated beliefs, only serve to hinder progress. It’s worth noting that TCI, essentially a tourist destination, relies heavily on its reputation as a progressive and welcoming place. Failure to address LGBTQI+ rights risks tarnishing this image, with negative implications for tourism and therefore for economic prospects.

  Advancing LGBTQI+ rights in the TCI requires ongoing advocacy, awareness-raising and a concerted effort to foster a culture of inclusion and acceptance within the local community and wider society.

  ---

  Get in touch with Stanbrook Prudhoe through itswebsite and connect with Tim Prudhoe onLinkedin.

• VIETNAM: ‘The government is using non-state actors against minority religions’

  CIVICUS speaks with Thang Nguyen of Boat People SOS (BPSOS), a civil society organisation based in the USA and Thailand, about the challenges for civil society and religious minorities in Vietnam, and about their work to enable civil society responses.

  Can you tell us about BPSOS and the work it does?

  I’m currently the CEO and President of BPSOS, having joined initially as a volunteer. BPSOS was founded in 1980. We have two major divisions. The first, our domestic programme, is about serving refugees and migrants in the USA, across six locations. Second, we have our international initiatives, run from our regional headquarters in Bangkok, Thailand.

  In Bangkok, we provide a legal clinic to help refugees and asylum seekers with their asylum claims and with protection – not only those coming from Vietnam but also from other countries, including Cambodia, China, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. We have a programme to help Vietnamese human rights defenders at risk, whether they be in prison or in hiding in Vietnam or seeking refuge in Thailand or elsewhere. A major component is to build capacity for civil society in Vietnam at the community level. Finally, we have a religious freedom project, working with local, regional and global partners, to build up a network for advocates for freedom of religion or belief in South East Asia. We hold an annual conference, the Southeast Asia Freedom of Religion or Belief Conference (SEAFORB).

  What are the key current challenges experienced by civil society in Vietnam?

  The regime is still very oppressive. The government has heavy-handed policies against people coming together to form their own associations, which make it hard for organised civil society to develop. The government is now somewhat more tolerant with individuals speaking out, or perhaps it is that the government struggles to control expression on social media to the same extent.

  Another challenge comes with the people themselves. Living in a closed society, they don’t have many opportunities to develop the necessary skills or experience to come together and form associations.

  Further, there’s very little commitment or investment from the international community to develop civil society in Vietnam, compared for example to Cambodia or Myanmar. There are very few organisations from outside Vietnam that work hand in hand with groups in Vietnam to help them develop capacity to implement programmes.

  Because of this, there are very few truly functional independent civil society organisations in Vietnam and the number of these has decreased over the last five years because they cannot sustain themselves in the face of interference from the government. There are only individual human rights defenders, some of them well-known, but not organised civil society.

  In contrast, there are tens of thousands of government-owned ‘non-governmental’ organisations (GONGOs) that are controlled by the Communist Party. They present themselves as the civil society of Vietnam.

  What are the challenges minority groups face in Vietnam, particularly religious minorities?

  Many of the minority groups are indigenous peoples, but the government of Vietnam does not recognise them as such; it only classes them as ethnic minorities. They therefore face a fight for the right to be recognised as indigenous people. They are often separated from their ancestral land.

  For many groups, a religion that is a minority belief in Vietnam is part of their social and cultural makeup. For example, the Cham are Muslim and the Khmer Krom are Theravada Buddhists, which is very different from the Mahayana Buddhism practised by the majority of Vietnamese Buddhists. Then there are the Hmong and the Montagnards: Christianity has spread among the Montagnards for decades, and the government wants to control and stop this. Since the early 1980s, Christianity also started to develop in the Northwest Region among the Hmong population. The government of Vietnam viewed this as an undesirable influence from the west, and therefore it has taken drastic messages to stop its further spreading in the Northwest and Central Highlands regions.

  Most of these groups of people are located remotely and so don’t have access to the internet, and don’t know how to attract resources, even from within Vietnam. Other people in Vietnam aren’t aware of the situation, let alone the international community. Little information is available about these groups.

  The government authorities are directly suppressing independent house churches. In the Central Highlands, thousands of house churches have been closed, set on fire and destroyed. In 2004 the government issued an ordinance on belief and religion, meaning that house churches have to be registered. There are credible reports that the government trained a lot of its own people to become pastors, and they have set up new churches allowed by the government. These are run and controlled by the government.

  A major challenge is the forced renunciation of faith. Christians have been ordered to leave their parish churches and told not to follow any religion, or to join a government-controlled church. People who have resisted joining government-controlled churches have been harassed, persecuted and tortured. Several deaths in police custody have been documented. There are quite a lot of religious prisoners of conscience, many of them Montagnard Christians.

  The repression of the Hmong is even more drastic. In many parts of Northwest Region, Hmong Christians who have refused to renounce their faith have been evicted from their villages by the local authorities. Their villages have been declared as Christian-free zones. Tens of thousands of Hmong have been affected, something that continues to this day. They became itinerant, and it has taken them many years to coalesce into new communities, usually in previously uninhabited areas unknown to local government. Many moved to the Central Highlands. They are completely undocumented and so have become functionally stateless. They live outside society. Married people are not issued with marriage certificates, babies do not get birth certificates, children can’t formally receive education – although some slip into school unofficially – and people can’t get legal employment, set up a business, or open a bank account. They are restricted in their travel: pastors can’t travel into these communities, while they cannot travel to worship elsewhere.

  In many provinces Catholics, even when they are part of the major ethnic groups, have been persecuted by the government. And then there is the Cao Dai religion, a minority religion with about five million reported followers, although the government only recognises around 1.2 million Cao Daiists. Its church structures were disbanded in 1978. In 1997 the government created a new Cao Dai sect, and then 10 years later turned this into a new religion with a similar name and transferred all the property of the Cao Dai religion to it. To the world the government presents this sect as the representative of the Cao Dai religion.

  The government is also using non-state actors against minority religions. In Nghe An Province, the authorities use organised mobs known as Red Flag Associations, which are supported and encouraged by local authorities to attack churches and beat up parishioners. We have had several reports of this.

  What steps are needed to help civil society respond to these rights violations?

  Because of the restriction of organised civil society there’s very little response to the suppression of religious minorities. This lack of organised civil society also makes it difficult to foster partnerships between civil society groups in Vietnam and international human rights organisations. In response, we are trying to build community capacity to develop organisations in Vietnam to protect rights.

  We train a lot of people in Vietnam to know how to report human rights violations. So far we’ve trained about a thousand local rapporteurs and they have generated about 200 different reports that have been submitted to various United Nations (UN) special procedures and UN bodies, and shared with other governments and international human rights organisations to raise awareness of the situation in Vietnam.

  We are helping to form community-based CSOs in each minority community. So far there are about 20 of these, and we aim to have 100 by the end of 2020. We have incubated a number of CSOs specialising in different aspects of human rights, based on the international commitments Vietnam has made as a result of signing various conventions. For example, we have supported the creation and development of Vietnamese Women for Human Rights, the Vietnam Coalition Against Torture and the Vietnam Freedom of Religion or Belief Roundtable. We have worked with Montagnard people to form a CSO specialising in Montagnard minorities. Now we are connecting these specialist CSOs with their peers outside Vietnam. For instance Vietnamese Women for Human Rights is now a member of FORUM-ASIA, a network of human rights organisations throughout Asia and the Pacific. We are cultivating these kinds of partnerships.

  What more support is needed?

  Once CSOs in Vietnam have developed some capacity, there is a need to connect them with civil society outside Vietnam. We are advocating for organisations to offer internship and fellowship schemes to enable staff to develop skills, experience, connections and exposure outside Vietnam.

  We hope to see more projects geared at further developing civil society in Vietnam, through training, coaching and technical assistance as well as advocacy. There has been an almost complete lack of this kind of investment from civil society worldwide. Organisations are issuing statements about Vietnam and that is appreciated, but this is the next step needed. Amnesty International now has a Vietnamese national working on Vietnam, who was with BPSOS before, so this is a positive step and a model to replicate.

  It would be much more effective if international human rights organisations working on Vietnam could coordinate among themselves, and with groups within Vietnam. For instance, a joint advocacy project on the functionally stateless Montagnard Christians, with pressure coming from multiple directions, would help.

  Civic space in Vietnam is rated as ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with BSPOS through itswebsite orFacebook page and follow@BoatPeopleSOS on Twitter.

• WOMEN’S RIGHTS: ‘Progressive civil society must claim for itself the defence of life’

  As part of our 2019thematic report, we are interviewing civil society activists, leaders and experts about their experiences of backlash from anti-rights groups and their strategies to strengthen progressive narratives and civil society responses. CIVICUS speaks to María Angélica Peñas Defago, gender specialist, professor and researcher of Argentina’s National Research Council (CONICET) based at the National University of Córdoba, and co-author of the recentGlobal Philanthropy Project report, ‘Religious Conservatism on the Global Stage: Threats and Challenges for LGBTI Rights'.

  Do you think anti-rights groups have increased their activity in recent times?

  We should start by defining what we mean by ‘recent times’, how far back we need to go, and what specific context we are talking about, because for instance in Latin America the situation varies from country to country. In the case of Argentina, we have seen over time – and not only over the past year, when a bill allowing for the voluntary termination of pregnancies was being discussed in Congress – reactions against the progress achieved in claiming rights by women and LGBTQI people. While it is true that, in recent years, anti-rights groups have become more visible and coordinated, largely in response to advances achieved in the area of sexual and reproductive rights, they have been present for decades, always coercing our agendas. In Argentina, they have been actively litigating against any attempt to enact public policy on sexual and reproductive health or even remotely linked to these rights for at least 20 years. In the province of Córdoba, where I live, these efforts have been very successful in the lower courts, although rulings favourable to these groups were eventually overturned in the higher courts.

  With regard to street actions, strong reactions by these groups were already recorded in the past, including demonstrations throughout the country, for instance against equal marriage, which was approved in Argentina in 2010. The same groups marched once again against the legalisation of abortion in 2018. There has also been a renewed backlash against sex education in schools, a longstanding battle. Sex education was implemented through a 2006 law that is still being resisted. During the abortion debate, anti-rights groups pretended to promote sex education as an alternative to abortion, but after the bill on the voluntary termination of pregnancy was voted down by the Senate, they restarted their attacks against sex education.

  A reorganisation of the conservative camp is currently underway, and I think it is as a result of this that these groups have recently gained more visibility. Although new actors have indeed emerged within civil society, the central phenomenon in the current socio-political context is the reassertion that is taking place in the political and the economic spheres. This can be seen, for example, in the alliances reached in Colombia around the 2016 referendum on the peace process, as well as in Brazil, embodied in the 2018 election of President Jair Bolsonaro.

  During the campaign leading to the referendum in Colombia, the forces that rejected the agreement claimed that if ‘yes’ won, so-called 'gender ideology' would be imposed. In Brazil, fake news claiming that the Workers’ Party promoted paedophilia and would try to ‘convert’ children into homosexuals or transsexuals mushroomed during the election campaign.

  In other ways, the phenomenon is also seen in Argentina, where all the main actors opposed to the progressive agenda, and specifically to the sexual and reproductive rights agenda, have tended to converge.

  Do you think that these are purely reactive groups, whose raison d'être is to curb the progress of the progressive agenda?

  As far as I can tell, that is indeed the case. I have monitored congresses of so-called ‘pro-life’ groups and analysed the actions they have undertaken in regional and global spaces, and particularly in the Organization of American States and the United Nations, and it is readily apparent that they are losing ground regarding family formats and the assignment of sexual roles, and they are aware of it. These groups are reacting to what they perceive as a setback. Their reaction is being coordinated not only around the thematic agenda of sexual and reproductive rights, but also around a wider nationalist, neoliberal – and, in some cases, fascist – political and economic agenda.

  The Bolsonaro phenomenon is a good example of a reaction to a pluralistic agenda around sexual morality and sexual and reproductive rights. The advances of this pluralist agenda acted as a binding agent for a broader conservative political agenda. Within the framework of the reaction against progress achieved in sexual and reproductive rights, other actors are taking advantage to impose their own conservative agendas, for example around migration issues. There are some new actors at play, especially those joining from other fields – political, economic, religious – but many of the actors that are gaining greater visibility are the same as always, the difference being that they are now unifying agendas that used to run in parallel and in less coordinated ways.

  What tactics have these groups used to advance their agenda?

  Litigation against sexual and reproductive rights has been an important tool for more than three decades. In Argentina, these groups have litigated, among other things, against the administration of emergency contraception and to stop the implementation of protocols for non-punishable abortions. In Argentina, abortion has been legal since 1921 for cases of rape, unviability of the foetus, or danger to the woman’s life or health; however, these groups have tried to prevent timely and secure access to this right.

  For the part of civil society that works in the area of women's rights, these groups have always been there. But litigation is sometimes a quite silent affair and has possibly remained unnoticed by the wider civil society. Often, it all remained within the realm of the administration of justice and health services. This however did not prevent this strategy from having very strong effects, because judicial decisions regarding sexual and reproductive health tend to produce fears, doubts and paralysis among health providers, which are key agents for guaranteeing actual access to these rights.

  The presence of anti-rights groups is not news for feminist and LGBTQI groups, but it may very well be so for other sectors of civil society, including human rights organisations, which in recent times have seen them acting more intensely through the occupation of street space and the creation of partisan political alliances, the two key arenas for political struggle in contemporary democracies. These groups are trying to appropriate public space, showcasing themselves as the majority, and in this way they are gaining public visibility. In this area, one of their most successful strategies has involved the use of coordinated messages and symbols. The ‘Don’t mess with my children’ campaign, for example, has used the same phrases and slogans, and even the same symbols and colours, not only throughout Latin America, but also well beyond. We have seen it in Eastern Europe, in Italy, in Spain. These groups are intensively using social media so that their strategies and symbols travel, are shared and ultimately reach us repeatedly from various latitudes.

  If anti-rights positions have gained more visibility, it is because the actors that promote them, mostly faith-based, have gained a prominence in the public space that they did not have 20 years ago. Evangelical churches, like the Catholic Church, are plural and heterogeneous. But in much of Latin America, the political processes of resistance to sexual and reproductive rights have been led by very conservative evangelical churches, sometimes in alliance with the higher ranks of the Catholic Church, and in other cases dissenting or even opposing them.

  Unlike litigation, the strategy of occupying public space requires support in large numbers. Do you think these groups are gaining in popularity?

  The socio-political phenomenon fuelled by these groups is significant. It is not simply about campaigns and slogans; they are deeply embedded at the grassroots level. To understand what is happening in the religious arena and in terms of resistance against progress in sexual and reproductive rights, it is necessary to take into account the socio-economic context and the way that these churches are operating at the grassroots, in strong connection with the populations that they mobilise.

  In Argentina, a very politically mobilised society, street mobilisation has been widely used by these groups, so it is nothing new. What is new is the massive character of their mobilisations. These groups were already mobilising 30 years ago, or maybe even earlier, but there was no social media back then. The modes of communication and mobilisation have changed at the same time as the religious field has in the face of advances in sexual and reproductive rights. Evangelical churches have grown throughout the region, and within them, conservative sectors have grown the most.

  I think that to understand the phenomenon it is also key to understand the neoliberal context and its general effects that undermine living conditions. In the socio-political context of neoliberalism, as the state has withdrawn from its basic functions, many religious groups have gone on to perform tasks and provide services that should be provided by the state. In some places, such as in the USA, the Catholic Church has been long in charge of providing services to some groups, such as migrants, that are not tended to by the state. In Latin America, the role of evangelical churches, for instance in the area of aid and treatment for addictions, is really impressive. Evangelical sectors are growing exponentially because they are assisting communities that are being forgotten by the state. Evangelical pastors play central roles in communities, are active in providing social assistance, dealing with addictions and providing health and education services, and are also key in mobilising people – partly because many of them are also members of these communities. They live in the same neighbourhoods and maintain close ties with the members of their congregations.

  In sum, we are not facing a mere battle of narratives. The discourses that we need to stand up to are rooted in the practices of grassroots communities, and often mobilisations are summoned from the pulpit. Calls from the pulpit are important because to many excluded people the church has become indispensable. In countries that have very high poverty rates, for many people the church is the only place of belonging and protection that remains when both the state and the market have excluded them, and therefore do not have access to work, education, or health services. Beyond the fact that religion remains a central element of many people’s identities, these feelings of belonging and community are not minor issues in contexts of extreme precariousness and individualisation brought about by the economic, political, social and cultural neoliberal model.

  What does progressive civil society have to offer in the face of this?

  Progressive civil society has a lot to offer, because it focuses on the struggle for and the creation of liveable, rich, plural ways of life, based on solidarity and mutual support. I don't think there is a single recipe, because this work involves very different movements. There are feminist and LGBTQI movements that work from the standpoint of religious pluralism, disputing the idea of the monopoly of faith, and these are very rich spaces of struggle and belonging. Religions, all of them, comprise plural, democratic and horizontal spaces, which many organisations take advantage of in their struggle for meaning. Other organisations have expertise in crafting messages, and that is where they make their contribution. But this battle is not taking place only, or even mainly, on social media, since not everyone has even access to the internet. The dispute over meaning is fundamental both on social media and offline, as can be seen around the ‘pro-life’ label that many anti-rights groups have appropriated. Women’s and LGBTQI groups working at the grassroots level continually reference this label, by asking the question: how much is my life worth if I do not have access to a job, to the recognition of my identity, to the protection of my health – if the kind of life that is being offered to me is not a decent one? Progressive civil society must claim for itself the defence of life, understood as a dignified, fully human life.

  To offer this response, progressive civil society needs to ally with others who share its values of pluralism, freedom and equality. The pluralist, inclusive, non-essentialist and decolonial feminist agenda is a good basis on which to form alliances with multiple actors that were not attracted by feminism in the past, in order to take part in the struggle for meaning not only in the rhetorical field, but also in concrete reality. Popular feminism represents a return to the realm of the real, as it focuses on the implications of principles on people’s daily lives. If we talk about abortion, for instance, we must focus on the consequences of the legality or illegality of this practice for the daily reality of pregnant women, families and communities. Religion and faith are an important part of people's lives, and the feminist movement, or at least a good part of it, is now working within this reality.

  Get in touch with María Angélica through herFacebook page and check her work onResearchGate.