asia

  • Malaysia: Government should respect human rights as it seeks UN Human Rights Council membership

    YAB Dato Sri Ismail Sabri Yaakob
    Prime Minister of Malaysia
    Pejabat Perdana Menteri, Blok Utama, Bangunan Perdana Putra, Pusat Pentadbiran Kerajaan Persekutuan, 62502 Putrajaya, Malaysia

    Dear Prime Minister,

    We, the undersigned international human rights organisations—ARTICLE 19 and CIVICUS World Alliance for Citizen Participation—call on the new government of Malaysia to implement a comprehensive program of reform to strengthen human rights in Malaysia, especially the rights to freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly, as a prospective member of the UN Human Rights Council. Malaysia must also sign and ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and demonstrate that it is committed to protect human rights.

    During the Human Rights Council pledging session on 8 September 2021, organised by Amnesty International and International Service for Human Rights, H.E. Dr Ahmad Faisal Muhamad expressed Malaysia’s unequivocal commitment to advancing human rights for all, noting the domestic legislation in place to enable citizens to “exercise rights and freedoms responsible and not to suppress them.” However, over the last two years there has been a deterioration in the state of human rights and fundamental freedoms under the former Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin’s government. This has included violations of the rights to freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly, the failure to ratify key international human rights treaties, including the ICCPR, together with the government’s dismal record of cooperating with the UN human rights system.

    As the government seeks membership to the UN Human Rights Council and has made public pledges to uphold human rights, it is imperative that the new government takes sincere and concrete action to improve its rights record at home. The new government has a unique opportunity to reverse the rights-violating actions of its predecessors and shift to a new rights-respecting approach. Legal and policy reform are pivotal to attain this and would demonstrate a genuine intention from the new government to meet its international human rights obligations.

    Without overhauling the violations and abuse of human rights in its country, Malaysia cannot be a valuable and effective member of the Human Rights Council.

    Freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and association
    Several laws in Malaysia unduly fetter the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and association. In order to fulfil its pledges made to the Human Rights Council, Malaysia must repeal or substantially revise the following laws:

    • The Sedition Act 1948 – Despite the former government’s commitment to conduct a study and a review of the security laws, including the Sedition Act, the authorities aggressively applied the law, primarily against government critics. Between January and August 2021, NGOs documented the investigation of 17 cases involving 37 individuals under the Sedition Act. The recent investigation of the #Lawan protest organisers under the Sedition Act is worrying and runs contrary to Malaysia’s international human rights obligations. The new government must follow-through with its pledge to review this archaic colonial law and should ultimately repeal it, noting that it has no place in a rights-respecting democracy.

    • The Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 – Under the former government, the Communications and Multimedia Act continued to be used as the primary tool to censor human rights defenders, journalists, artists, political opponents, and ordinary members of the public who have been critical of government officials or Malaysian royalty or shared opinions about issues deemed sensitive, such as race and religion. We are encouraged to hear H.E. Dr Ahmad Faisal Muhamad state during the Human Rights Council pledging session on 8 September 2021 that, “the government is in the midst of amending the Communications and Multimedia Act.” The new government must ensure the Act is adequately reformed in consultation with stakeholders so it can no longer be used by authorities as a weapon to silence expression.

    • The Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 – In its pledges to the Human Rights Council, the government committed to a review of the problematic Peaceful Assembly Act. It is imperative that this review leads to legislative reform of this law, which authorities have used to target protest organisers and discourage assemblies. The space for peaceful protests shrank considerably under the previous administration, who disrupted gatherings critical of authorities and arbitrarily arrested peaceful protesters under the guise of dealing with the pandemic. We urge the new government to reverse this approach and ensure adequate protection for the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.

    • The Societies Act 1966 – Muhyiddin’s government utilised the broad powers of the Societies Act to delay and even rejectthe formation of new political parties, undermining the right to freedom of association, which is critical in a functioning democracy. While not included in its written pledges, we encourage the government to substantively revise this law, ceasing its use as a barrier to the exercise of the freedom of association.

    • Other legislation routinely used to silence dissent includes Sections 504 and 505b of the Penal Code, the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984, the Film Censorship Act 2002, Section 114 of the Evidence Act 1950, and the Official Secrets Act 1972. Wholesale reform of these laws is required to ensure that the right to freedom of expression can be exercised in the country without fear.

    The reform or repeal of the aforementioned laws have been repeatedly raised by the Malaysian human rights commission, human rights groups, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Special Rapporteurs, and other States as essential to safeguarding human rights in the country. Encouragingly, during the pledging session, H.E. Dr Ahmad Faisal Muhamad stated that “the government is cognizant of the need to continuously review these acts to make sure that they continue to be efficient, continue to be relevant, and in line with international standards.” To demonstrate that this commitment is sincere, the government must prioritise meaningful legislative reform of all laws impeding on the rights to freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly.

    Undermining accountability mechanisms
    ARTICLE 19 and CIVICUS are further concerned that domestic accountability mechanisms have been weakened in Malaysia. While the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) retains its “A” status as a National Human Rights Institution, SUHAKAM’s yearly reports have been largely ignored by the government. Although SUHAKAM’s 2018 report was debated for the first time in parliament after 19 years under the previous Pakatan Harapan government in December 2019, there was a lack of follow-through by Muhyiddin’s government.

    Concerningly, on 8 August 2021 SUHAKAM announced that its commissioners have been called in for police questioning over their attendance as monitors at the #Lawan protest. Two SUHAKAM commissioners, Jerald Joseph and Dato Mah Weng Kai, were investigated on 5 August at the Dang Wangi District Police Headquarters under Section 21A of the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases Act 1988 and the Peaceful Assembly Act.

    In presenting its candidacy for membership of the UN Human Rights Council, Malaysia made the voluntary commitment to “[c]ontinue to strengthen human rights institutions and mechanisms in Malaysia.” The government pledged funding support, law review, and more government agency engagement with SUHAKAM. A crucial requirement for fulfilling this pledge is for the government to meaningfully engage with SUHAKAM, viewing them as a key partner in upholding human rights.

    Discrimination
    In its pledges to the Human Rights Council, the government stated that it would “continue to promote diversity,” and that it “firmly embraces the values of inclusivity, acceptance, and understanding in ensuring harmony and peaceful coexistence.” The government asserted that it will take a “whole-of-society approach in the promotion and protection of human rights in the country.”

    Despite legislative protections in Malaysia, namely Article 8(2) of the Malaysian Constitution, which prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, descent, place of birth or gender, systemic discrimination against minorities persists. ARTICLE 19 and CIVICUS are concerned about homophobic and discriminatory language and actions directed at LGBTQI communities, refugees, migrants, and religious minorities in Malaysia. Any form of national unity must include the rights of minorities, and there is a crucial need for more inclusive and non-discriminatory policies in place.

    Police reform
    While the government made no reference to police reform in its pledges to the Human Rights Council, ARTICLE 19 and CIVICUS note that it is a pivotal aspect of improving rights protection in Malaysia. Police reform should be prioritised alongside legal reform, as the arbitrary implementation of rights-respecting laws can still lead to human rights violations.

    ARTICLE 19 and CIVICUS have recorded dozens of incidents of harassment and intimidation by police against activists, human rights defenders and ordinary citizens because of the exercise of their right to freedom of expression. Without police reform, existing restrictive legal provisions will continue to be used to intimidate vocal critics and to shrink civic space in Malaysia.

    The new government must reform the Royal Malaysia Police and establish a dedicated Independent Police Complaints and Misconduct Commission (IPCMC) with a mandate to receive and investigate complaints about police misconduct and abuse. The IPCMC should be given the necessary powers to investigate abuses, compel cooperation from witnesses and government agencies, subpoena documents, and submit cases for prosecution.

    Commitments to the UN human rights mechanisms
    It is encouraging to hear Malaysia’s pledge to assess, monitor and implement its Universal Periodic Review (UPR) recommendations. The government has committed to work closely with the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the UN in Malaysia to jointly develop a UPR “Monitoring Matrix” to measure the implementation of UPR recommendations that Malaysia has accepted. It has also committed to a “multi-stakeholder biannual consultation” with involvement from civil society and the UN to follow up on UPR recommendations. If adequately acted upon, these commitments could give rise to far-reaching improvements to human rights in Malaysia.

    Despite this, the government’s cooperation with mechanisms of the UN Human Rights Council has historically been incredibly poor. Civil society groups working on the UPR process in Malaysia, in their 2021 midterm UPR report, concluded that steps towards ratifying the core human rights instruments, including the ICCPR, have progressed extremely slowly despite commitments made since the first UPR cycle in 2009. ARTICLE 19 and CIVICUS hope the new administration will speed up the process of ratification to illustrate its commitment to human rights as it seeks Human Rights Council membership.

    In 2019, the Pakatan Harapan government implemented a policy of standing open invitations for visits by the UN Special Procedures. Malaysia has previously hosted various Special Rapporteurs including on the sale and sexual exploitation of children, on the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation, and on extreme poverty and human rights. The new government should uphold this policy of open invitations, and in particular extend invitations to the Special Rapporteurs on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, and on Freedom of Religion or Belief. ARTICLE 19 and CIVICUS urge the new government to respond to individual communications from Special Procedures and enter into meaningful dialogues with UN experts rather than deny allegations outright as previous governments have.

    Recommendations
    To demonstrate its commitment to human rights as a prospective member of the UN Human Rights Council, ARTICLE 19 and CIVICUS make the following recommendations to the Malaysian government:

    • Ratify the core human rights instruments and their optional protocols, including the ICCPR, and rescind reservations to existing treaties that are contrary to their objectives and principles;
    • Extend a standing invitation to all UN Special Procedures, and act swiftly to facilitate visits by the mandates on freedom of expression and on freedom of peaceful assembly and association;
    • Implement all recommendations made by UN Member States during the previous cycle of Malaysia’s UPR, in particular those relating to civic space;
    • Repeal the Sedition Act 1948, the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984, Official Secrets Act 1972, and the Film Censorship Act 1998;
    • Reform the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998, in particular Section 233(1)(a), to ensure it fully complies with international freedom of expression law and standards;
    • Reform the Penal Code, including Sections 504 and 505b, the Peaceful Assembly Act 2012, Section 114 of the Evidence Act, and the Societies Act 1966 in accordance with international law and standards;
    • Drop all investigations and charges against those exercising their right to freedom of expression, including social media users;
    • Ensure authorities do not harass or instigate arbitrary criminal investigations and proceedings against human rights defenders, protesters, activists, media workers, or opposition political figures;
    • Consult with civil society organisations on the shortcomings of Malaysia’s legal framework as they relate to freedom of expression and access to information;
    • Establish an IPCMC to investigate police abuses as per the recommendations of the Royal Commission to Enhance the Operation and Management of the Royal Malaysia;
    • Should Malaysia be granted membership to the Human Rights Council, ensure it exercises earnest efforts to defend and enhance international human rights standards and ensure accountability for human rights violations and abuses in other countries in Southeast Asia and worldwide.

    ARTICLE 19 and CIVICUS express sincere hope that the new government will take these steps to address the human rights concerns highlighted above and stand ready to engage in constructive dialogue to support such efforts. We hope to hear from you regarding this matter as soon as possible.

    Yours sincerely,

    ARTICLE 19 and CIVICUS.

    Cc. Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva
    International Center Cointrin
    Bloc H
    Route de Pré-Bois 20
    1215 Geneva 15

    For more information, contact:

    David Diaz-Jogeix, ARTICLE 19 Senior Director of Programmes, , or
    Josef Benedict, CIVICUS Civic Space Researcher, .

    Civic space in Malaysia is rated as obstructed by the CIVICUS Monitor.

     
  • MALAYSIA: ‘Migrants are amongst the first to be victimised and discriminated during the pandemic’

    Adrian PereiCIVICUS speaks to Adrian Pereira, the Executive Director ofNorth South Initiative (NSI), about the situation of migrant workers in Malaysia amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

    NSI helps build advocacy and leadership capacities among migrants, refugees and stateless persons, both documented and undocumented, so they can claim their rights. It also monitors labour and immigration-related abuses by authorities, employers and local workers and ensures that migrant organisations are connected to a strong solidarity network and are able to cooperate with other civil society organisations (CSOs) and trade unions.

    There are estimated to be somewhere between three and six millionmigrant workers in Malaysia. Migrant workers are set up for exploitation by a combination of unscrupulous recruitment agents and employers, harsh immigration policies, unmonitored supply chains and a lack of enforcement of labour protections. They are subjected to passport confiscation, low pay in violation of minimum wage laws, poor living conditions, punishment by fines, high recruitment fees and debts to recruitment agencies and employers, forced labour, human trafficking and salary deductions. Areport on the ability of migrants and refugees to access civic freedoms, produced by CIVICUS and Solidarity Center in collaboration with NSI, showed that the rights to the freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression in Malaysia are severely restricted for these vulnerable minorities.

     

    What was the situation of migrant workers’ access to healthcare prior to the pandemic?

    Malaysia removed subsidies for migrant workers to access public healthcare in 2016. Given that migrants rely mostly on public medical services, this measure resulted in declining quality and access to healthcare by migrants, both documented and undocumented, as the high cost of private alternatives usually deters them from getting any healthcare. Despite migrants and their employers and agents paying billions of Malaysian Ringgit per year in levies, taxes and other payments, they are not getting their money’s worth in healthcare.

    Those who are undocumented are only able to access private healthcare, because if they try to access public healthcare, immigration authorities will be informed, and they will come to arrest them. Over the years, brutal enforcement by police, immigration and customs forces and the People’s Volunteer Corps towards undocumented migrants has made them even more fearful of seeking medical treatment.

    There are also cultural competency gaps between medical practitioners and migrants, which make it difficult for them to get proper healthcare. Domestic workers who don’t have days off and are locked indoors have an even more difficult time in accessing healthcare.

    One positive step in 2019 was the inclusion of documented migrants into the national social security system, ensuring much higher compensation and better healthcare in the event of work-related accidents and illnesses. But for non-work-related accidents and injuries, private insurance offers minimal coverage. 

    What additional challenges have migrant workers faced since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic?

    Many migrant workers, and especially undocumented and informal ones, have lost their source of income. As a result, they can’t pay for food, rent and medicines, unless they have tested positive for COVID-19, in which case their quarantine and care is covered by the government. Only migrants who provide government-sanctioned ‘essential services’ are able to work. But their safety really depends on whether the companies permitted to operate comply with rules set by the government. The rules are meant to ensure workers are safe from the risk of COVID-19 infection and can continue to work. But there is almost no one to monitor this consistently.

    The government has announced an economic stimulus package that sadly has marginalised migrant workers. There is a worker’s salary subsidy to ensure companies don’t have to retrench workers, but this does not apply to migrant workers. Previously, migrant workers were also excluded from the Workers Insurance Scheme under the national social security body, which would ensure a safety net for workers who were retrenched. The Movement Control Orders (MCOs) imposed by the government to restrict travel that came into force on 18 March have made it difficult for migrants to travel to access basic services, food, banking and other essentials. In Enhanced MCO areas, service providers can’t even enter. Informal sectors are sacking and abandoning the migrants who worked for them, particularly undocumented migrants and refugees. 

    Employers are forcing migrant employees to resign or take unpaid leave. Employers are taking advantage of the MCOs to not pay their workers. NSI received reports of at least two cases of unpaid salaries way before the MCOs were imposed. One had been unpaid since December 2019 and another since February 2020.

    There is also fearmongering going on, with fake messages and misinformation online putting migrants at risk of backlash from Malaysians. The government pledged not to arrest and detain migrants who come forward for COVID-19 testing. But there is still a lot of fear among migrants and hence many are not coming forward. Some sectors that are very economically aggressive are forcing the government to allow them to reopen so workers can go back to work. We have seen this in the Sabah state palm oil sector.

    The European Union (EU) is also putting both migrant and Malaysian workers at risk of forced labour by asking Malaysian personal protective equipment (PPE) manufacturers to ensure production continues during the pandemic. The EU has offered tax incentives to Malaysian companies to supply PPE. Further, small and medium enterprises that have been hiring undocumented workers for many years have abandoned their workers, claiming they are short on cash. 

    How have you and other CSOs responded to the situation?

    We are coaching migrant leaders to ensure their communities have access to networks that provide services and can provide accurate information about needs to those who are providing services. Some public networks, such as the ‘Care Mongering Malaysia’ group, are proving a platform for Malaysians to reach out to help migrants and refugees in need. This is an online platform that links those who need help with those who can afford to provide the service. Also, Sikh temples are providing groceries and packed lunches. 

    Other CSOs working hard on the ground to provide groceries include BERSIH2.0, Beyond Borders, Dapur Jalanan, Engage, Geutanyoe Foundation, HOPE, Liga Rakyat Demokratik, Malaysian Trades Union Congress, Our Journey, The Patani, Refuge for the Refugees, Tenaganita and also migrant and refugee community organisations.  Migrant workers can call them when they need assistance with food.

    We are forming a network to ensure services can be delivered in the long term, as we foresee the problems continuing for many months to come. Many migrant workers will remain and will need aid, so we are developing a supply chain to support them.

    We are ensuring migrants receive accurate information from global bodies such as the International Organization for Migration, United Nations (UN) Development Programme and UN Refugee Agency and also from the various government agencies related to health, labour, security and welfare. This includes providing information via infographics on counselling services and on health issues in different languages. 

    We are also fighting misinformation related to migrant workers and refugees. There has been a lot of fearmongering blaming them for the spread of the virus.

    We are also encouraging migrants to seek medical treatment if they are sick and monitoring employers who are taking advantage of the current situation and committing labour offences, particularly as the MCOs have partly restricted lawyers from providing legal representation and legal aid.

    Other CSOs are providing counselling, delivering groceries, doing fundraising, monitoring human trafficking, providing gender-sensitive and maternity-related services and catering to women’s needs.

    What further support does Malaysian civil society need at this time?

    We need cash to support migrants’ needs, including to pay for groceries, bills, rentals and safe repatriation home after the MCOs. We are also seeking funding opportunities because as long as the MCOs apply, we are unable to conduct physical meetings, and most fundraising is based on this. We also need legal aid services for those who are being retrenched unfairly and detained unjustly.

    What lessons have you learned so far from the pandemic?

    We have seen that the government has barely consulted CSOs before implementing policies and this is not in line with good governance principles. Also, there is overkill in punishing those who violate MCOs, including people who are forced to breach the MCOs due to livelihood issues. Further, the over-securitisation of migration over the years has now caused a backlash against migrants, who have been neglected.

    Migrants are amongst the first to be victimised and discriminated against during the pandemic as they are neglected and don’t have strong safety nets. A capitalist system that operates on the basis of mega global supply chains and mega businesses does not have a proper risk-management plan that ensures accountability and transparency. Malaysia also has a problem with statistics, as it has been doctoring the numbers of those in poverty and has failed to address the problems resulting from the huge number of undocumented workers due to the meddling of the deep state.

    The civic rights of migrants have been suspended under the MCOs and Enhanced MCOs, and this in turn has weakened their bargaining power to gain their rights. There has also not been enough cooperation between migrants’ countries of origin and Malaysia to ensure the safe repatriation of those who want to return home, which poses a high risk of infection for everyone. We have received reports that under the MCOs, migrants are forced to use irregular passages to travel home. Embassies have turned to Malaysians for assistance for their citizens.

    CSOs are also not as united as I had assumed in building consensus in dealing with the problems, as they have struggled to cope with this. At the same time, some Malaysians who may have been biased against migrants have, in this time of need, showed compassion and responded in solidarity to migrants’ struggles. As has become clear, in the long term, the economic contributions of migrants ended up benefitting everyone except migrants themselves.

    Civic space inMalaysia is rated as ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
    Get in touch with the North South Initiative through itswebsite and Facebook page, and follow@nsinitiative11 on Twitter.
  • MALAYSIA: ‘The government should have assisted refugees under the pandemic’

    Htoon Htoon OoCIVICUS speaks to Htoon Htoon Oo, a refugee and activist from Myanmar, currently based in Malaysia. In 2007, he was a chemistry student in East Yangon University and an activist who took part in what was described as the Saffron Revolution, a series of protests unleashed by a hike in fuel prices, which were harshly repressed. He was also active during Myanmar’s transition from a military dictatorship to a quasi-civilian government in 2010.

    Aware of being under state surveillance and fearing that his family members and loved ones would experience reprisals and harassment due to his activism, he fled Myanmar in 2011 and has lived as a refugee in Malaysia ever since.

     

    What is the situation of refugees in Malaysia?

    The life of Myanmar refugees in Malaysia continues to be difficult, as it involves various struggles and suffering. We often feel helpless, hopeless, and unprotected. As of May 2021, there were an estimated 179,570 refugees and asylum seekers registered with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in Malaysia. The majority – a total of 154,840 – were from Myanmar, including 102,950 Rohingya people, 22,490 ethnic Chins, and 29,400 from other ethnic groups fleeing persecution or conflict-affected areas.

    Malaysia has not yet ratified the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The absence of a legal framework for recognising refugees and asylum seekers has created problematic and exploitative conditions for refugees and asylum seekers because we lack formal rights to work, we do not have legal status, we do not benefit from any legal protection and we continue to remain at risk of arrest, detention, and refoulement.

    We also have limited civic freedoms. Although there are many different organisations of refugees from various backgrounds, when it comes to expressing our concerns and organising our struggles, the reality is that we are not able to do it freely. There is common fear among refugees regarding the consequences of speaking up about our struggle, expressing our concerns, and claiming our rights.

    For example, under the Peaceful Assembly Act, Section 4(a), the right to assemble peacefully is reserved exclusively for Malaysian citizens. Moreover, there are many laws in Malaysia that create a chilling effect for refugees who want to speak up, such as the Immigration Act, which criminalises undocumented migrants as well as refugees, given that we are not recognised by law. The Immigration Act also exposes refugees to severe forms of punishment, such as caning. The lack of recognition of refugees and asylum seekers in Malaysia exposes us to arrest, imprisonment, and various abuses.

    What additional challenges have refugees faced under the pandemic?

    Since the COVID-19 pandemic broke out in Malaysia in March 2020, refugees have faced several issues and struggles. The lockdown, known as the Movement Control Order (MCO), which was applied to the whole nation, has had a huge impact on refugees.

    Refugees cannot work under Malaysian law, but some do seek informal work to survive. Under the pandemic, we have seen cases of employers forcing refugees to work for salaries below the normal wage or to take unpaid leave or resign just because of their refugee status. Many refugees lost their jobs due to the pandemic. There is nothing to protect us from these abuses.

    We also fear for our safety during the pandemic because there have been several cases of refugees being targeted by the police and immigration officers due to a lack of clear policies and awareness among law enforcement officials on what a refugee is. Some refugees were fined by the police, and some were even detained at police stations for several days.

    Some people also label us as illegal immigrants even if we hold complete and authentic UNHCR refugee cards or documents.

    Most of the refugees who face these struggles are also dealing with depression and are mentally exhausted through thinking of ways just to survive and remain safe.

    Have refugees received any support from the Malaysian government or the UNHCR during the pandemic?

    Refugees have received no support from the Malaysian government; rather we experienced more raids and increasing restrictions. This is the opposite of what should have happened: they should have provided us with access to information on COVID-19 treatment and testing and there should have been other support programmes for refugees during the pandemic.

    Instead, in May 2020, Malaysia’s immigration department and police force carried out immigration raids in Kuala Lumpur. While those registered with the UNHCR were largely spared arrest, unregistered asylum seekers were swept up along with undocumented migrant workers. Some were also stuck in areas under strict lockdown surrounded by barbed wire, with residents forbidden from leaving their homes, which made it very difficult. Many of us have not recovered from this.

    There has also been a wave of online hate speech towards refugees, and particularly towards Rohingya people, during the pandemic, accompanied by government announcements and policies that are hostile towards migrants and refugees.

    The UNHCR sent direct messages to refugees whose documents expired informing them that they would remain valid until the UNHCR could resume its normal operations, which were disrupted by the pandemic. This, however, made no difference to law enforcement, and many people have been fined and arrested.

    What is the status of refugees regarding access to the COVID-19 vaccine?

    The Malaysian government has encouraged refugees to come forward to register for vaccination but has not provided clear information, and the existing systems are not accessible for refugees.

    For example, there is a requirement for specific documents to register for vaccines. The system requires refugees and asylum seekers to input an ID card or passport number, two documents that we do not have access to.

    The system should be more inclusive of all persons living in Malaysia, including refugees, asylum seekers, and undocumented migrants because vaccinations should be the first barrier against the creation of COVID-19 clusters. Arresting us will only make things worse because fatal clusters are known to have been formed in detention centres. The criminalisation of immigration is at the root of this problem.

    What are the demands of refugee communities towards the Malaysian government and the international community?

    We would like the Malaysian government to raise public awareness on the status of refugees as refugees, rather than as illegal immigrants, ‘risk’ groups or criminals. There has been a negative perception of refugees as only benefiting from society and not contributing to it, which is false.

    In reality, we want to contribute to Malaysia in every way that we can. We urge the Malaysian government to give refugees legal access to work and to acknowledge their legal status. We are currently unable to find formal work, and lack of recognition exposes us to exploitation. We hope the government will raise awareness of the true reasons why refugees are here.

    I hope that the government can work hand in hand with the UNHCR and civil society to settle refugee issues in more appropriate and effective ways and not deport any Myanmar detainees back to Myanmar, which is currently under a military regime. Instead, we should find solutions such as a resettlement programme. There should also be clear policies and information on vaccines accessible to all refugees.

    Civic space inMalaysiais rated as ‘obstructed’by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  • MALAYSIA: ‘We need global solidarity to push back on attacks on rights’

    As part of our 2019thematic report, we are interviewing civil society activists and leaders about their experiences of backlash from anti-rights groups and their strategies to strengthen progressive narratives and civil society responses. CIVICUS speaks to Thilaga Sulathireh of Justice for Sisters and Seksualiti Merdeka about LGBTQI rights in Malaysia and the ways in which state and non-state forces are working together to deny rights.

    Can you tell us about your work and the status of LGBTQI rights in Malaysia?

    I work with Justice for Sisters and Seksualiti Merdeka. Justice for Sisters is a network that primarily works for the human rights of trans people in Malaysia, and we provide legal support, do human rights documentation, engage in national policy work and undertake advocacy with the United Nations (UN) to highlight human rights violations. At Seksualiti Merdeka, we recently launched a website, Queer Lapis. We do capacity strengthening and content production. The work we do is very much grounded in feminist, intersectional principles, and from a queer perspective.

    The human rights of LGBTQI people are definitely regressing in Malaysia. Malaysia historically inherited section 377 of the Penal Code, which criminalises ‘unnatural’ sexual acts, from British colonial rule. Section 377 has been amended several times, and the last amendment in 2017 resulted in the imposition of mandatory whipping as a punishment for consensual carnal intercourse deemed unnatural. The law is gender-neutral but it is used in political ways. As a result, people see it as a law that applies to gay people. We also have shariah laws in three states of Malaysia, introduced between 1995 and 2013, that penalise same-sex relations and posing as a woman or man. Unlike Section 377, these laws directly criminalise sexual and gender identity. The implementation of these laws varies according to state, but amongst them, the law against posing as a woman is most actively used.

    Has the situation for LGBTQI people changed in recent years?

    In recent years, arrests and raids made under these laws have decreased, because of a legal challenge that took place between 2010 and 2015. An appeal went through the different stages of courts. We got a negative decision in the High Court and then won in the Court of Appeal, which upheld that the law was unconstitutional, but then the decision was overturned by the Federal Court. But because of the activism around this case, the number of arrests significantly reduced.

    At the same time we saw a shift in tactics by the government’s Islamic Department, which has adopted a softer evangelical approach towards LGBTQI people. They saw that heavy prosecutions were giving the department a bad image, so there was a shift towards a softer approach, around promoting the ‘rehabilitation’ of LGBTQI people. There is a narrative that LGBTQI people need help in returning to the ‘right path’.

    We saw an increase in state-funded ‘rehabilitation’ activities in this decade, at the same time that Seksualiti Merdeka, which used to organise festivals, was banned in 2011. The government decided it needed to increase its response to this growing LGBTQI movement. This gave rise to more groups that promote and provide ‘rehabilitation’ or ‘conversion therapy’. We have seen more anti-LGBTQI campaigns in universities and on social media. We have seen more concerted efforts overseen by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which sits under the Prime Minister’s office, and which launched a five-year action to plan to address the ‘social ills’ caused by LGBTQI behaviour. This brought together most ministries.

    As well as the use of various laws and increased state funding for anti-LGBTQI activities, we have seen a heavy-handed response to the freedoms of association and assembly of LGBTQI people. For example, when LGBTQI people have taken part in women’s marches, their organisations have been investigated.

    Did anything alter as a result of the May 2018 election, which saw the first change of government in Malaysia’s independent history?

    The 2018 election has historic in that it changed the administration, but the government has adopted and continued the same policies. Nothing has changed from the LGBTQI perspective. We still see the same amount of resources going into policies that treat LGBTQI people as a problem.

    There is also an ongoing struggle between the new government and the former ruling party that is now in opposition, and this is used to justify the lack of change for LGBTQI people. Right after the election a lesbian couple was arrested in the state of Terengganu, which is an opposition-controlled state. They were charged for sexual relations between women and caned openly in the public court. After this there were also two cases of caning of sex workers.

    So there is all this moral policing. Homophobia is real, but there is also a political tussle and mind games being played over who are the guardians of Islam and race. In this crossfire LGBTQI issues and people become politicised.

    Who are the main groups attacking LGBTQI rights in Malaysia?

    All the groups attacking LGBTQI rights use evangelical language, similar to the right wing in Europe or the USA. They reject the universality of human rights, are nationalistic, oppose pluralism and diversity in many ways, prioritise a particular race or religion and support ‘conversion therapy’. Some of the state-funded activities towards LGBTQI people are carried out by these groups.

    There are celebrity preachers who post social media videos encouraging people to troll LGBTQI people and those who post LGBTQI-related content. There are also individuals who make homophobic comments and conservative student groups who organise against LGBTQI people. But they are less physically aggressive than those in Europe and the USA. They are often careful not to insult LGBTQI people out of fear of giving Islam a bad name.

    There are also ethno-nationalist groups, with the purpose of protecting Muslims and ethnic Malays, that also engage in anti-LGBTQI activity. These don’t adopt an evangelical approach. They engage more in reporting LGBTQI people to the police, and sometimes physical intimidation and violence. At the last women’s march, we saw some of these groups physically intimidating participants. They also issue statements and have an active social media presence.

    Then there are groups that call themselves Islamic non-governmental organisations (NGOs), some of which come together under a coalition of Islamic NGOs that participate in the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). These include groups that use more rights-oriented language, given that they engage in the UPR process, and particularly use the language of religious rights. They position what they call the ‘rehabilitation’ of LGBTQI people as consistent with these religious rights. They also cite examples such as the case of a bakery in the USA that was taken to court for refusing to provide a cake for a same-sex wedding to support their arguments for religious rights. Some of these are groups of doctors, lawyers and academics, and they make pseudo-scientific and legal arguments against LGBTQI rights. Some of these Islamic NGOs also provide services, and as such are involved in the government’s ‘rehabilitation’ programme.

    Within civil society, there is a tension between groups that support the universality of human rights and those that oppose it. Between those that promote pluralism and liberalism and those that oppose these. Between those that support LGBTQI rights and those that talk in terms of ‘rehabilitating’ LGBTQI people.

    How do these tensions play out around civil society’s engagement at the international level?

    Some of those Islamic NGOs engage in policy spaces. If LGBTQI CSOs attend a government consultation on the UPR, they share the space with these.

    The UPR process – and UN processes more generally – offer a key site of contestation between these two camps. The second UPR cycle in 2013 was seen by critics as an attempt by civil society to push for the recognition of LGBTQI rights and destabilise the position of Islam in the Federal Constitution. There was a lot of pushback. And then in the third UPR cycle in 2018, these groups participated in the process and claimed space. Some of the recommendations of this group were included in the report compiled by the UNHRC.

    When the Government of Malaysia tried to ratify the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, there was a lot of pushback from these groups and attempts to mobilise Muslim people against ratification. The government pulled out of ratifying on the grounds that it would affect the position of Islam and could offer an entry point to the recognition of LGBTQI rights.

    How do different groups that oppose LGBTQI rights connect and receive support?

    After the corruption scandal that led to the ruling party losing the election, ethno-nationalist groups are no longer as closely linked to political parties as they used to be. I suspect now they are mostly self-funded. With Islamic NGOs, I suspect they receive some foreign funding. Some have a presence outside Malaysia as well. There is an umbrella group, ISMA (Malaysian Muslim Solidarity), which apparently has an office in Germany.

    We also believe some groups receive state funding for their participation in the government’s anti-LGBTQI programme. When a colleague raised the issue of state-sponsored violence against LGBTQI people at a UPR meeting, this created a lot of protest from Islamic NGOs, including those linked with ISMA, who demanded an apology and retraction. The small organisations that are providing ‘rehabilitation’ services also mobilised in their support, making quite clear the connections between groups receiving state funding to provide services and Islamic NGOs advocating against LGBTQI rights.

    How is progressive, rights-oriented civil society trying to respond?

    In the last few years LGBTQI groups are also pushing back and being more organised. The coalition of human rights organisations that participated in the UPR process has also tried to engage with Islamic NGOs and tried to increase engagement by pro-human rights Islamic organisations. They had some success in the UPR process in getting some groups to recognise the discrimination LGBTQI people face. Now there are more civil society groups that are countering arguments against universal human rights online, and more actions to communicate human rights messages in popular ways and in different languages. LGBTQI groups are working on communication strategies. We need this because we face overwhelming misinformation about LGBTQI people.

    LGBTQI groups recognise that these issues aren’t restricted to Malaysia alone. We see a lot of tension at the UN level and realise these issues are ongoing, with states pushing the adoption of problematic language. For example at the Commission on the Status of Women in 2019, language about sexual orientation and gender identity was dropped because of pushback from conservatives. This is a global issue. Civil society everywhere is dealing with these challenges. So how can we come together and strategise around this? How can we do global activism better?

    We need to make sure there is diverse representation in these international forums. We need to have global solidarity to push back on attacks on rights.

    Because there’s a religious dimension to this, and because Islamophobia is on the rise, we need also to be careful when talking about these issues not to encourage more Islamophobia. We need to have more conversations about how we address intersectional forms of oppression and also give spaces for Islamic groups to participate in processes that help address Islamophobia. This is something that as civil society we need to be sensitive to.

    Civic space in Malaysia is rated as ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with Justice for Sisters through itswebsite andFacebook page, orfollow@justice_sisters on Twitter.
  • Malaysia: Muhyiddin government escalating efforts to silence dissent

     

    Global civil society alliance CIVICUS is extremely concerned by the escalation of repression of critical voices by the Malaysian authorities in recent weeks. These cases highlight an increasing intolerance for dissent by the government as they seek to hold on to power and is creating a chilling effect on freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.

    On 23 April 2021, the police arrested activist and artist Fahmi Reza under Section 4(1) of the draconian Sedition Act and Section 233 of the Communications and Multimedia Act (CMA) in relation to a satirical Spotify playlist about the Queen. He was released the day after, but the investigation is ongoing. Previously, in March 2021, he was questioned by the police about two caricatures of the Health Minister, that he posted on multiple social media platforms.

    On 28 April, it was reported that another cartoonist, Zulkifli Anwar Ulhaque - who goes by the pen name Zunar -  is also being investigated by the police over a satirical drawing in January 2021 that mocked the Kedah state Chief Minister for his decision to cancel a holiday to mark a Hindu festival. Officials had defended cancelling the holiday, blaming the coronavirus pandemic. He is being investigated under Section 505c of the Penal Code for ‘incitement’ and Section 233 of the CMA.

    “The Malaysian authorities have become so fearful of dissent that anyone who dares to speak out including artists and cartoonists face judicial harassment. The government must end this absurd probe of Fahmi Reza and Zunar, halt its use of restrictive laws and respect the right to freedom of expression that is guaranteed in the constitution”, said Josef Benedict, Asia Pacific researcher for CIVICUS.

    The authorities have also sought to harass peaceful protesters for exercising their fundamental freedoms. On 29 March, police summoned 11 individuals to give a statement for a peaceful protest held outside parliament to protest the Election Commission’s (EC) delay in implementing the 18-year voting age. Those hauled up include the organisers and opposition politicians. According to reports they are being investigated under Section 9(5) of the Peaceful Assembly Act 2012, for gathering without notification.

    On 1 May, it was reported that police want to question eight people for attending a solidarity gathering for activist Fahmi Reza. The gathering was held on 14 April outside the Dang Wangi district police headquarters after police detained Fahmi overnight. The eight include one parliamentarian, two politicians, and five civil society members. Those from civil society include SUARAM executive director Sevan Doraisamy, youth activist Wong Yan Ke, ARTICLE 19 Malaysia programme officer E. Nalini, EDICT executive director Khalid Mohd Ismath, and activist Numan Afifi Saadan.

    On the same day, the police said it will be calling up around 90 participants of a physically distanced sit-in protest in front of the Parliament on 30 April, where participants broke their fast together for the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. The rally was held to call for the reopening of Parliament, which had been suspended following the January 2021 declaration of a State of Emergency, purportedly to deal with the pandemic. This emergency has been questioned by civil society who have accused the Prime Minister of using the pandemic to cling to power by preventing the parliament from convening and determining if he still has the majority to form a government.

    “The harassment of peaceful protesters highlights the shrinking space for fundamental freedoms under the Perikatan Nasional government. The questioning of these individuals is aimed at creating a climate of fear and stifling criticism of the government and must end. As a country that is seeking membership of the Human Rights Council, these actions clearly run contrary of international human rights law and standards that such as body is supposed to protect,” said Benedict.

    In a joint report with Article 19, released in March 2021, our organisations found that the Perikatan Nasional government has undermined and obstructed the exercise of fundamental freedoms. It has initiated baseless criminal proceedings against government critics, human rights defenders, journalists, and individuals expressing critical opinions. It has also attempted to silence peaceful protesters and also impede the formation of political parties to keep itself in power.

    Civic space in Malaysia is rated as ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
  • MALDIVES: ‘We have come a long way, but more needs to be done to further open up civic space’
    SaafathCIVICUS speaks about the situation of women’s rights in Maldives with Safaath Ahmed Zahir, founder and president of Women & Democracy (W&D). 
     
    Founded in 2016, W&D is a civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes women’s economic and political participation and good democratic governance in the Maldives through research, advocacy and awareness-raising activities. 
     
    What led you to become an activist and found a women’s rights CSO?
     Growing up in Maldives, a small island developing nation, the disparities between men and women became evident to me. I came from a majority-women family and witnessed the personal upheavals that my mother endured and how much my family battled for my education. Returning home after studying abroad was an eye-opener for me. In interviewing for a job, I experienced first-hand the deep-rooted patriarchal culture and the double standards women face on a daily basis. So I decided to put my education to good use: to push for women’s rights and empowerment in my country.

    I first played a role in creating Women on Boards, a CSO promoting gender diversity in the workplace. This inspired me to try to contribute further to building the organisational infrastructure and community to support women’s economic and political participation in Maldives. The organisation I founded, W&D, is now one of the most prominent in Maldives, with over 300 members, 200 of them aged between 18 and 29.

    What are the main women’s rights challenges in Maldives?

    Maldives ranked 106 out of 144 nations in the World Economic Forum’s 2017 Global Gender Gap Report. Women are marginalised in the political sphere due to institutional barriers, discriminatory cultural practices and social norms. Despite being roughly half of the population, having a 98 per cent literacy rate and actively participating in political parties, in 2009 only 6.5 of members of parliament were women. The proportion fell to 5.9 per cent in 2013, and again to 4.6 per cent in 2019. Currently, only four out of 87 parliamentarians are women, and few women hold senior public sector roles.

    With the passing of the Decentralisation Act, which allocates 33 per cent of local council seats to women, there has been some progress in local governance. The Maldives’ women development committees are an important platform for women to enter into politics and to participate in the decision-making process at local and national levels. But many barriers still limit their fulfilment of their mandate. They should be empowered to achieve true decentralisation.

    Women continue to take on the burden of childcare and domestic chores, which makes it difficult for women to engage in economic activities on a par with men. Female labour force participation in Maldives is higher than in other South Asian countries, but women tend to be clustered in low-growth sectors and in lower-paying positions, and they earn less than men. While tourism is the lifeblood of our economy, women make up only seven per cent of the tourism labour force.

    Women’s entrepreneurship is generally underdeveloped, and women’s economic contribution tends to be rendered invisible, particularly in major sectors such as tourism, fisheries, construction and wholesale and retail trading. Gendered economic inequalities were exacerbated under the pandemic, reversing what little progress had been made over previous years.

    Gender-based violence also remains an entrenched problem. One in three women aged between 15 and 49 have experienced physical or sexual violence at some point in their lives. There is a great need for more and better infrastructure to support survivors.

    In sum, a clear female disadvantage persists. Regulatory institutions must be strengthened to solidify existing gender equality gains and mitigate gender inequalities.

    How is civil society in general, and W&D in particular, working to address these challenges?

    Women’s rights CSOs have been working to address these challenges for several years, through capacity development workshops, advocacy campaigns, movement-building and creating opportunities for women and girls.

    Six years on from its founding, W&D has become a leading CSO working to protect the rights and improve the lives of women. We particularly advocate for women’s safety, economic and political leadership and for inclusive democratic governance.

    Since 2018, we have conducted an annual capacity development programme to advance women’s leadership and political empowerment in partnership with the International Republican Institute. In three years, more than 680 women aspiring to public office and political leadership have taken part in our training activities. In the 2021 elections for local councils and women’s development committees, 83 women who successfully completed our training were elected.

    During the pandemic, we launched a rapid response programme for vulnerable women and girls. In response to the dramatic increase in reports of domestic abuse, we established a domestic violence and mental wellness helpline to help women seek the assistance of the relevant authorities, undertake safety planning and connect them with wellbeing resources. We provided survivors with psychosocial counselling and referred the most urgent cases to emergency shelters or other safe spaces. With a grant from the Queen’s Commonwealth Trust (QCT) we were able to assist 130 women.

    Also with QCT support, we worked to improve access to menstrual materials for vulnerable women and girls. Approximately 10,500 sanitary materials were distributed as part of our rapid response programme. We have just received additional support to continue our rapid response programme. We expect to assist at least 240 more women and girls within the next eight months.

    Additionally, in partnership with the Commonwealth Foundation we have hosted multi-stakeholder discussions and consultations with vulnerable populations, relevant government bodies and CSOs to offer policy reforms to address the needs of the most vulnerable.

    This year we implemented a project to help strengthen the capacity of CSOs and community-based organisations working towards women’s empowerment and social development in Maldives. We brought together more than 160 people from various organisations.

    How has civil society in Maldives joined the recent global mobilisation wave against gender-based violence?

    Over the past seven years there have been many street mobilisations, mainly condemning rape and demanding justice for sexual crimes against women and girls and children in Maldives. Protection gaps in rape laws and barriers to accessing justice have perpetuated the prevalence of sexual violence and the lack of justice for survivors. The dire state of women’s safety in Maldives was highlighted by the 2016 Demographic Health Survey conducted by the Ministry of Health, which showed that one in every four women in relationships had faced physical or sexual violence from an intimate partner in their lifetime. In recent years, the Maldivian community has become more outspoken on the issue, particularly amidst the #MeToo movement, where a lot of Maldivian women came forward with their experiences.

    Throughout 2020 and 2021, there were multiple street mobilisations spurred by cases of sexual violence and injustice. In early 2020, following a case of sexual abuse of a two-year-old girl by her relatives, outraged citizens protested against rape and urged the government to protect children from predators. The authorities again came under criticism in mid-2020 after a foreign woman was sexually assaulted and the suspects were released from custody, with reports soon following that one of them was in a position of influence. People gathered outside parliament to protest against rape and impunity.

    Following the exacerbating effects of the pandemic on violence and abuse against women and girls, protesters rallied again in 2021 The government has taken steps to address these problems. It ratified the First Amendment to the Sexual Offences Act to improve the definition of rape and strengthen investigations, including by removing burdensome evidence requirements. In 2021, it also criminalised marital rape, marking a significant milestone for the women’s rights movement. But there is still a lot of progress to be made in combating the violence and abuse faced by women and children.

    How has the space for civil society action evolved over the past few years?

    As a relatively new democracy, the Maldives has taken significant steps towards ensuring civic space freedoms, but there is still a lot of room for improvement.

    Following the November 2018 elections, Maldives has experienced legislative reforms and a relative opening up of civic space. A commission was established to probe unresolved disappearances. Maldives drastically improved its position in the World Press Freedom Index, moving from 142 to 87 out of 180 countries. This was made possible by reforms such as the repeal of the 2016 defamation law.

    While Maldives has come a long way since its first democratic election back in 2008, more needs to be done to further open up civic space. Over the years, human rights defenders have been targeted and subjected to verbal attacks, including hate speech and death threats, while women activists have faced online vilification and threats due to their work for women’s rights.

    CSOs are also under pressure from extremists and hate groups, whose influence in limiting the social and cultural lives and roles of women has persisted. There have been instances of religious scholars advocating for girl child marriage and female genital mutilation, and attempts to suppress women advocates who speak out against these grave violations of women’s rights. Women human rights defenders are specifically targeted and face additional and gender-specific challenges, including threats of sexual violence and rape.

    What kind of international support does the Maldives’ women’s rights movement need?

    We need the continued support of international partners and collaborators to maintain and advance our work to empower women. As our movement is mainly composed of CSOs, we rely on the generosity of international organisations that identify with our mission to be able to continue to run the projects that are making a difference in Maldives.

    We also need continued opportunities for dialogue and collaboration with the international community. The exchange of ideas and information among countries and cultures is inspiring and empowering for women and girls in Maldives, particularly in the areas of business and politics.

    International support for Maldivian civic space also plays a significant role in furthering women’s empowerment. This is largely achieved by developing the skill sets of CSOs through workshops and programmes run by our international partners and collaborators.

    Vocal support from the international community for the Maldives women’s rights movement is also crucial. While we have faced obstacles, CSOs in Maldives have persevered in promoting women’s rights and we will continue to do so alongside our international partners and supporters.

    Civic space in Maldives is rated ‘obstructed’by the CIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with Women & Democracy through its website or Facebook page, and follow @wdmaldives on Twitter.
  • MONGOLIA: ‘The government makes decisions without proper consultation’

    CIVICUS speaks with two civil society activists, who asked to remain anonymous for security reasons, about restrictions experienced by civil society in Mongolia and proposed new laws affecting civil society.

    Mongolia protest

    Mongolian youth protest in Sukhbaatar Square (Photo Credit: Anand Tumurtogoo)

    What’s the problem with the Associations and Foundations bills, currently under discussion in Mongolia?

    The drafts of the bills on associations and foundations have been under discussion since 2019 and were submitted by the Ministry of Justice and Internal Affairs to parliament in November 2021. The bills are meant to govern the work of civil society organisations (CSOs), including the processes for registration and reporting and the types of activities allowed, among other issues.

    If passed, these bills will impose undue burdens on CSOs, particularly regarding the ways they will have to report to meet government requirements. It is estimated that more than 90 per cent of CSOs, three-quarters of which are non-membership CSOs, may have to stop operating because of failure to comply with various undue burdens. These include increased and burdensome reporting criteria that apply to all CSOs regardless of their size, capacities and activities as well as internal requirements related to management and organisational structures that are not suitable for many informal groups.

    The provision establishing a Civil Society Development Support Council, an independent body to oversee CSOs, is also problematic because it comes with sweeping powers to dissolve organisations arbitrarily and allocate funding among CSOs, deciding which get government funding. This carries the potential of shrinking funding opportunities for many CSOs, particularly those working to further rights. The risk of arbitrary deregistration is also high, given the vast powers conferred on the Council and the broad and vague provisions on prohibited activities.

    How has civil society reacted?

    CSOs have tried to review and refine the bills several times to ensure they uphold fundamental civic freedoms, but to no avail. The attempt now is to block the laws.

    In November 2021, Mongolian civil society, together with several international CSOs, launched a campaign calling for the bills to be scrapped immediately, given there had been no consultation with civil society and there was no time or space to do so. The campaign managed to halt the progress of the draft bills and parliament announced that further discussions would be held.

    As of April 2022, it seemed likely the bills would be postponed and undergo further consultation. However, the speaker of parliament issued a decree to establish a working group to draft an alternative bill, the Professional Associations Bill.

    This draft had also been circulated in 2019 and was deemed problematic because it would tarnish the independence of CSOs by requiring CSO workers to have professional licences. At the moment, the discussion of this bill is suspended.

    What can the international community do to support Mongolian civil society?

    Although parliament has said the bills are currently suspended, there is no guarantee they will be dropped. Past experience shows the government often makes decisions on policy matters without proper consultation. Therefore, continuous scrutiny, including at the regional and international levels, would be very helpful.

    Access to resources and connection to international platforms such as the United Nations system would also be useful to help local civil society continue its struggle. 

    Civic space in Mongolia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor. 
  • MYANMAR: ‘If we fail to take appropriate action, the junta will commit more crimes’

    KyawWinCIVICUS speaks with Kyaw Win, founder and Executive Director of theBurma Human Rights Network (BHRN), about the situation in Myanmar one year after the coup. As theCIVICUS Monitor has documented, activists and journalists continue to be criminalised and killed. Political prisoners have been tortured and ill-treated and the junta continues to block aid and imposes restrictions on humanitarian workers. 

    BHRN works for human rights, minority rights and religious freedom in Myanmar. It has played a crucial role advocating for human rights and religious freedom with the international community and earned a reputation for providing credible and reliable analysis. It recently published reports oncrimes against humanity by the Myanmar military following the coup and on human rights violations and the situation inRohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh. 

    What led you to found BHRN?

    I was born and brought up in a predominantly Muslim township in Yangon and lived there for 30 years. But in 2009 I had to leave the country and stayed at the Thailand-Myanmar border, temporarily leaving my family. Because I was not able to go back, I eventually moved to the UK and after one-and-a-half years I was reunited with my family.

    In 2012, when violence against Muslims erupted in Myanmar, I felt I needed to take action and founded BHRN, which was registered in the UK in 2015. Despite progress in the transition to democracy, we decided to keep BHRN underground. This surprised many, but we felt the situation could reverse easily. Unfortunately, this came true with the February 2021 military coup.

    BHRN tracks hate speech both online and offline. We believe hate speech is very dangerous and monitoring it helps us predict impending violence. As we are underground, we are able to collect data on the ground even if it’s very risky. We work in Myanmar and have staff there, including in Rakhine State, as well as in Bangladesh and Thailand. We see the need to expand because as a result of the coup there are restrictions on movement.

    We have experts on various themes, including on freedom of religion and Rohingya issues, and we produce monthly reports. We also undertake international advocacy to share our research with decision-makers such as United Nations (UN) representatives, European Union officials and staff of the US State Department, as well as decision-makers in countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia.

    We also work with young people in Myanmar and build capacity around human rights, democracy and pluralism.

    A year on from the coup, what is the situation for activists and civil society in Myanmar, and how are human rights groups outside the country responding?

    The military has accused civil society activists of leading the resistance against the coup with backing and funding from the west. The military wants to destroy civil society, and many are being attacked and killed, so there is a lot of fear. Those in detention are in terrible conditions. Many have been tortured.

    Other activists who became aware that the coup was imminent were able to flee the country or leave the cities. They now operate from the outside, in Thailand and at the Thailand-Myanmar border, supporting those still in the country.

    We are calling for justice and the removal of the military from power. We have been calling for international sanctions since 2017, following the Rohingya genocide. However, at the time the international community was unwilling to take strong action, as they hoped that democratic reforms would be undertaken by the government of the National League for Democracy. There was only symbolic action but no targeting of the government at that time.

    Following the coup, we made clear to the international community that if we fail to take appropriate action, the junta would be emboldened to commit more crimes. Now, finally, targeted economic sanctions have been imposed and some companies, such as Chevron and Total, have decided to leave Myanmar. Some argue that economic sanctions will push Myanmar closer to China, but those people forget that in 2007, following sanctions after the Saffron Revolution, there was an internal revolt that led to the transition to a civilian government. The junta can’t survive long-term economic sanctions. The people of Myanmar know they may suffer due to sanctions, but many have told me they welcome them as long as they hit the military.

    We are also pushing for an arms embargo and to stop the sale of jet fuel to the junta, which they have used to bomb civilians. Another thing we request from the international community is humanitarian support.

    We are concerned about the UN’s position, which appears to view the military as a stakeholder in a potential power-sharing agreement. The UN Special Envoy recently expressed this position and we were very disappointed.

    We also have concerns with the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) formed in exile by those who had been democratically elected, because we have observed the exclusion of minorities. The NUG has no Muslim representation, so we don’t have a voice. This also affects the NUG’s credibility.

    How do you assess the response to the military coup by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)?

    In April 2021, a five-point consensus plan was agreed at an ASEAN summit. This included an immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar, constructive dialogue among all parties, the appointment of a special ASEAN envoy to facilitate dialogue, the provision of humanitarian assistance and a visit by the envoy to Myanmar.

    However, ASEAN is not united on this. It includes three groupings that cannot agree on anything. For instance, Vietnam is close to Russia and would block any arms embargo. Thailand seems to support the military junta. Indonesia and Malaysia have taken a strong stand; we have engaged with them since day one and they have supported us. Singapore has also spoken up.

    It doesn’t help that the permanent members of the UN Security Council are toying with ASEAN, using this regional body as their proxy. They have passed the buck to ASEAN to resolve an issue that they have failed to tackle.

    We can’t expect more from ASEAN than it can deliver. We want the military to be removed from power and replaced with a civilian government, and this is something many ASEAN governments don’t understand. ASEAN’s five-point consensus plan has not been implemented. ASEAN has no weight on Myanmar unless China or the USA move. 

    We seem to have excessive expectations placed on ASEAN, while in fact there is not much it can do. The rest of the international community should step up and do more.

    What can international civil society do to support activists in Myanmar and hold the junta accountable?

    In the past we only focused on human rights investigations, but now we are also doing humanitarian work. We are renting and setting up safe houses to hide people and helping them leave the country. Costs have greatly increased but funding has remained the same.

    Those working in the country need the support of international civil society, and new ways to deliver support need to be devised because it has become dangerous to receive funds as the junta is monitoring bank accounts. There are also issues of accountability and transparency, as we cannot disclose the names of the people we are helping.

    However, I believe if we overcome this challenge, Myanmar’s civil society will emerge very strong. But we need more understanding and engagement with us.

    I believe nothing lasts forever and this too will pass. The junta will have to leave at some point. While the situation is quite bad, a good sign is that many military personnel have changed sides and now support the NUG. But we need to continue our struggle with a clear vision of the future that is centred on human rights and democracy. And we need support from the international community so those struggling on the ground will one day see their dreams come true.

    Civic space inMyanmar is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
    Get in touch with BHRN through itswebsite and follow@kyawwin78 on Twitter. 
  • MYANMAR: ‘The ruling military junta uses fear as a domination tool’

    Myanmar coup protests 3 Gallo

    CIVICUS speaks about the human rights situation and prospects for democracy in Myanmar with a civil society activist based in Myanmar, who asked to remain anonymous for security reasons.

    What is the current situation in Myanmar, a year and a half on from the military coup?

    Myanmar has been in turmoil since February 2021. The coup halted the fragile democratisation process. All branches of government – legislative, executive and judiciary – were concentrated in the hands of the junta and fundamental rights were suspended.

    The rule of law has been significantly degraded at every level. In the business sector, the junta’s inconsistent regulations make it impossible for investors to make decisions. Foreign investors are increasingly withdrawing from Myanmar, and the telecom sector fell into the hands of the junta’s cronies. The junta has questionable capacity to manage the economy, and inflation has pushed up the prices of essential commodities.

    The degradation of the rule of law puts people’s everyday life and livelihood at risk. Repression and fundamental rights violations make everyone feel unsafe and spread fear. The junta uses fear as a domination tool. Even once-peaceful villages in central Myanmar have become conflict zones where the junta’s troops have destroyed tens of thousands of people’s humble homes.

    What effects has the coup had on civil society?

    The post-coup setting is very challenging. The coup set back civil society, which had been slowly growing since the late 2000s, when young democracy and human rights activists who had survived the military dictatorship started getting together and organising to pursue common objectives.

    Our organisation came into existence in the early days of Myanmar’s political transition. There were limited freedoms and rights and limited space for civil society organisations. Our objective was to create a gathering space and provide support for political and civic activists. Within a decade, we adopted the broader objective of promoting civic space in Myanmar. We use technology to reach the right audiences and promote civic awareness, participation and engagement.

    Right now our work is severely restricted. A few organisations have relocated their offices to border areas or neighbouring countries, but we continue operating inside Myanmar. Since speaking out entails security risks, along with many other activists and organisations we have changed our approach, keeping a low profile. We are also conducting research as a tactical response to understand the challenges and find possible ways out.

    For some of Myanmar’s local civil society activists, life under a repressive regime is not a new experience: they operated under similar conditions before the 2010s. They continue to take numerous risks to serve their communities. Some organisations have also managed to channel international humanitarian assistance to conflict areas and vulnerable populations.

    What kind of work are pro-democracy groups doing and what backlash do they face?

    Restoring democracy is hard work. Pro-democracy groups are working to force a return of power to an elected government. They discuss things such as interim arrangements, political pacts for federalism and a transitional constitution. On the ground, they promote rights and freedoms and defend people from the junta’s repression.

    Having expressed their wish for democracy in the 2020 general election, the public supports pro-democracy groups in various ways, such as by taking part in peaceful demonstrations and campaigns for the suspension of tax payment, boycotting the junta’s products and brands, and joining in so-called ‘social punishment’, a form of protest that consists of doxing members of the junta and their family members – revealing information about their businesses and family connections. Many people inside Myanmar and in the diaspora also contribute financially to support the security of people in conflict areas and provide emergency humanitarian supplies.

    The vital goal of pro-democracy protests is to sustain awareness of fundamental rights and freedoms, provide encouragement and show determination to take action rather than be the junta’s victims. In the earlier days, the protests were joined by people from all walks of life, including young people, students, members of civil society and political parties, government staff and celebrities. Even as the junta used lethal force and arbitrary arrests and committed atrocities, they continued to demonstrate daily in some rural regions and hold occasional flash mobs in urban areas.

    The junta keeps trying to clear out pro-democracy groups and to get the endorsement of the international community. As it finds the latter quite hard, it increasingly focuses on the former. They apply the so-called ‘four cuts’: they try to cut off financial support, rations, information and recruitment by pro-democracy groups. They arrest high-profile businesspeople suspected of supporting them and strictly regulate financial transactions. They deploy police and troops at every crossroads, equip their supporters with weapons and train informants. They have banned numerous news agencies and publications that could counter their propaganda and torched villages that were believed to host pro-democracy groups.

    What will be the consequences of the recent executions of pro-democracy activists?

    In late July the military executed four pro-democracy activists. It was the first time the death penalty was imposed in Myanmar in decades.

    For the junta, this means there is no turning back. They meant it as a message to shock and paralyse people and comfort their hard-line supporters. But it backfired: it fuelled robust determination among pro-democracy groups.

    Internationally, the executions showed that the junta will not play by the rules to gain international recognition. In fact, it has continued to show muscle, using hostage diplomacy. A former British ambassador, recently jailed, became one of the victims of this.

    When they lose power, they will have to face justice. Any transition will have to contemplate transitional justice arrangements to hold everyone who committed crimes against humanity and war crimes accountable in domestic and international courts. They shall not enjoy impunity anymore.

    How can the international community help Myanmar’s civil society?

    Myanmar needs attention and practical coordination. The international community must listen to our people’s voices and reflect on their agendas by following up with quick and responsive actions. Paying attention to local concerns and voices and developing effective international assistance will make people feel more hopeful and maintain their resilience.

    Meanwhile, the junta is trying to boost its legitimacy by holding a controversial election. Elections under its iron fist will never be free and fair. The international community must be clever enough not to recognise such elections, which are a rotten trick the military have used for decades. Endorsing the junta as a legitimate ruler will only prolong the crisis.

    So we ask the international community: please listen to and amplify Myanmar people’s voices!

    Civic space inMyanmar is rated ‘repressed’by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  • MYANMAR: ‘The world must recognise this as a sham election and support our struggle for genuine democracy’

    CIVICUS discusses Myanmar’s upcoming general election with Lynn Htett, a human rights activist and coordinator of Towards Media, a grassroots initiative that documents human rights violations, promotes civic education and supports democratic movements in Myanmar.

    Myanmar’s military junta has scheduled a general election for 28 December, presenting this as a step towards restoring civilian rule. However, with major opposition parties dissolved, leaders imprisoned and large areas of the country experiencing armed conflict, the election can be expected to consolidate military control than restore democracy.

    Read more 
  • MYANMAR: “Casi todos los detenidos nos dicen que fueron golpeados”

    CIVICUS conversa con Manny Maung, investigador en Myanmar de Human Rights Watch (HRW), acerca de la situación de derechos humanos en Myanmar. Anteriormente Manny fue periodista y pasó muchos años viviendo y trabajando en Myanmar.

    Myanmar sigue figurando en la lista de vigilancia de CIVICUS, que incluye a países que recientemente han experimentado rápido deterioro de sus libertades cívicas. En Myanmar los militares tomaron el poder mediante un golpe de estado el 1º de febrero de 2021, arrestaron a los líderes civiles de los gobiernos nacional y estaduales y lanzaron una brutal represión contra el movimiento de protesta en todo el país. Más de seis meses más tarde, el asalto al espacio cívico continúa. Miles de personas han sido detenidas y encarceladas arbitrariamente. Muchas enfrentan acusaciones infundados y se han denunciado torturas y malos tratos durante los interrogatorios, así como muertes bajo custodia.

    Manny Maung

    ¿Cuál es la situación de las libertades cívicas en Myanmar a más de cinco meses del golpe?

    Desde el golpe militar del 1º de febrero, hemos asistido a un rápido deterioro de la situación. Miles de personas han sido detenidas arbitrariamente y cientos han sido asesinadas, mientras que muchas más están escondidas e intentan evitar ser detenidas. HRW ha determinado que los militares han cometido contra la población abusos que equivalen a crímenes contra la humanidad, por lo que es evidente que la situación para la sociedad civil es extremadamente peligrosa, ya que las libertades cívicas se han vuelto inexistentes.

    ¿Sigue activo el movimiento de desobediencia civil (MDC) a pesar de la represión?

    Se siguen realizando protestas a diario, aunque son más pequeñas y ad hoc. Se producen protestas relámpago en todo Myanmar, no solamente en las principales ciudades. Pero estas manifestaciones están ahora algo acalladas, no sólo por la violenta represión de las fuerzas de seguridad, sino también por la devastadora tercera oleada de infecciones por COVID-19. Se han dictado cientos de órdenes de detención contra los líderes de las protestas, incluidos casi 600 médicos que han participado en o liderado el MDC. Periodistas, abogados y líderes de la sociedad civil han sido objeto de ataques, al igual que cualquiera que sea considerado un líder de la protesta o de la huelga. En algunos casos, si las autoridades no encuentran a la persona que pretenden detener, arrestan a sus familiares como forma de castigo colectivo.

    ¿Cuál es la situación de los manifestantes que han sido detenidos y encarcelados?

    Casi todas las personas con las que hablamos que fueron detenidas o acorraladas durante la represión generalizada de las protestas nos cuentan que fueron golpeadas cuando fueron detenidas o mientras estaban retenidas en centros de interrogatorio militares. Un adolescente describió que le golpearon tan fuerte con la culata de un rifle que se desmayó entre entre una y otra paliza. También describió cómo le obligaron a meterse en una fosa y le enterraron hasta el cuello mientras tenía los ojos vendados, todo ello porque las autoridades sospechaban que era un líder de la protesta. Otros han relatado las graves palizas que les propinaron mientras estaban esposados a una silla, que les fueron negados agua y alimentos, que se les privó del sueño y que sufrieron violencia sexual o amenazas de violación.

    Muchos de los manifestantes que siguen detenidos no han tenido realmente un juicio. Algunos han sido acusados y condenados, pero se trata de un número pequeño comparado con los miles que están esperando que sus casos avancen. Muchos de los detenidos que ya han salido de la cárcel nos dicen que han tenido un contacto mínimo, si es que han tenido alguno, con sus abogados. Pero los abogados que los representan también corren riesgos. Al menos seis abogados que defienden a presos políticos han sido detenidos, tres de ellos mientras representaban a un cliente en un proceso judicial.

    ¿Cómo ha afectado al MDC la interrupción de los servicios de internet y televisión?

    La prohibición de la televisión por satélite se ha sumado a las restricciones del acceso a la información. La Junta alegó que las “organizaciones ilegales y las organizaciones de noticias” estaban emitiendo por satélite programas que amenazaban la seguridad del Estado. Pero las prohibiciones parecen dirigirse principalmente a los canales de noticias extranjeros que emiten por satélite en Myanmar, entre ellos dos emisoras independientes en lengua birmana, Voz Democrática de Birmania y Mizzima, a las que la Junta revocó sus licencias de medios en marzo. Los cortes de internet también han dificultado el acceso a la información y la comunicación en tiempo real.

    Los cortes generalizados de internet son una forma de castigo colectivo. Dificultan el acceso a la información y las comunicaciones necesarias para la vida cotidiana, y resultan especialmente disruptivos durante la crisis y la pandemia de COVID-19. Las restricciones también dan cobertura a los abusos de derechos humanos y complican los esfuerzos para documentar las violaciones.

    ¿Por qué ha aumentado la violencia en las zonas étnicas, y cuáles son sus blancos preferidos?

    En algunas partes del país el golpe provocó la reanudación de los combates entre grupos étnicos armados y el ejército. El estado de Rakhine parece ser la excepción, ya que allí el Ejército de Arakan ha negociado un alto el fuego y las protestas contra los militares no han sido tan ruidosas ni generalizadas. Otros grupos étnicos armados, como el Ejército por la Independencia de Kachin y el Ejército de Liberación Nacional de Karen (KNLA), han acogido con satisfacción la resistencia frente a los militares y están proporcionando refugio a quienes huyen de los militares en los territorios que controlan. Los renovados enfrentamientos entre el ejército y el KNLA han dado lugar a diversas violaciones de derechos humanos de la población civil y han desplazado a miles de personas en la frontera entre Tailandia y Myanmar.

    ¿Qué opina de la respuesta de la Asociación de Naciones del Sudeste Asiático (ASEAN) a la situación de Myanmar?

    La ASEAN ha intentado utilizar los canales diplomáticos, pero esta situación no es la habitual. Los militares se han hecho con el poder y han estado cometiendo crímenes contra su propio pueblo, una población civil que ya ha expresado su preferencia en las elecciones. Tras meses de negociaciones inútiles, la ASEAN debería estar preparada para imponer sanciones a Myanmar. Como naciones independientes, los Estados miembros de la ASEAN deben actuar juntos e imponer sanciones selectivas a Myanmar para garantizar que los militares dejen de actuar con total impunidad.

    La reacción del general Min Aung Hlaing, que se ha autoproclamado primer ministro, ante el plan de consenso de cinco puntos propuesto por la ASEAN, muestra su absoluto desprecio por la diplomacia regional y pone de manifiesto que sólo responderá a demostraciones de fuerza, tales como la de cortar su acceso y el de los militares a ingresos del exterior mediante la imposición de sanciones.

    ¿Qué puede hacer la comunidad internacional para apoyar a la sociedad civil e impulsar el retorno a la democracia?

    HRW recomienda que el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas (CSNU) remita la situación de Myanmar a la Corte Penal Internacional. El CSNU y países influyentes como Estados Unidos, el Reino Unido, Australia, Japón, India, Tailandia y la Unión Europea deberían aplicar sanciones coordinadas para presionar a la junta. El CSNU también debería aprobar una resolución para prohibir la venta de armas a Myanmar.

    En cuanto a las organizaciones internacionales de la sociedad civil, deben seguir defendiendo a los miembros de la sociedad civil que actualmente se encuentran escondidos o detenidos arbitrariamente. Esto significa seguir presionando para que se reconozca la gravedad de la crisis política y humanitaria en Myanmar y presionar a los gobiernos para que actúen en beneficio del pueblo de Myanmar.

    El espacio cívico en Myanmar es calificado como “represivo” por el CIVICUS Monitor.

    Siga a @mannymaung en Twitter.
  • MYANMAR: “If this coup is not overturned, there will be many more political prisoners”

    CIVICUS speaks about the recent military coup in Myanmar with Bo Kyi, a former political prisoner and co-founder of theAssistance Association of Political Prisoners (AAPP). Founded in 2000 by former political prisoners living in exile on the Thai-Myanmar border, AAPP has its headquarters in Mae Sot, Thailand and two offices in Myanmar that opened in 2012. AAPP advocates for the release of political prisoners and the improvement of their lives after their release, with programmes aimed at ensuring access to education, vocational training, mental health counselling and healthcare.
  • MYANMAR: “Los militares convirtieron a los trabajadores de la salud de héroes en criminales de la noche a la mañana”

    Nay Lin Tun May

    CIVICUS conversa con Nay Lin Tun, un médico que colabora habitualmente como voluntario con los equipos de rescate en las zonas de emergencia de la ciudad de Yangon, en Myanmar. Desde que los militares tomaron el poder mediante un golpe de Estado el 1º de febrero de 2021, el ejército ha iniciado unabrutal represión contra el Movimiento de Desobediencia Civil (MDC), un movimiento de protesta que se extendió por todo el país y en el cual losprofesionales de la salud han desempeñado un rol fundamental.

    Desde el golpe de Estado, Nay Lin Tun ha estado en la primera línea tratando a manifestantes heridos por las fuerzas de seguridad. Anteriormente trabajó en el estado de Rakhine prestando atención médica comunitaria móvil a la población rohingya y a otros desplazados internos en zonas afectadas por el conflicto. También participó en la campañaGoalkeepers Youth Action Accelerator, dedicada a acelerar el progreso hacia los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible de las Naciones Unidas.
  • MYANMAR: “Nearly everyone detained tells us they were beaten”

    CIVICUS speaks to Manny Maung, Myanmar researcher for Human Rights Watch (HRW), about the human rights situation in Myanmar. Manny was previously a journalist and spent many years living and working in Myanmar,

    Myanmar remains on the CIVICUS Monitor Watchlist as a country that has seen a recent and rapid decline in civic freedoms. The Myanmar military seized power in a coup on 1 February 2021, arrested the civilian leaders of the national and state governments and launched a brutal crackdown against the protest movement. More than six months on, the assault on civic space persists. Thousands have been arbitrarily arrested and detained. Many face baseless charges and there have been reports of torture and ill-treatment during interrogation, and of deaths in custody.

    Manny Maung

    What is the situation of civic freedoms in Myanmar more than five months after the coup?

    Since the military coup on 1 February, we’ve seen a rapid deterioration of the situation. Thousands have been arbitrarily detained and hundreds have been killed, while many more are in hiding and trying to evade arrest. HRW has determined that the military has committed abuses that amount to crimes against humanity against its population, so quite clearly the situation for civil society is extremely dangerous as civic freedoms have become non-existent.

    Is the civil disobedience movement (CDM) still active despite the repression?

    Protests are still being held daily, although they are smaller and more ad hoc. Flash strikes are popping up all over Myanmar, not just in major cities. But these demonstrations are now slightly muted, not just due to the violent crackdowns by the security forces, but also because of the devastating third wave of COVID-19 infections. Hundreds of arrest warrants have been issued for protest leaders, including against almost 600 medical doctors who participated in or led the CDM earlier on. Journalists, lawyers and civil society leaders have all been targeted and so has anyone who is deemed to be a protest or strike leader. In some cases, if the authorities can’t find the individual who they are targeting for arrest, they arrest their family members as a form of collective punishment.

    What is the situation of protesters that have been arrested and detained?

    Nearly everyone we speak to who was detained or rounded up during widespread crackdowns on protests tells us they were beaten when they were arrested or being held in military interrogation centres. One teenager described to me how he was beaten so hard with a rifle butt that he passed out in between beatings. He also described how he was forced into a pit and buried up to his neck while blindfolded, all because the authorities suspected him of being a protest leader. Others have described severe beatings while being handcuffed to a chair, being denied food and water and deprived of sleep, and experiencing sexual violence or the threat of rape.

    Many protesters who are still detained have not had serious trials. Some have been charged and convicted, but that’s a small number compared to the thousands who are waiting to have their cases move forward. Many detainees who have since been released from prison tell us they had minimal contact, if any, with their lawyers. But the lawyers who represent them also face risks. At least six lawyers defending political prisoners have been arrested, three of them while representing a client in a trial proceeding.

    How has the disruption of internet and television services affected the CDM?

    Bans on satellite television have added to the restrictions on access to information. The junta claimed that ‘illegal organisations and news organisations’ were broadcasting programmes via satellite that threatened state security. But the bans appear primarily targeted at foreign news channels that broadcast via satellite into Myanmar, including two independent Myanmar-language broadcasters, Democratic Voice of Burma and Mizzima, both of which had their media licences revoked by the junta in March. Internet shutdowns have also made it difficult for people to access information and communicate with each other in real time.

    Blanket internet shutdowns are a form of collective punishment. They hinder access to information and communications that’s needed for daily life but especially during crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic. The restrictions also provide cover for human rights abuses and complicate efforts to document violations.

    Why has violence in the ethnic areas increased, and who is being targeted?

    The coup sparked renewed fighting in some parts of the country between ethnic armed groups and the military. Rakhine State appears to be the exception, as the Arakan Army has negotiated a ceasefire there, and protests against the military have not been as vocal or widespread. Other ethnic armed groups such as the Kachin Independence Army and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) have welcomed resistance to the military and are providing safe haven to those fleeing from the military in the territories they control. Renewed clashes between the military and the KNLA have resulted in a number of human rights violations on civilians and have displaced thousands on the Thai-Myanmar border.

    What do you think of the response by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to the situation in Myanmar so far?

    ASEAN has attempted to follow diplomatic channels, but this is not a situation where it’s business as usual. The military has seized power and has been committing crimes against its own people – a civilian population that has already voted for its preferred government. After months of futile negotiations, ASEAN should be prepared to impose penalties on Myanmar. As independent nations, ASEAN member states should act together and impose targeted sanctions on Myanmar to ensure the military no longer acts with total impunity.

    The reaction by General Min Aung Hlaing, who has made himself the Prime Minister, to the five-point consensus plan proposed by ASEAN shows his utter disdain for regional diplomacy and makes it apparent that he will only respond to tough acts – such as cutting off his and the military’s access to foreign revenue through smart sanctions.

    What can the international community do to support civil society and push for a return to democratic rule?

    HRW recommends that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) refers the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court. The UNSC and influential countries such as the USA, the UK, Australia, Japan, India, Thailand and the European Union should apply coordinated sanctions to pressure the junta. The UNSC should also pass a resolution to ban the sales of weapons to Myanmar.

    As for international civil society organisations, they should continue to advocate on behalf of civil society members who are currently in hiding or being held in arbitrary detention. This means continuing to push for recognition of the severity of the political and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar and pushing for governments to act in favour of the people of Myanmar.

    Civic space in Myanmar is rated as ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

    Follow @mannymaung on Twitter.
  • MYANMAR: “Si el golpe no se revierte, habrá muchos más presos políticos”

    CIVICUS conversa sobre el reciente golpe militar en Myanmar con Bo Kyi, ex preso político y cofundador de la Asociación de Asistencia a Presos Políticos (AAPP). Fundada en 2000 por antiguos presos políticos que viven exiliados en la frontera entre Tailandia y Myanmar, AAPP tiene su sede en Mae Sot (Tailandia) y dos oficinas en Myanmar que abrieron en 2012. La AAPP aboga por la liberación de los presos políticos y el mejoramiento de sus vidas tras su puesta en libertad, con programas destinados a garantizar su acceso a la educación, la formación profesional, el asesoramiento en salud mental y la asistencia sanitaria.
  • MYANMAR: “The military turned medical workers from heroes to criminals overnight”

    Nay Lin Tun May

    CIVICUS speaks to Nay Lin Tun, a medical doctor who regularly volunteers with rescue teams in emergency areas in the city of Yangon, Myanmar. Since the military seized power through a coup on 1 February 2021, the army has launched abrutal crackdown against the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), a protest movement that spread across the country.Medical workers have played a key role in the movement.

    Ever since the coup, Nay Lin Tun has been on the frontline treating protesters injured by the security forces. He previously worked in Rakhine State providing mobile community-based medical care to Rohingya people and other internally displaced populations in conflict-affected areas. He was also involved in theGoalkeepers Youth Action Accelerator campaign dedicated to accelerating progress towards the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

    What has the situation been since the coup? How has the medical system been affected?

    Since the military coup occurred on 1 February, our lives entered darkness: internet access, the freedom of expression, the freedom of speech and all our basic human rights have been denied. I cannot believe that such a military coup can still happen in the 21st century. We live in a cycle of fear every day and are afraid of getting arrested or killed for no reason.

    People were already in a stage of desperation before the coup, due to the social and economic hardships associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. They were hoping that their business would recover and grow when COVID-19 infection figures fell in Myanmar. Now, all these plans are gone. People have said they would rather die fighting for a democratic future than live under a military junta.

    Almost all government departments and ministries are shut down because the CDM is boycotting all services linked to the military and promoting labour strikes and walkouts by civil servants and other workers. Health systems have all collapsed.

    Worryingly, COVID-19 prevention and control mechanisms have also stopped since the coup, as has the vaccination campaign. The authorities bought 30 million COVID-19 vaccine doses from the Indian government, which were shipped in January and April 2021. But there are lots of data discrepancies between those who have received the first dose and those who have received the second: 1.54 million people have received the COVID-19 vaccine once but only 0.34 million have been vaccinated for a second time. This shows the failure of the vaccination programme. In addition, the COVID-19 surveillance system has been slow and has low testing capacities. This puts many people at risk in case a third or fourth wave of COVID-19 hits Myanmar.

    How are medical workers responding to the pandemic and the coup?

    Myanmar healthcare professionals have shown their strength and commitment, and have been hailed as COVID-19 heroes, since the beginning of the 2020 COVID-19 outbreak. At that time, there were not enough resources to treat those infected and cases began rising; deaths reached a total of 3,209 (according to the Ministry of Health and Sports (MOHS) website, COVID-19 Dashboard data updated on 4 May 2021). But, due to our admirable health heroes and good leadership, the slope of COVID-19 infections declined in late 2020 and people in Myanmar began to receive vaccines in the last week of January 2021. Myanmar was the third country to have a COVID-19 vaccination programme in the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) region, right after more developed countries such as Indonesia and Singapore.

    But all these positive developments have been destroyed overnight. On 1 February, all elected government officials, including State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, were detained. People have not been willing to accept this takeover by an abusive military junta and are showing their anger on the streets. The military forces have brutally cracked down on the protests with lethal weapons and real bullets. This has led to 769 people being killed as of 4 May, according to data from the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP). Due to the military coup, government workers left their jobs to join the CDM. It was medical workers from the MOHS who initiated this movement, and they were followed by those in other departments and ministries.

    Therefore, the military has targeted government staff involved in the CDM protest movement and those who support them. They have tried to arrest them using a new provision in the Penal Code, Section 505A, that can be used to punish comments regarding the illegitimacy of the coup or the military government, among other violations. These are punishable with up to three years in prison.

    By doing so, the military turned medical workers from heroes to criminals overnight. The military spokesperson for the Tatmadaw Information Team, Brigadier-General Zaw Min Tun, has even accused government doctors who withdrew their services after joining the CDM of murdering people in cold blood.

    In reality, CDM doctors are helping the public in various ways, including by providing free treatment at private hospitals and charity clinics, making home visits and providing telephone counselling. Due to the military coup, people have faced numerous challenges and insecurity both day and night. Curfews are in place from 8 pm to 6 am in all states and regions except Rakhine State. In addition, the internet is blocked for those accessing it via SIM cards and Wi-Fi services; as a result, most people lack internet access and the flow of information is restricted. All these conditions have had a major impact on people’s ability to reach out to healthcare services on time.

    What risks do medical workers face for speaking out?

    Currently, all the medical doctors who help anti-coup protesters risk arrest and those who joined the CDM are on an arrest list. Up to now, according to AAPP data, more than 4,700 people, including elected leaders, election commissioners, anti-regime protesters, teachers, doctors, journalists, writers, artists and civilians, have been arrested since the coup. Therefore, if we speak out, we face a high risk of arrest anytime, any day in any place.

    According to the latest information, not even free charity clinics are now allowed to accept CDM doctors or admit wounded patients for treatment. The military is also acting against private hospitals, which are forced to shut down, and have their doctors arrested if they accept CDM doctors’ consultations.

    Have you witnessed military violence against civilians?

    On the evening of 9 April, reports began emerging that security forces had killed scores of people in the city of Bago, about 80 kilometres north-east of Yangon, after unleashing heavy weapons and grenades to disperse protesters occupying barricades. Before launching the operation in Bago, the armed forces had blocked the roads, preventing ambulances from picking up the wounded, many of whom were eventually dumped in a monastery compound.

    At least 80 people were killed in Bago that day, but the final death toll will probably never be known. Something else we will likely never know is how many of the wounded died because they did not receive treatment. I arrived in Bago three days later to help treat the wounded. It was a difficult task. Many injured protesters were in hiding, for fear they would be arrested if they sought treatment. We were also told that volunteer medical workers had been detained by the security forces.

    As a frontline medical volunteer, I have regularly witnessed the brutality of the junta’s operations to disperse protesters. The first time was during a protest near Thanlyin Technological University in the outer south-eastern Yangon Region on 9 March. Troops had occupied the campus, and students were protesting peacefully to demand that they leave. The security forces suddenly opened fire with live rounds, leaving several people injured. We began treating some of the injured in a safe house not far from the site of the protest, but then soldiers arrived nearby, and we had to quickly evacuate the patients to another safe house. Thankfully, we managed to get them to a safe location and continued treating them.

    How can the international community support medical workers?

    Attacks on health facilities and personnel must be documented by national and international bodies. We are lucky that the World Health Organization has a surveillance system on attacks on healthcare facilities and personnel, which are recorded daily. From 1 February to 30 April, there were at least 158 attacks on healthcare facilities, vehicles, staff and supplies, as well as against patients, resulting in 11 deaths and 51 injuries. These facts help people understand the scope of the problem and can guide the design of interventions to prevent and respond to the attacks. But in Myanmar, there isn’t a leading organisation that can take action to prevent attacks and violence against healthcare personnel. Therefore, we need international pressure on Myanmar authorities and need international humanitarian organisations to address this issue seriously. 

    The international community should stand together with us in condemning the attacks on healthcare facilities and workers and unite with Myanmar healthcare workers in speaking out forcefully against all acts of discrimination, intimidation and violence against healthcare workers and facilities. Support to frontline medical workers in the form of medicines and other emergency aid would also be welcome.

    What is your hope for Myanmar?

    I wish for a day when all our healthcare workers receive full respect in accordance with our professional role. In other countries, medical professionals also held protests against their government, but their governments engaged with them and worked out agreements to end the protests because medical workers deal with millions of patients and in a democracy, their protests could have an impact on elected officials. Therefore, doctors’ strikes in other countries did not last long.

    It is the opposite in Myanmar. The military has unleashed a brutal crackdown on striking doctors and has arrested health workers. Doctors who are involved in the CDM can be sentenced to up to three years of imprisonment. CDM doctors have also been arrested at their homes and even in their clinics while providing treatment to patients. Therefore, it will be a very meaningful day for all our medical workers in Myanmar when we get full respect for our work.

    We also aspire to have a professional body that can protect all healthcare workers from attacks. The Myanmar Medical Association and Medical Council have silently witnessed the arrest of our brothers and sisters in the medical sector. We should receive full protection from a strong medical association.

    Last but not least, according to medical ethics reflected in the Hippocratic Oath, we have a full duty of care for the safety of patients that require treatment. Treatment of needy patients in an emergency should not be seen as a crime. But our medical teams are targeted for arrest for providing medical assistance. We wish one day all our medical workers will have freedom of care with no limitation.

    Civic space inMyanmaris rated as ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  • Myanmar: Activistas entre rejas

    MyanamrActivistsinPrison Banner1

    Tras el golpe militar de febrero de 2021, miles de personas han sido arrestadas, detenidas y atacadas arbitrariamente en Myanmar, entre ellas personas que defienden los derechos humanos, sindicalistas, periodistas, activistas políticos y estudiantiles, poetas, escritores y monjes. 

    Tal y como ha documentado el CIVICUS Monitor, muchos de ellos se enfrentan a cargos infundados y también se han denunciado torturas y malos tratos durante los interrogatorios, así como muertes bajo custodia. A continuación, presentamos algunas de las personas defensoras de los derechos humanos y activistas que han sido detenidas por la Junta.

    Min Htin KoKo Gyi1Min Htin Ko Ko Gyi - director de cine  

    El cineasta Min Htin Ko Gyi fue detenido el 1 de febrero de 2021, tras el golpe de Estado militar. Se trata de un destacado cineasta y fundador del Human Dignity Film Institute. Ha producido el documental "Floating Tomatoes", ganador de un premio, sobre el desastroso efecto que están teniendo los pesticidas en el lago Inle de Myanmar.

    En agosto de 2019, fue detenido y condenado a un año de prisión, en virtud del artículo 505(a) del Código Penal de Myanmar, por el Tribunal del municipio de Insein, por una serie de publicaciones en Facebook en las que criticaba la Constitución de 2008, redactada por los militares, y el papel de éstos en la política.

    (Foto: Myanmar NOW) 

    Ko Min Thway Thit1Ko Min Thway Thit - estudiante activista 

    El activista estudiantil Ko Min Thway Thit fue detenido el 1 de febrero de 2021, tras el golpe de Estado. Ya había sido encarcelado en 2015 por su papel en las protestas contra el nuevo proyecto de ley de educación y liberado en 2016.

    También fue uno de las cuatro personas multadas con 30.000 kyats por organizar una protesta sin permiso el 7 de julio de 2019 para conmemorar la masacre de activistas estudiantiles de Ne Win en 1962.

    (Foto: Burma News International) 

    ko mya aye kyaukseMya Aye - activista de la generación 88

    Este destacado activista por la democracia y uno de los líderes de la Generación del 88 fue detenido el 1 de febrero de 2021, tras el golpe de Estado. En dos ocasiones fue arrestado por la antigua junta por su activismo político durante y después del levantamiento de 1988, y cumplió un total de 12 años en prisión.

    Se enfrenta a cargos de incitación al odio en virtud del artículo 505(c) del Código Penal, que conlleva hasta dos años de prisión.

     

    (Foto: The Myanmar Times)

    Shwe Nya Wah SayadawShwe Nya Wah Sayadaw - monje budista prodemocracia

    El monje budista Shwe Nya War Sayadaw fue detenido el 1 de febrero de 2021, tras el golpe de Estado. Fue detenido por los militares en su monasterio de Yangon. Es un monje crítico con el movimiento 969, apoyado por monjes budistas nacionalistas.

    En 2012 se le ordenó que abandonara su monasterio en Yangon debido a un discurso que pronunció en un acto en favor de la democracia en la oficina de Mandalay de la Liga Nacional para la Democracia, en el que había pedido públicamente la liberación de los presos políticos y el fin de las guerras civiles en curso.

     (Foto: Kaung Htet/ The Myanmar Times)

    Thin Thin Aung1Thin Thin Aung - defensora de los derechos de las mujeres

    Thin Thin Aung fue detenida arbitrariamente el 8 de abril de 2021 en el municipio de Botahtaung, en Yangon, y llevada al centro de interrogatorio militar de Yay Kyi Ai, en el municipio de Insein, en Yangon. El 9 de abril de 2021, las fuerzas de seguridad militares allanaron su apartamento en Yangon e incautaron sus pertenencias, incluidos sus ordenadores. Ese mismo día la llevaron al centro de interrogatorio de Mingalardon (Yay Kyi Aing). Tras ser torturada durante dos semanas, fue trasladada a la prisión de Insein de Yangon el 21 de abril de 2021. Ha sido acusada de acuerdo con el artículo 505 (a) del Código Penal.

    Es cofundadora de la Agencia de Noticias Mizzima y de la Liga de Mujeres de Birmania (WLB), fundadora de Mujeres por la Justicia, antes conocida como Asociación de Derechos y Bienestar de las Mujeres de Birmania (WRWAB). Desde el levantamiento de 1988, Thin Thin Aung ha dedicado su vida a la lucha por la democracia y los derechos humanos en Myanmar. Ha pasado la mayor parte de su tiempo abogando a nivel local e internacional por la justicia de los derechos humanos de las mujeres. 

    Ko Wai Moe Naing1Ko Wai Moe Naing - líder de protestas

    Ko Wai Moe Naing, destacado líder de las protestas contra la junta en Monywa, región de Sagaing, fue golpeado y arrastrado por las fuerzas de la junta después de que su motocicleta fuera embestida el 15 de abril de 2021.  Al día siguiente de su detención, se hizo viral una foto en la que aparentemente aparece torturado.

    Wai Moe Naing se reunió con sus abogados por primera vez el 27 de mayo de 2021, más de un mes después de su detención. Al parecer, se enfrenta a un total de 10 cargos penales, entre ellos traición, asesinato, incitación, asociación ilícita, confinamiento ilegal y robo a mano armada.

    (Foto: Myanmar NOW) 

    Myo Aye1Ma Myo Aye - lideresa sindical

    Ma Myo Aye es una de las principales líderes sindicales de Myanmar. Fue detenida el 15 de abril de 2021, en su oficina del municipio de Shwepyithar, por alrededor de 40 miembros de las fuerzas de seguridad de la Junta Militar, que la llevaron a una comisaría para ser interrogada.

    Es directora del Sindicato de Solidaridad de Myanmar (STUM) y ha sido una de las líderes sindicales más destacadas del movimiento de desobediencia civil, que lleva organizando huelgas y protestas nacionales desde que los militares tomaron el poder.

    (Foto: Twitter/@cleanclothes) 

    Man Zar Myay Mon1Man Zar Myay Mon - defensor del derecho a la tierra y al medio ambiente

    Man Zar Myay Mon es un defensor del derecho a la tierra y al medio ambiente en la región de Sagaing. Fue detenido por soldados en la mañana del 8 de junio de 2021 cuando intentaba huir del pueblo de Shan Htoo, municipio de Chaung-U, región de Sagaing. Los soldados le dispararon en la pierna mientras conducía una motocicleta, lo capturaron inmediatamente, lo esposaron y le vendaron los ojos. Está retenido en un centro de interrogatorios en el cuartel general del Comando Noroeste del Tatmadaw en Monywa, región de Sagaing.

    Tras convertirse en una figura destacada de las protestas pacíficas contra el golpe de Estado, en marzo de 2021 Man Zar Myay Mon fue acusado de "incitación" en virtud del artículo 505(a) del Código Penal por su participación en las manifestaciones y se dictó una orden de detención contra él, lo que le obligó a esconderse. Ha trabajado durante muchos años para promover la responsabilidad de las industrias extractivas en beneficio de las comunidades locales. También participó activamente como uno de los líderes comunitarios en las protestas contra la mina de Letpadaung, en la región de Sagaing.
    (Foto: The Irrawaddy)

    Ma Chun BuMa Chan Bu - periodista

    El 29 de marzo, las fuerzas de seguridad golpearon y detuvieron a la reportera Ma Chan Bu, de la cadena 74 Media, mientras cubría una protesta en Myitkyina, estado de Kachin. Fue detenida junto con Ko La Raw, de Kachin Wave. Ambos medios de comunicación tienen su sede en la capital del estado de Kachin. Ha sido acusada de acuerdo con el artículo 505a del Código Penal.

    Según los informes del 15 de julio de 2021, casi la mitad de los 87 periodistas detenidos por la Junta de Myanmar en los cinco meses transcurridos desde el golpe de Estado siguen detenidos. 31 reporteros quedaron en libertad antes del 30 de junio de 2021, cuando la junta declaró una amnistía general y liberó a 2.300 presos de las cárceles del país, entre ellos otros 14 periodistas. En la mayoría de los casos, las autoridades acusaron a los reporteros de difamar a los militares en virtud del artículo 505 (a). En la actualidad, decenas de reporteros se encuentran en la clandestinidad.

    (Foto: BNI Multimedia Group)
  • Myanmar: Activists behind bars

    Myanmar activists behind bars 5

    Following the February 2021 military coup, thousands in Myanmar have been arbitrarily arrested, detained, and attacked including human rights defenders, trade unionists, journalists, political and student activists, poets, writers, and monks. 

    As documented by the CIVICUS Monitor, many are facing baseless charges and there have also been reports of torture and ill-treatment during interrogation, and of deaths in custody. The following are some of the human rights defenders and activists who have been detained by the junta.

    Updated January 2023

    SueShaShinn LGBTQI+ activist Sue Sha Shinn Thant  

    Sue Sha Shinn Thant was arrested in Mandalay in October 2021. She is a transgender woman who has campaigned for the Prevention of Violence Against Woman Bill in Myanmar. She was a union-level representative in the Mandalay Region Youth Affairs Committee before the junta seized power. Since the coup Sue Sha Shinn Thant played a leading role in anti-dictatorship protests in Mandalay.

    On 14th December 2022, she was sentenced to 22 years in prison by a junta court in Mandalay. Obo Prison Court handed down the sentence for allegedly violating Section 505 (b) of Myanmar’s Penal code for inciting sedition against the state, and Section 50 (j) of the Counter Terrorism Law for aiding and abetting murder. She had already received a three-year sentence for allegedly inciting sedition against the military.

     (Photo Credit: The Irrawady) 

    LuPhanKar Poet and activist Lu Phan Kar 

    On 20th December 2022, Lu Phan Kar, who led anti-regime protests in Ayeyarwady region’s Pathein city, was sentenced to another two years in prison for incitement against the military under Section 505 (a) of Myanmar’s Penal Code. Lu Phan Kar is a published poet who began leading anti-junta demonstrations in Ayeyarwady region following the coup. In November 2021, Lu Phan Kar was sentenced to 26 years in prison under Sections 122 and 124 of the Penal Code for sedition and treason, and six months for breaking prison rules.

    (Photo Credit: RFA) 

     

    ThaeSuNaing Activist Thae Su Naing 

    Thae Su Naing, a member of Myanmar’s Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), was sentenced to seven years in prison by Meiktila Court in Mandalay region on 30th August 2022. The 24-year-old teacher was a former chairwoman of the Meiktila University Students’ Union and taught in the local township.

    Thae Su Naing was sentenced under Section 52 (A) of the Counter-Terrorism Law. Sentences under the law range from three to seven years. Thae Su Naing was arrested by the army at her home in Meiktila township in November 2021 and accused of being a People’s Defence Force (PDF) leader and held for nine months before being sentenced. 

    (Photo Credit: DVB English) 

    SuYeeLin Student activist Su Yee Lin 

    Su Yee Lin was the chair of the Eastern Yangon University Students’ Union. She was were arrested in Yangon on 20th December 2021 while on her way to a protest in Thingangyun Township. In April 2022, she was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment.

    (Photo Credit: Twitter/ @NanLin96) 

     

     

    MinThukhaKyaw Student activist Min Thukha Kyaw 

    Thae Su Naing, a member of Myanmar’s Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), was sentenced to seven years in prison by Meiktila Court in Mandalay region on 30th August 2022. The 24-year-old teacher was a former chairwoman of the Meiktila University Students’ Union and taught in the local township.

    Thae Su Naing was sentenced under Section 52 (A) of the Counter-Terrorism Law. Sentences under the law range from three to seven years. Thae Su Naing was arrested by the army at her home in Meiktila township in November 2021 and accused of being a People’s Defence Force (PDF) leader and held for nine months before being sentenced. 

    (Photo Credit: Myanmar Now) 

    MaAeint 2Filmmaker Ma Aeint

    Ma Aeint was detained in June 2021 and after ten months in jail as a political prisoner, was found guilty of breaching Article 505A of Myanmar’s criminal code which penalises “causing fear, spreading fake news or agitating against government employees.” She was sentenced to three years of jail, with hard labour, by a court in Yangon, Myanmar.

    (Photo Credit: Mizzima News) 

     

    Ko Wai Moe Naing1Protest leader Ko Wai Moe Naing 

    Ko Wai Moe Naing, a prominent anti-junta protest leader in Monywa, Sagaing Region, was beaten and dragged away by junta forces after his motorcycle was rammed on 15th April 2021. A photo apparently showing him to have been badly tortured went viral the day after his arrest

    Wai Moe Naing’s trial took place at a military court located inside Monywa Prison, On 12 August 2022, he was found guilty of committing multiple counts of incitement under section 505(A) of the Penal Code, which has been routinely used by the military junta to target critics of the regime. Following the conviction, Wai Moe Naing was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment.

    (Photo Credit: Myanmar NOW) 

    Man Zar Myay Mon1Land and environmental rights defender, Man Zar Myay Mon 

    Man Zar Myay Mon is an activist from the Sagaing Region. He has worked for many years to promote accountability of the extractive industries for the benefit of local communities. He was also active as one of the community leaders in the Letpadaung mine protests in Sagaing Region.

    After he became a leading figure of peaceful anti-coup protests, in March 2021 Man Zar Myay Mon was charged with “incitement” under Article 505(a) of the Penal Code for his participation in the demonstrations.

    He was detained on the morning of 8 June 2021, by soldiers while he was attempting to flee Shan Htoo Village, Chaung-U Township, Sagaing Region. The soldiers shot him in the leg while he was riding a motorbike, immediately captured him, handcuffed him, and blindfolded him. He is being held at an interrogation center at the headquarters of the Tatmadaw’s Northwestern Command in Monywa, Sagaing Region

    In March 2022, he was sentenced to two years in prison.

    (Photo Credit: The Irrawaddy) 

    RELEASED 

    Ma Chun BuJournalist Ma Chan Bu

    Security forces beat and arrested reporter Ma Chan Bu from the 74 Media on 29 March while she was covering a protest in Myitkyina, Kachin State. She was arrested with Ko La Raw, who is with Kachin Wave. Both media outlets are based in the Kachin State capital. She has been charged under Section 505a of the Penal Code. 

    According to reports as of 15 July 2021, nearly half of the 87 journalists arrested by Myanmar’s junta in the five months since the coup remain in detention. 31 reporters were released prior to 30 June 2021 when the junta declared a general amnesty and freed 2,300 prisoners from the country’s jails, including another 14 journalists. In most cases, authorities charged reporters with defamation of the military under Section 505 (a). Dozens of reporters are currently in hiding. She was released on 19 October 2021.

    (Photo Credit: BNI Multimedia Group)

    Thin Thin Aung1Women human rights defender Thin Thin Aung 

    Thin Thin Aung was arbitrarily arrested on 8 April 2021 from Botahtaung Township in Yangon and taken to the Yay Kyi Ai military interrogation centre in Yangon’s Insein Township. On 9 April 2021, military security forces raided her apartment in Yangon and seized her belongings, including her computers. She was taken to the Mingalardon interrogation centre (Yay Kyi Aing) on the same day. After being tortured for two weeks, she was transferred to Yangon’s Insein prison on 21 April 2021. She has been charged under Section 505 (a) of the Penal Code. 

    She is a co-founder of Mizzima News Agency and the Women’s League of Burma (WLB), the founder of Women for Justice formerly known as Women’s Rights and Welfare Association of Burma (WRWAB). Since the 1988 uprising, Thin Thin Aung has dedicated her life to the fight for democracy and human rights in Myanmar. She has spent most of her time advocating locally and internationally for justice for women’s human rights. She was released on 19 October 2021.

    Myo Aye1

    Trade union leader, Ma Myo Aye 

    One of Myanmar’s leading trade union leaders, Ma Myo Aye was arrested on 15th April 2021. She was arrested at her office in Yangon’s Shwepyithar Township by around 40 members of the military junta’s security forces. Myo Aye was then taken to a police station for interrogation. 

    She is director of Solidarity Trade Union of Myanmar (STUM) and has been one of the most prominent union leaders in the civil disobedience movement, which has been organising national strikes and protests since the military seized power.  She was released on 19 October 2021.

    (Photo Credit: Twitter/@cleanclothes)  

    Shwe Nya Wah SayadawPro-democracy Buddhist monk, Shwe Nya Wah Sayadaw 

    Buddhist monk Shwe Nya War Sayadaw was arrested on 1 February 2021, following the coup. He was detained by the military at his monastery in Yangon. He is an outspoken monk and has been critical of the 969 movement, which is backed by nationalist Buddhist monks.

    In 2012, he was ordered to leave his monastery in Yangon because of a speech he gave at a pro-democracy event at the Mandalay office of the National League for Democracy, where he had publicly called for the release of political prisoners and the end of ongoing civil wars.

     (Photo Credit: Kaung Htet/ The Myanmar Times)

    Ko Min Thway Thit1Student activist Ko Min Thway Thit 

    Student activist Ko Min Thway Thit was arrested on 1 February 2021, following the coup. On 30 December 2021 he was sentenced to one year imprisonment for driving an unregistered vehicle without a license under Section 95 of the Vehicle Safety and Motor Vehicle Management Law.

    He was previously imprisoned in 2015 for his role in the protests against the new education bill and released in 2016. He was also among four fined 30,000 kyats for organising a protest without permission on 7 July 2019 to commemorate Ne Win’s 1962 massacre of student activists.

    (Photo Credit: Burma News International) 

    ko mya aye kyaukse88 Generation activist, Mya Aye 

    Prominent democracy activist and one of the leaders of the 88 Generation was arrested on 1 February 2021, following the coup. Mya Aye was arrested twice under the former junta for his political activism during and after the 1988 uprising and served a total of 12 years in prison.

    He faces hate speech charges under Article 505(c) of the Penal Code for incitement, which carries up to two years in prison.

    (Photo Credit: The Myanmar Times) 

     
  • Myanmar: civic space is under assault - meaningful and robust resolution needed

    Statement at the 52nd Session of the Human Rights Council

    Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar

    Delivered by Kyaw Win

    Thank you, Mr. President.

    CIVICUS and the Burma Human Rights Network thanks the Special Rapporteur for his update.

    We remain deeply concerned about the state of civic space in Myanmar, two years on from the unconstitutional coup. Human rights defenders and activists have continued to be prosecuted by the junta on fabricated charges and convicted in sham trials by secret military tribunals and given harsh sentences including the death penalty. As noted by the Special Rapporteur more than 16,000 political prisoners are now behind bars and some have been tortured or ill-treated in detention. The Special Rapporteur has also highlighted the ongoing attacks on civilians and the draconian new Organization Registration law that will further shackle what is remaining of civil society. The CIVICUS Monitor, this month downgraded Myanmar’s civic space rating from ‘repressed’ to ‘closed’.

    We welcome the landmark UN Security Council resolution adopted in December 2022, denouncing the violations by the junta but was disappointed it did not impose an arms embargo or refer the case to the International Criminal Court. At the same time, ASEAN’s five-point consensus has remained ineffective in addressing the human rights violations in Myanmar and its time the regional body moves beyond it. Further, as noted by the Special Rapporteur there are serious concerns about that international community’s treatment of Rohingyas and others fleeing Myanmar and many face the risk of detention, deportation and pushbacks at land and sea.

    We call on the Council to support a meaningful and robust resolution which reflects these serious concerns and renews the critical mandate of the Special Rapporteur. Special Rapporteur, what the international community should do to halt the assault on civic space and serious human rights violations committed by the junta and to support those fleeing to neighbouring countries.

    Thank you.

     Civi space in Myanmar is rated as "Closed" by the CIVICUS Monitor 
  • Myanmar: Lift Internet Restrictions in Rakhine and Chin States

    Mobile internet blackout in four townships in Rakhine State among the world’s longest running.

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