asia
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Chinese authorities must release “Blank Paper” protesters and allow free expression on COVID-19 pandemic
On International Women’s Day, 25 organisations call on the Chinese government to release and drop all charges against editor Cao Zhixin (曹芷馨), writer Li Siqi (李思琪), accountant Li Yuanjing (李元婧), and teacher Zhai Dengrui (翟登蕊). Beijing police arrested the four women for participating in a memorial protest on November 27, 2022. We also call on Chinese authorities to release and drop charges against all other individuals in China detained for freely expressing themselves during the “Blank Paper” protests of November-December, many of whom were women, and to end its suppression of speech about the COVID-19 pandemic.
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Civil Society Organisations condemn the continued investigation of ex-RFA journalists Yeang Sothearin and Uon Chhin
Phnom Penh, 07 October 2019 -We, the undersigned civil society organisations strongly condemn the decision by the Municipal Court judge to continue the investigation into unsubstantiated espionage charges against Yeang Sothearin and Uon Chhin. The pair were arbitrarily arrested, detained and charged for the peaceful exercise of their freedom of expression and for their work as investigative journalists on issues of social justice. Yesterday’s hearing showed that there is a complete lack of evidence in support of these baseless charges exposing fair trial rights violations and highlighting the trial as a blatant affront to freedom of expression and media freedom in Cambodia. We urge the authorities to immediately drop all charges against the pair.
Yeang Sothearin and Uon Chhin, former Radio Free Asia (RFA) journalists, were arrested on 14 November 2017 and detained in Prey Sar prison. They were provisionally charged four days later with ‘supplying a foreign state with information prejudicial to national defence’, under Article 445 of Cambodia’s Criminal Code. The pair – who worked for RFA’s, now closed, Cambodia bureau – were denied their first bail application on appeal before the Supreme Court on 16 March 2018 and soon afterwards were charged by the Phnom Penh Municipal Court with the alleged production of pornography under Article 39 of the Law on the Suppression of Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation. As a result of the accumulated charges, each face 16 years in prison. On 21 August 2018 they were both released from Prey Sar prison on bail, after more than nine months in pre-trial detention, however remain under judicial supervision.
The original verdict hearing was scheduled for 30 August 2019 but on the morning of the hearing it was delayed due to an unannounced absence of the judge. It was subsequently scheduled for 03 October 2019, however the Phnom Penh Municipal Court again failed to deliver a verdict on the grounds that further investigation was required. The failure to reach a verdict is indicative of a lack of credible evidence against the pair and as such illustrates that there is insufficient evidence to hold them criminally liable as per the burden of proof standards enshrined in Article 38 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia (Constitution). Throughout the process of their arrest, detention, and ongoing trial, Yeang Sothearin and Uon Chhin have been denied the rights to fair trial, liberty and security protected under domestic and international human rights law.
Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), incorporated into domestic law by the Constitution, states that ‘no one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law.’ Article 14 thereafter preserves the rights to ‘be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law’ and to presumption of innocence. The charges levelled against Yeang Sothearin and Uon Chhin are unsubstantiated and lack a clear legal basis. Instead, they have been employed as a means to punish the legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of expression and silence journalism critical of the government. The pair had previously reported on a wide range of human rights issues.
In addition to baseless charges, the holding of these two men in pre-trial detention in deplorable conditions for more than nine months, and their continued placement under judicial supervision of already 12 months, violates their right to liberty and to a fair trial guaranteed under international law and the Constitution. International law stipulates that people charged with criminal offenses should not, as a general rule, be held in custody pending trial - a requirement not adhered to in Yeang Sothearin and Uon Chhin’s case.
In May 2019, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention issued an opinion on the case, finding that the Cambodian government had failed to (1) establish a legal basis for arrest and detention, and (2) provide proof that it had considered alternatives to pre-trial detention. Concluding that the pre-trial detention of the journalists resulted from their peaceful exercise of the right to freedom of association and the freedom of expression, the Working Group found their deprivation of liberty to be arbitrary.
The prosecution of Yeang Sothearin and Uon Chhin is but one piece of the broader legal assault on journalists, human rights defenders, members of the political opposition, union leaders, activists, civil society representatives and individuals expressing their views on matters of public interest, including expressions of critical dissent. While the situation of press freedom was already constricted prior to 2017, since then Cambodia has seen almost all of its independent and local media silenced. Critical Khmer-language media outlets have had their activities severely restricted, including via the closure of 32 radio stations relaying RFA, Voice of America (VOA) and Voice of Democracy (VOD). RFA closed its Cambodia bureau in September 2017, citing the repressive environment and ongoing harassment of their journalists. The change of ownership of the Phnom Penh Post in May 2018, Cambodia’s last remaining independent English-Khmer language daily, was widely regarded as the last blow to press freedom in Cambodia. The space for freedom of expression online is also severely curtailed, illustrated through the increase in harassment of individuals who merely peacefully dissent or express their opinions through shares, posts or likes on Facebook.
The right to freedom of expression, protected by Article 19 of the ICCPR and Article 41 of the Constitution, is essential for the guarantee of the exercise of all human rights, including the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of information, and the right to develop one’s personality and private life. As such, the importance of creating an enabling environment in which journalists are free to conduct their work – including by exposing corruption, expressing diverse viewpoints and shedding light on human rights violations – cannot be understated.
The failure to vacate the charges against Yeang Sothearin and Uon Chhin strikes yet another blow against what little remains of freedom of expression and media freedom in Cambodia. This case sends a clear warning to individuals who dare to exercise their fundamental right to freedom of expression and fosters an environment of intimidation and censorship. The legitimate and invaluable work of these individuals should be recognized, in line with Cambodia’s human rights obligations, and they should be able to carry out their activities in the future without fear of reprisal, obstruction or threat of prosecution. We encourage the Royal Government of Cambodia to cease its intimidation and harassment of all individuals exercising their right to freedom of expression and to re-establish an enabling environment for a free and pluralistic media and a thriving civil society in line with its obligations under the Constitution and international human rights law.
This joint statement is endorsed by:
- Alliance for Conflict Transformation (ACT)
- Amnesty International
- Article 19
- ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR)
- Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
- Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL)
- CamAsean Youth’s Future (CamASEAN)
- Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR)
- Cambodian Center for Independent Media (CCIM)
- Cambodian Food And Service Workers Federation (CFSWF)
- Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC)
- Cambodian Independent Teachers’ Association (CITA)
- Cambodian Volunteers for Society (CVS)
- Cambodian Youth Network (CYN)
- Coalition for Integrity & Social Accountability (CISA)
- Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia (COMFREL)
- Community Legal Education Center (CLEC)
- Center for Alliance of Labor and Human Rights (CENTRAL)
- CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
- Human Rights Watch (HRW)
- Independent Democracy of Informal Economy Association (IDEA)
- Independent Trade Union Federation (INTUFE)
- Indradevi Association (IDA)
- International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)
- International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX)
- Khmer Kampuchea Krom for Human Rights and Development Association (KKKHRDA)
- Klahaan
- Labor Rights Supported Union of Khmer Employees of Naga World (L.R.S.U)
- Minority Rights Organization (MIRO)
- People Center for Development and Peace (PDP-Center)
- Ponlok Khmer (PKH)
- Reporters Without Borders (RSF)
- Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (STT)
- Urban Poor Women Development (UPWD)
- World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT)
- Youth Education for Development and Peace (YEDP)
- Youth Resource Development Program (YRDP)
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COP26: ‘False solutions are brandished to divert our attention from those responsible’
In the run-up to the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26), which will take place in Glasgow, UK between 31 October and 12 November 2021, CIVICUS is interviewing civil society activists, leaders and experts about the environmental challenges they face in their contexts, the actions they are undertaking to tackle them and their expectations for the upcoming summit.
CIVICUS speaks with Lia Mai Torres, Executive Director of the Center for Environmental Concerns (CEC) – Philippines, a civil society organisation (CSO) that helps Filipino communities address environmental challenges. Founded in 1989 through an initiative of organisations representing fisherfolk, farmers, Indigenous peoples, women, people living in urban poverty and professional sectors, CEC focuses on environmental research, education, advocacy and campaigning. It is also part of the secretariat of the Asia Pacific Network of Environment Defenders (APNED), a coalition of organisations working in solidarity to protect the environment and its defenders.
What’s the key environmental issue in your country that you’re working on?
The main environmental issue that the Philippines is currently facing is the proliferation of environmentally destructive projects and programmes. This situation persisted or even worsened under the pandemic.
Just recently, the current administration lifted a moratorium on mining, based on claims that it will help the economy recover, after it was hard hit by the poor pandemic response. This will usher in around 100 mining agreements in different parts of the country. This was opposed by many communities due to the negative impacts of existing mining operations. An example is in the village of Didipio, Nueva Vizcaya, in the northern part of the Philippines, where a mining agreement with the Australian-Canadian company OceanaGold was renewed for another 25 years. The Bugkalot and Tuwali Indigenous communities are already suffering from a lack of water supply due to the mining operations and they fear that this will worsen with the continuing operations.
Infrastructure projects are also a priority of the government, which claims that they will also help the economy. However, there are projects that are foreign funded under onerous loans that will worsen the situation of residents. An example of this is the China-funded Kaliwa Dam in Rizal province, in the southern part of Luzon island. It will encroach on the Dumagat Indigenous people’s ancestral domain, including sacred sites, as well as a protected area.
Another example are the monocrop plantations that can be found mostly in the provinces of Mindanao. Ancestral domains of the Lumad Indigenous people have been converted into banana and pineapple plantations. Some residents report illnesses from the synthetic chemicals used in the plantations and many are being displaced from their farmlands.
These are a few examples of priority projects that are pushed by the government to bring so-called development. However, it is obvious that these do not genuinely improve the situation of local communities, most of which are already experiencing poverty. In addition, the natural resources of the country are mostly not exploited to the benefit of its citizens, since the products extracted are destined for export. Only very few local and international corporations benefit from them. Natural resources are used for profit and not for national development.
Have you faced backlash for the work you do?
CEC works with local communities, since we believe that environmental struggles cannot be won without the united efforts of the people who are experiencing environmental impact. The real power comes from the organisations on the ground. CSOs like ours and other sectors should support their efforts, connecting local struggles to build a strong environmental movement at the national and international levels.
Because of our support to local communities, we have faced reprisals. In 2007, Lafayette Mining Ltd, an Australian mining company, filed a libel case against CEC’s then-executive director for exposing the impacts of the company’s operations. In 2019 and 2021, our organisation was targeted through red-tagging, a practice by which the government declares individuals and organisations as terrorists or communists, in retaliation for our humanitarian missions following a typhoon and during the pandemic.
We also received information of a threat of a police raid in our office for providing sanctuary to Lumad Indigenous children who were forced out of their communities due to militarisation, threats and harassment. Our peaceful protest actions are often violently dispersed by the police and private security forces, and a member of our staff was arrested in 2019.
Behind all these attacks are state security forces alongside the private security forces of corporations. The police and military have seemingly become part of the corporations’ security forces, using repressive measure to ensure that their operations run smoothly.
How do you connect with the broader international climate movement?
As many countries, especially from the global south, are experiencing similar environmental problems, we recognise the need to connect with organisations in other countries. In 2015, CEC was among the conveners of the International People’s Conference on Mining, in which environmental defenders were able to learn from each other’s experiences and coordinate local campaigns.
CEC also helped establish APNED, a solidarity campaign network that provides mutual support to campaigns, raises issues at the international level, advocates for greater protection to defenders, conducts capacity-building activities and facilitates services. We believe that it is important to have solidarity among defenders to help strengthen local movements as well as the international struggle for our environmental rights.
What hopes, if any, do you have for COP26 to make progress on your issue, and how useful generally do you find such international processes?
Even before the pandemic, there were concerns regarding the inclusion of frontline or grassroots environmental defenders in international processes such as the climate talks. Lack of inclusivity became more evident under the pandemic, as many CSOs have found it difficult to attend due to additional requirements and expenses. In addition, only accredited organisations can attend formal events, and these are only very few with accreditation. Further, governments’ reports are usually far from reality. The worsening climate crisis is proof that governments are not doing enough.
Despite this, we will still participate in the formal and side events of COP26, aiming to bring attention to how many developed countries and big corporations are worsening the climate crisis through resource grabbing and the exploitation of the natural resources of poor countries, exacerbating existing poverty, and how false solutions are brandished to divert our attention from their responsibility and lack of accountability. We also want to highlight the importance of environmental defenders in protecting our environment and upholding our environmental rights, and therefore the need to ensure that they do not suffer more politically motivated human rights violations that hinder them from doing their important work.
What one change would you like to see that would help address the climate crisis?
We hope that the profit-oriented capitalist framework will be changed in the Philippines. This would ensure resource conflicts will be addressed, environmental protection for ecological balance upheld, genuine climate adaptation programmes established and due attention given to vulnerable groups. This also includes holding countries and corporations that contribute to the climate crisis accountable and providing support for poor countries to adapt.
Civic space in the Philippines is rated ‘repressed’by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with the Center for Environmental Concerns-Philippines through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@CEC_Phils on Twitter. -
COP26: ‘My hope lies in the people coming together to demand justice’
In the run-up to the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26), which will take place in Glasgow, UK between 31 October and 12 November 2021, CIVICUS is interviewing civil society activists, leaders and experts about the environmental challenges they face in their contexts, the actions they are undertaking to tackle them and their expectations for the upcoming summit.CIVICUS speaks with Mitzi Jonelle Tan, a young climate justice activist based in Metro Manila, Philippines, who organises with Youth Advocates for Climate Action Philippines and is active in Fridays for Future International.
What’s the key climate issue in your community?
The Philippines is plagued by several impacts from climate change, from droughts that are getting longer and warmer to typhoons that are getting more frequent and more intense. Aside from these climate impacts – that we have not been able to adapt to and leave us with no support when it comes to dealing with the loss and damages – we also face numerous environmentally destructive projects, often undertaken by foreign multinational companies, that our government is allowing and even encouraging.
Youth Advocates for Climate Action Philippines, the Fridays for Future of the Philippines, advocates for climate justice and to make sure that voices of people from the most affected communities are heard, amplified and given space. I first became an activist in 2017 after working with Indigenous leaders of the Philippines, which made me understand that they only way to achieve a more just and greener society is through collective action leading to system change.
Have you faced backlash for the work you do?
Yes, just like anyone who speaks up against injustice and inaction, our government through its paid trolls red-tags and terror-tags activists – it basically calls us terrorists for demanding accountability and pushing for change. There is a fear that comes along with being a climate activist in the Philippines, which has been characterised as the most dangerous country in Asia for environmental defenders and activists for eight years in a row. It’s not just the fear of the climate impacts, it’s also the fear of police and state forces coming to get us and making us disappear.
How do you engage with the broader international climate movement?
I organise a lot with the international community, especially through Fridays for Future – MAPA (Most Affected Peoples and Areas), one of the global south groups of Fridays for Future. We do it by having conversations, learning from each other and creating strategies together, all while having fun. It’s important for the global youth movement to connect with one another, unite and show solidarity in order to truly address the global issue of the climate crisis.
What hopes, if any, do you have for COP26 to make progress on your issue, and how useful generally do you find such international processes?
My hope doesn’t lie with the so-called leaders and politicians who have continued business as usual for decades for the profit of the few, usually for the global north. My hope lies in the people: activists and civil society coming together to demand justice and to really expose how this profit-oriented system that brought us to this crisis is not the one that we need to bring us out of it. I think COP26 is a crucial moment and this international process has to be useful because we’ve already had 24 too many. These problems should have been solved at the very first COP, and one way or another we have to make sure that this COP is useful and brings meaningful change, not just more empty promises.
What one change would you like to see – in the world or in your community – to help address the climate crisis?
The one change I ask for is a big one: system change. We need to change our system from one that prioritises the overexploitation of the global south and marginalised peoples for the profit of the global north and the privileged few. The way we view development, it shouldn’t be based on GDP and everlasting growth, but rather on the quality of people’s lives. This is doable – but only if we address the climate crisis and all the other socio-economic injustices at its roots.
Civic space inthe Philippinesis rated as ‘repressed‘by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Youth Advocates for Climate Action Philippines through itswebsite or Facebook page, and follow @mitzijonelle onTwitter andInstagram. -
COP26: “Mi esperanza reside en que la gente se una para exigir justicia”
En vísperas de la 26ª Conferencia de las Partes de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático (COP26), que tendrá lugar en Glasgow, Reino Unido, entre el 31 de octubre y el 12 de noviembre de 2021, CIVICUS está entrevistando a activistas, líderes y personas expertas de la sociedad civil acerca de los desafíos medioambientales que enfrentan en sus contextos, las acciones que están llevando a cabo para abordarlos y sus expectativas para la próxima cumbre.
CIVICUS conversa con Mitzi Jonelle Tan, una joven activista por la justicia climática basada en el área metropolitana de Manila, Filipinas, integrante de Jóvenes Defensores del Clima de Filipinas y participante activa del movimiento internacional Viernes por el Futuro.
¿Cuál es el principal problema climático en tu comunidad?
Filipinas padece numerosos impactos del cambio climático, desde sequías cada vez más largas y con mayor calor hasta tifones cada vez más frecuentes e intensos. Aparte de estos impactos climáticos -a los cuales no hemos podido adaptarnos y que nos dejan sin apoyos a la hora de afrontar las pérdidas y los daños-, también enfrentamos numerosos proyectos que son destructivos para el medio ambiente, a menudo emprendidos por empresas multinacionales extranjeras, que nuestro gobierno está permitiendo e incluso fomentando.
Jóvenes Defensores del Clima de Filipinas, la versión filipina de Viernes por el Futuro, aboga por la justicia climática y por que las voces de las personas de las comunidades más afectadas tengan espacio y sean escuchadas y amplificadas. Yo me convertí en activista en 2017, después de haber trabajado con líderes indígenas de Filipinas, porque este trabajo me hizo comprender que la única manera de lograr una sociedad más justa y más verde es a través de la acción colectiva conducente al cambio sistémico.
¿Han enfrentado reacciones negativas por el trabajo que hacen?
Sí, al igual que cualquiera que se manifieste en contra de la injusticia y la inacción, nuestro gobierno, a través de sus troles a sueldo, designa como terroristas a los activistas: básicamente nos llama terroristas por exigir rendición de cuentas y presionar por un cambio. El hecho de ser activista por el clima va siempre acompañado de temor en Filipinas, el país que por ocho años consecutivos ha sido calificado como el más peligroso de Asia para las personas defensoras y activistas ambientales. Ya no se trata solamente de temor por los impactos climáticos, sino también de temor a que la policía y las fuerzas del Estado vengan a por nosotros y nos hagan desaparecer.
¿Cómo te vinculas con el movimiento internacional por el clima?
Hago mucho trabajo de organización con la comunidad internacional, especialmente a través de Viernes por el Futuro - Personas y Áreas Más Afectadas, uno de los grupos del sur global de Viernes por el Futuro. Lo hacemos manteniendo conversaciones, aprendiendo unos de otros y creando estrategias juntos, todo ello mientras nos divertimos. Es importante que el movimiento global de jóvenes esté muy bien interconectado, que se una y exhiba solidaridad para poder abordar realmente el problema global de la crisis climática.
¿Qué esperanzas tienes de que la COP26 resulte en avances, y qué utilidad le encuentras a este tipo de procesos internacionales?
Mi esperanza no reside en los mal llamados líderes, políticos que se han adaptado al sistema y lo han gestionado durante décadas para beneficio de unos pocos, normalmente del norte global. Mi esperanza reside en la gente: en los activistas y organizaciones de la sociedad civil que se juntan para exigir justicia y poner en evidencia que este sistema enfocado en las ganancias que nos condujo a esta crisis no es el que necesitamos para salir de ella. Creo que la COP26 es un momento crucial y este proceso internacional tiene que resultar útil, porque ya hemos tenido 24 que no han aportado gran cosa. Estos problemas deberían haberse resuelto en la primera COP, y de un modo u otro tenemos que asegurarnos de que esta COP sea útil y resulte en cambios significativos, y no en más promesas vacías.
¿Qué cambios desearías que ocurrieran para comenzar a resolver la crisis climática?
El único cambio que pido es uno grande: un cambio de sistema. Tenemos que cambiar este sistema que prioriza la sobreexplotación del sur global y de los pueblos marginados en beneficio del norte global y de unos pocos privilegiados. El desarrollo bien entendido no debería basarse en el PBI y el crecimiento eterno, sino en la calidad de vida de las personas. Esto es factible, pero solamente si abordamos la crisis climática y todas las demás injusticias socioeconómicas que están en su raíz.
El espacio cívico enFilipinas es calificado como “represivo”por elCIVICUS Monitor.
Póngase en contacto con Jóvenes Defensores del Clima de Filipinas a través de susitio web o su página deFacebook, y siga a Mitzi Jonelle enTwitter eInstagram. -
COP26: “Se esgrimen falsas soluciones para desviar nuestra atención de los responsables”
En vísperas de la 26ª Conferencia de las Partes de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático (COP26), que tendrá lugar en Glasgow, Reino Unido, entre el 31 de octubre y el 12 de noviembre de 2021, CIVICUS está entrevistando a activistas, líderes y personas expertas de la sociedad civil acerca de los desafíos medioambientales que enfrentan en sus contextos, las acciones que están llevando a cabo para abordarlos y sus expectativas para la próxima cumbre.
CIVICUS conversa con Lia Mai Torres, directora ejecutiva del Center for Environmental Concerns (CEC) - Filipinas, una organización de la sociedad civil (OSC) que ayuda a las comunidades filipinas a afrontar desafíos medioambientales. Fundada en 1989 por iniciativa de organizaciones que representan a pescadores, agricultores, pueblos indígenas, mujeres, personas que experimentan pobreza urbana y sectores profesionales, el CEC se dedica a la investigación, la educación, la incidencia y las campañas medioambientales. También integra la secretaría de la Red de Defensores del Medio Ambiente de Asia y el Pacífico (APNED), una coalición de organizaciones que trabajan solidariamente para proteger el medio ambiente y a sus defensores.
¿Cuál es el principal problema climático en tu país?
El principal problema ambiental que enfrenta Filipinas actualmente es la proliferación de proyectos y programas destructivos del medio ambiente. Esta situación ha persistido e incluso empeorado durante la pandemia.
Recientemente, el gobierno actual levantó una moratoria a la minería, basándose en el argumento de que ayudaría a la recuperación de la economía, después de que ésta se viera duramente afectada por la mala respuesta a la pandemia. Esto habilitará unos 100 acuerdos mineros en diferentes partes del país. Muchas comunidades se opusieron a esta medida debido a los impactos negativos que ya tienen los proyectos mineros actualmente en funcionamiento. Un ejemplo de ello es el pueblo de Didipio, Nueva Vizcaya, en el norte de Filipinas, donde se renovó por 25 años más un acuerdo minero con la empresa australiano-canadiense OceanaGold. Las comunidades indígenas de Bugkalot y Tuwali ya sufren la falta de suministro de agua debido a la actividad minera y temen que esto empeore si dicha actividad continúa.
Los proyectos de infraestructura también son una prioridad del gobierno, que afirma que estos contribuirán a mejorar la situación de la economía. Sin embargo, hay proyectos financiados con onerosos préstamos extranjeros que solo empeorarán la situación de la población local. Un ejemplo de ello es la represa de Kaliwa, financiada por China, en la provincia de Rizal, al sur de la isla de Luzón. La reserva invadirá los territorios ancestrales del pueblo indígena Dumagat, incluidos sus lugares sagrados, así como un área protegida.
Otro ejemplo son las plantaciones de monocultivo que se encuentran sobre todo en las provincias de Mindanao. Las tierras ancestrales de los pueblos indígenas Lumad se han convertido en plantaciones de plátanos y piñas. Algunos residentes reportan enfermedades causadas por los productos químicos sintéticos utilizados en las plantaciones y muchos están siendo desplazados de sus tierras de cultivo.
Estos son algunos ejemplos de proyectos prioritarios impulsados por el gobierno para conducirnos al llamado desarrollo. Sin embargo, es evidente que no mejoran realmente la situación de las comunidades locales, que en su mayoría ya se encuentran en situación de pobreza. Además, los recursos naturales del país en su mayoría no son explotados en beneficio de sus ciudadanos, ya que los productos extraídos se destinan a la exportación. Se benefician de ellos unas pocas empresas locales e internacionales. Los recursos naturales se utilizan para obtener beneficios y no para impulsar el desarrollo nacional.
¿Han enfrentado a reacciones negativas por el trabajo que realizan?
El CEC trabaja con las comunidades locales, ya que creemos que las luchas medioambientales no pueden ganarse sin el esfuerzo conjunto de quienes sufren el impacto medioambiental. El verdadero poder proviene de las organizaciones de base. Las OSC como la nuestra y otros sectores deben apoyar sus esfuerzos, conectando las luchas locales para construir un fuerte movimiento medioambiental a nivel nacional e internacional.
A causa del apoyo que brindamos a las comunidades locales, hemos enfrentado represalias. En 2007, Lafayette Mining Ltd, una empresa minera australiana, presentó una demanda por difamación contra el entonces director ejecutivo de CEC, ya que éste había denunciado los impactos de las actividades de la empresa. En 2019 y 2021, nuestra organización fue víctima de una práctica habitual mediante la cual el gobierno declara a personas y organizaciones como terroristas o comunistas. Lo hizo en represalia por las misiones humanitarias que realizamos tras un tifón y durante la pandemia.
También se nos amenazó con una redada policial en nuestra oficina, en represalia por ofrecer refugio a niños indígenas Lumad que se habían visto obligados a abandonar sus comunidades debido a la militarización, las amenazas y el acoso. Nuestras acciones de protesta pacífica suelen ser dispersadas violentamente por la policía y las fuerzas de seguridad privadas, y en 2019 un miembro del personal de nuestra organización fue detenido.
Detrás de todos estos ataques están las fuerzas de seguridad del Estado junto con las fuerzas de seguridad privadas de las corporaciones. La policía y el ejército claramente se han convertido en parte de las fuerzas de seguridad de las corporaciones, utilizando medidas represivas para garantizar el buen funcionamiento de sus operaciones.
¿Cómo se vinculan con el movimiento internacional por el clima?
Dado que muchos países, especialmente del sur global, están experimentando problemas medioambientales similares, reconocemos la necesidad de conectarnos con organizaciones de otros países. En 2015, el CEC se contó entre los convocantes de la Conferencia Internacional de los Pueblos sobre la Minería, que ofreció a personas defensoras del medio ambiente la posibilidad de aprender de las experiencias de los demás y coordinar campañas locales.
El CEC también ayudó a crear la APNED, una red de campañas solidarias que provee apoyo mutuo para la realización de campañas, plantea los temas a nivel internacional, aboga por una mayor protección de las personas defensoras, realiza actividades de capacitación y facilita servicios. Creemos que la solidaridad entre personas defensoras es importante para ayudar a fortalecer los movimientos locales, así como la lucha internacional por nuestros derechos medioambientales.
¿Qué esperanzas tienes de que la COP26 resulte en avances, y qué utilidad le encuentras a este tipo de procesos internacionales?
Incluso antes de la pandemia, existía preocupación por la inclusión de las personas defensoras del medio ambiente de base o en las primeras líneas en procesos internacionales tales como estas conversaciones sobre el clima. La falta de inclusión se hizo más evidente con la pandemia, ya que muchas OSC han tenido dificultades para asistir a causa de los requisitos y gastos adicionales. Además, sólo las organizaciones acreditadas pueden asistir a los actos oficiales, y son muy pocas las que están acreditadas. Asimismo, los informes de los gobiernos suelen estar muy alejados de la realidad. El empeoramiento de la crisis climática es la prueba de que los gobiernos no están haciendo lo suficiente.
A pesar de ello, seguiremos participando en los eventos formales y paralelos de la COP26, con el objetivo de llamar la atención sobre la forma en que muchos países desarrollados y grandes empresas están profundizando la crisis climática mediante el acaparamiento de recursos y la explotación de los recursos naturales de los países pobres, exacerbando la pobreza existente, y de qué manera se esgrimen falsas soluciones para desviar nuestra atención de su responsabilidad y falta de rendición de cuentas. También queremos destacar la importancia de las personas defensoras del medio ambiente en la protección de nuestro entorno y la defensa de nuestros derechos medioambientales, y por lo tanto la necesidad de garantizar que no sufran más violaciones de sus derechos humanos por motivos políticos que les impidan realizar su importante labor.
¿Qué cambios desearías que ocurrieran para comenzar a resolver la crisis climática?
Esperamos que el marco capitalista orientado al beneficio cambie en Filipinas. Esto garantizaría el abordaje de los conflictos por los recursos, el mantenimiento de la protección del medio ambiente para el equilibrio ecológico, el establecimiento de auténticos programas de adaptación al cambio climático y la atención que los grupos vulnerables necesitan. Esto también supone responsabilizar a los países y a las empresas que contribuyen a la crisis climática y proporcionar apoyo a los países pobres para que puedan adaptarse.
Elespacio cívico en Filipinas es calificado como “represivo”por elCIVICUS Monitor.
Póngase en contacto con el Center for Environmental Concerns-Filipinas a través de susitio web o su página deFacebook, y siga a@CEC_Phils en Twitter. -
COREA DEL SUR: “Los activistas y desertores norcoreanos enfrentan presiones cada vez mayores para silenciarlos”
CIVICUS conversa con Ethan Hee-Seok Shin, analista legal del Grupo de Trabajo de Justicia Transicional (TJWG), una organización de la sociedad civil (OSC) con sede en Seúl fundada por defensores de derechos humanos e investigadores de cinco países. Establecida en 2014, es la primera OSC con sede en Corea que centra su trabajo en los mecanismos de justicia transicional en los regímenes más represivos del mundo, entre ellos el de Corea del Norte. TJWG persigue el objetivo de desarrollar métodos prácticos para abordar las violaciones masivas de derechos humanos y promover la justicia para las víctimas antes y después de la transición. Ethan trabaja en el Proyecto Repositorio Central de TJWG, que utiliza una plataforma segura para documentar y publicitar casos de desapariciones forzadas en Corea del Norte. Utiliza acciones legislativas y legales para crear conciencia acerca de la situación de derechos humanos en Corea del Norte.¿Podría contarnos acerca del trabajo que hacen los grupos de la sociedad civil de Corea del Sur en relación con los derechos humanos en Corea del Norte?
Existe un abanico bastante amplio de OSC que trabajan en temas de derechos humanos en Corea del Norte. TJWG ha estado trabajando para preparar el terreno para la justicia transicional en Corea del Norte, en cumplimiento de su misión central, la documentación de derechos humanos.
El proyecto insignia de TJWG ha resultado en la publicación de una serie de informes que mapean las ejecuciones públicas en Corea del Norte, basados en entrevistas con personas que se han escapado y que ahora viven en Corea del Sur. Registramos la información geoespacial de los sitios de matanza, los lugares de enterramiento y los lugares de almacenamiento de registros, tales como tribunales e instalaciones de los servicios de seguridad, solicitando a nuestros entrevistados que identifiquen las ubicaciones en Google Earth. La primera edición del informe se publicó en julio de 2017 y se basó en 375 entrevistas, y la segunda edición se lanzó en junio de 2019, tras la realización de 610 entrevistas.
Actualmente también estamos en el proceso de armar una base de datos en línea, FOOTPRINTS, que registra los secuestros y desapariciones forzadas cometidas en y por Corea del Norte. La plataforma utiliza Uwazi, una tecnología gratuita y de código abierto que permite organizar, analizar y publicar documentos, desarrollada por la OSC HURIDOCS. Cuando se haga pública, FOOTPRINTS ofrecerá una plataforma de fácil acceso y búsqueda para rastrear a las personas capturadas y perdidas en Corea del Norte.
Aparte del trabajo de documentación y presentación de informes, hemos participado activamente en iniciativas de incidencia nacional e internacional. Junto con otras OSC de derechos humanos, el TJWG redactó y presentó una carta abierta instando a la Unión Europea a fortalecer el lenguaje y las recomendaciones en las resoluciones anuales de derechos humanos adoptadas por la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas (ONU) y el Consejo de Derechos Humanos de la ONU sobre Corea del Norte. También hemos presentado casos al Grupo de Trabajo de la ONU sobre Detenciones Arbitrarias, el Grupo de Trabajo de la ONU sobre Desapariciones Forzadas o Involuntarias y a otros expertos en derechos humanos de la ONU.
En julio de 2020, el gobierno de Corea del Sur revocó el registro de dos OSC y emitió un aviso de revisión administrativa e inspección a grupos “dirigidos por desertores” enfocados en los derechos humanos en Corea del Norte. ¿Por qué está apuntando contra estos grupos?
El catalizador directo fueron las provocaciones de Corea del Norte de junio de 2020. El 4 de junio, Kim Yo-Jong, hermana del líder supremo Kim Jong-Un y primera subdirectora de departamento del Comité Central del Partido de los Trabajadores de Corea, criticó los “folletos anti-RPDC” [República Popular Democrática de Corea] distribuidos en Corea del Norte por “fugitivos de Corea del Norte” y amenazó con el cese del turismo en el Monte Kumgang, la demolición completa de la región industrial de Kaesong, el cierre de la oficina de enlace intercoreana y la terminación del acuerdo militar de 2018 que creó zonas de amortiguamiento desmilitarizadas, a menos que las autoridades surcoreanas tomaran las “debidas medidas”.
Apenas cuatro horas después del bombazo matutino de Kim Yo-Jong, el Ministerio de Unificación de Corea del Sur (MOU) anunció que prepararía un proyecto de ley para prohibir la distribución de folletos a Corea del Norte. Se trató de un cambio radical en la postura de larga data del gobierno, que constantemente había eludido esa legislación por temor a violar la libertad de expresión.
El 10 de junio de 2020, el MOU anunció que presentaría acusaciones penales contra Park Sang-Hak y Park Jung-Oh, dos desertores de Corea del Norte, por violar el artículo 13 de la Ley de Intercambio y Cooperación Intercoreana, que requiere de aprobación previa para todo intercambio intercoreano de bienes, y que revocaría el reconocimiento legal de sus organizaciones, Luchadores por una Corea del Norte Libre (Fighters For Free North Korea, FFNK) y KuenSaem, por enviar folletos a Corea del Norte mediante el uso de globos aerostáticos y botellas de PET llenas de arroz arrojadas a las corrientes marinas, como ocurrió el 31 de mayo de 2020.
Si bien el gobierno de Corea del Norte finalmente bajó el tono de su retórica, el gobierno de Corea del Sur comenzó a tomar medidas contra las organizaciones de derechos humanos y los grupos de desertores de Corea del Norte, vistos como un obstáculo para la paz intercoreana.
El 29 de junio de 2020, el MOU celebró una audiencia y el 17 de julio se apoyó en el artículo 38 del Código Civil, una reliquia de la época autoritaria, para anunciar la revocación del reconocimiento legal de FFNK y KuenSaem por contravenir las condiciones de la obtención de la personería al obstaculizar gravemente la política de reunificación del gobierno, distribuyendo folletos y artículos a Corea del Norte más allá de los objetivos declarados en su estatuto y por fomentar la tensión en la península de Corea.
El MOU también lanzó “inspecciones comerciales” de otros grupos norcoreanos de derechos humanos y de apoyo y relocalización de desertores, entre las más de 400 asociaciones reconocidas con autorización del MOU, posiblemente con miras a revocar su reconocimiento legal. El 15 de julio de 2020, la Asociación de Desertores de Corea del Norte recibió un aviso del MOU de que sería inspeccionada por primera vez desde su reconocimiento en 2010. Al día siguiente, las autoridades del MOU informaron a los periodistas que primero realizarían inspecciones comerciales de 25 grupos norcoreanos de derechos humanos y de apoyo y asentamiento de desertores, 13 de ellos encabezados por desertores norcoreanos, y que otros serían inspeccionados en el futuro. Si bien reconoció que el tema de los folletos fue lo que desencadenó las inspecciones, el MOU agregó que las inspecciones comerciales no se limitarían a las personas involucradas en la campaña de distribución de folletos.
¿Cuántos grupos fueron examinados o inspeccionados después de los anuncios?
Debido al alboroto nacional e internacional suscitado por la naturaleza obviamente discriminatoria de las inspecciones de grupos de derechos humanos y personas escapadas de Corea del Norte, el MOU ha moderado un poco su enfoque y tardíamente ha comenzado a argumentar que está examinando a todas las OSC registradas bajo el MOU.
El 6 de octubre de 2020, el MOU dijo a los periodistas que había decidido inspeccionar a 109 OSC, sobre un total de 433, por no haber presentado sus informes anuales o por haber presentado documentación incompleta. Según la información proporcionada, 13 de los 109 grupos a inspeccionar están encabezados por personas que huyeron de Corea del Norte; 22 (16 de los cuales trabajan sobre derechos humanos en Corea del Norte y relocalización de desertores, cinco que trabajan en el terreno social y cultural y uno que trabaja en el campo de la política de unificación) ya han sido inspeccionados y ninguno ha revelado motivos serios para que se le retire el reconocimiento; y el MOU tiene la intención de completar la inspección de las 87 OSC restantes para fines de 2020.
En cualquier caso, el gobierno parece haber logrado ya su objetivo de enviar a Corea del Norte la clara señal de que está listo para dar cabida a sus demandas a cambio de vínculos más estrechos, incluso si eso implica sacrificar algunos principios fundamentales de la democracia liberal. El gobierno también ha enviado una clara señal a los grupos norcoreanos de derechos humanos y de desertores, y ha tenido el efecto paralizante que cabía esperar.
¿Cómo ha respondido la sociedad civil a estas iniciativas del gobierno?
Lamentablemente, la sociedad civil de Corea del Sur está tan polarizada como su política. Los progresistas actualmente en el gobierno ven a los conservadores como herederos ilegítimos de los colaboradores del régimen colonial japonés entre 1910 y 1945 y del régimen autoritario posterior a la independencia, vigente hasta 1987. El anterior presidente progresista, Roh Moo-Hyun, en el poder entre 2003 y 2008, se suicidó en 2009 durante una investigación de corrupción en su contra, que en general fue considerada políticamente motivada, emprendida por su sucesor conservador. El actual presidente, Moon Jae-In, fue elegido en 2017, en medio de una ola de indignación pública ante el juicio político de su predecesor de derecha por corrupción y abuso de poder.
La mayoría de las OSC están dominadas por progresistas que están políticamente alineados con el actual gobierno de Moon. Los progresistas apoyan relativamente la agenda de derechos humanos, pero generalmente guardan silencio cuando se trata de los derechos humanos en Corea del Norte, dado su apego al acercamiento intercoreano. Las mismas personas que se expresan ruidosamente en relación con las “mujeres de solaz” japonesas, sometidas a la esclavitud sexual por el Japón imperial antes y durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, o acerca de los atropellos de la era autoritaria, pasan por alto las actuales atrocidades norcoreanas en nombre de la reconciliación nacional.
La mayoría de los grupos norcoreanos de derechos humanos se estructuran en torno de desertores norcoreanos y de iglesias cristianas políticamente de derecha que caracterizan apasionadamente a los izquierdistas como títeres norcoreanos. Muchos también adoptan una postura hostil en relación con otros temas contemporáneos de derechos humanos, tales como los derechos de las personas LGBTQI+, lo cual es bastante irónico, ya que el juez australiano Michael Kirby, autor principal del informe de la ONU que en 2014 condenó con firmeza las graves violaciones de derechos humanos en Corea del Norte como crímenes de lesa humanidad, es gay.
Las OSC establecidas, mayormente progresistas, no han sido objeto de persecución por parte del gobierno encabezado por el presidente Moon; por el contrario, figuras destacadas de la sociedad civil han sido nombradas o elegidas para ocupar varios cargos, o han recibido generosas subvenciones. Hay quienes expresan en privado su consternación y preocupación por las tendencias iliberales del gobierno, pero pocas personas están dispuestas a plantear públicamente el tema a causa de la profunda polarización política.
¿Se está volviendo más restrictivo el espacio para la sociedad civil - estructurado por las libertades de asociación, reunión pacífica y expresión - bajo el actual gobierno surcoreano?
El gobierno de Moon ha mostrado tendencias preocupantemente iliberales en relación con los grupos que considera que se interponen en su camino, tales como los grupos norcoreanos de derechos humanos y de desertores, que enfrentan presiones cada vez mayores para permanecer en silencio y cesar su labor de incidencia.
El presidente Moon ha reabierto el diálogo con el gobierno de Corea del Norte para establecer relaciones pacíficas, neutralizar la amenaza nuclear del Norte y allanar el camino para la reunificación familiar, entre otros objetivos loables.
Sin embargo, junto con el presidente de Estados Unidos, Donald Trump, el presidente Moon ha empleado una estrategia diplomática que minimiza la preocupación por los derechos humanos. En particular, ni la Declaración de Panmunjom de 2018 entre Corea del Norte y Corea del Sur ni la Declaración Conjunta emitida después de la cumbre Trump-Kim de 2018 en Singapur mencionan las violaciones atroces de derechos humanos cometidas por Corea del Norte.
En las semanas previas a la reunión del presidente Moon con el líder norcoreano Kim en Panmunjom, se informó que se estaba impidiendo a los activistas desertores norcoreanos llevar a cabo su activismo. En octubre de 2018, Corea del Sur accedió a la demanda de Corea del Norte de excluir a un periodista desertor de la cobertura de una reunión en Corea del Norte. El 7 de julio de 2019 se hizo una entrega extraordinaria a Corea del Norte de dos desertores, dos pescadores presentados como asesinos fugitivos, cinco días después de su llegada y sin siquiera mantener las apariencias del debido proceso.
El gobierno de Moon también ha recurrido a tácticas iliberales contra otros supuestos opositores. Un hombre que el 24 de noviembre de 2019 había colgado un cartel en el que se burlaba del presidente Moon como “perrito faldero de Xi Jinping” (en referencia al presidente chino) en el campus de la Universidad de Dankook, fue procesado y el 23 de junio de 2020 fue multado por el tribunal por “intrusión en un edificio”, de conformidad con el artículo 319 (1) del Código Penal, pese a que las autoridades universitarias habían dejado claro que no deseaban presentar cargos en su contra por este ejercicio de su libertad de expresión. Muchos criticaron el proceso penal y la condena como un retroceso a los viejos tiempos militares.
El gobierno también ha tomado medidas para ejercer un control cada vez mayor sobre los fiscales. El ministro de Justicia, Choo Mi-ae, ha atacado a los fiscales que se atrevieron a investigar las acusaciones contra el gobierno por corrupción y abuso de poder, alegando la existencia de una conspiración para socavar al presidente Moon.
Otra tendencia preocupante es la táctica populista de los políticos del partido gobernante, y en particular del legislador Lee Jae-jung, de utilizar internet para incitar a sus seguidores a participar de acciones de acoso cibernético contra periodistas.
¿Qué puede hacer la comunidad internacional para apoyar a los grupos atacados?
En abril de 2020, el partido gobernante ganó las elecciones parlamentarias por abrumadora mayoría, obteniendo 180 de los 300 escaños, gracias a su relativo éxito en contener la pandemia de COVID-19. La oposición está desorganizada. En vez de llamarlo a la humildad, todo esto ha envalentonado al gobierno, de modo que es probable que sus tendencias iliberales continúen. Debido a la severa polarización política, es poco probable que los políticos del partido gobernante y sus partidarios presten mucha atención a las críticas internas.
Es por eso que la voz de la comunidad internacional será fundamental. Para el gobierno es mucho más difícil ignorar las preocupaciones planteadas por las OSC internacionales en tanto que ataques motivados políticamente. Una declaración conjunta o una carta abierta encabezada por CIVICUS sería útil para transmitir con fuerza el mensaje de que los derechos humanos en Corea del Norte realmente preocupan a la comunidad internacional.
Además, Corea del Sur pronto presentará su quinto informe periódico al Comité de Derechos Humanos de la ONU de acuerdo con la lista de cuestiones previa a la presentación de informes (LOIPR). Dado que las cuestiones y preocupaciones relativas a Corea del Norte no están incluidas en la LOIPR, sería de gran ayuda que las OSC internacionales unieran sus fuerzas para incluirlas en la discusión oral con los miembros del Comité de Derechos Humanos y en sus observaciones finales.
A corto plazo, las visitas a Corea del Sur por parte de la Relatora Especial de la ONU sobre la promoción y protección del derecho a la libertad de opinión y de expresión, el Relator Especial sobre el derecho a la libertad de reunión pacífica y de asociación, y la Relatora Especial sobre la situación de los defensores de derechos humanos serían excelentes oportunidades para internacionalizar el tema y presionar a nuestro gobierno.
Incluso los progresistas podrían apoyar una reforma de la ley obsoleta sobre el registro de OSC, por ejemplo, por interés propio, si es que no por principios, en caso de cambio de gobierno.
El espacio cívico enCorea del Sur es calificado como “estrecho” por el CIVICUS Monitor.
Contáctese con el Grupo de Trabajo de Justicia Transicional a través de susitio web o su página deFacebook, y siga a@TJWGSeoul en Twitter. -
CSW66: ‘Global-level policy-making is disconnected from women’s realities’
CIVICUS speaks about women’s human rights and the United Nations (UN) Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) with Wanun Permpibul of Climate Watch Thailand (CWT) and Misun Woo of the Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development (APWLD).
APWLD is an independent civil society organisation (CSO) committed to building feminist movements to advance women’s human rights and development justice in Asia and the Pacific as well as globally. CWT, a member organisation of APWLD, is a CSO that works with local communities and women to call for urgent climate action and climate justice.
What do you see as the main women’s rights issues in Thailand and the Asia Pacific region, and how does APWLD work to address them?
Women in Thailand still do not have access to political spaces. Women work on farms and take care of their families, but when policies are made regarding farm work and domestic work they are not engaged in policy discussions, either in the planning process or the implementation stages.
We tend to look at the symptoms of issues, in this case of the violations of women’s human rights, but we need to look at both the structural causes and the consequence of these violations and injustices. The exclusion of women in policy formulation and decision-making processes perpetuates gender injustices and rights violations. We need to shift power relations so that every person can exercise their inherent power with dignity. Most women do not have the opportunity to exercise their democratic rights and access political leadership because they are systematically undermined.
APWLD’s work consists of identifying the systems of oppression – patriarchy, fundamentalisms, militarism, colonialism and capitalism – and fighting to dismantle them while finding alternative solutions to advance women’s human rights and development justice. Through our work we have been able to build capacity and solidarity among feminist movements.
We focus on several thematic areas, including climate justice. Part of our work is about identifying and promoting the adoption of mitigation and adaptation strategies to advance women’s human rights as well as address the loss and damage and historical responsibilities. We see women experience the impacts of climate change disproportionately and they must be a source of solutions to help deal with the climate crisis. However, the reality is that they are not sufficiently engaged and the policies implemented in most instances do not cater to their needs and concerns.
What issues have you tried to bring into the CSW agenda this year?
This year’s focus for CSW’s 66th session (CSW66) was on the impact of climate change, environmental degradation and disasters on women’s human rights. We have highlighted the ways women have been experiencing the impacts of climate change and the solutions they have devised. What we really wanted to see highlighted at CSW66 was the acknowledgment of the root causes and consequences of climate change on women and their effects leading to widening inequalities and increasing violations of women’s human rights.
A very critical point we wanted to see addressed was loss and damage associated with impacts of climate change and delays in mitigation efforts. It would have been good if CSW66 had supported a financial mechanism to address loss and damage due to the climate crisis as well as an accountability mechanism to hold accountable those responsible for causing the climate crisis, particularly large fossil fuel industries. We need to address the root causes of climate change for our societies to achieve sustainability.
Another issue we wanted to highlight at CSW66 was the ongoing attacks against women human rights and environmental defenders in Asia and the Pacific in the context of the climate crisis. They are at the frontline of climate crisis, working day in and day out to raise awareness about and resist the catastrophic impacts of extractive industries and fossil fuel burning, and they must be protected.
What were your expectations, and to what degree were they met?
We had high expectations, even though so many restrictions were imposed due to the pandemic. We viewed CSW as a space or momentum to elaborate on the causes and the consequences of climate change, environmental degradation and disasters on women’s human rights. We expected it to meet the dual missions of advancing global commitments to address climate change and advancing women’s human rights, gender equality and women’s empowerment.
Unfortunately, CSW66 failed us on both counts. It did not look into the deeper causes of the climate crisis and the extent of its impacts on women’s human rights and gender equality. Mostly what it did was just add wording on climate change, environmental degradation and disasters at the end of the existing text of CSW66 conclusions. It failed to address the structural causes of the crisis, so the conclusions and recommendations are not designed to address and rectify those structural issues.
We need to pay attention to, for instance, how CSW66 Agreed Conclusions effectively let governments off the hook from their human rights obligation to regulate the private sector. Instead, they seek to strengthen the roles and responsibilities of the private sector and just encourage them to conduct human rights and environmental due diligence, where appropriate.
Another practical example is the net-zero goal included in the text. Most states are welcoming this goal that seeks to balance the amount of greenhouse gas produced and the amount removed from the atmosphere. In doing so, they are placing the responsibility of determining the future in the hands of those that are causing climate change.
If CSW66 were serious about addressing climate impacts and really thought this is a climate emergency, it would not go for a net-zero goal, which is buying time for those exploiting fossil fuels and polluting the planet to continue their business as usual, and would instead focus on the just and equitable transition to decentralised and renewable energy systems.
Did you have the opportunity to participate fully, or did you experience access issues?
We made a political decision to attend CSW66 in person, even though we were concerned about COVID-19 restrictions and there were lots of uncertainties regarding CSO participation in CSW66. The decision came from the fact that we, women from the global south, have lost significant opportunities and access to influence multilateral processes during the COVID-19 crisis.
Our experience is that CSW66 was not well organised, especially from the perspective of CSOs from the global south. It was all very uncertain and CSOs were not provided with enough information, while UN Women continuously advised us against traveling to New York. We were given access to the UN building only two or three days before CSW66 started. Only through an informal announcement we got to know that special event tickets would be distributed to two representatives per organisation with ECOSOC accreditation to access the conference room to observe. If the announcement had been made officially by the UN in time, it could have reached a larger audience of CSOs that had the right to be there.
We were also disappointed to see that CSOs continued to be excluded from the negotiation room. Civil society in the global south faces many structural restrictions on participation, including time constraints and language barriers. We really wanted to see CSW66 facilitate women’s meaningful and democratic participation, particularly because this year saw the negotiation of a Methods of Work resolution. However, this was yet another failure. To us, it was a further indication of how disconnected from women’s realities global-level policy making is.
If we compare CSW66 to other UN spaces, such as climate conferences, the lack of engagement between CSOs and national governments in CSW66 becomes readily apparent. It was challenging to have a dialogue with government representatives and negotiators because of the travel restrictions and the inability of some countries to participate in person.
Do you think that international bodies, and specifically the UN, adequately integrate women in their decision-making processes?
If we look at UN climate conferences, for instance, we will find that the proportion of women delegates is always low. Even though it has been increasing, it is still significantly small. We have seen attempts in successive climate conferences of the parties (COPs) to try and have a gender and climate focal point for every country, but the UN has not supported the initiative to introduce a protocol for national governments to implement it. The CSW66 Agreed Conclusions reiterate the need to have a gender and climate focal point in national governments. Thailand still does not have one.
Arrangements may be better for women in the global north, but from our global south perspective they are pretty bad. The CSW66 Agreed Conclusions note the importance of women’s and girls’ meaningful participation in decision making. However, the reality of women’s participation at CSW is far from encouraging.
It’s easier to say that UN Women or the CSW methods of work resolution encourage member states to include CSO representatives on their delegation. Many countries in Asia and the Pacific have seen a rise in autocratic and misogynistic leadership, and having CSO representatives on such government delegation is not something that will happen at all or in a meaningful way. It is not enough to hear the voices of women; women must be given actual power to make policy decisions grounded in women’s realities. This is the only way structural changes will happen.
Civic space in Thailandis rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with APWLD through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@apwld on Twitter. Get in touch with Climate Watch Thailand through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@ClimateWatchTH on Twitter. -
EU-Southeast Asia CSOs Recommendations to the 4th EU-ASEAN Policy Dialogue on Human Rights
On behalf of the CSOs[1] that participated at the 2nd EU-Southeast Asia CSOs Forum held on October 24-22, 2022 in Jakarta, and in parallel with the 4th EU-ASEAN Policy Dialogue on Human Rights, we would like to express our gratitude to the EU-ASEAN Forum on Human Rights for the space and opportunity to engage in a dialogue with civil society representatives. We believe that this is proof of commitment for improved communication, coordination, and meaningful engagement between CSOs, ASEAN, and the EU to achieve our common aspiration to leave no one behind.
On this occasion, we hereby submit the following recommendations to strengthen human rights protection within the ASEAN and the EU. The recommendations are based on present and emerging challenges faced by human rights defenders and pro-democracy activists, and on recommendations submitted by CSOs at the EU-ASEAN Human Rights Dialogue in 2019. We request for the inclusion of the attached submission as part of the official meeting notes. In this light, we urge immediate steps to be taken, collectively with civil society organisations across both regions, towards the implementation and monitoring of our recommendations.
Present and Emerging Challenges
After the First EU-ASEAN Human Rights Dialogue with CSO in 2019, the socio-political and economic situations in the ASEAN and the EU have tremendously regressed. These were mainly brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic, climate crisis, and the rise of militarism and authoritarianism. With respect to critical security issues, the Russian invasion of Ukraine led by President Vladimir Putin has resulted in deaths and injuries of thousands of civilians. Since 1 February 2021, the attempted military coup in Myanmar has spurred a cross-regional political, human rights, and humanitarian crisis. As of this writing, more than 1,000,000 people have been displaced, with more than 2,000 civilians killed, and 15,000 arrested. The use of excessive force by police and military against civilians claiming their basic human rights and fundamental freedoms has been perpetuated with impunity across the region.
The COVID-19 pandemic has, indeed, aggravated the shrinking of civic spaces. Instead of meaningfully addressing challenges and needs of the vulnerable, authoritarian states have even accumulated more power by convoluting health emergencies and national security approaches. Numerous documents have revealed how COVID-19 was used as a pretext to adopt restrictive laws to curb access to information, justice, and basic services. State-sponsored disinformation and misinformation were intensified. Dissenting opinions towards government pandemics measures were purged. Furthermore, measures to mitigate viral infection limited peoples’ movement and participation in social, economic and political affairs. The proclivity towards securitized approaches has led ASEAN to further exclude civil society and neglect peoples’ voices. This is in breach of the ASEAN Community Vision 2025, which aims to promote a people-centred and people-oriented regional community.
The climate crisis has led to the global health emergency, political upheavals, gross human rights violation, and humanitarian disasters. Climate change has disproportionately affected planetary health, which is closely linked with the health of its population and their ability to achieve their right to life. These have contributed to the uncertainty and instability of the future, particularly of those who live in fragile situations. In fact, Southeast Asia is already bearing the brunt of climate emergencies. Moreover, rising sea levels, flooding, and typhoons have tremendously increased more recently.
The current economic systems have perpetuated capitalist greed. Extractive industries have greatly contributed to multiple rights violations, particularly land grabbing. Moreover, they have put the lives of indigenous communities and environmental human rights defenders. With respect to climate action, communities' access to decision-making processes and participation remains virtually absent. As their concerns are neglected, this crisis continues to hinder State obligations to protect and fulfil human rights, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Worse, more and more people have become vulnerable and disempowered.
Amidst these crises, communities with pre-existing intersectional vulnerabilities are further discriminated against and marginalised. Pandemic recovery plans have failed to meaningfully address the specific needs of women, youth, children, LGBTQIA+ communities, and persons with disabilities. Furthermore, conflicts and climate emergencies have forcibly displaced people, rendering many stateless and without protection.
The steady rise of militarism and authoritarianism has many lives at greater risk. Repressive laws and practices, both in offline and online spheres, have become dangerously normalised. These include systematic proliferation of censorship, harassment, arbitrary arrests, violence, misinformation, and state-sponsored propaganda. As of this writing, human rights and environmental rights defenders, pro-democracy activists, dissenters, children, youth, journalists, academics, LGBTQIA+ communities - historically marginalized based on their sexual orientation, gender identity & expression and sexual orientations and sex characteristics (SOGIESC) are finding themselves on the edge of uncertainty and danger.
These shared lived experiences have proven the urgent need to establish and sustain safe and brave transnational and cross-sectoral networks and solidarity. It is crucial for marginalised individuals and communities to meaningfully engage in multilateral advocacy on human rights, and intersectional issues that matter to them the most.
Recommendations
Building on the 2019 Consolidated Recommendations from the first EU-ASEAN CSO Forum, our key recommendation is for EU and ASEAN Member States (referred to as ‘States’) to develop policies, implement measures, and invest in programmes that are inclusive, non-discriminatory, participatory, and proportionate. These should promote greater accountability and sustainability in order to address issues related to public health emergencies, security and climate crises, and the rise of authoritarianism.
States should ensure that development programs, which are in line with international human rights standards and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), are designed and implemented to fully advance inclusion, equality, dignity and justice in all corners of ASEAN and the EU.
Civic space in Indonesia is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
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FILIPINAS: “Los cargos en mi contra son parte de la tentativa del gobierno de silenciar a quienes lo critican”
CIVICUS conversa con la presidenta del grupo de derechos humanos Karapatan, Elisa “Tita” Lubi, que actualmente enfrentacargos falsos de intento de asesinato. Fue acusada, junto con el secretario general de Karapatan para la región de Mindanao Sur, Jayvee Apia, por la presunta comisión de estos delitos durante un enfrentamiento armado entre militares y miembros del grupo opositor armado Nuevo Ejército del Pueblo en mayo de 2018. La causa recién se abrió en junio de 2020, dos años después del supuesto enfrentamiento.
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HONG KONG: ‘Any activism that the government dislikes can be deemed a national security violation’
CIVICUS speaks about the persecution faced by Hong Kong activists in exile with Anouk Wear, research and policy adviser at Hong Kong Watch.Founded in 2017, Hong Kong Watch is a civil society organisation (CSO) based in the UK thatproduces research and monitors threats to Hong Kong’s autonomy, basic freedoms and the rule of law. Itworks at the intersection between politics, academia and the media to help shape the international debate about Hong Kong.
What challenges do Hong Kong activists in exile face?
Hong Kong activists in exile face the challenge of continuing our activism without being in the place where we want and need to be to make a direct impact. We put continuous effort into community-building, preserving our culture and staying relevant to the people and situation in Hong Kong today.
When we do this, we face threats from the Chinese government that have drastically escalated since the National Security Law (NSL) was imposed in 2020.
This draconian law was enacted in response to the mass protests triggered by the proposed Extradition Bill between Hong Kong and mainland China in 2019.
The NSL broadly defines and criminalises secession, subversion, terrorist activities and collusion with a foreign country or with external elements. The maximum penalty is life imprisonment. In 2022, the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee concluded that the NSL is ‘vague and ambiguous’.
In practical terms, any activism the Hong Kong government dislikes, including meeting a foreign politician, organising an event and publishing an article, can be deemed a violation of the NSL, according to the government’s interpretation. This means we don’t know what is legal and what is not, and many people end up self-censoring to protect themselves.
On 3 July 2023, the government issued new arrest warrants for eight activists in exile, including three in the UK – Nathan Law, Finn Lau and Mung Siu-tat – and offered bounties of around £100,000 (approx. US$130,000) each for anyone providing information leading to their arrest. All of them are accused of breaching the NSL. Despite having no legal basis for applying the NSL in the UK, the Hong Kong government continues to threaten and intimidate activists abroad.
To what extent are civil society and independent media in exile able to continue doing their work?
Since the imposition of the NSL, over 60 CSOs, including political parties, trade unions and media groups, have disbanded. Many have relocated abroad, including over 50 CSOs that signed a joint statement urging government action following the Hong Kong National Security arrest warrants and bounties this month.
There is a strong network of Hong Kong activists in exile, and activists in exile are still able to do their work. However, we have great difficulty collaborating with activists still in Hong Kong because of the risks they face. For example, last week, five people in Hong Kong were arrested for alleged links to activists in exile who are on the wanted list. Collaborations must now be even more careful and discreet than they already were.
What kind of support do Hong Kong activists and journalists in exile receive, and what further international support do you need?
In November 2022, Hong Kong journalists who relocated to the UK collaborated with the National Union of Journalists of the UK and Ireland to launch the Association of Overseas Hong Kong Media Professionals. They pledged to focus on freedom of the press in Hong Kong and provide mutual assistance for professionals who have relocated overseas.
There is also extensive support among Hong Kong activists and CSOs in exile, from civil society of host countries and from the international community, as can be seen in the joint response to the arrest warrants and bounties issued on 3 July.
However, more coordinated action is needed to respond to Beijing’s threats, particularly from the governments of host countries. There needs to be more assurance and action to reiterate that Beijing and Hong Kong do not have jurisdiction abroad and there will be serious consequences to their threats.
Hong Kong activists in exile are now making submissions to the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review process, which will review China’s human rights record since 2018.
We urge UN member states, CSOs and journalists to use this opportunity to highlight the drastic changes that have taken place in Hong Kong and to continue supporting our fight for democracy, rights and freedom.
Civic space in Hong Kong is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Hong Kong Watch through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@hk_watch and@anoukwear onTwitter.
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HONG KONG: ‘La Ley de Seguridad Nacional viola la libertad de expresión y está intensificando la autocensura’
CIVICUS conversa con Patrick Poon, investigador independiente en derechos humanos, sobre la situación de derechos humanos en Hong Kong tras la aprobación de una nueva Ley de Seguridad Nacional (LSN) en junio de 2020. Patrick es investigador de doctorado en la Universidad de Lyon, en Francia, y anteriormente trabajó como investigador sobre China en Amnistía Internacional y ocupó varias posiciones en el China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, el Independent Chinese PEN Center y el China Labor Bulletin.
El espacio cívico en Hong Kong ha sufrido crecientes embates desde que en junio de 2019 comenzara una ola deprotestas masivas por las libertades democráticas, disparadas por la presentación de un proyecto de Ley de Extradición. ElCIVICUS Monitor ha documentado el uso de fuerza excesiva y letal contra manifestantes por parte de las fuerzas de seguridad y el arresto y el procesamiento de activistas prodemocracia, así como ataques contra los medios independientes.
¿Por qué se impuso en Hong Kong la LSN y cuáles han sido sus impactos hasta ahora?
La LSN, impuesta por el gobierno chino el 20 de junio de 2020, sin ninguna consulta o supervisión legislativa, faculta a China para extender del continente a Hong Kong algunas de sus herramientas más potentes de control social. La ley incluye la creación de agencias de seguridad secretas especializadas, permite denegar el derecho a un juicio justo, otorga amplios poderes a la policía, aumenta las restricciones sobre la sociedad civil y los medios de comunicación y debilita el control judicial.
La nueva ley socava el estado de derecho y las garantías de derechos humanos consagradas en la constitución de facto de Hong Kong, la Ley Fundamental. Contraviene el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, que forma parte del marco jurídico de Hong Kong a través de la Ley Fundamental y se traduce en la Ordenanza para la Declaración de Derechos Humanos.
La intención del gobierno chino es utilizar la LSN para frenar el trabajo de incidencia y reducir el apoyo a la independencia porque más gente, y particularmente jóvenes, están apoyando la autonomía de Hong Kong y adoptando la identidad hongkonesa. Aunque la Ley Fundamental de Hong Kong consagra un alto grado de autonomía, el gobierno chino parece considerar los llamamientos a la autonomía y el autogobierno como un “peligro para la seguridad nacional”.
La LSN ha violado gravemente la libertad de expresión del pueblo de Hong Kong y está intensificando la autocensura en la ciudad. Bajo la LSN, quienes abogan por la independencia, así como los políticos y otras figuras prominentes que apoyan las sanciones de gobiernos extranjeros contra Hong Kong y contra los funcionarios chinos responsables de la promulgación de la LSN, han sido blanco de detenciones arbitrarias. El gobierno obviamente está intentando disuadir a otros de seguir el ejemplo de estas personas.
Los medios independientes también se han visto afectados por la represión. El arresto de Jimmy Lai, magnate de los medios de comunicación y fundador del popular periódico local Apple Daily, así como de otros altos ejecutivos de la empresa, representó un intento del gobierno de castigar a los medios de comunicación que lo critican. La publicación de notas que critican la LSN o reportan pedidos de sanciones presentados por funcionarios de gobiernos extranjeros se convierten en excusa para la represión de los medios independientes. Esto tendrá un impacto a largo plazo sobre los medios de Hong Kong, ya que intensificará aún más la autocensura de algunos medios.
¿Cuál ha sido la respuesta de la sociedad civil y el movimiento prodemocracia?
La sociedad civil ha reaccionado enérgicamente contra la ley porque el proceso para promulgarla violó el principio del estado de derecho y la justicia procesal de Hong Kong, y las definiciones vagas y amplias de varias disposiciones de la ley exceden la comprensión normal del derecho en la ciudad. Los políticos y funcionarios gubernamentales pro-China se han esforzado por justificar la ley, pero sus argumentos son absurdos.
¿Cómo han reaccionado la oposición y la sociedad civil ante la decisión del gobierno de posponer las elecciones legislativas a causa de la pandemia de COVID-19?
Las elecciones de 2020 para el Consejo Legislativo de Hong Kong originalmente estaban programadas para el 6 de septiembre, pero en julio la Jefa Ejecutiva de Hong Kong, Carrie Lam, con el argumento de que estaban aumentando las infecciones por COVID-19, usó sus poderes de emergencia para posponerlas por un año entero, de modo que ahora se supone que tendrán lugar el 5 de septiembre de 2021. Lam negó que el cambio se debiera a especulaciones políticas, pero lo cierto es que fue un golpe para los activistas prodemocracia, que aspiraban a obtener la mayoría en el Consejo Legislativo.
En un contexto de protestas masivas, los candidatos prodemocracia ya se habían impuesto por abrumadora mayoría en las elecciones para el Consejo de Distrito de 2019. Junto con la recién aprobada LSN, el aplazamiento de las elecciones fue visto como parte de la estrategia del gobierno para neutralizar el movimiento por la democracia. Justo antes del anuncio de la postergación de las elecciones, 12 candidatos de la oposición habían sido descalificados para postularse y cuatro jóvenes ex miembros de un grupo de estudiantes independentistas fueron arrestados bajo la LSN por sus publicaciones en favor de la independencia en las redes sociales.
El aplazamiento de la elección creó cierto conflicto dentro del campo prodemocrático, ya que hubo quienes se pronunciaron por mantener la lucha en el Consejo Legislativo mientras que otros reclamaron un boicot a la decisión del gobierno de posponer las elecciones. A partir de la decisión del gobierno de descalificar a algunos candidatos prodemocracia por sus opiniones políticas, queda claro que el gobierno no quiere escuchar voces disidentes en la legislatura.
¿Cómo podrían la comunidad internacional y las organizaciones internacionales de la sociedad civil apoyar a la sociedad civil de Hong Kong?
La sociedad civil de Hong Kong debe trabajar en conjunto para garantizar que el gobierno chino y el gobierno de Hong Kong no abusen de la LSN para ahogar todas las opiniones disidentes y monitorear de cerca si el gobierno cumple con los principios del estado de derecho y las normas internacionales de derechos humanos.
La comunidad internacional debe seguir expresándose en contra de la represión emprendida por los gobiernos de China y Hong Kong contra la sociedad civil y debe seguir planteando su preocupación por la LSN, que el gobierno chino está imponiendo por la fuerza en Hong Kong en nombre de la seguridad nacional, pero que en realidad no es más que un intento de silenciar las opiniones disidentes en la ciudad. La comunidad internacional debe enviar un mensaje claro de que la seguridad nacional no debe utilizarse como excusa para reprimir la libertad de expresión.
El espacio cívico en China es calificado como “cerrado” por elCIVICUS Monitor.
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HONG KONG: ‘The National Security Law infringes on freedom of expression and is intensifying self-censorship’
CIVICUS speaks with Patrick Poon, an independent human rights researcher, on the human rights situation in Hong Kong after a new National Security Law (NSL) was passed in June 2020. Patrick is a PhD researcher at the University of Lyon, France, and has previously worked as a China Researcher at Amnesty International and in various positions at China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, Independent Chinese PEN Center and China Labour Bulletin.
Civic space in Hong Kong is under renewed attack sincemass protests for democratic freedoms, sparked by a proposed Extradition Bill, began in June 2019. TheCIVICUS Monitor has documented excessive and lethal force by the security forces against protesters, arrests and the prosecution of pro-democracy activists as well as a crackdown on independent media.
Why has the NSL been imposed in Hong Kong and what have its impacts been so far?
The NSL, imposed by the Chinese government on 20 June 2020, without any consultation or legislative oversight, empowers China to extend some of its most potent tools of social control from the mainland to Hong Kong. The law includes the creation of specialised secret security agencies, allows for the denial of the right to a fair trial, provides sweeping new powers to the police, increases restraints on civil society and the media and weakens judicial oversight.
The new law undermines Hong Kong’s rule of law and the human rights guarantees enshrined in Hong Kong’s de facto constitution, the Basic Law. It contravenes the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which is incorporated into Hong Kong’s legal framework via the Basic Law and expressed in its Bill of Rights Ordinance.
The Chinese government’s intention is to use the NSL to curb advocacy and support for independence as more people, especially young people, have increasingly embraced Hong Kong’s autonomy and their identity as Hongkongers. Although Hong Kong’s Basic Law enshrines a high degree of autonomy, the Chinese government apparently regards calls for autonomy and self-governance as a ‘danger to national security’.
The NSL has seriously infringed Hong Kong people’s freedom of expression and is intensifying self-censorship in the city. Under the NSL, people who advocate for independence, as well as politicians and prominent figures who support foreign governments’ sanctions on Hong Kong and Chinese officials who are responsible for enacting the NSL, have been the target of the arbitrary arrests. The government is obviously attempting to scare off others not to follow these people’s calls.
Independent media have also been affected by the crackdown. The arrests of Jimmy Lai, media mogul and founder of popular local paper Apple Daily, and senior executives in his company, signify the government’s attempt to punish news media that are critical of it. Reports about criticism against the NSL and calls for sanctions by foreign government officials become the excuse for the crackdown on independent media. This will have long-term impact on Hong Kong media, even further intensifying self-censorship for some media outlets.
How have civil society and the pro-democracy movement responded?
Civil society has reacted strongly against the law because the process to enact it violated the principle of the rule of law and procedural justice in Hong Kong, and the vague and broad definitions of various provisions of the law exceed the normal understanding of law in the city. Pro-China politicians and government officials have been trying hard to justify the law, but their arguments are preposterous.
How have the opposition and civil society reacted to the government’s decision to postpone the legislative election due to the COVID-19 pandemic?
The 2020 Hong Kong Legislative Council election was originally scheduled for 6 September 2020, but in July the Hong Kong Chief Executive, Carrie Lam, cited an upsurge in COVID-19 infections and used her emergency powers to postpone it for a whole year, so now it’s expected to take place on 5 September 2021. She denied that the change was due to any political speculation, but it was in fact a blow for pro-democracy activists, who were seeking a majority on the Legislative Council.
In the midst of massive protests, pro-democracy candidates had already won by a landslide in the 2019 District Council election. Along with the new NSL, the postponement of the election was viewed as part of the government’s strategy to neutralise the pro-democracy movement. Just prior to the announcement that the election was being postponed, 12 opposition candidates were disqualified from running, and four young former members of a pro-independence student group were arrested under the NSL for their pro-independence posts on social media.
The postponement of the election created some conflict among the pro-democracy camp, with some calling for keeping up the fight in the Legislative Council and others urging a boycott over the government’s decision to postpone the elections. From the government’s decision to disqualify some pro-democracy candidates for their political views, it is clear that the government doesn’t want to hear any opposition voices in the legislature.
What can the international community and international civil society organisations do to support civil society in Hong Kong?
Civil society in Hong Kong needs to work together to ensure that the Chinese government and the Hong Kong government will not abuse the NSL to curb all dissenting views and closely monitor if the government abides by the principle of the rule of law and international human rights standards.
The international community should continue speaking up against the Chinese and Hong Kong government’s crackdown on civil society and keep raising concerns about the NSL, which is being forcibly imposed on Hong Kong by the Chinese government in the name of national security, but in fact is no more than an attempt to silence dissenting views in the city. The international community should send a clear message that national security should not be used as an excuse to crack down on the freedom of expression.
Civic space in China is rated as ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
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HONG KONG: ‘This is a leader-full movement, ran by countless small networks of talented people’
CIVICUS speaks about the protests that have rocked Hong Kong since June 2019 with Johnson Ching-Yin Yeung, democracy movement organiser and chairperson of the Hong Kong Civil Hub. The Hong Kong Civil Hub works to connect Hong Kong civil society with like-minded international stakeholders willing to help promote the rule of law, democracy and human rights in Hong Kong. What triggered the mass protests that have taken place for several months?
The protests had both short and long-term causes. When Hong Kong was decolonised in 1997, China signed an international treaty promising that people in Hong Kong would enjoy a high degree of autonomy. In other words, Hong Kong would have its own government, legislation, courts and jurisdiction. But, long story short, China is not fulfilling that promise and Hong Kong is slowly becoming more like China due to Chinese intervention in our government and judiciary. Following the2014 Umbrella Movement, there have been increasing restrictions on the freedom of association, and for the first time in decades the government made use of colonial-era laws and outlawed organisations that advocated for Hong Kong’s independence. We expect restrictions on association, funding and exchanges with international organisations and civil society to increase over the next few years.
Political participation has also been under attack. In 2017, for the first time since 1997, a few lawmakers were disqualified and expelled from the legislature. In the past three elections there have been disqualifications of candidates. This is becoming a major tactic used by China, based on claims that certain candidates are not respecting the law or they will not be loyal to Beijing. This explains why at some point people decided to take their grievances to the streets, given that most institutional channels for political demands are shut down.
People took to the streets in 2014, under the Umbrella Movement. But protest is being severely punished. In April 2019, several pro-democracy leaders weresentenced to eight to 16 months in prison. Local leaders who advocate for political independence have also been punished with up to seven years of imprisonment.
The current protests began in June 2019. On 9 June,more than a million people mobilised against the Extradition Bill, aimed at establishing a mechanism for transfers of fugitives to mainland China, currently excluded in the existing law. Three days later, the legislature decided to continue the legislation process regardless of the opposition seen on the streets, so people besieged the parliamentary building, to which the Hong Kong police reacted with extreme brutality, firing teargas and rubber bullets, shooting into people’s heads and eyes.
Amnesty International made a comprehensive report on the incidents of 12 June and concluded that the police had used excessive force, even though the protest had been authorised by the Hong Kong government.
What changed after the repression of 12 June?
There was a huge outcry because we had never experienced this kind of repression before, and two million people – almost one quarter of the population of Hong Kong – took part in the protests that took place four days after.
From then on, protesters had a few additional demands on top of the initial demand that the extradition agreement be withdrawn, something that happened three months after the first protest. Protesters demanded the release of the arrested demonstrators and the withdrawal of the characterisation of the protests as riots, which is cause enough to hold someone and convict them: all it takes is for a defendant to have been present at the protest scene to face up to 10 years in prison for rioting. Protesters also demanded an independent inquiry into police activity. Over the past six months we’ve documented a lot of torture during detentions. Excessive force is used all the time against peaceful protests, so people really want the police to be held accountable. A recent survey showed that 80 per cent of the population support this demand. But the government is relying solely on the police to maintain order, so they cannot risk such investigation. Last but not least, there is the demand of universal suffrage and democratic rights, without which it is difficult to foresee anything else changing for real.
What did not change was the government reaction and the police repression.Over the next few months, around 7,000 people were arrested – 40 per cent of them students, and 10 per cent minors – and around 120 people were charged. The fact that only 120 out of the 7,000 people arrested were charged shows that there have been lots of arbitrary arrests. The police would arrest people on grounds of illegal assembly. I was arrested in July when I was just standing in front of the corner line. I complied with police instructions, but I still got arrested.
Thousands of people were injured during the protests. The official number is around 2,600 but this is a very conservative estimate because more than half of the injured people were not brought to public hospitals and did not seek medical assistance because they were afraid they would be arrested. Some doctors and nurses organised underground settlements to treat serious injuries like infections or rubber bullet injuries. But they had to remain anonymous and there simply were not enough of them and they didn’t have enough medical supply. There have been at least 12 suicides related to the protest movement. Lots of people have gone missing. Students and activists who are arrested are often deprived of their right to a lawyer and a phone call, and no one knows where they are detained. In many cases, it’s hard to verify whether people are in fact missing or have fled the country.
Analysts have claimed that the strength of the current protests lies in their ‘leaderless’ character, something that prevents the government stopping the movement by jailing leaders. Do you agree with this characterisation?
Many observers have seen the way we have used technology to coordinate the protests and they have concluded that our movement has no leaders. It is true that our movement is characterised by the decentralisation of communications and mobilisation. But this does not mean it is aleaderless movement. On the contrary, the Hong Kong protest movement is a leader-full movement: it is full of leaders and is run by countless small networks of talented people capable of organising and coordinating action on their own.
While the demography of the protests is quite diverse in terms of age, background and social class, more than the 50 per cent of protesters are female, and the major force of the protests are people aged 20 to 49. There is also a strong presence of highly educated people: more than 85 per cent of protesters have tertiary education or above.
But a notable characteristic of this disparate protest movement has been its unity, which may have resulted from the longstanding repression of civil society. When the leaders of the 2014 protests – most of them young students – were sentenced to prison, older people showed up at the protests because they felt that they had not been doing enough. People also united against police brutality, because there was no previous history of such a serious crackdown on protesters and people felt morally responsible to show up in support.
Can you tell us more about how the protest movement has used technology for organising and coordinating action?
During the first few months at least, people would rely on their cellphones and the Telegram app. People would have strategic discussions and channel these discussions into a Telegram channel. These are not the safest communication tools but they can hold more than 3,000 subscribers, which means that you can speak to 3,000 people at the same time, you can share action timetables, the site of protests or the location of the police with a huge number of people. We use a live map to inform protesters where the police are and where the protests are taking place, so they can avoid being arrested. Another app shows which businesses and stores are supportive of the movement. Pro-democracy businesses appear in yellow, while pro-government ones appear in blue.
We also use Telegram bots for international advocacy. A group of people is dedicated to disseminating information on Twitter and Interact.
We also use social media as a recruitment tool because after an action is held, people use social media to reflect about the strategies used and assess the outcomes. But after a few months, people started using online apps less and less. They would instead form their own groups and organise their own actions. There are frontier leaders, first leaders, people working on documentation, people who organise street protests – each is doing their own thing while at the same time warning others about clashes and organising timetables. This is how we use civic tech.
How has the movement managed to grow and thrive in adverse conditions?
Several elements explain why people keep showing up and why the movement is so resilient against government repression. First, people deploy their actions in their own neighbourhoods. We disperse action rather than concentrate it, because when we use concentration tactics, such as holding a protest in front of a government building, we become an easy target for the police. In the face of dispersed actions, the police would try to disperse protesters but would often end up attacking passers-by or people going about their business in their own neighbourhoods. For many people not involved directly in the protests, this was also a wake-up call and functioned as a recruitment mechanism: police brutality ceased to be a far-away problem; instead, it hit home and became personal, triggering a protective reaction.
A tactic commonly used by protesters is the Lennon Wall, in which people post messages in public spaces, which creates a sense of community and helps organise public support. Lennon Walls appear in various places and people use them to send and receive information about the protests. People also put posters in bus stops so when people are waiting for the bus they can get information about the protests. People sing in protest in shopping malls. This way, people use their lunchtime to sing a song and protest while going about their business, and they reach people who don’t read the news and don’t pay much attention to politics. That is one of the key lessons here.
Another key lesson concerns the importance of the unity between the moderate side and the radical front of the protests. Given that even authorised protests would be dispersed with teargas for no reason, some people began resorting to more militant actions to combat the police and protect their space. Some social movement analysts claim that radical incidents diminish popular support for the movement, but this does not seem to be happening in Hong Kong. In a recent survey, more than 60 per cent of respondents said they understood the use of violence by the people. I suppose that one reason why people do not reject militant actions is that they view the government and the police as responsible for most of the violence, and view violence by protesters as a fairly understandable response. Another reason is that radical protesters have been careful not to target ordinary people but only the police and pro-government businesses.
What else have you learned in the process?
A big lesson that we’ve learned concerns the effectiveness of creativity and humour to offset government repression. Protesters used laser tags to disable cameras used for the surveillance of protesters, so people started to get arrested for buying laser tags. After a student was arrested for possessing a laser tag, hundreds of thousands of people gathered in a public space and used laser tags to point at a public building. Another example of an effective response took place in early October 2019. There is a law that states that people can be jailed for a year if they wear a mask or anything covering their faces, so people responded in defiance, forming a human chain in which everyone was wearing some kind of mask.
We’ve also come to understand the importance of global solidarity and leveraging geopolitics. The Hong Kong diaspora has organised a lot of lobbying and advocacy in various cities around the world. We have also lobbied foreign governments and supported the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, a bill that was introduced in the US Congress following the Umbrella Movement in 2014, but that was only passed in November 2019. This law requires the US government to impose sanctions against Chinese and Hong Kong officials responsible for human rights abuses in Hong Kong, and requires the US Department of State and other agencies to conduct an annual review to determine whether changes in Hong Kong's political status – namely its relationship with mainland China – justify changing the unique and favourable trade relations between the USA and Hong Kong. This is huge, and we are trying to replicate this in other countries, including Australia, Canada, Italy and New Zealand.
We have also done advocacy at the United Nations (UN), where some resolutions about police brutality have been passed. But the UN is quite weak at the moment, and aside from the documentation of human rights violations there is not much they can do. Any resolution regarding the protests will be blocked by China at the UN Security Council. That said, a thorough UN investigation on police brutality would send a strong message anyway. We have been communicating with human rights civil society organisations to do more advocacy at the UN.
We are also looking for alternative tactics such as working with unions in France, because water cannons are manufactured in France and we hope something can be done about it.
What have the protests achieved so far?
The democratic camp has made a lot of progress. In November 2019 we had elections for the District Council. True, the District Council doesn’t have any real political power because it carries out neighbourhood duties, like garbage collection and traffic management. Still, in the latest election 388 out of 452 seats went to the pro-democracy camps, whereas back in 2015 they were only 125 pro-democracy representatives, compared with 299 who were pro-Beijing.
That said, I don’t think the pro-democracy movement should put too much of its energy into institutional politics because the District Council is not a place where the political crisis can be solved. However, the elections served as a solid foundation for organisers to organise people at the local level.
According to the polls, almost 90 per cent of the people supported independent investigation of human rights violations, more than 70 per cent demanded the resignation of the Hong Kong Chief Executive, Carrie Lam, and 75 per cent supported universal suffrage. That kind of popular support has remained stable for several months, which is pretty amazing.
What are the challenges ahead?
While there is no sign of protests calming down, there is also no sign of the government making concessions anytime soon. Violence is escalating on both sides, and the protest movement might lose public support if some demonstrators decide to go underground. The Chinese government will not let itself be challenged by protesters, so it is infiltrating organisations and tightening the grip on civil society. Organised civil society is relatively weak, and Beijing can easily interfere with academic institutions, schools and the media by appointing more allies and dismissing those who are critical of the government. The next five years will likely be tough ones for civil society and democracy in Hong Kong, and we will have to work to strengthen civil society’s resilience.
Another important issue is that a lot of young protesters are traumatised by the violence they have witnessed and experienced. We have support groups with social workers and psychologists, but they cannot provide support in their official capacity or they would find themselves under pressure by their employers who take money from the government. Social workers are also at risk and the police constantly harass them. To strengthen self-care and gain resilience for the battle ahead, we need to train more people and create support groups to help people cope, control their stress and share their stories.
Another potential challenge is the limited sustainability of global solidarity. Right now Hong Kong is in the spotlight, but this will not last long. Our struggle is for the long haul, but the world will not be paying attention for much longer. So we will need to build more substantial and permanent alliances and partnerships with civil society groups around the world. We need to empower local groups and give people new skills regarding international law, advocacy and campaigning. The protest movement is not going anywhere. It’s going to be a long struggle so we will have to train more organisers. We will disseminate the knowledge gained by the protesters, so when they are sent to jail others will take over.
Civic space in China is rated as ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with the Hong Kong Civil Hub through itswebsite and follow@hkjohnsonyeung on Twitter.
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HONG KONG: ‘We urge governments to protect exiled human rights defenders within their jurisdictions’
CIVICUS speakswith Anouk Wear, research and policy adviser at Hong Kong Watch, about recent district council elections held in Hong Kong amid an ongoing crackdown on dissent.
Founded in 2017, Hong Kong Watch is a civil society organisation (CSO) based in the UK thatproduces research and monitors threats to Hong Kong’s autonomy, basic freedoms and rule of law. Itworks at the intersection between politics, academia and the media to shape the international debate about Hong Kong.
What was the significance of Hong Kong’s 2023 district council elections?
On 11 December 2023, Hong Kong held elections spanning 18 district councils with a total of 479 seats. District councillors advise the Hong Kong government on local issues within their districts and have funding to promote recreational, cultural and community activities.
These elections were especially significant because following the previous round, held in 2019 and won by pro-democracy candidates by a landslide, the Hong Kong government introduced several changes to ensure that the pro-China camp would maintain the majority in future elections.
The 2023 election was marked by a record-low voter turnout of just 27.5 per cent. Many people abstained because they felt a sense of despair given that all candidates had to be vetted and approved by the Chinese state. This left no opposition voices to vote for, diminishing the significance of the election.
We want genuine universal suffrage, not a ‘democracy with Chinese characteristics’, as the founding chairman of Hong Kong’s Democratic Party, Martin Lee, aptly warned in 2014. Unfortunately, the situation has only worsened since then.
What tactics did the government use to control the election?
As analysed in a briefing we published recently, the election fit into a broader trend of democratic erosion in Hong Kong.
In 2021, changes to Legislative Councils were introduced under the slogan ‘Patriots Governing Hong Kong’, aimed at screening out democrats and ensuring that only pro-establishment candidates aligned with Beijing could run for seats. To that effect, candidates are now required to pass two major political barriers before participating in the election.
First, they must secure nominations from all five sectors of the Election Committee, a 1,500-member electoral college made up of representatives of various constituencies, including industry, professions, grassroots organisations, the government and Hong Kong representation in Chinese bodies. Second, they are screened by the Candidate Eligibility Review Committee, mainly composed of government officials. Candidates who don’t have a strong pro-China agenda can be disqualified on grounds of not being ‘patriotic’ enough.
A similar approach was applied to district council candidates. In April 2023, Chief Executive John Lee announced that upcoming district council elections would be open exclusively to patriots, with only a certain number of ‘depoliticised’ seats focused on administrative tasks elected by the public. He added that people who love the country and are willing to serve can participate in district councils through ‘various other ways’. In line with these reforms, only 88 seats were directly elected by the public, compared to 452 in the previous election, with 179 to be appointed by the chief executive.
Moreover, in the lead-up to the elections, three members of the League of Social Democrats were followed and arrested for planning a protest against the election, which they called a ‘birdcage’, stating that ‘Hong Kong people’s right to vote and to be elected seems to be absent’.
What should be done to restore democratic freedoms in Hong Kong?
Civil space has drastically shrunk since the 2019 district council elections. Following the imposition of the National Security Law in 2020, over 60 organisations have been disbanded, including CSOs, political parties, trade unions and media outlets. Many organisations have relocated abroad, while others have adjusted the scope of their work to protect their members who remain in Hong Kong.
It’s crucial that discussions are continued, the human rights situation is monitored and detailed reports are provided as steps towards restoring democratic freedoms in Hong Kong. We shouldn’t accept new repressive laws as the norm but instead stay vocal about any regressive legislation and rights violation.
It’s important to keep speaking up for people in Hong Kong and human rights defenders in exile. For example, recently the Hong Kong national security police issued five arrest warrants offering HK$1 million (approx. US$ 128,000) bounties for exiled pro-democracy Hong Kong activists based in the UK and USA. We strongly condemn this illegal attack against our friends and colleagues. We urge governments to take a stand and protect Hong Kong human rights defenders within their jurisdictions.
How is Hong Kong Watch working towards this end, and what international support do you need?
We work to inform and educate legislators, policymakers and the media, as well as raise awareness among the wider public about violations of human rights, basic freedoms and the rule of law in Hong Kong. We advocate for actions to assist victims of rights violations through a combination of in-depth research reports, opinion editorials, monthly media briefings, interviews and advocacy campaigns.
It’s crucial to hold Hong Kong and China accountable for their violations of international human rights law and urge them to fulfil their obligations. For instance, the 2022 review of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee, tasked with monitoring compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), found that Hong Kong violated its international legal obligations and recommended that the authorities take tangible steps, with a clear timeline, to introduce universal suffrage and reform the electoral system in compliance with the ICCPR.
We’re engaging in this effort through submissions to the Human Rights Committee and other treaty bodies, including the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as to the upcoming Universal Periodic Review at the UN Human Rights Council.
We deeply appreciate the support we receive from governments, legislators, civil society and people worldwide. But we need more international solidarity, particularly at the governmental level, to pressure Hong Kong authorities to comply with their obligations under international law and ensure that other states refrain from conducting business as usual with Hong Kong, in view of the grave and systematic nature of human rights violations the current regime commits.
Civic space in Hong Kong is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Hong Kong Watch through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@hk_watch and@anoukwear onTwitter.
The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.
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INDIA: ‘Civil society efforts will be crucial to the quality of the elections’
CIVICUS speaks with Anjali Bhardwaj, founding member of the Society for Citizen Vigilance Initiatives (Satark Nagrik Sangathan, SNS), about recent electoral reforms and civil society efforts to ensure the quality of India’s upcoming election.Established in 2003, SNS is a civil society organisation (CSO) working to promote government transparency and accountability and foster active citizen participation.
What recent changes have been made to rules on campaign financing?
On 15 February, the Supreme Court ruled the electoral bond system currently used to finance election campaigns unconstitutional. This is a positive change, with a potential to bring transparency to campaign financing.
Introduced in 2018, the electoral bond scheme allowed people and organisations to buy designated bank bonds ranging from 1,000 to 10 million rupees (approx. US$12 to US$120,000) to donate to political campaigns in a completely anonymous way. When it introduced this system, the ruling Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) presented it as a measure to combat corruption and increase transparency in political financing.
Before the bond system was introduced, political parties could receive funds in cash or through the banking system, but large corporate donations were often made in cash. All cash donations below 20,000 rupees (approx. US$240) were anonymous under the Income Tax Act. So to hoodwink the system, parties often reported large cash donations as multiple donations of amounts smaller than 20,000 rupees.
The electoral bond scheme was presented as a measure to increase transparency but the anonymity it ensured had the opposite effects. The opacity it enabled allowed single donors to provide unlimited funding. It hasn’t allowed people, CSOs, opposition political parties or even the Election Commission of India to track the flow of money in politics. It has compromised the public’s right to information, as voters are unable to discern the extent or sources of funding political parties receive. This limited people’s democratic right to make informed voting decisions.
What was the reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s decision?
The Supreme Court first addressed this issue as early as 2019, acknowledging the bond system’s potential harm to democracy but allowing it to continue while it analysed the substance of the case. But even back then, it emphasised the deepened information imbalance created by a system that allowed the ruling party to access information about donors and donations through the government-controlled bank while leaving opposition parties and the public in the dark.
In its recent ruling, the Supreme Court stressed that electoral bonds infringe article 19 of the constitution because without the right to information in electoral matters, the rights to free speech and expression guaranteed by article 19 cannot be fully realised.
Voters in India predominantly support parties, rather than individual candidates. When large corporations contribute generous funds to political parties, there is the presumption that they do so in the expectation of receiving favours in return once parties become part of governments. When favours are returned, policy is guided not by promises made to voters or by people’s needs but by the interests of funders. This is why funding transparency is crucial for informed voting. Without this information, voters cannot know what to expect when parties access government.
Electoral bonds exacerbated corruption through anonymous funding that gave free rein to large corporations to influence policy. They also made the playing field even more uneven, as the BJP consistently received a substantial share of electoral bonds.
The Supreme Court judgment declared the scheme and associated amendments unconstitutional, emphasising the importance of the right to information. The court prohibited further transactions and mandated disclosure of past transactions, marking a significant move towards restoring transparency and fairness in India’s electoral process.
How has civic space evolved under Prime Minister Narendra Modi?
Regrettably, since the beginning of the Modi government in 2014 we have seen a significant contraction of civic space, due to systematic attacks on the crucial right to dissent, a cornerstone of any democracy.
The essence of democracy lies in people’s right to question those in power. But in India, this right has been under attack in three primary ways.
First, those who express dissent, criticise government policies or challenge legislation are labelled as anti-national. The governments files legal cases against them, leveraging draconian laws, terror-related legislation and money laundering statutes to silence them.
Second, the government has deliberately weakened the laws that empower citizens. The Indian Right to Information Act, lauded as one of the world’s most progressive, has been amended twice in the last five years. Regressive amendments have severely affected people’s right to access information and question the authorities. Similarly regressive amendments to other laws, such as the Representation of People Act and the Income Tax Act, along with the electoral bonds, have further curtailed people’s right to access vital information to hold the authorities to account.
The government has also undermined the independence of institutions responsible for upholding fundamental rights, including the right to free expression and protest. This has eroded the constitutional protection people should enjoy when expressing dissent. Protesting and questioning the government have therefore become increasingly difficult.
The cumulative effect of these developments has dealt a severe blow to civic space in India.
Are there enough guarantees for a free and fair election?
India has needed electoral reform long before the current administration. For decades civil society has advocated for changes to strengthen the electoral process. While India takes pride in conducting relatively free and fair elections, concerns over the quality of elections have increased over time.
Civil society has repeatedly expressed alarm over issues including the influence of money over elections, the security and reliability of electronic voting machines and manipulation of the voter roll.
Regarding the undue influence of money over elections and consequently over policymaking, electoral bonds have long been a matter of major concern. Civil society has also expressed apprehension about glitches in and tampering with electronic voting systems, prompting debate and ongoing legal challenges in the Supreme Court. Alarms were also sounded by recent elections that saw arbitrary deletions and additions to voter lists.
Civil society continues to bring attention to these issues, urging authorities to find solutions. The resolution of these challenges is essential for India to genuinely claim it conducts free and fair elections.
Who are the major contenders in the 2024 election, and what are the main issues the winner will need to tackle?
India has numerous political parties that actively participate in elections. The BJP and its allies have successfully formed a government twice and are currently strong contenders to secure a third term in office. The opposition landscape includes the Indian National Congress, historically prevalent prior to the BJP’s rise. But there are many other national and regional parties that contribute to the diversity of the political spectrum.
As a developing country, India, faces multifaceted challenges. Among the most significant are deep-seated socio-economic inequality and high incidence of poverty, with a small number of families holding a substantial portion of the country’s wealth and a substantial percentage of the population living below the poverty line. There is much need for policies to uplift those on the margins of society and reforms to the structures that perpetuate inequality.
Equally crucial is the protection of civic freedoms, particularly for those who criticise the government, including through peaceful protests. Those who express dissent and demand accountability must be protected rather than criminalised.
The next government should prioritise these issues, addressing inequalities and working to create an environment where citizens can freely express themselves and participate fully in the democratic process.
Civic space in Indonesia is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with the SCVI through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow @sns_india on Twitter.
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INDIA: ‘CSOs that dare speak truth to power are attacked with politically motivated charges’
CIVICUS speaks to human rights lawyer and researcher Mrinal Sharma about the state of civic freedoms in India. Mrinal works to help unlawfully detained human rights defenders, asylum seekers, refugees and stateless persons in India. She worked as Policy Advisor with Amnesty International India until the Government of India forced the organisation to shut down in October 2020. Her work with Amnesty focused on people who are arbitrarily deprived of their nationality in Assam, the barriers against access to justice in Kashmir and the demonisation of minorities in India. Mrinal had previously worked with the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative and Refugee Solidarity Network.
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INDIA: ‘Muslim girls are being forced to choose between education and the hijab’
CIVICUS speaks about the recent ban on the hijab, a headscarf worn by Muslim women, in educational institutions in the Indian state of Karnataka with Zakia Soman, a women’s rights activist and co-founder of the Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan (Indian Muslim Women's Movement, BMMA).Founded in 2007, BMMA is an independent, secular, rights-based civil society organisation (CSO) that advocates for the rights of women and the Muslim minority in India.
Why have girls wearing the hijab been banned from school in Karnataka state?
Girls in hijab were denied entry into classrooms in the name of the school uniform rules, with the authorities citing a circular that states that each student must comply with the uniform requirement in school. Both the Karnataka government and the high court played the uniform card to justify preventing Muslim women wearing the hijab from entering the college campus.
While educational institutions undeniably have the right to set their own rules, these cannot infringe the fundamental rights granted by the Indian Constitution. According to Article 25 of our constitution, all citizens are guaranteed the right to freedom of conscience as well as freedoms to profess, practise and propagate religion.
And under no circumstance can a dress code for schoolgirls be more important than education itself. Muslim girls have the right to be in school with or without the hijab, which is why I oppose those who promote the court’s verdict as a decision that empowers women. Although I don’t believe in the hijab, I think it is wrong to discriminate against girls wearing it. Our nation will only progress when girls have access to education regardless of their religious affiliation.
Does the hijab row indicate the rise of anti-minorities voices in India?
Although it may sound like an internal disciplinary matter over girls wearing the hijab, the wider context of the hijab row is one of religious polarisation and politics of hate towards Muslims. The hijab row is an integral part of the politics of religious hate in India’s polarised milieu, where Muslims are the target of the growing anti-Islam propaganda aired on TV as well as on social media platforms.
There is a spiralling nationwide campaign against the Muslim community under the garb of religious festivities. Journalists and other monitors have found deliberate, concerted violence against life, property and businesses of India’s Muslim community carried out by hooligans claiming to celebrate religious festivals in the states of Delhi, Gujrat, Karnataka and many others. But ultimately, the Indian state must be held responsible for the terrible living conditions experienced by millions of Muslims.
How has civil society responded to the ban?
Civil society has extended solidarity to the affected girls and has supported them. However, civil society’s response has so far failed to impress the government and the high court, which sadly ruled to uphold the hijab ban inside classrooms in Karnataka state.
As for opposition parties, they have been unable to run a sustained campaign to challenge the climate created by hate speech and open calls for the genocide of Muslims. This is why it’s so important for the international community to stand up and support the voices of sanity in India.
What have pro-hijab protests achieved so far?
Peaceful protests have been held in support of Muslim women’s right to wear the hijab in educational institutions. However, I am afraid that conservative elements of the Muslim community got involved in the protests in a way that aggravated matters, making Muslim girls and their families even more vulnerable to political onslaught.
In my understanding, neither the hijab nor the burqa, a full body covering, is mandatory in Islam; however, patriarchal elements would like to put every Muslim girl and woman behind a burqa or hijab. The matter could have been easily resolved through dialogue between college authorities and parents. Instead, it got politicised, with different religious and political outfits jumping in the fray with their radical and antagonistic positions.
As a result, Muslim girls found themselves in a tough position, being forced to choose between education and the hijab, which is outright unfair to them. Since many Muslim parents will not allow girls to go to school without the hijab and schools will not give them entry into class with the hijab, many girls have dropped out of their studies and have not sat their exams.
Civic space in India is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with BMMA through itswebsite and follow@BMMA_India on Twitter. -
INDIA: ‘The government is dealing with dissent in very concerning ways’
CIVICUS speaks Sudha Bharadwaj, a lawyer and long-time human rights defender working for the rights of workers and Indigenous peoples in India.Sudha wasarrested and detained in August 2018 under the draconian Unlawful Activities Prevention Act and accused of having links with Maoist terrorist organisations. Alongside 15 other human rights defenders, she was further accused of conspiring to incite violence among the Dalit community. Despiteproof that incriminating evidence against them was planted,concerns expressed by United Nations (UN) experts about the arbitrary charges and UN calls to release political prisoners from crowded jails during the pandemic, requests for Sudha’s release, including on health grounds, were repeatedlyrejected. She was finallyreleased on bail in December 2021 after three years in detention.
How did you get involved in human rights work?
For the last 35 years I have been working in Chhattisgarh, an area in eastern India that is very rich in mineral resources. I began around 1986 as a trade unionist and worked with a legendary union leader, Shankar Guha Niyog, who was organising iron ore miners. Conditions were appalling. Workers were not unionised, working hours were long, wages were very paltry and even the very basic labour laws of our country were not being applied.
I became a lawyer basically because my trade union needed one. I graduated in 2000, at the age of 40. I initially took up matters of our own union and later I shifted to work at the high court, where I realised contractual workers, farmers resisting land acquisition and Adivasi Indigenous groups resisting mining projects were forced to face very expensive corporate lawyers without any real legal assistance. They needed lawyers who understood them and who could devise legal strategies compatible with the tactics of their movements.
I started a group of lawyers to provide legal aid to unions, farmers’ and village organisations, Adivasi communities, and civil society organisations (CSOs). Around this time, I became involved in the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), one of the oldest human rights organisations in India. We dealt with various human rights issues, including attacks and harassment of minorities and the criminalisation of Dalits and Adivasis under false accusations of having links with armed Maoist groups, also called Naxals. We took up several cases in which security forces fired on villagers accused of being Naxalites. We were eventually able to prove that these were false accusations.
I dealt with cases against big corporations, so I made powerful enemies. By taking up cases of Adivasis I also annoyed the government. In 2018 I was teaching a course at the national lawyer’s university in Delhi and that’s when I was arrested.
Can you tell us about your experience in detention?
Because the case was in Pune, I was initially sent to the women’s wing of the Yervada central jail, which is a prison for convicts. I was taken there with another activist, Shoma Sen. As soon as we were brought there, we experienced attacks on our dignity. We were asked to strip and squat. We were isolated: kept in separate cells, unable to communicate with other prisoners, led out into a yard for only half an hour a day. We were under constant surveillance.
In the winter it was very cold. We spend most of the time reading, although we struggled to get books. Because the library was in the men’s side of the jail, only 25 books were brought at a time. We were allowed to keep only two or three with us in our cell. We also had issues with access to water and sometimes had to carry in buckets. Shoma struggled with severe arthritis.
Later on, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) took over our case, so we were moved to Byculla jail in Mumbai. This jail was extremely overcrowded, and we lacked any privacy. We would sleep right next to one another on coffin-sized strips of the floor which were allotted to us by the kamwali (staff) in charge of the barracks. There were also limited bathrooms to share.
Social distancing was impossible, and during the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, many detainees got infected and were stuffed in a quarantine barrack. I did not become seriously sick but both Shoma and I requested medical bail due to underlying conditions. This was systematically denied.
Due to the pandemic, we were totally cut off from the outside world and were not taken to the courts for about five or six months. Then PUCL and other groups requested the Bombay High Courts to authorise telephone calls and we were allowed to speak to our families for 10 minutes once a week. Our lawyers could talk to us by sending an email to the jail, and the jail would allow us to phone them back - for 10 minutes, twice a week. That’s how we were able to tell them about prison conditions. I also tried to help people around us who were old or sick to write petitions.
How did you feel when you were finally granted bail, and what’s next?
The bail order was issued on 1 December 2021. I felt extremely disappointed that other activists linked to the case were not released with me. My request for bail was accepted on technical grounds. I heard the NIA appealed to the Supreme Court to overturn my bail, but it was immediately dismissed.
On 8 December I was taken to the court, given cash bail, and asked to produce sureties. When I came back to the jail, many detainees celebrated for me and gave me their requests. I was released the next day.
The bail conditions have restricted me to Mumbai, which is not my city. Friends have been very helpful, but I don’t have a home or work here so I’m still trying to adjust to the situation. I would like to continue my practice on behalf of prisoners and trade unions. For now, I have to attend court hearings and check-in at the police station every two weeks.
How have the conditions for activism in India changed while you were in jail?
Even before I went to jail things were already challenging, but since I was released, I have seen increasing attacks against minorities, notably Muslims. There has been a rise in hate speech, which seems to be manufactured and copiously funded, especially on social media.
The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), passed in December 2019, is discriminatory against minorities. There was a strong movement against the CAA law, in many places led by Muslim women, but this was shut down due to the pandemic.
We are also seeing that many institutions that are supposed to be independent – such as the Election Commission and investigating agencies – are being manipulated by the government. There are even concerns about the independence of the National Human Rights Commission, which has failed to take a proactive role on many important issues. The undermining of these institutions will affect their roles in their future, even if the government changes.
The government is dealing with dissent in very concerning ways. One clear example is the increasing surveillance of journalists, activists, and advocates. A lot of us involved in the case had our phones infected by Pegasus spyware. We have approached the Supreme Court-appointed Technical Committee looking into the use of Pegasus against Indian citizens and it has decided to request our phones from the NIA and undertake an inquiry.
There are also concerns about the impacts of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA) on civil society. If you advocate for workers, Indigenous peoples or poor communities, your work is considered a political activity and you are barred from doing it. Larger CSOs with FCRA registration should be able to support smaller CSOs on the ground, but the government is depriving them of the ability of distributing funds to local grassroots groups and reaching out to real beneficiaries.
Where do you see positive change coming from in India?
One beacon of hope is the farmers’ movement. The opposition was against the farm bills proposed by the government, but it was unable to stop them. It was farmers themselves who stopped them, by standing their ground for almost one year in the heat, cold and rain. Thousands of criminal cases were brought against farmers, and they were smeared as terrorists. But they managed to hold their ground, build unity and push back. The key lesson here is that people must get organised.
I think that if it hadn’t been for the pandemic, the anti-CAA law movement would have had similar results. Students are also an important force, but we are seeing them facing attacks to prevent them organising and speaking up. But they will find a way to continue their struggle.
At a time when many internal mechanisms are failing us, international scrutiny and pressure are also key to improving the situation. There are international standards India cannot ignore. But of late, the Indian government has taken a problematic attitude towards UN bodies, including UN missions to Kashmir, and has gone as far as preventing people from speaking at or participating in international conferences. When UN Special Rapporteurs have made comments on human rights in India, the response has been dismissive and disparaging.
The government often uses terrorism and national security as an excuse for all kinds of human rights abuses. It is important to put the spotlight on this and not let the government get away with it.
Civic space inIndia is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Sudha was one of our #StandAsMyWitness faces. The campaign advocates for the release of Human Rights Defenders behind bars. In 2021, we welcomed the news of the release of three Human Rights Defenders -including Sudha-, and we continue to use our voices to call for the release of all other detained activists. Head to the official campaign page to read more about the current faces featured and join us in standing as their witnesses!
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INDIA: ‘We have achieved a historic labour rights win for female Dalit workers’
CIVICUS speaks about a recent labour rights victory in India’s garment industry with Jeeva M, General Secretary of the Tamil Nadu Textile and Common Labour Union (TTCU).TTCU is a women-led independent and majority Dalit trade union of textile workers that represents 11,000 female workers in Tamil Nadu, India. Jeeva, who hails from the Dalit community, has worked for more than five years in the Tamil Nadu textile industry, including at Eastman Exports. She is a founding member of TTCU and has led struggles for decent work and violence-free workplaces in the garment industry for more than a decade.
What is the Dindigul Agreement, and how significant is it?
The Dindigul Agreement was signed in April 2021 by TTCU and Eastman Exports, one of the largest textile producers in India, which supplies knitwear, apparel and accessories to major global clothing brands. Its aim is to end caste-based and gender-based violence and harassment (GBVH) at Eastman factories and spinning mills in Dindigul, a city in India’s Tamil Nadu state.
This is a historic labour rights win for around 5,000 mostly female Dalit workers, who are placed at the bottom of India’s caste system.
The Dindigul Agreement includes an enforceable brand agreement (EBA), a type of legally binding agreement in which multinational companies commit to use their supply chain relationships to support a worker-led or union-led programme at particular factories or worksites. In this case, TTCU, the Asia Floor Wage Alliance (AFWA) and Global Labour Justice-International Labour Rights Forum (GLJ-ILRF) have signed an EBA with the multinational fashion company H&M, which requires H&M to support and enforce the Dindigul Agreement. If Eastman Exports violates its commitments, H&M must take steps to penalise the company, including by reducing business, until it comes into compliance.
This agreement is the first of its kind in India, the only EBA to cover spinning mills and the first to include explicit protections against caste-based discrimination, a problem that intensified during the pandemic.
The Dindigul Agreement is in line with the International Labour Organization’s Convention 190 concerning the elimination of violence and harassment in the workplace. It creates structures that will empower female workers, supported by their union, to monitor and seek redress for GBVH. It also provides a new model for brands, suppliers and trade unions to cooperate to prevent and respond to GBVH in garment supply chains.
What tipped the balance in favour of the agreement after so many years of efforts?
Civil society has advocated for better working conditions for Dalit workers for many years, but it was not until the murder of Jeyasre Kathiravel, a Dalit woman garment worker and member of TTCU, that we succeeded in addressing the extreme problems of GBVH pervasive in this industry. The killing of Jeyasre by her supervisor in January 2021 prompted TTCU to shed light on the situation at the factory where she was killed.
In response, TTCU, AFWA and GLJ-ILRF formed a unique partnership and launched the #JusticeforJeyasre campaign in India and other Asian countries as well as in Europe and the USA. Over 90 international unions, labour groups and women’s rights organisations joined to urge international brands and Eastman Exports to sign a binding agreement to end GBVH.
A year-long campaign ensued, including an international vigil for Jeyasre held across 33 countries and an 11-city speaking tour across the USA to raise awareness about her case and the need to address GBVH in global supply chains. This enabled the civil society coalition to lead the negotiations that concluded with the historic agreement.
What other challenges do Dalit workers face in India, and what needs to be done to improve their situations?
Caste discrimination permeates every aspect of society. Due to its systemic nature, workplaces and supply chains are likely to be affected by it unless special measures to counter it are put in place.
For instance, Dalit workers experience poorer working conditions than non-Dalits, including longer working hours, sexual harassment, lower wages, dirtier or more hazardous tasks and abusive language and gestures. We also face discrimination at the hiring stage – for instance, qualified applicants from Dalit communities are not considered for skilled jobs – and encounter discrimination in accessing services and utilities offered by the employer, such as housing, healthcare and education and training.
With approximately 80 per cent of the bonded workforce coming from the Dalit community, strong measures need to be put in place to address bonded or forced labour and to ensure that employment in this sector is not forced.
Important measures to advance Dalit workers’ labour rights include ensuring the freedom of association and collective bargaining, improving working conditions, paying living wages and implementing binding agreements such as the Dindigul Agreement to address caste-based discrimination and GBVH in sectors where the workforce is mostly made up of Dalit women.
What’s next for the civil society groups involved in the Dindigul Agreement?
Through the campaign and negotiation process, TTCU built strong forward momentum and gained respect from the factory and brands. TTCU, AFWA and GLJ-ILRF have built a powerful coalition of unions, women’s rights groups and Dalit rights advocates, among others. Now the agreements have been signed, we need to keep that momentum. We will continue to keep our allies engaged in the implementation phase and as we work to drive industry-wide change.
We see the Dindigul Agreement as part of a regional movement against GBVH in garment supply chains. We plan to use it as a model for organising against GBVH across the industry and the region. We are already calling on more brands to join this agreement and working with them to expand it. There will surely be challenges, but we are confident we will overcome them.
Civic space in India is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with AFWA through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@asia_floorwage,@tamil_labour and@GLJhub on Twitter.