asia

• INDIA: ‘CSOs that dare speak truth to power are attacked with politically motivated charges’

  

  CIVICUS speaks to human rights lawyer and researcher Mrinal Sharma about the state of civic freedoms in India. Mrinal works to help unlawfully detained human rights defenders, asylum seekers, refugees and stateless persons in India. She worked as Policy Advisor with Amnesty International India until the Government of India forced the organisation to shut down in October 2020. Her work with Amnesty focused on people who are arbitrarily deprived of their nationality in Assam, the barriers against access to justice in Kashmir and the demonisation of minorities in India. Mrinal had previously worked with the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative and Refugee Solidarity Network.

• INDIA: ‘Muslim girls are being forced to choose between education and the hijab’

  CIVICUS speaks about the recent ban on the hijab, a headscarf worn by Muslim women, in educational institutions in the Indian state of Karnataka with Zakia Soman, a women’s rights activist and co-founder of the Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan (Indian Muslim Women's Movement, BMMA).

  Founded in 2007, BMMA is an independent, secular, rights-based civil society organisation (CSO) that advocates for the rights of women and the Muslim minority in India.

  Why have girls wearing the hijab been banned from school in Karnataka state?

  Girls in hijab were denied entry into classrooms in the name of the school uniform rules, with the authorities citing a circular that states that each student must comply with the uniform requirement in school. Both the Karnataka government and the high court played the uniform card to justify preventing Muslim women wearing the hijab from entering the college campus.

  While educational institutions undeniably have the right to set their own rules, these cannot infringe the fundamental rights granted by the Indian Constitution. According to Article 25 of our constitution, all citizens are guaranteed the right to freedom of conscience as well as freedoms to profess, practise and propagate religion.

  And under no circumstance can a dress code for schoolgirls be more important than education itself. Muslim girls have the right to be in school with or without the hijab, which is why I oppose those who promote the court’s verdict as a decision that empowers women. Although I don’t believe in the hijab, I think it is wrong to discriminate against girls wearing it. Our nation will only progress when girls have access to education regardless of their religious affiliation.

  Does the hijab row indicate the rise of anti-minorities voices in India?

  Although it may sound like an internal disciplinary matter over girls wearing the hijab, the wider context of the hijab row is one of religious polarisation and politics of hate towards Muslims. The hijab row is an integral part of the politics of religious hate in India’s polarised milieu, where Muslims are the target of the growing anti-Islam propaganda aired on TV as well as on social media platforms.

  There is a spiralling nationwide campaign against the Muslim community under the garb of religious festivities. Journalists and other monitors have found deliberate, concerted violence against life, property and businesses of India’s Muslim community carried out by hooligans claiming to celebrate religious festivals in the states of Delhi, Gujrat, Karnataka and many others. But ultimately, the Indian state must be held responsible for the terrible living conditions experienced by millions of Muslims.

  How has civil society responded to the ban?

  Civil society has extended solidarity to the affected girls and has supported them. However, civil society’s response has so far failed to impress the government and the high court, which sadly ruled to uphold the hijab ban inside classrooms in Karnataka state.

  As for opposition parties, they have been unable to run a sustained campaign to challenge the climate created by hate speech and open calls for the genocide of Muslims. This is why it’s so important for the international community to stand up and support the voices of sanity in India.

  What have pro-hijab protests achieved so far?

  Peaceful protests have been held in support of Muslim women’s right to wear the hijab in educational institutions. However, I am afraid that conservative elements of the Muslim community got involved in the protests in a way that aggravated matters, making Muslim girls and their families even more vulnerable to political onslaught.

  In my understanding, neither the hijab nor the burqa, a full body covering, is mandatory in Islam; however, patriarchal elements would like to put every Muslim girl and woman behind a burqa or hijab. The matter could have been easily resolved through dialogue between college authorities and parents. Instead, it got politicised, with different religious and political outfits jumping in the fray with their radical and antagonistic positions.

  As a result, Muslim girls found themselves in a tough position, being forced to choose between education and the hijab, which is outright unfair to them. Since many Muslim parents will not allow girls to go to school without the hijab and schools will not give them entry into class with the hijab, many girls have dropped out of their studies and have not sat their exams.

  Civic space in India is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with BMMA through itswebsite and follow@BMMA_India on Twitter.

• INDIA: ‘The government is dealing with dissent in very concerning ways’

  CIVICUS speaks Sudha Bharadwaj, a lawyer and long-time human rights defender working for the rights of workers and Indigenous peoples in India.

  Sudha wasarrested and detained in August 2018 under the draconian Unlawful Activities Prevention Act and accused of having links with Maoist terrorist organisations. Alongside 15 other human rights defenders, she was further accused of conspiring to incite violence among the Dalit community. Despiteproof that incriminating evidence against them was planted,concerns expressed by United Nations (UN) experts about the arbitrary charges and UN calls to release political prisoners from crowded jails during the pandemic, requests for Sudha’s release, including on health grounds, were repeatedlyrejected. She was finallyreleased on bail in December 2021 after three years in detention.

  How did you get involved in human rights work?

  For the last 35 years I have been working in Chhattisgarh, an area in eastern India that is very rich in mineral resources. I began around 1986 as a trade unionist and worked with a legendary union leader, Shankar Guha Niyog, who was organising iron ore miners. Conditions were appalling. Workers were not unionised, working hours were long, wages were very paltry and even the very basic labour laws of our country were not being applied.

  I became a lawyer basically because my trade union needed one. I graduated in 2000, at the age of 40. I initially took up matters of our own union and later I shifted to work at the high court, where I realised contractual workers, farmers resisting land acquisition and Adivasi Indigenous groups resisting mining projects were forced to face very expensive corporate lawyers without any real legal assistance. They needed lawyers who understood them and who could devise legal strategies compatible with the tactics of their movements.

  I started a group of lawyers to provide legal aid to unions, farmers’ and village organisations, Adivasi communities, and civil society organisations (CSOs). Around this time, I became involved in the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), one of the oldest human rights organisations in India. We dealt with various human rights issues, including attacks and harassment of minorities and the criminalisation of Dalits and Adivasis under false accusations of having links with armed Maoist groups, also called Naxals. We took up several cases in which security forces fired on villagers accused of being Naxalites. We were eventually able to prove that these were false accusations.

  I dealt with cases against big corporations, so I made powerful enemies. By taking up cases of Adivasis I also annoyed the government. In 2018 I was teaching a course at the national lawyer’s university in Delhi and that’s when I was arrested.

  Can you tell us about your experience in detention?

  Because the case was in Pune, I was initially sent to the women’s wing of the Yervada central jail, which is a prison for convicts. I was taken there with another activist, Shoma Sen. As soon as we were brought there, we experienced attacks on our dignity. We were asked to strip and squat. We were isolated: kept in separate cells, unable to communicate with other prisoners, led out into a yard for only half an hour a day. We were under constant surveillance.

  In the winter it was very cold. We spend most of the time reading, although we struggled to get books. Because the library was in the men’s side of the jail, only 25 books were brought at a time. We were allowed to keep only two or three with us in our cell. We also had issues with access to water and sometimes had to carry in buckets. Shoma struggled with severe arthritis. 

  Later on, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) took over our case, so we were moved to Byculla jail in Mumbai. This jail was extremely overcrowded, and we lacked any privacy. We would sleep right next to one another on coffin-sized strips of the floor which were allotted to us by the kamwali (staff) in charge of the barracks. There were also limited bathrooms to share.

  Social distancing was impossible, and during the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, many detainees got infected and were stuffed in a quarantine barrack. I did not become seriously sick but both Shoma and I requested medical bail due to underlying conditions. This was systematically denied.

  Due to the pandemic, we were totally cut off from the outside world and were not taken to the courts for about five or six months. Then PUCL and other groups requested the Bombay High Courts to authorise telephone calls and we were allowed to speak to our families for 10 minutes once a week. Our lawyers could talk to us by sending an email to the jail, and the jail would allow us to phone them back - for 10 minutes, twice a week. That’s how we were able to tell them about prison conditions. I also tried to help people around us who were old or sick to write petitions.

  How did you feel when you were finally granted bail, and what’s next?

  The bail order was issued on 1 December 2021. I felt extremely disappointed that other activists linked to the case were not released with me. My request for bail was accepted on technical grounds. I heard the NIA appealed to the Supreme Court to overturn my bail, but it was immediately dismissed.

  On 8 December I was taken to the court, given cash bail, and asked to produce sureties. When I came back to the jail, many detainees celebrated for me and gave me their requests. I was released the next day.

  The bail conditions have restricted me to Mumbai, which is not my city. Friends have been very helpful, but I don’t have a home or work here so I’m still trying to adjust to the situation. I would like to continue my practice on behalf of prisoners and trade unions. For now, I have to attend court hearings and check-in at the police station every two weeks.

  How have the conditions for activism in India changed while you were in jail?

  Even before I went to jail things were already challenging, but since I was released, I have seen increasing attacks against minorities, notably Muslims. There has been a rise in hate speech, which seems to be manufactured and copiously funded, especially on social media.

  The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), passed in December 2019, is discriminatory against minorities. There was a strong movement against the CAA law, in many places led by Muslim women, but this was shut down due to the pandemic.

  We are also seeing that many institutions that are supposed to be independent – such as the Election Commission and investigating agencies – are being manipulated by the government. There are even concerns about the independence of the National Human Rights Commission, which has failed to take a proactive role on many important issues. The undermining of these institutions will affect their roles in their future, even if the government changes.

  The government is dealing with dissent in very concerning ways. One clear example is the increasing surveillance of journalists, activists, and advocates. A lot of us involved in the case had our phones infected by Pegasus spyware. We have approached the Supreme Court-appointed Technical Committee looking into the use of Pegasus against Indian citizens and it has decided to request our phones from the NIA and undertake an inquiry.

  There are also concerns about the impacts of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA) on civil society. If you advocate for workers, Indigenous peoples or poor communities, your work is considered a political activity and you are barred from doing it. Larger CSOs with FCRA registration should be able to support smaller CSOs on the ground, but the government is depriving them of the ability of distributing funds to local grassroots groups and reaching out to real beneficiaries.

  Where do you see positive change coming from in India?

  One beacon of hope is the farmers’ movement. The opposition was against the farm bills proposed by the government, but it was unable to stop them. It was farmers themselves who stopped them, by standing their ground for almost one year in the heat, cold and rain. Thousands of criminal cases were brought against farmers, and they were smeared as terrorists. But they managed to hold their ground, build unity and push back. The key lesson here is that people must get organised.

  I think that if it hadn’t been for the pandemic, the anti-CAA law movement would have had similar results. Students are also an important force, but we are seeing them facing attacks to prevent them organising and speaking up. But they will find a way to continue their struggle.

  At a time when many internal mechanisms are failing us, international scrutiny and pressure are also key to improving the situation. There are international standards India cannot ignore. But of late, the Indian government has taken a problematic attitude towards UN bodies, including UN missions to Kashmir, and has gone as far as preventing people from speaking at or participating in international conferences. When UN Special Rapporteurs have made comments on human rights in India, the response has been dismissive and disparaging.

  The government often uses terrorism and national security as an excuse for all kinds of human rights abuses. It is important to put the spotlight on this and not let the government get away with it.

  Civic space inIndia is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor. 

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  Sudha was one of our #StandAsMyWitness faces. The campaign advocates for the release of Human Rights Defenders behind bars. In 2021, we welcomed the news of the release of three Human Rights Defenders -including Sudha-, and we continue to use our voices to call for the release of all other detained activists. Head to the official campaign page to read more about the current faces featured and join us in standing as their witnesses!

  

   

• INDIA: ‘We have achieved a historic labour rights win for female Dalit workers’

  CIVICUS speaks about a recent labour rights victory in India’s garment industry with Jeeva M, General Secretary of the Tamil Nadu Textile and Common Labour Union (TTCU).

  TTCU is a women-led independent and majority Dalit trade union of textile workers that represents 11,000 female workers in Tamil Nadu, India. Jeeva, who hails from the Dalit community, has worked for more than five years in the Tamil Nadu textile industry, including at Eastman Exports. She is a founding member of TTCU and has led struggles for decent work and violence-free workplaces in the garment industry for more than a decade.

  What is the Dindigul Agreement, and how significant is it?

  The Dindigul Agreement was signed in April 2021 by TTCU and Eastman Exports, one of the largest textile producers in India, which supplies knitwear, apparel and accessories to major global clothing brands. Its aim is to end caste-based and gender-based violence and harassment (GBVH) at Eastman factories and spinning mills in Dindigul, a city in India’s Tamil Nadu state.

  This is a historic labour rights win for around 5,000 mostly female Dalit workers, who are placed at the bottom of India’s caste system.

  The Dindigul Agreement includes an enforceable brand agreement (EBA), a type of legally binding agreement in which multinational companies commit to use their supply chain relationships to support a worker-led or union-led programme at particular factories or worksites. In this case, TTCU, the Asia Floor Wage Alliance (AFWA) and Global Labour Justice-International Labour Rights Forum (GLJ-ILRF) have signed an EBA with the multinational fashion company H&M, which requires H&M to support and enforce the Dindigul Agreement. If Eastman Exports violates its commitments, H&M must take steps to penalise the company, including by reducing business, until it comes into compliance.

  This agreement is the first of its kind in India, the only EBA to cover spinning mills and the first to include explicit protections against caste-based discrimination, a problem that intensified during the pandemic.

  The Dindigul Agreement is in line with the International Labour Organization’s Convention 190 concerning the elimination of violence and harassment in the workplace. It creates structures that will empower female workers, supported by their union, to monitor and seek redress for GBVH. It also provides a new model for brands, suppliers and trade unions to cooperate to prevent and respond to GBVH in garment supply chains.

  What tipped the balance in favour of the agreement after so many years of efforts?

  Civil society has advocated for better working conditions for Dalit workers for many years, but it was not until the murder of Jeyasre Kathiravel, a Dalit woman garment worker and member of TTCU, that we succeeded in addressing the extreme problems of GBVH pervasive in this industry. The killing of Jeyasre by her supervisor in January 2021 prompted TTCU to shed light on the situation at the factory where she was killed.

  In response, TTCU, AFWA and GLJ-ILRF formed a unique partnership and launched the #JusticeforJeyasre campaign in India and other Asian countries as well as in Europe and the USA. Over 90 international unions, labour groups and women’s rights organisations joined to urge international brands and Eastman Exports to sign a binding agreement to end GBVH.

  A year-long campaign ensued, including an international vigil for Jeyasre held across 33 countries and an 11-city speaking tour across the USA to raise awareness about her case and the need to address GBVH in global supply chains. This enabled the civil society coalition to lead the negotiations that concluded with the historic agreement.

  What other challenges do Dalit workers face in India, and what needs to be done to improve their situations?

  Caste discrimination permeates every aspect of society. Due to its systemic nature, workplaces and supply chains are likely to be affected by it unless special measures to counter it are put in place.

  For instance, Dalit workers experience poorer working conditions than non-Dalits, including longer working hours, sexual harassment, lower wages, dirtier or more hazardous tasks and abusive language and gestures. We also face discrimination at the hiring stage – for instance, qualified applicants from Dalit communities are not considered for skilled jobs – and encounter discrimination in accessing services and utilities offered by the employer, such as housing, healthcare and education and training.

  With approximately 80 per cent of the bonded workforce coming from the Dalit community, strong measures need to be put in place to address bonded or forced labour and to ensure that employment in this sector is not forced.

  Important measures to advance Dalit workers’ labour rights include ensuring the freedom of association and collective bargaining, improving working conditions, paying living wages and implementing binding agreements such as the Dindigul Agreement to address caste-based discrimination and GBVH in sectors where the workforce is mostly made up of Dalit women.

  What’s next for the civil society groups involved in the Dindigul Agreement?

  Through the campaign and negotiation process, TTCU built strong forward momentum and gained respect from the factory and brands. TTCU, AFWA and GLJ-ILRF have built a powerful coalition of unions, women’s rights groups and Dalit rights advocates, among others. Now the agreements have been signed, we need to keep that momentum. We will continue to keep our allies engaged in the implementation phase and as we work to drive industry-wide change.

  We see the Dindigul Agreement as part of a regional movement against GBVH in garment supply chains. We plan to use it as a model for organising against GBVH across the industry and the region. We are already calling on more brands to join this agreement and working with them to expand it. There will surely be challenges, but we are confident we will overcome them.

  Civic space in India is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with AFWA through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@asia_floorwage,@tamil_labour and@GLJhub on Twitter. 

• INDIA: “Las organizaciones de la sociedad civil que se atreven a decirle la verdad al poder son atacadas”

  CIVICUS habla con la abogada e investigadora de derechos humanos Mrinal Sharma acerca del estado de las libertades cívicas en India. Mrinal trabaja ayudando a personas defensoras de derechos humanos ilegalmente detenidas y a solicitantes de asilo, refugiados y apátridas en India. Trabajó como Asesora de Políticsa en Amnistía Internacional India hasta que el gobierno de este país obligó a la organización a cerrar en octubre de 2020. Su trabajo con Amnistía se enfocó en las personas privadas arbitrariamente de su nacionalidad en Assam, en las barreras para el acceso a la justicia en Cachemira y en la demonización de las minorías en toda India. Mrinal había trabajado anteriormente en la Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative y en la Refugee Solidarity Network.

  ¿Se están volviendo más restrictivas las condiciones para ejercer las libertades de asociación, reunión pacífica y expresión bajo el gobierno del primer ministro Narendra Modi?

  Ciertamente, el espacio cívico en la India ha experimentado un deterioro gradual bajo el gobierno de Modi. El 90% de los delitos de odio perpetrados en la última década se produjeron después de 2014, es decir, durante el gobierno de Modi. Según la base de datos sobre sedición de Artículo 14, desde 2010 11.000 personas han sido acusadas de sedición en la India. El 96% de los casos de sedición iniciados desde 2010 por criticar al gobierno nacional y a sus líderes fueron iniciados durante el gobierno de Modi. La India no es ajena a la tendencia al bloqueo deliberado del acceso a internet y ostenta el récord de haber impuesto el mayor número de bloqueos de internet en todo el mundo. Según el Internet Shutdown Tracker del Software Freedom Legal Centre, la cantidad de bloqueos de internet ha aumentado constantemente desde 2014. Estos alcanzaron su punto máximo en 2019, lo cual dio cuenta del prolongado apagón de las comunicaciones impuesto por el gobierno indio en Jammu y Cachemira. Además, entre 2012 y 2020, 148 de los 385 bloqueos de internet fueron impuestos para contener “situaciones de orden público” en curso, un eufemismo que suele utilizarse en referencia a las protestas pacíficas. Estos datos indican la magnitud de las restricciones impuestas sobre las libertades de asociación, reunión pacífica y expresión en la India.

  Además, el uso de leyes restrictivas tales como la Ley de Prevención de Actividades Ilegales (UAPA), la Ley de Seguridad Nacional, la Ley de Seguridad Pública y otras leyes de detención preventiva para frenar las protestas contra las políticas discriminatorias del gobierno también se ha convertido en algo habitual. Ni siquiera esta virulenta pandemia ha disuadido al gobierno indio de detener o mantener detenidas a personas defensoras de derechos humanos de avanzada edad o en mal estado de salud, a pesar de la situación de hacinamiento en las cárceles. En julio de 2020, Varavara Rao, un poeta y activista de 81 años que fue acusado en virtud de la UAPA por su presunta participación en actos de violencia ocurridos durante las celebraciones de Bhima Koregaon en 2018, dio positivo para el COVID-19 mientras estaba detenido en una prisión superpoblada de Maharashtra. Tras pasar más de dos años y medio detenido a la espera de juicio y de realizar múltiples intentos fallidos para obtener la libertad bajo fianza, recientemente fue puesto en libertad por seis meses en consideración de su precario estado de salud. Del mismo modo, Safoora Zargar, una investigadora académica que estaba embarazada de tres meses fue acusada bajo la UAPA y detenida en otra prisión superpoblada de Delhi por protestar pacíficamente contra la Ley de Enmienda de la Ciudadanía (CAA). Fue necesario llevar a cabo una intensa campaña pública internacional, nacional y local para que fuera puesta en libertad bajo fianza. Muchos estudiantes siguen detenidos.

  La pandemia ha sido utilizada para activar leyes draconianas de “emergencia”. Estas leyes otorgan amplios poderes al gobierno para detener y encarcelar a cualquiera que infrinja el confinamiento punitivo impuesto para frenar la propagación del virus. Estas leyes fueron aplicadas en forma arbitraria contra periodistas, trabajadores esenciales y personas pertenecientes a grupos excluidos. Algunos fueron incluso torturados y asesinados mientras estaban bajo custodia policial. Según un informe reciente del Proyecto de Justicia Penal y Responsabilidad Policial, la mayoría de los informes contravencionales elevados durante el confinamiento en el estado de Madhya Pradesh fueron contra peatones, y en particular contra vendedores ambulantes y personas en vehículos de dos ruedas, lo cual dejó en evidencia la aplicación discriminatoria de las leyes de emergencia.

  Cabe señalar que la aplicación de estas leyes es un hilo conductor que une a sucesivos gobiernos. La mayoría de estas leyes fueron aprobadas por el gobierno anterior; el gobierno actual simplemente las ha utilizado para atacar a grupos sociales específicos.

  ¿Cuáles son los principales motivos que dan cuenta de los ataques contra activistas y organizaciones de la sociedad civil (OSC)?

  La sociedad civil desempeña un rol muy importante a la hora de acortar distancias entre derechos y derechohabientes. Al hacer ese trabajo, también comprende los defectos de los sistemas sociales y económicos y tiene poder para cambiar el statu quo exigiendo el fin de las desigualdades y desmantelando las estructuras de poder existentes, cosa que ha hecho con éxito en el pasado. Los líderes políticos demonizan a las OSC, desacreditan su trabajo y experiencia y las convierten en chivos expiatorios en función de sus creencias políticas para adquirir poder y beneficiarse políticamente.

  Estos constantes ataques adoptan la forma de restricciones ilegales y uso de términos vagos e imprecisos para describir a las personas defensoras de derechos humanos, a los manifestantes pacíficos y a sus motivaciones, y así moldear a la opinión pública. Entre esos términos se cuentan los de “antinacional”, “naxal urbano” y el más reciente “aandolanjivis” (manifestantes profesionales). Las OSC también son descritas como portadoras de una “ideología extranjera destructiva”, como una elite corrupta y como ese “otro” que trabaja contra el pueblo, mientras que quienes lideran esta demonización son presentados como representantes de ese “pueblo”. Esto aviva aún más las hostilidades entre grupos sociales, distrae al público de las verdaderas taras de la sociedad y habilita la adopción de políticas discriminatorias. Además, la restricción selectiva del derecho de las personas a las libertades de expresión y asociación con el objeto de silenciar las críticas y perpetuar la narrativa del gobierno también conduce efectivamente a la polarización, que es un terreno fértil para promover agendas políticas estrechas.

  ¿Qué cuestiones de derechos humanos son las que más preocupan a Amnistía Internacional en la India?

  La flagrante criminalización del disenso en la India sigue siendo muy preocupante. Las interrupciones masivas de Internet, el uso excesivo, innecesario y a menudo ilegal de la fuerza por parte de la policía y las detenciones ilegales en virtud de las leyes antiterroristas se han convertido en algo demasiado habitual. Dan prueba de ello la respuesta de mano dura del gobierno frente a las protestas pacíficas contra la decisión unilateral de despojar a Jammu y Cachemira de su autonomía constitucionalmente garantizada, en medio de un apagón total de las comunicaciones, la promulgación de la discriminatoria CAA y, más recientemente, la aprobación de tres leyes agrícolas que pretenden desregular la agricultura en la India.

  Desde septiembre de 2020, más de 160 agricultores han muerto mientras protestaban pacíficamente contra las leyes agrícolas. Muchos jóvenes activistas que apoyan a los agricultores están detenidos bajo cargos de sedición. Al menos 50 personas murieron en los disturbios que estallaron en el noreste de Delhi en febrero de 2020. Además, la burbuja de noticias falsas y desinformación facilitada por los modelos de negocios de las grandes empresas tecnológicas, que están basados en la vigilancia, combinada con marcos débiles para la protección de los datos, alimenta constantemente la política de demonización en la India.

  También son preocupantes las represalias del Estado contra quienes denuncian violaciones y delitos de casta, así como la impunidad generalizada por los asesinatos y ataques contra minorías religiosas perpetrados por turbas de civiles armados y policías. A modo de ejemplo, a pesar de las pruebas irrefutables, grabadas en video, que muestran la complicidad de agentes de policía en los disturbios producidos en el noreste de Delhi en febrero de 2020, hasta ahora no hay ningún policía procesado. Al mismo tiempo que se ignoran sistemáticamente la violencia y el discurso de odio de los partidarios de la CAA, los manifestantes contrarios a la CAA siguen siendo acosados e intimidados por el gobierno.

  ¿Podría contarnos acerca de la Ley de Regulación de las Contribuciones Extranjeras (FCRA) y su impacto sobre la sociedad civil?

  La FCRA regula las donaciones extranjeras en la India. Ostensiblemente, fue promulgada para regular las donaciones extranjeras a los partidos políticos y controlar la influencia extranjera en las elecciones indias. Enmendada en múltiples ocasiones desde su aprobación en 2010, se ha convertido en un arma eficaz en manos del gobierno para sofocar a la sociedad civil india. Su versión más reciente impone restricciones discriminatorias al acceso de las OSC a financiamiento, imponiendo procedimientos de autorización onerosos, altamente burocráticos y difíciles de realizar. Desde 2011, según lo admite el propio gobierno, se han cancelado las licencias de más de 20.000 OSC. Las organizaciones que se atreven a decirle la verdad al poder o a cuestionar las violaciones de derechos humanos, como es el caso de Amnistía Internacional India, son atacadas con la FCRA mediante acusaciones motivadas políticamente.

  La última modificación de la FCRA, aprobada en plena pandemia, ha ahogado aún más a la sociedad civil. Prohíbe que los funcionarios públicos reciban fondos extranjeros; prohíbe la transferencia de fondos extranjeros de una organización o individuo a otro, más allá de que cuenten con licencia bajo la FCRA; reduce el límite de utilización del rubro de “gastos administrativos” del 50% al 20%; amplía el periodo de suspensión de la licencia para OSC otorgada por la FCRA de 180 días a un año; y establece que las contribuciones extranjeras solo pueden ser recibidas mediante una cuenta bancaria de la OSC marcada por la FCRA en una sucursal designada del banco estatal situada en Delhi.

  Estas enmiendas estigmatizarán efectivamente la asociación de funcionarios públicos con organizaciones sin fines de lucro, ahogarán las colaboraciones entre OSC y, en particular, aquellas que involucren a OSC más pequeñas y de base, reducirán los fondos asignados para pagar sueldos del personal y realizar proyectos en el terreno que conlleven gastos de viaje, y privarán a las OSC de fondos hasta que el gobierno complete su investigación por presuntas violaciones a la FCRA. También obstaculizarán el trabajo de las OSC que tienen su sede fuera de Nueva Delhi, que constituyen aproximadamente el 93% de s las OSC registradas en la India, ya que imponen innecesarios gastos de viaje, los cuales además se contarían dentro del límite de 20% para gastos administrativos.

  El gobierno tiene la obligación de justificar la imposición de estas estrictas restricciones y la vulneración de los derechos humanos de las personas y organizaciones a asociarse y expresarse libremente. Tiene que demostrar que estas restricciones son realmente legítimas, razonables y proporcionales al daño que buscan evitar, pero no lo ha hecho. De hecho, hizo caso omiso de los reclamos de la sociedad civil para que el proyecto de ley fuera sometido a un comité de personas expertas para generar mayor debate antes de su aprobación. El debate en el Parlamento también fue mínimo.

  La FCRA y sus enmiendas más recientes han sido muy criticadas por la comunidad internacional, y por personalidades como Maina Kiai, ex Relator Especial de las Naciones Unidas (ONU) sobre los derechos a la libertad de reunión pacífica y de asociación, y Michelle Bachelet, Alta Comisionada de la ONU para los derechos humanos, por ser demasiado amplias y vagas. Pero el gobierno no ha hecho caso. A nivel nacional, la Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDH) también ha pedido explicaciones por la cancelación masiva de licencias de la FCRA para las OSC.

  Paradójicamente, los partidos políticos siguen recibiendo fondos extranjeros, lo cual antes estaba prohibido, y lo hacen con mínimas restricciones. De hecho, a pesar de que los partidos políticos violan recurrentemente la FCRA, ahora no solamente les resulta más fácil recibir fondos, sino que además el proceso se ha vuelto mucho más opaco. A modo de ejemplo, en 2014 el Tribunal Superior de Delhi dictaminó que el partido gobernante, Bharatiya Janata, y el Congreso Nacional Indio habían violado la FCRA al aceptar fondos extranjeros. En 2016 y luego en 2018, el gobierno indio modificó la FCRA para legalizar el financiamiento extranjero para los partidos políticos y eximir a éstos del escrutinio no solo de los fondos que les llegaran en el futuro, sino también de los que ya les habían sido donados en el pasado. En diciembre de 2020, la Comisión Central de Información, a cargo de la implementación de la Ley de Derecho a la Información de 2005, dictaminó que la revelación pública de la identidad de los donantes de los partidos políticos no sirve a ningún interés público, y por lo tanto no es necesaria.

  Esta clara diferencia entre el trato que reciben los partidos políticos y las OSC debería bastar para entender las turbias motivaciones subyacentes a la FCRA.

  ¿Por qué Amnistía India fue obligada a cerrar, y cuáles han sido las consecuencias?

  Amnistía Internacional India se vio obligada a cerrar como represalia por la publicación de dos informes críticos que ponían de manifiesto la situación de derechos humanos en Cachemira y destacaban el papel de la policía de Delhi en los disturbios que tuvieron lugar en el noreste de Delhi en febrero de 2020. Poco después de que publicara estos informes, todas sus cuentas bancarias fueron congeladas. El gobierno no proporcionó ninguna advertencia ni aviso previo, ni ofreció ninguna razón para congelar las cuentas bancarias. Al no poder acceder a los fondos que había recaudado localmente, a partir de contribuciones de la ciudadanía india, Amnistía Internacional India se vio obligada a suspender todas sus actividades y a despedir a todo su personal.

  Para Amnistía Internacional India el acoso y la intimidación a causa de su trabajo de derechos humanos no era ninguna novedad. Desde 2016 enfrentaba una incesante campaña de desprestigio por parte del gobierno y de los medios de comunicación afines al gobierno. En 2018 soportó un allanamiento de 10 horas de duración por parte de la Dirección de Ejecución, tras el cual se vio obligada a despedir a varios miembros de su personal, lo cual afectó negativamente a su trabajo en la India, y en particular a su labor con comunidades excluidas. Aunque los tribunales emitieron una medida cautelar en favor de la organización, su buen funcionamiento se vio dificultado por la persecución mediática y la reducción de sus capacidades. Es importante señalar que hasta el día de hoy no se han presentado acusaciones formales contra la organización. Un año después, en noviembre de 2019, en medio de rumores de la inminente detención de sus altos funcionarios, las oficinas de Amnistía Internacional India y la residencia de uno de sus directores volvieron sufrir allanamientos, esta vez por parte de la Oficina Central de Investigación, la principal agencia de investigación del país, dependiente del gobierno central. Sin embargo, la organización siguió trabajando, desafiando estos ataques contra ella y sus empleados.

  Pero esta vez los ataques fueron más encarnizados. El impacto inmediato del cierre ha recaído sobre el personal de Amnistía Internacional India -investigadores, responsables de campañas, recaudadores de fondos-, que perdieron sus empleos de la noche a la mañana sin recibir ninguna indemnización, en el contexto de una recesión económica que se ha visto agravada por la pandemia. Los grandes proyectos de investigación y las campañas que llevaba a cabo Amnistía Internacional India se han paralizado. Habría que dejarle en claro al gobierno indio que, con la excusa de sujetar a controles a una supuesta “entidad extranjera”, todo lo que ha hecho es privar de sus medios de vida a muchos de sus propios ciudadanos. Y, lo que es aún más importante, ahora hay una voz menos exigiendo al gobierno indio que rinda cuentas de sus excesos y su inacción.

  ¿Hay otras organizaciones de derechos humanos que estén enfrentando desafíos similares?

  Varias OSC que han cuestionado o criticado las políticas del gobierno han enfrentado desafíos similares en relación con la FCRA. People’s Watch, Indian Social Action Forum, Hazards Centre, Greenpeace India, Sabrang Trust, Navsarjan Trust, Act Now for Harmony and Democracy, Indian Social Action Forum y Lawyers Collective son algunos de los grupos que han recibido acusaciones motivadas políticamente en virtud de la FCRA. Esto no es un accidente. Existe un patrón deliberado de silenciamiento de los grupos de derechos humanos mediante su trato como empresas criminales y la presentación de los disidentes como delincuentes. Lawyers Collective, por ejemplo, ha trabajado ampliamente con las víctimas de los ataques contra musulmanes de 2002 en Gujarat. People’s Watch ha hecho activamente campaña contra los abusos contra personas detenidas. Greenpeace India ha estado a la vanguardia de la lucha por el derecho a la tierra y contra el cambio climático y el impacto medioambiental de la minería del carbón.

  Además de la FCRA, otras leyes draconianas contribuyen a crear un entorno incapacitante para la labor de derechos humanos en India. Entre ellas están la UAPA, la Ley de Seguridad Pública y la Ley de Seguridad Nacional. Anunciadas como leyes antiterroristas o leyes que castigan “delitos contra el Estado”, han creado un sistema de impunidad y constituyen herramientas eficaces para mantener a la gente en la cárcel durante períodos prolongados. El índice de condenas en virtud de estas leyes es realmente bajo. Según la Oficina Nacional de Registros de Delitos, en 2018 más del 93% de los casos iniciados bajo la UAPA seguían pendientes de tratamiento en los tribunales, mientras que la tasa de condenas en virtud de la UAPA era de apenas 27%. Desde 2016, solo siete casos de sedición han terminado en condena. Según una investigación anterior de Amnistía Internacional India, alrededor del 58% de las órdenes de detención dictadas entre 2007 y 2016 en virtud de la Ley de Seguridad Pública, que se aplica en Jammu y Cachemira y permite la detención administrativa sin acusaciones ni juicio, fueron anuladas por el Tribunal Superior de Jammu y Cachemira. Entre marzo de 2016 y julio de 2017, el 81% de las órdenes de detención fueron anuladas. Esto demuestra que estas leyes son utilizadas para privar a las personas de su libertad de movimiento y de expresión durante el tiempo en que sus casos avanzan en los tribunales.

  ¿Qué puede hacer la comunidad internacional para apoyar a los grupos de derechos humanos y ampliar el espacio cívico en la India?

  En términos generales, la comunidad internacional debe amplificar las voces de quienes están al frente de la lucha contra las violaciones de derechos humanos en la India. Al mismo tiempo, debe dejar de asumir una posición moral elevada y desestimar las preocupaciones de la gente, reales o proyectadas, sobre la seguridad, el bienestar y el desarrollo. En cambio, debe centrarse en combatir el discurso que transforma a la sociedad civil en un “otro” rechazado y proyectar una visión de un mundo más justo, sostenible y equitativo – un mundo no puede lograrse en ausencia de una sociedad civil robusta que trabaje sin descanso para la gente a lo largo y a lo ancho del país. También debe mantenerse más cerca de las comunidades locales.

  En concreto, debe lograr que el Estado indio se responsabilice por todas las obligaciones internacionales en materia de derechos humanos que ha respaldado y aprobado y en las que se basa, mientras pelea por tener un lugar más importante en la mesa. Han pasado 24 años desde que India presentó al Comité de Derechos Humanos de la ONU un informe sobre el cumplimiento de sus obligaciones en virtud del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, del cual es Estado parte. La CNDH, el principal órgano de vigilancia de los derechos humanos de la India, no alcanza los niveles mínimos establecidos por los Principios de París para las instituciones nacionales de derechos humanos, pero sigue manteniendo una acreditación de categoría A y, por lo tanto, puede participar en el Consejo de Derechos Humanos de la ONU. La comunidad internacional debe exigir sistemáticamente la reforma de la CNDH y exigirle que rinda cuentas de la disminución de la protección de que gozan las personas defensoras de derechos humanos en la India. Los grupos de derechos humanos deberían poder confiar plenamente en las instituciones de derechos humanos de su país.

  El espacio cívico en India es calificado de “represivo” por elCIVICUS Monitor.

  Siga las actualizaciones de Amnistía Internacional sobre la India a través de susitio web.

• India: Death of priest highlights persecution of human rights defenders under Modi government

  "Human rights activism should not amount to the equivalent of a death sentence,” says CIVICUS, after receiving the devastating news that #Indian activist, Fr. #StanSwamy who had been held in pre-trial detention on trumped up charges had died in hospital.
  🧾https://t.co/hGmmxvknm3 pic.twitter.com/ilwQOSNtnQ

  — CIVICUS (@CIVICUSalliance) July 5, 2021

  The death of Jesuit priest and human rights defender Father Stan Swamy, today, has deeply shocked and outraged global civil society alliance CIVICUS. Swamy’s death is a result of the persecution he has faced by the Modi government after revealing abuses by the state.

• India: End communication blockade in Jammu and Kashmir without further delay

  

  Kathmandu/Bangkok/Paris/Geneva, 4 October 2019:

  Today completes two months of the unprecedented communication blockade in Jammu and Kashmir, India. The Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), CIVICUS, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), and the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) urge the government of India to immediately restore internet and mobile phone connections in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. We are deeply concerned over the wide-ranging impact on the enjoyment of basic human rights caused by this continuous restriction on communications.

  Internet shutdowns, of which there have been dozens in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir since the beginning of the year, have significant consequences, negatively impacting the economy, education, access to health care and emergency services, press freedom, freedom of expression, and the right to engage in political decision making. This is particularly grave given the context, in which the government of India, on 5 August, 2019, revoked the autonomous status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and bifurcated the State into two Union Territories. With the suspension of communications, people have effectively been denied the right to make informed political opinions and to express themselves regarding these decisions.

  Although limited landline connections were reportedly restored across Jammu and Kashmir on 13 September 2019, access to those connections remains limited. No enforceable law in India permits such unprecedented and prolonged internet shutdown without any valid justification. Moreover, freedom of expression is protected under Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which India is a state party, and under Article 19 of the Indian Constitution.

  A petition filed before the Supreme Court of India noted that the communication shutdown had fueled “anxiety, panic, alarm, insecurity and fear among the residents of Kashmir” and created hurdles for journalists to report on the situation in the region. In a statement on 22 August 2019, five UN human rights experts expressed deep concern over the shutdown and called it “inconsistent with the fundamental norms of necessity and proportionality.’

  There have also been reports of hundreds of detentions of political activists, human rights defenders, community leaders, and others, including children between 9 and 11 years of age, under the draconian Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act (PSA) of 1978, which permits preventive detention without charge. The communication blockade has also impeded access to legal aid.

  FORUM-ASIA, CIVICUS, FIDH, and OMCT strongly believe that this prolonged restriction on communication, coupled with arbitrary mass detentions, denial of freedom of expression and access to information, is unnecessary and disproportionate to the situation and will further lead to a deterioration of human rights and basic freedoms. We urge the government of India to end the communications blockade immediately and to adopt remedial measures to undo the damage done so far in Jammu and Kashmir. We reiterate our call to the government of India to resort to peaceful democratic means and refrain from use of brute force.

  For more information, please contact:

  1. CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, majumdar[AT]civicus.org
  2. South Asia Programme, FORUM-ASIA, sasia[AT]forum-asia.org
  3. FIDH, jrousselot[AT]fidh.org
  4. OMCT, nb[AT]omct.org, sa[AT]omct.org
• India: Two more women activists arrested as crackdown on protesters continue

  Human Rights Defenders Alert – India and global civil society alliance CIVICUS call for the immediate release of two women activists who were arrested last week for their involvement in mass protests against the discriminatory citizenship law. These arrests highlight the escalating crackdown on dissent by the Indian authorities.

• INDONESIA: ‘Communities have the right to have their opinions heard and considered’

  CIVICUS speaks about the recent protests triggered by rising fuel prices in Indonesia with Kahar S Cahyono, vice president of communications of Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia (KSPI), a trade union organisation that promotes social justice and the welfare of workers.

  What triggered recent protests in Indonesia?

  Workers’ protests were triggered by several government policies deemed to be detrimental for workers. The most recent was the increase in fuel prices, which lead to the increase of prices of basic necessities.

  Previously, to determine the minimum wage for 2022, the government had used the regulations of a very problematic law, the Omnibus Law on Job Creation. As a result, the wage increase was at the minimum level. For workers in many areas there was no increase at all. The national average wage rise was roughly one per cent, while the inflation rate in September 2022 reached almost six per cent. In other words, wage increases could not accommodate the sudden increase of prices. The situation worsened due to the increase in fuel prices.

  In this context, the government announced it would continue to use the same mechanism provided by the Omnibus Law on Job Creation to calculate the wage increase for 2023. On top of that, the government recognised that in 2023 there will be a global recession. When this happens, workers will likely be the main victims, not least because there will be massive layoffs.

  In sum, the purchasing power of workers’ salaries, which already declined because the wage increase has been lower than inflation, will plunge further due to the fuel price rise. The situation will worsen even more because next year’s wage increase will also be the minimum, and will also likely be overcome by inflation. On top of all this, workers will also be haunted by the fear of losing their jobs due to a global recession. 

  What are your demands, and what tactics are you employing to put them forward?

  KSPI has made four demands: cancellation of the increase in the fuel price, repeal of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation, a 13 per cent increase in the minimum wage for 2023 and measures to avoid job losses in a context of global recession.

  On top of these four, KSPI has conveyed two additional demands: the implementation of agrarian reform and the adoption of the draft Law on the Protection of Domestic Workers.

  Agrarian reform is important to achieve food sovereignty. If Indonesia is able to satisfy its food demand without depending on imported goods, it could avoid the worst impacts of a global recession. The draft Law on the Protection of Domestic Workers is key because domestic workers are typically employed in the informal sector and lack any protection.

  KSPI employs a ‘CLAP’ strategy, which stands for concept, lobby, action and politics. Concept refers to developing thought and arguments regarding the issues, through discussion, seminars and other exchanges. Lobbying refers to conducting meetings with relevant officials to convey our position on each issue.

  Action is conducted both through litigation – for example, we submitted a petition for judicial review to the Constitutional Court on the Law on Job Creation, as well as a petition to the Administrative Court on the determination of the minimum wage – and peaceful protest at both local and national levels – for instance, by demonstrating outside parliament or the office of the mayor or governor.

  Finally, politics refers to campaigning so that people will not vote for a political party that supports measures that hurt workers, such as the Omnibus Law or the increase in fuel prices. This is in addition to establishing a political party representing workers, that is, the Labour Party as a tool for class struggle.

  KSPI uses all these tactics jointly with organisations of farmers, fishers, young people, students, women, people living in urban poverty and academics.

  Have protesters experienced any human rights violations?

  Major human rights violations were recorded during theprotests against the Omnibus Law on Job Creation in 2020. An investigation byAmnesty International Indonesia documented at least 402 victims of police violence in 15 provinces and at least 6,658 individuals arrested in 21 provinces. People who protested online were also intimidated. Between 7 and 20 October 2020, at least 18 people in seven provinces were criminalised for allegedly violating the Information and Electronic Transactions Law. 

  As for workers, when KSPI urged a nationwide strike against the Omnibus Law, security force officers came to several factories, even entering production areas, to prevent workers joining the protest. Buses rented by workers to join the protest in Jakarta were suddenly cancelled for no reason, possibly as a result of intimidation or prohibition.

  Rather than with repression, the government should respond to labour action by implementing mechanisms for meaningful participation, enacting the right of the community to have their opinions heard and considered and to receive reasoned responses to the opinions provided.

  How did KSPI react to the football stadium disaster on 1 October?

  More than 130 people died and more than 300 were injured on 1 October as a result of the violence that erupted at Kanjuruhan stadium in Malang during an Indonesian league soccer match when supporters from the losing team invaded the pitch and police fired teargas, provoking a stampede. 

  When this happened, we conveyed our deepest condolences to the victims’ families and to those who were injured. We also examined the facts and concluded there were procedural failures in handling the crowd, and condemned the unprofessional behaviour that led to the tragedy.

  KSPI published a media release with a series of calls. First, we urged the head of Indonesian Police to strip the police head of Malang from his position due to his failure to police the incident adequately.

  Second, we called for this case to be handled by the Indonesian Police Headquarters so that it is thoroughly investigated and those found responsible are punished through either criminal or administrative proceedings, according to laws and regulations.

  Third, we urged the Football Association of Indonesia (PSSI) to suspend league matches until after the conclusion of the investigation of the tragedy. The PSSI should also ensure this won’t happen again by tightening its security protocol for football matches.

  Fourth, we urged the public to raise the Indonesian flag at half-mast in their homes as a symbol to express condolences. And finally, we urged society to promote a healthier, more peaceful sports culture.

  At KSPI we thought it was important for us to convey our position on this issue, not only because many football supporters are also workers, but also because we realise that the use of excessive force by the security forces is very easily directed against workers. Security forces also often use teargas to dissolve workers’ protests. We hope incidents such as this will not be repeated either inside or outside stadiums, in any mass protest attended by thousands of people.

  ---

  Civic space in Indonesia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagrampages.

• INDONESIA: ‘Proposed changes to the Broadcasting Act are part of a regression driven by religious fundamentalism’

  CIVICUS discusses proposed changes to Indonesia’s Broadcasting Act that would restrict LGBTQI+ rights with Dédé Oetomo. Dédé is co-founder of GAYa NUSANTARA, a civil society organisation at the forefront of the struggle for equality in Indonesia.

  Proposed amendments to the 2002 Broadcasting Act, which covers conventional and digital media, include restrictions on content that depicts LGBTQI+ ‘behaviour’ or promotes other ‘negative’ behaviours. The bill is expected to be passed before President Joko Widodoleaves office later this year. It will punish violations with fines and penalties such as the revocation of licences. Rights activists criticise its vague wording, which will allow for discretionary implementation and further restrict freedom of expression.

  What changes has the government proposed to the Broadcasting Act, and how will they affect LGBTQI+ people?

  The Indonesian government has proposed amendments to the 2022 Broadcasting Act, focused on determining what it is ‘appropriate’ to broadcast in Indonesia. The government’s proposed changes include restrictions on the ‘exclusive broadcast of journalistic investigation’, which critics warn could curb the ability to conduct investigative journalism.

  The draft bill also bans the broadcast of content depicting LGBTQI+ ‘behaviour’ and restricts content depicting professions or figures with ‘negative behaviours or lifestyles that could potentially be imitated by the public’. Penalties for violating these provisions could range from written warnings to the revocation of broadcasting licences.

  Politicians argue the changes are needed to update the outdated law, while free expression advocates and LGBTQI+ activists believe they will severely restrict media freedom and the right to free expression, and enable an escalation of restrictive measures targeting minority communities and dissenting voices.

  What’s the situation for LGBTQI+ people in Indonesia?

  Same-sex acts between consenting adults are not criminalised nationally. They are only effectively criminalised in Aceh province, which applies Sharia law. Penalties are provided for in other districts, but are often vague and not systematically enforced. However, they are used as a tool for harassment.

  Although LGBTQI+ relationships and identities are generally not criminalised, hate speech by politicians and conservative religious leaders is widespread. Public institutions such as the military, police and universities have issued statements and policies that discriminate against LGBTQI+ people. For example, the Faculty of Engineering at Gadjah Mada University recently issued a circular banning LGBTQI+ people being professors, administrators or students. This decision was, however, backtracked on following internal pressure.

  Transgender people face particularly severe persecution, including family abuse and community harassment. They are often visible targets and can suffer violent attacks, arbitrary arrest and torture in some areas, such as Aceh province.

  In more sparsely populated eastern regions, such as parts of the Maluku Islands and Sulawesi, persecution is less common and there are initiatives for local anti-discrimination ordinances. At the national level, there is a coalition working towards an anti-discrimination law, quietly supported by United Nations (UN) agencies, friendly embassies and various human rights organisations.

  For many LGBTQI+ people, day-to-day survival is the main issue. Discrimination in education, employment and housing is widespread. While there are some supportive communities and families, visibility often leads to persecution. This could worsen if initiatives such as the Family Resilience Bill, which would force families to report LGBTQI+ members, become law; it’s been shelved for now due to protests.

  What obstacles do LGBTQI+ activists face, and how would the new law affect them?

  Activists face significant obstacles, including physical threats and the need to hold events in secret to avoid attacks. For example, Pride events are held in undisclosed locations to avoid disruption by anti-rights vigilantes. Public marches or large gatherings are impossible due to the threat of violence.

  If the proposed amendment to the Broadcasting Act goes through, it will have a devastating impact on LGBTQI+ activism. The media would be unable to interview activists or even mention LGBTQI+ issues, essentially erasing their presence from public discourse. This mirrors the ‘Don't Say Gay’ mentality seen in other parts of the world, which aims to suppress any mention of LGBTQI+ identities.

  Despite setbacks, previous attempts to criminalise LGBTQI+ activities have been blocked by protests. For instance, the 2022 Penal Code criminalised adultery and fornication, but it stopped short of criminalising same-sex behaviour as a result of successful advocacy.

  Do you see the proposed changes to the Broadcasting Act as part of a wider regressive trend?

  The proposed changes are part of an ongoing regressive trend driven by fundamentalist religious groups. Since the fall of the dictatorship in 1998, the opening of civic space has allowed for the growth of numerous civil society organisations, including fundamentalist religious organisations. These groups initially targeted sex workers and trans women, but eventually broadened their focus to include the wider LGBTQI+ community. The growing harassment of those who defy traditional gender norms is often justified by a selective interpretation of religious principles.

  This is happening in a context of democratic erosion, with political elites and families consolidating their power. The recent murder of a journalist investigating online gambling highlighted the growing threat to freedoms. But while democracy is indeed under threat, there is still significant civil society resistance, in the form of petitions and public protests, to stop the backsliding.

  What international support do Indonesian LGBTQI+ activists need?

  International visibility, pressure and practical support can help Indonesian LGBTQI+ activists continue their fight for rights and recognition.

  International solidarity can take the form of public statements from friendly governments and high-level international organisations. When Indonesia is reviewed by bodies such as the  UN Human Rights Council or the Committee Against Torture, international pressure should be applied to highlight civil society concerns.

  Solidarity from the global community, including protests at Indonesian embassies and financial donations, can also be crucial. However, a significant barrier against raising awareness of Indonesia's unique challenges is that the country is often overlooked internationally. Interns and volunteers who can overcome language barriers and support local organisations are also valuable.

  ---

  Civic space in Indonesia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with GAYa NUSANTARA through itswebsite orInstagram page, and follow@gayanusantara and@dedeoetomo on Twitter.

• INDONESIA: ‘The new Criminal Code spells danger for civil society’

  CIVICUS speaks about the new criminal code passed in Indonesia withFatia Maulidiyanti, Executive Coordinator of KontraS/The Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence.

  KontraS is an Indonesian civil society organisation (CSO) established in 1998 to investigate enforced disappearances, acts of violence and other human rights violations.

  What are the main changes introduced in the new Criminal Code?

  It is KontraS’s opinion that this Criminal Code Bill will have effects well beyond hampering people’s right to privacy. Many of its articles seek to legitimise the ongoing restrictions that are shrinking civic space, bringing back the spirit of the authoritarian Suharto era.

  For example, articles 218 and 219 introduce the crimes of defamation and insult against the president and vice president. This will allow the criminalisation of government critics. Similarly, article 240 bans defaming and insulting the government, and article 351 makes it a crime to defame or insult any authorities or state institutions. These articles are meant to criminalise the publication of any kind of research, data or criticism of the government and the state institutions.

  This amounts to the reintroduction of a once repealed lèse-majesté clause dating back to Dutch colonial times, which of course has long been repealed in the Netherlands. And it spells danger for civil society. It is worth noting that the policing and judicial systems in Indonesia are very problematic. Police standards are low and there is a lot of corruption. Arbitrary arrest and detention are commonly used, as are unfair trials. This already hinders the ability of civil society movements to exist and sustain their work.

  There are also several problematic articles related to the need to request and obtain permits to conduct demonstrations, rallies and other public gatherings.

  What are the forces behind the changes?

  There have been too many obscure political bargains between the government and parliament to accommodate the interests of all political parties at the expense of civil rights and fundamental freedoms.

  While there seems to have been a group of academics supporting the drafting process, there has been no consultation with or participation of civil society or business interests. At the centre of the new criminal code is an attempt to secure power, guarantee public order and gain control in preparation for the 2024 presidential election.

  What do you make of the changes regarding ‘morality’ issues such as sex outside marriage?

  Regression on morality issues may be counterproductive at a time when the government is trying to prevent mass protests against their policies, particularly in view of the upcoming election.

  But the criminalisation of private relationships, acts and behaviours can also be seen as a bargaining chip as the current government is trying to bring Islamic fundamentalist groups into the fold. They are trying to ensure their loyalty by showing they are willing to safeguard conservative religious values. LGBTQI+ rights have been at the forefront of the battles waged by fundamentalist political and religious groups, so they have been the first to go.

   

  How has civil society tried to stop these changes from happening?

  We often discussed with our allies whether and how to provide inputs and recommendations to the Ministry of Law and Human Rights and to the House of Representatives during the process. We did have meetings and took part in various consultations, but as it turned out, these just went through the motions of public engagement, keeping the formalities but disabling any meaningful opportunity to influence the outcomes.

  Numerous CSOs across Indonesia have been protesting about this since at least 2019. There was a big campaign, #ReformasiDikorupsi (‘corrupt reform’) followed by a series of demonstrations against the enactment of the criminal code. However, the government and parliament chose to continue ignoring our objections and instead accelerated the process.

  What kind of support does Indonesian civil society need from the international community?

  We need all sectors of the international community, including international CSOs, foreign governments and their diplomatic missions and United Nations bodies, to send a clear warning to the Indonesian government against continuing to shut down civic space.

  We really hope the movement to warn the government of Indonesia comes not only from domestic civil society, but also from our international counterparts.

  Investors should also use their leverage, as the government is trying to attract foreign investments while the human rights situation continues to deteriorate on the ground.

  The Indonesian state should be held accountable and be persuaded to step back and change course.

  ---

  Civic space in Indonesia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with KontraS through itswebsite and follow@kontras_update on Instagram and@KontraS on Twitter.

• INDONESIA: ‘The Sexual Violence Bill is one step further in claiming the rights of women and children’

  CIVICUS speaks with Nuril Qomariyah, coordinator of Perempuan Bergerak, about the Sexual Violence Bill recently passed in Indonesia and the key roles played by civil society.

  Founded in 2016, Perempuan Bergerak is an Indonesian civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes women’s rights in local communities, striving for the values of equality, justice and human rights, and providing support for both women and men to build more equal gender relationships.

  What is the relevance of the newly passed Sexual Violence Bill?

  The Sexual Violence Bill that Indonesia’s House of Representatives passed on 9 May 2022, formally known as RUU TPKS, seeks to protect victims of sexual violence crimes and help them with the recovery process. 

  The bill deals with nine types of criminal acts of sexual violence regulated in article 4, paragraph 1: non-physical sexual harassment, physical sexual harassment, forced contraception, forced sterilisation, forced marriage, sexual torture, sexual exploitation, sexual slavery and electronic-based sexual violence. Perpetrators proven guilty of these crimes will be subject to imprisonment.

  It is interesting that the inclusion of electronic-based sexual violence received some criticism. In the early stages, when the bill was being drafted, it was not included. However, CSOs and activists advocated for its inclusion because sexual violence cases, especially among young children, are increasingly happening in or in connection with cyberspace.

  How might the new law change things for the better?

  The main outstanding thing about this bill is that it focuses on the victims and seeks to create an environment that will help them recover from acts of sexual violence. According to a study conducted by the Indonesia Judicial Research Society, the law should be appreciated because it clearly takes sides with sexual violence victims by mandating the establishment of mechanisms to support their recovery.

  In its article 30, paragraph 1 the bill states that victims are entitled to services such as restitution and counselling. If the perpetrator is unable to pay restitution the state will compensate the victim in accordance with the court’s decision. Further, victims are recognised as having the right to receive the necessary treatment, the right to be protected and the right to recovery.

  Community-based service providers such as the police are required to receive and follow up on reports of sexual violence and provide assistance to the victims. Under the new law they are no longer allowed to dismiss sexual violence cases, and instead must conduct the investigation needed to help the victims. The role of families, communities and central and local governments in preventing sexual violence is also emphasised. The new law seeks to make victims of sexual violence feel comfortable enough to report their perpetrators and open legal cases against them. We consider this bill fundamental in helping victims and survivors of sexual violence.

  Do you see it as a civil society victory?

  Indeed, we consider this a civil society victory because we have been involved in the whole process and have long advocated for the bill to be passed. CSOs working closely with victims and survivors of sexual violence understand how important this bill is, which is why we were at the forefront of the efforts that resulted in its approval. 

  It took us 10 years to get here. This is quite a long time. During the past decade, we have organised and made sure we built a unified front pushing for this law. Sexual violence is an offence that affects those who constitute the majority in our society; it is women and children who experience it the most. So getting this law passed is one step further in claiming the rights of women and children, including their right to live in a safe and secure environment. 

  The new law empowers victims because it provides tools to respond to cases of sexual violence. We are very happy to see this kind of progress. A victory like this provides confirmation of the great influence our work has on society. 

  What tactics did you use to encourage the passage of the new legislation?

  Perempuan Bergerak is based in Malang, the second-largest city in the province of East Java. We provide safe spaces for people, and especially women, to get together, exchange with one another, learn and organise. We also provide space for men to learn about equality in human relations so they are able to see women as fully autonomous human beings, rather than weak creatures of lesser value who are under their dominion.

  The Sexual Violence Bill is crucial for this work because it has the potential to provide the same kind of safe space, with legal guarantees, for women and children all over Indonesia. This is why we collaborated with various community groups in Malang, including students, academics and activists, to raise wide awareness about the importance of the bill. Perempuan Bergerak has a large virtual community on social media platforms, so we created content to promote the bill and shared it on these platforms. The young generation is very active on social media, so we channelled much of our activism there. 

  In addition to social media activism, we did a lot of work on the ground, including organising discussion forums, making as many appearances as we could on television and local radio stations, and demonstrating on the streets alongside other organisations and activists.

  We are also part of Koalisi Masyarakat Sipil Anti Kekerasan Seksual (KOMPAKS), a coalition of Indonesian civil society groups fighting against sexual violence. As a coalition, we share the same vision and have worked together to push the government to pass this bill. We mobilised in unity throughout the whole process. 

  What challenges do you see moving forward, and how does civil society plan to address them?

  The main challenge we anticipate is implementation. We know we will have to be very vigilant, monitor each implementation stage and make sure local governments respect the law. We have known this would be a challenge all along, so throughout our advocacy and campaigning in the process to get the bill passed we acted together as civil society to create awareness at the community level about the importance of this bill’s implementation. Now that our strategy to get the bill has worked, we will need to keep moving together to ensure a successful process of implementation. We believe that through collaboration with as many stakeholders as possible, including with the government, educational institutions and civil society, we can make the implementation stage progress smoothly.

  Civic space in Indonesia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch withPerempuan Bergerakthrough itsInstagram page.

• INDONESIA: “Los activistas independentistas pacíficos corren el riesgo de ser considerados terroristas”

  CIVICUS conversa con Samuel Awom, coordinador del grupo de derechos humanos KontraS Papúa, que monitorea violaciones de derechos humanos, realiza trabajo de incidencia en favor de las víctimas y trabaja por la paz en Papúa. KontraS Papúa tiene su sede en Jayapura, la capital de Papúa, y monitorea la situación de derechos humanos en toda la región de Papúa.

• INDONESIA: “Peaceful pro-independence activists may be labeled as terrorists”

  CIVICUS speaks to Samuel Awom, Coordinator of the human rights group KontraS Papua, which monitors human rights violations, advocates for victims and works for peace in Papua. KontraS Papua is based in Jayapura, Papua’s capital, and monitors human rights issues throughout the Papuan region.

  In Papua, located at the east end of the Indonesian archipelago, there have been gross human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, torture and arbitrary arrest of activists by the Indonesian security forces under the pretext of suppressing separatism. Although Indonesia President Joko Widodo continues to promise to address the grievances of the Papuan people, they face ongoing discrimination, exploitation, and repression.

  

  What is the human rights situation in Papua?

  As shown by the monitoring undertaken by KontraS Papua and other civil society groups, the military and police perpetrate serious human rights violations in the Papuan region. Abductions, killings and other violations of the rights of activists and other civilians by the security forces have taken place since 1963, when Indonesia took over Papua from the Netherlands. This situation has persisted until today. No legal processes have been undertaken to investigate and resolve these incidents. This is a very serious problem in Papua.

  Recent events include the displacement of thousands of people from the Intan Jaya, Nduga, and Puncak areas, where there has been continued conflict between the military and pro-independence armed groups since December 2018.

  In 2019, the situation became extremely tense following incidents of racist speech against Papuan students by the authorities in Java island, which were challenged by mass protests and mobilisation across Papua. In response, there were mass arrests of protesters and activists, which in turn led to violent incidents, including riots and arson. Until today, the instigators and perpetrators of the violence remain unknown and there has been a failure to investigate this. No one has been brought to justice for the killing of students and young people at that time. Many Papuans are still traumatised by this.

  Following this, in December 2019 the armed conflict expanded in the Intan Jaya district, causing thousands of civilians to flee, and some were killed. 

  Most recently, on 25 April 2021, President Joko Widodo ordered the military commander and the chief of police to arrest all members of the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPN/OPM), an armed pro-independence group, after the head of the Regional State Intelligence Agency was shot dead. On 29 April, the Indonesian government officially categorised the TPN/OPM as a ‘terrorist' organisation. This was followed by the entry of large numbers of security forces into the Puncak district.

  What do you think will be the impact of the government labeling the TPN/OPM as a terrorist group? 

  This comes at a time when all the civil society organisations (CSOs) and peace networks are talking about reconciliation and peace. The end of conflict requires dialogue and negotiation between the central government and Papua. The labelling of the TPN/OPM armed group as terrorists is a regressive move by the Jokowi administration that will close the space for democracy and the protection of human rights.

  This has made the situation in Papua worse. We now see the deployment of thousands of troops to the region and public access to the internet being blocked. This will create a situation for increased human rights violations in Papua, as the anti-terrorism law will allow for arbitrary arrests and undermine the rule of law. The Anti-Terrorism Law grants police powers to hold suspects for up to 221 days without being brought to court – a blatant violation of the right of anyone arrested on a criminal charge to be brought promptly before a judge and be tried within a reasonable time or be released. The law also expands the use of military personnel in counterterrorism operations, which further increases the likelihood of the excessive use of force and other human rights violations.

  In my opinion, this decision was made because the Jokowi administration has been only listening to the view of top military officials and has failed to find a concrete solution to the Papua problem. Meanwhile, all the civil society groups and movements in Papua, as well as the regional parliaments in the provinces and the governor, are calling for dialogue.

  This decision now prevents CSOs from investigating when civilians are attacked in conflict areas because the military operations have brought along restrictions of movement.

  Why is the government carrying out this military operation, and what is its impact on civil society?

  The government's rationale for the operations is that it has accused the TPN/OPM of attacking civilians, including teachers, and burning schools and a plane. Further, the shooting of the head of the Papua Regional State Intelligence Agency in the Puncak district has worsened the situation. However, the shooting has yet to be fully investigated to determine what was behind the shooting, and the investigation needs to be undertaken by an independent team. There has been no further explanation about this so far.

  As a result of this shooting, the head of the Police Security Intelligence Agency, Commissioner General Paulus Waterpauw, stated that human rights activists and CSOs are undermining political stability and damaging democracy in Papua. This creates a risk for human rights defenders, and particularly for Papuan activists working on ending the conflict and who are involved in political discussions around independence, who will be categorised as allied with terrorists, stigmatised, and arbitrarily arrested.

  Why was Viktor Yeimo arrested and what are the charges against him?

  Viktor Yeimo, the international spokesperson for the West Papua National Committee and the Papuan People's Petition Against Special Autonomy, was detained by the authorities on 11 May on the grounds that he was behind the 2019 anti-racism protests. However, his interrogation by the police seems to be leaning towards linking him with the TPN/OPM armed group.

  He was arrested in Jayapura, taken to the Papua Police station, and then transferred to the Police Mobile Brigade headquarters in Abepura. He is being investigated for treason, incitement, and broadcasting false information as well as other charges. A coalition of lawyers is supporting him. Communication with his family has been denied and has been made difficult by the authorities.

  Several more activists of the Papuan student alliance movement were also detained in cities inside and outside Papua and have been questioned. The democratic space in Papua is being squeezed.

  This has been reinforced by an internet disruption that began about one month ago after the Papuan head of intelligence was shot. It has made it very difficult for us to communicate with contacts and activists throughout Papua. It has made it challenging to get updates on the situation in the field and to send material to places in Intan Jaya, Nduga, and Puncak Jaya.

  What do Papuan activists need from the international community and civil society?

  We need support from international CSOs working with local civil society to promote and develop the concept of peace and reconciliation. We also need support on how to open negotiations between the central government in Jakarta and Papua. Further, we need to open up the space for access to international CSOs, journalists, and humanitarian monitors in Papua, which is currently closed.

  International actors and governments must also monitor and speak up against the anti-terrorism policies of the Indonesian government that have the potential to increase human rights violations. Civilians in Papua are often viewed as supporting armed groups and this makes them vulnerable. Those who have been displaced because of the conflict must also be assisted by the international community.

  Our hope is that CSOs in Papua, Indonesia, and internationally can work together to protect human rights and seek solutions to severe violations in Papua. There is also a need for international solidarity to seek lasting peace to the conflict in Papua.

  Civic space inIndonesiais rated as ‘obstructed’by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with KontraS through itswebsite and follow@KontraS on Twitter. 

• Indonesia: Halt using the G20 Summit to harass and block civil society activities

  CIVICUS, a global civil society alliance, and the Fight Inequality Alliance are appalled by the decision of the Indonesian authorities to disband the activities of civil society groups and harass their organisers in Bali, Indonesia, ahead of the G20 Summit. We call on the government of Indonesia to halt such actions, investigate these human rights violations thoroughly and adhere to the human rights standards enshrined in international law and its own Constitution.

• Indonesia: Unilateral renewal of Special Autonomy and arbitrary arrest of protesters in West Papua

  CIVICUS and TAPOL regret the revision and renewal of the Special Autonomy Law in West Papua (Papua and West Papua Provinces), which further strips critical aspects of decentralisation and autonomy for the region. We are also extremely concerned about the arbitrary arrest of people protesting the renewal and forcible disruptions of protests.  Despite such protests and the lack of consultation with the people of West Papua, the law was passed by the Indonesia House of Representatives on 15 July.

  

  Demonstrations held in the last week marked the latest in a series of protests by West Papuans opposing the Indonesian government's decision to extend Special Autonomy status and demanding an internationally supervised independence referendum. Police arrested 23 students and activists in Jayapura on 14 July 2021, and four protesters were injured. On 15 July, 18 demonstrators were arrested in Kaimana, West Papua, and a protest in Manokwari was blocked. Another 50 protesters were arrested and beaten in front of the House of Representatives in Jakarta on 15 July just prior to the passage of the law.

  We call on the Indonesia authorities to halt their repression of peaceful protest against the extension of the Special Autonomy Law. The right to peaceful protest is an essential part of a democracy, which Indonesia needs to immediately realise in West Papua. 

  The Special Autonomy Law in West Papua was first enacted in 2001 and has now been extended for another 20 years, with some concerning new amendments. The originally-enacted law had itself long been rejected by many West Papuans as failing to realise meaningful autonomy. 

  Eighteen articles of the revised law were amended and two articles were added, with serious implications for issues of decentralisation and autonomy. According to Article 76, the central government can now decide on the creation of new regencies and districts. This has been opposed by many West Papuans because it could lead to further marginalisation and militarisation in the region. Two sections of Article 28 were omitted, which removed the right to form local political parties. A new rule is now in place that the vice president will have an office in the provinces to oversee the implementation of the Special Autonomy Law.

  

  The Papuan People’s Assembly (Majelis Rakyat Papua/MRP) was excluded from the amendment discussions despite its inclusion in consultations being explicitly required by the law. The MRP had stated that the renewal is not the wish of West Papuan people. The Papuan People’ Petition (Petisi Rakyat Papua/PRP), which consist of 112 mostly Indigenous groups, collected 714,066 grassroot West Papuans’ signatures against Special Autonomy.

  The unilateral decision by the Government of Indonesia to revise and extend the Special Autonomy Law is a flagrant violation to the right to self-determination of West Papuan people.

  We urge the President of Indonesia Joko Widodo to issue a regulation in lieu of law (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang/Perppu) to annul the Special Autonomy Law. Instead of forcing this extension, the authorities should instead hold meaningful consultation with the West Papuan people to address their grievances, deal with the injustices they have faced and to seek an end to the conflict. This includes releasing all political prisoners detained for their activism including Victor Yeimo, ending the harassment of human rights defenders, activists, students and others in Papua and ensuring that all serious crimes committed by Indonesian security forces are investigated, findings made public and that victims and their families receive reparations.

  ---

  CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation is a global alliance of civil society organisations (CSOs) and activists dedicated to strengthening citizen action and civil society around the world. Founded in 1993, CIVICUS has more than 10,000 members in more than 175 countries throughout the world.

  TAPOL campaigns for human rights, peace and democracy in Indonesia. We are based in the UK and work to raise awareness of human rights issues in Indonesia, including in the contested territory of West Papua. Founded on grassroots campaigning, TAPOL works closely with local organisations in West Papua and Indonesia to advocate for truth and justice and encourage the international community to take action. 

• IRAN: ‘Mahsa Amini’s case was a spark in a flammable situation’

  CIVICUS speaks with Sohrab Razaghi, executive director of Volunteer Activists (VA), about the currentwomen-led protests, the state of civil society and the prospects for change in Iran.

  VA is an independent civil society organisation (CSO) based in the Netherlands, whose primary aims are building capacity among activists and CSOs, facilitating information exchange among civil society activists, community peacebuilding and advocating for the expansion of democracy and human rights in Iran and more generally in the Middle East. VA is the successor of a pioneer Iranian CSO, the Iranian Civil Society, Training and Research Centre, founded in 2001 and based in Tehran until 2007.

  What is the situation of Iranian civil society today?

  Civil society in Iran has become weaker over the past few years. Civic activism has grown but organised civil society has become weaker and has been marginalised. Following President Ebrahim Raisi’s ascent to power in 2021, civic space has shrunk dramatically. The establishment and operation of CSOs has been legally obstructed and any CSO not following the policies of Iranian authorities has been eliminated.

  Following significantteachers’ protests in May 2022 there was a major crackdown against the Iranian Teachers’ Trade Association and many of its leaders and activists were arrested. This was just one example of many.

  The ongoing crackdown follows a predictable sequence: first, the authorities exploit toxic narratives and disseminate false accusations to malign civil society and create internal conflict within civic movements. Then they repress the smaller remaining groups, arresting and detaining their leaders and activists.

  The authorities have attacked all institutions and organisations that are the expression of social power, eliminating the possibility of further organising. To fill up the space, they set up fake CSOs organised and led by government officials, often affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. These are often local, community-oriented organisations that involve local communities by approaching the mosques and charities that support them.

  What made the death of Mahsa Amini a turning point?

  Mahsa Amini’s case was a spark in a flammable situation. She was a young member of an ethnic minority who was visiting Tehran, was violently arrested by the morality police and died under custody. All these elements together made her case relatable for many Iranians. She was only 22 years old, a woman, a member of an ethnic minority and a Sunni Muslim, which is a religious minority in Iran. Many Iranians identify with at least one and possibly many of these elements of Mahsa’s identity and resent the policies aimed at suppressing them. As a result, large groups that feel discriminated against and suppressed mobilised.

  This happened in a context of high poverty and repression, with a government that acts with impunity because it knows it won’t be held accountable. For years, instead of trying to meet the needs of their citizens, the authorities have cracked down on all sorts of protests. With Raisi coming to power, any hope for change was gone.

  In what ways have these protests been different from previous ones?

  The current protests are very different from previous ones, including recent protests that took place in2017 and2019. First, protesters are mostly between 15 and 25 years old. This is possibly their first engagement in a civic movement. They have grown up in the digital world and are using in the real world what they learned playing video games – only that in the real world, there is no respawning! So many are getting killed.

  Second, protesters are primarily women and students. And some of their acts of protest, such as female protesters burning headscarves and cutting their hair, are unprecedented. Their demands are also different from those of previous civic movements. Whereas in 2017 and 2019 demands were mostly economic, now they are cultural: their main demand is for freedom to lead a different lifestyle than the authorities allow them to have. The shout ‘Women, Life, Liberty’ has become a protest cry and a slogan of solidarity both inside Iran and internationally.

  Third, support from Iranians in the diaspora and media coverage have both drastically increased. This time the events have received major media coverage since the outset, with the protests on front pages all over the world. For the first time, on 23 October, 80,000 Iranians from the diaspora gathered in Berlin to support protesters and demonstrate against the Iranian regime. This support is unprecedented. 

  Finally, public discourse about the protests has shifted. In the past, dominant discourse highlighted the non-violent character of the protests, but this time there have been calls for retaliation and to use violence to defend the protests. Violence is no longer taboo: some elites and influencers inside and outside Iran are advocating for it. This is extremely concerning, considering that it may legitimise violence by the Iranian authorities, which could resort to even more violence in response.

  How has the government cracked down on the protests, and why have protests continued regardless?

  The government has used multiple tactics. First, it deploys riot police and security forces that use violence to physically prevent and dissolve protests. As a result, over 7,000 protesters have been arrested, many have been beaten and over 200 have been killed. Second, it has restricted internet access for over four weeks now, limiting the free exchange of information while increasing the circulation of disinformation and official propaganda. Third, it has used the same narrative tactics it normally uses against civil society, linking the protests to foreign intelligence forces.

  The government’s reaction has been as repressive as towards previous movements. However, these protesters are more resilient, so the crackdown has not been as effective as previous ones. Two sources of this resilience are decentralisation and spontaneity: protests are held locally rather than in a central place, and they are not centrally organised – they are organised by small groups and happen rather spontaneously during the day or night at random hours, with protesters quickly dispersing afterwards.

  Additionally, the fact that there are so many children and young students among protesters has somewhat limited the violence. Many children and adolescents have been killed, but the death toll would likely have been much higher had they not been among protesters. And many of these young people are students, therefore part of the middle class – which means there is a cultural middle class that continues to support the protests.

  What is the likelihood of these protests leading to change?

  We can identify five possible scenarios – and only one of them leads to regime change.

  In the first scenario, the crackdown succeeds and protests end. This would result in widespread hopelessness and disappointment.

  In the second, the authorities make concessions and the mandatory hijab rules are repealed. This would lead to the recognition of some limited freedoms, but not to regime change.

  In the third, neither the authorities nor the protesters prevail, leading to continuing violence and bloody conflict. Protesters go into an armed offensive and the situation escalates into a civil war-like situation.

  In the fourth, military groups seize power and suppress both protesters and established authorities to pursue their own goals.

  In the fifth scenario, mass mobilisation leads to regime change.

  What happens will depend on the capacity of protesters – the resources they can gather, the groups they can bring together, the leadership they build and the collective narrative they produce out of compelling personal stories – and international influences and pressures.

  In the current situation, scenarios one to three are the most likely. The movement has not entered a revolutionary stage. There are not massive gaps in the regime – neither in its repressive machinery nor in its will to crack down on protests. And the protests have not been massive nor widely representative of the make-up of society. We have not seen hundreds of thousands or even tens of thousands on the streets, and we have not seen protests by various ethnic or religious minorities, and by different social classes. Strikes are typically the heart of social movement action in Iran, and we have not yet seen strikes by major branches and sectors of the economy.

  What can women’s rights supporters and democracy activists from around the world do to support civil society in Iran?

  International civil society as a collective should be more vocal. We need a unified collective of civil society echoing the voices of Iranian activists and advocates for democracy and human rights in Iran. In addition, actions of solidarity are needed as well as networks to exchange knowledge, experience and skills so Iranian activists can learn from civic movements internationally and be more effective.

  Regarding the immediate response, there are various needs, such as juvenile justice support, including legal support, wellbeing and mental health support, as well as training and awareness raising on civic activism in Iran.

  The main goal should be to support Iranian protesters and activists so their voice is heard and the crackdown does not succeed, while supporting the victims of the crackdown. International pressure is instrumental, not only from governments but also from civil society as a change leader. A close connection between international civil society, Iranian activists in diaspora, Iranian civil society and the media is also essential.

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  Civic space in Iran is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Volunteer Activists through itswebsite.

• IRAN: ‘Mahsa’s death highlights the struggle women must face just to go about their daily lives’

  CIVICUS speaks with Kylie Moore-Gilbert about thecurrent women-led protests in Iran, sparked by Mahsa Amini’s death in the custody of the so-called ‘morality police’.

  Kylie is a British-Australian women’s rights advocate and academic specialising in Islamic studies. She has extensively researched political issues in the Middle East, including the ‘Arab Spring’. In 2018 she was falsely charged with espionage and remained in prison in Iran for more than two years before being released in a prisoner exchange deal negotiated by the Australian government. She speaks about this experience in a recently published book,The Uncaged Sky: My 804 days in an Iranian prison.

  What are the demands of the protesters currently mobilised in Iran?

  In contrast to previous outbreaks of protest and civil unrest in Iran, from the very first day the current protesters adopted slogans calling for the fall of the Islamic Republic regime. Their slogans include ‘Death to Khamenei’, the Supreme Leader, ‘Down with the dictator’ and ‘No to the Islamic Republic’.

  While the trigger for the unrest was the senseless death of Mahsa Amini at the hands of the morality police, the issue of forced hijab and the harassment of women by regime officials due to their clothing and behaviour has become a symbol of the protesters’ desire to remove this regime altogether. Protesters are demanding freedom, equality between women and men and an end to the tyranny imposed on them by Iran’s regime of ageing clerics.

  The protests are happening countrywide and have involved Persian and ethnic-minority communities, irrespective of language, religion or class. To further their demands, protesters are using overwhelmingly peaceful tactics, such as rallies and marches, organised hijab-burnings and hair-cuttings, and general strikes.

  How have the authorities responded to the protests so far?

  The protests have faced a rolling crackdown since their inception. Many protesters, including several young teenagers, have been shot dead in the streets by security forces. Thousands have been rounded up and arrested. Sharif University of Technology was besieged for several days, with its students rounded up, beaten and imprisoned.

  The regime has cut off internet access to most of the country in a bid to contain protests. This is why it is so important for the international community to keep up the pressure on Iran and continue to shine a light on its human rights abuses. It must help prevent a massacre of innocent protesters and hold the regime to account for its crimes.

  Has Amini’s case helped reveal underlying women’s rights issues?

  Yes, most definitely. One reason why Amini’s arrest and murder touched such a nerve in Iran is that nearly all Iranian women, and many men too, have had similar encounters with the morality police at some point in their lives. What happened to Mahsa could have happened to any one of them.

  Mahsa’s death highlights the struggle women in Iran must face just to go about their daily lives. Women are routinely harassed in public by regime officials and pro-regime sympathisers for ‘bad hijab’ and are even banned from singing and dancing, hugging or touching men who are not their relatives, among too many other things. Many Iranian women are tired of the constant policing of their appearance and behaviour. They want to be free to get on with their lives as they see fit.

  What needs to change for women’s rights to gain recognition in Iran?

  For women’s rights to be recognised, the regime would have to change. I do not believe the Iranian government is capable of reforming itself. Forced hijab and discriminatory laws against women are a core pillar of the regime’s ideology. If it granted women equal rights, it would cease to exist.

  My hope is that the protests will make a difference well beyond women’s rights. As the protests are now entering their third week, my hope is that they will eventually lead to the downfall of the regime altogether. Iranians deserve a democratic government that respects gender equality and freedom of speech and is truly representative of the will of the people.

  What kind of assistance does Iranian civil society need from the international community?

  Iranian civil society desperately needs its voices to be amplified internationally and for attention to continue to be focused on what is happening inside Iran. The full glare of international media and foreign governments will act as something of a brake on the worst excesses of the regime’s crackdown.

  The international community could also assist in trying to keep Iran’s internet functioning, so protesters can communicate with one another and get news, photos and videos out of Iran so the world knows what is happening there.

  Foreign governments could also impose sanctions on Iranian officials responsible for the crackdown and other human rights abuses, and should cease all negotiations with Iran over sanctions relief and unfreezing Iranian assets abroad.

  ---

  Civic space in Iran is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Follow @KMooreGilbert on Twitter.

• IRAN: ‘The regime is executing protesters to create fear and suppress any attempt at new mobilisation’

  CIVICUS speaks aboutthe ongoing wave of executions in Iranwith Asal Abasian, an Iranian journalist and queer feminist activist. After receiving serious threats, Asal fled Iran for Turkey in 2021. They’re currently based in Paris, France.

  How has repression escalated since the 2022 protests?

  Repression by the regime of the Islamic Republic has escalated with executions of protesters, aimed at creating fear to suppress any attempt at new mobilisations such as the Woman, Life, Freedom nationwide protests triggered by Mahsa Amini’s death.

  Recently, four young Kurds from the western provinces of Iran were hanged on unproven charges of cooperation with the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan. Their families demanded a pardon until the last moment, but their requests went unheard.

  The Islamic Republic has always been at odds with ethnic minorities. Forty-five years since the Islamic Revolution, this conflict is as alive as on the first day. If anything, it has become worse.

  Of course, the death threat that comes with ramping up executions is not directed only at ethnic minorities. Every excluded group in Iran is under threat. The regime founded after the 1979 Islamic revolution was grounded on the aim of protecting the interests of Shia Muslim men. This means that everyone except Shia Muslim men is oppressed by design. This includes all women and LGBTQI+ people and sexual minorities, children and religious and ethnic minorities.

  Throughout 45 years there have been several spikes in executions of people from minority groups as well as political activists opposing the Islamic Republic. This trend has been ongoing from the onset, and it was even worse at the beginning. In the first decade of the Islamic Republic thousands of young dissidents were secretly executed or shot.

  On top of this, ethnic and religious minorities such as Bahais, Balochs, Kurds and Sunni Arabs experience daily discrimination and marginalisation, which sometimes cost people their lives.

  Additionally, the regime of the Islamic Republic supports Hamas and other terrorist Islamic groups and has no qualms about it. It laments the killing of children in Gaza while it has killed so many during the protests that erupted in Iran in September 2022. But ideologies shouldn’t matter: the massacre of children by any regime or group is a despicable act.

  Is there any space for civil society to operate in Iran?

  Young people in Iran continue resisting, despite the severe economic pressure and the suppression of activism. Even if this involves making sacrifices in their careers, education or social lives, young women continue defying the mandatory hijab. Nationwide protests may have decreased, but young people continue resisting the arbitrary and inhumane laws of the Islamic Republic.

  The struggle continues under the surface. Although the Islamic Republic and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps severely suppress any attempt at a protest, people have not stopped fighting. The fact that they continue embracing civil resistance despite the potentially serious costs is very encouraging.

  Many of our fighters, whom I would like to mention, are in Tehran’s Evin prison with long sentences. Sarvenaz Ahmadi, Anisha Asadollahi, Keyvan Mohtadi, Sepideh Rashnu, Nasim Soltanbeygi and many others are in the frontlines of this struggle, spending the years of their youth in prison. And what cost would be higher than paying with years of your life?

  I try to support their struggle by raising awareness on international platforms and amplifying their voices. But the main struggle is being carried on by young Iranians in Iran. From afar, we can only admire their struggles and broadcast them to the world.

  How has the international community reacted to the escalation of repression in Iran?

  Unfortunately, the international community has maintained a shameful silence and indifference. As people were being executed, the 2023 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Narges Mohammadi, and several other civil activists wrote to the United Nations (UN) on the human rights crisis that Iranians face. And still, UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Nada Al-Nashif recently travelled to Iran despite activists warning that this could be used as propaganda by the government.

  The Iranian people will not forget the indifference and self-interest of the international community. This is as much of a historical disgrace as the silence in the face of the crimes that are being committed in Gaza.

  Many members of the international community are perhaps more involved in domestic and regional interests, and it seems that, contrary to their proclaimed slogans, they are not really concerned about genocide, the killing of children and people’s oppression. This is very unfortunate.

  We neither forgive nor forget.

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  Civic space in Iran is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Follow Asal onInstagram orTwitter.

• IRAN: ‘The regime uses executions to maintain its grip on power through fear and intimidation’

  

  CIVICUS speaks with Jasmin Ramsey, Deputy Director of the Center for Human Rights in Iran (CHRI), about the ongoing wave of executions as part of the Iranian regime’s effort to suppress dissent and discourage further protests.

  Founded in 2008, CHRI is an independent civil society organisation that works to protect and promote human rights in Iran. Headquartered in New York, it researches and documents human rights violations throughout Iran, and provides governments, the United Nations, think tanks, global media and research centres around the world with detailed information, analysis and policy recommendations. CHRI’s approach is strictly nonpartisan, operating within the framework of international human rights law.

  What has led to the current wave of executions in Iran?

  Executions in Iran are not just a pillar of the founding of the Islamic Republic, but a ruthless tool wielded by the regime to maintain its grip on power through fear and intimidation. Although the vast majority of the more than 834 people who were hanged in Iran in 2023 were accused of drug offences or other non-political activities, the increase in executions after the protests, and the growing number of political prisoners among those executed in recent years, underscore the regime’s desperation to crush dissent. It is determined to prevent the emergence of another grassroots movement such as the Woman, Life, Freedom protests triggered by the September 2022 killing of Mahsa Amini at the hands of the morality police.

  This wave of state-sanctioned killings has galvanised civil society to unite in condemnation. Women prisoners of conscience, in particular, have shown remarkable resilience, leading calls against the death penalty among Iranian civil society through joint statements and hunger strikes.

  Iranian civil society is uniting to demand not just a cessation of executions, but the abolition of the death penalty. No matter how much the regime uses force and violence, it has failed to quell the desire for fundamental and systemic change in Iran. At every turn, society is pushing back against state policies that are repressive and discordant with the desires and beliefs of much of the population.

  Alongside increasing executions, how else has the regime reacted to the protests?

  Repression in various forms has escalated significantly since the emergence of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement in 2022, manifesting in various forms such as increased arrests and detentions of peaceful activists and family members seeking justice for victims of state violence.

  The government is also pushing for a law to impose harsher penalties on women appearing in public without the mandated hijab. This proposed law burdens citizens, encourages vigilante violence and increases women’s vulnerability to abuse through increased surveillance and state security forces deployed on the streets.

  Is there any space for civil society in Iran?

  While technically there might some room for civil society to operate in Iran, as established in legislation, the reality is starkly different. Article 27 of Iran’s constitution allows for public gatherings and marches under some conditions, but protests critical of the state are swiftly suppressed, often with violence. Fundamental rights such as freedoms of speech, expression and the press are severely curtailed, and peaceful activism is often treated as a threat to national security.

  Despite these challenges, activists and citizens persist in reclaiming their rights, using a variety of methods such as social media posts, prison letters and acts of civil disobedience, like women defying the state’s forced hijab law by walking the streets unveiled. Despite facing repression and economic hardships exacerbated by governmental corruption and sanctions, their determination remains strong.

  I am grateful to be doing this work in a place of safety, where, at least for now, I am shielded from the dangers faced by activists in Iran. I consider myself fortunate to learn from the courageous Iranians, especially women, who persist and resist despite immense risks. CHRI’s mission is to amplify their voices and advocate for civil society’s demands internationally, a task that comes with its own set of challenges. However, these challenges pale in comparison to the dangers faced by those on the frontlines in Iran.

  What should international allies do to support the struggle for freedoms in Iran?

  During the initial surge of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, there was a heightened international focus on the events unfolding in Iran. This sparked hope for more substantial action from governments with influence over the Islamic Republic. At that time, we outlined steps for the international community to pressure Iran to cease its violent crackdown on protests.

  Among our recommendations, we emphasised the need for governments that have diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic to recall their ambassadors in protest against the killing of protesters and hanging of prisoners. We asked them to summon Iran’s diplomats to communicate directly their outrage and warn that further costs and isolation would ensue unless the Iranian authorities halted executions, annulled death sentences, ceased torture under custody, released prisoners and respected due process for those accused.

  We urged the international community to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organisation and impose or expand human rights sanctions against Iranian officials and entities associated with rights violations and freeze the assets of officials who violated human rights, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and many more.

  We also asked parliamentarians around the world to sponsor individual political prisoners, particularly those facing execution, to publicise their cases and the unjust nature of their prosecution or sentences and publicly demand their safety and release, both on the international stage and directly with Iranian ambassadors and other Islamic Republic officials.

  Additionally, we urged states to suspend negotiations over Iran’s nuclear deal, which could provide increased revenue to the Iranian state and therefore increase its repressive capacity. We demanded it be expelled for multilateral bodies and various international platforms and associations, particularly those whose principles it blatantly violates. We also asked governments to support the United Nations (UN) Fact-Finding Mission on Iran and assist those fleeing Islamic Republic persecution, and asked tech companies to support safe digital communications for the Iranian people.

  This roadmap remains relevant today. It is crucial for international allies to rally behind the UN’s independent international Fact-Finding Mission, tasked with investigating atrocities committed by the regime since the onset of the violent repression of the protests in September 2022. As the Fact-Finding Mission presents its first report to the UN Human Rights Council in mid-March, a united, multilateral approach to supporting its mandate is essential for holding the Iranian government accountable and advancing the struggle for justice and human rights in Iran.

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  Civic space in Iran is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with CHRI through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@ICHRI onTwitter and@centerforhumanrights onInstagram.