civic space

• DRC: ‘Civil society action is needed more than ever, but the space in which it can undertake it is getting smaller’

  CIVICUS speaks with Bahati Rubango, country coordinator at the Women’s International Peace Centre (WIPC), about conflict in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

  WIPC is a feminist organisation seeking to catalyse women’s leadership, amplify their voices and deepen their role in peacebuilding. It started out in 1974 as Isis-Women’s International Cross-Cultural Exchange, and in 1994 it moved from Geneva to Uganda and deepened its focus on the women, peace and security agenda.

  What’s the security situation in the DRC, and how is civil society working to address it?

  In the DRC, and particularly in Kivu and other parts of eastern DRC, including Beni, Bunagana, Masisi and Rutshuru territories and Ituri and South Kivu provinces, the situation is dire due to ongoing conflict. The prominence of the M23 rebel group exacerbates the crisis. The DRC’s government has accused Rwanda of supporting M23, with these claims substantiated by United Nations (UN) reports. The region is also plagued by the presence of over 120 other armed factions, foreign and local, some of which receive backing from Uganda, further complicating the situation.

  This has precipitated a humanitarian catastrophe, characterised by widespread displacement, killings, rape, plundering of natural resources, instances of sexual violence and severe limitations on access to education and healthcare, worsening the suffering and vulnerability of millions of civilians.

  Despite the deployment of various regional and international peacekeeping missions, the violence persists. The peacekeeping efforts of MONUSCO, the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC, have fallen short. The conflict has regional and global dimensions beyond the DRC’s borders, impacting on peace and security across multiple countries.

  There is a complex interplay of local and international dynamics, including economic interests that perpetuate the conflict. The conflict’s economic dimension has been illustrated by the fact that rebel groups are mainly located where there are strategic natural resources.

  Efforts to quell the insurgency by national militia groups such as the Wazalendo movement find obstacles in the challenging terrain and the firm grip of rebel groups on strategic areas. As a result, access to Goma and other conflict-affected regions is primarily limited to air travel and boats across Lake Kivu, which impedes humanitarian aid and peacekeeping efforts.

  Civil society organisations play a crucial role in peacebuilding, monitoring human rights violations and advocating for justice and security sector reforms. Civil society highlights the need for justice for victims and the involvement of women and young people in peace processes. Despite challenges, including threats to human rights defenders, civil society strives to raise awareness, combat hate speech and protect vulnerable populations.

  How much space is there for civil society action in the DRC?

  The situation has been tumultuous since May 2021, with the declaration of a state of siege in conflict areas that has subsequently been renewed. Under the ongoing state of siege, the military displaced civilian authorities and assumed control. This shift resulted in a significant curtailment of civic freedoms, particularly for public demonstrations and speech. Military justice has taken precedence over civilian law, raising ethical concerns and contributing to lack of accountability.

  Problems have been compounded by the questionable level of training and education in the army. There have been reports of inadequately trained people being integrated, including former rebel fighters with no regard for human rights principles, approaches or values. This has led to a rise in criminal activities and violations committed by security forces, further restricting civic space.

  Human rights defenders and journalists critical of the government have faced persecution. Arrests and criminalisation under baseless charges have become commonplace. Despite legislative efforts to protect activists, implementation has been lacking, exacerbating the erosion of civic space. An example is Lucha (Lutte pour le changement – Fight for Change), an organisation of young activists, several of whom spent four days under arrest simply for signing a declaration urging the state to stop war.

  Advocacy at national, regional and global levels is needed to address the challenges of conflict. However, entrenched power dynamics in the DRC, including the dominance of the ruling party, pose significant obstacles to meaningful reform. Urgent action is needed to reverse the trend of declining civic space, because civil society action is needed more than ever, but the space in which it can undertake it is getting smaller.

  What’s the likelihood of tensions between the DRC and Rwanda escalating into a regional conflict?

  Rwanda’s involvement in destabilising the DRC is concerning, especially considering its history of aggression in the region, but it won’t necessarily lead to a regional conflict. Despite Rwanda’s attempts to exert influence, the DRC has demonstrated significant military strength in defending its territory against its aggression in the past.

  Rwanda’s diplomatic prowess and hidden support from foreign countries – often driven by economic interests around mineral resources – contribute to its ability to manipulate regional dynamics. Rebel groups such as the M23 and the Allied Democratic Forces exploit the porous borders between Rwanda and the DRC, seeking refuge in and support from Rwanda to evade accountability for their actions. This exacerbates tensions between the two countries.

  But the likelihood of the conflict escalating into a full-blown regional war is mitigated by mutual interests and dependencies. Both countries rely on resources derived from the DRC, which acts as a deterrent to all-out warfare. Regional initiatives like the Nairobi Process, brokered by the East African Community in November 2022, seek to address underlying tensions and promote peacebuilding efforts. However, the effectiveness of such initiatives is undermined by external influences dictating the terms of engagement and providing support to conflicting parties.

  Civil society plays a crucial role in advocating for peace and stability, but its efforts are hindered by external interference and power dynamics that dictate the trajectory of the conflict. While regional organisations, notably the African Union, are theoretically focused on addressing conflict in the continent, external influences and interests often compromise their effectiveness.

  Ultimately, it will require a concerted effort from regional and global players committed to peace and stability in the Great Lakes region to prevent the escalation of the conflict and resolve it for good.

  How can the international community support peacebuilding efforts in the DRC?

  There is a pressing need for support from the international community to assist internally displaced people in desperate need of essentials such as food and shelter. Efforts are also needed to document atrocities to ensure accountability further along the road. This includes highlighting the responsibilities of perpetrators and using this information to ensure justice is served, even if it takes years. Support for civil society groups involved in peacebuilding processes is crucial, particularly since the state lacks adequate resources.

  Although it may not generate enthusiasm in all quarters of the international community, security sector reform requires attention. Fortunately, there are promising initiatives funded by international donors.

  Another critical need is justice reform, which should include mechanisms for transitional justice. This will be vital to address the immediate effects of conflict and the long-standing grievances and cycles of violence that have plagued the region for decades. Access to justice for victims is paramount to break the cycle of impunity and prevent further atrocities. There’s a need for collective and individual reparations for victims, as well as guarantees that such violence will not be repeated. This includes addressing psychological trauma and providing survivors the support they need to rebuild their lives.

  Both local and international engagement will be needed to ensure that peacebuilding agreements are fully respected and implemented, including by holding all parties responsible and accountable. Civil society activists, academics and journalists will have a crucial role in monitoring and advocating for these agreements to be fulfilled.

  Finally, it’s essential to recognise that the conflict in the DRC is not isolated but has regional and global implications. Efforts to address the crisis must consider its broader context and involve stakeholders at all levels, from local communities to international organisations. Only through a holistic and inclusive approach can lasting peace and stability be achieved in the region.

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  Civic space in the DRC is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Women’s International Peace Centre through itswebsite and follow @TheWIPCentre and@BRubango on Twitter.

• EAST AFRICA: ‘The pipeline project would open up critical ecosystems to commercial oil exploitation’

  CIVICUS speaks about the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) project and its potential impacts on the climate and on the health and livelihoods of local communities with Omar Elmawi, coordinator of the Stop the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (#StopEACOP).

  #StopEACOP is a global online campaign that seeks to raise awareness of the effects of the project and calls for its cancellation.

  What is EACOP, and what is wrong with it?

  EACOP is a project to extract and transport crude oil from Uganda to Tanzania, led by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and French energy conglomerate TotalEnergies alongside the Uganda National Oil Company and Tanzania Petroleum Development Cooperation.

  If it goes on, EACOP would have disastrous consequences for local communities, for wildlife and for the entire planet. In other words, it will affect humans, nature and climate. It threatens to displace thousands of families and farmers from their land. It poses significant risks to water resources and wetlands in both Uganda and Tanzania – including the Lake Victoria basin, which over 40 million people rely on for drinking water and food production.

  Additionally, EACOP would increase the severity of the global climate emergency by transporting oil that, when burned, will generate over 34 million tonnes of carbon emissions per year. The pipeline would also open up critical ecosystems in the landlocked regions of Central and Eastern Africa to commercial oil exploitation.

  It would also rip through numerous sensitive biodiversity hotspots and risk significantly degrading several nature reserves crucial to the preservation of threatened species, including elephants, lions and chimpanzees.

  How are you mobilising against EACOP?

  Civil society came together under a global campaign that we have called #StopEACOP, aimed at sharing news related to the pipeline project and distributing resources to help people organise and take action against it.

  #StopEACOP is led by an alliance of local groups and communities and African and global civil society organisations (CSOs). Over 260 CSOs have endorsed it and are working towards realising the campaign’s objectives through public mobilisation, legal action, research, shareholder activism and media advocacy.

  Since environmental licences have been awarded for the pipeline and associated oil fields in Kingfisher and Tilenga, several cases have been filed against the EACOP pipeline, including at the East African Court of Justice and in French courts against TotalEnergies, under the duty of vigilance law.

  We hope that our campaign will put enough pressure on the companies and governments involved so that they will put an end to the pipeline project and prioritise the wellbeing of people and the environment.

  How have the governments involved responded to the #StopEACOP campaign?

  The governments of both Tanzania and Uganda are committed to seeing this project through despite the fact that each will receive only 15 per cent of the proceeds from the crude oil going through the pipeline. TotalEnergies and CNOOC hold 70 per cent of the pipeline’s shares, so they will be the ones pocketing 70 per cent of the proceeds from crude oil.

  Additionally, TotalEnergies and CNOOC both get tax benefits, including a waiver on payment of corporate tax for 10 years once the pipeline becomes operational and on the value-added tax on imported products and materials needed for the pipeline. They are required to pay only five per cent in withholding tax instead of the required 15 per cent.

  We haven’t stopped trying to engage the Tanzanian and Ugandan governments, although some of our members, and especially community partners, have been arrested and detained, had their offices raided or been threatened with the deregistration of their organisations. The government has had a part to play in most if not all these challenges, but we have continued to engage and use all legal mechanisms and processes available to make sure our community partners are protected.

  What kind of support do you need from international civil society and the wider international community?

  Allied organisations, activists and regular people are welcome to visit our website and click on our action page, which suggests a variety of actions addressed at the companies involved and governments and their funders and insurers. Please take as many of the actions listed as you can, prioritising those targeting insurance companies and banks. This is key because the EACOP project will need multi-billion-dollar loans to proceed, as well as numerous insurance policies covering every component of the project.

  People can also donate to the cause. All the resources we receive are shared with our community partners and support any security and legal needs that may arise, including legal representation fees.

  You can follow us on our social media pages to get updates on the campaign and subscribe to receive email updates on the progress of the campaign and upcoming actions that you can endorse or take part in.

  Civic space in bothTanzania andUganda is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with #StopEACOP through itswebsite or its Facebook and Instagram pages,and follow @stopEACOP on Twitter. 

• ECUADOR: ‘Democracy has allowed room for organised crime and narco-politics to grow’

  CIVICUS speaks with Mauricio Alarcón Salvador, executive director of Fundación Ciudadanía y Desarrollo (Citizenship and Development Foundation, FCD), about the elections that will be held in Ecuador on 20 August, the eruption of political violence and organised crime and the implications for civil society and the future of the country.

  FCD is an Ecuadorian civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes and defends the rule of law, democratic principles and individual freedoms and encourages citizen participation, social control, transparency, open government and public innovation.

  Why is Ecuador facing general elections only two years after the inauguration of a new president?

  We will have new elections because the current president resorted to the mechanism known as ‘mutual death’, established in the constitution since 2008. This allows the president to dissolve the National Assembly on various grounds. It is known colloquially as ‘mutual death’ because ‘killing’ the legislature also causes the ‘death’ of the executive. In May this year, President Guillermo Lasso dissolved the National Assembly because, in his opinion, it had caused a serious political crisis, in the context of an impeachment trial against him based on accusations of corruption in his close entourage. The use of this mechanism allows the president to continue governing briefly without Congress but requires both legislative and presidential elections to be called within a short period of time to elect those who will complete the ongoing term. That is why the National Electoral Council called for presidential and legislative elections to be held on 20 August. Those elected in this vote will stay in power for approximately 18 months, the length of the current term remaining, which will end in May 2025.

  How has civic space evolved under this government, and what are the prospects for the future?

  For the little more than two years that this government has been in office, the situation of civic space has not changed much from the previous period. While it is true that the Organic Law on Communications was reformed to provide greater guarantees for freedom of expression and press freedom, the hostile environment against the media and journalists remains unchanged. The main aggressor may no longer be the president, but the notion persists that some people have the right to silence others just because they think differently. The climate of censorship and self-censorship hasn’t changed.

  Nor have the regulatory conditions under which CSOs operate. Although the authorities no longer persecute or intimidate them, the regulations that enable them to do so remain in place. No progress has been made towards the adoption of an NGO law fully guaranteeing freedom of association.

  Finally, as regards freedom of peaceful assembly, protests in June 2022 highlighted the weak character of the procedures available to authorities for guaranteeing it. There is still much work to be done in this regard and the challenge ahead is enormous.

  CIVICUS, an organisation of which we are members, has been key in making the situation of civic space in Ecuador and its evolution visible in recent years.

  Are the conditions for clean and transparent elections in place?

  At FCD we believe that general conditions exist for a clean and transparent electoral process. The National Electoral Council that is in charge of this process is the same that organised the presidential vote in 2021 and local elections a few months ago. These were processes that, generally speaking, have been commended by electoral observation missions. There are some pending issues to be resolved, mainly regarding the financing of politics, but in terms of the organisation of the process we are confident that everything will go well.

  As civil society, we would have liked to collaborate much more in supporting these elections, but this process came about unexpectedly and the organisations that usually take part have not been in a position to implement all our initiatives. Nevertheless, national election observation will be carried out and we have conducted campaigns to promote informed voting: we have published background information about the candidates and their government plans, and we have even monitored, albeit in a limited way, issues related to political financing. The challenge is enormous, but we are confident that we are doing our part to strengthen an extraordinary electoral process that we never saw coming.

  What are the key campaign issues?

  What we’ve seen these past few weeks is an apathetic campaign, very weak on proposals. Candidates seem to be fully aware that what is being elected is a transitional government that will last a few months, and they are not giving it due importance. Little has been said about fundamental rights and freedoms in a context where security is the main focus of public attention. This is of great concern to us, because in the face of the critical situation of insecurity at the national level, people demand quick solutions regardless of whether their implementation violates rights and freedoms. Regarding security, for example, several candidates have referred to the use of force outside of what is established by basic rights and international standards in force in Ecuador and the region.

  Unfortunately, it is difficult for a situation as serious as the one Ecuador is going through to be resolved in such a short period of time as the one that will be afforded to the future president. The main concerns of Ecuadorians are centred on insecurity, the economic crisis and corruption. It is hoped that the new government will act on these issues by listening to people and putting an end to the arrogance that has characterised the outgoing government. Although time is short, the transitional government should establish basic lines of action, either for continuity through the next period or so that whoever comes to power in 2025 will have a basis for doing so.

  How does the assassination of Fernando Villavicencio change the political scenario?

  Political violence is nothing new in Ecuador: in recent elections there have been candidates who experienced threats and attacks, which in some cases have cost them their lives.

  However, this is the first instance in a long time that a presidential candidate has been the victim of an assassination. The conditions under which the attack on Fernando Villavicencio occurred are revealing. He was a candidate with a risk assessment of over 95 per cent, who had police protection and had been denouncing constant threats against him.

  This affects not only the electoral landscape but also Ecuador’s democracy itself, which has allowed room for organised crime and narco-politics to grow. If the proper institutions act in a timely manner and not only prevent events like this from happening again, but also manage to put an end to the prevailing impunity, we will end up strengthening a weak democracy that has been crying out for help. For this to happen, there is much work ahead, focused on coordinating efforts between public institutions, civil society, the private sector and political actors in ways that put the country ahead of any particular interest.

  What international support does Ecuadorian civil society need to continue doing its work?

  After what has happened in recent years, the starting point would be to ensure that international cooperation does not abandon Ecuadorian civil society. Cooperation institutions must also understand that although it is more profitable – at least in terms of communication – to save the environment, protect species or support community development, it is key to maintain support for organisations and initiatives working for democracy and civic space, because no other initiative would be viable without these.

  The international community must keep its eyes on Ecuador and look for local allies to fight back against the democratic setbacks we are experiencing. A joint effort is needed to strengthen civil society as a fundamental pillar of democracy.

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  Civic space in Ecuador is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with FCD through itswebsite orFacebook account, subscribe to itsYouTube channel and followfcd_ecuador on Instagram and@FCD_Ecuador and@aiarconsalvador on Twitter.

• ECUADOR: ‘The election provided a temporary escape valve, but instability is not over’

  CIVICUS discusses the results of the 15 October runoff vote in Ecuador’s presidential election with Humberto Salazar, executive director of Fundación Esquel.

  Esquel is a civil society organisation that seeks to contribute to sustainable human development, the improvement of the quality of life of the most excluded parts of the population and the construction of a democratic, responsible and supportive society in Ecuador.

  How did violence as a result of organised crime affect the election?

  The electoral process was deeply affected by violence. This was not limited to the death of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio. In the context of these and the previous local elections, elected representatives to local governments were also assassinated. The most notorious case was that of Agustín Intriago, mayor of the city of Manta. A candidate for the National Assembly was also assassinated, and many other candidates for different positions received threats. The list of fatal victims of violence expands if we include the seven suspects captured for the Villavicencio assassination who were killed in the prisons where they were being held.

  In this context, voting preferences were surely affected. From the shadows, groups representing local and transnational mafias sent intimidating messages through violent acts that influenced people’s votes. This was very evident in the first round, when following Villavicencio’s assassination, most voters opted for candidates who until then had had no chance of reaching the runoff. This was the case with Jan Topic and Daniel Noboa, the president-elect. Both saw their numbers rebound after the assassination.

  Was violence a campaign issue in the runoff?

  The influence of violence on the elections went beyond being a campaign issue strategically chosen by the candidates. For voters, security became a central issue on the agenda, even surpassing in priority other key issues such as unemployment and poverty.

  It is not that unemployment and poverty lost relevance, but rather that the three issues became an integrated trio of aspirations that is at the basis of current demands. The electorate is looking for quick and effective, but not isolated, answers. Security, unemployment and poverty are all elements of the same equation that citizens demand from the political system.

  Although the candidates’ proposals on the issue were very general, there is a consensus in political circles that security is a key issue in Ecuador’s current situation. Consequently, in the coming days the president-elect will have to develop his security proposals in greater detail. At the polls, voters didn’t evaluate whether the proposals of either candidate on the issue were the best, nor did they have the tools to do so, but now they hope that, regardless of the policies chosen, the result of their implementation will be greater peace.

  Do you see the result as indicating a rightward turn by the electorate, or do you think the vote wasn’t ideologically motivated?

  The analysis of electoral preferences is not a game of addition and subtraction in which one side, in this case the right, wins, while the other side loses. Nor are we dealing with a naïve or uninformed electorate that has been tricked by a renewed right-wing alternative and has leaned towards right-wing values, principles and narratives as a result.

  In the current circumstances, the vote is far from ideological. Other considerations weigh in the assessment of available options. In this case, the search for novelty prevailed, allowing for the victory of an ‘outsider’. In Ecuador, outsiders have a long track record of success.

  While the winning candidate represents the right in terms of his values and models, discursively he presents himself as a renovator, much more pragmatic than ideological. This blurring of ideological content is not a unique feature of this particular candidate, but expresses a deeper process of transformation of representation in a context in which rhetoric has been emptied of content as a result of practices blatantly contradicting discourse.

  People voted overwhelmingly for a candidate who managed to inspire their trust, whose traits set him apart from the polarised competition proposed by more ideological candidates. They looked for someone who offered alternatives not only to address security issues but also to tackle issues of economic recovery and welfare.

  The result was also influenced by the expectations of specific audiences such as young people, who make up a major part of the electoral roll. This part of the electorate sought options for the future detached from the conflicts between those who are ultimately responsible for the crisis in which we are now immersed. In this sense, right-wing and left-wing ideological narratives were equally punished, as evidenced by the fact that all traditional parties lagged behind in the election results.

  Why did defeated candidate Luisa González lose, despite having a stronger party structure?

  A key factor in Luisa González’s defeat in the runoff was the weight of the figure of former president Rafael Correa as the symbol and leader of the Citizen Revolution movement. This leadership, which offers the movement a captive electorate of around 25 per cent, also creates a ceiling that, in a polarised competition between Correism and anti-Correism, does not allow the candidate to surpass the 50 per cent required to win in the runoff. The same polarisation strategy that gave Correa’s government the strength to push its agendas has reduced her chances of attracting an electorate that is not part of the party’s hardcore vote.

  The revanchist narratives of Correism, expressed in the motto ‘neither forgive nor forget’, also undermined González’s support. The appeal to a return to the past reaffirmed the party’s base, but prevented it winning the votes of a broader electorate that distrusts the authoritarian tendencies of Correism and feared that the triumph of his candidate would translate into restrictions on civic space, particularly on freedom of association.

  What are civil society’s expectations of the new administration?

  While the president-elect does not have a history of resistance to civil society participation, during the campaign he was not particularly open to receiving proposals from and meeting with civil society groups. This creates uncertainty about how broad and effective spaces for civil society participation in public policy design and implementation will be. In principle, there are no clear threats to civic space, but there is uncertainty regarding the new government’s position on the promotion and strengthening of civil society.

  It is worth noting that the two second-round competitors had a conservative bias beyond their ideological leanings to the right or left. Hence the uncertainty as to how the new president will respond to social demands from the gender equality agendas of feminist groups and the LGBTQI+ community, the demands of the Indigenous movement regarding plurinationality and interculturality, and the concerns of the human rights movement regarding the search for policies to tackle crime that do not sacrifice rights.

  What is certain is that there is a huge number of problems that the new government will have to address. To sustain its initiatives beyond the one and a half years of his term in office, the new president will need to make a broad call for action and produce a basic agenda endorsed by national multi-stakeholder agreements. Policies on security, labour – with an emphasis on youth employment under a model of intergenerational inclusion – and combating chronic child malnutrition will be indispensable. The so-called Democracy Code, the 2009 law that establishes the electoral system, the management of elections and the requirements for the functioning and financing of political parties and movements, must also be reformed.

  Do you think this election put an end to political instability?

  The instability is not over, but the election provided a temporary and short-lived escape valve for the tensions of the multi-dimensional crisis affecting Ecuador. The government’s grace period, however, will be very limited: it will have to produce measures in the short term that show it’s on the way to resolving major problems.

  Two things could work against it: the slowness of the bureaucratic apparatus to develop transformative projects and the power struggle that could block its initiatives in the National Assembly. The relationship between the executive and legislative branches will be key. If the executive once again finds itself blocked by a multitude of special interests demanding perks to enable the approval of its initiatives, the crisis will again deepen.

  Civic space in Ecuador is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Fundación Esquel through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow @FundacionEsquel onInstagram andTwitter.

• ECUADOR: ‘The new government must dialogue and seek political agreements that are public, not under the table’

  CIVICUS discusses the results of the 15 October runoff vote in Ecuador’s presidential election with Ruth Hidalgo, executive director of Participación Ciudadana (Citizen Participation).

  Participación Ciudadana is a non-partisan and pluralist civil society organisation (CSO) that works to strengthen democracy in Ecuador.

  How did organised crime violence affect the electoral process?

  The electoral process that just ended has been marked by political violence: a presidential candidate, a mayor and a prefect were assassinated. There has also been a climate of violence on the streets due to the actions of drug gangs, who extort protection money known as ‘vaccines’ from the public and uses it to finance organised crime groups.

  This made the issue of security one of the central topics in the debate between the second round candidates, and one that has generated the highest expectations.

  The two candidates’ proposals, however, were broadly similar, although with some differences in tone and characteristics of their own. Both aimed to strengthen the presence of the armed forces as co-executors alongside the police of anti-crime policies.

  How do you interpret the triumph of a centre-right alternative?

  This was not necessarily an ideological vote. The weakness of political parties in Ecuador means that ideology is losing strength. For some time now, the country has been debating not between right and left but between Correism and anti-Correism: it is the controversial legacy of former president Rafael Correa, in power for a decade between 2007 and 2017, which continues to polarise Ecuadorian society.

  The winning candidate, business leader Daniel Noboa, represents at least by his origins a centre-right option. But if he has won, it is because he has managed to capture the votes of a young electorate that is not on either side of the polarisation and has rather opted for a new vision, a young candidate with no political baggage who offers a form of politics that, unlike that of his predecessors, is not confrontational.

  What factors worked against the candidacy of Luisa González?

  Correa’s candidate, Luisa González, was hurt by the constant presence of Correa during most of the campaign, which ended up overshadowing her candidacy. Although in the end she tried to distance herself from that influence, she did not manage to position herself as a renewed Correist option, which is what she should have conveyed in order to have a chance of winning. She remained stuck to the worn-out and questioned political image of the former president.

  I believe that the element of Correa’s legacy that leads to the greatest rejection is his confrontational and threatening way of dealing with those he views as political enemies. This seems to be eliciting more and more discontent and disapproval. While the amount of support González received was not small, this set a ceiling for her that she was unable to break through. This was precisely the reason her opponent was able to prevail.

  How has the space for civil society evolved in recent years, and what can be expected under the new government?

  Civil society, in my opinion, has recovered its presence and freedom of action after Correa’s time in power, during which it was restricted and in some cases persecuted. Let’s not forget that an important environmental CSO, which confronted the government because of its extractivist policies, was arbitrarily shut down and then legislation was passed to regulate the registration, operations and closure of CSOs at the government’s discretion, with the aim of removing those that bothered the government. Many civil society activists and journalists were criminalised for their work.

  The expectation of civil society under the new government is the same as always: to have an enabling environment that allows it to carry out its activities freely. We expect a government that protects and promotes freedom of association.

  What should be the priorities of the new president?

  It’s worth remembering that these were early elections called to elect President Guillermo Lasso’s successor after he used the ‘cross-death’ mechanism, dissolving congress to prevent it impeaching him, but simultaneously cutting his mandate short. This means Noboa will only serve as president for the rest of Lasso’s term: a mere 18 months, too little time for the many challenges he will face.

  The new president takes over a country plagued by insecurity and violence, with a high fiscal deficit, almost zero growth, very high unemployment rates and on top of that, one that is once again experiencing the El Niño climate phenomenon, with warming water currents that produce extreme weather events and record temperatures. These are all issues he will have to prioritise, with public policies aimed at mitigating the most important problems in the areas of the economy, climate change and public security. To do so, he will need to build a strong team and create spaces for dialogue and reconciliation. He will need to demonstrate openness to civil society and seek political agreements that are public, not under the table.

  Every election presents an opportunity. As always in a country with so many needs, expectations are high. The main task ahead for the new government is to strengthen Ecuador’s democracy, which will demand an enormous amount of work.

  Civic space in Ecuador is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Participación Ciudadana through itswebsite orFacebook account, subscribe to itsYouTube channel and follow@participacionpc on Instagram and@ParticipacionPC and@RhidalgoPC on Twitter.

• EGYPT: ‘Activists who work from abroad are being targeted through their families’

  

  CIVICUS speaksabout the ongoing repression of dissent in EgyptwithAhmed Attalla, Executive Director of the Egyptian Front for Human Rights (EFHR).

  Founded in 2017 and registered in the Czech Republic, EFHR is a civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes human rights in Egypt, with a specific focus on criminal justice, through advocacy, research and legal support.

  What are the conditions for civil society in Egypt?

  Civic space in Egypt has remained highly restricted for the past decade, with the authorities consistently targeting civil society activists, journalists, political dissidents and human rights advocates.

  The 2019 NGO law restricts the rights of CSOs. It mandates their registration and enables the government and security forces to interfere in their operations and order the cessation of activities deemed sensitive by the government, such as monitoring human rights conditions and denouncing violations. Organisations registered under this law may also face funding restrictions.

  Some CSOs had to shut down because the authorities targeted them with counter-terrorist measures or prosecuted their directors in Case no. 173 of 2011, commonly known as the ‘Foreign Funding Case’. In some instances, the directors of these organisations were prohibited from leaving the country and their assets were frozen. Some courageous organisations have persisted in their work even in the face of attacks against their directors and staff.

  In September 2021, the government launched the National Human Rights Strategy, a propaganda tool aimed at concealing the human rights crisis ahead of hosting the COP27 climate summit in 2022. As part of this initiative, it took steps to release some political prisoners and engaged in a national dialogue that contained a broader spectrum of political actors, including civil society representatives.

  How has Egyptian civil society organised in the face of repression?

  Civil society has adapted to the ongoing repression in various ways. Many CSOs have decided to limit their public engagement and abstain from taking to the streets or limit their work to the provision of legal aid while refraining from undertaking research and international advocacy, especially with international human rights mechanisms. Other organisations have been forced to relocate their operations abroad to safeguard their staff and ensure the continuity and integrity of their work, which has had the opposite effect of facilitating their advocacy efforts with international mechanisms and among European Union (EU) member states.

  In response to the continuous pressure, many organisations have started collaborating more closely. In 2019, EFHR coauthored a joint report with eight other CSOs for the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council and participated in the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) session in which Egypt’s human rights record was examined. In 2023, we jointly submitted another report for Egypt’s UPR. We have also engaged in joint campaigns and participated in the formation of coalitions aimed at addressing specific challenges. Egyptian CSOs are increasingly recognising the importance of working together to amplify their impact and advocate for change.

  How does EFHR work in such a repressive context?

  When it was founded in 2017, EFHR was officially registered in the Czech Republic with affiliates in Egypt, where our team of researchers and lawyers provides crucial legal support by attending daily court hearings and working directly with victims of prosecution. We have successfully coordinated work between our overseas office and our colleagues based in Egypt. Our work focuses on issues that are ignored by the Egyptian authorities, including issues concerning criminal justice, detention conditions and gender-based violence.

  We take various security measures to protect the identities of our staff. For instance, our research publications don’t include author names or contact details, and we maintain the anonymity of our legal team. These precautions give us some space to work and leverage our findings and expertise with international mechanisms, by engaging with UN Special Rapporteurs and working groups and collaborating with EU diplomats.

  However, we have also faced some challenges. Three of our lawyers have been implicated in state security cases, facing accusations of affiliating with terrorist groups and potentially engaging in the use of force. We have managed to relocate other at-risk colleagues to ensure their safety. The same is happening to other Egyptian human rights organisations, whose members either managed to flee the country or were arrested and remained in prison for least two years.

  How do you support Egyptian activists under threat?

  We provide legal assistance to those who have been arrested or targeted by the authorities and take measures to ensure activists’ digital security and protect their anonymity, enabling them to continue their work. We collaborate with partners and foreign embassies to put pressure on the Egyptian government, but sometimes this doesn’t work.

  Within Egypt, there are a few tools available to protect our colleagues at risk. Even political parties cannot protect their members in Egypt, so they also face regular detentions. Parties often attempt to exert pressure on the authorities to release arrested politicians but after releasing them the government arrests other members of the same organisations.

  Are Egyptian activists safe in exile?

  Activists who work from abroad are being targeted through their families. For example, the Egyptian-American human rights advocate Mohamed Soltan, who filed a case against former prime minister Hazem el-Beblawi, saw his five family members harassed and arrested as a result of his activism. A German resident, Alaa Eladly, was arrested upon landing in Cairo just because his daughter, Egyptian activist Fagr Eladly, criticised President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi president over human rights abuses at a 2015 press conference between the president and then German chancellor Angela Merkel . The father of Belgium-based journalist and human rights advocate Ahmed Gamal Ziada has recently been detained and accused of misuse of communication, spreading false news and joining a banned group. This strategy aims to silence activists and impose an even higher personal cost for doing their work.

  What can the international community do to support Egyptian civil society?

  To gain a comprehensive understanding of the situation in Egypt it is important to listen to the perspectives of local human rights defenders. Our international allies and partners must exert pressure on the Egyptian government to open civic space, stop targeting journalists, civil society activists and political figures and filing trumped up charges against them, and release all political prisoners detained for defending the fundamental rights to freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression.

  EU member states must revise their terms of cooperation with Egypt to prioritise human rights. For instance, they should include human rights considerations as a conditionality for providing financial aid. It is imperative to strike a balance between the interests of governments and the demands of Egyptian civil society. It is also essential to sustain financial support for Egyptian CSOs, especially now that the economic crisis has also hit civil society.

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  Civic space in Egypt is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with EFHR through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@egyptian_front onTwitter.

• EGYPT: ‘The president is desperate for international attention ahead of 2024 election’

  CIVICUS speaks with Ahmed Samih about the repression of civic space in Egypt ahead of the COP27 climate summit, which will be held in Egypt in November. 

  Ahmed is an Egyptian civil society activist living in exile and co-founder of the Andalus Institute for Tolerance and Anti-Violence Studies, an Egyptian civil society organisation (CSO) established in 2004 to advocate for tolerance and the elimination of all forms of discrimination in Egypt and the Middle East and North Africa.

  What is the current state of civic freedoms in Egypt?

  Civic freedoms are almost non-existent under the regime led by President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi due to the ideology of the ruling military class, which dates back to the 1952 military coup. Its ideology is based on a view of society as immature and irresponsible, and therefore not capable of sharing social, economic and political responsibilities with the state. In that, the Egyptian state has mimicked the Soviet model since 1953.

  The regime relies on laws as a tool to control society, instead of just regulating it. Other institutions, such as parliament, have a duty to assist the executive in dominating society. This legal doctrine contrasts with the one embraced by countries that believe in the rule of law, where legislation is aimed at developing society rather than dominating it. Legal domination being such a central idea, the state can’t accept the existence of civil society, although many civil society structures predate the existence of the Egyptian state. The military regime that emerged in 1952 took over the assets of charities that were dedicated to serving society, on the basis of the belief that it is the state’s responsibility to provide for poor people, which leaves no room for others. This has also opened the doors to corruption.

  Historically, civic space in Egypt has shrunk or expanded depending on the ability of the political regime to understand the reality of social change. President Hosni Mubarak, in power from 1981 until he was ousted in 2011, clearly understood these dynamics. He grasped the international human rights paradigm and allowed some freedoms at the local level. He didn’t shut down CSOs but instead permitted them to work on his own terms, under surveillance. Quite pragmatically, he understood that their work contributed to the stability he needed to remain in power. In other words, he utilised civil society to stay in power for three decades.

  How do you interpret President El-Sisi’s recent call for a national political dialogue?

  Thecall for anational political dialogue is likely the consequence of the president’s acknowledgement of two key challenges ahead.First, he has realised that the ongoing economic crisis is likely to be followed, possibly soon, by social unrest, eventually leading to political unrest if not contained. Observers have already forecasted social unrest breaking out ahead of the 2022 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP27), which will be held in Sharm El Sheikh in Egypt in November.

  The other key challenge is the 2024 presidential election, where he, as a presidential candidate, will be asked for a real electoral programme with a timeline. He can’t repeat the experience of the2018 presidential election, in which he ran in the absence of any actual competitor. For the upcoming election, a more open political atmosphere will be necessary. However, political competition remains blocked as most political activists are imprisoned or exiled.

  In this context, the aim of the national dialogue is likely to oxygenate the political atmosphere. Towards the world, President El-Sisi has even shifted the official discourse, from denying human rights issues to admitting their applicability in Egypt. But it is important to note that the outcomes of the dialogue will be by no means binding, and El-Sisi will not be accountable to any of the parties involved. The dialogue, and the discursive shift, are just what he views as an optimal solutions to two major problems he will likely face.

  How does the upcoming COP27 summit fit into the regime’s strategy?

  El-Sisi is desperate for international attention and respect ahead of the presidential election but hasn’t so far gained any. Under his presidency, Egypt hasn’t hosted an international event since the 2015 Egypt Economic Development Conference.

  Hosting COP27 is an excellent opportunity for his regime to whitewash its international reputation without opening up its closed civic space. El-Sisi was eager to host COP27 because the climate summit’s outcomes are not binding, so being the host won’t put his government under pressure to adopt the resulting recommendations, and Egypt even stands to benefit from international investment in its renewable energies sector.

  The only potential issue is posed by international environmental activists who will likely protest, which is why the Egyptian government chose Sharm Al Sheik, a geographic locationwhere protests can easily be contained by security forces.

  To what extent is campaigning for the liberation of imprisoned activists such as Alaa Abdel Fattah affecting Egypt’s public relations machine?

  Some high-profile cases, such as that of imprisoned Egyptian-British blogger and activist Alaa Abdel Fattah, can in the short term be damaging to the government’s whitewashing attempts. Alaa has been on hunger strike since April and his family has been quite active in sharing updates on his condition with international media and advocating for his liberation, to the point that he has become a sort of symbol of the plight of persecuted and imprisoned Egyptian human rights defenders.

  But having Alaa as a symbol for the campaign has a downside. While the campaign may lead to his release or an improvement in the conditions of his detention, if he gets released before November the campaign will lose momentum and the Egyptian government will position itself as moderate and reasonable. So in the long run, the campaign won’t make a big dent on Egypt’s public relations machine.

  For it to profit the most off COP27, the Egyptian government needs to bring as many global leaders as possible to Sharm El Sheikh. To prevent this happening, there is a need for a broad connected campaign led by Arab and international advocates to raise awareness about the human rights situation in Egypt. Sadly, I am not aware of any significant coordination efforts between human rights and environmental activists, Egyptian or otherwise, inside Egypt or abroad, in the run-up to COP27.

  Civic space in Egypt is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor. 
  Follow@AhmedSamih on Twitter.

• EGYPT: ‘There's been severe deterioration in the rule of law & respect for human rights’

  CIVICUS speaks about recent protests in Egypt and their repression with a woman activist and protester who, for security reasons, asked to remain anonymous. The space for civil society in Egypt is severely restricted: laws limit legitimate civil society activities and detention and intimidation are routinely used to silence human rights defenders and journalists. The protests that took place in September 2019 resulted in mass arrests and the criminalisation of protesters.

  

  What were the main drivers of the September 2019 protests in Egypt?

  The trigger for the September 2019 protests came in the form of a series of viral videos shared by the Egyptian actor and construction contractor Mohamed Ali, in which he accused the authorities and the armed forces of corruption and the squandering of public funds. While President Abdul Fattah El-Sisi ultimately addressed the videos in some form, more videos by Ali and others  followed; a broader conversation on the role of the military in Egypt’s economy also ensued.

  On 20 September, and partly in response to Ali’s call for demonstrations against Sisi, hundreds took to the streets in the capital, Cairo, and Alexandria, Suez and other cities. As part of this wave of demonstrations, more protests took place on 20, 21 and 27 September. They occurred within a broader context in which many Egyptian citizens were also bearing the brunt of austerity measures and subsidy cuts and were increasingly affected by an escalating crackdown targeting independent, peaceful expression.

  What was the response of the government to the protests?

  Immediately following the protests and for days afterwards, the Egyptian authorities carried out a widespread arrest campaign that not only targeted people who were present at the demonstrations, but also lawyers, political activists and advocates more broadly. Local civil society organisations (CSOs) estimate that at least 3,763 people were arrested. Many of these people were ordered into pretrial detention in cases involving alleged charges of belonging to a terrorist organisation and spreading false news; a number of them remain in detention.

  In the wake of the protests, Netblocks reported restricted use around Facebook Messenger, BBC News and social media CDN (content delivery network) servers. In Cairo, the authorities blocked some roads and temporarily closed some metro stops, particularly those close to Tahrir Square.

  What has been the state of democracy and human rights in Egypt under the current regime?

  Increasingly since 2013, there has been a severe deterioration in the rule of law and respect for human rights in Egypt. Authorities are using the law to consolidate authoritarianism. This is reflected in new legislation that restricts rights and re-writes the relationship between civilians and the state; the prosecution of peaceful advocates using overly broad anti-terrorism legislation; and the introduction of amendments to the constitution allowing executive influence and interference in the functioning of what are meant to be independent state institutions, including the judiciary and the prosecution.

  The use of extended pretrial detention periods as a punitive measure, the sentencing of individuals in mass trials, and a spike in death penalty sentences continue to take place. Detention conditions remain poor; instances of torture and deaths in detention as a result of inadequate access to medical care abound.

  The situation of minorities leaves much to be desired. Though the authorities passed a Church Construction Law in 2016 and built the region’s largest church in the New Administrative Capital, Egypt’s Christian minority population continues to suffer from sectarianism, finds it difficult to access justice amid reconciliation sessions that favour the majority faith, and often faces obstacles in building and licensing churches in the areas in which they actually reside. While the state has made some initial attempt to compensate the ethnic Nubian minority, their constitutionally recognised right to return to their ancestral lands remains unfulfilled.

  Although Egypt is performing better on a number of economic indicators, austerity policies and subsidy cuts have impacted on the economic and social rights of particularly marginalised civilians, affecting key issues such as housing, education, health and work.

  How has the new NGO law impacted on the freedom of association?

  In August 2019, Egypt’s new NGO Law went into effect. However, its implementing regulations have not yet been issued, which is making it difficult to understand the degree to which the law is in force – and if it is not, which law and implementing regulations are – and to assess the implementation of the law and its impact on civil society. According to the law, implementing regulations were required to be issued within six months, but this deadline passed in February 2019. Media reports suggest however that the regulations are now expected to be issued in mid-March 2020.

  Egypt’s 2019 NGO Law does away with penalties involving jail time, as well as the National Agency to Regulate the Work of Foreign NGOs, a security and intelligence-heavy body created by the 2017 NGO Law to approve and monitor foreign funding. However, the law furthers significant restrictions on the activities of CSOs, places bureaucratic constraints on registration and creates expansive oversight and monitoring authority for government actors.

  While it may be early to report on the precise impact of the new law, there is no doubt that its passing has already contributed to some self-censorship, as CSOs have reported being uncertain regarding what legal schemes govern their work and have also raised concern about the law’s broad restrictions. The law was passed in an environment characterised by travel bans, asset freezes and the prosecution and arrest of members of civil society. These trends are only expected to continue. It is important to note that the NGO Law is not the only piece of legislation governing civil society: the media law, the cybercrime law, the counter-terrorism law and the Penal Code are all examples of laws that contain provisions potentially implicating associational activity as well.

  At this point, what can international civil society do to support civil society in Egypt?

  In some cases in the past, the Egyptian authorities have targeted CSOs engaging with international civil society and subjected them to various forms of reprisal. At other times, international connectivity, collaboration and work with networks has been a form of protection for Egyptian civil society. Accordingly, some organisations are able, willing, or well-positioned to engage with international civil society, while others may not be; this often ends up being a very contextualised and determined on a case-by-case basis.

  In cases in which international support can be of benefit to a particular Egyptian CSO, there are a number of clear needs: the creation of long-term and technical training opportunities and resources; systematic network building to expand access to decision-makers; and the provision of in-kind and financial support. Together, this programming has the potential to amplify the voices of, strengthen and provide protection for domestic CSOs that can often be under-resourced, cut off from the international community and subjected to government restriction.

  Civic space in Egypt is rated as ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

• EL SALVADOR: ‘The election is only a formality to give the green light to a dictatorship’

  CIVICUS speaks about El Salvador’s general election with Carolina Amaya, a Salvadoran freelance journalist specialising in climate crises and socio-environmental conflicts.

  What’s at stake in this election?

  Eighty years after the end of the Maximiliano Martínez dictatorship, El Salvador is approaching a new dictatorship. On 4 February, once President Nayib Bukele is unconstitutionally re-elected, Salvadorans will lose guarantees for our basic human rights.

  Bukele's first administration was characterised by widespread human rights violations: excessive militarisation, a prolonged state of emergency, stigmatisation and criminalisation of poverty as synonymous with involvement in gangs, attacks on independent press, land dispossession, environmental destruction, persecution of environmental defenders – the list goes on. This reality is disguised by propaganda disseminated by media and content creators aligned with the government. Their narrative is that gangs will be back on the streets if Bukele or his party, Nuevas Ideas, lose power.

  Bukele is seeking re-election after ignoring the Salvadoran constitution, which does not allow it. Therefore, his new administration will be unconstitutional, as will all the decisions he makes. It is to be feared that all the rights enshrined in that same constitution will be violated. And we will no longer know how long Bukele and his circle will remain in power.

  In short, what is at stake in the election is our dying democracy. Salvadoran citizens will get to have their say at the ballot box now, but it is uncertain whether they will be able to do so freely again in the future.

  What are the chances of this election being truly free and fair?

  The election will be free, but completely irregular given that the front-runner’s candidacy is unconstitutional. The process has been flawed from the moment the Supreme Electoral Tribunal allowed the registration of Bukele’s candidacy, despite him being ineligible for re-election.

  As for fairness, there are other parties running on different platforms, but competition is unequal. The ruling party has made use of official funds for its electoral campaign, while the rest had to use their own funds to compete against a lavishly funded apparatus with a strong presence on both social and traditional media. This annihilates any alternative, so the election is only a formality to give the green light to a dictatorship.

  The democracy that was born in 1992 has been eroded over the years. Every political party that has held power has been embroiled in corruption scandals. Corruption, the arrogance of elites, the inefficiency of the state and the lack of transparency have resulted in widespread distrust. Impoverished communities have become strongholds of Bukelism because they depend on government welfare to satisfy immediate needs; it is clear to them that they cannot expect long-term solutions.

  The government has campaigned intensely by handing out food boxes and cutting the ribbon on construction projects, all of which is prohibited by the Electoral Code. But there is no authority that can put a stop to these illegal acts because the entire state structure is co-opted by Bukelism, including the judiciary and watchdog bodies.

  What has the climate of opinion been ahead of the election?

  Social media such as YouTube and TikTok are dominated by disinformation and the manipulation of information, while a campaign of fear has taken hold on television. This is nothing new in El Salvador: political parties have long campaigned on the fear that El Salvador could become another Cuba or Venezuela. Now the threat is focused on insecurity and the preservation of life.

  It is very concerning that this messaging has permeated Salvadoran society to the point of not only normalising Bukele's unconstitutional candidacy but also giving him the certainty of a comfortable win.

  What’s the position of civil society, the political opposition and public opinion regarding the government's security policy?

  Bukele’s government has been authoritarian throughout all these years and in many ways, not just in the area of security. During the pandemic it locked up thousands of people who did not comply with isolation directions. When the quarantine was over, it established the state of emergency that continues to allow it to spy on us, persecute us and lock us up. Bukele has militarised the streets, and this has intensified in January 2024, on the eve of the election. The military has been patrolling every neighbourhood of San Salvador, the capital, to demonstrate its presence and power.

  The public is grateful that the gangs lost much of their grip over the country. That is the main achievement of the Bukele administration. The problem is that most people are unaware of the reality of Bukele’s negotiations with gangs, so they think that he managed to clear the streets of gang members just by subjecting them to his state of emergency.

  The media’s handling of images of imprisoned gang members has been very effective, to the point that it has had international repercussions. In several Latin American countries experiencing the scourge of organised crime, people are calling for an authoritarian figure just like Bukele to put an end to it. Even the president of Honduras, ideologically far removed from Bukele, has opted for militarisation and the use of repression to deal with gangs.

  How has civic space been restricted under Bukele?

  As a journalist, I can attest to the fact that many people shy away from the cameras because they dare not make public statements. Sources that spoke to me for years have increasingly stopped responding to my calls, starting from 2019, when Bukele came to power. The situation has worsened as this administration has progressed. Freedom of expression is increasingly limited, as is freedom of assembly. For example, when marches are called in the capital, police blockades are set up to hold back buses coming from the interior.

  Harassment of dissenting voices is also apparent on social media. Day after day, journalists and human rights defenders are denigrated by armies of trolls. I am among the 10 female journalists most attacked on Twitter. Attacks against us women are often misogynistic in nature.

  Some organisations, such as Acción Ciudadana, the Association of Journalists of El Salvador and Cristosal, continue to denounce the lack of a free environment for the expression of opinions, but their complaints have had little effect. Freedom of expression has continued to erode. And a country without freedom of expression, where human rights are violated and human rights defenders are persecuted, is nothing short of a dictatorship.

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  Civic space in El Salvador is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Follow@sharkgirl_sv on Twitter.

• Equatorial Guinea: CIVICUS urges release of activists and respect for human rights

  Spanish 

  Update: Since the issuance of this release, as of 28 April Enrique Asumu has been released from jail. Alfredo Okenve is still in detention.

   Global civil society alliance, CIVICUS, is deeply concerned about the arbitrary detention of civil society activists Enrique Asumu and Alfredo Okenve, and severe restrictions on civic space in Equatorial Guinea. Enrique Asumu and Alfredo Okenve are the President and Vice President of the civil society organisation, the Centre for Development Studies and Initiatives (CEID). 

  The two activists were arrested on 16 April in the capital Malabo following activities commemorating the twentieth anniversary of CEID.  They were interrogated by the Minister of Interior for several hours before being taken to a prison in Malabo where they are detained. 

  “The government of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, in power for almost 40 years has created unacceptably stifling conditions for political and civil society participation, which are an anathema in this day and age,” said Mandeep Tiwana, Head of Policy and Research at CIVICUS.

  Several members of CEID are also at risk of arrest following summons from the authorities to explain their participation at CEID’s 20^th anniversary celebrations. CEID facilitates civic engagement on human rights, good governance, community and rural development. The organisation also raises awareness about the management and use of natural resources in Equatorial Guinea.

  The arbitrariness of the detention of Enrique Asumu and Alfredo Okenve is symptomatic of the political environment in Equatorial Guinea.  Earlier this year, in February 2017, CIVICUS spoke to Alfredo Okenve about the situation in the country revealing a sorry picture of public protests being violently repressed;   a majority of civil society organisations being heavily influenced by the state; close monitoring of independent civil society by the authorities; restriction of online freedoms through routine blocking of websites and social media; and the labelling of those expressing democratic dissent as ‘enemies of the state’.

  Last year, in March 2016, Equatorial Guinean authorities issued an order to suspend the activities of CEID indefinitely. They accused the organisation of violating the country’s public order law by disseminating messages aimed at inciting youth to violence and civil disobedience during its Youth Forum on tolerance and development on 29 January 2016.   In September 2016, CEID announced that it had resumed operations and has since then organised several events attended by public officials including the Prime Minister. 

  CIVICUS urges the release of the detained activists and respect for internationally guaranteed human rights standards by the government of Equatorial Guinea.

  Equatorial Guinea is rated closed by the CIVICUS Monitor.

  For more information, please contact

  Deborah Walter

  Communication Manager, CIVICUS

   

  Inés M. Pousadela

  Policy and Research Officer, CIVICUS

• ERITREA: ‘When the government reacts to our work, we know what we do is making an impact’

  CIVICUS speaks with about civil society work in Eritrea’s context of closed civic space with Helen Kidan, chairperson of the Eritrean Movement for Democracy and Human Rights (EMDHR).

  Founded in 2003 and based in South Africa, EMDHR is a civil society organisation (CSO) that raises awareness about the lack of civil and democratic freedoms and promotes the rule of law, human rights and democracy in Eritrea.

  What’s the situation for civil society in Eritrea?

  Eritrea has never truly implemented its 1997 Constitution and until Eritrea it is run by the rule of law, human rights abuses will continue with no recourse to justice. This includes completely closed civil society space, with no semblance of rights of association, assembly and expression.

  Since Proclamation No. 145 of 2005 went into effect nearly two decades ago, there has been no independent civil society in Eritrea. According to this law, the only way CSOs can implement programmes is in partnership with government agencies, which restrict the areas, themes and focus of the projects that can be implemented. There are obviously very few CSOs present and active in Eritrea.

  The only way to start creating any space for independent CSOs in Eritrea would be to have Proclamation 145/2005 revoked.

  What is EMDHR doing to try to improve the situation?

  EMDHR advocates against the ongoing human rights abuses in Eritrea as well as for the rights of Eritrean refugees in the diaspora. Our mission is to promote and defend human right values as established in international legal instruments and advance democratic change, rule of law and constitutionalism in Eritrea, with the ultimate aim of building a society in which people exercise their basic rights and live in peace, dignity and prosperity.

  We provide training, sustain networks and produce and disseminate information to create awareness of the situation of Eritreans. We have made several presentations at the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council in Geneva, and in July 2022 we made a presentation at the UN in New York.

  We are currently working with African CSOs to bring the ongoing crisis in Eritrea to the African level and get support for Eritrean refugees. We have also commissioned a report on the state of Eritrean CSOs that makes recommendations to the international community.

  In early September 2023 we co-organised the Africa Civil Society Organisations Summit held in Arusha, Tanzania. Through a joint project with Africa Monitors, Eritrean Satellite Television and Eritrean Diaspora for East Africa, a CSO based in Kenya, we have provided training to Eritrean human rights activists, including on digital activism, and created a space for Eritrean CSOs and activists to be able to work together.

  In 2019 we provided in-person training in a workshop held in Uganda. In 2017 we co-organised a conference in Brussels on the ongoing Eritrean refugee crisis, with which we tried to elicit a reaction from members of the European Parliament, commissioners and CSOs from across Europe. And in 2015 we campaigned and got asylum for Eritrean footballers in Botswana.

  What’s it like to be a diaspora activist? How do you connect with activists within Eritrea?

  It’s extremely frustrating because it makes our work less effective. Connecting with people inside Eritrea is very hard as internet penetration in Eritrea is only two per cent. The government basically controls all media: all independent media ceased to exist in 2001. This is why most information is brought to us by people who have recently left the country. But while the work is challenging, it is still possible to get information. And when the government reacts to our work, we know what we do is making an impact.

  A lot of funders provide funds to African organisations only when they operate in their home country. The fact that we are not able to operate inside Eritrea means we also suffer financially and hence a lot of Eritrean CSOs are forced to sustain themselves on the basis of voluntary work.

  Additionally, the work remains emotionally and psychologically draining, as many Eritrean activists in the diaspora are threatened with harm to family members still living in Eritrea for speaking out against the regime back home.

  As Eritrean human rights defenders, even if you are operating outside the country, the government will always discredit your work. All those that don’t agree with them are seen as traitors. The government uses social media as a means of trolling and tries to attack websites and other social media channels.

  What sparked recent protests by Eritrean refugees in Israel, and how has the Israeli government responded?

  Those protests appeared to have been organised by a new group called Brigade N’Hamedu, which is trying to overthrow the regime. Their members hold demonstrations across the world, and they particularly attack the festivals that the regime holds abroad, which they view as a means of raising funds for the regime and spreading its propaganda. They are tired of government interference and intimidate Eritreans who have left their country but still support the Eritrean government. They want all Eritreans who claim asylum but express support for the Eritrean government to have their asylum revoked.

  This is a movement of young Eritreans but a lot of veterans and older members of the community support them, as they see them as the most plausible means of removing the regime. Although they have succeeded in mobilising Eritreans, however, there seems to be no clear strategy and this could be a stumbling block. They are very unlikely to succeed.

  In response to these protests, and using their unprecedented violence as an excuse, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that he wants all Eritreans removed from Israel. The predicament of Eritreans in Israel was already dire, but this has now opened the doors for the far-right government in Israel to deport all Eritreans. However, the UN, Israeli human rights groups and other human rights groups outside Israel are asking that genuine refugees whose lives are at risk not be deported to Eritrea.

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  Civic space in Eritrea is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with EMDHR through itswebsite or Facebook page,and follow @emdhrorg on Twitter.

• ESTONIA: ‘Legal changes deepen the cultural shift favourable to LGBTQI+ rights’

  CIVICUS speaks about civil society’s role in the recentlegalisation of same-sex marriage in Estonia with Kelly Grossthal, head of strategic litigation at the Estonian Human Rights Centre (EHRC).

  Established in 2009, the EHRC is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) working to create anopen society where human rights are guaranteed by the state, and where everyone knows that their rights, as well as the rights of others, deserve equal protection. 

  How significant is the recent legalisation of same-sex marriage?

  Marriage equality has always been the ultimate goal of LGBTQI+ and human rights advocates. The previous arrangement, that of civil unions, was only a temporary compromise. In 2014, the Estonian parliament passed the gender-neutral Registered Partnership Act, which came into force in 2016. Under this law, couples entering a partnership agreement are entitled to joint property rights, succession rights, shared financial obligations, access to each other’s private information and resolution of issues related to the end of life. However, due to the law’s lack of implementation provisions, many couples had to resort to the courts to be able to actually exercise these rights.

  In 2018, the Supreme Court ruled that, regardless of the lack of implementing provisions, the Registered Partnership Act was in force and was part of the Estonian legal order. It stated that failure to issue implementing provisions did not automatically render the legislation unconstitutional, as some argued. This highlights that even with the Registered Partnership Act in place, the struggle for marriage equality persisted.

  How did the EHRC advocate for legal change?

  Since its establishment in 2009, the EHRC has monitored legislation that impacts on LGBTQI+ people and put forward suggestions to improve it. Our main advocacy goal has always been legal equality. However, we have encountered numerous obstacles, primarily stemming from the political climate and societal attitudes. For many years LGBTQI+ rights lacked support from public opinion, and therefore it was not advantageous for politicians to actively champion the cause.

  We have conducted public campaigns advocating for LGBTQI+ rights as human rights, engaged in research, contributed to public discussions and pursued legal cases through our strategic litigation programme. Strategic litigation aims to have a societal impact through specific cases and narratives. When selecting cases related to the LGBTQI+ community, our primary criterion is their potential to maximise a positive outcome for LGBTQI+ people’s human rights.

  We handled several cases that have improved access to social benefits and adoption rights for LGBTQI+ people and filed petitions for constitutional review of regressive laws. For instance, in 2019 the Supreme Court ruled that a provision in the Aliens Act that prevented the granting of temporary residence permits to same-sex registered partners of Estonian citizens for leading a family life in Estonia was unconstitutional and therefore invalid.

  Many of our advocacy efforts have been planned and executed in cooperation with the Estonian LGBT Association and the Equal Treatment Network, which unites 10 Estonian CSOs dedicated to protecting the equal rights of different target groups.

  How have public attitudes towards LGBTQI+ people evolved over time?

  Just a couple of years ago, the majority of Estonians opposed marriage equality. Resistance could have been influenced by personal values, religious beliefs, or a fear of change. Over the past few years, however, there has been intense societal debate over LGBTQI+ issues. Various video campaigns and petitions have been launched both in support of and against the Registered Partnership Act, marriage equality and LGBTQI+ rights more generally. Unfortunately, this has led to an increase in hate speech towards LGBTQI+ people, fuelled by conservative politicians. But it had the positive effect of making rainbow families more visible, as they shared their stories in response to anti-rights attacks.

  The ongoing debate and increased visibility have played a crucial role in driving cultural change and garnering support for LGBTQI+ rights. The adoption of the Registered Partnership Act and the legalisation of same-sex marriage were two big milestones. Legal changes seem to have further deepened the positive cultural shift.

  For over a decade the EHRC has commissioned public opinion surveys on LGBTQI+ issues from an independent research company, Turu-uuringute AS. According to the most recent one, conducted earlier this year, support for marriage equality has increased by six points in the past two years, with 53 per cent of Estonians currently in favour. Progress has been significant: a decade ago only 34 per cent were in favour and 60 per cent opposed it.

  Civil society has been instrumental in shifting public opinion about LGBTQI+ people, with numerous LGBTQI+ groups and networks organising events for both LGBTQI+ people and the public as a whole.

  The Estonian LGBT Association has been the main organiser of Baltic Pride, the most recent of which took place in the capital, Tallinn, in June, just before the parliamentary vote on marriage equality. It attracted over 7,000 participants from three Baltic states and there were no major incidents. It was a truly joyous march followed by an open-air concert with community artists and a picnic.

  Since 2017, Estonia has also hosted an LGBTQI+ film festival, Festheart, organised by a small CSO. Initially held in the town of Rakvere, by 2020 it had expanded to Tartu, Estonia’s second-largest city.

  Has the legalisation of same-sex marriage elicited any anti-rights backlash?

  As anticipated, there has been a conservative backlash in response to the new legislation. Two parties, the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia and Isamaa (Fatherland), have been vocal opponents of LGBTQI+ rights in general and marriage equality in particular. Their leaders and prominent members have expressed great dissatisfaction with the new law, and some politicians have pledged to reverse it should conservative parties regain power.

  The anti-LGBTQI+ civil society movement in Estonia is closely linked to conservative parties. A few weeks before the final parliamentary vote, conservative CSOs and parties organised a demonstration in front of parliament. Surprisingly, it attracted only a few thousand protesters and was not as visible and large as some previous demonstrations. Nonetheless, protests of this nature will likely continue in some form, although their scale and impact are difficult to predict.

  Do you think progress in Estonia can pave the way for similar developments in other post-Communist countries?

  We certainly hope so! At the same time, it is crucial to acknowledge that each country in our region is distinct, with its own language, culture and political landscape. In the case of Estonia, there’s currently a ruling coalition with all three members prioritising individual liberties, which has provided civil society with a historic opportunity to advance marriage equality. Hopefully, favourable conditions will also arise for our Baltic friends and beyond.

  Meanwhile, we are delighted to share our experiences, both failures and successes, with our regional allies. Although we are a traditional human rights advocacy organisation, we maintain strong connections with LGBTQI+ CSOs in Latvia and Lithuania. We have collaborated on several international projects related to combating hate speech, working with victims of hate crimes and promoting equal treatment.

  What forms of international support does Estonian civil society need to keep supporting LGBTQI+ people and advancing their rights? 

  International cooperation and support are incredibly important. Human rights work can be frustrating at times, and it is comforting to connect with others working in other countries and facing similar societal and personal struggles. While it may sound like a cliché, it is vital to establish connections, share experiences and learn from each other. This process is empowering and fosters development.

  It is crucial to recognise that marriage equality alone will not solve all the problems. Issues such as bullying of LGBTQI+ children, harassment of LGBTQI+ people, anti-LGBTQI+ hate speech, disinformation, intolerance and the denial of transgender rights continue to be pressing concerns. We have seen in other countries that progressive laws and legal precedents can be reversed. Therefore, it is essential for like-minded individuals and CSOs to cooperate across borders. Just as we are currently endeavouring to support the human rights of Hungarian LGBTQI+ people through various actions and means, we hope to receive support ourselves in times of urgent need.

  Civic space in Estonia is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Estonian Human Rights Centre through itswebsite or itsFacebook page.

• ETHIOPIA: ‘Civil society can play a key role in overcoming divisions’

  CIVICUS speaks to Yared Hailemariam, Executive Director of theAssociation for Human Rights in Ethiopia, about recent political reforms in Ethiopia, the opening opportunities for civil society and the prospects for further change.

  Can you tell us about your background and how the political reforms introduced in Ethiopia since 2018 by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed have impacted on you?

  I used to work for the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO), a civil society organisation (CSO) established in 1991 by people concerned about the human rights situation in Ethiopia at that time. This was just after the removal of the military junta and its replacement by the current ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Front (EPRDF). I joined EHRCO as an investigator in 1998, and then came the notorious 2005 elections, which the government rigged and which were followed by violence. There were mass killings in the capital, Addis Ababa, in June 2005, and then my colleagues and I were targeted by security forces and detained several times. One time we were detained for a couple of weeks. After we were released there were more clashes between government security forces and opposition members and supporters. Just before the second round of massacres in November 2005 I left the country to attend a conference in Uganda, and while I was there I found myself in the wanted list, so after that I was in exile.

  I returned home in January 2018 for the first time after 13 years in exile. Currently I’m leading the Europe-based Association for Human Rights in Ethiopia, which is an organisation that was working to fill the gap, because Ethiopian civil society was under threat and not able to do any advocacy activities outside the country. They were not able to conduct any research or reach the international community. So some of my colleagues who left the country and I established this association in 2013. We conducted undercover research in Ethiopia, but mostly we have focused on advocacy. I was working mostly at the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and with European institutions. We were doing advocacy together with CIVICUS, the Committee to Protect Journalists, DefendDefenders, Front Line Defenders, Human Rights Watch and other partner organisations. But now we are allowed to go back home.

  What are the main differences the political reforms have made for Ethiopian civil society?

  In the last 10 years, civic space in Ethiopia was in a very horrible condition but now, following these reforms, it’s seen a really huge change. Civic space has opened widely.

  The previous law was very restrictive. It targeted civil society working on rights-based issues, but now CSOs are encouraged. The Civil Society Proclamation, a very draconian piece of legislation, has been reformed, and the process was very open and civil society was respected in it. The new draft accommodated all our concerns. The previous law established an agency that monitored the activities of civil society that was very authoritarian and limited the work of civil society, but that institution has also been reformed. In the new agency there’s a presence of civil society and independent representatives, as well as people from the government. I visited the agency. They are very friendly, very open and work really closely with civil society.

  Just a year and a half ago, international human rights organisations were not able to organise any meeting or training activity, or even visit Ethiopia. I’ve now been able to conduct capacity development workshops in Addis Ababa. So, the impression I have is one of huge progress that is very satisfactory for local civil society.

  The opening of civic space in Ethiopia can be also a good example for other countries that had followed the bad practices of Ethiopia.

  How has civil society responded to the changes?

  There is now a lot of activity, including training and workshops, and it’s open to international human rights organisations. They are providing capacity development training and financial and technical support to local civil society, which is also receiving support from donors, embassies and the international community. These opportunities are new. Local civil society can now recover and rehabilitate from its past limitations, and reach the international community, because people can also now travel.

  What are the major challenges that remain for civil society?

  Because of the impact of the previous laws and because CSOs were labelled as enemies of the state they were restricted in their development, and now they have challenge of getting back to attracting skilled professionals. CSOs have opportunities but they don’t have the capacity to explore and exploit all the opportunities that come to their door. That’s the big challenge. I interviewed some CSOs that don’t know how to prepare a proposal to attract donors and don’t know how to do advocacy. I met some donors who told me that they want to provide support to local civil society but there is shortage of skilled people who can prepare proposals and report back to them at the level they require. Now an election is coming in 2020 and many CSOs want to engage with this process, but even prominent CSOs have told me that they don’t know how to approach donors and how to submit good proposals to get grants.

  So there is a huge gap now, and that’s the area where we are trying to support local CSOs to develop skills. There is a need for people from outside. What I’m saying to the international community is that it’s not enough to go there and do training; if they send one or two experts for some months these experts could help strengthen and offer support for some prominent CSOs.

  Given that the reforms are emanating from the prime minister, what are the risks that could hinder further reforms?

  There are potential dangers. Reform is still at the top level. The prime minister promised to reform the country through a democratic transition and to open up the political space. You can feel that there is a change in the country and there is some political willingness at the top level, but at the same time the regime has huge and very complex bureaucratic structures.

  Most government structures, offices and institutions are full of political appointees from parties in the ruling coalition. That makes it really difficult to reform organisations. Even when the central government in Addis Ababa says something or a new law or regulation is adopted, it may not go very deep. Reforms may not go deep through to the bottom of bureaucracy, to the structures. People are starting to complain in public media that the government is saying the right things, reforming the law, appointing new faces to high-ranking positions, but the suffering still continues at the lower level. So, that’s one challenge, and there is still no clear roadmap that shows how the central administration can improve this mess

  People who were appointed because of their political affiliation rather than their talents now feel under threat. They fear they may be moved or replaced. So in some regions we have seen that some movements are trying to shift the direction of reform. Some people linked to the old regime are still in control of their regions and are trying to instigate conflicts. They have money and weapons, so they can manipulate regions to instigate ethnic conflicts.

  The EPRDF is a coalition of four major parties that are now not united like they were before and are publicly disagreeing. There are tensions between the Amhara and Tigray regional governments, and recently a conflict erupted in the border area between the Amhara and Oromia regions. In the past, these groups acted together because they were fully dominated by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the other parties were used as a tool. But now, each of the regional governments considers themselves as effectively a sovereign state so there is competition. Each regional state is recruiting and training militias, such that each region has thousands of fully armed forces.

  There is a fear that the administration in Addis Ababa has failed to control these dynamics of conflicts and tension within the ruling coalition that might affect the unity of the country. We don’t know in which direction it will lead us, but there are clear tensions. There is tension between the ruling party members and the different coalition parties, there is ethnic tension, and in each region there are extremist elements, groups that spread hate speech and advocate the removal of other targeted ethnic groups from their region. Ruling parties are also competing and fighting with the extremist groups in their regions. Because of this, the Addis Ababa administration is failing to reinforce the rule of law.

  In some regions, the instability is such that there are huge and serious debates about the dangers of holding the election. Some parties are requesting that the election be postponed for at least six months because of extreme elements, and the fear that people will be targeted and attacked and wouldn’t be moved from region to region to mobilise their supporters or open offices. Some parties are restricted from moving and are now only able to work in Addis Ababa, and maybe a few more cities where they are given full security. So, many parties have requested a delay. But on the other side, extreme and ethnic-based parties are requesting that the government conducts the election on its planned dates. They have already declared that if the election day changes, even by one day, they will call for a protest, and that might create more problems. So now the Addis Ababa administration faces a dilemma. If the election is conducted on its time, I’m sure that ethnic nationalist extremist parties that are instigating violence will win seats in parliament. These upcoming days, weeks and months will be a very difficult time for Ethiopia.

  What role is hate speech playing in stoking ethnic conflict?

  People are living together and still sharing values. In Addis Ababa you didn’t feel it. People are living their normal lives and going about business as usual. It is the elites and their activists who are using social media to spread hate speech instigating ethnic tension, violence and targeting of certain groups of people. They have followers, and when they call some kind of violent action you immediately see that there is a group on the ground that’s ready to act and attack people.

  In the last year and a half almost three million people were forced into internal displacement. Ethiopia is now in the 10 highest countries in the world for internal displacement. This has happened in the last year and a half because of ethnic conflicts. Hate speech is spreading easily and very quickly through phones and social media, especially Facebook. Some of the calls for ethnic conflicts are coming from outside Ethiopia, including Europe and the USA.

  Now the government is drafting a new law to regulate hate speech, but it’s really hard to tackle.

  How can further political reform be encouraged?

  We all, especially human rights activists and researchers, including from the international community, need to encourage this reform in many ways. We need to support the strengthening of national human rights institutions, including the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, and strengthen the capacity of local civil society.

  Civil society could play a key role in overcoming divisions, given that political parties and some media are ethnically based. Because civil society is neutral, the international community should focus on strengthening its capacity to play a key role in shaping the behaviour of new generations, who are vulnerable to being used by political elites. Civil society could give broad-based civic education to nurture good citizens who understand their responsibilities.

  In short, we need to focus on how to strengthen the capacity of civil society to support the positive achievements and political reforms going on in Ethiopia.

  What are the most urgent support needs of civil society?

  There are many ways to support local civil society, and not only by providing money. As I said earlier, there is now the possibility to receive funding, but people still need skills to apply for and use these grants. So, in addition to financial support, local civil society needs skill training in various aspects, including in advocacy, research methodologies, monitoring and documenting human rights, and they also need to network, and not only at the national level. They need support to connect themselves to the outside world, to the UN Human Rights Council and other international and regional mechanisms. Local civil society is not able to use these processes well, and some don’t know how to engage with these international mechanisms at all. So, they need the guidance and support of the international community.

  Civic space in Ethiopia is rated as ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Association for Human Rights in Ethiopia through itswebsite orFacebook page.

   

• ETHIOPIA: ‘The June 2021 election is between democratic life and death’

  CIVICUS speaks to Mesud Gebeyehu about the political conflict in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia and the highly contested upcoming Ethiopian national election, scheduled to take place in June 2021 amidst an ongoing pandemic and a continuing state of emergency. Mesud is Executive Director of the Consortium of Ethiopian Human Rights Organisations (CEHRO) and vice-chair of the Executive Committee of CIVICUS’s Affinity Group of National Associations. Mesud is also Executive Committee member of the Ethiopian CSOs Council, a statutory body established to coordinate the self-regulation of civil society organisations (CSOs) in Ethiopia.

• EU-Southeast Asia CSOs Recommendations to the 4th EU-ASEAN Policy Dialogue on Human Rights

  On behalf of the CSOs^[1] that participated at the 2nd EU-Southeast Asia CSOs Forum held on October 24-22, 2022 in Jakarta, and in parallel with the 4th EU-ASEAN Policy Dialogue on Human Rights, we would like to express our gratitude to the EU-ASEAN Forum on Human Rights for the space and opportunity to engage in a dialogue with civil society representatives. We believe that this is proof of commitment for improved communication, coordination, and meaningful engagement between CSOs, ASEAN, and the EU to achieve our common aspiration to leave no one behind.

  On this occasion, we hereby submit the following recommendations to strengthen human rights protection within the ASEAN and the EU. The recommendations are based on present and emerging challenges faced by human rights defenders and pro-democracy activists, and on recommendations submitted by CSOs at the EU-ASEAN Human Rights Dialogue in 2019. We request for the inclusion of the attached submission as part of the official meeting notes. In this light, we urge immediate steps to be taken, collectively with civil society organisations across both regions, towards the implementation and monitoring of our recommendations.

  Present and Emerging Challenges

  After the First EU-ASEAN Human Rights Dialogue with CSO in 2019, the socio-political and economic situations in the ASEAN and the EU have tremendously regressed. These were mainly brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic, climate crisis, and the rise of militarism and authoritarianism. With respect to critical security issues, the Russian invasion of Ukraine led by President Vladimir Putin has resulted in deaths and injuries of thousands of civilians. Since 1 February 2021, the attempted military coup in Myanmar has spurred a cross-regional political, human rights, and humanitarian crisis. As of this writing, more than 1,000,000 people have been displaced, with more than 2,000 civilians killed, and 15,000 arrested. The use of excessive force by police and military against civilians claiming their basic human rights and fundamental freedoms has been perpetuated with impunity across the region.

  The COVID-19 pandemic has, indeed, aggravated the shrinking of civic spaces. Instead of meaningfully addressing challenges and needs of the vulnerable, authoritarian states have even accumulated more power by convoluting health emergencies and national security approaches. Numerous documents have revealed how COVID-19 was used as a pretext to adopt restrictive laws to curb access to information, justice, and basic services. State-sponsored disinformation and misinformation were intensified. Dissenting opinions towards government pandemics measures were purged. Furthermore, measures to mitigate viral infection limited peoples’ movement and participation in social, economic and political affairs. The proclivity towards securitized approaches has led ASEAN to further exclude civil society and neglect peoples’ voices. This is in breach of the ASEAN Community Vision 2025, which aims to promote a people-centred and people-oriented regional community.

  The climate crisis has led to the global health emergency, political upheavals, gross human rights violation, and humanitarian disasters. Climate change has disproportionately affected planetary health, which is closely linked with the health of its population and their ability to achieve their right to life. These have contributed to the uncertainty and instability of the future, particularly of those who live in fragile situations. In fact, Southeast Asia is already bearing the brunt of climate emergencies. Moreover, rising sea levels, flooding, and typhoons have tremendously increased more recently.

  The current economic systems have perpetuated capitalist greed. Extractive industries have greatly contributed to multiple rights violations, particularly land grabbing. Moreover, they have put the lives of indigenous communities and environmental human rights defenders. With respect to climate action, communities' access to decision-making processes and participation remains virtually absent. As their concerns are neglected, this crisis continues to hinder State obligations to protect and fulfil human rights, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Worse, more and more people have become vulnerable and disempowered.

  Amidst these crises, communities with pre-existing intersectional vulnerabilities are further discriminated against and marginalised. Pandemic recovery plans have failed to meaningfully address the specific needs of women, youth, children, LGBTQIA+ communities, and persons with disabilities. Furthermore, conflicts and climate emergencies have forcibly displaced people, rendering many stateless and without protection.

  The steady rise of militarism and authoritarianism has many lives at greater risk. Repressive laws and practices, both in offline and online spheres, have become dangerously normalised. These include systematic proliferation of censorship, harassment, arbitrary arrests, violence, misinformation, and state-sponsored propaganda. As of this writing, human rights and environmental rights defenders, pro-democracy activists, dissenters, children, youth, journalists, academics, LGBTQIA+ communities - historically marginalized based on their sexual orientation, gender identity & expression and sexual orientations and sex characteristics (SOGIESC) are finding themselves on the edge of uncertainty and danger.

  These shared lived experiences have proven the urgent need to establish and sustain safe and brave transnational and cross-sectoral networks and solidarity. It is crucial for marginalised individuals and communities to meaningfully engage in multilateral advocacy on human rights, and intersectional issues that matter to them the most.

  Recommendations

  Building on the 2019 Consolidated Recommendations from the first EU-ASEAN CSO Forum, our key recommendation is for EU and ASEAN Member States (referred to as ‘States’) to develop policies, implement measures, and invest in programmes that are inclusive, non-discriminatory, participatory, and proportionate. These should promote greater accountability and sustainability in order to address issues related to public health emergencies, security and climate crises, and the rise of authoritarianism.

  States should ensure that development programs, which are in line with international human rights standards and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), are designed and implemented to fully advance inclusion, equality, dignity and justice in all corners of ASEAN and the EU.

  READ THE FULL JOINT STATEMENT

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  Civic space in Indonesia is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

• EUROPE: ‘Delays in dealing with gender-based violence cost women, children and LGBTQI+ people their lives’

  As part of the #16DaysOfActivism campaign, CIVICUS speaks about civil society efforts to eradicate gender-based violence (GBV) with Eliana Jimeno and Charlotte Cramer of Women Against Violence Europe (WAVE).

  Founded in 1994, WAVE is a network of organisations from across Europe working to prevent GBV and protect women and children from violence.

  The 16 Days of Activism against Gender-Based Violence is an annual international campaign that kicks off on 25 November, the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, and runs until 10 December, Human Rights Day.

  What work does WAVE do?

  WAVE is a network of 160 women’s rights civil society organisations (CSOs) working against GBV in European countries. Most of these organisations provide specialised services such as shelters, rape crisis centres and helplines. Some are umbrella organisations that include among their membership groups delivering specialist services to women, while others focus more specifically on research and data collection, and yet others focus on advocacy and campaigning for better legislation at the national level and at the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN).

  WAVE’s work focuses on three main areas: advocacy, capacity building and data collection. Regarding our advocacy work, we lobby and campaign for better legislation to help fight GBV against women. WAVE is pushing for women’s specialist services all over Europe to be better funded so more women have access to specialist support.

  We also focus on capacity building. We provide training for our members so they are better equipped to support women and children exposed to violence. We do this through webinars, conferences and mutual learning exchanges.

  We collect data on women’s specialist support services in the 46 countries we operate in and analyse it to identify gaps in the implementation of the Istanbul Convention – the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence.

  What challenges have you faced?

  We have faced several challenges. The main one has been dealing with the strong anti-gender movement pushing to block theaccession of the EU to the Istanbul Convention. Because of the backlash, we have seen governments trying to get away with implementing it only partially, as in the case of Poland, or just completelywalking out, as in the case of Turkey.

  Anti-gender movements frame their narrative in ways that put feminist CSOs and institutions advancing women’s, children’s and LGBTQI+ people’s rights under threat. At a country level, they argue that women’s rights organisations challenge the ‘traditional values’ of the family, for example by demanding access to accessible contraception, or claim they are exposing kids to ‘harmful’ information – a reference to comprehensive sexuality education – in schools. There are also security challenges. Many of our members work in hostile environments and some have been threatened for challenging governments and holding them accountable.

  We also face issues regarding data collection and systematisation. Data is collected and codified in different ways in different EU countries, so it is very difficult to collect and compare information regarding women support services, access to sexual and reproductive rights or education. There is no standardised way of tracking GBV cases in Europe – particularly femicide, for which there is no common definition – so we are constantly trying to adapt to collect the data required to advance the rights of women, girls and LGBTQI+ people more effectively.

  A positive challenge is weaving our network together. We represent 160 organisations in 46 European countries, some of which are themselves umbrella organisations, which means we are talking about some 1,600 organisations. There is a lot of diversity within our membership, and this creates complexities when it comes to balancing what brings us together as feminist CSOs and our different perspectives due to our different national contexts.

  What have you planned for the 16 Days of Activism campaign?

  We have released astatement on femicides, one of the main topics of the campaign. We are also emphasising the need to adopt a standardised definition of femicide throughout Europe to better monitor the evolution of the phenomenon and push for the design and implementation of better policies to tackle it. We want to push key stakeholders to act right now, as every delay costs women, children and LGBTQI+ people their lives.

  On 8 March,International Women’s Day 2022, the European Commission presented aproposal for a directive to combat violence against women and domestic violence. The draft that was put forward, which resulted from consultations with selected CSOs, is rooted in a criminal law approach and fails to recognise GBV and domestic violence as human rights violations. It is also reactive, focusing on how states should act when violence has already happened rather than on preventing it happening in the first place. During the 16 days of Activism, we will campaign for a directive that enables victims of GBV and domestic violence to exercise their human rights. 

  We also plan on having webinars and releasing podcasts to highlight the problem of GBV in Europe, the intersectional harm it causes and the need for better legislation and practices to fight it. Our expectation is that the podcast and webinars will help us reach a larger audience. We will also focus on how the media can tackle GBV through a more sensitive approach.

  Additionally, WAVE has prepared a toolkit to make advocacy and campaigning more accessible to young people. The toolkit will serve as a resource to empower them and help them raise their own voices and run their own campaigns in a meaningful, sustainable and creative way.

  What should international bodies, particularly the UN, do to contribute to eradicating GBV?

  The UN has opened the space for specific conversations to take place on women’s rights, for example on the link between violence against women and child custody procedures. This has been really helpful because feminist CSOs all over the world run programmes and projects and provide specialist services for victims and survivors of violence with very limited resources. They seldom have the resources or logistics capacity to play such a global convening role. WAVE is one example of women’s grassroots organisations seeking to host conversations at a European level, but we are not a global network.

  In contrast, the anti-gender movement has a lot of funding as well as a global footing. To be able to compete, we must work extra hard and are still at a disadvantage. So, by bringing in its resources for convening, supporting the work of feminist CSOs and data collection, the UN can to some extent help level the playing field.

  In many countries the space for civil society is shrinking, and the UN can play a key role in creating the platforms where we, as feminist CSOs, can have these very important conversations, instead of just giving the space to national governments that are disseminating narratives not reflective of the experiences of survivors of GBV.

  Further, we hope accountability will move at the centre of the UN’s work. The UN must hold perpetrators accountable to stop the culture of impunity, including UN staff, such as soldiers serving in UN peacekeeping operations. The UN must send a strong message that it does not tolerate GBV.

  Finally, we hope that world leaders, governments, international institutions and CSOs will genuinely and meaningfully work together and take an intersectional approach to achieve the SDGs for world justice and leave no one behind.

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   Get in touch with WAVE through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@WAVE_europe on Twitter.

• EUROPEAN MEDIA FREEDOM ACT: ‘It will be crucial for EU member states to take this legal framework seriously’

  CIVICUS speaks with Renate Schroeder, Director of the European Federation of Journalists (EFJ), about theEuropean Media Freedom Act, the first integrated legislation that protects freedom of expression and media independence and pluralism in the European Union.

  The EFJ is the largest organisation of journalists in Europe, fighting for decent working conditions and defending the right to freedom of expression.

  Why was the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) needed?

  The European Commission (EC) produced the draft EMFA in September 2022, in a context of growing disinformation and threats to media independence and journalists’ safety across Europe. The Vice President of the European Commission for Values and Transparency, Věra Jourová, understood the dangers of media capture and political manipulation. With her help and a lot of research by European institutions, we were able to show media freedom was declining in the European Union (EU), despite the bloc’s historical commitment to this principle.

  That’s why the EC came up with a proposal to ensure the right of all citizens to receive plural and editorially independent information. This had never been formally addressed before. The EMFA is rooted in the need to create clear rules to level the playing field across the EU, addressing issues such as media capture, the independence of public service media, editorial independence, transparency in media ownership and state advertisement.

  What regulations does the EMFA introduce?

  The EMFA seeks to safeguard media freedom and integrity. It includes provisions to protect journalistic sources, ensuring confidentiality. This is particularly crucial for investigative journalism given the growing use of spyware to target journalists’ sources, as seen in countries such as Greece and Hungary.

  The Act also addresses state control over public service media. Rather than state broadcasters, what the ecosystem needs is independent, strong, public service media systems free of state influence or control over funding.

  In addition, the EMFA recognises readers’ right to know who’s behind what they read, so it includes an article on transparency in media ownership and another on editorial independence to prevent journalism being used for political or economic interests or propaganda. This is based on the acknowledgment there are people such as politicians or foreign business leaders who own media outlets and use them for their agendas. They don’t view journalism as a public good but as a tool for propaganda.

  Another issue the Act deals with is content moderation. Journalists are no longer the gatekeepers of information – platforms are. Recognising this, the EMFA requires platforms to consult media service providers and journalists before removing content.

  Finally, the Act establishes a board composed of independent regulatory authorities tasked with overseeing compliance with the EMFA and other related legislation such as the Audiovisual Media Service Directive.

  What were the main points of contention during the process?

  At the beginning, several stakeholders were against the EMFA. Germany raised one significant point of contention. It has a federal system where states have their own independent regulatory media systems, and they were concerned about potential interference from Brussels.

  Publishers also presented a challenge. They showed little interest in any transparency or editorial regulation and had concerns about a European board having a say on that.

  However, with the support of a group of media freedom organisations, digital rights advocates and other civil society groups, we overcame most of these obstacles. While the initial draft was not as good as we would have liked, the European Parliament emerged as our ally and helped strengthen transparency rules and reinforce provisions related to public media service and source protection.

  One particularly contentious issue during negotiations with both the European Parliament and European Council was the protection of sources and safeguards against spyware. Some states, such as France, argued for exemptions based on national security considerations. These risked compromising the protection of journalists’ sources and transforming the EMFA into a surveillance tool. Thanks to efforts of supportive countries such as Spain, these proposals were rejected, preserving the EMFA’s integrity.

  Does the final draft fully address civil society concerns?

  While the final draft addresses some concerns raised by civil society, there are areas where our partners feel it could have gone further.

  For instance, on the issue of transparency of media ownership, civil society groups wanted to establish a European database, but this provision didn’t go through. We also wanted to include a stronger article addressing concentration of media ownership and requiring a public interest test for mergers. The language in the final agreement is often too principled, which may cause problems when implemented at the national level.

  Even so, we understand that drafting regulations at the European level, where you deal with multiple and diverse states, is not easy. The current rise of right-wing governments is only making it harder. Even traditionally supportive states such as Denmark, Finland and Sweden have been cautious in their approaches.

  We knew it was now or never, so we are very happy the EMFA got adopted, even if some articles are not worded as strongly as we would have liked. With right-wing movements on the rise, there was a lot of pressure to agree a final text and have it passed right away, even if it wasn’t perfect, because the June European Parliament elections will likely result in a more right-wing Parliament.

  What happens next?

  The next step is for the European Parliament’s Plenary session in Strasbourg on 11 March to formally vote on the provision agreement, which the Council of the EU under the current Belgian presidency will officially adopt. The Act needs a three-fourths majority, and only Hungary is certain to vote against. It will enter into force a year afterwards, with some articles taking effect earlier, at six months, and others later, at 15 months. And then it will get implemented and have direct effects at the national level.

  There will likely be a testing period in which civil society and journalists’ organisations will play a vital role in ensuring effective implementation and taking legal action if necessary. For instance, if media providers fail to comply with transparency rules, civil society may need to challenge them in court.

  However, it is still unclear how this process will work. For instance, if a civil society organisation in Hungary believes there’s a lack of plural access to media and decides to take legal action, it may face challenges in Hungary’s judicial system and may need to escalate the issue to the Court of Justice in Luxembourg, a process that could take several years.

  I am also worried about how the article on the protection of sources will be implemented. Even though safeguards are in place, this article may be misinterpreted. At the end of the day, national security issues are always defined at the national level. That’s a limitation of all EU treaties and some states may end up finding clever ways to circumvent these protections.

  Having this legal framework in place is a big step forward, but it will also be crucial for states to take it seriously.

  Over the last five years, the EC has made significant progress in regulating the information ecosystem, with initiatives such as the Digital Service Act, Digital Markets Act, Artificial Intelligence Act and now the EMFA. The main challenge will be the effective implementation of all these measures. We hope the EC will prioritise implementation and sanction states that fail to comply. We also hope the EMFA will receive sufficient funding for the board to deal with monitoring and implementing it. Without proper enforcement, no regulation will be of any help.

  What further reforms are needed?

  We are worried about the use of generative AI to promote disinformation and deep fakes. Voluntary guidelines are not enough. We need stronger measures that balance freedom of expression with human control over AI systems. While AI can be a great tool for journalists it can also be misused.

  The EU is at a crossroads. The European Parliament has always been on the side of media freedom, and for the first time we risk losing this support. Young voters will play a vital role in the upcoming elections. Their engagement, informed vote and understanding of the role of the EU and what is at stake may change the course of the elections. And for that facts are needed, and a healthy information ecosystem with limited disinformation circulating in social media.

  ---

  Get in touch with the European Federation of Journalists through itswebsite orInstagram andFacebook pages, and follow@EFJEUROPE and@renatemargot on Twitter.

• Faces of Open Government - An interview with Danny Sriskandarajah

  In his interview with Open Government Partnership (OGP), CIVICUS Secretary General, Danny Sriskandarajah shares insights on broad trends affecting civil society globally and how CIVICUS is responding to these. He also highlights the importance of the “openness revolution" and why everyone, including new powerful players in the corporate world, should throw their weight behind it. 

  Read on: Open Government Partnership

• FINLAND: ‘We’ll have the most right-wing government since the 1930s’

  CIVICUS speaks about Finland’s new government with Silla Ristimäki, development policy specialist at Fingo.

  Founded in 2018, Fingo is an umbrella organisation comprising about 270 Finnish civil society organisations (CSOs). Fingo monitors and defends civic space in Finland and around the world with the aim of building a strong, diverse, open, active and free civil society with solid operating capacities.

  What was the relationship between government and civil society like under the government of former Prime Minister Sanna Marin?

  Sanna Marin’s government took measures to promote transparency and the rule of law and improve conditions for civil society. Under the previous government’s programme, Finland took an active role in promoting open government internationally. Several initiatives were undertaken to improve the participation of and dialogue with Finnish civil society to increase transparency, which was seen as an integral part of all national governance objectives. For example, a transparency register was developed in 2023 to keep track of lobbying with parliament.

  The previous government’s programme also aimed to harmonise procedures for tracking civil society funding while respecting CSOs’ autonomy and guaranteeing equal treatment of organisations. The objective was to reduce bureaucracy and increase the predictability of funding. Changes were made in accounting and fundraising regulations that particularly favoured small CSOs. Overall, official development assistance grew quite consistently. Fundamentally, the nature of relationships was about building a partnership between state and civil society to reduce inequality.

  What were the key issues that influenced the outcome of the 2023 parliamentary elections?

  Sanna Marin’s government was a coalition of left-wing parties that pushed, for example, for stricter climate policies and reduced inequalities, including gender-based one. During its term, the Finnish government’s debt grew significantly. At the same time, Russia’s attack on Ukraine resulted in an unprecedented change in Finnish popular opinion regarding NATO membership. So the elections were greatly influenced by two major issues: the severity of government debt and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

  The economic and security conditions increased the popularity of right-wing parties. The National Coalition Party that won the election has been the longest and loudest advocate of Finland’s NATO membership. It also pushed an agenda to urgently reduce Finnish public debt. The far-right Finns Party, which came second, ran an anti-immigration campaign and proposed balancing the budget by reducing climate measures and cutting development funding. On 18 June it was confirmed that Ville Tavio from the Finns Party will be the new minister for Trade and Development.

  The Social Democratic Party headed by Sanna Marin came third. This is politically noteworthy, since the ruling party generally tends to do much worse in parliamentary elections. There was a significant fall in support for The Greens and the Left Alliance, and some experts say that people voted strategically for the Social Democratic Party to try to prevent the emergence of a conservative right-wing government. However, the new government coalition formed with the Finns Party, Swedish People’s Party of Finland and the Christian Democrats will be the most right-wing government Finland has had since the 1930s. Their overall interpretation of the elections results is that Finland ‘needs a change in direction’, and that people particularly want new fiscal policies.

  How much public debate was there around Finland’s accession to NATO?

  There has never been a lot of public political debate over Finland’s accession to NATO. Politicians used to maintain a position that it was never the right time for it, and if Finland were to change its position of neutrality and consider accession to NATO, a referendum would be organised before a final decision was made.

  But the situation changed when Russia attacked Ukraine. Polls showed a significant increase in support for accession, rising to above 60 per cent. Almost no members of parliament publicly raised concerns or expressed an opinion against Finland’s accession. In the end, Finland applied for NATO membership without a referendum being held. It was considered that the polls were a strong enough indication of citizen support.

  What is the new government programme’s stance on civil society and human rights?

  All three parties that received the most votes in the election are largely committed to supporting civil society and recognise the value of safeguarding civic space. The new government’s programme, published on 16 June, confirms that a vibrant civil society is a prerequisite for social development and states that in all its activities Finland will promote the principles of democracy, civil society and the rule of law.

  However, it also states that Finland will reduce the number of refugees it welcomes, control immigration and limit the rights of migrants. It doesn’t mention the issues of loss and damage and climate finance. While it claims that Finland will stick to its national Climate Change Act, which commits it to become climate-neutral by 2035, it also states that this must not be done at the expense of increasing daily living costs or negatively impacting on the market competitiveness of Finnish industries.

  How is civil society working to safeguard human rights and democracy in Finland?

  Civil society works at the local and national levels to promote human rights and safeguard democracy in Finland.

  In regard to democracy, Finnish civil society has a role in providing training for democracy skills (such as decision-making in communities and communication skills); advocating towards policy-makers on a variety of societal issues; as well as working with decision-makers and officials for the implementation of democratic decisions. For example, with regards to social and health care services as well as development cooperation, this last role in implementation is quite crucial. Generally, the basis for the work of Finnish civil society is human rights: concretely this means for example working for the economic rights of vulnerable people in Finland or promoting the ‘leave no one behind’ -principle in development cooperation.

  Fingo has three main areas of work: advocacy, learning and communications. Advocacy is targeted towards political leaders. Fingo undertakes efforts to improve the operational environment and institutional support for CSOs and to protect civic space. The learning component is particularly targeted at building capacity among member CSOs, offering training on, for example, how to improve advocacy, communication and analytical skills and fundraising proposals, or how to mainstream gender. A significant portion of this component is to advance global citizenship education. Communications efforts are targeted at the broader public to uphold and generate further support for human rights and democracy through media engagement and campaigns.

  Following the publication of the new government’s programme, our next step is to re-evaluate the priorities of our advocacy efforts. For example, the new government has left reproductive rights out of development assistance priorities, so this may be an area that needs particular attention. All efforts to jointly protect civic space globally are valuable and support one another.

  Civic space in Finland is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Fingo through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@FingoFi onTwitter.

• Five key battles for re-imagining democracy in a radically changed world

  By Danny Sriskandarajah

  The challenges facing civil society now aren’t about reviving our weakening democracies—they are about re-imagining democracy for a radically changed world.

  Read on: Open Global Rights