crisis

• AFGHANISTAN: ‘Lack of dialogue and punishing sanctions are undermining the promotion of human rights’

  CIVICUS speaks about the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan with Hadiya Afzal, programme coordinator of Unfreeze Afghanistan.. Unfreeze Afghanistan is a women-led civil society organisation (CSO) formed by women from Afghanistan and the USA. It advocates for the release of Afghan assets frozen following the Taliban takeover to enable the state to pay salaries owed to public sector workers, including teachers and doctors, and tackle the ongoing humanitarian crisis.

  Why is civil society calling for the release of frozen assets of the Afghan state?

  When over US$9 billion of Afghanistan’s Central Bank reserves were frozen in August 2021, it had a devastating impact on the economy. Central Bank assets are the people’s money, used to hold currency auctions in the country, safeguard against inflation and control price stability. Afghanistan needs its Central Bank reserves back to stabilise its economy and perform centralised banking functions again.

  The assets frozen also included private monies, that is, accounts held by private individuals, companies and CSOs. People were unable to withdraw their own money from banks for months, with many still unable to do so due to lack of cash. Many Afghans sold off anything they owned to afford essential goods, the prices of which skyrocketed.

  Over the past year, leading CSOs, humanitarian organisations and more than 70 economists, including Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, have advocated through meetings, protests, letters and media appearances for the return of Afghanistan’s money to get its economy back on its feet, independently of whatever global aid funding is provided. United Nations (UN) experts have also called for the USA to unblock Afghanistan’s frozen assets to ease the humanitarian situation.

  What kind of safeguards should be put in place if the frozen assets are returned?

  The USA has signalled that funds could be returned to Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), the country’s central bank, as long as three conditions are met: the establishment of independent monitoring mechanisms, the implementation of credible anti-money laundering regulations and controls to combat the financing of terrorism and DAB’s insulation from political interference – which meant replacing its top leadership, in the hands of Taliban officials, one of whom is under US and UN sanctions, with professionals.

  DAB has already agreed on independent monitoring conditions, and experts have set out how pre-existing independent monitoring and electronic auditing could be restored. US claims that the new Afghan government lacks expertise and that capacity building is needed for the state to be able to perform central bank functions could be addressed by assistance from the international community. The law that outlines DAB’s function as a technocratic institution charged with responsibilities such as currency auctions and oversight of banks is still in place. DAB continues to have the same audit oversight committee, with the same members it had under the previous government. And the chair of the audit committee has been an outspoken advocate for the return of DAB’s reserves.

  The Afghan government should ensure that the DAB law remains in place and that the institution will function separate from political considerations. Advocacy experts highlighted that the USA does not apply audit conditions as strictly to other countries as it does to Afghanistan. It does not seize their foreign assets due to limited monitoring capabilities.

  What else should the international community do to contribute to improving the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan?

  The international community should focus on supporting a strong, independent Afghan economy that can run on its own, the first step in which should be to return the full assets of the Afghan people to its central bank.

  Another measure the international community can take is to provide global aid raised by the UN and other international bodies. Human Rights Watch alerted that without sustained humanitarian aid donations, Afghanistan’s upcoming winter could be even worse than the last one.

  Last year, UN emergency funding staved off experts’ worst fears of a devastating winter, but the people of Afghanistan cannot continue to depend on global kindness after a year marked by war, the pandemic and rising inflation. Afghanistan’s assets must be returned to its central bank to bring stability to the lives of ordinary Afghans, and the international community should invest in the infrastructure necessary to ensure its success.

  What alternative measures, other than financial sanctions, can the international community implement to promote human rights, and specifically women’s rights, and support civil society in Afghanistan?

  Sanctions have had a devastating impact on Afghanistan, and the resulting humanitarian crisis has disproportionately affected the average Afghan. The Center for Economic and Policy Research stated that financial sanctions on Afghanistan amount to a form of ‘collective punishment’ of the Afghan people for the actions of a government they did not choose.

  The sanctions are not helping. In the words of Jamila Afghani, founder and president of the Afghan chapter of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, ‘we are not supporting Afghan women by starving them’.

  In fact, sanctions are only making things worse. The cultural practice of forced marriages and what effectively amounts to the sale of girls is reinforced by socio-economic factors. Even under the previous government more than 70 per cent of marriages were forced. These are expected to increase as a result of the humanitarian crisis.

  Meanwhile, Islamic scholars such as Daisy Khan have highlighted Quranic evidence supporting women’s independence, education and liberation. The promotion of human rights and specifically women’s rights is best fostered in a stable economic environment with sustained international diplomacy and interfaith dialogue.

  Lack of dialogue between the international community and the government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan compounded by punishing sanctions is undermining the promotion of human rights. Human rights can only be promoted through constructive dialogue while addressing the drivers of wellbeing – rebuilding financial stability, economic independence and global cooperation.

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  Civic space in Afghanistan is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Unfreeze Afghanistan through its website or Facebook page, and follow @UnfreezeAfghan on Twitter.

• AFGHANISTAN: ‘The seizure of sovereign assets will worsen the world’s worst humanitarian disaster’

  CIVICUS speaks with Arash Azizzada, co-founder and co-director of Afghans for a Better Tomorrow, about the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. Afghans for A Better Tomorrow is a grassroots civil society organisation (CSO) dedicated tobringing about transformative change for Afghans in the USA and beyond. It has recently advocated for the release of Afghanistan’s frozen assets.

  Why is civil society calling for the return of Afghanistan’s frozen assets?

  Before August 2021, when the USA froze Afghanistan’s assets, Afghanistan’s western-backed government was heavily reliant on foreign aid and was spending most of its revenue on the conflict with the Taliban. Since the Taliban took over, the entire country has essentially found itself sanctioned economically and Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), its central bank, had all its assets frozen.

  Since the DAB serves as collateral insurance for private banks to be able to operate, the entire banking system has been paralysed as of August 2021. The same goes for the whole Afghan economy: businesses and people cannot access their own hard-earned money to buy food at the market down the street. Philanthropic foundations have trouble sending funds into Afghanistan. This has contributed to soaring inflation, worsened by the rise in food and commodity prices caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and a record-breaking drought.

  As a result, Afghanistan has become ‘hell on Earth’, as the director of the United Nations (UN) World Food Programme put it. Over 21 million Afghans don’t know where their next meal will come from. Every women-led Afghan household currently faces poverty and hunger as the country’s healthcare system teeters on the brink of collapse.

  The consensus among Afghan civil society, both within and outside the country, is that the seizure of sovereign assets that belong to the Afghan people is a violation of international norms and will worsen the world’s worst humanitarian disaster. Through grassroots organising, high-level advocacy and litigation, the Afghan American community has stepped up to bring the frozen assets back to their rightful owner: the Afghan people.

  At the same time, following the blocking of Afghan assets, a group of families in the USA who had secured rulings against the Taliban connected to its role in the 9/11 attacks filed a civil case in a federal court to enforce those rulings using the frozen DAB funds. In February 2022, President Joe Biden signed an executive order allocating half of the more than US$7 billion that the previous government of Afghanistan had placed in the New York Federal Reserve for humanitarian relief in Afghanistan and leaving half subject to litigation brought by some of the 9/11 families.

  As part of a broad coalition of Afghan-American groups representing the community, we filed an amicus – friend of the court – brief stating that the court should oppose this for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the Taliban are not recognised as the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan by its people or the international community. The money belongs to the Afghan people, not the Taliban. And although 9/11 families deserve compensation, doing it this way would harm Afghans and not the Taliban.

  What kind of safeguards should be put in place if the frozen assets are returned?

  While the Taliban might be the de facto rulers of most of Afghanistan, they remain untrustworthy and illegitimate. But the DAB continues to be function as a technocratic body, so frozen funds should be returned as long as there is proper ring-fencing and enhanced safeguards such as electronic auditing records to ensure the reserves are not interfered with by the Taliban.

  Our proposed plan recommends an initial trust-building process in which a conditional amount of US$150-200 million a month is released so that the DAB is allowed to perform its core functions. The funds ought to be used to regulate the Afghan currency and run US dollar auctions to inject liquidity into the struggling economy and ease the pain of the Afghan population. Not one cent of these funds should be used for humanitarian aid purposes.

  What should the international community do to contribute to improving the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan?

  International philanthropy and the international community should support a fledging Afghan civil society, and especially the women’s groups that remain operational within the country, by ensuring wide-ranging sanctions relief.

  As it stands, the entire Afghan population is on the receiving end of collective punishment due to the sanctions imposed on the Afghan state. As the world has become hostile to doing business in the country, the World Bank and other international institutions should continue to focus on funding economic development projects and ensure the healthcare system remains functional.

  The international community should work hard to differentiate between targeted sanctions that focus on individuals within the Taliban and projects that ensure Afghans have a chance at survival. As one example, direct cash assistance to the Afghan population remains a much more effective and equitable method of assistance than trying to truck in food for a population of over 21 million people and helping circumvent Taliban attempts at interfering with aid.

  The UN appeal for humanitarian aid for Afghanistan still remains US$2 billion short of its target. There is a strong need for donor countries to fill that gap. Much of it should be filled by the NATO member countries that occupied Afghanistan for 20 years.

   

  What alternative measures, other than financial sanctions, can the international community implement to promote human rights and support civil society in Afghanistan?

  A core demand remains the non-recognition of the Taliban government, which is deepening its repression and remains unrepresentative of the Afghan population. It is important that the international community listens to the voices of Afghan civil society, and specifically those of Afghan women leaders and the minority Hazara and Shia communities.

  The most vital thing at this moment is a strengthened mandate by the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan to document and monitor human rights violations as well as support accurate and free media in the country. Significant UN presence on the ground will be key as Afghanistan faces a deteriorating human and women’s rights situation.

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  Civic space in Afghanistan is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Afghans for a Better Tomorrow through itswebsite orFacebook page,and follow@AfghansTomorrow on Twitter.

• CAMEROON: ‘The Anglophone discontent must be addressed through meaningful discussion with all parties’

  CIVICUS speaks with the Cameroonian writer and digital activist Dibussi Tande about the ongoing crisis in Cameroon’s Anglophone regions. The conflict emerged in 2016 out of a series of legal and educational grievances expressed by the country’s Anglophone population, which is a minority at the national level but a majority in Cameroon’s Northwest and Southwest regions.

  Dibussiis the author ofScribbles from the Den. Essays on Politics and Collective Memory in Cameroon. He also has a blog where he shares news and analyses of the situation in Cameroon.

  What have been the humanitarian consequences of the escalating conflict in Cameroon?

  The main humanitarian issue is the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people fleeing the conflict. According to the United Nations (UN) Refugee Agency, by August 2021 there were 712,800 internally displaced persons (IDPs). Although some have since returned, there are still over half a million IDPs spread across Cameroon.

  The priority needs of IDPs and returnees today are housing and access to healthcare, food, water and education. However, help has not been readily available, which explains why this conflict has repeatedly been classified as one of the most neglected displacement crises since 2019.

  Let’s not forget that the UN Refugee Agency has an additional 82,000 Cameroonian refugees registered in Nigeria. Add the millions of people trapped in conflict zones and caught in the crossfire, and you have the recipe for a humanitarian crisis of epic proportions.

  What will it take to de-escalate the situation?

  It’s quite simple. First, the parties involved in the conflict must be willing to look beyond the military option, which so far has not resolved anything, and seek a peaceful resolution instead. There can be no real de-escalation until they give meaning to the now derided calls for an ‘all-inclusive dialogue’ that have become a platitude and an excuse for inaction. That said, I think the onus lies primarily with the government of Cameroon, which is the party with the resources to at least initiate real dialogue.

  Second, the international community needs to revise its approach to the conflict. All attempts thus far at international mediation – for example, the ‘Swiss Process’ in which the government of Switzerland convened talks – have either dragged on for years or simply failed. The international community must step up the pressure on all factions, including the threat of individual and collective sanctions for their continued obdurateness. Without this two-pronged approach, there will not be a de-escalation anytime soon.

  What kind of challenges does civil society face when advocating for peace?

  Civil society faces numerous challenges. For starters, civil society organisations (CSOs) have limited access to conflict zones. They must also walk a fine line between government and Ambazonian groups – those fighting for the independence of Ambazonia, a self-declared state in the Anglophone regions – who both routinely accuse them of supporting the other side. Even when civil society gains access to conflict zones, it operates with very limited financial and other resources.

  That said, the most serious challenge to their operations is government hostility. Local CSOs have routinely complained about intimidation and harassment by Cameroonian authorities as they try to work in conflict zones. In 2020, for example, the Minister of Territorial Administration accused local CSOs of colluding with international CSOs to fuel terrorism in Cameroon. He claimed that these ‘teleguided NGOs’ had received 5 billion CFA francs (approx. US$7.4 million) to whitewash the atrocities of separatist groups while publishing fake reports about alleged abuses by the Cameroonian military.

  International humanitarian groups such as Doctors Without Borders (MSF) have also faced the wrath of the government. In 2020, Cameroon suspended MSF from carrying out activities in the Northwest region after accusing it of having close relations with separatists. And in March 2022, MSF suspended its activities in the Southwest region after four of its workers were arrested for allegedly collaborating with separatists. MSF complained that the government confused neutral, independent and impartial humanitarian aid with collusion with separatist forces.

  What were the expectations of English-speaking Cameroonians for 1 October, proclaimed as ‘Independence Day’ in the Anglophone regions?

  English-speaking Cameroonians come in different shades of political ideology, so they had different expectations. For independentists, the goal is simple: independence for the former British Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons. As far as they are concerned, any negotiation with the government must be about how to end the union and not about whether the union should continue.

  But other segments of the population still believe in a bilingual Cameroon republic, albeit under new political arrangements. Federalists believe that Anglophone expectations will be met if the country returns to the federal system that existed between 1961 and 1972. This system gave the former British Southern Cameroons constitutional protections within a federal republic, including the right to its own state government, an elected legislature, an independent judiciary, a vibrant local government system and state control over the education system.

  The government of Cameroon has accommodated neither the radical demands of independentists nor the comparatively moderate demands of the federalists. Instead, it is forging ahead with a ‘decentralisation’ policy that gives nominal power to the regions but does not even begin to address the fundamentals of the so-called ‘Anglophone problem’.

  What should Cameroon’s government do to ensure the recognition of the rights of English-speaking Cameroonians?

  For starters, the government should abandon its stopgap and largely cosmetic approach to resolving the conflict, because it only adds to the existing resentment. This is the case, for example, with the much-maligned ‘special status’ accorded to the Northwest and Southwest regions, supposedly to recognise their ‘linguistic particularity and historic heritage’, but which does not give them the power to influence or determine policies in key areas such as education, justice and local government, where this ‘particularity’ needs the most protection.

  The historical and constitutional origins of the Anglophone discontent within the bilingual Cameroon republic are well documented. This discontent must be addressed with a holistic approach that includes meaningful discussions with all parties, from the federalists to the independentists. Dialogue is a journey, not a destination. And the time to start that journey is now, no matter how tortuous, frustrating and challenging, and despite the deep-seated distrust, resentment and animosity among the parties.

  How can the international community support Cameroonian civil society and help find a solution?

  Cameroonian civil society needs financial, material and other resources to adequately provide humanitarian and other assistance to displaced people and people living in conflict zones. This is where the international community comes in. However, international aid is a double-edged sword, given the Cameroon government’s suspicion and hostility towards local CSOs that have international partners, especially those that are critical of how the government has handled the conflict so far. Civil society also needs resources to accurately and adequately document what exactly is happening on the ground, including war crimes and violations of international human rights laws.

  To be able to play a pivotal role in the search for a solution to the conflict, CSOs will have to figure out a way to convince the government – and Ambazonian groups that are equally suspicious of their activities – that they are honest brokers rather than partisan actors or trojan horses working for one side or the other. This is a Herculean, if not virtually impossible, task at this juncture. So, for now, civil society will continue to walk a fine line between the government and the independentists, all the while promising more than it can deliver to the people affected by the conflict.

  As for international support to finding a solution, there has been a lot more international handwringing, from the African Union to the UN, than real action. The international community has so far adopted a largely reactive stance towards the conflict. It issues statements of distress after every atrocity, followed by hollow calls for inclusive dialogue. And then it goes silent until the next tragedy. Hence, the parties have little incentive for dialogue, especially when each believes, rightly or wrongly, that it is gaining the upper hand militarily.

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  Civic space in Cameroon is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Dibussi Tande through hiswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@dibussi on Twitter.

• CHILE: ‘The proposed constitution reflects the country’s division rather than being an instrument for its union’

  CIVICUS speaks with Patricia Reyes, director of Fundación Multitudes, about the process to develop a new constitution in Chile since a previous draft was rejected in a referendum in September 2022.

  Fundación Multitudes is a civil society organisation dedicated to generating spaces and building capacity for civil society to participate effectively in decision-making processes.

  Why does Chile need a new constitution?

  The constitution-making process in which Chile has been immersed since 2022 was a response to a longstanding social and political crisis that erupted in October 2019. Faced with the eruption of social demands for greater protection, equity and guarantees of basic social rights such as education, health and social security, which in some cases were expressed with unusual violence, all political sectors agreed to initiate a constitution-making process.

  Initially, an inclusive process unfolded that produced a draft constitution that incorporated adequate standards of rights protection for a democratic and social state. But the proposal failed to win the support of the more conservative parts of society and was rejected in a referendum, largely because of mistakes made in the process. These were mainly due to the political inexperience of the members of the constituent commission, who were mostly independents with no links to political parties. They overlooked the need to reach broad agreements encompassing all parts of society, and particularly traditional political players. Other factors were the incorporation of some drastic changes in political institutions and the inability to communicate the benefits of the new constitutional text adequately to the public as a whole.

  After the proposal was rejected, the social demands that had triggered the process were still there, and the existing constitution continued to be as ineffective in resolving them as it was when the social outburst occurred. To solve our problems of democratic coexistence, we need a new social pact that can unite us around a shared institutional project. That is why the constitution-making process was resumed, this time in a more traditional format, which has produced a new draft that will again have to be submitted to a popular vote.

  How different is the new draft from the one that emerged from the 2021 Constitutional Convention?

  The new draft is a lot more similar to the current constitution. It introduces more modest changes. Compared to the previous one, I think it rolls back some rights that had already been won, particularly for historically excluded groups such as women. Nor does it introduce recognition of other vulnerable population groups , such as Indigenous peoples and children and adolescents. But it does share with the previous draft the reaffirmation of freedom of enterprise and the concept of a subsidiary state.

  The two processes have been quite different because in the first case the constituent body included many citizens elected by popular vote and independent of political parties, while the second involved a Council of Experts appointed by the two chambers of Congress and a Constitutional Council elected by popular vote but made up mostly of members proposed by political parties ranging from the centre to the far right.

  However, there is one thing that the proposals resulting from both processes share: both have been considered partisan in nature, viewed as aligned with the interests of a specific political camp. They reflect the division of Chile rather than being an instrument for its union.

  What changes would the new draft make to the existing constitution?

  Overall, the text reproduces the current institutional framework, except for the fact that it reduces the number of members of parliament. It also enshrines the same rights as the current constitution. It shares many of its strengths but also suffers from many of the same weaknesses.

  The draft contains several articles that have caused controversy because of the regressive way in which they could be interpreted. For example, in the area of reproductive rights, constitutional provisions could mean that the rule that currently allows abortion in cases of rape, danger to the life of the mother and non-viability of the foetus could be declared unconstitutional.

  The incorporation of a special anti-corruption body could enter into conflicts of competence with the current Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. Additionally, some populist tools would be introduced to allow the immediate expulsion of undocumented migrants, along with some tax exemptions – a matter that generally does not belong in a constitutional text – and a number of highly sensitive provisions, such as the possibility of allowing terminally ill convicts to serve their sentences at home, which could benefit people convicted of crimes against humanity committed during the period of dictatorship.

  On the plus side, a Victims’ Ombudsman’s Office would be established and progress would be made on decentralisation, granting greater powers to local governments.

  What’s the position of different groups towards the referendum to be held on the latest draft?

  Most right-wing parties approve of the project, while those on the left reject it and those in the centre have a great diversity of opinions, with some campaigning for approval and others for rejection.

  But the last word will be up to voters, who are going through what has been defined as a moment of constitutional exhaustion. Because of the lengthy and controversial process and the lack of cross-cutting agreements, there is a lot of apathy and indecision, as well as conflicting positions. Right now polls show a majority of people would reject the new constitution, but the vote is on 17 December, so there is still a long way to go, and there are many people who have not yet decided how they will vote.

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  Civic space in Chile is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Fundación Multitudes through itswebsite orFacebook account, subscribe to itsYouTube channel and follow @FMultitudes onInstagram andTwitter.

• CHILE: “La propuesta de constitución refleja la división del país en vez de ser un instrumento para su unión”

  CIVICUS conversa con Patricia Reyes, directora de la Fundación Multitudes, acerca del proceso para redactar una nueva constitución para Chile luego de que la propuesta anterior fuera rechazada en un referéndum en septiembre de 2022.

  La Fundación Multitudes es una organización de la sociedad civil dedicada a generar espacios y crear capacidades en la sociedad civil para que pueda participar efectivamente en los procesos de toma de decisiones.

  ¿Por qué necesita Chile una nueva constitución?

  El proceso constituyente en que Chile ha estado sumido desde 2022 fue una respuesta a una crisis social y política de larga data que estalló en octubre de 2019. Ante la irrupción de demandas sociales de mayor protección, equidad y garantía de derechos sociales básicos como la educación, la salud y la seguridad social, que en algunos casos se expresaron con violencia inusitada, todos los sectores políticos acordaron iniciar un proceso constituyente.

  En un primer momento se desarrolló un proceso inclusivo que produjo una propuesta de constitución que incorporó estándares adecuados de protección de derechos para un estado democrático y social. Pero la propuesta no logró reunir la adhesión de los sectores más conservadores y fue rechazada en referéndum, en gran medida a causa de errores cometidos en el proceso. Estos se debieron sobre todo a la inexperiencia política de los miembros de la comisión constituyente, que eran en su mayoría independientes sin vínculos con los partidos políticos. Ellos pasaron por alto la necesidad de lograr acuerdos amplios que representaran todos los sectores de la sociedad, y especialmente a los actores políticos tradicionales. También influyeron la incorporación de algunos cambios drásticos en la organización política y la incapacidad de comunicar adecuadamente a la ciudadanía los beneficios del nuevo texto constitucional.

  Tras el rechazo de la propuesta, las demandas sociales que habían disparado el proceso seguían vigentes, y la Constitución actual continuaba siendo tan ineficaz para resolverlas como lo era cuando ocurrió el estallido social. Para resolver nuestros problemas de convivencia democrática necesitamos un nuevo pacto social que nos una en torno a un proyecto institucional común. Por eso se recomenzó el proceso constituyente, esta vez con una dinámica más tradicional, que ha arrojado una nueva propuesta que deberá ser sometida nuevamente al voto de la ciudadanía.

  ¿Cuán diferente es esta nueva propuesta de la que surgió de la Convención Constitucional de 2021?

  La actual propuesta es mucho más cercana a la Constitución vigente, es decir, introduce cambios más modestos. En comparación con la anterior, pienso que retrocede en algunos derechos ya conquistados, especialmente por grupos tradicionalmente relegados como las mujeres. Tampoco introduce un reconocimiento para otros segmentos vulnerables de la población, como niños, adolescentes y pueblos indígenas. Pero sí comparte con la anterior la reafirmación de la libertad de empresa y el mantenimiento de la concepción de un Estado subsidiario.

  Los dos procesos han sido bastante diferentes porque en el primer caso el órgano constituyente incluyó a muchos ciudadanos elegidos por voto popular e independientes de los partidos políticos, mientras que en el segundo se trató de un Consejo de Expertos nombrado por las dos cámaras del Congreso y un Consejo Constitucional elegido popularmente, pero constituido mayormente por miembros propuestos por los partidos políticos que van desde el centro hasta la ultraderecha.

  Sin embargo, en algo sí se parecen las propuestas resultantes de ambos procesos: las dos han sido consideradas de carácter partisano, es decir, alineadas con los intereses de un bando político determinado. Reflejan la división del país en vez de ser un instrumento para su unión.

  ¿Qué cambios introduciría el nuevo proyecto en la Constitución vigente?

  El texto en general reproduce la institucionalidad vigente, salvo por la disminución del número de parlamentarios, y contiene los mismos derechos ya consagrados en la Constitución actual. Tiene muchas de sus fortalezas y también padece muchas de las mismas debilidades.

  El proyecto tiene también varios artículos que han generado polémica por la forma regresiva en que se los podría interpretar. Por ejemplo, en materia de derechos reproductivos las disposiciones constitucionales podrían permitir que se declare inconstitucional la norma que permite el aborto en casos de violación, peligro para la vida de la madre e inviabilidad del feto.

  Asimismo, la incorporación de un órgano especial para la lucha contra la corrupción podría entrar en conflictos de competencia con la actual Contraloría General de la República. También se incluirían algunas herramientas populistas para permitir la expulsión inmediata de migrantes indocumentados, así como algunas exenciones impositivas – cuestión que generalmente no pertenece a un texto constitucional – y algunas disposiciones de gran sensibilidad, como la posibilidad de beneficiar a enfermos terminales con reclusión domiciliaria, que podría beneficiar a personas condenadas por delitos de lesa humanidad cometidos durante la dictadura.

  En lo positivo, se crearía una Defensoría de Víctimas y se avanzaría en la descentralización, otorgando mayores facultades a los gobiernos locales.

  ¿Cómo se posicionan los distintos sectores frente al plebiscito de salida?

  Los partidos de derecha mayoritariamente aprueban el proyecto, mientras que los de izquierda lo rechazan y en el centro hay una gran diversidad de opiniones, con algunos militando por el apruebo y otros por el rechazo.

  Pero la última palabra la tiene la ciudadanía, que atraviesa un momento que ha sido definido como de agotamiento constitucional. Por lo largo y polémico que ha sido el proceso y por la falta de acuerdos transversales, en general hay mucha apatía e indecisión, así como posiciones encontradas. Por el momento las encuestas arrojan una mayoría de rechazos, pero la votación es el 17 de diciembre, por lo que todavía falta bastante, y sigue habiendo mucha gente que aún no tiene decidido su voto.

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  El espacio cívico en Chile es calificado como “estrecho” por elCIVICUS Monitor.

  Póngase en contacto con la Fundación Multitudes a través de supágina web o su cuenta deFacebook, suscríbase a su canal deYouTube y siga a @FMultitudes enInstagram yTwitter. 

• HAITI: ‘Civil society must get involved because political actors cannot find a solution to our problems’

  CIVICUS speaks about Haiti’s ongoing crisis and calls for foreign intervention with Monique Clesca, a journalist, democracy advocate and member of the Commission to Search for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis (Commission pour la recherche d’une solution haitienne a la crise, CRSC). CRSC, also known as the Montana Group, is a group of civic, religious and political organisations and leaders that got together in early 2021. Following the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, it promoted theMontana Accord, calling for a two-year provisional government to take over from acting Prime Minister Ariel Henry and hold elections as soon as possible, as well as a road map to reduce insecurity, tackle the humanitarian crisis and respond to social justice demands. The Monitoring Office of the Montana Accord continues to follow up on this roadmap.

  What are the causes of Haiti’s current crisis?

  People seem to associate the crisis with the assassination of President Moïse, but it started way before that, because there were various underlying issues. It is a political crisis but also a much deeper social crisis. The majority of people in Haiti have suffered the effect of profound inequalities for many decades. There are huge gaps in terms of health and education so there is a need for basic social justice. The problem goes far beyond the more visible political, constitutional and humanitarian issues.

  Over the past decade, we have had governments that tried to undermine state institutions so that a corrupt system could prevail: there have not been transparent elections and no alternation of power, with three successive governments of the same political party. Former president Michel Martelly postponed the presidential elections twice. He ruled by decree for more than a year. In 2016, fraud allegations were made against Moïse, his successor. In his time in office, Moïse dissolved parliament and never organised elections. He fired several Supreme Court judges and politicised the police.

  He also put forward a constitutional referendum, which has been repeatedly postponed, that is clearly unconstitutional. The 1987 Constitution defines how it should be amended, so by trying to rewrite it, Moïse went the unconstitutional way.

  By the time Moïse was killed, Haiti was left with his legacy of weak institutions, massive corruption and the lack of elections and renewal of the political class. After Moïse’s assassination the situation worsened further, because now there was no president and no functioning judiciary and legislative body. We had, and continue to have, a full-blown constitutional crisis.

  Ariel Henry, the current acting prime minister, clearly has no mandate. Moïse selected him as the next prime minister two days before he was killed and didn’t even leave a signed nomination letter.

  What has the Montana Group proposed as a way out of this crisis?

  The Montana Group formed in early 2021 out of the realisation that civil society must get involved because political actors could not find a solution to Haiti’s problems. A forum of civil society then put together a commission that worked for six months creating dialogue and trying to build consensus by speaking to all political actors, as well as to civil society organisations. As a result of all this input, we came up with a draft agreement that was finalised and signed by almost a thousand organisations and citizens: the Montana Accord.

  We put together a two-part plan: a governance plan and a social justice and humanitarian roadmap, which was signed as part of the agreement. To get consensus with wider participation, we proposed the creation of a checks and balances body that would carry out the role of the legislative branch and also an interim judiciary during the transition. Once Haiti can have transparent elections, there would be a proper elected legislative body and the government could go through the constitutional process to name the high-level judiciary body, the Supreme Court. That is the governance that we’ve envisioned for the transition, one that is closer to the spirit of the Haitian Constitution.

  Earlier this year, we met several times with Henry and tried to start negotiations with him and his allies. At one point, he told us he didn’t have the authority to negotiate. So he closed the door to negotiations.

  What are the challenges to holding elections in the current context?

  The main challenge is the massive insecurity. Gangs are terrorising the population. Kidnappings are rampant, people are being assassinated. People can’t go out of their homes: they can’t go to the bank, to the stores, to the hospital. Children can’t go to school: classes were supposed to start in September, then in October and now the government is silent on when they will start.

  There is also the dire humanitarian situation, only made worse when gangs blocked the main oil terminal of Varreux in Port-au-Prince. This impacted on power supply and water distribution, and therefore on people’s access to basic goods and services. Amid a cholera outbreak, health facilities were forced to reduce their services or shut down.

  And there is political polarisation and massive mistrust. People don’t only mistrust politicians; they also mistrust one another.

  Because of the political pressure and gang activity, citizen mobilisations have been up and down, but since late August there have been massive demonstrations calling for Henry’s resignation. People have also marched against rising fuel prices, shortages and corruption. They have also clearly rejected any foreign military intervention.

  What is your position regarding the prime minister’s call for foreign intervention?

  Henry has no legitimacy to call for any military intervention. The international community can help, but it is not up to them to decide whether to intervene or not. We first need to have a two-year political transition with a credible government. We have ideas, but at this point, we need to see a transition.

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  Civic space in Haiti is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Contact theCommission to Search for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis through itsFacebook page, and follow@moniclesca on Twitter.

• HAITI: ‘There is opportunity for a meaningful shift from foreign interference to true leadership of Haitian people’

  CIVICUS speaks with Ellie Happel, professor of the Global Justice Clinic and Director of the Haiti Project at New York University School of Law. Ellie lived and worked in Haiti for several years, and her work continues to focus on solidarity with social movements in Haiti and racial and environmental justice.

  What have been the key political developments since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021?

  As an American, I want to begin by emphasising the role the US government has played in creating the present situation. The history of unproductive and oppressive foreign intervention is long.

  To understand the context of the Moïse presidency, however, we have to at least go back to 2010. Following the earthquake that devastated Haiti in January 2010, the USA and other external actors called for elections. People did not have their voting cards; more than two million people had lost their homes. But elections went ahead. The US government intervened in the second round of Haiti’s presidential elections, calling for candidate and founder of the PHTK party, Michel Martelly, to be put into the second round. Martelly was subsequently elected.

  During the Martelly presidency we saw a decline in political, economic and social conditions. Corruption was well documented and rampant. Martelly failed to hold elections and ended up ruling by decree. He hand-selected Moïse as his successor. The US government strongly supported both the Martelly and Moïse administrations despite the increasing violence, the destruction of Haitian government institutions, the corruption and the impunity that occurred under their rule.

  Moïse’s death is not the biggest problem that Haiti faces. During his tenure, Moïse effectively destroyed Haitian institutions. Haitian people rose up against the PHTK regime in protest, and they were met with violence and repression. There is evidence of government implication in mass killings – massacres – of people in areas that were known to oppose PHTK.

  Two weeks prior to Moïse’s assassination, a prominent activist and a widely known journalist were murdered in Haiti. Diego Charles and Antoinette Duclair were calling for accountability. They were active in the movement to build a better Haiti. They were killed with impunity.

  It is clear that the present crisis did not originate in Moïse’s assassination. It is the result of failed foreign policies and of the way the Haitian government repressed and halted opposition protests demanding accountability for corruption and violence, and demanding change.

  What currently gives me hope is the work of the Commission for Haitian Solution to the Crisis, which was created prior to Moïse’s assassination. The Commission is a broad group of political parties and civil society organisations (CSOs) that came together to work collectively to rebuild the government. This presents an opportunity for a meaningful shift from foreign interference to true leadership of Haitian people.

  What is your view on the postponement of elections and the constitutional referendum, and what are the prospects of democratic votes taking place?

  In the current climate, elections are not the next step in addressing Haiti’s political crisis. Elections should not occur until the conditions for a fair, free and legitimate vote are met. The elections of the past 11 years demonstrate that they are not an automatic means of achieving representative democracy.

  Today, there are many hurdles to holding elections. The first is one of governance: elections must be overseen by a governing body that has legitimacy, and that is respected by the Haitian people. It would be impossible for the de facto government to organise elections. The second is gang violence. It’s estimated that more than half of Port-au-Prince is under the control of gangs.  When the provisional electoral council was preparing for elections a few months back, its staff could not access a number of voting centres due to gang control. Third, eligible Haitian voters should have voter ID cards.

  The US government and others should affirm the right of the Haitian people to self-determination. The USA should neither insist on nor support elections without evidence of concrete measures to ensure that they are free, fair, inclusive and perceived as legitimate. Haitian CSOs and the Commission will indicate when the conditions exist for free, fair and legitimate elections.

  Is there a migration crisis caused by the situation in Haiti? How can the challenges faced by Haitian migrants be addressed?

  What we call the ‘migration crisis’ is a strong example of how US foreign policy and immigration policy towards Haiti have long been affected by anti-Black racism.

  Many Haitians who left the country following the earthquake in 2010 first moved to South America. Many have subsequently left. The economies of Brazil and Chile worsened, and Haitian migrants encountered racism and a lack of economic opportunity. Families and individuals have travelled northward by foot, boat and bus towards the Mexico-USA border.

  For many years now, the US government has not allowed Haitian migrants and other migrants to enter the USA. They are expelling people without an asylum interview – a ‘credible fear’ interview, which is required under international law – back to Haiti.

  The US government must stop using Title 42, a public health provision, as a pretext to expel migrants. The US government should instead offer humanitarian assistance and support Haitian family reunification and relocation in the USA.

  It is impossible to justify deportation to Haiti right now, for the same reasons that the US government has advised US citizens not to travel there. There are estimates of nearly 1,000 documented cases of kidnapping in 2021. Friends explain that anyone is at risk. Kidnappings are no longer targeted, but school kids and street merchants and pedestrians are being held hostage to demand money. The US government has not only declared Haiti unsafe for travel, but in May 2021, the US Department of Homeland Security designated Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, allowing eligible Haitian nationals residing in the USA to apply to remain there because Haiti cannot safely repatriate its nationals.

  The USA should halt deportations to Haiti. And the USA and other countries in the Americas must begin to recognise, address and repair the anti-Black discrimination that characterises their immigration policies.

  What should the international community, and especially the USA, do to improve the situation?

  First, the international community should take the lead of Haitian CSOs and engage in a serious and supportive way with the Commission for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis. Daniel Foote, the US special envoy for Haiti, resigned in protest eight weeks into the job; he said that his colleagues at the State Department were not interested in supporting Haitian-led solutions. The USA should play the role of encouraging consensus building and facilitating conversations to move things forward without interfering.

  Second, all deportations to Haiti must stop. They are not only in violation of international law. They are also highly immoral and unjust.

  Foreigners, myself included, are not best placed to prescribe solutions in Haiti: instead, we must support those created by Haitian people and Haitian organisations. It is time for the Haitian people to decide on the path forward, and we need to actively support, and follow.

  Civic space in Haiti is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Follow@elliehappel on Twitter.

• LEBANON: ‘The main culprits of the current crisis are bank owners and their greed for profit’

  CIVICUS speaks about Lebanon’s ongoing financial crisis and the situation of depositors who are unable to access their savings with Alaa Khorchid, head of Depositors’ Outcry Association. 

  Depositors’ Outcry Association is a citizens’ group that formed in 2019 to support depositors’ attempts to withdraw their savings from Lebanese banks after their accounts were frozen in response to the financial crisis.

  Who is to blame for the situation Lebanese depositors are currently in?

  Lebanese depositors are desperate because their savings have been frozen, so they cannot withdraw them from banks. The way they are being mistreated is outrageous. If a depositor simply complains loudly, bank staff call the police on them. Even if they have a million dollars in the bank, depositors are unable to get medical treatment or pay for their kids’ university fees. Banks are only allowing them to withdraw US$140 a month, and are told if they have an issue with that limit, they can go ahead and file a lawsuit.

  The main culprits of the current crisis are bank owners, whose greed for profit got us to this point. What they did was a scam. They sent representatives abroad to convince Lebanese expatriates and foreigners to invest their money in Lebanese banks even though they knew we were heading into a crisis, while they smuggled their own money to France, the USA or the Gulf countries, where their investments amount to billions.

  Also responsible are state authorities, starting with Riad Salameh, governor of the Banque du Liban (BdL), Lebanon’s central bank. He should have regulated banks and held them accountable three years ago, but he didn’t.

  The government is responsible for not applying the laws on banks owners. They should have forced them to return depositors’ money out of their own pockets, but instead allowed them to smuggle their money abroad.

  The courts also have their share of responsibility, as they have thousands of cases pending, years after they’ve been filed. When cases filed by depositors in Lebanon reach a certain point they are shelved, while in France and the UK depositors managed to win their cases and get their money back.

  How have people organised to get their money back?

  People got together to fight collectively through organisations such asDepositors’ Outcry Association, which formed in 2019. Asan association, we have filed lawsuits against the BdL governor as well as the Association of Banks in Lebanon (ABL) and one bank, the Société Générale de Banque au Liban (SGBL), that smuggled US$1.2 billion out of the country. All these lawsuits have been pending for years because most of the judiciary has been bribed by the banks. 

  We also support depositors by mediating between them and the banks. For example, we have a list of cancer patients that we shared with the banks to try and convince them to release some of their funds to enable people to pay for treatment. Some banks, but not all, have responded positively.

  Some depositors have gone the banks to get their money by whatever means. One of them was Sali Hafiz, whom we supported. Hafiz asked for our help; a lawyer and members of the association went inside the bank with her and over 100 members were outside the bank to cheer for her and ensure her safety. We also helped a retired serviceman in Chtoura retrieve some of his savings from the bank. The association’s lawyer follows up with depositors, and when a depositor enters a bank to try to get some of their money back, we spread the word among our supporters so people gather outside in support and make it harder for others to enter the bank or for security to kick them out.

  It is worth noting that not all the organisations out there are supporting depositors. There are several organisations funded by ABL or SGBL, which obviously always side with the banks. The same applies to local media, which continues to accept money from the banks in the form of advertising. Depositors have had their accounts blocked for three years on the grounds that there is no money to give them back, but the banks still find money to pay for advertising.

  What needs to change so the situation can be resolved?

  We don’t have a functioning governance system. Banks have retained people’s savings for three years and the BdL has allowed this to continue, while the judiciary has protected the banks by withholding thousands of cases without reaching a conclusion. Many judges have a financial incentive to behave this way: they got bank loans worth millions of US dollars, which they are now repaying in Lebanese lira at a ridiculous exchange rate – they will end up paying 10 per cent of the original amount. This is a real scandal.

  The first change needed is to replace the BdL governor. He is the one behind the financial policies issued in 2017 and 2018. He brought cash in from correspondent banks and loaned it to the state without any guarantees. He spent US$100 billion without ever being held accountable. He considers himself above the law: he faces multiple lawsuits but he simply refuses to show up in court. 

  What are the implications of the recently passed Banking Secrecy Law?

  Parliament passed an amended Banking Secrecy Law that will lift secrecy on the bank accounts belonging to public officials and major bankers. We find the new law acceptable, although we hoped it would apply retroactively. As we told the head of the Parliament’s Finance and Budget Committee, we want to clarify what happened to the funds the political and financial elite transferred abroad after 17 October 2019, estimated at between US$13 and 15 billion. We want to understand who smuggled them and where to. But the new law won’t solve all the issues as there is no trust in the banking system.

  Another bill, the Capital Control Law, is set to be discussed in parliament, but there is still no final draft to comment on. Unfortunately, it is a bit too late to discuss capital controls, once capital has been massively smuggled abroad. Capital controls should have come a week, even a month into the crisis, but not after three years. Banks have smuggled the funds of the elite abroad because there were no legal impediments. The latest update we heard regarding the capital control law is that there will be no separate capital control law and it will be part of a larger recovery roadmap consisting of many changes in addition to capital control. We consider the potential recovery roadmap as a death sentence to depositors.

  What do you think about the conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for approving a US$3 billion loan?

  According to the government, one of the IMF’s main conditions is to write off US$70 billion of depositors’ funds. If that is what the IMF wants in exchange for giving the state a US$3 billion loan, then of course we are against it. The IMF can’t ask the state and BdL to write off as much funds to ensure they get repaid for their loan. Some members of parliament promised us they would refuse to pass any legislation to that effect.

  But a reform requested by the IMF that is most important to us, and which ABL rejects, is the restructuring of banks. We hope that banks will be restructured and a timeline for repaying depositors will be released.

  At the beginning of the crisis, BdL had US$34 billion. Today, it has US$8 billion. Those billions are gone due to governance failures. If the same policies remain in place, nothing will work, regardless of whether the IMF gives the state a loan of US$3 or 10 billion. The first step to get out of this crisis should be to guarantee deposits, because the crisis wasn’t the depositors’ fault.

  In the past 15 years banks made over US$35 billion in profit, which was transferred abroad. We demand a forensic audit of each bank to find out which had profits, and how much. There are 40 banks in Lebanon. Why are they being treated as one? We should examine each separately. 

  ---

   Civic space in Lebanon is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Depositors’ Outcry Association through itsFacebook page.

• LEBANON: ‘This crisis should be handled with a feminist vision’

  CIVICUS speaks to Lina Abou Habib, a feminist activist based in Beirut, Lebanon, about the civil society response to the emergency caused by the explosion on 4 August 2020. Lina teaches Global Feminisms at the American University of Beirut, where she is affiliated with the Asfari Institute, and chairs the Collective for Research and Training on Development-Action, a regional feminist organisation working in the Middle East and North Africa. She also serves on the board of Gender at Work and as a strategic Middle East and North Africa advisor for the Global Fund for Women.

  

  Would you tell us about the moment of the explosion?

  The Beirut explosion happened on 4 August 2020, at around 18:10 Beirut time. I was at home and I had known for an hour that there was a huge fire at the Beirut port. When the fire started getting bigger the sky was blackened by fumes. I was looking out, and the first thing I felt was a very scary earthquake-like feeling, after which it took a split second for a huge explosion to happen. Glass shattered all around me. It took me a couple of minutes to understand what had just happened. The first thing everyone was call our family and close friends just to make sure that they were okay. Everybody was in a state of disbelief. The explosion was so powerful that each one of us felt like it had happened right next to us.

  What was civil society’s immediate response?

  It is important to note that alongside the civil society response there was also an individual response. Individuals took to the streets in an attempt to help others. Nobody trusted that the state would help in any way. The state was responsible for what had happened. People took the responsibility for helping each other, which meant addressing immediate problems such as clearing rubble from the streets and talking to people to find out what they needed, including shelter and food. About 300,000 people had become homeless and lost everything in a split second. There was an extraordinary reaction by ordinary people to help: people with brooms and shovels started clearing rubble and distributing food and water. Anger turned into solidarity.

  This was an amazingly empowering moment that still continues. As we speak, there are volunteers and civil society organisations (CSOs) who are basically holding the fort and not only engaging in immediate relief but also providing all sorts of support to distressed populations.

  However, these acts of solidarity and care have also been criticised. The main criticism has been that such acts are unhelpful because they relieve the state from fulfilling its obligations and performing its duties. I understand this critique, but I don’t agree with it. To me, the acts of solidarity performed by civil society and ordinary people were our main success stories: stories of power and resistance that we should talk about. We need to highlight the immediate response provided individually by people who themselves had been hurt or had lost a lot. Migrant worker communities, who live in dire conditions of exploitation, racism and abuse, went out there to clear the rubble and help others. I don’t think we should ignore the significance of these acts of solidarity.

  Lebanon was already undergoing deep economic crisis, which was further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the explosion. Which groups were impacted upon the most?

  The worst effects were felt by those who were already in the most vulnerable situations. A clear example of multiple forms of discrimination overlapping and reinforcing one another is the situation of female migrant workers in Lebanon. This is not new; this situation is decades old. First, migrant women work in the private sphere, which makes them even more invisible and vulnerable. Second, there are absolutely no rules that need to be followed to hire them, so they are basically at the mercy of their employers. They are kept in quasi-slavery conditions based on so-called ‘sponsorship contracts’. The air that they breathe is dependent on the will of their employers and they are completely bound to them. In sum, this is a population of women from poor countries of the global south who work as domestic workers and caregivers, positions that make them incredibly vulnerable to abuse. There are no laws that protect them and that has always been the case. Therefore, they are the ones left behind when there is a security issue or a political crisis.

  Three consecutive events have affected their situation. The first is the revolution that started on 17 October 2019, an incredibly important moment that was the culmination of years of activism, including by women migrant workers, who were supported, nurtured and mentored by young Lebanese feminists. As a result, in the midst of the revolution there were migrant workers who revolted against the sponsorship system, which deprives them of their humanity and exposes them to working conditions that amount to slavery, and demanded dignified work and a dignified life.

  And then there were the economic breakdown and the COVID-19 pandemic, both of which hit as the protests were still ongoing. As a result of the economic crunch, some people choose to not pay their migrant and domestic workers’ salaries, or even worst, simply disposed of them on the streets during the pandemic.

  And then the Beirut port explosion happened, which again affected migrant workers in particular. It was a succession of crises that hit migrant workers first and foremost, and particularly women, because they were already in precarious conditions in which they were abused, their labour taken for granted and then thrown away on the streets, forgotten by their embassies and ignored by the Lebanese government. 

  As an activist and a feminist, how do you view the government response to the explosion?

  There hasn’t been any responsible government response. I would not even call what we have a government, but rather a regime. It is a corrupt dictatorship, an authoritarian regime that continues to pretend to be democratic and even progressive. The regime says it embodies reforms, but it never follows through. For instance, 10 days into the revolution, in October 2019, the president addressed the nation and promised an egalitarian civil family law, which feminist activists have been demanding for decades. This came as a surprise, but it turned out that it wasn’t serious, as nothing has been done about it. The authorities just say whatever they think people want to hear, and they seem to be convinced that the public is too ignorant to notice.

  So we need to position the response to the explosion against the background of the recent uprising. The government’s response to the revolution has been to not acknowledge the problems that people were pointing at: that it had emptied the public coffers, that it continued to exercise nepotism and corruption and, worst of all, that it was dismantling public institutions. The only government response has been to close the space for civil society and attack the freedoms of association and expression and the right to protest. I’ve lived in this country for most of my life, including through the civil war, and I think there hasn’t been a crackdown on freedoms of the magnitude we are seeing right now under this regime. We have never witnessed people being summoned by the police or general security because of something they said or posted on social media. This is exactly what the regime is doing and continues to do. The president is acting as if there was a lèse-majesté law and is not accepting any criticism; people who criticise him are paying with their freedom. It is the first time we hear about activists being detained for this reason.

  In short, the regime hasn’t done anything significant in response to the explosion. Sending the army to distribute food aid packets is in no way significant. They are even refusing to give food aid items to non-Lebanese people who were affected. This exposes the various layers of corruption, bigotry and mismanagement that are at interplay here.

  Following the explosion, people took to the streets again to protest. Do you think protests have made an impact?

  On the Saturday following the explosion there were people protesting on the streets. I was there and I was scared because of the deployment of violence by the security forces.

  In the face of so many calamities, the only reason why people are not massively on the streets is because of the COVID-19 pandemic. This has been a gift for the regime. It has imposed curfews, broke up the tents set up by the revolutionaries at Martyrs’ Square and arrested and detained people, all under the guise of wanting to protect people from the virus. But of course, nobody is duped. The levels of contagion are increasing rather than decreasing. It doesn’t help that the regime is so corrupt that we basically don’t have any functioning health services.

  The constraints created by the pandemic and the fears for one’s health are seriously limiting people’s actions against the regime, but I don’t think this is going to stop the revolution. People have had enough. People have lost everything. And when you push people’s backs to the wall, there is nowhere else to go but forward. The regime will continue to use brutal force, it will continue to lie and mismanage funds and resources, but this is becoming totally unacceptable to an increasingly larger proportion of the population.

  I believe that street mobilisation has been successful on several levels. One can disagree and point out that the regime is still in power, and this may be true; it will take a long time for it to fall. But one immediate success of the protests is that they shattered a taboo. There was a kind of halo or sanctity around certain leaders who were believed to be untouchable. Now it's obvious that they don’t enjoy that protection any longer. Although the regime is not ready to concede, they are just buying themselves some time.

  The way I see it, a major gain has been the leadership role played by feminist groups in shaping the country that we want, the rights and entitlements we are claiming and the form of government that we want. Alongside 40 feminist organisations we have released a charter of demands. We put our heads together and have stated what humanitarian reconstruction needs to look like from a feminist perspective and are using this as an advocacy tool for the international community. The way we are intervening indicates that this crisis should be handled with a feminist vision.

  Additionally, for the first time the LGBTQI+ community has been part and parcel in shaping the reform process, the transition process and again shaping the country we want, regarding both the form of state and human relations. And the voice of the migrant community has been amplified as well. To me, these gains are irreversible.

  What support does civil society in Beirut and Lebanon need from the international community?

  There are a number of things that need to be done. First, we need tangible forms of solidarity in terms of communications to amplify our voice. Second, we need to lobby the international community on behalf of the Lebanese feminist movement so that the Lebanese regime is held accountable for every cent it receives. To give an example, we received about 1,700 kilograms of tea from Sri Lanka, and the tea has disappeared; it appears that the president distributed it among the presidential guards. We need influence and pressure from the international community to hold this regime accountable. Third, we need to bring these voices to the attention of international mainstream media.

  I want to emphasise the point that international aid should not be without conditions, as the ruling regime lacks transparency and accountability. Of course it is not up to civil society to rebuild, or to reconstruct the infrastructure. But if any cent has to go to the regime, then it must be given with conditionalities of transparency, accountability and due diligence. Civil society must be empowered to play a watchdog role. This means that CSOs must have the voice and the tools for monitoring. Otherwise nothing is going to change. International aid will vanish; it will only help the regime prolong its rule while the city remains in ruins.

  Civic space in Lebanon is rated as ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with the Collective for Research and Training on Development-Action through itswebpage, and follow@LinaAH1 on Twitter.

• LÍBANO: ‘Esta crisis debe manejarse con una visión feminista’

  CIVICUS conversa con Lina Abou Habib, una activista feminista basada en Beirut, Líbano, acerca de la respuesta de la sociedad civil a la emergencia causada por la explosión del 4 de agosto de 2020. Lina enseña Feminismos Globales en la Universidad Americana de Beirut, donde integra el Instituto Asfari, y preside el Colectivo de Investigación y Capacitación en Acción para el Desarrollo, una organización feminista regional que trabaja en Medio Oriente y África del Norte. También se desempeña en la junta de Gender at Work y como asesora estratégica del Fondo Mundial para la Mujer en Medio Oriente y África del Norte.

  

  ¿Podría contarnos acerca del momento en que ocurrió la explosión?

  La explosión de Beirut ocurrió el 4 de agosto de 2020, alrededor de las 18:10 hora de Beirut. Yo estaba en mi casa y desde hacía una hora que sabía que se había producido un gran incendio en el puerto de Beirut. Cuando el fuego empezó a extenderse, el cielo se oscureció a causa del humo. Yo estaba mirando hacia afuera, y lo primero que sentí fue una sensación aterradora, similar a un terremoto, y apenas una fracción de segundo más tarde ocurrió una gran explosión. Los vidrios a mi alrededor se hicieron añicos. Me tomó un par de minutos comprender lo que acababa de suceder. Lo primero que todos hicimos fue llamar a nuestras familias y amigos cercanos para asegurarnos de que estaban bien. Todo el mundo estaba en un estado de completa incredulidad. La explosión fue tan poderosa que cada uno de nosotros sintió que había sucedido justo a nuestro lado.

  ¿Cuál fue la respuesta inmediata de la sociedad civil?

  Es importante subrayar que junto con la respuesta de la sociedad civil también hubo una respuesta individual. La gente salió a las calles para intentar ayudar a los demás. Nadie confiaba en que el Estado fuera ayudar de ninguna manera; de hecho, el Estado era el responsable de lo sucedido. Las personas asumieron la responsabilidad de ayudarse unas a otras, lo cual supuso abordar problemas inmediatos, tales como despejar las calles de escombros y hablar con otras personas para averiguar qué necesitaban, por ejemplo refugio y comida. Cerca de 300.000 personas se habían quedado sin hogar y lo habían perdido todo en una fracción de segundo. Hubo una reacción extraordinaria por parte de gente común que se dispuso a ayudar: personas con escobas y palas comenzaron a quitar los escombros y a distribuir alimentos y agua. La indignación se convirtió en solidaridad.

  Se trató de un momento de gran empoderamiento, que aún continúa. En este mismo momento hay personas voluntarias y organizaciones de la sociedad civil (OSC) que básicamente están haciéndose cargo de la situación y no solo brindan ayuda inmediata, sino que también ofrecen toda clase de apoyos a la gente en dificultades.

  Sin embargo, estos actos de solidaridad y cuidado también han sido criticados. La principal crítica ha sido que son contraproducentes porque eximen al Estado de cumplir con sus obligaciones y hacer sus deberes. Entiendo esta crítica, pero no estoy de acuerdo con ella. Para mí, los actos de solidaridad realizados por la sociedad civil y la gente común constituyeron nuestras principales historias de éxito, historias de poder y resistencia de las que es bueno hablar. Es necesario resaltar la respuesta inmediata brindada individualmente por las mismas personas que habían experimentado daños o habían perdido mucho. Las propias comunidades de trabajadores migrantes, que viven en condiciones extremas de explotación, racismo y abuso, salieron a limpiar los escombros y ayudar a otras personas. No creo que debamos ignorar el significado de estos actos de solidaridad.

  El Líbano ya estaba atravesando una profunda crisis económica, que se vio agravada aún más por la pandemia de COVID-19 y la explosión. ¿Cuáles fueron los grupos más afectados?

  Los peores efectos los sintieron quienes ya se encontraban en las situaciones más vulnerables. Un claro ejemplo de múltiples formas de discriminación que se superponen y se refuerzan entre sí es la situación de las trabajadoras migrantes en el Líbano. No es una situación nueva, sino que ya lleva décadas. Primero, las mujeres migrantes trabajan en el ámbito privado, lo cual las torna aún más invisibles y vulnerables. En segundo lugar, no hay absolutamente ninguna regla que sea obligatorio seguir para contratarlas, por lo que básicamente están a merced de sus empleadores. Se les mantiene en condiciones de cuasi esclavitud sobre la base de los denominados “contratos de patrocinio”. El aire mismo que respiran depende de la voluntad de sus empleadores y están completamente atadas a ellos. En resumen, se trata de una población de mujeres procedentes de países pobres del sur global que se desempeñan como trabajadoras domésticas y cuidadoras, posiciones que las vuelven increíblemente vulnerables al abuso. No hay leyes que las protejan, y siempre ha sido así. Por tanto, son quienes acaben siendo dejadas atrás cuando ocurre una crisis de seguridad o una crisis política.

  Tres hechos consecutivos afectaron su situación. El primero fue la revolución que se inició el 17 de octubre de 2019, un momento increíblemente importante que fue la culminación de años de activismo, y en el que también participaron las trabajadoras migrantes, que fueron apoyadas, sostenidas y orientadas por jóvenes feministas libanesas. Como resultado de ello, hubo en el seno de la revolución trabajadoras migrantes que se rebelaron contra el sistema de patrocinio, que las priva de su humanidad y las expone a condiciones de trabajo equivalentes a la esclavitud, y exigieron trabajo decente y una vida digna.

  A ello se sumaron el colapso económico y la pandemia de COVID-19, los cuales sobrevinieron cuando aún continuaban las protestas. Como resultado de la crisis económica, algunas personas optaron por no pagar los salarios de trabajadores domésticos y migrantes o, lo que es peor, simplemente se deshicieron de ellos dejándoles en la calle durante la pandemia.

  Y luego ocurrió la explosión del puerto de Beirut, que nuevamente afectó particularmente a los trabajadores migrantes. Fue una sucesión de crisis que afectaron ante todo a los trabajadores migrantes, y en particular a las mujeres, porque ya se encontraban en condiciones precarias en las que sufrían abusos, su trabajo se daba por descontado y eran luego descartados en las calles, olvidados por sus embajadas e ignorados por el gobierno libanés.

  Como activista y feminista, ¿cómo evalúa la respuesta del gobierno ante la explosión?

  No ha habido una respuesta responsable de parte del gobierno. Ni siquiera llamaría “gobierno” a esto que tenemos, sino “régimen”. Es una dictadura corrupta, un régimen autoritario que sigue simulando ser democrático e incluso progresista. El régimen dice ser la encarnación de la reforma, pero nunca la lleva a cabo. Por ejemplo, diez días después de la revolución, en octubre de 2019, el presidente se dirigió a la nación y nos prometió una ley civil de familia igualitaria, algo que las activistas feministas hemos exigido durante décadas. Fue toda una sorpresa, pero resultó que no era en serio, ya que no se ha hecho nada al respecto. Las autoridades simplemente dicen lo que creen que la gente quiere escuchar, y parecen estar convencidas de que la ciudadanía es demasiado ignorante para darse cuenta.

  De modo que debemos situar la respuesta a la explosión en el contexto del reciente levantamiento. La respuesta del gobierno a la revolución ha sido no reconocer los problemas que la gente señalaba: que había vaciado las arcas públicas, que seguía ejerciendo el nepotismo y la corrupción y, lo peor de todo, que estaba desmantelando las instituciones públicas. La única respuesta del gobierno ha sido cerrar el espacio de la sociedad civil y atacar las libertades de asociación y expresión y el derecho de protesta. He vivido en este país la mayor parte de mi vida y he pasado por una guerra civil, y creo que no hemos experimentado una represión de las libertades de la magnitud que estamos viendo ahora mismo bajo este régimen. Nunca habíamos visto que las personas fueran citadas por la policía o las instituciones de seguridad por algo que dijeron o publicaron en las redes sociales. Esto es exactamente lo que este régimen hace, y lo continúa haciendo. El presidente actúa como si tuviéramos una ley de lesa majestad y no acepta crítica alguna; quienes lo critican pagan por ello con su libertad. Es la primera vez que vemos a activistas detenidos por esta causa.

  En resumen, el régimen no ha hecho nada significativo en respuesta a la explosión. El hecho de que haya enviado al ejército a distribuir paquetes de ayuda alimentaria no tiene gran importancia. De hecho, se han negado a entregar artículos de ayuda alimentaria a personas no libanesas que fueron afectadas. Esto pone en evidencia la forma en que interactúan en este proceso sucesivas capas de corrupción, intolerancia y mala gestión.

  Tras la explosión, la gente volvió a salir a las calles a protestar. ¿Cree que las protestas han tenido algún impacto?

  El sábado siguiente a la explosión hubo gente protestando en las calles. Yo estaba allí y me asustó el despliegue de violencia de las fuerzas de seguridad.

  Ante tantas calamidades, la única razón por la que la gente no se ha volcado masivamente a las calles es la pandemia de COVID-19. En ese sentido, la pandemia ha sido para el régimen un regalo del cielo. Ha impuesto toques de queda, ha destruido las carpas que los revolucionarios habían armado en la Plaza de los Mártires y ha hecho arrestos y detenciones, todo ello con el pretexto de proteger a la gente del virus. Pero, por supuesto, no logra engañar a nadie. Los niveles de contagio aumentan en lugar de disminuir. El hecho de que el régimen sea tan corrupto que básicamente no tengamos un servicio de salud en funcionamiento, realmente no ayuda.

  Las limitaciones creadas por la pandemia y los temores de la gente por su propia salud están limitando seriamente las acciones contra el régimen; sin embargo, no creo que esto vaya a detener la revolución. La gente ya ha tenido suficiente. Mucha gente lo ha perdido todo. Y cuando te ponen contra la pared, no te queda otro lugar a donde ir como no sea hacia adelante. El régimen seguirá usando la fuerza bruta, seguirá mintiendo y administrando mal los fondos y los recursos, pero esto se está volviendo totalmente inaceptable para una porción cada vez mayor de la población.

  Creo que la movilización callejera ha tenido éxito en varios niveles. Uno puede estar en desacuerdo y señalar que el régimen todavía está en el poder, y es verdad que todavía tomará mucho tiempo para que caiga. Pero el éxito inmediato de las protestas fue que quebraron un tabú. Había una especie de halo o santidad en torno de ciertos líderes que eran considerados intocables. Ahora es obvio que ya no disfrutan de esa protección. Aunque el régimen no esté dispuesto a ceder, apenas está ganando tiempo.

  A mi modo de ver, un logro importante ha sido el rol de liderazgo desempeñado por los grupos feministas a la hora de pensar el país que queremos, los derechos y prerrogativas que reivindicamos y la forma de gobierno que deseamos. Junto a 40 organizaciones feministas publicamos una lista de demandas. Pensamos juntas y establecimos cómo debe ser una reconstrucción humanitaria desde una perspectiva feminista y estamos utilizando esto como una herramienta de incidencia ante la comunidad internacional. La forma en que estamos interviniendo indica que esta crisis debe manejarse con una visión feminista.

  Además, por primera vez la comunidad LGBTQI+ ha sido parte integral en la configuración del proceso de reforma, el proceso de transición y la configuración del país que queremos, tanto en lo que se refiere a la forma de estado como en lo que concierne a las relaciones humanas. También se ha amplificado la voz de la comunidad migrante. Para mí, estos logros son irreversibles.

  ¿Qué apoyo de la comunidad internacional necesitaría la sociedad civil de Beirut y el Líbano?

  Hay varias cosas que podrían hacer. En primer lugar, necesitamos formas tangibles de solidaridad en el campo de las comunicaciones, para amplificar nuestra voz. En segundo lugar, debemos presionar a la comunidad internacional en nombre del movimiento feminista libanés para que el régimen libanés rinda cuentas por cada centavo que recibe. Para dar un ejemplo: recibimos unos 1.700 kilos de té de Sri Lanka, pero el té ha desaparecido; parece que el presidente lo distribuyó entre los guardias presidenciales. Necesitamos la influencia y la presión de la comunidad internacional para que este régimen rinda cuentas. En tercer lugar, debemos que los principales medios de comunicación internacionales amplifiquen estas voces.

  Quiero enfatizar el hecho de que la ayuda internacional no debe estar exenta de condiciones, ya que el régimen gobernante no opera con transparencia y no rinde cuentas. Por supuesto que no le corresponde a la sociedad civil reconstruir lo dañado o poner en pie la infraestructura. Pero cada centavo que vaya dirigido al régimen para estos menesteres debe entregarse bajo condiciones de transparencia, rendición de cuentas y debida diligencia. Debe empoderarse a la sociedad civil para que desempeñe funciones de control. Esto significa que las OSC deben tener la voz y las herramientas para monitorear. De lo contrario, nada va a cambiar. La ayuda internacional se desvanecerá; sólo ayudará al régimen a prolongar su dominio mientras la ciudad permanece en ruinas.

  El espacio cívico en el Líbano es calificado de “obstruido” por elCIVICUS Monitor.
  Contáctese con el Colectivo de Investigación y Capacitación en Acción para el Desarrollo a través de supágina web, y siga a@LinaAH1 en Twitter.

   

• MOROCCO: ‘Support those who were there before the earthquake hit and will stay when the cameras are gone’

  CIVICUS speaks about the role of civil society in the response to the recent earthquake in Morocco with Victoria Vrana, Chief Executive Officer at GlobalGiving.

  Founded in 2002, GlobalGiving is a nonprofit organisation working to accelerate community-led change. When a crisis happens, GlobalGiving works to quickly deliver funds to vetted organisations that are best suited to lead immediate and long-term relief and recovery.

  What can governments do to reduce the damage caused by natural disasters?

  Governments play a critical role in disaster response, and there is a global need for enhanced disaster preparedness and risk reduction efforts. Even thoughevery US$1 invested in disaster risk reduction saves US$6 in damages, the currentglobal spending on disaster response is five times higher than the spending on risk reduction. Prioritising disaster-resilient homes and businesses, early warning systems and risk mapping saves lives. Still, relatively little attention is being paid to these essential activities worldwide, leaving the most vulnerable communities, including children, women and low-income families, underprepared when disaster inevitably strikes.

  How does civil society help address disasters?

  When governments impose aid restrictions or, in the chaotic aftermath of a disaster, block roads or runways, circumventing red tape becomes crucial for delivering aid directly to those in need. During earthquakes, friends, families and neighbours emerge as the true first responders, standing on the frontlines alongside local organisations. The goal of GlobalGiving is to deliver aid into their handsas quickly as possible. We rapidly mobilise resources and make disbursements within a few days after a disaster strikes. 

  What work is GlobalGiving doing in Morocco? 

  There is an ongoing disaster response with many stakeholders involved. GlobalGiving collaborates with over two dozen vetted nonprofit partners, actively involved in earthquake-affected areas. Many of them are registered and based in Morocco and others have decades of experience working in the country. We focus on empowering those local, community-led organisationsto make a lasting impact by providing them with the necessary tools and resources for pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis situations.

  GlobalGiving is a safe and trusted organisation with over 20 years of experience accredited by theBBB Wise Giving Alliance andhighly rated onCharity Navigator. All donations to theGlobalGiving Morocco Earthquake Relief Fund contribute to relief and recovery efforts in Morocco.

  Initially, the fund has been instrumental in addressing survivors’ immediate needs in food, fuel, clean water, medicine and shelter. As time passes, our fund will shift its focus to support recovery efforts. The most significant challenge isrebuildinglives and communities following disaster. Our partners will be working to meet the most pressing needs over the coming months, but the rebuilding process will likely take years, leaving many people without permanent homes in the meantime.

  What international support does Morocco currently need, and how can people help?

  Some of the greatest needs include food, water, emergency medical supplies and temporary relief and emergency supplies for displaced families. Our partners are also providing mental health and psychosocial support for affected communities, including frontline workers. You can contribute to all these efforts by donating to theGlobalGiving Morocco Earthquake Relief Fund.

  History demonstrates that attention shifts elsewhere over the next few weeks after a disaster takes place, but affected communities are left grappling with the impacts for years to come. In the case of Morocco, we’ve already observed a decline in news coverage, leading to diminishing international support. Astartling 70 to 80 per cent of disaster funding is directed at short-term relief, with the majority allocated within the first two months of a disaster. Therefore, continuous support to local groups and those with contextual knowledge is of paramount importance.

  At GlobalGiving, we advocate for planned donations that help survivors in the long run. So we encourage people to consider making a smaller immediate donation, followed by further contributions over time or, even better, to set up a monthly recurring donation to provide a steady source of income to help communities meet their long-term needs.

  When you donate locally in the aftermath of an earthquake or another natural disaster, your contribution goes to organisations that have been living and working in the affected area and are better able to find context-specific solutions. Those people were there before the earthquake hit and will stay long after the news cameras are gone. 

  Civic space in Morocco is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with GlobalGiving through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@GlobalGiving and@vicvrana on Twitter.

• PERU: ‘Political and social instability has already cost dozens of lives’

  CIVICUS speaks about the political crisis in Peru with Nadia Ramos, CEO of the Women’s Leadership Centre of the Americas and official spokesperson for the Hemispheric Network Somos Lideresas, two organisations that promote women’s leadership and empowerment in Peru and Latin America.

• PERÚ: “La inestabilidad política y social ya ha costado decenas de vidas”

  CIVICUS conversa sobre la crisis política en Perú con Nadia Ramos, CEO del Centro de Liderazgo para Mujeres de las Américas y portavoz oficial de la Red Hemisférica Somos Lideresas, organizaciones que impulsan el liderazgo y el empoderamiento de las mujeres en Perú y en América Latina.

  ¿Cómo se gestó el conflicto de poderes que acabó con la salida del presidente Castillo?

  El expresidente Pedro Castillo fue elegido democráticamente a través del voto popular, pero desde antes de iniciar su mandato vivió un acoso constante de grupos que argumentaban que su victoria electoral nació a partir del fraude y, por ende, no lo reconocían como presidente legítimo. Estos grupos presentaron denuncias sin pruebas ante organismos internacionales para tratar de impedir su juramentación.

  Perú tiene un sistema presidencialista híbrido, ya que, en vez de estar completamente separados, los poderes Ejecutivo y Legislativo tienen poderes para destituirse o disolverse recíprocamente. Hay un Consejo de Ministros conformado por todos los ministros de Estado cuyo presidente es nombrado directamente por el presidente del Perú. El Congreso otorga su voto de confianza al presidente del Consejo de ministros, pero si le niega su confianza en dos oportunidades el presidente de la República puede disolver el Congreso.

  Los dos poderes están constantemente midiendo fuerzas, y durante el Gobierno de Castillo el choque institucional se sintió aún más. Si a esto se le suma que tenemos partidos políticos débiles, el resultado es una situación política inestable, algo a lo que estamos los peruanos muy acostumbrados.

  Durante su gobierno, Castillo fue acosado por el Congreso, a lo que luego se sumó una denuncia grave de corrupción presentada por la Fiscal de la Nación. También fue atacado por la prensa tradicional, que durante meses nunca pudo obtener una entrevista con el presidente. Castillo no daba explicaciones de nada: guardó absoluto silencio y daba mensajes a la nación de un minuto de duración para explicar temas puntuales de su gestión.

  A pesar de no tener mayoría en el Congreso, Castillo evitó ser destituido por el Congreso en varias oportunidades. Como se supo luego, lo hizo buscando discretamente apoyos en algunas bancadas clave. Pero mientras que sus antecesores tuvieron entre seis meses y un año en que pudieron gobernar, Castillo nunca tuvo tregua. Ante el acoso y la persecución, finalmente recurrió a la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA) para solicitar la activación de la Carta Democrática, un instrumento de defensa de la democracia bajo amenaza, argumentando que era víctima de un complot que buscaba sacarlo del poder. La OEA respondió enviando una Comisión de Alto Nivel a Perú para analizar la situación política y confirmar si se estaba gestando un complot en su contra, amenazando la democracia.

  La democracia en Perú es muy precaria, y este fue un gobierno precario que buscó sobrevivir día a día. Era prácticamente imposible que llegara hasta el final de su mandato el 28 de julio de 2026.

  ¿Qué ocurrió el 7 de diciembre?

  Desde hacía tiempo Castillo venía siendo hostigado por el Congreso, que de manera constante presentaba mociones de vacancia, aunque no obtenía los votos suficientes para destituirlo. Mientras tanto, el presidente guardaba silencio y se concentraba en lograr los apoyos necesarios para sobrevivir en el cargo. Hasta el 7 de diciembre, cuando el escenario político cambió por error del propio Castillo.

  Ese día, el presidente inesperadamente quebró el orden constitucional de Perú y cometió un suicidio político. Durante su mensaje a la nación ordenó instaurar un “Gobierno de excepción”, disolvió el Congreso y convocó a elecciones para un Congreso Constituyente encargado de elaborar una nueva constitución. Declaró un toque de queda por 48 horas y anunció la reorganización del Poder Judicial, entre otras medidas.

  Pero Castillo no contaba con que sus ministros renunciarían en bloque y las Fuerzas Armadas le darían la espalda y sacarían un comunicado indicando que no le debían obediencia a un gobierno usurpador. En respuesta a su mensaje a la nación, el pleno del Congreso hizo un llamado a todas las bancadas para celebrar una sesión extraordinaria en la que aprobó la moción de vacancia presidencial por incapacidad moral con 101 votos a favor -bastantes más de los 87 requeridos- y cuatro en contra, en ausencia de varios congresistas afines al gobierno.

  Castillo quedó detenido y una semana más tarde un juez dictó 18 meses de prisión preventiva mientras es investigado por rebelión, crimen organizado y corrupción, delitos por los cuales de ser condenado podría pasar varias décadas de prisión.

  ¿Cómo se resolvió la crisis institucional?

  En los últimos años hemos visto pasar a seis presidentes y sobrevivido a varias situaciones de inestabilidad profunda. Esta crisis política se resolvió en pocas horas, ya que el Congreso enseguida vacó al presidente y convocó a la vicepresidenta, Dina Boluarte, para asumir como la primera presidenta del Perú.

  No obstante, la ciudadanía esperaba que Boluarte renunciara, que el Congreso eligiera una nueva Mesa Directiva – el órgano encargado de la dirección administrativa del Congreso – y que el presidente del parlamento asumiera la presidencia para convocar a nuevas elecciones generales. Cuando Boluarte decidió continuar al frente se desató una ola de protestas en todo el país en reclamo de su dimisión. En la represión de las protestas fueron asesinadas 28 personas, entre ellas cuatro menores de edad. Esto llevó a la renuncia de dos ministros y a la renovación del primer gabinete del gobierno de Boluarte.

  A continuación el Congreso aprobó en primera votación que las elecciones generales se lleven a cabo en abril de 2024. Ahora toca llevar a cabo una segunda votación en la siguiente legislatura ordinaria. Esperamos que las reformas electorales y políticas continúen para garantizar que las personas correctas puedan llegar al Congreso y a la presidencia.

  ¿Qué posición ha adoptado la sociedad civil peruana, y qué clase de apoyos internacionales necesita?

  La sociedad civil peruana está llevando a cabo protestas pacíficas, pero la represión ha sido una constante durante las últimas semanas. La inestabilidad política y social ya ha costado decenas de vidas, por lo que esperamos mensajes firmes de condena de la comunidad internacional, la continuidad de las investigaciones de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, y que las redes internacionales de derechos humanos sean nuestra voz para que los crímenes cometidos contra adultos y adolescentes peruanos no queden impunes.

  Buscamos y exigimos justicia y reparación para los familiares de las víctimas. Asimismo, exigimos judicialización de todos los responsables –desde quien dio la orden y cometió las matanzas, hasta los involucrados en el sembrado de pruebas falsas contra líderes de organizaciones sociales y civiles para acusarlas falsamente de terrorismo.

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  El espacio cívico en Perú es calificado como “obstruido” por elCIVICUS Monitor.

  Póngase en contacto con elCentro de Liderazgo para Mujeres de las Américas y conSomos Lideresas a través de sus respectivas páginas de Facebook, y siga a@SLideresas y a@ramosnadia en Twitter.

• TURKEY: ‘It is just not possible to respond to such a large-scale disaster effectively without civil society’

  CIVICUS speaks with Gözde Kazaz, Communications Officer at Support to Life, about the way Turkish civil society has responded to the recent earthquakes and the support it needs to provide an effective emergency response.

  Support to Life is an independent humanitarian civil society organisation (CSO) that helps disaster-affected communities meet their basic needs and advance their rights by providing emergency assistance, refugee support, child protection and capacity building. Founded in 2005, it adheres to the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence and accountability in delivering aid.

  What damage have the recent earthquakes caused, and what has been the Turkish government’s response?

  The recent earthquakes affected 11 Turkish cities encompassing nearly 15 million people. This means the disaster affected roughly one in five people in Turkey. As of today, causalities have surpassed 44,000.

  In a disaster of such magnitude, public institutions had a problem in meeting needs and establishing coordination among the various state agencies involved. This was particularly the case in the first 72 hours, when search and rescue efforts are of the most vital importance. One of the reasons for this may be that infrastructure in the region was badly damaged and communication lines were cut off. The sites and staff of public institutions were themselves also affected.  We are currently seeing some improvements in coordination, but meeting the emerging needs in this vast disaster area is still very difficult. It is of great importance that the state, private sector and civil society work together on the basis of a healthy division of labour.

  How has civil society responded?

  Many CSOs that have useful expertise and work on disasters, Support to Life included, came together to form the Turkish Local NGO Humanitarian Forum (TIF) to coordinate delivery of aid and help meet the enormous needs we see in the field. Dividing responsibilities for various response areas according to each one’s expertise was an effective way to avoid duplication and deploy resources effectively.

  In addition, another coalition, the Disaster Platform, is active in the response. It is just not possible to respond to such a large-scale disaster effectively without civil society, and particularly without grassroots organisations active at the local level.

  Responding to disasters is one of the main things Support to Life does, so our emergency aid teams arrived in Hatay, one of the most affected provinces, right after the earthquakes hit on 6 February. We immediately deployed a humanitarian aid operation in the cities of Adana, Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa, and particularly in Hatay. Soon after, we expanded towards Adıyaman and Kahramanmaraş.

  We worked with partners to conduct needs assessments in affected areas, which we continue to carry out on an ongoing basis in order to monitor the response. Since the outset, the Greenpeace Mediterranean and Amnesty International call centre teams were particularly helpful in enabling the general due diligence and rapid needs assessment required in disaster-affected rural areas.

  We have focused much of our efforts on WASH – water, sanitation and hygiene – by working to establish water and sanitation infrastructure in temporary shelters. We have also prioritised shelter, food security and the provision of mental health and psychosocial support.

  What reception have you had from the government?

  As a CSO working in the field, we have not encountered any government-imposed restriction. We have permission from the Ministry of Family and Social Services to deliver mental health and psychosocial support services in the disaster area. We provide WASH services in tent areas established and maintained by the Ministry of the Interior’s Disaster and Emergency Management Authority. We participate in coordination meetings with local authorities. In other words, we have a collaborative relationship and we at least have not faced any obstacles when doing our work.

  What role is international solidarity and support playing in responding to the emergency?

  This disaster once again showed the importance of international solidarity and international support channelled through both government and civil society. Responding to a disaster of this magnitude is only possible if there is a great deal of international solidarity that translates into resources.

  Ten days after the earthquake, the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) launched a three-monthflash appeal for US$1 billion for Turkey, aimed at supporting the government-led response and enabling humanitarian agencies to help more than five million people affected by the disaster. As of 27 February, barely seven per cent of the US$1 billion of the flash appeal, roughly US$73 million, has materialised.

  TIF formed immediately after the UN appeal and has since played an important role in coordinating civil society humanitarian efforts and helping local CSOs access resources, including by engaging with the OCHA system. Support to Life regularly attends strategic meetings under the coordination of OCHA, representing TIF.

  But three weeks on from the earthquake, serious humanitarian needs remain in the most severely affected areas, especially emergency shelter, WASH, food and non-food items such as plastic sheeting, cooking sets, blankets, jerry cans, sleeping mats and sanitary items. 

  What further support do Turkish CSOs need to keep doing this work?

  What Turkish CSOs working to respond to the disaster need right now is as much financial support as they can get.

  Humanitarian CSOs working in the field, Support to Life included, have noted that this is not a one-off or short-term but a continuous, long-term situation. We need to think about recovery, which will require lots of resources. This means a lot more financial support will be needed.

  As an independent humanitarian CSO, Support to Life carries out its operations with funding that comes mostly from international donors such as UN agencies including UNICEF – the UN Children’s Fund – and UNHCR – the UN Refugee Agency – and theDirectorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, the Danish Refugee Council, Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe – a German faith-based humanitarian assistance agency – Save The Children and Terre des Hommes, among others. We are working with our donors to revise our ongoing projects so that we can redirect resources towards disaster response.

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   Civic space in Turkey is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Support to Life through itswebsite,Instagram orFacebook page, and follow@Support2Life on Twitter.