CIVICUS speaks about Cambodia’s communal elections of June 2022 with Lee Chung Lun, Campaign and Advocacy Programme Officer of the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL).

Established in 1997, ANFREL is a regional civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes democratic, free and fair elections by conducting election monitoring, capacity building and civic engagement in member countries.

How free and fair were the recent local elections in Cambodia, and what were their results?

The official results of the elections for the commune and sangkat – an administrative subdivision – council held on 5 June 2022 gave the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) 9,376 (80.7 per cent) of the 11,622 council seats and 1,648 (99.8 per cent) of the 1,652 positions of commune chief. The recently reactivated Candlelight Party gained 2,198 (18.9 per cent) of council seats and four commune chief positions. The remaining 48 council seats went to other small parties.

The CPP’s victory is no surprise given its tight control of politics and the pressures on the opposition, including the dissolution of the main opposition party, the Cambodia National Rescue Party. In such context, the CPP won over 3,000 more seats than it did in the 2017 elections, and its popular vote surged from 3.5 million to 5.3 million.

However, it was unexpected that the Candlelight Party only managed to secure four commune chief positions despite winning one-fifth of the popular vote. The disproportionate vote-to-seat translation warrants further investigation.

Overall, Cambodia still falls short of the benchmark for free, fair and inclusive elections, as assessed in ANFREL’s pre-election assessment mission. ANFREL’s member, the Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia (COMFREL), also noted various irregularities in the process.

The undemocratic elements of the existing legal framework continue to allow room for abuse. In recent years, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, crackdowns on the media, CSOs and the political opposition have increased. Numerous opposition candidates and members of opposition parties, most notably from the Candlelight Party, became the target of harassment and intimidation throughout the election period. As long as threats against the opposition and civil society continue to be prevalent, there can’t be a genuine and legitimate election.

What role did civil society play in the election process? 

In July 2021, a coalition of 64 Cambodian CSOs launched a list of recommendations that they named ‘minimum conditions for legitimate commune and sangkat council elections’. These included enabling a free political environment and active participation in political activities and allowing the main opposition to review and select members of the National Election Committee (NEC). They also called for greater political neutrality of military forces and independence of the courts, as well as freedom for the media and CSOs to function. Regrettably, no significant changes have been made since then.

CSOs such as COMFREL recruited, trained and deployed citizen observers to monitor the election process. The NEC’s accreditation standards, however, are questionable, given that 93 per cent of the 74,885 accredited election observers came from organisations closely linked to the CPP. More than half of them came from the Union of Youth Federations of Cambodia and Cambodian Women for Peace and Development, led by Cambodian prime minister’s son Hun Manet and deputy prime minister Men Sam An, respectively.

Cambodia is virtually a one-party state and now has a mostly closed civic space as a result of ongoing attacks on CSOs, independent media and the political opposition. Since 2017, the government has arrested, imprisoned, and harassed hundreds of activists, opposition figures and journalists. Some flee the country out of fear of retaliation.

The draconian provisions outlined in the Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organisations continue to be in effect. The law forbids unregistered organisations from carrying out any activity and grants sole authority over the registration process to the Ministry of the Interior, while registered organisations must adhere to a broadly defined ‘political neutrality’ requirement. CSOs are frequently required to go through informal approval processes with local authorities to carry out their work on the ground, even though the law does not require them to do so.

Do you think the results of the communal elections will be replicated in the upcoming national elections?

The results of the commune and sangkat council elections can be regarded as a predictor of the results of the next National Assembly elections, scheduled to take place in July 2023. They confirm once again that no free and fair election can take place in Cambodia’s current political environment. If attacks on the opposition and civil society continue, the CPP will retain its power in the next election.

What support does Cambodian civil society need from international organisations?

Cambodian civil society needs more attention from the international community on critical human rights violations and the dwindling state of democracy. International organisations should keep up their efforts to monitor developments in Cambodia closely and extend solidarity with Cambodian civil society, which frequently faces threats and harassment while carrying out their work. Local CSOs also need funding to continue their advocacy and campaigning on the ground.

Civic space in Cambodia is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with the Asian Network for Free Elections through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@Anfrel on Twitter. 

The Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA) and CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation strongly condemn Cambodia’s National Election Committee (NEC)’s decision to bar the Candlelight Party (CP) - the country’s main opposition party–from contesting in the upcoming general election in July 2023. 

Statement at the 49th Session of the UN Human Rights Council

Item 10: Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on Cambodia

Delivered by Lisa Majumdar

This is a critical moment for Cambodia ahead of local elections this year and national elections next year.

The resolution adopted last session has not resulted in any tangible human rights improvements on the ground. The Cambodian government continues to invoke laws to arbitrarily restrict human rights, undermine and weaken civil society, and criminalise individuals’ exercise of their right to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly.

Human rights defenders, activists and journalists are regularly subjected to harassment and legal action. Labour strikes by the Labour Rights Supported Union of Khmer Employees of NagaWorld (LRSU) have been disrupted and protesters met with state-sponsored violence, including sexual harassment, and arbitrary arrests. Cambodia’s highly politicised judicial system leaves defendants deemed a threat to the interests of the government with virtually no prospect of a fair trial.

The last round of elections, held in 2017 and 2018, were neither free nor fair. Since then, attacks on civil and political rights and the systematic dismantlement of any credible opposition have made Cambodia a de facto one-party State. Earlier this month, Cambodian courts convicted and sentenced 20 former members of the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party to prison sentences of 5-10 years following a mass trial on bogus charges of incitement and plotting. Many other opposition activists are standing trial on politically motivated charges. Peaceful gatherings organised by families of jailed opposition activists to demand their release have frequently been met with excessive force by the authorities.

If the elections take place in the current climate, they will further entrench a ruling party which has proven that it will use any legislative or extra-legal means at its disposal to remain in power.

There are steps Cambodia can take to improve its human rights situation ahead of elections, which include removing restrictions on civil society; improving space for political participation; and ensuring that independent media can operate freely and without fear of reprisal.

This Council must be prepared to take further action on Cambodia should these not be met.

We thank you.

 Civic space in Cambodia is rated as repressed as by the CIVICUS Monitor 

By Teldah Mawarire, Campaigns and Advocacy Officer and Ine van Severen, Civic Space Research Officer

For nations in crisis, free and fair elections usually can bring much-needed reprieve. Voting offers hope and chance to end strife and conflict. We’ve seen this in recent times in countries like The Gambia, The Maldives and Malaysia, where increasingly autocratic presidents were booted out of office at the ballot box by fed-up voters.

Read on: The Government and Business Journal

By Teldah Mawarire, Advocacy and Campaigns Coordinator 

I know many Zimbabweans in the diaspora. I am one of them. Many such exiled Zimbabweans have written public break-up letters with the country of their birth and “filed for divorce” because the relationship had become too “toxic”. With each passing election, nothing changes despite all the promises. Yet with every election, that tortured relationship is rekindled with hope. Perhaps this one will deliver the chance to return home.

Read on: City Press

By David Kode, Advocacy & Campaigns Lead at CIVICUS

In a familiar pattern than continues to be repeated, President Idriss Déby looks set to be elected for yet another term in Chad following this Sunday’s presidential elections. In power since 1990, this will be the 68-year-old incumbent’s sixth term.

President Déby’s victory at the ballot box may be all but assured, but that’s not to say he doesn’t face significant opposition. When he was nominated to be the ruling Patriotic Salvation Movement’s flagbearer this February, the announcement sparked widespread demonstrations. In the capital N’Djamena and other major cities, protesters took to the streets chanting “no to a sixth term!” and “Leave, Déby!”.

Read on African Arguments

CIVICUS speaks with Alberto Precht, executive director of Chile Transparente, about Chile’s presidential elections and their persistent pattern of low electoral turnout. Founded 23 years ago, Chile Transparente is a civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes transparency in public and private institutions and the fight against corruption.

What have been the peculiarities of this electoral process?

There have been three recent votes in Chile: first, the national plebiscite held in October 2020, in which citizens were asked whether they wanted a new constitution and, if so, which body should be in charge of drafting it; then the elections of representatives to the constitutional convention in May 2021; and now, with the constitutional convention in place, the presidential elections, with the first round held on 21 November and the second round scheduled for 19 December.

These electoral processes have been quite peculiar because each of them has produced quite different results as measured on the left-right ideological axis. On the one hand, a progressive constitutional convention was elected, including a significant hardcore left-wing component. On the other, both in the primary elections and in the first round of the presidential election, a hardcore right-wing candidate, José Antonio Kast, won first place, followed by Gabriel Boric, a progressive candidate running in coalition with the Communist Party.

The political environment is quite polarised, but what is most striking is that between 50 per cent and 60 per cent of Chileans do not show up to vote. This makes the election results very uncertain. Moreover, whoever wins will do so with 13 or 14 per cent of all eligible voters. It is not surprising that there are usually wide currents of anti-government opinion, since the government never represents a majority. 

Why do so few people vote?

It is paradoxical, because in the current context one would have expected a higher turnout. The 2021 election for the constitutional convention was the most important election since 1988, and turnout did not reach 50 per cent. The only vote that exceeded that threshold was the 2020 plebiscite, with a 51 per cent turnout, but that was different because it was a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote. This low turnout was striking, because although no one expected a 80 or 90 per cent turnout, as was the case in the historic 1988 plebiscite that said ‘no’ to the Pinochet dictatorship, turnout was expected to be closer to 60 per cent.

It is very likely that we will see even lower participation in the second round, even though there are two very clear and distinct options, which would hopefully motivate more people to vote.

In Chile there is a structural problem of low participation. In part, this has to do with the fact that voting is voluntary, but it also has to do with the fact that the political offer is not very attractive. Although the offer has changed a lot and the latest reform in the system used to elect parliamentarians has allowed for greater pluralism, this has not been enough to motivate people to vote. The latest elections have been a rollercoaster and therefore very hard to analyse; the only certainty we have is that at least 50 per cent of Chileans do not feel represented in the electoral system.

How could people be motivated to vote?

Some legal reforms are already being introduced to that effect. The national plebiscite that will take place in 2022, where people will say whether they agree with the new constitution, is going to be a mandatory vote. Additionally, the vote is going to be organised in a georeferenced way, so that people will be able to vote at a polling place within walking distance of their residence.

This is not a minor detail: in Chile, voting places are not assigned according to place of residence, so people, especially low-income people, must take a lot of public transport to get to the polls. Even though it doesn’t cost them money, because it’s free, they have to invest the whole day in going to vote, which many can’t do. These changes will increase participation rates, but it will be very difficult for Chile to reach 80 per cent participation in the short term.

The big questions that no one has been able to answer are who the people who don’t vote are and what they think. Between the constituent convention elections and the presidential election there seems to have been a turnover of voters. Younger voters showed up to vote in the constitutional convention elections, while older voters tended to participate more in the presidential election.

What role does Chile Transparente play in the electoral process?

Chile Transparente has a system of complaints and protection for victims and witnesses of corruption that has been receiving complaints of misuse of electoral funds. Today we are stuck with a very important controversy involving the candidate who came third in the first round of the presidential elections, Franco Parisi. He is a neo-populist candidate whose campaign has been funded in quite opaque ways.

We also work to motivate participation and have participated in observations of local electoral processes that had to be repeated. We receive the support of the European Union for a programme called Transparent Convention, which publicises the functioning of the constitutional convention, highlighting certain issues that might seem relatively opaque and that need to be brought to the public’s attention.

We are one of the few organisations in the country that are active in transparency and anti-corruption issues and we play a very important role alongside investigative journalists.

How are these elections influenced by the protest movement?

The election for the constitutional convention fed off the strength of the 2019 protests; in fact, at one point in the Constitutional Convention came to reflect the people who were protesting. But by the time of the presidential elections, held one year later, only the hangover from the protests remained, and the results were rather a reflection of the people who had suffered the effects and were against the protests.

We need to understand that the mobilisation process has not been purely romantic, but has been accompanied by a lot of violence. Between the pandemic and the protest violence, there are people who have not been able to reopen their businesses, who cannot go to work in peace, who have lost everything. At the same time, we obviously have a debt in terms of human rights violations.

These tensions were expressed at the polls, and we will surely have a heart-stopping second round, in which the competitors are a candidate who represents a hardcore right wing, quite different from the traditional right that has governed in recent years, and a candidate who has formed a coalition with the Communist Party, until now marginal in a political game that has rather gravitated towards the political centre.

What has happened to the established Chilean party system?

There is undoubtedly a weariness with the democracy of the last 30 years, regardless of all the progress the country has made. There are large sectors that believe the centrist consensus that characterised the transition to a so-called ‘democracy of agreements’, consisting of doing what was considered to be within the realm of the possible, does not provide solutions. This has led not only to a social outburst, but also to a conservative reaction. It is a textbook situation: every revolution is followed by a counter-revolution.

On top of this there is a problem of migration management, which has caused a huge electoral shift throughout the country, especially in the north. Chile used to vote for the left and now it voted for two candidates – one from the extreme right and a populist candidate – who proposed harsher measures against migration, such as the construction of border ditches or mass expulsion: nothing could be further from a culture of human rights. 

At the same time, the left has lacked any self-criticism. It has not understood how important it is to respond to people’s concerns about insecurity and to attend to the victims of violence. When there is an outbreak of violence, violence victims will vote for those who offer them order. As is well known, in Chile there has long been a major conflict with the Indigenous Mapuche people. There is also conflict with non-Mapuche sectors, often linked to organised crime, who have taken violent action. In those areas, where one would expect a vote for the left, the complete opposite has happened. In certain localities where violence has become endemic, the conservative candidate has received up to 60 or 70 per cent of votes. 

What would be the implications for civil society depending on which candidate wins in the second round?

A part of the more traditional press seeks to give the impression that if Boric wins, it will be the advent of communism, while another part claims that if Kast wins, he will take us back to the times of Pinochet. However, thanks to social media and new technologies, alternative media outlets have flourished in recent years. There are more pluralistic television channels and channels with quite diverse editorial lines, which have more nuanced views.

I believe that both alternatives entail risks, because both candidates include within their coalitions people or parties that seek to limit the space for civil society, that adhere to a narrative that the press is financed by international powers, that Chile Transparente serves certain mega-powers, and promote conspiracy theories. Let’s remember that the Communist Party candidate who lost the primary elections against Boric proposed an intervention in the media. For his part, Kast has the support of hardcore Pinochetist elements.

However, in the second round, the two candidates have moved towards the centre to capture the votes they need to win. The groups that followed former President Michelle Bachelet, who initially opposed Boric, are now working with him. On the other side of the spectrum, in order to attract segments of the liberal right, Kast also has had to moderate his discourse.

Perhaps hope lies in parliament acting as a regulator of the two extremes. It is a diverse parliament where no party will have a majority, so whoever gets to govern will have to do so in negotiation with parliament. At the same time, the constituent process, which is still underway, can produce a constitution of unity that would set the conditions for the new president to govern.

The problem is that for the first time the extremes are inside parliament and there are some voices that are unacceptable from a democratic point of view. For example, two deputies elected by the extreme right recently mocked an elected candidate who is transgender. Some not very encouraging positions on human rights have also been expressed by the left. For example, the Chilean Communist Party has just recognised Daniel Ortega as the legitimate president of Nicaragua and continues to recognise Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela.

Civic space in Chile is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Chile Transparente through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram profiles, and follow@Ch_Transparente and@albertoprechtr on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Marcela Guillibrand De la Jara, Executive Director of the Chilean Volunteer Network (Red de Voluntarios de Chile) and General Coordinator of Now It’s Our Time to Participate (Ahora Nos Toca Participar). The Volunteer Network is a national platform that brings together Chilean civil society organisations (CSOs) that promote voluntary action. Now It's Our Time to Participate is an initiative of social organisations gathered in the New Social Pact (NPS-Chile) that seeks to contribute to strengthening democracy and social cohesion by promoting citizen participation in the plebiscite on a new constitution scheduled for October 2020 and in the constituent process that the plebiscite is expected to trigger. The campaign focuses on citizen training, the creation of spaces for dialogue and the generation of proposals to feed into the constituent process.

In late 2019, a referendum was called in order to trigger a constituent process. To what extent was this the victory of a mobilised society?

In October 2019, Chile reactivated its political and social life, collectively and throughout its territory. Citizens took to the streets to meet, to speak and take part in politics, as they had not done for a long time. This is how specific and unconventional participatory experiences emerged, locally rooted and with a local identity, mixed with expressions of discontent and frustration towards the structural inequality that had developed and manifested in our country for a long time.

All this was initially motivated by young people’s dissatisfaction with an increase of 30 pesos (approx. US$0.33) on the price of the ticket used in the Chilean capital’s transportation system, the Metro. In reaction to the increase, demonstrations took place, initially in the form of fare evasion but eventually embracing slogans such as ‘It's not 30 pesos, it's 30 years’, a reference to the time that we have been living in a democracy – since our democratic transition took place in 1990 – and the feeling, shared by a large part of the population, that we have not been included in the decision-making process. This was fuelled by high levels of mistrust in institutions, great political disaffection and the reaction against a model that pushed our country towards more individualistic views and forms of participation in all areas.

Faced with a level of mobilisation that did not relent, on 15 November 2019 political parties across the spectrum signed the ‘Agreement for Social Peace and a New Constitution’. As a result, citizens were given the opportunity to decide if they want a new constitution through a plebiscite that will be held on 25 October 2020. In the plebiscite, citizens must also select the mechanism that would be used to draft a new constitution: a constitutional convention, a body fully elected for the purpose of drafting the constitution; or a mixed constitutional convention, which would include both current Congress members, who would make up 50 per cent of the body, and representatives elected exclusively for this task, who would make up the other 50 per cent. A large part of society views this process as opening up a unique opportunity for us to choose freely the Chile we want. Although technically what gave rise to this opportunity was an agreement between various political groupings, this historic constituent moment was achieved by citizens.

Within this process, civil society has also made historic progress on gender issues. Various social organisations that have long worked very hard to promote and defend women’s rights pushed the demand for gender parity in the constituent process, and managed to impose it thanks to the echo they found among various political groups represented in Congress. If the option in favour of drafting a new constitution wins in the plebiscite, the gender parity rule will apply in the election of constitutional delegates. The rule, however, will only be fully operational if the constitutional convention alternative prevails, since in that case all members of the constituent body would be elected in a single election. If the mixed constitutional convention alternative is chosen, the parity rule would apply to the half of the body that will be elected, but not to the half that will be made up of legislators who already occupy congressional seats.

What stance has Chilean civil society taken regarding the prospect of a constitutional reform process?

As the plebiscite date approaches, interest on the subject has increased. We have had localised quarantines for more than five months due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the organisations with which we interact have had their attention focused mainly on the survival of their programmes and supporting their target populations, since economically the pandemic has hit them very hard. Even so, little by little they have shown growing interest in constitutional issues. For our part, we have stayed connected with them and we have worked together to offer them a platform that contains citizenship training materials that they can use and to coordinate various spaces to conduct training through digital platforms and other mechanisms suited to reach a variety of territories, such as radio and text messaging.

It is in this context that we launched Now It’s Our Time to Participate, an initiative of the New Social Pact (Nuevo Pacto Social) network, which brings together just over 700 CSOs. The initiative seeks to guarantee the training of citizens and citizen participation in the context of the constituent process that will likely take place. Our focus is on activating citizens, providing them with training tools and jointly generating spaces for participation and dialogue to regain prominence in decision-making in our country. For this, in the run-up to the plebiscite, we have organised a range of key content in several sections – citizen participation, constitution and constituent process – that we have made available to citizens and CSOs through our web platform, www.ahoranostocaparticipar.cl, as well as on social media and through other means. On the basis of this content we have developed a range of training options that include accessible materials in various languages, such as Aymara, Mapudungun and Rapa Nui, as well as in Creole. The idea is that all the people who wish to can find answers in these materials about the constitution and the likely constituent process, in order to be able to take part in the plebiscite in a free and informed manner and thus contribute to achieving the most massive vote in Chilean history.

The plebiscite had originally been planned for April before being postponed to October due to the pandemic. Have there been any conflicts or disagreements regarding the postponement and the new date?

The health scenario created by the pandemic forced the relevant institutions to move the date of the plebiscite to October. The section of civil society with which we interact understood that this change was necessary based on a higher common good, people’s health. At the moment we take for granted that the plebiscite will take place in October, since the institutions that could make the decision to change the date have not yet done so, so we continue to work based on that date. Currently, issues related to the implementation of the plebiscite are being discussed. They focus firstly on health safeguards, but also on how to promote citizen participation in this process, which will undoubtedly have very different characteristics from what we are used to. Intersectoral working groups have been set up to work on the issue. First, the Senate set up a forum to receive recommendations and analyse the comparative experiences of other countries that have been in the same situation. Then the Electoral Service kept the forum to continue working along the lines of guaranteeing a safe and participatory plebiscite. Various CSOs have been invited to participate, including Now It's Our Time to Participate. Jointly with these organisations, we have produced a document with recommendations that range from health issues to campaign regulations, and also includes issues such as access to information and citizen capacity development, which is what we work on. This space continues in operation.

Are measures being taken so that people’s participation in the campaign and vote is not undermined by the effects of the pandemic?

The current pandemic scenario is naturally forcing us to adopt safeguards. The electoral advertising phase kicked off on 26 August, so now it is possible to disseminate campaign materials in public places that are expressly authorised by the Electoral Service, as well as on the media. Debate is taking place with great force on social media, which given the need to take precautions, avoid crowds and physical contact and respect sanitary restrictions decreed by the authorities, is currently the main space to gain visibility.

What to do to guarantee everyone’s right to participate on the day of the plebiscite is something that has been under discussion. As a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic, some places in our country remain under confinement, multiple sectors are quarantined due to the presence of active cases, and there are municipalities that had initiated a deconfinement plan but then had to back off due to new outbreaks of the virus.

How do we guarantee the right to participation of those people who are infected with COVID-19? What alternatives do we have? These are the kind of questions that are being debated by both the public and the relevant authorities who are in a position to respond to these demands.

Along these lines, alongside various CSOs we are promoting a series of recommendations that address not only the sanitary aspect – so that COVID-19 patients can vote – but also issues such as ensuring access to timely information and citizen capacity development to all those people who have historically been excluded from participation for multiple reasons, including due to not having adequate information channels to receive content, or content not being available in a variety of languages. In this sense, it is important that every effort be made to guarantee the right to participation, not only to those who at this particular time might not be in a position to exercise it for health reasons, but also to those who have historically found themselves in a more vulnerable situation, such as older adults, Indigenous peoples, rural populations, women, LGBTQI+ people and migrants.

Civic space in Chile is rated as ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Now It’s Our Time to Participate through itswebsite,Instagram or itsFacebook page, and follow@ahrnostoca and@marbrandd on Twitter.

By Inés Pousadela, Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

On 7 May, Chileans went to the polls to choose a Constitutional Council that will produce a new constitution to replace the one bequeathed by the Pinochet dictatorship – and handed control to a far-right party that never wanted a constitution-making process in the first place.

This is the second attempt at constitutional change in two years. The first process was the most open and inclusive in Chile’s history. The resulting constitutional text, ambitious and progressive, was widely rejected in a referendum. It’s now far from certain that this latest, far less inclusive process will result in a new constitution that is accepted and adopted – and there’s a possibility that any new constitution could be worse than the one it replaces.

Read on Inter Press Service News

CIVICUS s’entretient avec Marcela Guillibrand De la Jara, directrice exécutive du Réseau chilien de volontaires et coordinatrice générale de Ahora Nos Toca Participar. Le Réseau de volontaires est une plateforme nationale qui rassemble des organisations de la société civile (OSC) chilienne promouvant le volontariat. Ahora Nos Toca Participar est une initiative d’organisations sociales regroupées dans le Nouveau Pacte Social (NPS-Chili) qui cherche à contribuer au renforcement de la démocratie et de la cohésion sociale en promouvant la participation des citoyens au référendum sur la réforme constitutionnelle prévu pour octobre 2020 et au processus constituant qui devrait commencer avec lui. La campagne se concentre sur l’éducation des citoyens, la création d’espaces de dialogue et la génération de propositions pour alimenter le processus constituant.

By David Kode

It is a big year for democracy on the African continent. Millions will head to the polls in at least eight presidential elections. In many of these countries there are big aspirations for political change, while in others there are concerns about whether the elections will be fair and transparent. 

Read on: East African Standard

As Kenyans go to the polls tomorrow to vote in general elections, global civil society alliance, CIVICUS calls on the authorities, leaders of political parties and communities to adhere to democratic principles and respect the will of all Kenyans.

Kenya has a history of violence during election seasons and fear of a recurrence has dominated the period of political campaigns. Kenyan authorities and leaders of political parties have a responsibility to ensure a peaceful and transparent election, which will enhance Kenya’s democratic credentials.

Human rights violations committed over the last few months have raised security concerns and increased calls for all involved in the vote to avoid a repeat of the violence that followed the 2007-2008 elections in which over 1,000 people were killed and more than 500,000 internally displaced.  

Last week, Chris Msando, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission’s (IEBC) head of Information, Communication and Technology, was found dead after being missing for three days.  Msando had played a key role in the development of a new electronic ballot and voter registration system and complained of death threats shortly before he was killed. 

Since Msando oversaw the new electronic system regarded as key to eliminating vote rigging and ensuring the credibility of the elections, his killing raises serious concerns over threats of violence related to electoral malpractices. Prior to the adoption of the new system, Kenya’s High Court nullified a contract awarded to Dubai-based Al-Ghurair Printing and Publishing, a company with alleged links to President Uhuru Kenyatta.  Following the court’s 9 July ruling, President Kenyatta and his Jubilee Coalition questioned the independence of the judiciary and accused it of supporting the political opposition.  

The election campaign period has also been dominated by an exchange of accusations between President Uhuru Kenyatta and main opposition leader, Raila Odinga.  The President accused Odinga of trying to divide Kenya and provoke violence and Odinga, in turn, accused the President of planning to rig the vote. While the 2013 elections were largely peaceful, violence erupted following the 2007 elections after political figures encouraged supporters to protest election results.  

“Kenya’s politics is largely based on ethnic affiliations and the views of political figures are taken seriously.  It will be very important for leaders to avoid using language that may incite the population and instigate violence during and after tomorrow’s elections.   Said David Kode, CIVICUS’ Head of Advocacy and Campaigns.

There has been violence among rival parties’ supporters during the nominations of candidates for positions of president, legislators and local councillors.  Human rights defenders and journalists have also been attacked, intimidated and vilified as they sought to access voter registration stations and polling booths and report on political campaigns. On 18 June 2017, Walter Menya of the Nation newspaper was arrested and held at an undisclosed location for two days before being released without charge. Some communities have heightened tensions by accusing activists and journalists of anti-nationalist agendas for making representations at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 polls. 

CIVICUS calls on the Kenyan authorities, politicians and leaders to act in a responsible manner and respect the will of the electorate during and after the elections. 

Kenya’s civic space is rated as ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor, an online platform that tracks threats to civil society across the globe. It is currently on the Monitor’s Watch List of countries where there are serious and ongoing threats to civic space.

Watch our interview with activist and poet Sitawa Namwalie talking about about her hopes and fears for 2017 Kenyan Elections. 

ENDS

For more information, please contact:

Grant Clark

Senior Media Advisor

CIVICUS

Email:

T: +27 63 567 9719

David Kode

Head of Advocacy and Campaigns

CIVICUS

Email:

As the 23 May elections in Ethiopia near, the administration has virtually left no stone unturned to silence the local media and civil society groups. To curtail the ability of civil society to effectively monitor the present elections, the Ethiopian authorities have over the past two years introduced a raft of restrictive measures, many of which are being replicated by the Ugandan authorities.

Authorities in Bahrain are waging a relentless campaign against activists whose views are not in line with the official position. Currently, 24 prominent human rights defenders are facing trial under Bahrain's anti-terrorism laws. They have been charged with collaborating with foreign organisations and circulating false information. They have also been accused of forming terrorist networks, destruction of public and private property and defaming the authorities.

The arrested activists have complained about torture and abuse meted out to them by the National Security Agency. They have so far appeared in court on four occasions and the next hearing has been scheduled for 23 December. During their first appearance in court on 27 October, detainees informed the court that while in detention they were beaten, electrocuted, verbally and physically assaulted and denied adequate sleep. Those detained were not allowed access to legal representation during interrogation and some family members did not know where they were being detained for two weeks after their arrest. It has also been reported that prior to, during and after the elections about 350 other activists have been arrested.

"In a worrying trend, it has become commonplace in Bahrain to arrest activists for writing articles and delivering speeches which are critical of the government's discriminatory policies and official corruption,"  said Netsanet Belay, CIVICUS' Director of Policy and Research. "Persecution and torture of public-spirited individuals offering legitimate criticism against official policies and the clampdown on their organisations amounts to a repudiation of Bahrain's accession to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention Against Torture."

The Bahrain Human Rights Society (BHRS), a CIVICUS partner for the Civil Society Index and one of the few remaining independent groups striving for the protection of civil and political freedoms in the country, has been targeted in the recent crackdown. On 6 September, the Ministry of Social Development issued an order to dissolve the Board of the BHRS and went ahead to appoint an administrator 'an employee from the Ministry' to lead the BHRS. The BHRS has had to go to court in response to these arbitrary actions and its fate currently depends on the court's response. The first hearing of the case scheduled for 26 October has been postponed to 4 January 2011.

According to Abdullah Aldorazi of BHRS, "The unfair order issued by the Ministry of Social Development to dissolve the Board of the BHRS is a security strategy aimed at preventing the documentation of atrocities carried out by the authorities during the crackdown and preventing families of the detainees from using the society as a safe haven."

CIVICUS urges the authorities of the Kingdom of Bahrain to live up to their commitments under international law and guarantee civil society the space to freely express, associate and assemble.

CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation is a global movement of civil society with members and partners in over a hundred countries. The Civil Society Watch (CSW) Project of CIVICUS tracks threats to civil society freedoms of expression, association and assembly across the world.

For more information please contact CIVICUS:

or

David Kode ( , +27 73 775 8649), Policy Officer
Office Tel: +27 11 833 5959

CIVICUS House, 24 Gwigwi Mrwebi Street, Newtown 2001, Johannesburg, South Africa
PO Box 933, Southdale 2135, Johannesburg, South Africa
tel: +27-11-833-5959 | fax: +27-11-833-7997 | email:
web: www.civicus.org

In the lead up to the 14^th general elections in Malaysia on 9 May, CIVICUS interviewed the Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections (Bersih 2.0 which means "clean" in Malay). The coalition - made up of like-minded civil society organisations - was officially launched in 2006 with the objective of campaigning for clean and fair elections in Malaysia.

Among its eights demands include: cleaning the electoral roll; reforming postal balloting; the use of indelible ink; a minimum 21 days campaign period; free and fair access to media for all political parties; strengthening public institutions to act independently and impartially in upholding the rule of law and democracy and halting corruption and dirty politics.

Since 2007, it has organized five massive street protests to the have drawn tens of thousands of people to protest on the streets of Kuala Lumpur and other parts of the country calling for electoral and national reform. Smallers protests have also been held in different countries across the world. Ahead of these mass rallies Bersih 2.0 organisers have been arrested or harassed by the authorities and authorities have seized their computers, mobile phones and documents.

Over the last month, Bersih 2.0 raised concerns about the redelineation of constituencies which was done in haste in favour of the ruling government, highlighted problems with the overseas postal voting system, publicized vote buying by candidates and the manipulation and abuse of power by the Election Commission (EC) on Nomination Day

More information on Bersih 2.0 can be found at https://www.bersih.org

Johannesburg. 18 May 2010. CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation warns that the operating environment for civil society in Kenya remains fraught with danger. As the spotlight is focused on impunity in Kenya by the international community including the International Criminal Court (ICC) and special representatives of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), civil society activists are facing grave risks.

Groups advocating for ending impunity for perpetrators of human rights violations and those that have documented the violations are particularly threatened. On 4 May 2010, a meeting organised by Bunge la Mwannanchi on the post election violence in Kenya was dispersed and four of its activists were detained and later released without charges. In April this year, Kenneth Kirimi, a member of the civil society group, Release Political Prisoners, was arbitrarily detained and severely tortured by security operatives requiring him to need medical treatment. He was questioned with regard to his work on collecting information about extra-judicial killings and sharing of information with the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston.

Restrictions on civic space rising despite prevalence of democracy

Click hereto read a Spanish language version of this release

Civil society in Latin America and the Caribbean is coming under increasing pressure despite the prevalence of electoral democracy in the region, says a new reportreleased today by CIVICUS, the global civil society alliance.

While the core civil society freedoms of association, assembly and expression are constitutionally recognised in most countries, legal, administrative and de facto barriers to the exercise of these freedoms have risen throughout the continent. These restrictions are appearing after an upsurge of citizens’ protests over entrenched issues of inequality, corruption and abuses of political power.

CIVICUS speaks about the recent presidential election in Colombia with Gina Romero, executive director of the Latin American and Caribbean Network for Democracy (RedLad).

Founded in 2008, RedLad promotes the full exercise of democracy as a way of life for the common good in the Americas. It undertakes advocacy in the inter-American human rights system; research through the Citizen Observatory on Corruption, Observatory on Freedom of Religion and Belief, reporting on 11 countries for the CIVICUS Monitor; work to open democratic dialogue within civil society and among civil society and international bodies, governments, the private sector and others; action to strengthen the capacities of Latin American civil society through leadership training; and advocacy in defence of the rights of vulnerable populations.

How would you assess the choice available between the two candidates in the second round of Colombia’s presidential election?

It was very revealing that both candidates called themselves ‘anti-system’, positioned themselves against traditional politics and ran outside traditional political parties. Colombian citizens are tired of the long hegemony of traditional parties and of political elites who are also economic elites.

The defeated candidate, Rodolfo Hernández, represents a right-wing political sector, although his campaign sought to emphasise his closeness to the people by championing the fight against corruption, despite the fact that he is under investigation for corruption. The winning candidate, Gustavo Petro, represents a left-wing position. The fact that a leftist option was elected for the first time in history says a lot about citizens’ social demands, the same ones that have been expressed publicly on the streets since 2019.

I believe that the second round was not a polarised confrontation between an extreme right and an extreme left, but rather a confrontation between innovative – one could say populist – proposals outside traditional politics, and particularly against the legacy of former president Álvaro Uribe, which is also embodied by the outgoing incumbent, Iván Duque.

A citizenry fed up with politics and social inequality, which has intensified as a result of the pandemic, made for a ticking bomb that manifested itself in the elections. It is great that this found expression through democratic channels, rather than through political violence, as used to be the case in the past.

How do you interpret the fact that Hernández made it into the second round?

Hernández’s presence in the runoff was quite surprising, since the candidates that were thought to have a chance were Federico Gutiérrez and Gustavo Petro. His discourse was one of closeness to citizens. He campaigned hard on social media, especially TikTok, and focused on the problems people systematically prioritise in the polls, such as corruption.

Hernández was seen as a simple person, who speaks very simply to ordinary citizens, while other candidates’ discourse sounded too lofty. He convinced many people with the argument that, as a millionaire, he would not steal like the others, and would even refuse the president’s salary. He also mobilised many people who do not understand what it means for Colombia to be going through a peace process, who voted ‘no’ in the 2016 referendum on the peace deal, and who had previously elected right-wing presidents such as Duque and Uribe.

Added to Hernández’s attractiveness were the big mistakes of centre parties and the fear elicited by Petro, both for being from the left and for being accompanied by a Black vice-presidential candidate, Francia Márquez, who had been a domestic worker and graduated from college at the age of 39. All this contributed to Hernández’s success in the first round, despite the fact that he is completely unfamiliar with politics and is neither fit to govern nor to do a good job as an opposition leader.

What was the campaign for the runoffs like?

It was a campaign of strong emotions, more than any other in the past. Political emotions are what ultimately determine the course of an election.

Fear played a big role. Many people in Colombia are afraid of any left-wing project. Moreover, Colombia is a racist, classist and misogynist country, so a candidate like Márquez also caused fear. I met few people who would vote for Hernández because they liked him rather than because they were afraid of Petro. These people described Hernández as ‘the cute old man who fights corruption and has a lot of money’. This is how right-wing populism gets close to the people.

The anti-Petro campaign circulated disinformation with the sole objective of generating fear, much as had happened in the campaign for the peace referendum. Among these unfounded fears was that Colombia would become a new Venezuela, as Petro would want to stay in power forever, as Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez once did. People repeated this uncritically without realising that, in Colombia, the one who wanted to do this was Uribe, through a constitutional change in 2004 that allowed him to renew his mandate and stay in office for eight years, after which he tried to do it again.

Another idea associated with Venezuela’s fate was that of impoverishment, currency devaluation and hyperinflation. There was also much talk of the possible business reaction sector to a left-wing government and the supposed large outflow of companies from the Colombian market that would follow. It is true that the dollar rose the week after the election – as it did in Chile when Gabriel Boric won – but the dollar has been rising in recent years and the initial increase has not been catastrophic.

Fear was also instilled among the public with the irresponsible use of the term ‘guerrilla’ in reference to Petro, who had in the past been a militant in the M19, a now-deactivated guerrilla group. Petro has had a long civilian political career since, and for decades has had nothing to do with any group outside the law. But the stigma remains, which shows how far Colombia still has to go in its reconciliation process.

Disinformation and digital violence also targeted the two female candidates who ran in this election, Ingrid Betancourt – who stood in the first round of the presidential election – and Márquez. Much research on digital violence argues that when women are in politics, personal information about them is used and facts are misrepresented. But in the case of Márquez, there was real racialised hate speech. Horrible things were said about her, both because of her personal history and her past as a very poor woman, and because she is a Black woman. The worst racist and misogynist jokes were told.

Colombia needs a profound reflection on how we construct the identity of the other and how we recognise ourselves as a multicultural country. Cali is the city with the second largest Afro-descendant population on the continent, and the entire Colombian Pacific is full of Afro and Indigenous people. But there is a systemic racism that was very apparent in the campaign.

For the most part, mainstream media have done much wrong by echoing hate speech. A week before the second round, for example, Semana magazine ran a sensationalist cover story wondering who would get elected, the engineer or the former guerrilla fighter. The ex-guerrilla fighter is also an economist, but this was not about the candidates’ professions, but rather about giving a frightening message. In the last months of the campaign, Petro was forced to deny many things, while Hernández hid and refused to participate in any debate.

Thus, we were sold the idea that we were ‘between a rock and a hard place’ and had to choose the ‘least worst’ candidate. A public narrative was mounted that since the political elite was not represented in this election, all that was on offer was simply bad.

What kind of voter backed the candidates?

There was a fairly close overlap between the Colombia that voted ‘no’ in the referendum on the peace accords, the Colombia that in the past elected Duque and the Colombia that now voted for Hernández. It is made up of culturally conservative citizens who fear change, have identified with traditional political elites and have not been drawn to the peace process or felt the appeal of political progressivism. Hernández’s voters in the cities and other parts of the country fear processes of inclusion of vulnerable populations and hardly include Indigenous or Afro-descendant parts of the population. In places with the largest Indigenous populations Petro won with unprecedented numbers.

The Colombia that voted ‘yes’ in the referendum coincides with the Colombia that voted for Petro. This is the Colombia of the margins, which brings together the least developed regions of the country. Big cities, with the exception of Medellín, also voted for Petro. This is an urban bloc, which Márquez defines as a citizenry made up of ‘nobodies’. The people who voted for Petro are largely a frustrated citizenry that has been affected by corruption like no other, who are not part of the political elite and who have been historically relegated by development processes. These are people who have little, who see in Petro a promise of improvement. Previous candidates have offered no real solutions to their problems – not even a chance of feeling involved.

The country is divided, but this is not a new division. Past governments have failed to reconcile these differences. We have two Colombias, with immense polarisation: in the elections with the highest participation in the past 20 years, Petro won by just 800,000 votes. That means there are 10 million people who oppose Petro and 11 million who support him. Petro will have to learn how to speak to these two facets of Colombia and ensure that the Colombia that did not vote for him does not feel left behind.

What are civil society’s expectations or fears following the result?

Whoever wins, our work as civil society will always remain the same. But personally, seeing what happened when Petro was mayor of Bogotá, I fear that revanchism could hinder the government’s progress. Polarisation, hate speech and the manipulation of institutions can have very serious effects. The potential reaction of the markets to a left-wing government is also a source of fear.

There is also the fact that Petro is a very passionate person, and often does not communicate in the best possible way; both his and Hernández’s campaigns attacked the press when media criticised them. The press has a fundamental role, and this can be very annoying for any government, but it is essential that it has sufficient guarantees to do its job. There are fears that Petro could be very hostile to the press that is critical of his government.

Organisations that, like RedLad, engage in international advocacy, are concerned about how Petro will position himself in relation to other Latin American leftists. Currently Latin America has a left that is the source of a lot of hope, that proposes change and is different from the traditional left; this is the left represented by Boric in Chile. But there is also the left of Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico, not to mention the lefts of Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, which have caused serious civic space crises. I think Petro is somewhere in the middle and faces the dilemma of who to side with. I think he should go along a more proactive and development-friendly left.

Although Petro’s party, Pacto Histórico, achieved good legislative representation in the March 2022 parliamentary election, the transformations he has put on the table are quite broad and deep, and their success they will require a wide political agreement, something that is complex to achieve in Colombia. If this is not achieved, the people who voted for Petro and believed his promises will be frustrated. It will be interesting to see how this government, elected under the banner of the 2019 mobilisations, will respond to people if they happen to mobilise again.

For the great expectations it has created not to wane, Petro’s government will need to score some early victories, showing progress in advancing the peace process and decreasing the number of assassinations of social leaders. I hope that Petro makes progress on international commitments, that civic space is not further reduced but expanded, and that the freedoms of assembly and expression are guaranteed.

Civic space in Colombia is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with RedLad through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@REDLADoficial on Twitter.

CIVICUS s'entretient avec Ethan Hee-Seok Shin, analyste juridique pour le Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG), une organisation de la société civile (OSC) basée à Séoul et fondée par des défenseurs des droits humains et des chercheurs de cinq pays. Créée en 2014, elle est la première OSC basée en Corée qui se concentre sur les mécanismes de justice transitionnelle dans les régimes les plus répressifs du monde, y compris la Corée du Nord. Le TJWG poursuit l'objectif de développer des méthodes pratiques pour lutter contre les violations massives des droits humains et promouvoir la justice pour les victimes avant et après la transition. Ethan travaille au Central Repository Project du TJWG, qui utilise une plate-forme sécurisée pour documenter et faire connaître les cas de disparitions forcées en Corée du Nord. Il utilise des actions législatives et juridiques pour sensibiliser à la situation des droits humains en Corée du Nord.

Pouvez-vous nous parler du travail que font les groupes de la société civile sud-coréenne sur les droits humains en Corée du Nord ?

Il existe un éventail assez large d'OSC travaillant sur les questions des droits humains en Corée du Nord. TJWG a travaillé pour ouvrir la voie à la justice transitionnelle en Corée du Nord, remplissant sa mission principale, la documentation des droits humains.

Le projet phare du TJWG a abouti à la publication d'une série de rapports sur les exécutions publiques en Corée du Nord, sur la base d'entretiens avec des personnes en fuite vivant maintenant en Corée du Sud. Nous enregistrons les informations géo-spatiales des sites de tuerie, des lieux de sépulture et des lieux de stockage des enregistrements, tels que les tribunaux et les établissements chargés de l'application de la loi, en demandant à nos personnes interrogées d'identifier les emplacements sur Google Earth. La première édition du rapport a été publiée en juillet 2017 et reposait sur 375 entretiens, et la deuxième édition a été lancée en juin 2019, à la suite de 610 entretiens.

Nous sommes également en train de constituer une base de données en ligne, FOOTPRINTS, qui enregistre les enlèvements et les disparitions forcées commis en Corée du Nord et par la Corée du Nord. La plateforme utilise Uwazi, une technologie gratuite et open source qui permet d'organiser, d'analyser et de publier des documents, développée par l'OSC HURIDOCS. Une fois rendu public, FOOTPRINTS offrira une plate-forme facilement accessible et de recherche simple pour retrouver les personnes capturées et disparues en Corée du Nord.

Outre le travail de documentation et d'établissement de rapports, nous avons été activement impliqués dans des initiatives de plaidoyer nationales et internationales. En collaboration avec d'autres OSC des droits humains, le TJWG a rédigé et présenté une lettre ouverte exhortant l'Union européenne à renforcer le libellé et les recommandations des résolutions annuelles sur les droits humains adoptées par l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies (ONU) et le Conseil des droits de l’Homme sur la Corée du Nord. Nous avons également présenté des cas au Groupe de travail des Nations Unies sur la détention arbitraire, au Groupe de travail des Nations Unies sur les disparitions forcées ou involontaires et à d'autres experts des droits humains des Nations Unies.

En juillet 2020, le gouvernement sud-coréen a révoqué l'enregistrement de deux OSC et a publié un avis d'examen administratif et d'inspection aux groupes « dirigés par des fugitifs » axés sur les droits humains en Corée du Nord. Pourquoi ces groupes sont-ils ciblés ?

Le catalyseur direct a été les provocations nord-coréennes de juin 2020. Le 4 juin, Kim Yo-Jong, sœur du guide suprême Kim Jong-Un et premier directeur adjoint du département du Comité central du Parti des travailleurs de Corée, a critiqué les « brochures anti-RPDC » [République populaire démocratique de Corée] distribuées en Corée du Nord par des « fugitifs de Corée du Nord » et a menacé d’arrêter le tourisme sur le mont Kumgang, de démolir complètement la région industrielle de Kaesong, de fermer le bureau de liaison intercoréen, et de résilier l'accord militaire de 2018 qui créait des zones tampons démilitarisées, tout ce à moins que les autorités sud-coréennes ne prennent « des mesures appropriées ».

Quatre heures seulement après le bombardement matinal de Kim Yo-Jong, le Ministère sud-coréen de l'Unification (MOU) a annoncé qu'il préparerait un projet de loi interdisant la distribution de tracts en Corée du Nord. C'était un changement radical dans la position de longue date du gouvernement, qui avait constamment contourné une telle législation par crainte de violer la liberté d'expression.

Le 10 juin 2020, le MOU a annoncé qu'il déposerait des accusations criminelles contre Park Sang-Hak et Park Jung-Oh, deux fugitifs nord-coréens, pour violation de l'article 13 de la loi sur l'échange et la coopération intercoréennes, qui doit être approuvée avant tout échange intercoréen de marchandises, et qu'il révoquerait la reconnaissance juridique de leurs organisations, Fighters For Free North Korea (FFNK) et KuenSaem, pour l'envoi de brochures en Corée du Nord par l'utilisation de montgolfières et des bouteilles en PET pleines de riz jetées dans les courants océaniques, tel qu’ils l’ont fait le 31 mai 2020.

Alors que le gouvernement nord-coréen a finalement atténué sa rhétorique, le gouvernement sud-coréen a commencé à sévir contre les organisations de défense des droits humains et les groupes de déserteurs nord-coréens, considérés comme un obstacle à la paix intercoréenne.

Le 29 juin 2020, le MOU a tenu une audience et le 17 juillet il s'est appuyé sur l'article 38 du Code civil, vestige de l'époque autoritaire, pour annoncer la révocation de la reconnaissance légale de la FFNK et de KuenSaem pour avoir enfreint les conditions d’obtenir un statut juridique en entravant gravement la politique de réunification du gouvernement, en distribuant des brochures et des articles en Corée du Nord au-delà des objectifs déclarés de sa charte et en fomentant des tensions dans la péninsule coréenne.

Le protocole d'entente a également lancé des « inspections commerciales » d'autres groupes nord-coréens de défense des droits humains et de transfert et de réinstallation, parmi les plus de 400 associations reconnues avec l'autorisation du protocole d'accord, peut-être en vue de révoquer leur reconnaissance légale. Le 15 juillet 2020, la North Korean Defectors Association a reçu un avis du MOU lui indiquant qu'elle serait inspectée pour la première fois depuis sa reconnaissance en 2010. Le lendemain, les autorités du MOU ont informé les journalistes qu'elles procéderaient d'abord à des inspections commerciales sur 25 groupes nord-coréens de soutien et d'implantation et de défense des droits humains, 13 d'entre eux dirigés par des transfuges nord-coréens, et que d'autres seraient inspectés à l'avenir. Tout en reconnaissant que la question des brochures avait déclenché les inspections, le protocole d'entente a ajouté que les inspections commerciales ne seraient pas limitées aux personnes impliquées dans la campagne de distribution de brochures.

Combien de groupes ont été inspectés après les annonces ?

En raison du tollé national et international sur la nature manifestement discriminatoire des inspections des groupes de défense des droits humains et des personnes évadées de Corée du Nord, le mémorandum d'accord a quelque peu modéré son approche et a commencé tardivement à faire valoir qu'il vérifiait toutes les OSC enregistrées dans le cadre du PE.

Le 6 octobre 2020, le protocole d'entente a déclaré aux journalistes qu'il avait décidé d'inspecter 109 OSC, sur un total de 433, en raison qu’elles n’avaient pas soumis leurs rapports annuels, ou que les documents soumis étaient incomplets. Selon les informations fournies, 13 des 109 groupes à inspecter sont dirigés par des personnes qui ont fui la Corée du Nord; 22 (dont 16 qui travaillent sur les droits humains en Corée du Nord et la relocalisation des déserteurs, cinq qui travaillent dans le domaine social et culturel et un qui travaille dans le domaine de la politique d'unification) ont déjà été inspectés et aucun n'a révélé de motifs sérieux de se voir retirer la reconnaissance; et le protocole d'entente prévoit d'achever l'inspection des 87 OSC restantes d'ici la fin de 2020.

En tout état de cause, le gouvernement semble avoir déjà atteint son objectif de signaler clairement à la Corée du Nord qu'il est prêt à répondre à ses demandes en échange de liens plus étroits, quitte à sacrifier certains principes fondamentaux de la démocratie libérale. Le gouvernement a également envoyé un signal clair au transfuge nord-coréen et aux groupes de défense des droits humains, qui a eu l'effet dissuasif auquel on pourrait s'attendre.

Comment la société civile a-t-elle répondu à ces initiatives gouvernementales ?

Malheureusement, la société civile sud-coréenne est aussi polarisée que sa politique. Les progressistes actuellement au gouvernement perçoivent les conservateurs comme les héritiers illégitimes des collaborateurs du régime colonial japonais de 1910-1945 et du régime autoritaire postindépendance, en vigueur jusqu'en 1987. L’ancien président progressiste, Roh Moo-Hyun, au pouvoir entre 2003 et 2008, s'est suicidé en 2009 lors d'une enquête pour corruption à son encontre, généralement considérée comme politiquement motivée, menée par son successeur conservateur. L'actuel président, Moon Jae-In, a été élu en 2017, au milieu d'une vague d'indignation publique face à la destitution de son prédécesseur de droite pour corruption et abus de pouvoir.

La plupart des OSC sont dominées par des progressistes qui s’alignent politiquement avec le gouvernement actuel de Moon. Les progressistes sont relativement favorables à l'agenda des droits humains, mais restent généralement silencieux en ce qui concerne les droits humains en Corée du Nord, étant donné leur attachement au rapprochement intercoréen. Les mêmes personnes qui parlent haut et fort des « femmes de réconfort » japonaises soumises à l'esclavage sexuel par le Japon impérial avant et pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, ou des outrages de l'ère autoritaire, ignorent les outrages actuels, à savoir les atrocités nord-coréennes au nom de la réconciliation nationale.

La plupart des groupes de défense des droits humains nord-coréens sont structurés autour de déserteurs nord-coréens et d'églises chrétiennes de droite politique qui caractérisent passionnément les gauchistes comme des marionnettes nord-coréennes. Beaucoup adoptent également une position hostile sur d'autres questions contemporaines des droits humains, telles que les droits des personnes LGBTQI+, ce qui est assez ironique étant donné que le juge australien Michael Kirby, auteur principal du rapport de l'ONU qui en 2014 a condamné les violations graves des droits humains en Corée du Nord en tant que crimes contre l'humanité, est homosexuel.

Les OSC établies, pour la plupart progressistes, n'ont pas été ciblées par le gouvernement dirigé par le président Moon ; au contraire, des personnalités éminentes de la société civile ont été nommées ou élues à divers postes ou ont reçu de généreuses subventions. Il y a ceux qui expriment en privé leur consternation et leur inquiétude face aux tendances illibérales du gouvernement, mais peu de gens sont prêts à soulever la question publiquement en raison de la profonde polarisation politique.

L'espace de la société civile - structuré par les libertés d'association, de réunion pacifique et d'expression - devient-il plus restrictif sous l'actuel gouvernement sud-coréen ?

Le gouvernement Moon a montré des tendances inquiétantes et illibérales envers les groupes qui, selon lui, se dressent sur son chemin, tels que les groupes nord-coréens de défense des droits humains et les transfuges, qui font face à une pression croissante pour garder le silence et cesser leur travail de plaidoyer.

Le président Moon a rouvert le dialogue avec le gouvernement nord-coréen pour établir des relations pacifiques, neutraliser la menace nucléaire venant du Nord et ouvrir la voie au regroupement familial, entre autres objectifs louables.

Cependant, conjointement au président américain Donald Trump, le président Moon a utilisé une stratégie diplomatique qui minimise le souci des droits humains. En particulier, ni la déclaration de Panmunjom de 2018 entre la Corée du Nord et la Corée du Sud ni la déclaration conjointe publiée après le sommet Trump-Kim de 2018 à Singapour ne mentionnent les violations flagrantes des droits humains commises par la Corée du Nord.

Dans les semaines qui ont précédé la rencontre du président Moon avec le dirigeant nord-coréen Kim à Panmunjom, il a été signalé que les activistes nord-coréens étaient empêchés de mener leur activisme. En octobre 2018, la Corée du Sud s'est conformée à la demande de la Corée du Nord d'exclure un journaliste déserteur de la couverture d'une réunion en Corée du Nord. Le 7 juillet 2019, deux déserteurs, des pêcheurs présentés comme des tueurs fugitifs, ont été livrés en Corée du Nord cinq jours après leur arrivée et sans même maintenir l'apparence d'une procédure régulière.

Le gouvernement Moon a également eu recours à des tactiques illibérales contre d'autres opposants présumés. Un homme qui, le 24 novembre 2019, avait accroché une affiche se moquant du président Moon en le qualifiant de « chien de poche de Xi Jinping » (faisant référence au président chinois) sur le campus de l'université Dankook, a été inculpé et le 23 juin 2020, le tribunal lui a infligé une amende pour « intrusion dans un bâtiment », conformément à l'article 319 (1) du Code pénal, alors que les autorités universitaires avaient clairement indiqué qu'elles ne souhaitaient pas porter plainte contre lui pour cet exercice de leur liberté d’expression. Beaucoup ont critiqué le processus pénal et la condamnation comme un retour aux vieux jours militaires.

Le gouvernement a également pris des mesures pour exercer un contrôle croissant sur les procureurs. Le ministre de la Justice Choo Mi-ae a attaqué des procureurs qui ont osé enquêter sur des allégations de corruption et d'abus de pouvoir contre le gouvernement, alléguant l'existence d'un complot visant à saper le président Moon.

Une autre tendance inquiétante est la tactique populiste des politiciens du parti au pouvoir, et du législateur Lee Jae-jung en particulier, d'utiliser Internet pour inciter leurs partisans à s'engager dans des actions de cyber-intimidation contre les journalistes.

Que peut faire la communauté internationale pour soutenir les groupes attaqués ?

En avril 2020, le parti au pouvoir a remporté les élections législatives, obtenant une écrasante majorité, remportant 180 sièges sur 300, grâce à son succès relatif à la contention de la pandémie de la COVID-19. L'opposition est désorganisée. Plutôt que de l'appeler à l'humilité, tout cela a enhardi le gouvernement, de sorte que ses tendances illibérales risquent de perdurer. En raison de la forte polarisation politique, il est peu probable que les politiciens du parti au pouvoir et leurs partisans prêtent beaucoup d'attention aux critiques internes.

C’est pourquoi la voix de la communauté internationale sera essentielle. Il est beaucoup plus difficile pour le gouvernement d'ignorer les préoccupations soulevées par les OSC internationales et de les écarter comme des attaques à motivation politique. Une déclaration conjointe ou une lettre ouverte dirigée par CIVICUS serait utile pour transmettre fermement le message que les droits humains en Corée du Nord concernent réellement la communauté internationale.

En outre, la Corée du Sud soumettra prochainement son cinquième rapport périodique au Comité des droits de l’Homme des Nations Unies, élaboré en fonction de la liste de points à traiter préalables à la soumission des rapports. Étant donné que les questions et préoccupations concernant la Corée du Nord ne sont pas incluses dans cette liste, il serait utile que les OSC internationales unissent leurs forces pour les inclure dans la discussion orale avec les membres du Comité des droits de l’Homme et dans leurs observations finales.

À court terme, des visites en Corée du Sud du Rapporteur spécial des Nations Unies sur la promotion et la protection du droit à la liberté d'opinion et d'expression, du Rapporteur spécial sur le droit à la liberté de réunion pacifique et d'association et du Rapporteur spécial sur la situation des défenseurs des droits humains seraient d’excellentes occasions d’internationaliser la question et de faire pression sur notre gouvernement.

Même les progressistes pourraient soutenir une réforme de la loi obsolète sur l'enregistrement des OSC, par exemple, par intérêt personnel, si non pas par principe, en cas de changement de gouvernement.

L'espace civique en Corée du Sud est classé « étroit » par leCIVICUS Monitor. Contactez le Groupe de travail sur la justice transitionnelle via sonsite Web ou sa pageFacebook, et suivez@TJWGSeoul sur Twitter.

By David Kode

The ruling by Kenya’s Supreme Court strengthens the independence of the judiciary and places this institution as a key player and arbiter in future elections and on issues that affect peace and security in Kenya. Future rulings on elections – either in favour of or against a political party or coalition – can be received as the final outcome and prevent conflict.

Source:Pambazuka