freedom of expression

• Maldives: amend provision in the evidence act that compels journalists to reveal sources

  The undersigned 10 organizations call on the government of Maldives to repeal or amend the deeply problematic provision in the Evidence Act (Act No. 11/2022) that compels journalists to reveal sources on court orders and to ensure the rights to privacy, freedom of expression and the press in line with international human rights law.

• Maldives: One year later, no justice for Yameen Rasheed

  On the anniversary of the killing of the popular Maldivian blogger and social media personality, Yameen Rasheed, Amnesty International and CIVICUS call on the Maldivian authorities to bring his killers to justice.

  In a shocking murder that marked a worrying attack on freedom of expression and sent a shiver of fear throughout Maldivian civil society, Yameen Rasheed, 29, was found stabbed to death on 23rd April 2017 outside his apartment building. He had received multiple death threats before his murder, which he had reported to the police.

  “One year later, we have seen no action from the Maldivian authorities. Not only did they fail to protect Yameen during his lifetime, they have also failed to effectively investigate his murder and hold his killers accountable. His loved ones and friends should not have to wait any longer for justice,” said Dinushika Dissanayake, Deputy Director for South Asia at Amnesty International.

  The killing of blogger Yameen Rasheed took place against the backdrop of tightening restrictions on freedom of expression on the Indian Ocean island nation. The Maldivian authorities have been harassing journalists, activists and other peaceful human rights defenders – a trend that has intensified this year, ever since a state of emergency was imposed on 5 February 2018.

  “The Maldivian authorities have a duty to protect human rights defenders and create an enabling environment where their rights are guaranteed. Instead, we have seen an even further shrinking of civic space to the point where people are being punished for exercising their rights to freedom of expression, peaceful of assembly and association,” said Josef Benedict, Civic Space Research Officer at CIVICUS.

  Background

  On 5 February 2018, the Maldives imposed a state of emergency for 45 days, arbitrarily detaining Supreme Court judges, members of the political opposition, outlawing peaceful protests, and imprisoning people solely for exercising their rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. 

  While some protestors have since been released, many of those arrested during the state of emergency remain under detention.

• Morocco: End intimidation and harassment campaign against rights defender Maati Monjib

  The undersigned civil society organisations call on the Moroccan authorities to immediately end their intimidation and harassment campaign against academic and human rights defender Maati Monjib and drop all baseless charges leveled against him.

• MYANMAR: ‘Opposition parties complain that the election body censors their messaging'

  CIVICUS speaks to award-winning journalist Cape Diamond about the upcoming elections in Myanmar. Cape is a multimedia journalist based in Myanmar, covering issues of human rights, crisis and conflict. Currently freelancing for the Associated Press (AP), he has provided critical coverage during the Rohingya crisis and contributed to numerous international outlets, including Al Jazeera, ABC News and CBS. He also contributed to the BAFTA Award-winning documentaryMyanmar’s Killing Fields and New York Film Festival gold medal award-winner The Rohingya Exodus.

  Scheduled on 8 November 2020, the election will be Myanmar’s first since 2015, which resulted in a landslide victory for the National League for Democracy (NLD), and only the second competitive election since 1990, when the military annulled the NLD’s overwhelming victory.

  What is the situation for civic freedoms and civil society ahead of the elections?

  The situation for the freedom of speech is very concerning. Over the years, journalists and rights activists in Myanmar have been criminally charged for their work. Restrictive laws, including the Telecommunications Law, the Unlawful Associations Act, the Official Secrets Act and defamation provisions in the Penal Code, continue to be used to prosecute activists and journalists. The Peaceful Assembly and Procession Law has been used against those protesting.

  Many political parties have raised complaints that the Union Election Commission (UEC), the electoral body, has censored the messages that are set for broadcast on national TV ahead of the elections. For example, Ko Ko Gyi, chairman of the People's Party, said that the edits that the UEC made to his election campaign speech prevent him from airing the party's full political stance ahead of the elections. Two parties – the Democratic Party for a New Society and the National Democratic Force – cancelled their election broadcasts in protest against censorship.

  At the same time, critics say that the electoral body is biased in favour of the ruling party, the NLD led by Aung San Suu Kyi. It’s something that we should keep our eyes on and speak out about to ensure credible elections.

  Has the electoral body engaged with civil society?

  I’ve been hearing that the current UEC is not that actively engaging with civil society. They initially barred the People’s Alliance for Credible Elections (PACE), one of the largest election monitoring groups in the country, from monitoring the election. The UEC accused PACE of not being registered under the law that applies to civil society organisations and of receiving funding from international sources. Even though the UEC subsequently allowed PACE to operate, the organisation is struggling to proceed due to the newly imposed COVID-19 restrictions.

  What are the main issues the campaign will revolve around?

  The COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing civil war across the country are the main issues for us at the moment. It’s very clear that the ruling party and the government are not paying enough attention to the situation of minorities in regions experiencing civil war. 

  It’s worrying that the country is undergoing a pandemic, which I believe it does not have enough capacity to handle. As of 29 September 2020, we have had a total of 11,000 reported cases and 284 deaths due to COVID-19. A surge of infections over the last few weeks has been worrying, as we only had around 400 confirmed cases in August. I am concerned about whether the environment will be safe for people to go out and vote on the election days. 

  More than 20 political parties have sent requests to the electoral body to postpone the elections due to the pandemic, but they were rejected. The ruling party is not willing to have the elections postponed.

  Will it be possible to have a ‘normal’ campaign in this context? 

  I don’t think it’s possible to have normal campaign rallies such as those of the previous election in 2015, because we are in a pandemic. The government has taken several measures to combat the spread of the disease, including orders against gatherings of people. Political parties are not allowed to organise their campaigns in semi-lockdown areas.

  Major cities like Yangon and the Yangon Region, as well as some townships in Mandalay, are under semi-lockdown, which the government calls the Stay-At-Home programme. At the same time, the whole of Rakhine State, which is experiencing civil war, is also on semi-lockdown. I am afraid people in the civil war zone will not be able to go out and vote.

  Candidates are using both mainstream and social media to reach their audiences. However, as noted earlier, some opposition parties have been censored by the UEC. Some opposition members have denounced unfair treatment by the UEC and the government, while the ruling party is using its power to expand its popularity. This will clearly harm the electoral chances of the opposition.

  What specific challenges do candidates face in Rakhine State?

  As the whole of Rakhine State is under COVID-19 restrictions, candidates are not able to campaign in person. Therefore, they are mostly campaigning on social media. At the same time, a long internet shutdown has been in place in many townships in Rakhine State, imposed due to ongoing fighting between the Arakan Army and the military. I am concerned about whether people will be able to get enough information around the elections.

  The Myanmar government is also using the discriminatory 1982 Citizenship Law and the Election Law to disenfranchise Rohingya people and block them from running for political office. Election officials barred Kyaw Min, head of the Rohingya-led Democracy and Human Rights Party (DHRP), from running. He was disqualified along with two other DHRP candidates because their parents were allegedly not citizens, as required by election law. This is one of the various tools used to oppress the Rohingya population.

  In October, the UEC released a smartphone app that was criticised over its use of a derogatory label for Rohingya Muslims. The mVoter2020 app, aimed at improving voter awareness, labels at least two candidates from the Rohingya ethnic group as ‘Bengali’, a term that implies they are immigrants from Bangladesh, although most have lived in Myanmar for generations. This label is rejected by many Rohingya people. Additionally, none of the one million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and another several hundred thousand dispersed in other countries will be allowed to vote.

  Civic space in Myanmar is rated as ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Follow@cape_diamond on Twitter.

• NEPAL: ‘The TikTok ban signals efforts to control the digital space in the name of national sovereignty’

  CIVICUS speaks about the recentTikTok ban in Nepal with Anisha, provincial coordinator for Gandaki Pradesh at Body and Data.

  Founded in 2017,Body and Data is a civil society organisation promoting an accessible, safe and just digital space for all people in Nepal. Anisha, known by her digital name Aneekarma, oversees a project focused on online expression by women and LGBTQI+ people and leads Body and Data’s digital rights initiative in Nepal’s Gandaki province. 

  Why did the Nepali government ban TikTok?

  The government has cited multiple reasons for banning TikTok. It cited concerns about a rise in cybercrime, the disruption of social harmony – mainly due to the circulation of ‘vulgar’ content that ‘damages societal values’ – and TikTok’s perceived promotion of a ‘begging culture’, as content creators use it to seek money or gifts from their audience during live sessions. They also invoked the fact that the platform is being banned in some global north countries, although those bans normally apply only to government phones.

  Ultimately, it all boils down to an attempt to restrict freedom of expression. TikTok has grown to be a significant platform. It serves a diverse audience including housewives, older people, small business owners and entrepreneurs. Recently, people began using TikTok to voice opinions and exercise free speech against the authorities, provoking anger and fear among political leaders who have stepped up surveillance.

  How will this ban impact on digital rights?

  Nepal is a democratic country where freedom of speech and expression are fundamental, and the ban on TikTok has raised concerns about these rights being compromised. These concerns have been exacerbated by the government’s plans to introduce a separate bill aimed at tightening control over social media.

  The enforcement of the TikTok ban infringes on the basic rights of freedom of expression and access to information. The platform was used not just for entertainment and for small enterprises to promote their products and services but also as a channel to share diverse opinions, engage in creative expression and amplify the voices of excluded communities, particularly women.

  Bans on popular social media platforms add complexity to the ongoing international debate regarding digital rights. There are growing concerns surrounding the intersection of technology, free expression and governance in the digital age. The TikTok ban sparks discussions on the delicate balance between government regulation and individual liberties.

  What potential privacy or security concerns arise from users shifting to other platforms?

  Because of TikTok being banned, users have started to migrate to alternative platforms, which raises further privacy and security concerns. It is paramount that digital rights are safeguarded during this transition.

  User education and awareness campaigns on privacy and security best practices are needed to enhance digital literacy. Users must be confident that their personal information is well protected. Transparent data practices, including clear information on data collection and usage, are vital for building user trust and enabling informed decision-making.

  The influx of new users to alternative platforms may also introduce potential cybersecurity threats. Platforms should continuously invest in security measures such as encryption protocols, regular audits and prompt vulnerability fixes. It is also essential to implement user authentication and verification mechanisms to mitigate risks such as fake accounts and identity theft.

  The situation in Nepal raises additional concerns due to the government’s limited understanding of cybersecurity. The absence of consultation with experts before this type of decision is made poses severe risks, as evidenced by instances of people’s personal data being exposed and government websites being hacked.

  The TikTok ban only made the gap in the oversight of data privacy clearer. A comprehensive approach is required to address these issues, integrating technological measures, transparent policies, education initiatives and regulatory frameworks to ensure robust safeguards for user privacy and digital rights.

  What are the global implications of the growing trend of TikTok bans?

  The growing trend of countries considering or implementing bans on TikTok due to security concerns reflects a global unease surrounding potential risks associated with the platform. Often intertwined with geopolitical tensions, the TikTok ban signals broader government efforts to control the digital space in the name of national sovereignty. These bans underscore an intensified scrutiny of data privacy and security practices on digital platforms, with governments expressing reservations about the potential misuse of user data.

  This trend is reshaping the global tech landscape, prompting questions about the dominance of specific platforms and the role of international tech companies. Governments face a significant challenge in striking a delicate balance between encouraging innovation and implementing regulations to address security and privacy concerns.

  As users encounter bans on TikTok, they may migrate to alternative platforms, fostering increased competition and influencing user demographics and content trends. This trend emphasises the need for international collaboration on digital standards and regulations to address security concerns and establish a framework for responsible behaviour in the global digital arena.

  Ultimately, bans on TikTok carry broader implications for the future of digital platforms, shaping discussions on user awareness, advocacy and the delicate interplay between innovation and regulation in the evolving digital landscape.

  How can governments regulate platforms without compromising people’s rights to free expression and privacy?

  Governments face the complex challenge of regulating social media platforms to combat misinformation and disinformation while also safeguarding their citizens’ rights to free expression and privacy. Sophisticated strategies are required to achieve a balance between national security imperatives and global digital rights.

  Just as TikTok has established its own guidelines regarding harmful content, governments can collaborate with technology companies to define clear and transparent standards for social media conduct that do not compromise people’s right to express their opinions, but rather that counteract misinformation. It is crucial to implement robust fact-checking mechanisms and foster media literacy to empower users to distinguish between reliable and deceptive information.

  International collaboration to standardise regulations is key to preventing the infringement of digital rights across borders. The adoption of privacy-enhancing technologies, such as end-to-end encryption, preserves individual privacy while facilitating uninhibited self-expression. It is paramount to recognise that state-controlled surveillance and censorship directly threaten our freedom of expression. Rather than resorting to outright bans, governments should prioritise measures that address concerns about misinformation and privacy to strike a nuanced balance that safeguards fundamental rights.

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  Civic space in Nepal is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Body and Data through itswebsite orInstagram page,and follow@bodyanddata and@aneekarma on Twitter.

• NEPAL: ‘This landmark decision represents significant progress for all LGBTQI+ people’

  CIVICUS speaks with Sanjay Sharma, Programme Director of Nepal’s Blue Diamond Society, about the recentSupreme Court’s order to register same-sex marriages and civil society’s role in advancing LGBTQI+ rights in the country.

  Founded in 2001, Blue Diamond Society is a pioneering and leading LGBTQI+ civil society organisation (CSO) working toensure equal rights, equal access to public and private services, economic empowerment, representation and protection for all of Nepal’s sexual and gender minorities.

  What is the status of LGBTQI+ rights in Nepal?

  The Nepalese Constitution recognises the rights of gender and sexual minorities as fundamental rights. Article 12 states that people can obtain a citizenship certificate that aligns with their gender identity, while Article 18, on the right to equality, and Article 42, on the right to social justice, explicitly forbid discrimination based on gender identity or sexual orientation.

  Being LGBTQI+ is not criminalised in Nepal, so we can talk about LGBTQI+ issues everywhere, including parliament and government offices. The school curriculum also addresses LGBTQI+ issues. The LGBTQI+ community is diverse, and the number of our allies and of innovative ideas to benefit our community are increasing.

• New digital security law a further blow to media freedom and free expression in Bangladesh
  • The Digital Security Act was passed despite protests from civil society and journalists
  • DSA  incorporates other legislation that has been systematically used to silence dissent
  • New law comes amid a growing, brutal crackdown on peaceful protests and dissent  
  • No safety of journalists in the digital age if impunity persists

    Statement at the 50th Session of the UN Human Rights Council

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     Interactive Dialogue with Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression

    Delivered by Nicola Paccamiccio

    Thank you Mr President,

    We welcome the report of the Special Rapporteur and share the concerns over the increasing vilification, targeting and criminalisation of journalists and media workers.

    Journalists play a critical role in reporting on violations of fundamental rights, and the ability of journalists to work safely and without fear is a critical component of civic space.

    In Sri Lanka and Kazakhstan, journalists have been attacked and arrested while reporting on protests. In Kenya and Mexico, attacks against journalists have continued unabated, with impunity. In Hungary, political interference by the government has significantly undermined media freedom. All five countries, along with Chad, are currently on CIVICUS’s Watchlist for their serious, and rapid decline in respect for civic space.

    The digital age has reinforced these existing threats and created new ones to the safety of journalists.

    “Fake news’’ laws are used to target journalists and media workers not in line with governments’ official positions. In Russia, journalists can face criminal penalties of up to 15 years in prison for disseminating allegedly ‘false information’ about Russian armed forces in Ukraine.

    Digital surveillance is increasingly used to monitor journalists. In India, the Pegasus Spyware has been employed to target at least 300 journalists, diplomats, and activists. Biometric technologies are utilised to identify and target protesters and journalists covering protests.

    Given that the digital age has brought further menaces to the safety of journalists and a chilling effect on freedom of expression, we ask the Special Rapporteur what States should do to end impunity for human rights violations against journalists and media workers?

     We thank you.

  • NORTH KOREA: ‘It is time for the international community to adopt a ‘human rights up front’ approach’

    CIVICUS speaksabout the activism of North Korean escapees with Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK).Founded in 2001 and based in the USA, HRNK is a human rights organisationwith the principal objective of raising international awareness of North Korea's human rights situation.

    Is it possible to carry out any form of activism in North Korea?

    No form of activism is possible in North Korea. There is no civil society due to an overwhelming and unprecedented level of coercion, control, surveillance and punishment. The markets that emerged following the famine of the 1990s and the newly created domestic mobile phone network allow North Koreans to engage in limited forms of market activity, but even this is subject to state surveillance and control. Every North Korean, regardless of whether they are a member of the ruling party or a government official, belongs to a party-controlled organisation, such as the Youth League or the Women’s Union. Anecdotal information from sources inside the country suggests that there is sporadic opposition and resistance to state agents at the local level, but the regime has gone to extreme lengths to prevent the emergence of any organised opposition.

    Have there been any recent changes in how the North Korean regime responds to dissent?

    Under the pretext of COVID-19 prevention, the North Korean regime has intensified its crackdown on those attempting to smuggle in information from the outside world or attempting to access such information. In December 2020 the Supreme People’s Assembly, North Korea’s highest legislative body, passed the ‘Anti-Reactionary Ideology and Culture Law’. This law imposes severe criminal penalties on those who access or disseminate foreign content, including movies, dramas, music and books. The penalties are especially severe, up to a life sentence of hard labour, for those who smuggle in or disseminate South Korean media.

    How do people manage to escape North Korea?

    Leaving the country without official authorisation is regarded as treason in North Korea. To escape, North Koreans need the assistance of religious networks, international civil society organisations (CSOs) and brokers who operate in the China-North Korea border region. The author and journalist Melanie Kirkpatrick has called this escape route ‘Asia’s underground railroad’. In some cases, family members or relatives who have already escaped pay brokers to arrange the escape. The most common route is through China and Southeast Asia. Upon arrival in Thailand, the escapees either choose to go to South Korea or apply for asylum in other countries.

    However, since Kim Jong-un came to power in late 2011, the North Korean regime has intensified border security. The Chinese government has also taken steps that make it more difficult for the escapees to move inside China. In addition, the Chinese government has a longstanding policy of forced returns, whereby it repatriates any North Korean refugees arrested in its territory. This violates China’s obligations as a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, since North Korean refugees face a credible fear of persecution upon return.

    This, combined with the COVID-19 border lockdown, means the number of escapees reaching South Korea has plummeted. The highest annual recorded number of arrivals to South Korea was 2,914 in 2009, but this fell to only 67 in 2022. The easing of COVID-related measures is likely to result in a greater number of attempts to flee.

    What kind of help do escapees receive?

    Most escapees choose to go to South Korea, as they are granted citizenship upon arrival under South Korea’s constitution. The South Korean government provides various forms of economic, educational and job training assistance to North Korean refugees. International and local CSOs also help them adjust to life in South Korea.

    The situation is still difficult for many escapees, given how different the two societies have become in over seven decades of division. According to the latest available data from South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, a total of 34,000 escapees have resettled in South Korea to date. Refugees who choose to go to other countries, including the UK and the USA, primarily receive help from CSOs and other escapees who have already relocated there.

    How do escapees work to document and denounce human rights violations in North Korea?

    North Korean escapees play a critical role, given their first-hand experience of life under the regime. Many refugees, including those who are survivors of North Korea’s detention facilities, provide vital testimony to CSOs that seek to document and raise awareness of human rights violations in North Korea. Escapee testimony has also played a critical role in the work of the United Nations (UN) Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea, whose 2014 report concluded that the North Korean regime has committed crimes against humanity pursuant to policies determined at the highest levels of the state. Both the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea and the Seoul office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights continue to work closely with North Korean escapees.

    Some refugees operate their own organisations. In addition to documenting and raising global awareness of the human rights situation in North Korea, they are often involved in sending outside information to North Korean people. Methods they use include radio broadcasts, leaflet balloons flown across the Korean demilitarised zone and rice and micro-SD cards in plastic bottles that are floated across the maritime border between the two Koreas. It is also common for individual escapees to send money to family members in North Korea with the help of brokers.

    How does HRNK support escapees?

    HRNK works closely with North Korean escapees to document and raise awareness of the human rights situation in North Korea. Given the lack of on-the-ground access inside North Korea, we employ a methodology that combines satellite imagery analysis, witness testimony and open-source investigation.

    Testimonies are often given by escapees who have already resettled in South Korea, although HRNK has sometimes obtained information through refugees with contacts inside North Korea. HRNK has held consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council since April 2018 and reports to various UN bodies and hosts side events in Geneva and New York. We have facilitated the participation of North Korean escapees at these events to amplify their voices on the international stage.

    What further international support do diaspora activists need?

    North Korean activists need support from both private and public sources of funding. In general, North Korean human rights activists are overworked and underfunded. ‘Like-minded’ governments such as those of Japan, South Korea, the USA and others display interest in the issue but have often sidelined human rights concerns to focus solely on negotiating military, political and security matters. It is time for the international community to adopt a ‘human rights up front’ approach to North Korea, ensuring that human rights concerns are integrated into every aspect of its interactions with North Korea. Escapee activists will play a critical role in this effort.

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    Civic space in North Korea is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with HRNK through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@committeehrnk onTwitter.

  • NORTH KOREA: ‘Since Kim Jong-un came to power, the surveillance and security system has increased dramatically’

    CIVICUS speaks about activism in the closed civic space of North Korea with Bada Nam, Secretary General of People for Successful Corean Reunification (PSCORE).

    Founded in 2006 and based in South Korea, PSCORE is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) that works to improve human rights in North Korea, assist North Korean escapees settling in South Korea and address barriers to reunification of the two Koreas.

    Is there anything resembling civil society in North Korea?

    North Korea values organisational activities, requiring every citizen to participate simultaneously in several groups such as the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea, North Korea’s Socialist Women’s Union and the Socialist Patriotic Youth League. All of them are government-organised and exert control over people rather than encourage critical thinking. Mentioning civic organisations from the outside world is strictly forbidden.

    Congregating and engaging in activism in any way critical to the regime is a serious criminal offence, with punishments that can extend to the death penalty. As a result, any such activity must be covert, and it’s difficult to obtain accurate information on the existence of an underground civil society.

    North Korea is a surveillance state, where people are always cautious about what they say, even to close friends and family members. It’s impossible to gather colleagues and engage in civic activities because everyone is made to monitor each other and failure to report treasonous crimes to the authorities would also result in severe punishment. Public criticism sessions and public executions are also examples of how the regime strikes fear into the population.

    People are deterred from opposing the government not only because of the extreme punishment they would face but also due to North Korea’s policy of guilt by association, which puts their close relatives at risk. The ‘Songbun’ class system classifies people according to their political loyalties, as ‘loyal’, ‘wavering’ or ‘hostile’, and family members may be demoted in this classification system, affecting their life opportunities, including career options and access to food rations. In serious cases, entire families may be sent to political camps and die from forced labour or starvation. Therefore, North Koreans don’t dare imagine opposing the government.

    Have there been any recent changes in the ways the North Korean regime responds to dissent?

    The North Korean government has always responded to dissent in an extreme manner. However, since Kim Jong-un came to power in 2011, the surveillance and security system has increased dramatically, making it nearly impossible to escape from North Korea. Extra security measures are in place along the borders and a shoot-to-kill policy is enforced against those trying to escape. The situation was exacerbated further during the COVID-19 pandemic when the China-North Korea border was closed, both halting trade and also impeding the flow of defectors.

    Information poses the greatest threat to the North Korean regime, especially due to the influence of the recent ‘Korean wave’ that has made South Korean popular culture increasingly prevalent. Most people in North Korea have been exposed to South Korean dramas and music, leading some to adopt South Korean manner of speech and fashion style. In response, the government has intensified monitoring, enacted strict laws and imposed severe punishments for consuming or distributing foreign media. The Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act, enacted in January 2023, explicitly prohibits the use of foreign languages and specifically bans South Korean terms such as ‘oppa’, which translates as ‘older brother’ and is used as a form of endearment for a boyfriend.

    How do people manage to escape North Korea?

    Most North Koreans escape across the border with China, often with the help of a broker. Brokers reach out to wealthy families in North Korea or help those who have escaped to China get to South Korea. Defectors in South Korea sometimes contact a broker to help other family members flee.

    China has a policy of forced repatriation for North Korean refugees, and its advanced surveillance system makes it extremely difficult to travel in China undetected. If apprehended and returned to North Korea, defectors and their families face severe punishment.

    Most North Korean refugees must travel through several countries before reaching safety. From China, they might flee to Mongolia and Southeast Asian countries such as Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. Many North Koreans end up seeking asylum in Thailand, where the government assists them and helps organise their journey to South Korea.

    What help do escapees receive?

    The assistance available to North Korean refugees depends on the laws and diplomatic relations of countries with North and South Korea. Civil society, including PSCORE, helps North Korean defectors settle in South Korea by teaching essential life skills. Thanks to our volunteer teachers, we focus on providing educational support, including English lessons and vocational workshops. In the past, we also assisted escapees in reaching South Korea but, unfortunately, this became impossible due to China’s growing securitisation and the impact of COVID-19.

    Once in South Korea, North Koreans must undergo a 12-week training programme at the Hanawon rehabilitation centre, where they learn various skills to adapt to the South Korean lifestyle and have access to medical treatment and mental health services. While the South Korean government has implemented programmes to assist refugees, the process of fully integrating into South Korean society is still difficult for people who have previously lived under the totalitarian regime. Psychological trauma from refugees’ journey to freedom may have lasting effects on their lives.

    How do escapees work to raise awareness and advocate for change in North Korea?

    There are many CSOs, mainly based in South Korea, that support North Koreans inside the country and abroad. Some organisations send messages, information, K-dramas and K-pop to North Korea using USB sticks. South Korean news outlets, such as Daily NK and NK News, have sources in North Korea that provide insights into the current situation. PSCORE and other North Korean human rights groups conduct interviews with defectors and publish reports based on their testimonies.

    Our primary activities involve organising public awareness campaigns through seminars and events. We also share short catchy videos on various North Korea-related topics via our social media channels. Our large international team of interns plays a crucial role in advocacy by translating our social media content into various languages. This makes our mission and content visible to the rest of the world.

    PSCORE was granted special consultative status with the United Nations (UN) Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 2012, facilitating our engagement with the international community. We hold an annual side event at the UN Human Rights Council to share the latest information on North Korea’s human rights situation. We leverage international pressure to try to bring about change.

    What further international support do diaspora activists need?

    The topic of North Korean human rights is seen as a very political issue in South Korea. This means that CSOs are affected by each change of government, as policies toward North Korea shift with every administration. While PSCORE’s objective is centred on achieving peace and improving human rights in North Korea, we receive limited support compared to other CSOs due to the interpretation of our activities as politically charged, even though PSCORE is a non-partisan and non-religious CSO. Increased media exposure could help us secure more funding.

    Insufficient funding is a common challenge for North Korean human rights organisations. It hinders the potential to raise awareness and support refugees in South Korea. North Korean activists need more platforms to amplify their voices and continue advocating for change. Still, we hope that more donations will come as the international community becomes more interested in the cause of human rights in North Korea.

    Civic space in North Korea is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with PSCORE through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@PSCORE911 on Twitter.

  • Omani human rights activist silenced and pushed into exile

    CIVICUS interviews Habiba Al Hinai a human rights defender from Oman who had to leave the country for her own safety. She also elaborates the situation for human rights defenders in the country. She is currently living in Germany with her son after she felt that had become difficult for her to live in her home country due to her human rights activities.

    1. What are the restrictions you and other human rights defenders in Oman have faced after being active in the uprising in 2011?
    In 2011, and like in many suppressed Arab countries, Oman witnessed wide spread human rights demonstrations that triggered an extremely violent government reaction attempting to suppress such unusual public actions. Demands of Omani demonstrators were not something new to the authorities, especially with rampant corruption, unemployment, poverty, limited education, suppression of press freedom and freedom of expression, ignoring women and children's rights, conducting of false elections and enforced restrictions and monitoring of civic society associations. The protests resulted in the death of two innocent civilians, in addition to tens wounded by rubber bullets and hundreds detained from different parts of the country.

    As expected, the government responded with an iron fist to human rights movements such as teachers, doctors and workers strikes by imprisoning demonstration organisers along with many human rights defenders, activists, writers, bloggers and the educated elite. As a result of this oppression, many activists had to run away to other countries such as the United Kingdom, Spain and Australia and ask for political asylum, as it has been made impossible for them, facing all kinds of threats of detention and imprisonment, to conduct human rights activities within Oman.

    In 2012, I was arrested along with two of my colleagues during our coverage of a strike by more than 4 000 workers in the desert oilfield. In 2016. I had to pay a fine as I was convicted of two charges for “insulting the Omani people” and “disturbing the general order set by the government”. These charges arose over a post I wrote on my Facebook page. Because of this statement, I had to sign a statement written by the top security service stating that I will not continue with my human rights activities or otherwise I would be sent to prison. Our organisation’s website, Facebook account and Twitter account were hacked and I was kicked out of the Facebook group so that I cannot edit it anymore. The account is still running and all that’s being said on the site is that we are very happy and have no human rights complaints anymore. For this reason, it would not be safe to start another website, Facebook or Twitter account without having high levels of digital security as it can be hacked again.

    A lot of human rights activists in Oman have been sent to courts and faced long and costly trials over fake accusations. Many have served prison sentences of one to three years in prison for “defaming the Sultan” following Facebook and Twitter posts that criticised Sultan Qabos bin Sa’eed Al Sa’eed. This is part of a punishment method for activists who refuse to stop their work. The security services are using different kinds of tools as punishment, including judicial, religious or social pressure. Sadly many activists end up in prison, unable to work or are banned from travelling. Luckily, I was able to leave Oman before I could have been banned from travelling. The political situation in Oman is dire now since the Sultan is of advanced age and is quite sick, which has led to all the different political factions fighting over who will take over power. Unfortunately, the government is using this time to punish activists through prison sentences and other restrictions.

    2. What is the situation in general for civil society in Oman?
    The situation is that all independent civil society organisations (CSOs) are banned from carrying out their activities and CSO workers have been threatened to not even work online or even form WhatsApp groups. Making calls on Skype, Signal, Messenger and WhatsApp is also banned. All independent magazines and newspaper have been closed down and reports indicate that three journalists from the Al Zaman newspaper have been sentenced to three years in prison for publishing articles critical of the state. Six activists have fled to the United Kingdom where they have been granted asylum, which is a new phenomenon for us. Many of those human rights defenders who are not in prison right now in Oman are waiting for their cases to be finalised by the courts.

    The result of this is fear of doing any human rights work. We don’t know who will rule Oman after the Sultan and many people in Oman are in general very afraid because they don’t know what will happen in the future. Additionally there is a lot of corruption and the unemployment rate is very high. 70% of the population are youth under the age of 30, meaning youth unemployment is very high. Omanis feel that the Sultan cannot solve these problems because of his age and illness and are unsure as to who will rule the country in the future.

    The crackdown on civil society has resulted in very little reporting on the human rights situation in Oman and most human rights defenders have completely stopped making posts online. The state security has managed to control and push the society back and to make civil society afraid. This has resulted in nobody recording the human rights violations publicly from inside Oman and only space left is for Omani human rights defenders who are abroad to publicly report about the situation.

    3. What specific restrictions have you faced as a woman human rights defender?
    In general, the environment for women human rights defenders in Oman is very unhealthy. The government uses its political power and pressures religious entities and our families to pressure us with the aim of breaking us down. Methods used to shame women human rights defenders include defamation and spreading bad news about women activists. This has resulted in many women human rights defenders being silenced.

    Almost all the women human rights defenders in Oman stopped their activism because they couldn’t take the pressure. The government has contacted over and over the families of women activists to pressure them to stop their female family member from activism. This and the other restrictions became too much for most women human rights defenders to handle. I worked on women’s rights, children’s rights and other human rights issues in Oman and I was punished for it. Besides the detention and paying a fine, I also underwent interrogations by the security forces and was told by the government that I didn’t have a permit to do any work on women and children’s rights.

    In my situation, the government sent my own family members to break me down. The government used them and some of our personal differences to come and detain me when I attended a protest in 2011. This creates terrible cracks in the family and I suffered a lot. Now some of my family members chose to abandon me or don’t talk to me. If they even support me financially, they will face a backlash from the government. The restrictions I faced are still causing me great problems. After I was imprisoned in the middle of the dessert in temperatures that could sometimes reach 50 degrees with my hands ties and with no air conditioning, I have a phobia of indoor spaces and this is still very stressful for me today. Currently I am seeing a psychiatrist in Germany for a treatment.

    4. What support is needed from international civil society and international actors?
    The international community must be aware of the human rights situation in Oman. Many people and governments around the world don’t think there is an issue with human rights in Oman including the European Union. This has a lot to do with us not being able to report on the situation from Oman. The government in Oman managed to scare us quickly before the international community knew what was happening.

    It is important to pressure the embassies of Oman around the world. Just recently, I saw that the Omani embassy in London had invited a big INGO for an event at the embassy. This is a sign of how good the Omani government is at networking and putting on a certain face to the outside world including human rights organisations worldwide. It is important that international human rights organisations do not accept invitations to events by the Omani embassies. If they do attend, they must pressure the government officials while at the events.

    The United States of America had previously started a Female Genital Mutilation campaign in Oman but when the US-Iran deal came into place with Oman being a key actor in the deal the US started being friendlier to the Omani government. In the United Nations Universal Periodic Review of Oman in March 2015, the United States was very gentle concerning the human rights situation in Oman. But the international community can do a lot through diplomacy. When UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to association and assembly, Maina Kiai, came to Oman, he met with activists. Luckily, international organisations supported Maina Kiai’s critical reports but this report must be collected and used as part of diplomacy at an international level. Unfortunately, the Omani government does very good diplomacy so governments need to be persistent.

    • Follow Habiba Al Hinai on Twitter @HabibaAlHinai
    • Oman is rated as ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor

  • Open Letter to president of Venezuela regarding the proposed International Cooperation Bill
    Presidente de la República
    S.E. Hugo Chávez Frías
    Palacio de Miraflores, Caracas,
    Venezuela
    Fax:+58.212.806 3698
    E-mail: 
     
    Your Excellency,
     
    Re: Proposed International Cooperation Bill
     
    I write as the Secretary General of CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, an international alliance of civil society with members and partners in over a hundred countries. CIVICUS works to strengthen civil society and citizen action throughout the world.
     
    We at CIVICUS, our members and partners, are deeply concerned about your recent comments urging National Assembly members to adopt a "severe" law to effectively stop international funding for NGOs. We would like to emphasise that Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) play an extremely important role in national life. Their constructive criticism and quest for greater accountability in public life are important assets for the nation. We therefore urge your government to respect expressions of legitimate dissent and unequivocally uphold civil society's rights to express, associate and assemble freely.
  • Open letter to Sri Lankan government: Withdraw Online Safety Bill to protect people’s rights and future

    

    Hon. Minister Tiran Alles,

    Minister for Public Security of Sri Lanka

    We, the undersigned organisations committed to protecting freedom of speech and expression, are writing to urge the Ministry of Public Security to withdraw  the proposed Online Safety Bill and to conduct meaningful consultations with all stakeholders including local groups.

    We are alarmed that the bill is proposed to be presented in Parliament at the end of January 2024 without addressing the concerns raised by key stakeholders, experts and civil society about the  severe implications that the bill will have on the human rights and democratic values enshrined in the Constitution and international legal instruments to which people in Sri Lanka are entitled.

    The harms stemming from the bill have been noted not only by human rights and civil society organisations, but also by the technology industry, through statements from the Asia Internet Coalition and the Global Network Initiative. Following the filing of over 50 petitions against the bill, which make it very clear that the bill requires significant amendments in order to be valid, the bill should be withdrawn, and discussions held in good faith, to tackle the issues of online gender-based violence and other harmful speech while respecting and affirming the rights of people in Sri Lanka and complying with the principles of necessity and proportionality. However, we note that consultation has been limited to closed-door meetings with only technology companies and the draft of the Online Safety Bill as amended has not been released for adequate review by the public.

    We respectfully submit that:

    • The bill has a chilling effect on free speech, which is crucial not only for participation, accountability, the right to information and the right to protest, but also for individual development, freedom of thought and conscience, and artistic expression. Free speech also enables the rights to assembly and association and to livelihood. By using vague, ambiguous and overbroad terminology to define offences, the bill enables over-censorship, which could also lead to self-censorship and adversely affect civic spaces for the people of Sri Lanka.
    • The bill seeks to establish an Online Safety Commission with no independence from the executive. Members of the Commission would be appointed by the President, expanding the powers of the executive and leading to potential abuse. Sri Lanka has a lengthy history of politicised and undue control over freedom of expression, arbitrary arrests, and weaponisation of laws to hinder dissent. In the absence of strong, independent safeguards, the proposed Online Safety Bill would enable and legitimise such conduct by the Sri Lankan political establishment irreversibly.
    • The Online Safety Commission, effectively controlled by the executive, has wide-ranging powers to restrict free speech. The Commission is empowered to direct users, intermediaries and service providers to take down content and block access to accounts on extremely vague and overbroad grounds such as communicating “false statements” which may threaten “national security” and “public order”, promote “feelings of ill-will and hostility” between groups, and cause “disturbance to an assembly”; to initiate criminal action; to scrutinise accounts; and to enforce security practices and procedures to be created by the Commission. The Commission may demand removal of content within 24 hours without judicial oversight. The scope of the Commission’s powers is neither necessary nor proportionate.
    • The Commission also has the power to require intermediaries to disclose the identity of an individual who shared impermissible content. This may require platforms to collect and reveal sensitive information and implement proactive monitoring. For platforms with end-to-end encryption, which is crucial for privacy and free expression, it would be impossible to comply without fundamentally altering their architecture in a way that undermines people’s privacy and safety. Any model of regulation must follow international law, principles of data minimisation, necessity and proportionality, and be practically feasible in order to seek people’s data held by intermediaries.
    • The bill fails to incorporate the recommendations of experts who have been engaged in consistent research to understand the causes for online harms, particularly online violence against women and children, and come up with potential mitigation tools. To tackle the harms associated with content online, we urgently need to provide agencies with adequate resources and make a dedicated effort to sensitise state officials to the issues involved in gender-based offences, and improve digital literacy education at all levels for user empowerment. Criminalising speech does not benefit women or children, whom the bill claims to protect, and in fact can stifle essential debates and discussions over issues central to the health, safety, and well-being of all individuals.
    • The bill will have a detrimental impact on Sri Lanka’s digital economy and avenues for employment online, an area which has tremendous potential to equip Sri Lanka’s youth and generate economic growth. Suppressing speech will have a spillover effect on all fundamental freedoms for people in Sri Lanka, inhibiting investment opportunities and space for growth.

    In light of the grave implications for the freedoms of people in Sri Lanka and the opacity of the legislative process thus far, we respectfully call on the government to withdraw the Online Safety Bill, and to engage in meaningful, sustained and inclusive multi-stakeholder consultations, including civil society and human rights experts, on the way forward for online content regulation. This is essential to protect and ensure Sri Lanka’s commitment to a free, open, and safe internet and a flourishing democracy.

    Signatories:

    • Access Now
    • ARTICLE 19
    • Article 21 Trust
    • Association for Progressive Communications
    • Centre for Communication Training
    • Center for Investigative Reporting (CIR)
    • Centre for Equality and Justice
    • Centre for Law and Democracy
    • CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
    • Committee to Protect Journalists
    • Delete Nothing
    • Digital Empowerment Foundation
    • Digital Rights Foundation
    • Digital Rights Kashmir
    • Digital Rights Nepal (DRN)
    • Digitally Right
    • DNS Africa Media and Communications
    • DreamSpace Academy
    • Electronic Frontier Foundation
    • Fight for the Future
    • Freedom Forum, Nepal
    • Global Network Initiative
    • Hashtag Generation
    • Interfaith Colombo
    • Internet Freedom Foundation
    • Internet Society
    • Internet Society India Hyderabad Chapter
    • Internet Society Nigeria Chapter
    • Internet Society, Ethiopian Chapter
    • Koneta Hub
    • Law and Society Trust
    • LIRNEasia
    • Majal.org
    • Mannar Women’s Development Federation
    • Media Diversity Institute (MDI)
    • MinorMatters
    • Movement for the Defence of Democratic Rights (MDDR)
    • Muslim Women’s Development Trust
    • National Christian Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka
    • National Peace Council of Sri Lanka
    • OPTF / Session
    • People’s Action for Free and Fair Elections (PAFFREL)
    • Point of View
    • Privacy & Access Council of Canada
    • Prostasia Foundation
    • Realizing Sexual and Reproductive Justice (RESURJ)
    • Search for Common Ground (SFCG)
    • Sisterhood Initiative
    • Software Freedom Law Center, India
    • South Asia Free Media Association
    • Southeast Asia Freedom of Expression Network (SAFEnet)
    • Tech for Good Asia
    • Tech Global Institute
    • The Centre for Internet and Society
    • The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA)
    • The Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace and Justice
    • The Tor Project
    • Tuta
    • Voices for Interactive Choice and Empowerment (VOICE)
    • Women’s Action Network
  • Outcomes from the UN Human Rights Council...to be continued

    In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the United Nations Human Rights Council’s 43rd Session, which was scheduled to run from 24 Feb – 20 March, was suspended after three weeks on 13 March until further notice.
    
    CIVICUS fully supports the suspension of the Session on public health grounds, and the precautionary measures taken before the suspension. However, we remain concerned that public participation in the Council risks being disproportionately affected, especially in light of the decision to cut General Debates from the 44th Session (June), which removes a key platform for civil society to engage with governments. The UN depends on information from the ground in order to make evidence-based decisions, and we call on states to take steps to ensure that the participation of civil society is not compromised.

    In Nicaragua, a human rights crisis has seen hundreds of thousands flee the country and an ongoing crackdown against human rights organisations, community leaders, and journalists. The situation is compounded by a lack of political will from the government to engage with regional or international mechanisms, or to ensure accountability. CIVICUS welcomes that the draft resolution on Nicaragua tabled during the Session would provide a mandate for enhanced monitoring and reporting by the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) on the situation at this critical time, and we urge all states to support this resolution when the Session resumes.

    We also call on states to support the renewal of the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar. The 43rd session marked the final one for the current Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, Yanghee Lee, and we thank her for her outstanding work during her mandate. Myanmar has undergone significant developments in its human rights framework since the Special Rapporteur began her term – from elections in 2015 which saw a groundswell of hope for positive change, to the dawning realisation of crimes against humanity against the Rohingya in Rakhine state. But the curtailment of fundamental freedoms and total crackdown on any criticism of authorities has remained grimly consistent. Those on the ground, the human rights defenders and activists who are trying to achieve change, need international support from the Human Rights Council.

    In late 2019, Iran erupted into a series of protests against the lack of political and democratic freedoms and the deteriorating economic situation. Protesters were met with violent repression through mass arrests and lethal force. When the Session resumes, the Human Rights Council will vote on extending the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Iran. We welcome support shown by states so far for the renewal of the mandate, and we urge adoption of this resolution when the Session continues.

    What is a Special Rapporteur? Special Rapporteur is a title given to an independent expert who works on behalf of the United Nations who has a specific country or thematic mandate from the Human Rights Council. Special Rapporteurs often conduct fact-finding missions to countries to investigate allegations of human rights violations. They can only officially visit countries that have agreed to invite them. Aside from fact-finding missions, Rapporteurs regularly assess and verify complaints from alleged victims of human rights violations.

    The mandates for Special Rapporteurs on freedom of expression and opinion, and on human rights defenders, are set to be renewed when the Session resumes. We encourage all member and observer states to show their full support for these mandates by co-sponsorsing the resolutions.

    Just prior to the suspension of the Session, Mary Lawlor was appointed as new Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders. We look forward to working with her as she protects those on the frontline of defending human rights around the world, and we thank Michel Forst, the outgoing mandate holder, for his tireless work.

    Towards the beginning of the Session, the High Commissioner’s update on Sri Lanka highlighted ongoing impunity for past grave human rights abuses in the country. The new Sri Lankan government, which came into power in 2019, has said that it intends to renege on Human Rights Council resolution 30/1 which provided commitments to accountability, truth and reconciliation. The human rights space in Sri Lanka has deteriorated sharply under the new administration, and the undermining of this resolution – currently the only route to ensuring transitional justice in Sri Lanka – would not only be fatal to victims and their families, but also a significant setback to the UN itself. We urge states to strongly encourage Sri Lanka to uphold its commitments and reiterate calls for an international accountability mechanism to ensure that accountability remains a possibility.

    Although India was not on the official agenda of this Session, the ongoing crackdown on Kashmir, a discriminatory citizenship law and violent suppression of protests proved an ongoing issue throughout the Session.

    CIVICUS, FORUM-ASIA, ISHR, FIDH, OMCT and ICJ organized a side event to discuss the current situation and ways in which the international community, including the Council, could contribute to constrictive progress. With key partners, CIVICUS also joined important statements on the situation in Jammu and Kashmir as well as on India’s recent discriminatory citizenship law, and we were encouraged to see several states raise their own concerns about India during debates.

    ---

    Civic space ratings by CIVICUS Monitor
    Open	Narrowed	Obstructed	Repressed	Closed

     

    Our joint and stand alone country statements at the 43rd Session of the Human Rights Council
    Angola	Burundi	El Salvador	Eritrea	Fiji
    India	Iraq	Iran	Jammu & Kashmir	Madagascar
    Myanmar	Nicaragua	Sri Lanka	See all statements

     

  • Over 150 organisations demand international community stand against raids and closures of 7 Palestinian organisations

    Amid Israel’s escalating attacks targeting their work, a group of more than 150 Palestinian, regional, and international organisations express our full solidarity with the designated seven leading Palestinian civil society organisations, Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, Al-Haq Law in the Service of Man (Al-Haq), Bisan Center for Research and Development, Defense for Children International-Palestine (DCI-P), Health Work Committees (HWC),the Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC), and the Union of Palestinian Women’s Committees (UPWC).

  • PAKISTAN: ‘The government must hold accountable those responsible for excessive force against protesters’

    CIVICUS discusses recent protests in Pakistan with Asad Iqbal Butt, chairperson of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, a civil society organisation that works for the realisation of the full range of human rights for all of Pakistan’s citizens and residents.

    Protests erupted in response to the rising cost of food, fuel and utilities in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. The situation quickly escalated into violence. Several protesters and a police officer were killed and many protesters were injured and arrested. As tensions flared, traders closed their shops, exacerbating economic disruption. The Kashmiri prime ministeracknowledged the protesters’ grievances but stressed the need to maintain peace and stability, while Pakistan’s president called a high-level meeting to devise a response. Having narrowly avoided defaulting on its foreign debt last year, Pakistan is now seeking a new bailout package from the International Monetary Fund.

    What triggered the protests, and how did the government respond?

    Since March 2023, Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) has witnessed several large-scale protests, with people taking to the streets to demand subsidised electricity and flour. Led by the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), a civil society group, these protests have also called for the removal of unnecessary perks and privileges enjoyed by politicians and bureaucrats.

    The movement gained momentum in May 2024. On 11 May, thousands of people responded to the JAAC’s call and began marching towards the capital, Muzaffarabad. The entire region came to a standstill as reports of violent clashes and casualties emerged, first on social media and then in mainstream media.

    Shortly after the first verified reports of violence, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan launched a fact-finding mission, on 16 and 17 May. We found that ahead of the protests, the AJK government had sent a request to the Pakistani government for paramilitary and civilian forces. This signalled its intention to use force against protesters. Deployment of additional forces began on 3 May, almost a week before the call for protests and the long march. But it was the involvement of the Pakistan Rangers, a federal paramilitary force, that marked a significant escalation. Their entry into Muzaffarabad and alleged unauthorised use of force contributed to the violence.

    Key incidents during the protests included a police raid on 10 May on the residence of Shaukat Nawaz Mir, an elected traders’ leader, which resulted in arrests and clashes. On 8 May, an assistant commissioner reportedly assaulted an older person in Dodyal, Mirpur. A crackdown on the JAAC leadership in Kotli, Mirpur and Muzaffarabad further inflamed public anger, leading to retaliatory attacks on government officials and property.

    On 10 May, a crippling shutdown and wheel-jam strike took place, followed by violent clashes between police and protesters. Police arrested scores of activists and clashes resulted in injuries on both sides. The long march from Mirpur to Muzaffarabad on 11 May was marred by violent clashes. A police sub-inspector was killed and many police officers and protesters were injured.

    The entry of the Rangers, their lack of coordination with local authorities and the perception they were being deployed to violently suppress the protests fuelled violence. Clashes in Muzaffarabad left three protesters dead and many others injured. The situation escalated when the Rangers resorted to teargas shelling and firing.

    Who organised and led the protests?

    These protests were unprecedented because they were leaderless, not driven by a political agenda or led by a political party. A cross-section of civil society took part in or documented the protests, including journalists, lawyers, students, traders and young people.

    There were other demands apart from those put forward by JAAC. Civil society lawyers emphasised that the people of AJK are highly sensitive about their identity, particularly following India’s revocation of the special constitutional status of Indian-occupied Kashmir. This explained their concern about any perceived attempts to undermine AJK’s special status or deny recognition of Kashmiris’ rights over their natural resources.

    Although not directly involved in the protests, many women from civil society expressed their solidarity with the movement. One woman said that even though she knew the government would use violence against protesters, she hadn’t stopped her young son going to the march because the protest was necessary to make people’s voices heard.

    What are civil society’s demands to the government?

    Civil society groups, including the HRCP, have primarily called on the AJK government to listen to people’s legitimate demands for economic rights and better governance, and to show restraint and engage with protesters through peaceful dialogue and negotiation.

    The government must also hold those responsible for excessive force against protesters accountable, following an independent investigation, including to help prevent future abuses. The use of paramilitary forces against AJK citizens is also cause for serious concern and should not recur.

    The AJK government must respect human rights, including the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and expression and the right to life. It must also implement sustainable economic relief measures, including subsidies and price controls, to address immediate public needs.

    Additionally, the Pakistani federal government should ensure that legislative powers in AJK lie with the elected AJK Assembly. Finally, AJK should be given control over its natural resources, while Pakistan’s earnings from its use of AJK’s water and electricity must be shared more equitably.

    How can the international community help?

    The international community should monitor potential human rights abuses in AJK and, where possible, press the Pakistani government to ensure they do not recur. It is important to exert moral pressure on the government to respect, protect and fulfil the democratic and fundamental freedoms of the people of AJK.

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    Civic space in Pakistan is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan through itswebsite and follow@HRCP87 on Twitter.

  • PHILIPPINES: ‘Historical memory of martial law under Marcos Senior gives us strength to persevere’

    CIVICUS speaks withCristina Palabay, Secretary General of Karapatan, about the human rights situation in the Philippines since the start ofFerdinand Marcos Junior’s government.

    Founded in 1995, Karapatan isan alliance of civil society activists and organisations working for the promotion and protection of human rights in the Philippines. Its founders and members have been at the forefront of the human rights struggle in the Philippines since the time of Ferdinand Marcos Senior’s martial law regime.

    What have the government’s policy priorities been in its first year?

    Ferdinand Marcos Junior, known as Bongbong Marcos, the son of former dictator Ferdinand Marcos, was inaugurated for a six-year presidential term on 30 June 2022, succeeding Rodrigo Duterte, whose rule was marked by closing civic space and attacks against civil society activists.

    While the new government tries to make it look like its policy priorities are aimed at addressing the economic crisis and its impacts on the debt-ridden domestic economy, this is not the case. Inflation and unemployment rates continue to rise while disproportionate shares of the budget are allocated to militarist policies rather than social services. These are insufficient palliatives and the government continues to invoke the crisis situation to justify the continuing violations of economic, social and cultural rights.

    No substantial efforts have been made to curb corruption. But one after another, graft allegations against members of the Marcos family are being dismissed by the courts, which enables them to keep the money siphoned from the nation’s coffers.

    The new administration tries to present itself as more humane than its predecessor in relation to the so-called ‘war on drugs’, but reports from the ground prove that extrajudicial killings and abuses of power by the police are ongoing. Moreover, Marcos Junior stands firmly behind Duterte in rejecting the International Criminal Court’s independent investigations into the thousands of killings committed under Duterte’s watch.

    While mainstream surveys say that Marcos Junior maintains the trust of the population, people on the ground are increasingly questioning his rule because they see that his campaign promises to lower the prices of basic commodities and costs of services aren’t being fulfilled.

    Have conditions for civil society worsened under Marcos Junior’s rule?

    There seems to be no essential or substantial change in the relationship between the government and Filipino civil society, which continues to be hostile. If there is any change at all, it seems to be rather negative, considering the cumulative effect of the continuing human rights violations, attacks on civic and democratic space, dire lack of justice and accountability, and the prevalent culture of impunity.

    The conditions for civil society have worsened due to the accumulation of restrictions that the state has continued to impose on civic space. These include red-tagging – the practice of labelling people and groups as associated with or sympathetic to the communist movement or progressive movements, judicial harassment and illegal or arbitrary arrests and detention of human rights defenders (HRDs). We have witnessed an increased use of counter-terrorism laws against HRDs, political dissenters, journalists and workers in churches and faith-based institutions. Violations of freedoms of association, expression and peaceful assembly have clearly continued.

    The recently adopted National Security Policy bodes ill for those working towards the achievement of just and lasting peace and upholding and defending human rights, because it affirms all the policies of the Duterte administration, including the institutionalisation of a government task force that has been notorious for committing red-tagging and other forms of human rights violations. Additionally, Marcos Junior hasn’t issued a clear policy statement concerning human rights.

    What challenges does Karapatan face as a human rights organisation?

    Filipino civil society organisations remain steadfast in our collective work to uphold and defend human rights in the Philippines. Our historical memory of martial law under Marcos Senior gives us the strength to persevere in our human rights advocacy despite all the restrictions and challenges.

    Karapatan specifically continues to face numerous challenges. One of our staff members, Alexander Philip Abinguna, remains in jail on trumped-up charges. Our national officers continue to face judicial harassment, threats and red-tagging. We are in constant fear of physical attacks and the use of draconian laws against us. However, at our recent National Council meeting, we expressed an even stronger determination to continue doing our human rights work, demanding justice for all victims of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, resisting all forms of authoritarianism, fighting for a truly democratic country and building a human rights culture.

    What international support does Filipino civil society receive, and what further support do you need?

    We appreciate the tenacious political, moral and material support that the international community provides to Filipino civil society to defend and uphold human rights. Karapatan calls on its international friends and allies to further strengthen this spirit of international solidarity by amplifying our calls to your communities and peoples, to your parliaments and governments and to international mechanisms such as the United Nations Human Rights Council. We likewise appreciate any political and material support for victims of human rights violations, including HRDs at risk and their families and communities.

    ---

    Civic space in the Philippines is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with Karapatan through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@karapatan and@TinayPalabay onTwitter.

  • PHILIPPINES: ‘The government is headed by a former dictator’s son who reached power in a suspicious manner’

    CIVICUS speaks with Nymia Pimentel-Simbulanabout the human rights situation in the Philippines since the start ofFerdinand Marcos Junior’s government.Nymia ischairperson of the Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA) and Executive Director of thePhilippine Human Rights Information Center (PhilRights).

    Established in 1991, PhilRights serves as PAHRA’s research and information centre. Its vision is that of a society where each person can fully realise their potential, participate effectively in economic, political and cultural life and benefit from economic progress.

    Has the relationship between government and civil society changed under the new government?

    The relationship between state and civil society hasn’t changed under the new government – it hasn’t worsened, but it hasn’t improved either. However, since the government is now headed by the son of a former dictator who came to power in a suspicious manner, civil society organisations (CSOs) approach it with caution, scepticism and a lukewarm attitude.

    Overall, conditions for civil society work have not improved, as numerous policies and programmes that restrict the activities and functioning of CSOs, particularly human rights organisations, remain in effect. For instance, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 (Republic Act 11,497), which has the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC) as its primary implementing entity, persists in its campaign to discredit human rights advocates through red-tagging – labelling people and groups as associated with communism. Threats, harassment and killings of human rights defenders (HRDs) – including civil society activists, environmentalists, human rights lawyers, trade unionists and Indigenous leaders – have continued. Journalists such as 2021 Nobel Peace Prize winner Maria Ressa have not been exempt from attacks either. Multiple trumped-up charges have been filed against her as part of the government’s sustained efforts to stifle dissent.

    Has the government shifted its focus from the ‘war on drugs’ to other policy issues?

    We have not seen any significant differences in priorities or approaches to economic, foreign relations, environmental and human rights issues between current president Ferdinando Marcos Junior and former president Rodrigo Duterte.

    However, while the focus on the drug problem remains, there has been a discursive shift from Duterte’s punitive and violent approach to an anti-drug campaign emphasising prevention and rehabilitation. But this hasn’t translated into an end to extrajudicial killings, which continue unabated in impoverished urban areas that are known to be havens for drug-related activities. Dahas, a research group from the University of the Philippines, reported 342 instances of drug-related killings carried out by state and non-state groups and people during the first year of the new government. The targets of the anti-drug campaign continue to be minor drug users and low-level peddlers. As happened under the previous administration, prominent drug lords remain untouched.

    Meanwhile, people’s quality of life continues to decline and food insecurity has worsened due to the impact of continuous increases in oil and fuel prices, pushing up the cost of essential commodities and services. Staples such as rice, sugar, onions and flour have become scarce in many Filipino households. The president has failed to take decisive action on the pressing food problem, even though he also serves as Secretary of Agriculture.

    What support does the president enjoy?

    According to a recent survey, the president enjoys substantial approval and trust ratings, standing at around 80 per cent. These scores are consistent across regions and socioeconomic groups.

    I believe this phenomenon reflects how the government’s information and communication machinery has effectively crafted, packaged and disseminated Marcos Junior’s and his administration’s endeavours, policies and priorities, primarily featuring messages of unity and concern for the poor. Social media platforms such as Facebook, TikTok and YouTube have served as the main channels for conveying these messages, enabling the government to reach out to the majority of the population, who predominantly rely on social media as news sources.

    How is Filipino civil society working to protect and promote human rights?

    Filipino CSOs, including PhilRights, are actively involved in human rights education, research, documentation of rights violations and community mobilisation through grassroots organisations, schools, universities, factories and churches.

    Civil society pursues five primary goals. We advocate for the adoption of the Human Rights Defenders Protection Bill and combat the vilification campaign against HRDs, including the red-tagging of civil society activists. We seek justice for victims of extrajudicial killings in the context of the ‘war on drugs’ through lobbying at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and International Criminal Court. We work to address economic concerns, including food insecurity, by trying to achieve reductions in the costs of basic goods and services, promoting decent employment opportunities and fair wages and providing adequate housing for urban poor residents. We engage in environmental protection efforts, which involve advocating for an end to large-scale mining activities like open-pit mining, particularly in Indigenous peoples’ communities.

    How is the international community supporting this work?

    Filipino civil society benefits from international solidarity coming from various government missions, human rights organisations and religious groups that support our lobbying efforts at the UNHRC. They release press statements, position papers and reports addressing human rights issues and concerns in the Philippines. They provide essential funding and material assistance to Filipino CSOs for our diverse human rights and development initiatives. Moreover, as leaders of civil society and HRDs, we are frequently invited to speak about the human rights situation in the Philippines to organisations and groups abroad, keeping them informed and keeping solidarity alive.

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    Civic space in the Philippines is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch withPhilRights through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@PhilRights onTwitter.

  • POLAND: ‘In reaction to conservative backlash, public support for LGBTQI+ rights is on the rise’

    

    CIVICUS speaks about 2023 Pride and Polish LGBTQI+ rights organisations’ response to the conservative backlash against LGBTQI+ rights with Annamaria Linczowska, advocacy and litigation officer at Campaign Against Homophobia (KPH).

    Founded 2001, KPH is a Polish LGBTQI+ civil society organisation (CSO) working to counter violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity through political, social and legal advocacy.

     

  • Poland: concerns over intimidation, violence and detentions of peaceful protesters

    Joint letter to:

    Clement Voule, UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Assembly and Association
    Mary Lawlor, UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders
    Irene Khan, UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Opinion and Expression
    Tlaleng Mofokeng, UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Physical and Mental Health
    Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
    Palais Wilson, 52 Rue des Pâquis
    1201 Geneva, Switzerland

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