freedom of expression

• Press freedom vital in the fight against the pandemic

  

  Freelance journalist Hopewell Chin'ono. Credit: Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights

  By Sibahle Zuma, Researcher with CIVICUS

  Access to accurate information is vitally important during the pandemic, so that people can understand how to protect themselves and their families, and to hold their governments to account for their response to the health emergency.

  Just like the virus, the persecution of the press has no borders, affecting journalists in many countries across the region. In its latest global report, the CIVICUS Monitor, an online platform that tracks civic freedoms, documented that journalists had been detained in at least 28 African countries. This was the top civic rights violation recorded in Africa during the past year.

  Read on Inter Press Service News 

• Proposed new social media law in Nepal threatens freedom of expression
  • A new broad and restrictive law being introduced by the Nepalese government gives the authorities sweeping powers to block social media platforms and remove or criminalise defamatory posts
  • The government has also tabled legislation that restricts civil servants from sharing their views in the media including via social media sites
  • Global and regional human rights groups are concerned that these laws are to be designed to stifle dissent and silence critical voices

  New proposed laws relating to social media use in Nepal are intended to stifle dissent and silence critical voices, say global and regional human rights groups.

  Global civil society alliance, CIVICUS and the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) say they are seriously concerned that new legislation, which has been tabled in parliament by the Nepalese government, are meant to create a chilling effect on freedom of expression in the country.

  On February 20, 2019, Nepal's government tabled the Information Technology bill in parliament, which would impose harsh sanctions for “improper” social media posts. Under the proposed law, the government would have the power to block social media sites like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, unless the owners registered their platforms in Nepal. The government can also instruct social network site operators to remove posts. Failure to do so could lead to a three-year jail term and a fine of 30,000 Nepalese rupees (US$ 262). Those responsible for social media posts deemed defamatory or against national sovereignty could be punished with up to five years behind bars and a fine of 1.5 million Nepalese rupees (USD 13,000).

  “We are extremely concerned that this bill is overly broad and restrictive and, if passed,  could be used to block or criminalise reporting on government misconduct and the expression of critical opinions by civil society and citizens,” said Josef Benedict, CIVICUS Civic Space Researcher.

  “Any efforts to genuinely regulate online content must be approached in a transparent and consultative manner, and avoid criminal restrictions on free speech,” said Benedict. 

  “We call on the Nepalese government to ensure that the legislation is in line with international law and standards in particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which it has ratified and that vague provisions around protecting national sovereignty should be removed”

  CIVICUS and AHRC are also concerned about a new bill, tabled on February 13  2019, that prohibits civil servants from sharing their views through media including their micro-blogging sites, even after their retirement from government service. The law also prohibits speeches and writing that are considered “contrary to the policies of the Government of Nepal or to undermine mutual relationship between the Government of Nepal and the people or the relationship with any foreign country”.

   “It is extremely worrying to see such laws being introduced by the authorities that will further shrink civic space in Nepal,” said Basil Fernando, Director of AHRC.

  “Criticism and dissent are essential attributes for an open and democratic society. We urge the authorities to pull the plug on such regressive legislation and instead take steps to create an enabling environment for freedom of expression to flourish,” said Fernando.

  Fundamental freedoms in Nepal continue to face serious threats. Journalists have been arrested and charged under the Electronic Transaction Act 2008 for their reports and dozens have been attacked or threatened. Police have also used excessive and lethal force at demonstrations, with impunity and laws have been proposed to curtail the work of NGOs.

  The CIVICUS Monitor, an online platform that tracks threats to civil society in countries across the globe, rates civic space – the space for civil society – in Nepal as Obstructed.

  ENDS

   For more information or to arrange an interview, please contact:

  Josef Benedict

  Insert CIVICUS facebook page link

  Insert CIVICUS twitter account (including Monitor twitter account where relevant

• Re: Proposed International Cooperation Bill
  Presidente de la República
  S.E. Hugo Chávez Frías
  Palacio de Miraflores, Caracas,
  Venezuela
  Fax:+58.212.806 3698
  E-mail:
   

  Your Excellency,

   
   

  Re: Proposed International Cooperation Bill

   
   
   
  I write as the Secretary General of CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, an international alliance of civil society with members and partners in over a hundred countries. CIVICUS works to strengthen civil society and citizen action throughout the world.
   
   
  We at CIVICUS, our members and partners, are deeply concerned about your recent comments urging National Assembly members to adopt a "severe" law to effectively stop international funding for NGOs. We would like to emphasise that Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) play an extremely important role in national life. Their constructive criticism and quest for greater accountability in public life are important assets for the nation. We therefore urge your government to respect expressions of legitimate dissent and unequivocally uphold civil society's rights to express, associate and assemble freely.
   
   

  We would like to draw your attention to the International Cooperation Bill, currently being discussed by law makers. We believe that the bill has been drawn up without adequate consultation with civil society. Moreover, we are deeply apprehensive that that passage of the Bill in its current form will severely curtail civil society space in the following ways:

  1. Subjecting CSOs to additional layers of bureaucracy by requiring them to register with the government in order to receive funds from international sources could increase the possibility of subjective denial of registration to CSOs who have been critical of official actions.
  2. The creation of an official fund for International Cooperation and Assistance for the collection of monetary grants from overseas and their subsequent disbursement by the government is likely to impede international cooperation activities between Venezuelan CSOs and their counterparts abroad. Moreover, it will lead to government ownership and prioritisation of international cooperation funds rather than democratic ownership by CSOs and local communities.
  3. By increasing executive discretion to monitor CSO affairs through the creation of an Agency for International Cooperation, limits of whose powers and have not been clearly defined, raising apprehension of increased restrictions on CSO affairs. 

  We believe that the registration and funding requirements of the Bill, given their ambiguity, have the potential to breach the right to freedom of association embodied in the Venezuelan Constitution, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Defenders Declaration. 

  We urge you to use your executive powers and influence to carry out consultations with civil society with regard to the need for an international cooperation law as well as the principles that should underpin any regulatory mechanism for civil society.

  Sincerely,

  Ingrid Srinath
  Secretary General
  CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation

• RUSSIA: ‘The shutdown of media sources threatens to create information vacuum for Russians’

  CIVICUS speaks about anti-war protests in Russia and the government’s violations of digital rights with Natalia Malysheva, co-founder and press secretary of Roskomsvoboda.

  Roskomsvoboda is a civil society organisation (CSO) that works to defend people’s digital rights. Established in 2012, it promotes the freedom of information and advocates against censorship. It is currently working to ensure people receive accurate information about the war and offering assistance to those who have been detained.

  How significant are the ongoing anti-war protests in Russia?

  The protests are small. In the first days of the so-called ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine, many people came out to take part in spontaneous rallies for peace in all major cities of Russia. Human rights CSOs have reported that more than 15,000 people have been detained so far for speaking out against the war. But now protests typically consist of small groups of people in multiple locations across the country.

  The new law that prohibits and criminalises the dissemination of ‘fake news’ about the Russian military action and the expression of support for ‘anti-Russian sanctions’ has had a strong impact on how people organise, and on whether they go out to protest, because it has installed fear throughout society.

  People have been arrested merely for using the words ‘war’ and ‘peace’ in the context of protests, and even for using asterisks instead of letters on their signs – because the government knows that if you protest with a blank sign or a sign full of asterisks, what you are trying to say is ‘no to war’. People who advocate against the war on social media are also often at risk of being arrested.

  There are fewer and fewer people who are willing to take part in an uncoordinated rally and get arrested for several days, because most of them have families and jobs they wish to protect. Many people who fear for their lives are leaving the country for their safety. Others simply do not see any prospects in a continuing struggle. Moving forward, we shouldn’t expect mass protests to arise in Russia.

  Do you think protests can make any difference?

  Right now it is clear that the Russian government does not intend to have a dialogue with the part of society that does not support its so-called ‘military operation’ in Ukraine. This is unfortunately a relatively small segment of society and its demands are overlooked.

  Although people continue to go out to protests and some get arrested in the process, in my opinion this will not change the course of the events that are currently taking place. The authorities won’t listen to protesters. Protesting will perhaps start making more sense when – or if – most Russians begin to understand what is really happening.

  What is Roskomsvoboda focusing on?

  Roskomsvoboda is a CSO that supports open self-regulatory networks and the protection of digital rights of internet users. It seeks to counter online censorship and expand the opportunities brought by digital technologies.

  For 10 years, Roskomsvoboda has constantly monitored the activities of government agencies. We publish a register of blocked sites and raise awareness of online abuse, leakages of personal data and the persecution of citizens for their social media statements. We conduct extensive public campaigns and events aimed at informing citizens about the violation of their digital rights, initiating public discussion and bringing people together so they can fight for their rights. Our lawyers defend those who are prosecuted for their online statements or activities, represent the interests of users and site owners in court and participate in the development of proposals for changing legislation.

  In the past few days, against the backdrop of an information war and a growing social crisis, we have focused more on helping people get reliable information about what is happening. We have published pieces about new laws that have been adopted to introduce censorship and analysed how they will affect people and their right to speak up. Our lawyers continue to provide targeted legal assistance to those who are being prosecuted for speaking out online, defending people in courts.

  The closure of some news outlets and social media platforms is affecting the kind of information people receive. State media outlets provide information that only reflects events from the government’s perspective and disseminate a lot of propaganda. The shutdown of leading media sources threatens to create an information vacuum for Russians, which won’t contribute to the goal of achieving peace.

  Restrictions on access to information and censorship have already significantly reduced people’s ability to protest. Even publishing an online call for a peace rally can result in criminal punishment.

  We recently issued a statement calling on the world’s leading internet and IT companies and initiatives not to indiscriminately impose mass sanctions and not to punish ordinary people in Russia, many of whom are already in a vulnerable position. We have translated our appeal into several languages and are asking everyone to help disseminate it.

  What are the dangers of disinformation in the context of the current crisis?

  The biggest risk of disinformation is that of disconnecting Russia from the global information space.

  Russian authorities have blocked the world’s largest media outlets and social media. Many western companies have stopped operating in Russia, making it even more closed for international viewers. This prevents people from getting the truth about what is happening; it also destroys the businesses and careers of many people who have worked in partnership with Western countries for many years.

  The current closure of businesses has left many people without vital resources. People are not only affected by oppression from the Russian government but must also deal with the potential loss of their jobs and sources of income. With such actions, western countries only risk Russia shutting down completely from the outside world, paving the way for the rise of a ‘sovereign internet’ – an internet thoroughly controlled by the government.

  How can the international community best support Russian civil society?

  The international community can help by bringing our message to the widest possible audience. On behalf of Russian internet users, Roskomsvoboda urges technology companies located in the jurisdictions of the USA, the European Union and other countries not to massively disable the accounts of Russian users. They should not restrict their access to information and means of communication.

  Digital discrimination based on nationality would reduce the ability of Russians to gain access to reliable information, as well as to conduct honest work, study and research activities. So we ask you to please distribute our statement far and wide.

  We also started a petition asking the world’s virtual private network (VPN) services to help ensure that Russian users have free access to their services during these difficult times. This is necessary to protect users’ basic rights to privacy, the secrecy of communication and their ability to receive and disseminate information freely. Access to information is a basic human right enshrined in various international agreements. In critical situations, it is more important than ever.

  Civic space in Russiais rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor. Russia is currently on theCIVICUS Monitor Watch List, which identifies countries in which a severe and abrupt deterioration in the quality of civic space is taking place.
  Get in touch with Roskomsvoboda through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@RuBlackListNET on Twitter.

• RUSSIA: ‘These protests are key to the preservation of Russian civil society’

  CIVICUS speaks about the ongoing anti-war protests in Russia and the repressive government response with OVD-Info’s spokesperson Maria Kuznetsova.

  OVD-Info is an independent civil society organisation (CSO) that aims to promote and protect human rights – and specifically the freedom of peaceful assembly – in Russia. It monitors protests and their repression and assists detained protesters through legal aid, online consultations, and bringing them food and water while in detention.

  How big are the ongoing anti-war protests in Russia?

  The protests were massive in the first two weeks of the war – we recorded protest-related arrests in at least 159 cities. Of course, the biggest protests were those taking place in major developed cities, basically Moscow and St. Petersburg.

  People came out against the war for moral reasons, because they could not look at the horror of what was happening in Ukraine and not react: mass bombings, killings of civilians, violence.

  Protesters are mostly people under 40 years old – because they are the ones who, thanks to the internet, get an accurate picture of what is happening, in contrast to the narrative that is pushed by censored state TV. Their demands to end the war are simultaneously, of course, demands to overthrow Putin. Because one is impossible without the other.

  My opinion is that due to the deteriorating economic situation, another – quite different – wave of protests may be expected soon. This may start among the poorer sections of the population who have lost income and jobs, and among doctors and patients, who are already experiencing the consequences of shortages of life-saving medicines due to sanctions.

  Do you think repression has dissuaded people from protesting in bigger numbers?

  At the height of the protests, on 5 March, more than 5,500 people were detained in one day. Since the beginning of the war, nearly 15,000 people have been detained at anti-war protests. The police are very harshly suppressing the protests – for example, on Sunday 20 March in Moscow, virtually all protesters were detained, and many of them were arrested for five to 30 days.

  In addition, 39 criminal cases have already been opened due to statements and protests against the war; some of the defendants are already in jail. All of this scares away potential protesters. They understand that they can get a prison sentence even for participating in a peaceful rally, and it is obvious that fewer people are coming out now. However, protest continues under different forms: people sign open letters, write on social media, quit their jobs. We have even seen several high-profile dismissals of journalists and editors from federal media channels.

  Those who still venture out to protest are being assisted by several human rights organisations, including OVD-Info. We send our lawyers to police stations where protesters are held. When there are not enough lawyers or we do not have a lawyer in a given city, we provide online consultations. We accompany the defendants to court. In addition, there is an extensive network of volunteers who also come to police stations to bring detainees water and food so that they do not go hungry all night after they are detained.

  Do you think the protests will lead to meaningful change?

  I don’t think there is a chance that these protests will influence the politics of the current regime, and as a human rights project, rather than a political one, OVD-Info is not in a position to assess the prospects for regime change. What we know for sure is that the only possible path to peace in Europe is having a free Russia that protects human rights. We do not know when our country will turn that way.

  Still, these protests are key to the preservation and future development of Russian civil society. By taking part in them, those who oppose the war will gain invaluable self-organisation skills and acquire the moral right to play a prominent role when the time comes to build a new Russia.

  How have media restrictions imposed by the government affected the protests, and civil society work more generally?

  In my opinion, what we are witnessing in Russia is the establishment of military censorship. Even calling the events in Ukraine a war is prohibited – this is punishable by an administrative fine, and in case of repeated violations it becomes a criminal case, which can result in up to five years in prison. A new crime has been included in the Criminal Code: that of public disseminating knowingly false information about the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. You can get up to 15 years in prison if you’re accused of doing that.

  The websites of almost all independent organisations have been blocked in Russia since the beginning of the war. Due to anti-war remarks, its founders were forced to shut down Echo of Moscow, a radio station. The online media Znak.com also closed due to pressures. Independent TV channel Dozhd left Russia and temporarily interrupted its broadcasts, which were viewed by millions. Almost all independent media outlets were forced to leave Russia. In addition, the government blocked Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, because they realised they were unable to effectively impose censorship on social media.

  At the moment, military censorship makes it tough to continue any anti-war and independent civilian activity, because any statement or protest can result in a prison term. But people continue to protest regardless, and many celebrities are speaking out publicly. We have seen employees of propaganda channels getting fired, which suggests that people are so enraged by what is happening that they are willing to fight back despite the risks.

  How have the sanctions affected your work?

  I don’t have a clear answer just yet. It seems to me that so far sanctions have not affected our work so much, but the situation can always quickly deteriorate. In fact, OVD-Info has closed down all Russian donations, while international donations continue to be safe. 

  For the time being, it is the shutdown of many social media platforms that has made our work much more complex: it is increasingly difficult for us to convey information to people, educate them on legal issues and provide them with legal assistance. It will be especially difficult for us if Telegram is blocked in Russia, because it is now our primary platform for communicating with detainees.

  How can the international community help independent CSOs and human rights activists in Russia?

  I think the international community should be more careful with sanctions, which should be targeted. I think that the idea of collective responsibility is wrong – in Russia, it is a concept reminiscent of Stalin’s mass deportations of whole peoples, such as the Crimean Tatars, to pay for some individuals’ cooperation with the Third Reich.

  From a pragmatic rather than an ethical point of view, it must be noted that many sanctions that have been imposed are having negative side effects – they are harming the most progressive part of society that opposes the war, preventing it from receiving information and obstructing the work of the last independent media. For example, Mailchimp – a USA-based platform and email marketing service that is used to create and distribute email marketing campaigns – has blocked all its clients from Russia.

  It is also essential to understand that the Russians and Belarusians that are now leaving their countries and arriving in Turkey, Georgia, Armenia and other parts of Europe are mostly opposition activists and independent journalists who face jail time in their homeland. But because they are Russians and Belarusians, they are facing massive discrimination. However, these activists and journalists are not responsible for their government’s actions – they are in fact the only hope that their countries will change, so it is essential to help them instead of discriminating against them as if they were the aggressors’. It is necessary to understand that not all Russians and Belarusians support the war in Ukraine.

  Civic space in Russiais rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor. Russia is currently on theCIVICUS Monitor Watch List, which identifies countries in which a severe and abrupt deterioration in the quality of civic space is taking place.
  Get in touch with OVD-Info through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@ovdinfo on Twitter.

   

• Russia: Human Rights Council must respond to crackdown on civil society

  Joint statement ahead of the 46th Session of the Human Rights Council, condemning Russia (a new member of the body) for recent attacks against protestors (over 12,000 detained since late January).

  ---

• Saudi rights activist Loujain al-Hathloul spends 1000th day in prison

  

  Today,  as Saudi women’s rights activist Loujain al-Hathloul spends her 1000th day in prison, global civil society alliance CIVICUS and the Free Saudi Activists coalition call for her immediate and unconditional release. 

• SENEGAL: ‘After being an example of democracy in Africa, we are increasingly tending towards authoritarianism’

  CIVICUS speaks with Abdou Aziz Cissé, Advocacy Officer at AfricTivistes, about President Macky Sall’s decision to postpone the presidential election that was due on 25 February and its implications for democracy in Senegal.

  AfricTivistes is a pan-African civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes and defends democratic values, human rights and good governance through civic tech. It aims to empower African people to become active players in building their societies and holding their governments to account.

  Why did President Sall postpone the 25 February presidential election?

  This latest crisis in Senegal began with a solemn address by President Sall on 3 February, the day before the planned day for the start of the campaign for the 25 February election, in which his successor was to be elected. He repealed the decree convening the electoral body, which had set the presidential election for 25 February.

  He cited three reasons: a supposed institutional crisis between the National Assembly and the Constitutional Council concerning an alleged case of corruption of judges, the need to set up a parliamentary commission to investigate suspected irregularities in the process of verifying sponsorships for the election and the revelation that one of the candidates vetted by the Constitutional Council has dual nationality.

  It should be noted that Karim Wade, son of former president Abdoulaye Wade and candidate for the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), was not on the final list of candidates for the presidential election announced on 20 January. To contest this decision by the Constitutional Council, PDS members of parliament called for the creation of a parliamentary commission of enquiry to shed light on the process of candidacy verification. They also accused two Constitutional Council magistrates of corruption. Parliament approved the establishment of this commission on 31 January.

  On 5 February, a bill to postpone the presidential election until 15 December was passed after opposition legislators were ejected from parliament by security forces. It should be remembered that on 3 July 2023, after stating that he would not seek a third term in office, Sall promised to hand over power on 2 April following free, inclusive and transparent elections.

  Why has this decision been described as a ‘constitutional coup’?

  Sall’s actions have been described as a constitutional coup because he is not allowed to interrupt an electoral process that has already begun. The postponement of an election is the exclusive prerogative of the Constitutional Council.

  Sall’s decision also violates other articles of the constitution, notably article 27, which provides for a five-year presidential term and a limit of two consecutive terms, which means the president cannot extend his term of office. There is also article 103, which states that ‘the republican form of the state, the method of election, the duration and number of consecutive terms of office of the President of the Republic may not be revised’.

  I would like to emphasise that in accordance with article 52 of the constitution, the president can only interrupt the process ‘when the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity of the national territory or the fulfilment of international commitments are threatened in a serious and immediate manner’. However, all institutions of the republic were operating regularly. The establishment of a parliamentary commission of enquiry and the passage of a bill clearly proved it.

  By making this illegal decision, Sall became the first president in Senegal’s history not to organise a presidential election on its due date since 1963.

  What has the reaction of civil society been?

  The reaction of civil society was spontaneous. Several CSOs, including AfricTivistes, condemned this anti-democratic act in press releases and media statements. The nation’s other driving forces, such as trade unions from all professions, also voiced their disagreement.

  On social networks, citizens shared their indignation, internationalising their anger at the decision.

  On 4 February, 19 candidates held a press conference, joined by members of civil society, to reaffirm their willingness to campaign together.

  Another demonstration was declared for 5 February, the day of the parliamentary vote, but could not take place because all the strategic roads leading to the National Assembly were cordoned off. Since June 2023, the administrative authorities have systematically banned demonstrations, even peaceful ones.

  The ‘Aar Sunu Election’ (‘Let’s protect our election’) platform brought together more than a hundred CSOs to reject the postponement of the election. The pressure paid off, because on the evening of 15 February, the Constitutional Council declared the presidential decree of 3 February and the law passed by the National Assembly on 5 February invalid.

  How has the government reacted?

  The government began by cracking down on the demonstrations that took place on 4 February, the day after the president’s announcement and the day on which the election campaign was due to begin. Censorship was also imposed that day, with the internet via mobile data cut off, according to the minister in charge, to stop ‘the dissemination of hateful and subversive messages’. The same reasons had been provided to justify acts of internet censorship in June, July and August 2023. Mobile data was restored on 7 February, then restricted to specific time slots on 13 February.

  Internet blackouts and other forms of online restrictions violate the constitution and several international conventions ratified by Senegal. They are violations of freedom of expression, access to information and economic freedoms. According to Senegalese telecoms unions, censorship has caused losses amounting to 3 billion CFA francs (approx. US$ 4.9 million).

  With this in mind, AfricTivistes and two Senegalese journalists are taking the state of Senegal to the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States, the regional organisation, to seek an end to untimely cuts in mobile internet data.

  In addition, the licence of the Walfadjri television station was suspended at the height of the protests following the announcement of the postponement of the election. Walfadjri has been subjected to a relentless attack by the authorities. Its signal was restored on 11 February.

  On 9 February, a peaceful rally held by numerous organisations on the Place de la Nation in Dakar was dispersed by the police. People mobilised throughout the country, particularly in the northern city of Saint-Louis. Peaceful protesters were violently repressed with disproportionate use of force, resulting in three deaths and several people injured, some of whom were not even taking part in demonstrations, along with over 200 arrests.

  The press was also prevented from covering the demonstrations and providing people with fair and accurate information. Journalists, most of them women, were teargassed, arrested and roughed up in the same way as protesters. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, at least 25 journalists were attacked, detained or teargassed during the demonstrations. Journalist Absa Anne, of the news website Seneweb, was dragged into a police vehicle and beaten unconscious, becoming a symbol of the indiscriminate crackdown on the press that took place that day.

  A silent march announced by the ‘Let’s protect our election’ platform was banned on 13 February by the administrative authorities. However, another march on 17 February was authorised, and people came together in huge numbers to enjoy their long-threatened constitutional freedoms. This national moment of communion was proof that when authorised by the administrative authorities, demonstrations go off peacefully.

  How do you see the future of democracy in Senegal?

  After being an example of democracy and political stability in Africa, with peaceful democratic alternation in power in 2000 and 2012, Senegal is increasingly tending towards authoritarianism, symbolised by the restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms.

  Even if the release, since 15 February, of more than 600 political detainees arrested for crimes of opinion or belonging to the opposition is helping to ease the political climate, the crisis that we are currently experiencing does not augur a bright future for Senegalese democracy.

  But I am optimistic, because even if the political class is engaged in a fierce power struggle, civil society is strong and has a considerable ability to assert itself in all areas of the country’s social life. Not to mention the new force of protest that has emerged with the advent of civic technologies. Social media amplifies citizens’ voices and gives them an international dimension, hence the moves by the authorities to try to silence the voices that express themselves through online tools.

  Senegal also has strong justice and administrative systems, which have always played their role as a counterweight. We must also take into account that, like all democratic systems, Senegal’s needs to be perfected. It has made significant progress, albeit with ups and downs like those we are currently experiencing. And we must bear in mind that it is from crises that opportunities emerge.

  What should the international community do to help solve this crisis?

  The international community can play an important role in supporting a transparent and fair democratic process by sending election observation missions.

  As well as supporting civil society, international partners can exert diplomatic pressure, as Antony Blinken, the US Secretary of State, Joseph Borell, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights have done, calling for independent investigations to shed light on the killings of protesters. All this goodwill can help to encourage an inclusive dialogue. This could foster a search for consensual solutions.

  The international community must condemn all political violence and reiterate the importance of respecting fundamental human rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of peaceful assembly.

  How do you assess the state of democracy in West Africa, and how is AfricTivistes working to help activists in countries affected by coups?

  Over the past three years democracy in the region has declined. Between 2020 and 2022, West Africa experienced five coups against a backdrop of terrorism in the Sahel and anti-imperialist rhetoric. Civil society plays a crucial role in shaping democracy, but civic space is stifled in countries where the military has taken over.

  However, each country has its own historical and political dynamics. Democratic trends vary considerably depending on historical, cultural and socio-economic factors. Countries that have succeeded in implementing institutional reforms to combat corruption have generally seen the quality of their democracy improve, as seen in Cabo Verde, West Africa’s champion of good governance.

  Several countries have maintained relative political stability, such as Senegal before the latest developments. The last country to hold a presidential election was Côte d’Ivoire, following post-election incidents and the violation of the Ivorian constitution, which also limits the number of presidential terms to two.

  With a large community enabling us to internationalise our advocacy, AfricTivistes provides moral support to democracy activists by publishing press releases to point out the illegality of their arrest and censorship.

  We also provide them with technical support so they can circumvent the censorship they face in their countries. To date, we have supported seven democracy activists and journalists in danger.

  ---

  Civic space in Senegal is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with AfricTivistes through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@afric_tivistes and@frican_excellency on Instagram and@AFRICTIVISTES and@AbdouJCisse on Twitter.

• SENEGAL: ‘The restriction of civic space remains civil society’s greatest concern’

  CIVICUS speaks with Malick Ndome, senior policy adviser and board member at the Council of Non-Governmental Organisations in Support of Development (CONGAD), about the recent election in Senegal.

  CONGAD was founded in 1982 by civil society organisations (CSOs) working in Senegal to coordinate relations with the state and other partners. CONGAD provides training for CSOs, local authorities and the media. It also advocates for a stronger civil society capable of influencing public policy.

  What was the significance of the victory of opposition candidate Bassirou Diomaye Faye in the recent presidential election?

  Faye’s first-round victory was difficult to predict. However, it is important to recognise the impact of his release from prison, as well as that of Ousmane Sonko, the leader of his party, Senegal’s Patriots (PASTEF), just 10 days before the election.

  Sonko had been barred from standing following a controversial conviction for youth corruption and defamation in 2023. Faye was nominated as a candidate in his place, but was also sent to prison for criticising the court’s decision in the Sonko case. Their release galvanised the support of PASTEF supporters and activists, and young people in general, who appreciated their message of change and their anti-corruption aura. In contrast, there seems to have been a noticeable lack of enthusiasm for the government coalition.

  In addition, there was much speculation and a lot of rumours about President Macky Sall’s lack of support for his party’s presidential candidate, which undoubtedly influenced the electoral landscape.

  Given the circumstances, the clear victory of an opposition candidate has profound implications for the strength of Senegalese democracy. First, it signifies a strengthened commitment to the rule of law, guaranteeing every Senegalese citizen a fair chance of access to the highest office. It also demonstrates the resilience of Senegal’s electoral institutions in the face of challenges. Further, despite persistent concerns about voter turnout, Senegalese citizens demonstrated a commendable level of confidence in electoral processes, underlining their commitment to democratic principles. Voter turnout was 61 per cent.

  This provides an opportunity for a comprehensive review of the electoral law and the electoral code, with a focus on correcting the main shortcomings identified by political stakeholders and civil society. It is imperative to review the role and effectiveness of institutions such as the National Autonomous Electoral Commission in overseeing elections, ensuring that it has the resources and capacity to fulfil its mandate impartially and effectively.

  In sum, while Faye’s victory may have been unexpected, it marks a crucial moment in Senegal’s democratic journey, highlighting both strengths and areas for improvement in its political system.

  Was civic space restricted before the election? What challenges did this pose and what can be expected in the future?

  Significant restrictions were observed in February, when Sall’s announcement of the postponement of the election led to violent demonstrations and deaths. The Constitutional Council’s positive response in favour of holding the election helped ease tensions, leading to the lifting of the suspension of TikTok and the restriction of Facebook, which had an impact on digital industries and small-scale workers in the informal sector.

  The restriction of civic space has been strongly criticised by various groups and people. Under the new government, we expect to see restrictions on civic space lifted, but I can’t prejudge that. It remains a strong demand from civil society and the political arena.

  How did civil society contribute to a free and fair election?

  Civil society’s actions were analysed and perceived differently depending on whether you were in the opposition or the presidential camp. There were many citizens’ initiatives to ensure that the electoral timetable was respected and free and transparent elections were held.

  Civil society initiatives included the setting up of digital platforms to facilitate communication and citizen mobilisation. Civil society formed groups to voice citizens’ concerns and influence political decisions. It organised forums to raise awareness and mobilise the population to ensure the electoral timetable was respected and the election was transparent.

  In addition, civil society organised meetings with presidential candidates to ask them questions and hear their proposals. It also helped to inform the public by publishing press articles and sharing information on electoral issues.

  In addition, civil society interacted with stakeholders in sensitive spheres such as religious leaders to promote a climate of peace and stability during the election period. It also facilitated the hosting and coordination of the local, regional and sub-regional structures responsible for overseeing the election, thus ensuring effective and transparent monitoring of the electoral process.

  What are civil society’s expectations of the new government?

  Civil society has a number of expectations and is advocating several policy measures to protect civic space and human rights and promote good governance.

  According to the information available to me, there has not yet been any formal request from civil society. However, it is clear that the restriction of civic space remains civil society’s greatest concern.

  Among the political measures advocated are the passing of a press code to provide a better framework for the exercise of journalism and the publication of implementing decrees, as well as the revision of article 80 of the Constitution concerning offences against the head of state. Civil society is also calling for the adoption of a law to protect whistleblowers and human rights defenders, as well as the publication of reports by the Court of Audit and the prosecution of offenders.

  Civil society calls for institutional change in the governance of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, and for the establishment of a financial prosecutor’s office with broad responsibilities.

  Finally, the fight against corruption and for better governance is a major concern for civil society, which hopes that the new government will take effective measures in this direction.

  ---

  Civic space in Senegal is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with CONGAD through itswebsite.

• Sex Education Deemed Illegal in Uzbekistan
  Johannesburg. 16 March 2010.Uzbek HIV activist, Maxim Popov, has been sentenced to seven years in prison apparently as punishment for his work to raise public awareness on prevention of sexually transmitted diseases and the promotion of healthy lifestyles. Although the sentence was given in September 2009, this news became public only in late February 2010.

  According to local sources, Maxim Popov was charged with embezzlement of funds, involving minors in anti-social behavior, molesting individuals, involving individuals with drugs, and tax evasion. Two of his colleagues were also charged with embezzlement, tax evasion and violations of foreign currency regulations and were given one-year suspended sentences. Mr Popov is the leader of NGO Izis, which focuses on work with drug addicts, sex workers and on HIV prevention. He is also the author of the book "HIV and AIDS Today", which was published with the support of UNICEF and Population Services International. This book, explaining STD prevention, was deemed "illegal" by the criminal court of Tashkent, based on the findings of a commission of experts that it is disrespectful of the national culture and the Uzbek people.

• SINGAPORE: ‘Opposition parties were given unfavourable coverage by the state media and had difficulty accessing voters’

  CIVICUS speaks to human rights defender Jolovan Wham about the recent elections in Singapore, which were held in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. TheCIVICUS Monitor has documented the use of restrictive laws in Singapore against civil society activists, human rights defenders, lawyers, independent online media outlets and members of the political opposition, who face prosecution, including through defamation suits and contempt of court charges.

  

   

  Has there been any disagreement around whether elections should be held, when, or how?

  Yes. Opposition parties were largely against it as the COVID-19 pandemic had not abated and holding the elections might pose a public health threat. They were also concerned that physical rallies and door-to-door visits would be disallowed, which would hinder their campaign efforts.

  And indeed, it was more difficult to connect face to face with voters when a one-metre distance had to be maintained during walkabouts and door-to-door visits. Everyone had to give their speeches and connect with voters online.

  Some changes were introduced so elections would proceed in the context of the pandemic. Voting time was extended by two hours to take the longer queues caused by social distancing into consideration. But the possibility of online voting was not discussed. And older people and those who were frail may have not participated for fear of getting infected with COVID-19.

  What was the state of civic freedoms ahead of the elections?

  The ruling People’s Action Party’s (PAP) control of all public institutions is a major civic freedom issue. It means it gets to shape the political discourse according to its agenda and set the rules of the game to its advantage. For example, the elections department, which draws electoral boundaries, reports to the prime minister himself. Most civil society groups are afraid of engaging in the elections in a meaningful way for fear of being seen as ‘partisan’. If a civil society association is associated with an opposition party, it may lose funding, support and patronage for its work.

  A recent report by the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Parliamentarians for Human Rights documented structural flaws that prevented the election from being fair, including the prime minister’s broad powers over the entire electoral process without any effective oversight. The environment in which the Singaporean people were able to exercise their right to participate in public life was heavily restricted. Key opposition candidates had been targeted with lawsuits by members of the PAP, and voters in opposition-led constituencies fear reprisals for not voting for the PAP. Fundamental freedoms, which are intrinsically linked to free elections, are limited as the government controls the media and uses restrictive laws against dissenting and critical voices.

  How did this affect the chances of the opposition?

  Opposition candidates and parties had to rely solely on social media to get their message out, because of unfavourable coverage by state media. They also had difficulty accessing voters because of the PAP’s monopoly, manipulation and control of national grassroots groups, unions and organisations, on top of the difficulties involved in holding physical rallies in the context of the pandemic.

  The elections were held on 10 July. The PAP secured 83 parliamentary seats but faced a setback as the opposition made minor but historic gains. The Workers’ party, the only opposition party in parliament, increased its seats from six to 10 – the biggest result for the opposition since independence. The PAP popular vote dipped to 61 per cent.

  What were the main issues the campaign revolved around?

  For the PAP, the campaign revolved around smearing opposition candidates, accusing them of peddling falsehoods and of having nefarious agendas and engaging in character assassination. Scaremongering tactics were also used: the electorate were told that only the PAP could get Singaporeans out of the COVID-19 pandemic and that having more opposition members in parliament would thwart these efforts.

  Opposition parties, on the other hand, focused on telling the electorate that they were in danger of being wiped out of parliament as they held fewer than 10 elected seats out of almost 90. Issues such as the high cost of living and immigration were other key issues raised by the opposition.

  Civic space in Singapore is rated as ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

• Singapore: Anti-fake news bill another tool to suppress criticism and dissent

  

  The Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA) and CIVICUS, the global civil society alliance, are extremely concerned by a new bill that has been proposed by the Singaporean authorities to counter false news. Our organisations believe that the stated aim of the bill - to deal with online misinformation - is merely a smokescreen to increase curbs on the freedom of expression, and to further silence dissent in this already tightly controlled State. We urge the authorities to discard the bill immediately.

• Singapore: Drop investigations and cease harassment against human rights defenders

  Seven (7) human rights organisations urgently call on the Singaporean authorities to drop their criminal investigations of human rights defenders Kirsten Han and Rocky Howe and cease harassing them through legal processes for their work.

• Singapore: Drop police report against independent media outlet New Naratif

  We, the undersigned civil society organisations, urge the government of Singapore to order the Elections Department (ELD) to immediately withdraw its police report against New Naratif, and to cease abusing the law to harass critical voices and independent journalists.

• Singapore: Open letter to parliamentary candidates and political party leaders to prioritise fundamental freedoms

  🇸🇬Singapore: Three civil society organisations call on parliamentary candidates and political party leaders to commit to respecting and protecting human rights, particularly fundamental freedoms, during and after the #SGElection https://t.co/kpDykUxFZw pic.twitter.com/EGyzabme4h

  — CIVICUS (@CIVICUSalliance) July 3, 2020

  As Singaporeans prepare to go to the polls in parliamentary elections on 10 July 2020, the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation and the International Commission of Jurists urge all parliamentary candidates and political party leaders to commit to respecting and protecting human rights, particularly fundamental freedoms, as part of their mandate.

• Singapore: Withdraw Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Bill

  Today, eleven undersigned organizations called on the Government of Singapore to withdraw the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Bill (‘FICA’). FICA’s provisions contravene international legal and human rights principles – including the rights to freedom of expression, association, participation in public affairs, and privacy – and will further curtail civic space, both online and offline.

  On October 4, 2021, the Parliament of Singapore passed FICA, three weeks after it was tabled on September 13 by the Ministry of Home Affairs purportedly to “prevent, detect and disrupt foreign interference in (...) domestic politics”. This was despite serious concerns that the law could undermine civic freedoms – raised by members of the public, civil society, legal fraternity, independent media, political opposition, academia and industry in Singapore. The bill went through both its second and third readings in one parliament sitting and FICA was passed without significant amendments to address key concerns.

  While the protection of national security may be a legitimate aim, FICA contravenes the rule of law and the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality under international human rights law. Overbroad and ambiguous provisions draw within its scope a wide range of conduct, activities and communications “directed towards a political end in Singapore”. As a result, almost any form of expression and association relating to politics, social justice or other matters of public interest in Singapore may be ensnarled within the ambit of the legislation – making it difficult, in turn, for the average individual to reasonably predict with precision what conduct may fall foul of the law. Vague provisions also allow for unfettered executive discretion in interpretation and implementation of the law. Unlimited executive discretion – together with severe penalties under the law – can result in executive overreach into what it deems permissible as civic discussion and public debate. FICA also provides no mechanism for independent judicial oversight or provision of remedy where human rights violations occur as a result of the enforcement of its provisions. The law thus fails to provide for the least intrusive mechanisms to achieve its stated aim of protecting national security while greatly enhancing the risk of executive abuse.

  FICA empowers the Minister for Home Affairs to order the removal or disabling of online content – undermining the right to freedom of expression. The Minister is, for example, empowered to order publication of mandatory messages drafted by the authorities, ban apps from being downloadable in Singapore, and order disclosure of private communications and information, when the Minister “suspects or believes” that someone is undertaking or planning to undertake online communications activity “on behalf of a foreign principal”, and that it is in the “public interest” to act. The law makes it a criminal offence to undertake “clandestine” electronic communications on behalf of a foreign principal under certain circumstances, including when that activity “diminishes or is likely to diminish public confidence in (...) the Government or a public authority” or “is likely to be directed towards a political end in Singapore”. Activity “directed towards a public end” includes conduct influencing or seeking to influence government decisions or public opinion on matters of “public controversy” or “political debate” in Singapore. The government can also designate individuals as “politically significant persons” after which they can be required to follow strict limits on sources of funding and disclose all links with foreigners or foreign entities.

  FICA’s provisions can also facilitate violations of the rights to freedom of association and participation in public affairs. “Conduct” committed in connection with a “foreign principal” and “directed towards a political end in Singapore” is criminalized where this involves “covert” communication or “deception” – which is defined as including any “deliberate” use of “encrypted communication platforms”. The expansive and vaguely worded definition of activities “directed towards a political end” can cover a broad range of activities – including social justice advocacy, artistic commentary, academic research, social enterprise or journalistic reporting – carried out by, among others, members of civil society, academia, media, the arts and industry. Meanwhile, the overbroad configuration of connection with a “foreign principal” as “arrangements” with any “foreigner” or “non-Singapore registered entity” that can be “written or unwritten” brings within the law’s remit nearly all forms of cross-border collaboration or engagement. Use of “encrypted platforms” as a reflection of “covert” communications also allows for criminal intent to be inferred from a wide range of modes of communications via modern electronic devices and platforms – including through encrypted messaging and email services; and the use of online platforms through secure connection services, such as virtual private networks (VPNs).

  FICA will disproportionately impact members of civil society, independent journalists, academics, researchers, artists, writers and other individuals who express opinions, share information and collaborate to advocate on socio-political issues and matters of public interest. As their work can involve critical opinions and is often underpinned and supported by cross-border collaboration, research and funding, they are exposed to increased scrutiny and sanctions under FICA. The issues on which they work will also come under increased State oversight and control. Executive oversight and control can, in turn, infringe not only their rights to freedom of expression and association but the rights of other individuals in Singapore who rely on their work to participate in public affairs, which includes conduct of citizens to “exert influence through public debate and dialogue with their representatives or through their capacity to organize”.

  Severe penalties under FICA are disproportionate. In addition, many of those penalties may be imposed without adequate independent oversight or remedy in case of human rights violations, which can result in a chilling effect on civic space and discussion. Directions can be issued by the authorities to censor, restrict or block access to online content, accounts, services, apps or locations deemed to violate the law. The law also allows for the authorities to designate “politically significant” individuals and entities and order them to “disclose foreign affiliations” and “arrangements” or to end “reportable arrangements”. However, there is a lack of independent oversight over these restrictions and designations. These directions may only be appealed to a Reviewing Tribunal appointed by the President on advice of the Cabinet, and decisions made by this Tribunal cannot be appealed to the High Court except for non-compliance with procedural requirements. Further, individuals can face criminal sanctions under the law for “clandestine foreign interference by electronic communications activity” and non-compliance with directions, which may result in steep fines and imprisonment terms. These criminal offences are arrestable and non-bailable.

  These penalties and restrictions not only risk undermining the right to privacy, but increase the risk of individuals self-censoring and deliberately deciding not to participate in or engage with cross-border networks to avoid potentially falling foul of the law. Their negative impacts can be particularly severe on independent online platforms, which can be banned from receiving funding or other financial support from foreign individuals or entities, and on journalists, political commentators, civil society members and community researchers who often nurture public opinion and debate through information, opinions and advocacy shared online.

  In light of these significant concerns, we request that the Government of Singapore withdraw FICA. The law risks imminently and substantially narrowing already limited civic space in the country – particularly where this space is significantly restricted through abuse of other existing laws such as defamation and contempt of court provisions; the Protection Against Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA), the Public Order Act and the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act. The imminent enactment and future enforcement of FICA will significantly undermine the Government of Singapore’s obligations under international law to protect, promote and fulfil human rights – instead allowing for the State to expand curtailment of civic freedoms to the detriment of its people.

  Signatories:

  Access Now
  Amnesty International
  ARTICLE 19
  ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
  Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
  CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
  Digital Defenders Partnership
  Human Rights Watch
  International Commission of Jurists
  Lawyers’ Rights Watch Canada
  Wikimedia Foundation

  Summary Legal Analysis

  International legal principles are clear that even as the protection of national security is a legitimate purpose for the restriction of certain rights, restrictions must be narrowly defined, strictly necessary and proportionate to this aim. The UN Human Rights Committee has clarified that this three-part test of legality, necessity and proportionality applies to freedom of expression. Limitations on this right must “conform to the strict tests of necessity and proportionality” and be “directly related to the specific need on which they are predicated”. Restrictions on the right to freedom of expression also negatively impact upon the rights to association and participation in public affairs as freedom of expression underpins the “free communication of information and ideas about public and political issues between citizens, candidates and elected representatives”. Meanwhile, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has noted that the three-part test also applies to the right to privacy in the digital age – noting that any interference with privacy must be “necessary and in proportion to” a legitimate aim, “be the least intrusive option available,” and “not render the essence of the right meaningless”.

  Overbroad and ambiguous provisions

  FICA’s overbroad and ambiguous provisions allow for abusive interpretation and implementation by the authorities, while failing to provide clarity to the public on what conduct would fall foul of the legislation. Its potential to encompass a wide range of conduct fails to ensure compliance with the principle of legality and confers overbroad discretion in interpretation and implementation upon those charged with enforcement of the law.

  FICA applies to “conduct” engaged on behalf of a “foreign principal” directed “towards a political end in Singapore”. (ss 4; 8) This includes “arrangements” with any “foreigner” or “non-Singapore registered entity” that can be “written or unwritten” to “influence or seek to influence” “public opinion” on matters of “public controversy” or “to promote or oppose political views, or public conduct relating to activities that have become the subject of a political debate”. (ss 4; 5; 8(f); 8(g))

  Criminal penalties apply where a person “undertakes electronic communications activity on behalf of a foreign principal” in a “covert” or other manner that “involves deception” which results in the publication in Singapore of “information or material” which “is likely to be prejudicial” to “public tranquillity” or “public order”; “likely to diminish public confidence in the Government” or is “likely to be directed towards a political end.” (ss 17-19)

  The expansive and vaguely worded definition of activities “directed towards a political end” encompasses a broad range of activities – including social justice advocacy, artistic commentary, academic research, social enterprise or journalistic reporting relating to a “political” issue – of civil society, academia, media, the arts and industry, amongst others. Individuals and organizations are therefore unable to accurately define what conduct can risk violating the law. Engagement “on behalf of a foreign principal”, for example, can also cover collaboration with foreign actors to conduct and share research; receive funding to hold events or implement projects; and cross-border training and education.

  Matters of “public controversy” and “political debate” can also overbroadly apply to pertinent issues of public interest on which individuals engage – potentially limiting their rights to freedom of expression, association and participation in public affairs. This risks impacting particularly on civil society engaging in research and advocacy – whose purpose is specifically to nurture and direct “political debate” on matters of public interest, including “controversy”, and to oversee and check powers of the executive. There is a risk that the authorities may bring within FICA’s remit civil society’s cross-border engagement and information-sharing, both of which are fundamental to policy and advocacy work, thereby negatively affecting collaboration among civil society actors in Singapore and organizations based outside the country, such as the organizations that are signatories to this statement.

  “Public tranquillity” and matters which “likely diminish public confidence in the Government”also allow for an overly broad interpretation to target critical commentary on government policy even in the absence of any legitimate reason to limit freedom of expression. “Covert” conduct includes “deliberately moving onto encrypted communication platforms” (p. 205), which can apply to the use of most modern electronic devices and be relied on to infer criminal intent from a broad range of potential communications – including through encrypted messaging and email services; and the use of online platforms through secure connection services, such as virtual private networks (VPNs).

  Unfettered executive discretion

  FICA allows for unfettered executive discretion to censure expression and association deemed impermissible by the State. In fact, it provides for wide potential for the authorities to encroach on the rights to free expression, association, participation in public affairs, and privacy, even in circumstances when such encroachment is not strictly necessary to achieve the purported aim of protecting national security.

  FICA allows authorities to designate individuals and entities as “politically significant” if their activities are “directed in part towards a political end” and if “it is in the public interest”. (ss 47, 48) This can result in any individual being potentially targeted under the law for expression or advocacy on issues relating to politics or public interest in Singapore. It can also apply to any individual currently working on these issues for a foreign organization or in collaboration with foreign actors – either through academic, civil society or other modes of arrangement.

  Designated “politically significant” individuals and entities can be ordered to “disclose foreign affiliations” and “arrangements” through reports to the authorities on their activities, even where they are “not directed towards a political end in Singapore”. (ss 76, 78) The authorities can also direct these “reportable arrangements” to end. (s 84) This can result in infringements of the rights to privacy and association of designated individuals working on issues of social concern in Singapore – particularly journalists, academics and researchers who may be required to reveal information and communications with foreign actors in contravention of professional ethics. Designated “politically significant” journalists and independent media outlets can also be issued a “transparency directive” – requiring them to disclose any “political matter with a foreign link” published in Singapore and identify the author’s name and nationality and any links to a “foreign principal”. (s 81)

  FICA also prohibits “politically significant” individuals and entities from accepting “donations” from “impermissible donors” who are not Singaporean individuals or companies (ss 55, 56); caps anonymous donations at S$5,000 a year (ss 57, 58); and bans foreigners from provision of “voluntary labour” to such individuals and entities. (ss 55, 56) These provisions risk being abused to muzzle social justice initiatives, civil society organizations and independent media outlets that rely on independent funding and potential support of individuals who are not Singaporeans to volunteer work or research time.

  Notably, FICA empowers the authorities to order any person to “provide any document or any information or material” on activities “directed towards a political end in Singapore” where it is deemed “necessary” for the exercise of powers under FICA. (s 108) This potentially violates the rights to privacy and association of any individual in connection with any individual or entity in relation to any matter under FICA – with a penalty of a fine of up to S$5,000 (approx. US$3,685) and continuing fines of up to S$500 (approx. US$368) for “every day or part of a day” of non-compliance. (s 108)

  Severe penalties

  Severe penalties can result in a chilling effect on the free exercise of the rights to expression, association, and participation in public affairs. Directions can be issued by the authorities under Part 3 of the law to “stop”, “disable” or “block access to” online content; and “restrict accounts or services” and “remove apps” for apparent violations. An online location which is deemed a “proscribed online location” by the Minister (s 24) on a Part 3 direction can then be prohibited from “soliciting or procuring” “any expenditure to operate”or for “services” provided for the platform. (s 39) Non-compliance with these restrictions amounts to a criminal offence, which is arrestable and non-bailable. Individuals can be slapped with severe criminal sanctions for alleged “clandestine foreign interference by electronic communications activity” – they can be fined up to S$100,000 (approx. US$74,000) and/or imprisoned for up to fourteen years. (ss 17 – 19)

  The UN Human Rights Committee has noted that criminal sanctions constitute severe interference with the right to freedom of expression and are disproportionate responses in all but the most egregious cases. These severe penalties are likely to exert a chilling effect on everyone, and particularly on journalists, political commentators, civil society members, academics and community researchers, who often publish information and opinions online.

  Lack of independent judicial oversight

  FICA does not provide for any independent oversight or remedial mechanism to address potential human rights violations. Appeals against Part 3 directions and Part 4 designations are provided for under the law – however, they are to first be made to the Minister in charge of issuing the order in the first place (ss 92, 93) and/or to a “Reviewing Tribunal” chaired by a Supreme Court Judge but consisting of three individuals closely linked to the government, “each of whom is appointed by the President on the advice of the Cabinet”. (s 94) The rules for such Tribunal’s proceedings are to, in turn, be determined by the Minister for Home Affairs. (s 99)

  Independent judicial review is severely limited as any appeal decision made by the Reviewing Tribunal, Minister or other authorities is “final” and “not to be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court” – except where the requested review of the Tribunal’s or Minister’s decision refers to procedural requirements, that will not analyze substantive questions relating to executive implementation of the law. (s 104) This limitation on the judiciary’s review powers undermines the rule of law, which requires judicial oversight as a check and balance against the executive’s exercise of discretionary power. Lack of oversight accentuates risks of violations perpetuated by severe penalties and the law’s stipulation that non-compliance with any order is an offence with penalties incurred from the time of alleged offending, regardless of any appeal.

  Civic space in Singapore is rated as "obstructed" by the CIVICUS Monitor

• Somaliland poet’s three-year prison sentence a shameful attack on free expression

  The three-year conviction of Somaliland poet and peace activist Nacima Abwaan Qorane this week highlights the increasingly repressive environment in Somaliland for peaceful expression, said global civil society alliance, CIVICUS.

• Spotlight on Cameroon: Reverse the suspension of journalists

  CIVICUS condemns the decision by Cameroon's National Communications Council to suspend journalists Séverin Tchounkeu (CEO) and Cédrick Noufele (Editor-in-chief and presenter), who are working with the privately-owned broadcaster Equinoxe TV for one month.

• Sri Lanka: Release youth activist Nathasha Edirisooriya and drop charges

  

  CIVICUS, a global civil society alliance, urges the government of Sri Lanka to immediately release youth activist and stand-up comedian Nathasha Edirisooriya and drop the charges against her unconditionally. Her arrest and detention go against the country’s international human rights obligations to protect fundamental freedoms.

  Nathasha Edirisooriya was arrested on 27 May 2023, accused of insulting Buddhism and hate speech for two jokes made during a comedy performance published on YouTube three days earlier. An edited clip of the performance was circulated, resulting in severe social media backlash. She retracted the video the same day and publicly apologised.

  On the night of 27 May 2023, Nathasha was prevented from travelling and subsequently arrested by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) at the Bandaranaike International Airport. The police initially refused access to lawyers or her partner.

  Despite her apology, online harassment and threats against her escalated, and the location of her residence was shared online. She faced trolling, serious threats of violence, and rape.

  On 28 May, she was charged under Section 3 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Act No. 56 of 2007, Section 291A (deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of any person) and 291B (deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of persons) of the Penal Code of Sri Lanka and the Computer Crimes Act. She was denied bail on the basis that her release would result in ‘public disturbance’ and was remanded until 7 June 2023. Her bail was then extended until 21 June.

  “The arrest of Nathasha Edirisooriya highlights the increasing intolerance in Sri Lanka towards freedom of expression, including satire. Her detention is a clear attack on artistic expression and a violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The charges against her must be dropped immediately,” said David Kode, Advocacy and Campaigns Lead at CIVICUS.

  Nathasha Edirisooriya is one of the few practicing women stand-up comedians in Sri Lanka. She has actively created and defined a space for herself as a feminist who addresses issues of gender, sex, chauvinism and misogyny, moral and religious hypocrisy, education, family life and mental health through her stand-up comedy.

  She has also been part of the CIVICUS Youth Action Lab for grassroots Global South youth activists building resilient and sustainable movements for a more equitable world. In 2021 she conducted a piece of research titled ‘Decoding Sexual Harassment’ to understand the instigation of sexual harassment in Sri Lanka.

  CIVICUS is also concerned about the use of ICCPR Act against Nathasha Edirisooriya, which among other provisions, criminalises the advocacy of “national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”. No credible evidence has been presented to substantiate the charges. Further, the CIVICUS Monitor has documented how the law has been misused over the years to criminalise activists, stifle freedom of expression and detain and silence poets, writers and others.

  “This is another example of the authorities' blatant misuse of the ICCPR Act. It has been systematically misused to silence free speech and to keep individuals behind bars for long periods. The law must be amended so that it is not used to deter or discourage individuals from freely expressing their opinions,” added Kode.

  The UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief has pointed out that the present Act is not fully compatible with Article 19 of the ICCPR. Instead of being used to protect minorities against incitement, it has been invoked to protect religions or beliefs against criticism or perceived insult. The UN Human Rights Committee also raised concerns on the misuse of the law and stated in March 2023 that the authorities have failed to grant bail in a timely manner to individuals charged under the Act.

  ---

  Civic space in Sri Lanka is rated as "Repressed" by the CIVICUS Monitor. 

• SRI LANKA: ‘Media control gave the government a definite advantage’

  CIVICUS speaks to Sandun Thudugala, Head of Programmes at the Law and Society Trust (LST), about the legislative elections held in Sri Lanka on 5 August 2020, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. LST is a legal research and advocacy organisation founded in 1982 in Colombo, Sri Lanka, with the goal of promoting legal reforms to improve access to justice, the justiciability of rights and public accountability.

  Ahead of the August 2020 elections, the CIVICUS Monitordocumented that human rights lawyers and journalists in Sri Lanka faced arrests, threats and harassment. Areport by the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, published in May 2020, also showed that civil society faced challenges in registering and operating along with various barriers to protest.

  

  What was the situation for civic freedoms and civil society ahead of the elections?

  As in many other countries, the situation of civic freedoms and the space for civil society has always been in a vulnerable situation in Sri Lanka. Even under the previous government, which was supposed to be more supportive towards civil society and the human rights agenda, efforts to introduce new draconian laws to control civil society and the undermining of basic freedoms in the name of counterterrorism continued.

  The situation got worse with the election of Gotabaya Rajapaksa as the new president in November 2019. His election campaign, which was built on the ideas of Sinhala Buddhist supremacy, disciplined society and enhanced national security, was supported by an overwhelming majority, especially from the Sinhala Buddhist community. This result was seen as a mandate given to the government to undermine basic freedoms and civic space in the name of national security and development.

  There have been signs of an increased militarisation of every aspect of society and the undermining of democratic institutions, such as the appointment of members of Presidential Task Forces – which are accountable only to the president – to handle key governance functions. There has also been a clear message of unwillingness to cooperate with the state’s international obligations, including by complying with UN Human Rights Council Resolution 30/1, which the previous government had co-sponsored and which was aimed at promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka after the 1983-2009 internal conflict, as well as with local human rights mechanisms.

  There have been increased surveillance of civil society activities and arrests of social media activists. This has clearly reflected a trend of undermining civic freedoms and civic space before the elections. The situation was exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The need to deal with the virus has been used as an excuse to increase militarisation and the concentration of power in the hands of the president.

  What were the main issues the campaign revolved around?

  The government led by newly elected President Rajapaksa, of the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna party (SLPP), was seeking a two-thirds majority in parliament to be able to amend the current constitution and give the president additional powers. That’s been the major election campaign goal of the SLPP. The need to have a strong government to protect the aspirations of the Sinhala Buddhist majority, defend national sovereignty and foster economic development were therefore among their major campaign themes. The popularity the president gained after winning the presidential election was used to mobilise voters to support the SLPP.

  The main opposition parties were divided, and their internal conflict was more prominent in the election campaign than their actual election messages. One of their major promises was to provide economic assistance for poor people who were most affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns.

  Issues such as the need to strengthen democratic governance systems, justice for war victims, longer-term solutions to ethnic issues or the root causes of rural poverty, indebtedness and inequality were not highlighted during the election campaign by any of the major parties. 

  Was there any debate around whether the election should be held during the pandemic? 

  The government wanted to conduct the election as soon as possible. It was willing to hold the election in April 2020, as planned, even at the height of the pandemic. Almost all opposition parties were against holding the election in April. The Election Commission subsequently decided to postpone it to August 2020 due to the health risks it might entail. By August, the situation had got considerably better and there was no major opposition to conducting the elections, which took place on 5 August.

  As far as I know, online voting was not considered as an option for this election. I do not think that Sri Lanka has the infrastructure and capacity to adopt such an option at this moment. More than 70 per cent of eligible voters cast votes and apart from the people who are still in quarantine centres, people experienced no major barriers in casting their votes. There were however incidents of some private factories denying leave for their employees to vote.

  Was it possible to have a normal campaign in the context of the pandemic?

  Health guidelines were issued by the Election Commission, which imposed significant controls on election campaigning. No major rallies or meetings were allowed, but the government and the main opposition parties violated these health guidelines by convening public rallies and other meetings openly, without any repercussions. It was clear that the parties with power had a clear advantage in overstepping certain rules. Additionally, candidates from major political parties, who had more money to use for electronic and social media campaigns, had a definite advantage over the others.

  Due to its control over state media and the support it received from most private media, both electronic and print, the government had a definite advantage over the opposition during the election campaign. The smaller opposition political parties were at the most disadvantageous position, as they did not get any significant airtime or publicity in mainstream media.

  This surely impacted on the election results, in which the SLPP, led by President Rajapaksa and his brother, former president Mahinda Rajapaksa, won 145 seats in the 225-member parliament. The opposition Samagi Jana Balavegaya party, which was established in early 2020 as a breakaway from the right-wing United National Party, won 54 seats. The Illankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi party, which represents the Tamil ethnic minority, won 10 seats, and 16 other seats were split among 12 smaller parties. As a result, on 9 August, Mahinda Rajapaksa was appointed Prime Minister of Sri Lanka for the fourth time.

  Was civil society able to engage in the election in a meaningful way? 

  Apart from being engaged in election monitoring processes, the engagement of independent civil society in the election was minimal. This is a drastic change when compared to the 2015 election, in which civil society played a key role in promoting a good governance and reconciliation agenda within the election campaign. Divisions within the opposition and the COVID-19 context made it difficult for civil society organisations to engage effectively in the process. Some organisations tried to create a discourse on the importance of protecting the 19th amendment to the Constitution, which curbed presidential powers while strengthening the role of parliament and independent institutions and accountability processes, but didn’t get any significant spaces within the media or any other public domains to discuss these issues.

  Civic space in Sri Lanka is rated as ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with the Law and Society Trust through itswebsite orFacebook page and follow@lstlanka and@SandunThudugala on Twitter.