human rights
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ANGOLA: ‘Chances for real democracy in Angola are quite low’
CIVICUS speaks about the recent presidential and National Assembly election in Angola with Pascoal Baptistiny, Executive Director of MBAKITA – Kubango Agricultural Benevolent Mission, Inclusion, Technologies and the Environment. MBAKITA is a civil society organisation based in Cuando Cubango province in southern Angola. Founded in 2002, it defends the rights of Indigenous peoples and traditional communities, denounces the discrimination they suffer and the expropriation of their lands, and promotes a more just, democratic, participatory, tolerant, supportive, healthy and humane society.
What was the political climate in the run-up to the recent election in Angola?
The political climate was veryunfavourable, not at all conducive to a free and fair election. Angola was alreadycharacterised by heavy restrictions on civic space, and this worsened in the run-up to the 24 August election.
Civic space has been long marked by persecution, intimidation, threats, arbitrary arrests, judicial harassment, slander, defamation, censorship, intolerance and ordered killings. Protests are often banned and frequently repressed, sometimes with lethal violence.
Restrictions tightened before the election and were maintained during the voting and in the aftermath, to prevent protests at suspected fraud. Rapid Intervention Police, State Secret Information Services, Public Order Police, Migration and Foreigners Services, Border Guard Police, Criminal Investigation Services and the Attorney General's Office were all deployed in the streets of Angola’s 18 provinces.
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ANGOLA: ‘Much effort was put into excluding people from the electoral process’
CIVICUS speaks about the recent Angolan election and its aftermath with Catarina Antunes Gomes and Cesaltina Abreu from the Social Sciences and Humanities Laboratory of the Catholic University of Angola (LAB). LAB works closely with Civic Movement Mudei (‘I changed’ in Portuguese), a movement of multiple civil society organisations (CSOs) that advocate for democratic change in Angola. It campaigns for voting rights and fair conditions of electoral competition, including transparent funding, equitable media coverage and citizen monitoring of election processes.
What kinds of civic space restrictions did Angolan civil society encounter during the election?
Civil society has faced many constraints before, during and after the election. Prior to the election, there was a partial review of the constitution that was done without any consultation and did not follow the recommendations of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. The organic law on general elections was also amended without the participation of civil society or the political opposition, and it resulted in reduced electoral transparency. Key stakeholders were denied a platform to be part of the process.
A few months before the election, the government also decided to change Angola’s political and administrative division, with potential impact on the drawing of electoral districts. Although it did not follow through with this reform, this caused great confusion and gave rise to suspicions about the intentions of the ruling party, the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the credibility of the election.
In 2021 President João Lourenço appointed Laurinda Cardoso, a member of the MPLA’s political bureau, as chief judge of the Constitutional Court. Civil society also raised concerns about the appointment and swearing in of Manuel Pereira da Silva as the new president of the National Electoral Commission. But our voices have been overlooked during the whole process.
The media situation has also been very precarious. Since the start of the electoral process, state intervention has increased, even in private media. Mudei monitored the media coverage of various parties and candidates from May until July and found that both public and private media had become instruments of propaganda, undermining the right to freedom of information and free choice.
On 6 July, just as the electoral campaign was about to begin, a new law was proposed to prohibit surveys and posts revealing voting choices. Instead of ensuring people were fully included in the electoral process, much effort was put into excluding them.
As a result, the level of transparency and fairness of the 24 August election has been dubious to say the least. It has been questioned by civil society through many public statements. The organisations we work with, Mudei and LAB, have produced a statementindicating they do not consider the elections to have been transparent, fair and free.
What do you think contributed to low voter turnout?
There were probably many reasons why fewer than half of registered voters went to the polls, but we believe major ones were disorganisation, fear and lack of trust.
The whole process was badly organised. In September 2021 there was an ‘unofficial electoral registration’ period, which is really a process of connecting databases to determine who is eligible to vote, but it was not made clear to people what this was about. Most people were confused about what the law said on residency and voting. The process was marked by lack of clarity and irregularities. Everything seemed too complicated so many lost interest. Many people were excluded as a result.
People were also afraid. The electoral campaign should be a time when candidates share their ideas with us, debate their parties’ proposals and tell us their thoughts about Angola’s future. But this was not what happened. The ruling party had a strong negative discourse, treating the other parties as enemies rather than adversaries. They didn’t present any ideas on how to make the country progress and what they published as their political programme was of very low quality.
Staying away from the polls can also be interpreted as a form of protest. We have done a lot of comparative electoral analysis and found that protest voting has increased in Angola through the years. This is the result of people’s complete lack of faith in political institutions, given their limited democratic character and lack of transparency. This year the protest vote rose even further.
How has the Angolan government reacted to civil society’s criticisms of electoral irregularities?
The government has responded with repression. There are two situations that we would like to share with CIVICUS and other international allies so they can help us by providing visibility, pressuring human rights international bodies and offering support in the form of capacity-building and funding for human rights activists and social movements in Angola.
The first situation concerns Pascoal Baptistiny, executive director of MBAKITA, a CSO that promotes the rights of Indigenous peoples and traditional communities in the province of Cuando Cubango in southern Angola. Pascoal has expressed concerns about the election, including in an interview with CIVICUS last year. This made him a target. He was put under surveillance and has recently requested our help to evacuate his family to Luanda, Angola’s capital, because he has been threatened and is afraid for their safety.
The second situation concerns several members of Mudei, including its coordinator, who has been threatened repeatedly. Another of our colleagues, who was an independent candidate, has been mentioned in aggressive articles and social media posts along with an official from the European Union delegation in Luanda. They are attacked as part of a supposed subversive conspiracy involving powerful international interests aiming at destabilising Angola.
The feeling of oppression has been increasing. The Angolan army has been put on high alert, allegedly to prevent attacks. But how would unarmed civilians be able to attack them? That is clearly an excuse; their presence is threatening and intimidating. We urge the international community to publicly denounce what our government is doing to people and act to protect civil society activists who continue to work regardless and face threats and violence as a result.
Civic space in Angola is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Mudei through itsFacebook page,and follow@MovCivicoMudei on Twitter.
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ANGOLA: ‘The new NGO Law is just a way of legalising the government’s arrogance and excesses’
CIVICUS discusses the state of civic space and the new restrictions being imposed on the work of Angolan civil society with Godinho Cristóvão, a jurist, human rights defender and executive director of the association Movimento de Defensores de Direitos Humanos de Angola (Movement of Human Rights Defenders of Angola, KUTAKESA).KUTAKESA is a civil society organisation (CSO) working for the rights and protection of human rights defenders (HRDs) in Angola, particularly those active in more vulnerable areas, working on more sensitive issues and from historically excluded groups.
What are the current conditions for civil society in Angola?
Angolan CSOs work in a climate of suspicion and uncertainty, despite the fact that the Constitution of the Republic of Angola enshrines a catalogue of citizens’ fundamental rights, freedoms and guarantees.
The Angolan authorities should have aligned themselves with the democratic rule of law and respected the work of CSOs and HRDs. Instead, there has been an increase in threats, harassment and illegal arrests of HRDs who denounce or hold peaceful demonstrations against acts of bad governance and violations of citizens’ rights and freedoms. There have been clear setbacks with regard to the guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the constitution, as well as the rights set out in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other human rights treaties Angola has ratified.
How is the government targeting civil society with restrictive legislation?
The attacks on civil society are totally uncalled for. On 25 May, the Angolan National Assembly passed a draft NGO Statute, despite severe criticism from CSOs, which have stated that it limits freedom of association and gives the state excessive powers to interfere with CSO activities.
The government targets civil society with legislation that is meant for terrorists and money launderers, though it has never been proven in any court that a CSO has committed an act of terrorism in Angola. On the contrary, the rationale of this legislation constitutes institutional terrorism, the target of which are CSOs.
In Angola we all know who the corrupt are, and which party feeds corruption and money laundering. And as far as we know, CSOs are not part of that group. Funders of Angolan CSOs are all clearly identified, and the transfer of funds goes through national banking institutions and a rigorous compliance process. It is also worth remembering that many CSO funders are the same ones that fund government projects.
How does the new restrictive law compare with the 2015 decree that was declared unconstitutional?
In general, the content and spirit of Presidential Decree 74/15 on the Regulation of NGOs are the same as those of the new NGO Statute Law. By way of example, the rights and duties chapter of the previous regulation, later declared unconstitutional, was retained with only minimal changes in wording that in no way alter its content and its controlling and repressive spirit.
Additionally, the decree that was found unconstitutional provided for an administrative body under the tutelage of the Angolan executive – called IMPROCAC – with the power to monitor and control CSO actions. The recently approved draft NGO Statute Law provides for a similar body with the same attributions as the old IMPROCAC.
In other words, this is a new attempt to impose similar restrictions, but it is more serious since its instrument is no longer a presidential decree but a law. This means that it is no longer only the executive that is attacking the principles of autonomy and freedom of association provided for in article 48 of the constitution, but Congress as well, in which the president’s party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), has a majority. It is worth remembering that it was the MPLA majority that approved the 2010 constitution which it is now violating by passing the NGO Statute Law.
How is civil society, including KUTAKESA, reacting to the proposed law?
CSOs, at least the most active ones, are not looking favourably on the approval of this law, given the threats it represents in terms of closing off civic space in Angola.
We are taking joint action to prevent the final approval of this law and its entry into force. From the point of view of legal certainty and security, the courts should be aligned with the principle of jurisprudential precedent. Since they submitted the presidential decree to a review of unconstitutionality and declared it unconstitutional, they should now follow suit, given that the new law contains the same irregularities.
All national organisations took a joint position to call on parliament to take off the agenda the law now approved. This was done through information exchange meetings with opposition parties represented in parliament. At the same time we made public statements alerting the public about the dangers for freedom of association if the law was approved, and we made urgent appeals to the special rapporteurs of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the United Nations (UN) who have a mandate on freedom of association and HRDs to alert the Angolan government about the consequences the law will have on respect for human rights.
On KUTAKESA’s part, urgent appeals were made to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in Africa, Remy Ngoy Lumbu, and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, Mary Lawlor.
Do you see the new law as part of a wider trend to restrict civic space?
Yes of course, but it is also important to note that the repression of peaceful and legal demonstrations predates the approval of this law. Government mismanagement and endemic corruption have been some of the main causes of the deteriorating social, economic and family conditions for the majority of the population, leading to growing protests and mass demonstrations, which have often been repressed. The approval of this law is just another means of repression and of legalising the arrogance and excesses of the government and its agents, particularly the national police.
While the law is not necessarily intended as a response to the ongoing protests, given that the attempt to get it passed dates back to 2015, it is likely to be used as another tool to crack down on the protests.
Now, if the government has good sense and makes a strategic reading of the current political and social context of Angola, it could stop the process of approval of the law or, if it is too late for that, the president could refuse to promulgate it, taking the appeals of civil society into consideration. The law’s approval would certainly increase the number of protests and demonstrations.
Civic space in Angola is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with KUTAKESA through theirwebsite.
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ANGOLA: ‘The untrue government narrative reveals an aversion to civil society denouncing malpractice’
CIVICUS discusses the state of civic space and the new restrictions being imposed on civil society in Angola with Emilio José Manuel, focal point for Angola of the Lusophone Platform for Human Rights and founding member of the Working Group for Human Rights Monitoring in Angola (GTMDH).
The GTMDH is a platform of civil society organisations (CSOs) that works to promote and defend human rights and strives for social justice within the framework of the Angolan constitution and other current laws, as well as international conventions and treaties.
What are the conditions for civil society in Angola?
Although there is currently no direct or indirect interference in the work of civil society in Angola, the authorities’ discourse is that, because they receive funding from international institutions, CSOs defend and represent foreign interests.
Meanwhile there are many joint actions between public institutions and CSOs. For example, once a year the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights organises a forum with CSOs where the GTMDH presents its public position on human rights and provides information on the granting of registration certificates, the legal documents that the Angolan state gives to each CSO attesting that it is legally registered and can operate in the country.
Why is the government targeting CSOs with legislation aimed at terrorists and money launderers?
According to the report supporting the draft law, the president considers that he has ‘encountered constraints and difficulties in ensuring compliance with international obligations assumed by the Angolan Government in the area of money laundering and the financing of terrorism’. Hence the need to control the sources and destination of CSO funds.
This narrative of the Angolan government is untrue and clearly demonstrates its aversion to the role of CSOs in monitoring and denouncing government malpractice. Financial support for the projects of CSOs and human rights defenders comes from well-identified organisations and goes through banking institutions with strict compliance rules – and some of these funders are the same ones that support government projects.
On 26 May, the draft NGO Statute Law was passed in general by the Angolan National Assembly, ignoring severe criticism from civil society, which has made clear that it limits the right of association and gives the executive excessive powers to interfere in CSO activities.
The situation is very alarming because the draft law imposes a 120-day period for existing CSOs to make their statutes conform with the law, otherwise they will be outlawed outright without a judicial decision. Article 2 of the draft law requires existing CSOs to conform with the new provisions, under penalty of having their statutes and registrations revoked. This is a violation of the principle of legality and access to justice guaranteed by the Angolan constitution. The principle of legality requires that the law should be clearly articulated and known in advance and should not be applied retroactively.
How has civil society reacted to the draft law?
Civil society analysed the draft law and reacted against it. In collaboration with the GTMDH coordinator, my role as legal officer was to prepare petitions, public position papers and communications with the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, and to engage with regional and international partners to amplify the voices of Angolan civil society.
We requested a technical opinion from UN Special Rapporteur Clément Voule and drafted a public civil society position on the bill explaining why it violates freedoms of association, which we presented publicly at a press conference.
We advocated with opposition parties represented in parliament and made contacts with the Angolan Bar Association to file, within the scope of our constitutional prerogatives, the appropriate action for an assessment of the unconstitutionality of the draft law. The day before the general approval of the draft law, we sent a public petition to the National Assembly demanding that it not approve it.
Our next action will be to send a letter to the presidents of some key countries about the closure of civic space in Angola and increasing controls over CSOs, including international CSOs.
Protests are also taking place against the proposed NGO Statute Law, which have converged with protests against measures that have increased fuel prices and a crackdown on street vendors.
Do you see this bill as part of a wider trend of restricting civic space?
The recent repression of demonstrations, arrests of activists and attacks on protesters, including women, is an indicator that civic space is being severely restricted. The use of force by the national police has resulted in deaths without any appropriate process to hold to account and punish police officers involved in cases of violence, torture and killings.
Our country depends on importing food staples and other goods from abroad. Right now the prices of food, other goods and services have increased. Street vendors are a group that some CSOs work with, particularly those dedicated to empowering women to establish small businesses. Some organisations provide micro credits to street vendors. Although the street vendors’ movement has a life of its own, it is CSOs and their lawyers who have provided them with free legal aid.
There is a current of national solidarity, taking into account that the law does not explicitly say it will regulate all initiatives by citizens who wish to create an association. My personal opinion is that everyone feels that control will go further. The draft NGO Statute Law lacks a clear definition of what a ‘non-governmental organisation’ is. It also includes vague provisions that need to be better fleshed out to enable the proper interpretation of the law. For example, it is difficult to understand the meaning and normative scope of article 19(1)(d), which imposes a ‘duty on NGOs to refrain from practices and actions that are subversive or liable to be confused with them’. The unanswered question here is how subversive actions are to be defined in the context of the law.
How does the new draft law compare with the 2015 decree that was deemed unconstitutional?
According to the analysis we’ve made, the arguments and contents are the same as in Decree 74/15 on the Regulation of NGOs. We have the new role of counselling judges in the Constitutional Court. The situation in the Supreme Court indicates that we have a crisis in the judiciary. So it is uncertain whether this time the judicial decision will be in favour of CSOs. The present draft law establishes rules to control, restrict, approve, authorise and suspend the activities of CSOs, including CSO extinction by an administrative entity to be determined by the president as holder of the executive power, which violates the principle of freedom of association as provided in article 48 of the constitution.
Do you view the draft NGO Statute Law as part of a regional or global trend?
After having participated in sessions of the NGO Forum and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, I noted a tendency to restrict civic space throughout Africa. As part of the civil society strategy, we held meetings with activists from Mozambique to share experiences and assemble regional, continental and international strategies. It is worth remembering that various activists, whether linked to CSOs or not, are directly involved in campaigns and waves of protest to try to ensure that the draft law is not given final approval by parliament and promulgated by the president.
Civic space in Angola is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Contact GTMDH through itswebsite.
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ANGOLA: “The ruling party sees local elections as a threat”
View the original interview in Portuguese here
CIVICUS speaks about the situation in Angola with Pascoal Baptistiny, Executive Director of MBAKITA – Kubango Agricultural Benevolent Mission, Inclusion, Technologies and the Environment, a civil society organisation based in the Cuando Cubango province in southern Angola. Founded in 2002, MBAKITA defends the rights of Indigenous peoples and traditional communities, denounces the discrimination they suffer and the expropriation of their lands, and promotes a more just, democratic, participatory, tolerant, supportive, healthy and humane society.What is the state of civic space in Angola, and what are the main constraints faced by Angolan activists?
The repression of civic space in Angola is one of the biggest challenges facing Angolan civil society today. Activists suffer arbitrary and illegal arrests, torture and ill-treatment, abductions, killings, harassment and disappearances by government forces, police and state intelligence services. This repression has made many Angolans careful about what they say in public. The few organisations that defend human rights in Angola often do so at great risk to the activists involved and their families.
Could you tell us about the restrictions you and your colleagues faced in 2020?
In 2020, my MBAKITA colleagues and I faced obstacles aimed at preventing, minimising, disrupting and reversing the impact of our organisation’s legitimate activities that focused on criticising, denouncing and opposing rights violations and ineffective government positions, policies and actions.
The various forms of restriction we experienced included arbitrary restrictions and the interruption of demonstrations and meetings; surveillance; threats, intimidation, reprisals and punishments; physical assaults; smear campaigns portraying MBAKITA members as ‘enemies of the state’ and mercenaries serving foreign interests; judicial harassment; exorbitant fines for the purchase of means of transport; burglary of our offices and theft of computer equipment; search and seizure of property; destruction of vehicles; the deprivation of employment and income; and travel bans.
In addition, 15 activists were arbitrarily detained and ill-treated during the COVID-19 prevention campaign. On 1 May my residence was invaded, and its guards were teargassed. On 16 November, two female activists were raped. Fatalities for the year included three of our activists and one protester.
What kind of work does MBAKITA do? Why do you think it has been targeted?
MBAKITA is an organisation that defends and promotes human rights. We work to promote, protect and disseminate universally recognised human rights and freedoms, and especially the rights to the freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression, the freedom of the press, the right to self-determination by Indigenous peoples, the rights to land, adequate food, clean water and the environment, and the fight against torture and ill-treatment.
We challenge violations of the civil, political, economic, social, cultural and environmental rights of Indigenous and migrant people, ethnic and linguistic minorities, LGBTQI+ people and people with disabilities.
My organisation uses peaceful and non-violent means in its activities. However, we have faced incalculable risks as a result of our human rights work in the southern provinces of Angola.
MBAKITA has been systematically attacked for several reasons. First, because in 2018 we denounced the death of four children during Operation Transparency, an action against diamond trafficking and undocumented migrants carried out by the Angolan police and armed forces in the municipality of Mavinga, in the Cuando Cubango province. Second, because in 2019 we denounced the diversion of funds intended to support drought victims in Angola’s southern provinces by provincial governments. Third, because in April 2019, two activists of the organisation denounced the illegal appropriation of land by political businesspeople – generals, legislators and governors – in territories belonging to the San and Kuepe Indigenous minorities and used for hunting, fishing and gathering wild fruits, which make up the diet of these groups. Fourth, because in February 2020 MBAKITA denounced the diversion of funds designated for the purchase of biosecurity products for the prevention of COVID-19 and the diversion of food destined for the Basic Food Basket Assistance Programme for Vulnerable Groups. Fifth, because we participated in and conducted an awareness-raising campaign on COVID-19, which included the distribution of biosecurity materials purchased with MISEREOR-Germany funds. And finally, because we participated in all demonstrations held by Angolan civil society, including the most recent one on 9 January 2021, focused on the fight against corruption and the demand for local elections, under the slogan ‘Local elections now, 45 years in power is too long!’ and for the fulfilment of various electoral promises, including those of 500,000 jobs, the reduction of the cost of living for families and the socio-economic inclusion of Indigenous minorities.
Why were the elections scheduled for 2020 cancelled?
For one thing, because of the COVID-19 pandemic. But aside from this deadly pandemic, the government was never interested in holding local elections in 2020. The ruling party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), sees local elections as a threat to central power and fears losing its grip on power. It fears introducing an element of voter control over local government, that is, citizen participation and control over the management of public funds. The government thinks that the people will wake up to the idea of the democratic state and the rule of law, and that many people will become aware of their rights and duties. This would run counter to the MPLA’s intention, which is to perpetuate itself in power.
The promise of local democracy in Angola has been a failure. Three years into his term in office, President João Lourenço has failed to deliver even 10 per cent of his electoral promises, leaving 90 per cent of Angolans in a state of total scepticism.
In Angola, the party that has been in power for more than 45 years does not tolerate free people. Today, human rights defenders lose their jobs, are unable to feed their children, lose their careers and even their lives if they dare to be free, to desire democracy and to exercise their freedom.
What are the prospects that the situation will change in the near future?
For the situation to change, civil society has a lot of work to do. The most important and urgent actions are acquiring training in individual, institutional and digital security, learning English, obtaining observer status with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, observing and participating in demonstrations and other public events, advocating and lobbying for the legalisation of human rights organisations, conducting prison visits, including interviews with prisoners and gathering evidence of torture, ill-treatment and imprisonment conditions, observing trials of activists in the lower courts, fundraising for the sustainability of human rights defenders’ activities, and monitoring the 2021 local elections and the 2022 general elections.
What kind of support do Angolan activists need from international civil society to be able to continue their work?
Needs are enormous and varied. Activists urgently need protection and security, including training in risk analysis, security planning and international and regional human rights protection mechanisms, as well as skills in investigating, litigating, documenting, petitioning and reporting human rights violations. Specifically, MBAKITA would like to receive technical assistance to assess what security arrangements could be put in place to increase the physical protection of the organisation’s office and my residence, as well as financial support for the purchase of such arrangements, such as a security system or a video surveillance camera.
Assaulted activists, and especially the 15 MBAKITA activists who have been direct victims of repression and torture at the hands of government forces, also need post-traumatic psychological assistance. Financial assistance would help us pay the fees of the lawyers who worked for the release of six activists who were imprisoned between August and November 2020. It would also help us replace stolen work equipment, without which our ability to work has been reduced, including two vehicles, computers, memory cards, a digital camera and a camcorder.
In the case of activists threatened with arbitrary detention, kidnapping or assassination, who have no choice but to leave the country or their region of origin quickly, we need support for transportation and provisional accommodation. Our activists would also benefit from exchanges of experience, knowledge and good practice, opportunities to strengthen their knowledge of digital security, training in journalistic and audio-visual techniques and the acquisition of English language skills.
Finally, the operation of organisations and their sustainability would be helped by obtaining support for the installation of internet services and the creation of secure websites, the acquisition of financial management software and resources to recruit permanent staff, so that staff members are able to support their families and fully dedicate themselves to the defence of human rights.
Civic space in Angola is rated ‘repressed’ by thehere.
Get in touch with MBAKITA through itsFacebook page. -
Angola: Repressive restrictions include arrest of protesters
Statement at the 43rd Session of the UN Human Rights Council
Angola's adoption of Universal Periodic Review on Human Rights
Watch us deliver our statement belowCIVICUS welcomes Angola’s acceptance of 14 recommendations focusing on civic space in this UPR cycle. However, in our UPR submission, we documented that since its last review, Angola has not implemented or taken any concrete steps to implement 19 of the 20 recommendations relating to civic space made in 2014.
Several pieces of restrictive legislation that in the past have been used against Human Rights Defenders (HRDs) and journalists critical of the government, including provisions on criminal defamation in the Penal Code and restrictions under Law 23/10 on Crimes against the Security of the State, remain in place.
Additionally, we are concerned about restrictions on peaceful assembly, notably the arrest of protesters. More than ten people and two journalists were briefly arrested in front of Angola’s National Assembly in Luanda in January 2020 in a protest against the delay in the approval of the municipal legislative package.
In April 2018, the District Court of Malanje sentenced three student protesters to prison sentences of five to six months on charges of insult of public authorities and disturbance of the functioning of sovereign bodies, the latter a crime against state security. The three were released in July 2018, after a ruling of the Supreme Court.
Civic space in parts of Angola, such as Cabinda, is severely restricted: HRDs are subject to threats and intimidation while arbitrary arrests and judicial harassment are systematically used to prevent protests from taking place. Between 28 January 2019 and 1 February 2019, security forces arrested at least 62 people in relation to a planned protest, on 1 February 2019, to call for independence for the enclave of Cabinda.
CIVICUS calls on the Government of Angola to take proactive measures to address these concerns and implement recommendations to create and maintain, in law and in practice, an enabling environment for civil society.
Civic space in Angola is currently rated as Repressed by the CIVICUS Monitor
See our recommendations that were submitted to the UN Human Rights Council about the conditions of human rights in Angola.
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ANTI-RIGHTS GROUPS: ‘Protesting once is not enough; we need to fight back every single day’
Following our 2019special report on anti-rights groups and civil society responses, we are interviewing civil society activists and leaders about their experiences of backlash from anti-rights groups and their strategies to strengthen progressive narratives and civil society responses. CIVICUS speaks about civil society protests against the World Congress of Families held in Verona, Italy, with Asia Leofreddi, a PhD Candidate at the Antonio Papisca Human Rights Centre of the University of Padua and a journalist with Confronti, a think tank and magazine dedicated to the study of the relationships between religion, politics and society.Based on the values of memory, hospitality, solidarity and pluralism, Confronti promotes dialogue among Christians of different denominations, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, Muslims and lay people interested in the world of faiths, with the aim of breaking down misunderstandings and fundamentalism and helping to build an intercultural democratic society.How would you characterise the World Congress of Families?
The World Congress of Families (WCF) is the biggest ‘pro-family’ gathering in the world. The Human Rights Campaign, the largest LGBTQI+ advocacy group and political lobbying organisation in the USA, has defined it as “the largest and most influential organization involved in anti-LGBT policies worldwide.” It was established by an American and a Russian in Moscow in 1997, and today it gathers together many associations, religious groups, scholars and political activists based in various countries, primarily belonging to Christian denominations. Among them, the Russian branch is particularly strong and acts with the open support of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Kremlin.
The WCF’s pro-family agenda translates into support for the traditional family model and reflects a highly conservative view of gender roles. Accordingly, the WCF opposes abortion, surrogate motherhood, same-sex marriage and any progress towards equality in sexual and reproductive rights. Their gathering is organised by the International Organization for the Family (IOF) which is active at many other levels. At the international level, beyond organising international conferences, it tries to influence international institutions, such as the UN, in order to promote a conservative and restrictive interpretation of human rights, in particular of Article 16 of the Universal Declaration. In domestic politics, its member organisations link with or operate as interest groups infiltrating parties and academic institutions, lobbying officials and using democratic means such as referendums and mobilisations to advance their claims in national public spheres.
Not coincidentally, over the past decade Brazil, Russia, the USA and several European countries have witnessed the rise of anti-gender and pro-family discourse, promoted by far-right parties, as well as the introduction, and sometimes also the approval and implementation, of morally conservative policies put forward by representatives of their national governments. In 2013, for instance, the Russian Duma unanimously approved a Law for the Purpose of Protecting Children from Information Advocating for a Denial of Traditional Family Values (popularly known as the ‘anti-gay law’). In Croatia a referendum was held that same year, promoted by an organisation called U ime obitelji (‘In the name of the family’) and aiming to establish a constitutional prohibition against same sex-marriage. It won with 67 per cent of the vote. In 2018 the right-wing governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia decided not to ratify the Istanbul Convention of the Council of Europe on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, which they viewed as a threat to the traditional family structure. And in 2019 the Council of Verona approved Motion 434, described as ‘an initiative to prevent abortion and promote motherhood’, put forward by a representative of the far-right League Party, and declared Verona a ‘pro-life city’. All the organisations and political representatives involved in all these processes are somehow connected to the WCF, which shows that over the past decades the ‘family’ label has started to play a key role in the creation of new geopolitical alliances that were not even thought to be possible a short while ago.
Who were the main groups involved in protesting against the WCF in Verona?
The main protests held in Verona during the meeting of the WCF in March 2019 were led by the local branch of the transnational feminist movement Non Una di Meno (‘Not one woman less’). They organised a three-day mobilisation called Verona Città Transfemminista (Transfeminist City Verona) that encompassed a variety of events spread throughout the city. These events looked like a real counter-congress, complete with panels, shows and speakers coming from every part of the world.
Additionally, another forum took place at the Academy of Agriculture, Letters and Sciences, a historic building in the city centre, on 30 March. This encounter was organised by the International Planned Parenthood Federation – European Network and the Union of Atheists and Rationalist Agnostics (Unione degli Atei e degli Agnostici Razionalisti) in collaboration with Rebel Network and other national and international organisations. This event gathered more than 30 speakers representing the transnational struggle of civil society for women’s and LGBTQI+ rights.
Some Italian politicians also decided to show their opposition to the WCF, and several female representatives of the opposition Democratic Party organised a public meeting in the K2 Theatre of Verona on the same day.
As all these events show, during those days Verona became a political laboratory in which two opposed views of society were on display. The small city became the battlefield of a global struggle. On the one hand, there was the reactionary and illiberal activism of the WCF, and on the other, the open and inclusive activism of national and international progressive movements and people who autonomously decided to participate in the protests.
However, what was most surprising was the great participation of Italian civil society. The demonstration held on 30 March was the biggest Verona had ever seen: more than 100,000 people took to the streets of the city to side with women’s right to choose.
What motivated all these groups and citizens to protest?
For civil society groups, the main binding factor was the WCF. Mobilised groups focused their activism on defending sexual and reproductive rights, strongly jeopardised by the narratives promoted and political strategies used by Congress participants.
Meanwhile Italian citizens took to the streets mostly in reaction against the strong support that the WCF received from an important sector of the Italian government at the time. Indeed, three then-ministers took part in the Congress – Matteo Salvini, then-Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, Lorenzo Fontana, Minister of the Family and Marco Bussetti, Minister of Education – and both the governor of the Veneto region and the mayor of Verona gave official sponsorship to the gathering. A majority of Italians viewed the institutional promotion of a gathering detrimental to civil rights as a political action against our Constitution.
What was the impact of the protests?
This was the first time the WCF had to face such a huge protest. As soon it was announced that the 13th edition of the WCF would take place in Italy – a founding member of the European Union with a strong civil society and a deep attachment to a set of rights gained through many years of struggle – analysts started watching the events with great interest. However, I don’t think anyone expected such a big reaction – not even our politicians attending the Congress.
At the national level, the protests achieved good results. For instance, they forced Matteo Salvini to publicly proclaim that Law 194 – the Italian law recognising abortion rights – would not be not touched and forced League Senator Simone Pillon to postpone a draft bill that had been widely criticised as not defending women from domestic violence. They also provided the opportunity for representative Laura Boldrini to pass a law against revenge porn, which until then had been strongly opposed by the parliamentary majority. Additionally, the days of the Congress were a great opportunity to unmask the strong connections that a section of our government, and particularly the League Party, which was in coalition government at that time, has with the global far right, despite their rhetoric on national sovereignty, and with some domestic far-right forces such as Forza Nuova, an extreme-right nationalist party, members of which were accredited to the Congress.
At the international level, the WCF in Verona offered an opportunity for participating opposition movements to forge new transnational alliances and reflect on the construction of common narratives and strategies. It was then that groups that until then had focused on their own national, and sometimes provincial, contexts realised how important it was to act globally. The presence of foreign experts and activists helped Italian movements to understand better the strategies of ultra-conservative groups and their ability to function simultaneously at different levels.
While we in Italy have always been confronted with the conservative positions of the Vatican and its influence on politics and civil society regarding sexual and reproductive rights, the WCF in Verona made it clear that we are facing a process of modernisation and professionalisation of ultra-conservative activism. As Kristina Stoeckl, an Austrian scholar, has widely demonstrated in her project on postsecular conflicts, these actors now enter public debate with their religious claims and turn them mainstream. They present them in a non-religious language, translating them into the language of human rights or natural law. They disseminate them with by using tactics and strategies typical of progressive mobilisations and campaigns. During the WCF held in Verona, Italian progressive movements became aware of the dimension of the phenomenon that they face as well as the fact that far from being limited to a national context, the politicisation of religion and pro-family rhetoric are actually part of a much broader political project.
These successes, however, by no means turned the Verona edition of the WCF into a failure. They clearly showed they were not be ready to deal with countries with a strong civil society capable of mobilising discourses and resources at their same level. Still, about 10,000 people took part in their ‘family march’ on 31 March. They were far fewer than those who took to the streets to participate in the feminist and progressive mobilisation off the previous day, but they were still many. Moreover, I think the success of the WCF is measured more by what happens inside the Congress than what happens outside. In the WCF in Verona there were many representatives of governments from all over the world – far more than in previous years – which offered them a great opportunity to strengthen their networks.
I don’t mean to diminish the results achieved by progressive movements in Verona, but to emphasise that protesting once is not enough. We need to remember to fight back every single day. We need to be aware that our opponents remain active even when they disappear from the scene. Ours is a battle of public opinion, which must be informed on a daily basis.
What more could civil society be doing to push back against anti-rights groups such as the WCF, and what support does it need to be able to respond?
First, the days in Verona demonstrated the importance of a vigilant and united civil society. On the way forward, it is important for progressive actors to develop better knowledge of these transnational networks and gain the ability not only to react but also to move proactively against ultra-conservative political projects on a daily basis. It is worth noting that the WCF has existed since 1997, and around the mid-2000s it started to become a political actor, capable of influencing national discourse and policies in several countries, from Russia to Central and Eastern Europe up to the USA. Moreover, for quite a long time some of its members have been involved in UN negotiations, playing a wider role in the international human rights debate. However, most Italian groups working on women’s and LGBTQI+ rights only became aware of its existence when it was announced that the Congress would take place in Verona.
Second, it is important to move beyond a reductionist interpretation of these movements as simply anti-gender and of this phenomenon as a mere ‘conservative backlash’ against progressive and emancipatory movements. Defining ultra-conservative claims in culturally binary terms (past vs future, intolerance vs tolerance, religion vs secularism, traditional family vs sexual freedom) does not help grasp the complexity of their project and their strong contextual adaptability, nor prevent them from taking further actions.
Indeed, their anti-gender claims often intersect with other issues including the right to homeschooling, concerns such as human ecology, demography, Christianophobia, political stances such as nationalism, the defence of national sovereignty and a more general critique of the Western liberal political and economic order and its supranational institutions. All these concepts help them build a more comprehensive and systematic ideology, mobilising forces in various countries and strengthening their political alliances.
But binary oppositions overlook these groups’ capacity to function in a variety of contexts. For instance, although they support a conservative view of gender roles, several ultra-conservative political parties have female leaders – just think of Alice Weidel (Alternative für Deutschland, Germany), Marine Le Pen (Rassemblement national, France), Giorgia Meloni (Fratelli d'Italia) and Pauline Hanson (One Nation, Australia). Others have women among their leadership, as seen with Barbara Pas (Vlaams Belang, Belgium) and Magdalena Martullo-Blocher (Swiss People's Party). On top of that, once in power, many of them promote social policies that advance women’s interests, such as a monthly income for every child born or more general welfare measures. Of course, these policies only favour heterosexual families, but still, they allow many families – and many women – to get the support they need.
Even regarding LGBTQI+ rights, they are able to contextualise their stances. While Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro says that he would prefer a dead son than a gay one, Alice Weidel is an out lesbian who lives with her partner and her two children. Similarly, prioritising the fight against radical Islam and foreign powers, during her latest electoral campaign the ultra-conservative Marine Le Pen recognised the acceptance of homosexuality as part of French values.
Third, the media have a key role in opposing these movements. It is very important to do research and disseminate information, explaining for example that many of the populist forces we see emerging in our countries are part of larger networks. It is no coincidence that Italy’s Salvini publicly kisses the crucifix, Brazil’s Bolsonaro made the legalisation of homeschooling one of his key priorities for his first 100 days in office, and Donald Trump is the first US president to attend his country’s most important national anti-abortion march. They are all part of a specific structure of power and the media have the responsibility to unmask their political and economic links.
Finally, I believe that the rise of these ultra-fundamentalist movements is the consequence of a broader crisis, which has also led to the success of several illiberal leaders in various parts of the world. Progressive movements need to be aware of this so as to rethink some key concepts of their strategy, assess whether they are still connected with the broader society and, if they are not, start addressing this issue. As masterfully expressed by Eszter Kováts, “We need to recognise the problematic nature of emancipatory discourse as it stands today: just because a particular criticism is coming from the Right of the political spectrum does not necessarily render our positions beyond critique. And then we need to ask the painful question: ‘how did we get here’, and what does the current popularity of the Right have to do with the unfulfilled promises and problematic developments of emancipatory movements. Of the very same movements that seem to have failed to address the real nature of inequalities and everyday material struggles of people.”
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Arabia Saudita: El asesinato del periodista y las detenciones generalizadas de defensores de los derechos de las mujeres
Arabia Saudita: la monarquía saudita debe rendir cuentas por la eliminación de la disidencia, tras el asesinato del periodista y las detenciones generalizadas de defensores y defensoras de los derechos de las mujeres
Reconociendo el derecho fundamental a expresar nuestras opiniones, libres de represión, las organizaciones de la sociedad civil abajo firmantes instamos a la comunidad internacional, entre otros, a las Naciones Unidas, a las instituciones multilaterales y regionales, así como a los Gobiernos democráticos comprometidos con la libertad de expresión, a adoptar medidas inmediatas para que Arabia Saudita rinda cuentas por violaciones graves de los derechos humanos. El asesinato del periodista Jamal Ahmad Khashoggi en el Consulado de Arabia Saudita en Estambul el 2 de octubre muestra únicamente una de las muchas, graves y sistemáticas violaciones perpetradas por las autoridades sauditas tanto dentro como fuera del país. A medida que se acerca el Día Internacional para Poner Fin a la Impunidad de los Crímenes contra Periodistas, el 2 de noviembre, nos hacemos eco de los llamamientos para que se lleve a cabo una investigación independiente sobre el asesinato de Khashoggi, a fin de que llevar a los responsables ante la justicia.
Este caso, junto a las crecientes detenciones de defensores y defensoras de derechos humanos, entre otros, periodistas, académicos, defensores y defensoras de los derechos de las mujeres, la represión interna, la posible imposición de la pena de muerte a manifestantes y las conclusiones del informe del Grupo de Eminentes Expertos de las Naciones Unidas que indican que la Coalición dirigida por Arabia Saudita ha cometido actos en Yemen que pueden ser constitutivos de crímenes internacionales, demuestra el historial de violaciones graves y sistemáticas de los derechos humanos de Arabia Saudita. Por consiguiente, nuestras organizaciones también instan a la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas a suspender a Arabia Saudita del Consejo de Derechos Humanos (CDH), de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el párrafo 8 de la resolución 60/251 de 13 de abril de 2006 de la Asamblea General.
Arabia Saudita nunca se ha destacado por su tolerancia y respeto de los derechos humanos, pero se esperaba que, cuando el príncipe heredero Mohammed Bin Salman puso en marcha su plan económico (Visión 2030) y por fin se permitió conducir a las mujeres, se podría producir una flexibilización de las restricciones de derechos de las mujeres y de las libertades de expresión y asamblea. Sin embargo, antes de que se levantara la prohibición de conducción en el mes de junio, las defensoras de derechos humanos recibieron llamadas telefónicas advirtiéndoles de que permaneciesen en silencio. Entonces, las autoridades sauditas detuvieron a decenas de defensores y defensoras de los derechos de las mujeres que habían participado en la campaña contra la prohibición de conducir. La represión ejercida por las autoridades sauditas contra toda forma de disidencia continúa hasta la fecha.
Khashoggi criticó las detenciones de los defensores y defensoras de derechos humanos y los planes de reforma del príncipe heredero y vivía en un exilio autoimpuesto en Estados Unidos. El 2 de octubre de 2018, Khashoggi fue al Consulado de Estambul con su prometida para realizar unos trámites, pero nunca salió de allí. Las autoridades turcas pronto afirmaron que había pruebas de que había sido asesinado en el Consulado, pero las autoridades sauditas no admitieron su asesinato hasta dos semanas más tarde.
Tan solo dos días después, el 20 de octubre, el Ministerio Fiscal saudita publicó sus conclusiones confirmando que Khashoggi había muerto. Sus informes indican que murió tras “una pelea a puñetazos” en el Consulado y que se había detenido a 18 ciudadanos sauditas. El rey Salman también emitió varios reales decretos destituyendo a funcionarios de alto nivel, entre otros Saud Al-Qahtani, asesor de la corte real, y Ahmed Assiri, subdirector de los servicios de Inteligencia. La Fiscalía continúa su investigación, pero el cuerpo todavía no ha sido hallado.
En vista de los informes contradictorios de las autoridades sauditas, es esencial que se lleve a cabo una investigación internacional independiente.
El 18 de octubre, el Comité para la Protección de Periodistas (CPJ), Human Rights Watch, Amnistía Internacional y Reporteros Sin Fronteras pidieron a Turquía que solicitase al Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas,António Guterres, una investigación de la ONU sobre la ejecución extrajudicial de Khashoggi.
El 15 de octubre de 2018, David Kaye, Relator Especial de las Naciones Unidas sobre la libertad de expresión, y Agnès Callamard, Relatora Especial de las Naciones Unidas sobre ejecuciones sumarias, solicitaron una investigación independiente que pueda alcanzar conclusiones creíbles y siente las bases para la adopción de medidas punitivas claras, entre otras, la posible expulsión de personal diplomático, la suspensión de organismos de las Naciones Unidas (como el Consejo de Derechos Humanos), prohibiciones de viajar, consecuencias económicas, reparaciones y la posibilidad de celebrar juicios en terceros Estados.
Observamos que el 27 de septiembre, Arabia Saudita se sumó al consenso del Consejo de Derechos Humanos de la ONU cuando aprobó una nueva resolución sobre la seguridad de los periodistas (A/HRC/Res/39/6). Observamos también que esta resolución insta a “realizar investigaciones imparciales, prontas, minuciosas, independientes y efectivas de todas las denuncias de actos de violencia, amenazas o agresiones contra periodistas y trabajadores de los medios de comunicación que competan a su jurisdicción, lleven a los autores de esos delitos ante la justicia, incluidos quienes ordenen cometerlos o conspiren para ello, sean cómplices en ellos o los encubran.” Y también “a quienes corresponda a que dejen en libertad, de inmediato y de manera incondicional, a los periodistas y trabajadores de los medios de comunicación que hayan sido detenidos o recluidos arbitrariamente”.
Khashoggi fue colaborador de los periódicos Washington Post y Al-Watan y redactor jefe del efímero canal de noticias Al-Arab News Channel en 2015. Salió de Arabia Saudita en 2017, cuando comenzó la escalada de detenciones de periodistas, escritores y defensores y defensoras de derechos humanos. En su último artículo de opinión publicado en el Washington Post, critica la condena a cinco años de prisión del periodista Saleh Al-Shehi, en febrero de 2018. Al-Shehi es uno de los más de 15 periodistas y blogueros arrestados en Arabia Saudita desde septiembre de 2017, lo que, según Reporteros Sin Fronteras, eleva a un total de 29 de ellos en prisión, además de 100 defensores y defensoras de derechos humanos y, probablemente, miles de activistas que también permanecen detenidos, según el Centro del Golfo para los Derechos Humanos (GCHR) y otros colaboradores sauditas como ALQST. Muchas de las personas detenidas en el último año han criticado públicamente los planes de reforma relacionados con Vision 2030 y han señalado que las mujeres no alcanzarían la igualdad económica únicamente por poder conducir.
Otro objetivo reciente de la represión contra la disidencia es el destacado economista Essam Al-Zamel, un empresario conocido por sus escritos sobre la necesidad de reformas económicas. El 1 de octubre de 2018, el Tribunal Penal Especializado (TPE) celebró una sesión secreta en la que la Fiscalía acusó a Al-Zamel de violar la Ley de Delitos Informáticos al “movilizar a sus seguidores en las redes sociales”. Al-Zamel criticó Vision 2030 en las redes sociales, donde tenía un millón de seguidores. Al-Zamel fue arrestado el 12 de septiembre de 2017, al mismo tiempo que otros muchos defensores de derechos humanos y reformistas.
La inédita persecución actual contra las defensoras de derechos humanos se inició en enero de 2018 con la detención de Noha Al-Balawi por su ciberactivismo para apoyar las campañas en las redes sociales en favor de los derechos de las mujeres como (#Right2Drive) o contra el sistema de tutela masculina (#IAmMyOwnGuardian). Antes incluso, el 10 de noviembre de 2017, el TPE de Riad condenó a Naimah Al-Matrod a seis años de prisión por ciberactivismo.
La ola de detenciones continuó después del periodo de sesiones de marzo del Consejo de Derechos Humanos y de la publicación de las recomendaciones del Comité para la Eliminación de la Discriminación contra la Mujer de las Naciones Unidas (CEDAW) sobre Arabia Saudita. Loujain Al-Hathloul, fue secuestrada en los Emiratos y trasladada a Arabia Saudita contra su voluntad el 15 de mayo de 2018; le siguió la detención de Eman Al-Nafjan, fundadora y autora del Saudiwoman's Weblog [Blog de las mujeres sauditas], quien previamente protestó contra la prohibición a conducir, y la de Aziza Al-Yousef, destacada activista de los derechos de las mujeres.
Otras cuatro defensoras de derechos humanos fueron detenidas en mayo de 2018, Aisha Al-Manae, Hessa Al-Sheikhy Madeha Al-Ajrous, que participaron en el primer movimiento de protesta de mujeres exigiendo el derecho a conducir en 1990, así como Walaa Al-Shubbar, una joven activista conocida por su movilización contra el sistema de tutela masculino. Todas estas personas son académicas y profesionales que apoyan los derechos de las mujeres y ayudan a supervivientes de violencia de género. Aunque todas han sido liberadas, se cree que las cuatro mujeres aún se enfrentan a acusaciones penales.
El 6 de junio de 2018, la periodista, editora, productora de televisión y defensora de los derechos humanos Nouf Abdulazizfue detenida después de una violenta incursión en su casa. Después de su arresto, Mayya Al-Zahranipublicó una carta de Abdulaziz, tras lo que ella misma fue detenida el 9 de junio de 2018 por la publicación de la carta.
El 27 de junio de 2018 fue detenida Hatoon Al-Fassi, una reconocida académica y profesora asociada de historia de las mujeres en la Universidad Rey Saud. Durante mucho tiempo ha defendido el derecho de las mujeres a participar en las elecciones municipales y a conducir, y fue una de las primeras en ponerse al volante el 24 de junio de 2018, día en que se levantó la prohibición.
En dos ocasiones en el mes de junio, los procedimientos especiales de las Naciones Unidas instaron a la puesta en libertad de los defensores y defensoras de derechos de las mujeres. El 27 de junio de 2018, nueve expertos independientes de la ONU declararon que, en marcado contraste con este momento de celebración por la liberación de las mujeres sauditas, se ha arrestado y detenido a gran escala a defensoras de derechos humanos en todo el país, lo que es verdaderamente preocupante y, probablemente, el mejor indicador del enfoque del Gobierno en relación a los derechos de las mujeres. Destacaron que las defensoras de derechos humanos “sufren una estigmatización más grave, no solo por su labor como defensoras de derechos humanos, sino también por discriminación en razón de su género”.
Sin embargo, las detenciones de defensoras de los derechos humanos continuaron con la de Nassima Al-Sadah y Samar Badawiel 30 de julio de 2018. Permanecen detenidas en régimen de aislamiento en una cárcel controlada por la Dirección de Seguridad Nacional, un mecanismo creado por mandato del rey Salman el 20 de julio de 2017. El hermano de Badawi, Raif Badawi, actualmente cumple condena a diez años de prisión por su actividad de incidencia política en línea y su exmarido Waleed Abu Al-Khair cumple una condena de quince años. Abu Al-Khair, Abdullah Al-Hamid y Mohammed Fahad Al-Qahtani (los dos últimos, miembros fundadores de la Asociación Saudí de Derechos Civiles y Políticos - ACPRA) recibieron conjuntamente el Premio “Right Livelihood” en septiembre de 2018. De momento todos ellos siguen en la cárcel.
También han sido detenidos familiares de defensores y defensoras de derechos humanos. Amal Al-Harbi, esposa del destacado activista Fowzan Al-Harbi, fue detenida por agentes de seguridad del Estado el 30 de julio de 2018, mientras se encontraba en la playa con sus hijos en Jeddah. Su marido es otro miembro de ACPRA actualmente encarcelado. Resulta alarmante que, en octubre de 2018, se hayan impuesto prohibiciones de viajar a las familias de varias defensoras de derechos como Aziza Al-Yousef, Loujain Al-Hathloul y Eman Al-Nafjan.
Preocupa también el hecho de que, en un juicio ante el TPE el 6 de agosto de 2018, el Ministerio Fiscal solicitó la pena de muerte para Israa Al-Ghomgam detenida junto a su marido, Mousa Al-Hashim,el 6 de diciembre de 2015 por su participación en protestas pacíficas en Al-Qatif. Al-Ghomgam fue acusado en virtud del artículo 6 de la Ley de Delitos Informáticos de 2007 por su actividad en las redes sociales, así como por otros cargos relacionados con las protestas. Si se la condena a muerte, sería la primera mujer que se enfrenta a la pena capital por acusaciones relacionados con el activismo. La próxima audiencia está prevista el 28 de octubre de 2018.
El TPE fue creado en 2008 para juzgar casos de terrorismo y se ha utilizado principalmente para procesar a defensores y defensoras de derechos humanos y a personas críticas con el Gobierno, a fin de mantener un férreo control sobre la sociedad civil.
El 12 de octubre de 2018, los expertos de la ONU volvieron a instar a la liberación de todas las defensoras de derechos humanos detenidas en Arabia Saudita. Manifestaron una especial preocupación por el juicio de Al-Ghomgam ante el TPE, afirmando que, “nunca se debe utilizar las medidas antiterroristas para eliminar o limitar el trabajo de derechos humanos”. Es evidente que las autoridades sauditas no han tomado medidas tras la preocupación manifestada por los procedimientos especiales, y esta falta de cooperación aumenta el descrédito que suscita su pertenencia al CDH.
Muchos de los defensores y defensoras de derechos humanos arrestados este año han permanecido en régimen de incomunicación, sin acceso a sus familiares o abogados. A algunos se les ha tachado de traidores y han sido objeto de campañas de difamación en los medios de comunicación gubernamentales, aumentando así la posibilidad de ser condenados a largas penas de prisión. En vez de garantizar un entorno seguro para los defensores y defensoras de derechos humanos en el contexto de la reforma económica, las autoridades sauditas han decidido aumentar la represión contra las voces disidentes.
Nuestras organizaciones reiteran su llamamiento a la comunidad internacional para que Arabia Saudita rinda cuentas, a fin de que no se permita la impunidad por estas violaciones de los derechos humanos.
Instamos a la comunidad internacional y, en especial, a las Naciones Unidas a que:
- Tomen las medidas necesarias para garantizar que se lleva a cabo una investigación internacional, imparcial, rápida, exhaustiva, independiente y efectiva sobre el asesinato del periodista Jamal Ahmad Khashoggi.
- Garanticen que Arabia Saudita rinde cuentas por el asesinato de Khashoggi y por sus sistemáticas violaciones de los derechos humanos.
- Convoquen un periodo extraordinario de sesiones del Consejo de Derechos Humanos ante la reciente ola de detenciones y ataques contra periodistas, defensores y defensoras de derechos humanos y otras voces disidentes en Arabia Saudita.
- Tomen las medidas necesarias en la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas para suspender a Arabia Saudita como miembro del Consejo de Derechos Humanos.
- Pidan al Gobierno de Arabia Saudita que cumpla las recomendaciones que se formulan a continuación.
Instamos a las autoridades de Arabia Saudita a que:
- Entreguen el cuerpo de Jamal Ahmad Khashoggi e inviten a expertos internacionales independientes a supervisar las investigaciones sobre su asesinato; cooperen con todos los mecanismos de las Naciones Unidas y garanticen que se lleva a los responsables de esta muerte ante la justicia, entre ellos a los responsables de mando.
- Anulen inmediatamente las condenas de todos los defensores y defensoras de derechos humanos, entre otros, de las mujeres y los hombres que defienden la igualdad entre géneros, y que retiren todas las acusaciones en su contra.
- Liberen inmediata e incondicionalmente a todos los defensores y defensoras de derechos humanos, escritores, periodistas y prisioneros de conciencia en Arabia Saudita detenidos por su legítimo y pacífico trabajo de promoción y protección de los derechos humanos, entre otros, de los derechos de las mujeres.
- Establezcan una moratoria de la pena de muerte, incluso cuando se utiliza como castigo para los delitos relacionados con el ejercicio del derecho a la opinión y expresión y de reunión pacífica.
- Garanticen en toda circunstancia que todos los defensores y defensoras de derechos humanos y periodistas en Arabia Saudita pueden desempeñar actividades legítimas de derechos humanos y de información de interés general sin temor a represalias.
- Cumplan de manera inmediata las recomendaciones del Grupo de Eminentes Expertos de las Naciones Unidas sobre Yemen, y
- Ratifiquen el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos y, que todas las leyes nacionales que restringen los derechos a la libertad de expresión, de reunión pacífica y de asociación se ajusten a la normativa internacional de derechos humanos.
Firmado:
- Access Now
- Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture (ACAT) - France
- Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture (ACAT) - Germany
- Al-Marsad - Syria
- ALQST for Human Rights
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- Amman Center for Human Rights Studies (ACHRS) - Jordan
- Amman Forum for Human Rights
- Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI)
- Armanshahr/OPEN ASIA
- ARTICLE 19
- Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
- Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC)
- Asociación Libre de Abogadas y Abogados (ALA)
- Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression (AFTE)
- Association for Human Rights in Ethiopia (AHRE)
- Association malienne des droits de l’Homme (AMDH)
- Association mauritanienne des droits de l’Homme (AMDH)
- Association nigérienne pour la défense des droits de l’Homme (ANDDH)
- Association of Tunisian Women for Research on Development
- Association for Women's Rights in Development (AWID)
- Awan Awareness and Capacity Development Organization
- Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD)
- Bureau for Human Rights and the Rule of Law - Tajikistan
- Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS)
- Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO)
- Canadian Center for International Justice
- Caucasus Civil Initiatives Center (CCIC)
- Center for Civil Liberties - Ukraine
- Center for Prisoners’ Rights
- Center for the Protection of Human Rights “Kylym Shamy” - Kazakhstan
- Centre oecuménique des droits de l’Homme (CEDH) - Haïti
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- Centro para la Acción Legal en Derechos Humanos (CALDH) - Guatemala
- Citizen Center for Press Freedom
- Citizens’ Watch - Russia
- CIVICUS
- Civil Society Institute (CSI) - Armenia
- Code Pink
- Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic
- Comité de acción jurídica (CAJ) - Argentina
- Comisión Ecuménica de Derechos Humanos (CEDHU) - Ecuador
- Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos - Dominican Republic
- Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) -Northern Ireland
- Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)
- Committee for Respect of Liberties and Human Rights in Tunisia
- Damascus Center for Human Rights in Syria
- Danish PEN
- DITSHWANELO - The Botswana Center for Human Rights
- Dutch League for Human Rights (LvRM)
- Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Center - Azerbaijan
- English PEN
- European Centre for Democracy and Human Rights (ECDHR)
- European Saudi Organisation for Human Rights (ESOHR)
- FIDH en el marco del Observatorio para la Protección de Defensores de Derechos Humanos
- Finnish League for Human Rights
- Freedom Now
- Front Line Defenders
- Fundación regional de asesoría en derechos humanos (INREDH) - Ecuador
- Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI) - Uganda
- Groupe LOTUS (RDC)
- Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR)
- Hellenic League for Human Rights (HLHR)
- Human Rights Association (IHD) - Turkey
- Human Rights Center (HRCIDC) - Georgia
- Human Rights Center “Viasna” - Belarus
- Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
- Human Rights Concern (HRCE) - Eritrea
- Human Rights in China
- Human Rights Center Memorial
- Human Rights Movement “Bir Duino Kyrgyzstan”
- Human Rights Sentinel
- IFEX
- Index on Censorship
- Initiative for Freedom of Expression (IFoX) - Turkey
- Institut Alternatives et Initiatives citoyennes pour la Gouvernance démocratique (I-AICGD) - DR Congo
- International Center for Supporting Rights and Freedoms (ICSRF) - Switzerland
- Internationale Liga für Menscherechte
- International Human Rights Organisation “Fiery Hearts Club” - Uzbekistan
- International Legal Initiative (ILI) - Kazakhstan
- International Media Support (IMS)
- International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR)
- El Instituto International de la Prensa
- International Service for Human Rights (ISHR)
- Internet Law Reform and Dialogue (iLaw)
- Iraqi Association for the Defense of Journalists' Rights
- Iraqi Hope Association
- Italian Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
- Justice for Iran
- Karapatan - Philippines
- Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and the Rule of Law
- Khiam Rehabilitation Center for Victims of Torture
- KontraS
- Latvian Human Rights Committee
- Lao Movement for Human Rights
- Lawyers' Rights Watch Canada
- League for the Defense of Human Rights in Iran (LDDHI)
- Legal Clinic “Adilet” - Kyrgyzstan
- Ligue algérienne de défense des droits de l’Homme (LADDH)
- Ligue centrafricaine des droits de l’Homme
- Ligue des droits de l’Homme (LDH) - Belgium
- Ligue des Electeurs (LE) DRC
- Ligue ivoirienne des droits de l’Homme (LIDHO)
- Ligue sénégalaise des droits humains (LSDH)
- Ligue tchadienne des droits de l’Homme (LTDH)
- Maison des droits de l’Homme (MDHC) - Cameroon
- Maharat Foundation
- MARUAH - Singapore
- Middle East and North Africa Media Monitoring Observatory
- Monitoring Committee on Attacks on Lawyers, International Association of People's Lawyers (IAPL)
- Movimento Nacional de Direitos Humanos (MNDH) - Brasil
- Muslims for Progressive Values
- Mwatana Organization for Human Rights
- National Syndicate of Tunisian Journalists
- No Peace Without Justice
- Norwegian PEN
- Odhikar
- Open Azerbaijan Initiative
- Organisation marocaine des droits humains (OMDH)
- People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)
- People’s Watch
- PEN America
- PEN Canada
- PEN International
- PEN Lebanon
- PEN Québec
- Promo-LEX - Moldova
- Public Foundation - Human Rights Center “Kylym Shamy” - Kyrgyzstan
- Rafto Foundation for Human Rights
- RAW in WAR (Reach All Women in War)
- Reporters Without Borders (RSF)
- Right Livelihood Award Foundation
- Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights
- Sahrawi Media Observatory to document human rights violations
- SALAM for Democracy and Human Rights (SALAM DHR)
- Scholars at Risk (SAR)
- Sham Center for Democratic Studies and Human Rights in Syria
- Sisters’ Arab Forum for Human Rights (SAF) - Yemen
- Solicitors International Human Rights Group
- Syrian Center for Legal Studies and Research
- Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression (SCM)
- Tanmiea - Iraq
- Tunisian Association to Defend Academic Values
- Tunisian Association to Defend Individual Rights
- Tunisian Association of Democratic Women
- Tunis Center for Press Freedom
- Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social rights
- Tunisian League to Defend Human Rights
- Tunisian Organization Against Torture
- Urgent Action Fund for Women’s Human Rights (UAF)
- Urnammu
- Vietnam Committee on Human Rights
- Vigdis Freedom Foundation
- Vigilance for Democracy and the Civic State
- Women Human Rights Defenders International Coalition
- Women’s Center for Culture & Art - United Kingdom
- World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers (WAN-IFRA)
- Organización Mundial Contra la Tortura (OMCT), en el marco del Observatorio para la Protección de Defensores de Derechos Humanos
- Yemen Center for Human Rights
- Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights)
- 17Shubat For Human Rights
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ARGENTINA: ‘Citizens must be able to take part in informed discussions on the issues that affect them’
CIVICUS speaks with Mariela Belski, Executive Director of Amnesty International Argentina, about the potential human rights effects of changes introduced by Argentina’snew government led by President Javier Milei.Founded in 1961, Amnesty International is the world’s largest international human rights organisation.
What are the main measures taken by Javier Milei’s government, and what are the problems with them?
As soon as he took office, President Milei issued a decree of necessity and urgency (DNU) to legislate on a large number of issues that will affect people’s lives. Although the National Constitution establishes that the president can only issue decrees when exceptional circumstances prevent the government following ordinary legislative procedures, decrees have been used often for decades. What’s new in this case is the number and magnitude of the changes included in the DNU, in sharp contrast with the executive’s argument that this is an emergency.
In addition, the government sent to Congress an ‘omnibus law‘ that covers numerous issues not included in the DNU, such as tax reforms. Although it is also justified with arguments related to the context of emergency and economic instability, the bill pushes forward on issues that far exceed the emergency.
Many changes included in the DNU and the omnibus law raise concerns about their impact on rights in areas such as employment, health, housing and freedoms of assembly and expression. Contrary to international rights standards, through deregulation and the withdrawal of the state, both pieces of legislation will have a negative impact on people’s ability to exercise their rights.
For instance, medical insurance companies will be able to increase their fees as they like, and are already doing so. If they receive complaints about their service, the state will not impose sanctions. Drug prices will also be deregulated.
In the area of labour, a series of regressive measures is being introduced regarding severance pay, overtime pay and the extension of probationary periods, among other things. The injunctions that courts have already granted to stop the implementation of these changes have only benefited some specific employment sectors.
On housing, the DNU repeals the rent law and leaves contractual terms, amounts and the currency rent is paid in up to negotiation between landlords and tenants, allowing the landlord to impose whatever conditions they wish.
According to the omnibus law, the updating of pensions will no longer be governed by a formula set by law, but left to the discretion of the executive branch.
The bill also conceives of protest as a crime rather than a right to participation and expression of dissent. It establishes, for instance, notification requirements for any public meeting or demonstration involving three or more people. Although statements have been made that this measure would be reversed, this has not yet happened. In addition, the bill establishes the role of the ‘organiser’ to allow for the identification and eventual sanctioning of protest leaders.
In the area of security, the bill expands the circumstances in which a police officer can be considered as acting in self-defence, weakening standards of police accountability designed to prevent abuses. Given Argentina’s high rates of police brutality, this goes in the opposite direction to what’s needed.
The environment will also be affected by the DNU, which amends the forestry law to further enable deforestation, the glaciers law to permit more mining and the fires law to allow more burning. These provisions put natural resources at risk and could aggravate the climate crisis in Argentina.
In terms of gender policies, both the bill and the DNU remove any reference to diversity and gender. In particular, the omnibus law introduces changes to what’s known as the ‘1,000 days law‘, approved alongside the law on the voluntary interruption of pregnancy to support those who decide to carry a pregnancy to term.
The instrumentalisation of the economic emergency to subjugate the autonomy of women, who are viewed exclusively as mothers, and the incorporation of figures such as that of the ‘unborn child’ reveal an attempt to bring about a strong regression on sexual and reproductive rights. In a country where every year more than 300 women are murdered, the real emergency should be to design effective policies against gender-based violence.
How does the new ‘anti-picket’ protocol affect freedom of expression and the right to protest?
Amnesty International believes that guidelines for police and state action set out in the Protocol for the maintenance of public order in the face of roadblocks violate freedoms of assembly, association and expression. The powers vested in police and security agents to intervene aren’t aligned with international standards on the use of force and risk escalating violence and social conflict, endangering people’s lives and physical integrity.
The protocol must reconcile the objectives of preserving ‘public order’ and ‘freedom of movement’ with the state’s obligations to respect and protect the physical integrity of individuals and the right to freedoms of assembly and expression, which are protected by the National Constitution and international human rights instruments. Both the protocol and the omnibus law seek to criminalise protesters and impose sanctions, including financial sanctions, that in practice could lead to the disappearance of collectives and organisations.
Argentina’s regulatory system doesn’t establish an order of priority between rights: neither free transit nor the right to protest take precedence over the other. The banning of demonstrations because of the possible disruption of free movement contradicts domestic norms.
The Argentine state must comply with its international human rights obligations, particularly regarding the right to protest, freedoms of assembly, association and expression and the use of force by its police and security agents.
Do you view these measures, and the way they are being taken, as a danger to democracy?
Amnesty International is concerned that a bill that will impact on numerous key aspects of people’s lives is being pushed through against the clock and during extraordinary congressional sessions.
In just three weeks the executive has proposed, through the DNU and the omnibus law, massive changes in legislation and regulations that were part of a consensus built over the past 40 years. The essence of democracy lies in citizens’ ability to take part in informed discussions on the issues that affect them. The extremely fast-paced discussion of these policies raises serious doubts about the integrity of the deliberative process.
Argentina’s context of economic and social crisis does call for profound reforms. Poverty over 40 per cent and exorbitant inflation rates demand a change of course. Reforms, however, must be carried out within the existing institutional and constitutional framework.
The omnibus law seeks a delegation of powers to the executive on a scale never seen before, in all spheres. Further, it establishes that the regulations issued in the exercise of this delegation will be permanent, except when the nature of the measure determines its transitory character and this is expressly stated.
Congress should carry out this process in an appropriate manner, following the principles set out in our constitution. Decisions that so significantly affect people’s lives should not be made in haste, but through public debate and following established procedures.
What initiatives is Amnesty International developing on these issues?
Regarding the protocol for the maintenance of public order we have presented an analysis with input and comments based on national and international standards. Our aim is to contribute to developing public policies that respect people’s rights.
Regarding the DNU and the omnibus law, we are organising meetings with officials and colleagues from various areas to jointly analyse the legislation and evaluate next steps.
Finally, we are preparing a document analysing the first 100 days of Milei’s government from a human rights perspective. In the same vein, we will be monitoring Congress closely.
Civic space in Argentina is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Amnesty International Argentina through itswebsite or itsFacebook, Instagram, TikTok orTwitter accounts, and contact Mariela Belski through herInstagram orLinkedIn accounts.
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ARGENTINA: ‘Milei’s victory expresses the rejection of the previous governments’
CIVICUS speaks with Yanina Welp, researcher at the Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy, about the results of Argentina’s runoff presidential election, won by a far-right outsider.How do you explain the victory of Javier Milei, an outsider with no party structure?
Milei’s victory, like that of any other candidate, cannot be explained by a single reason. There are at least three main explanations for his victory.
First, there’s the economic situation. On top of a high level of poverty – 40 per cent and growing – Argentina has very high inflation, and the economy hasn’t grown for many years. And the same goes for formal employment. There are a lot of informal workers and many people experience high levels of uncertainty.
Second is the inability of the political class to respond to these demands. Most recently, those in power have acted arrogantly. Insecurity, corruption scandals and the passivity of the authorities in the face of all these have increased. Milei’s leadership came to embody people’s rejection of the situation. Many people voted for him because he expresses well the rejection of recent administrations, and not necessarily because they approve of or adhere to the policies he has proposed to implement.
Third, there’s the role of political leadership, and specifically of the incumbent, for doing nothing in the face of this threat and even encouraging Milei’s candidacy with the aim of dividing the opposition’s vote and therefore having a better chance at winning. This was done first by Peronists, in the run-up to the first round, and by former president Mauricio Macri ahead of the runoff, which put his Together for Change coalition in crisis.
Do you think the electorate has leaned to the right?
Unlike almost all the other candidates, who only had vague and general proposals, Milei ran on a strongly ideological platform, which he kept putting forward throughout the campaign.
However, when analysing people’s attitudes, there are contradictions, first and foremost because there is no universal notion of what is supposed to be ‘right-wing’ or ‘left-wing’. For instance, polls show growing concern about rising insecurity, and it would be very elitist to think that having this concern makes you right-wing. The rise in crime shows that it is a real concern.
It is true that in this election campaign positive perceptions of the private sector have increased compared to perceptions of the public administration, possibly as a result of Milei’s discourse but also because the image of the state has deteriorated considerably under recent administrations. In this sense, it could be said that voters have indeed moved towards the right. But Milei’s victory with almost 56 per cent of the vote shouldn’t lead to the conclusion that more than half of the electorate have ideologically leaned rightwards, or even embraced the radical right, because many voted for him because he embodies the reaction to the status quo rather than because of his ideological proposals.
During the campaign it was argued that democracy was at stake. Is Argentina’s democracy in danger?
Democracy is not in imminent danger, as was the case with military coups, which wiped democracy away overnight. There are signs of democratic erosion – but these have been there for years. There has been both progress and setbacks, including attempts to co-opt the judiciary, the misuse of state resources and clientelistic practices.
Generally speaking, Argentina’s democratic institutions work. Despite the opposition’s complaints about the electoral system, the elections took place normally and the results were out very quickly.
However, we have seen a huge setback in terms of public debate. Intolerance and verbal violence have increased. Supporters of different parties can hardly talk to each other. There is a lot of aggression on social media. These are all medium-intensity warning signs that, if not addressed, will only pave the way for more violence and authoritarianism.
How will Argentina’s political scene change following this election?
Since 2003, with Néstor Kirchner’s election to the presidency, a system of two broad coalitions formed, which since 2007, under Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, has been maintained by the introduction of open, simultaneous and compulsory primary elections. These served to avoid party fragmentation but had the negative effect of eroding programmatic or ideological differences. The two coalitions that formed as a result included their own right and left wings, blurring the ideological debate and replacing it with a divide between Peronism and anti-Peronism. This ended up encouraging affective polarisation with very watertight alignments where it is increasingly difficult to find common ground.
The fact that the presidential elections were won by a party that until a couple of years ago did not exist will force the two big coalitions of recent decades, the Peronist ruling party and the opposition Together for Change, to profoundly reconfigure themselves.
Within Peronism, former president and current vice-president Cristina Kirchner was the big loser of this election. In recent times she has been absent from the political scene, leaving Peronism without clear leadership. Peronism has strong roots in trade unions and social organisations that are highly dependent on the state. These organisations have incentives to negotiate, should the new government open up that space. However, Milei’s initial discourse has pointed in a completely different direction, insisting that he will take shock measures.
What are the main challenges the new government will face?
The new government should tackle three major challenges. The first is to stabilise the economy by stopping inflation and putting the exchange rate in order. The second is to introduce reforms to increase productivity and solve the crisis in formal employment. And the third is governance. Argentina has very strong social organisations, which has both positive and negative aspects, but in any case, it is a strongly organised society that is very predisposed to conflict.
These three challenges must be tackled in a coordinated and consistent way, which is quite difficult.
Do you think Milei’s government will be able to tackle them?
I have serious doubts that the new government will be able to meet these challenges, not only in the area of stabilisation and structural reforms, but also and above all in the area of governance. Many of the proposed measures, such as adopting the US dollar as the currency, could be found unconstitutional. Other measures require legislative majorities that the new government won’t have. Its only prospect of obtaining substantial legislative support was through Together for Change, but the division of the opposition coalition leaves Milei without even a congressional quorum.
Milei has not one provincial governorship and almost no mayorships. However, Argentina’s sub-national powerholders have always been accommodating and pragmatic. Still, some key measures would go directly against the interests of the provinces, such as the elimination of co-participation, the system through which the federal state distributes public resources from national taxes to the provinces. And then there is the potential confrontation with the province of Buenos Aires.
Milei could try to rule by decree, but this would cause an instant crisis, and in case of an impeachment trial the vice-president, Victoria Villarruel, would take over. This would not ensure any positive change but would rather imply some additional negative elements.
Milei was elected with a very large majority, so he has great popular legitimacy. But this majority could be inflated, as is often the case in runoffs, and is compounded by the volatility and impatience of a large part of Argentina’s electorate. If he succeeds in implementing his ultra-liberal programme, a global rarity, the social costs will be extremely high. And if he fails to do so, people’s disenchantment with politics could increase and their support for democracy could be called into question.
Civic space in Argentina is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Yanina Welp via herwebsite and follow@Welpita on Twitter.
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ARMENIA: ‘As people leave their homes in search of safety, humanitarian organisations must support their basic needs’
CIVICUS speaks about the civil society humanitarian response to the Azerbaijani blockade and military offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh – the disputed territory within Azerbaijan that until recently was governed by ethnic Armenians – withShushanik Nersesyan,Media and Communication Manager at People in Need (PIN) Armenia.Founded in 1992 bya group of journalists involved in the 1989 Czechoslovak ‘Velvet Revolution’, PIN is a civil society organisation (CSO) working in the fields of humanitarian aid, human rights, education and social work. Since it was established in 2003, its permanent office in Armenia has worked to strengthen Armenian people’s abilities to improve their lives and the communities they live in.
How did the Azerbaijani blockade affect people in Nagorno-Karabakh?
It all started in December 2022, when Azerbaijani civilians identifying themselves as environmental activists began obstructing the Lachin corridor, which links Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. In April 2023 Azerbaijan set up an official checkpoint that largely cut off the passage of people and goods between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Once it was under Azeri control, it was possible to use the corridor only in exceptionally urgent cases, through the intermediation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or Russian peacekeepers.
On 29 July Azerbaijani authorities abducted V Khachatryan, a 68-year-old Nagorno-Karabakh resident who was being evacuated by the ICRC for urgent medical treatment through the Lachin corridor. Khachatryan remains in captivity. Another incident occurred in late August when three Nagorno-Karabakh students were captured by Azerbaijani border guards while travelling to Armenia via the corridor. They were only released 10 days later. Free movement of people to Armenia became impossible.
The prolonged blockade led to a humanitarian crisis due to shortages of essential goods – including electricity, fuel and water – and the closure of basic services. People in Need, along with Action Against Hunger and Médecins du Monde France, condemned it but, regrettably, our efforts to open to road for the trucks with food to Nagorno-Karabakh were thwarted.
The situation changed with the shelling that caused the deaths of hundreds of innocent people on 19 and 20 September. Since 24 September, over 100,000 people have fled Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenian regions, where they are also facing an emergency situation due to food and hygiene needs, plus longer-term issues of housing, education and jobs.
How has Armenian civil society responded to the humanitarian crisis?
CSOs including PIN deployed humanitarian projects to help blockade-affected people. CSOs conducted visits and issued statements. In Kornidzor, on the border, representatives from dozens of Armenian CSOs gathered during the blockade, urging the international community to uphold human rights and ensure the passage of humanitarian aid for civilians in Nagorno-Karabakh. The unimpeded delivery of essential goods, including food, hygiene items, medicine and fuel, as well as the unrestricted movement of people, including critically ill patients, are fundamental tenets of international humanitarian law.
What work is PIN doing in this context?
Since 1992, as a newly established organisation, PIN has been there to help people affected by the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, which lasted from February 1988 to May 1994. We have actively contributed to the growth of Armenian civil society, which has remained resilient throughout this crisis. We coordinate our efforts with the government and local authorities to closely monitor the situation on the ground and carry out numerous humanitarian projects.
We continue assisting the most vulnerable populations. Since September 2020, we have provided essential humanitarian aid and long-term efforts for the social and economic integration of thousands of people.
As a humanitarian organisation, we advocate for rights and a peaceful resolution of conflicts in adherence with international law. Along with our partners, we have expressed our concerns, called for measures to prevent the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe and continuously raised internal and donor funds to help people in need.
When people started fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh, we immediately mobilised PIN funds to support the first recipient centre in the Syunik border region to deliver aid such as food, clothes and blankets to forcibly displaced people and create a special space for children’s activities while their parents dealt with registration and searching for accommodation. Additionally, we launched the SOS Armenia appeal and new humanitarian assistance projects funded by the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the European Union, the Netherlands Refugee Foundation, Start Network and USAID.
As people continue to leave their homes in search of safety without being able to take their belongings, humanitarian organisations must continue providing assistance to support their basic needs.
Civic space in Armenia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with People in Need Armenia through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@PIN_Armenia on Twitter.
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Armenia: ‘For the quality of democracy to improve, judicial independence must be guaranteed and labour rights need further protection’
Elections held in Armenia in 2017 resulted in the ruling party holding onto power, but were marred by allegations of fraud, including vote-buying and misuse of state resources.CIVICUS speaks to Artur Sakunts, chairman of Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly - Vanadzor Office (HCA Vanadzor), a non-political, non-religious and not-for-profit civil society organisation that seeks to advance the values of human rights, democracy, tolerance and pluralism in Armenia. HCA Vanadzor works in the areas of research, dissemination, litigation, training, lobbying, campaigning and the promotion of public debate.
1. How would you describe the current state of democracy and human rights in Armenia?
Since 2013, human rights and democracy have considerably regressed in Armenia. The constitutional referendum, held in 2015, and elections to the National Assembly and Yerevan City Council in 2017 were marked by fraud and procedural violations. As a result of the constitutional referendum, Armenia changed from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary republic, and the changes began to be implemented during the 2017 elections. The new parliamentary system strengthened the dominant position of the Republican Party, which is the main party, and the power of its leader. A number of opposition figures have suffered and still suffer persecution. Any demonstration of civic activism has faced a harsh reaction and pressure by law enforcement agencies, and the space for civil society organisations (CSOs) and civil society initiatives has further shrunk. Additionally, the Four Day War with Azerbaijan in April 2016 led to a large loss of human lives and exposed the country's vulnerability to external threats. All these processes have occurred in an atmosphere of impunity. Meanwhile, the steps towards reform taken by the authorities have been reactive or aimed at solving problems by increasing the social burden on citizens rather than by making systemic changes.
In December 2015, a new phase of negotiations was launched between Armenia and the European Union (EU). The Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement was initialled in March 2017 and eventually signed in November 2017. However, the unpredictable behaviour of the Armenian authorities creates uncertainty in terms of the expected developments in EU-Armenia relations, even after the agreement has been signed.
2. Have recent changes in CSO regulations affected civil society’s ability to contribute to democratic governance?
On 16 December 2016, after long-held discussions, the Law on Non-Governmental Organisations was adopted, entitling CSOs to represent the public interest in court, albeit only in the field of environmental protection. It should be noted, however, that in its ruling of 7 September 2010, the Armenian Constitutional Court recognised the right of CSOs to represent the public interest in national courts without any limitation.
Another risk associated with the Law on Non-Governmental Organisations was that it initially prescribed state supervision over the financial activity of all CSOs. However, as a result of public debate, this requirement was eventually prescribed only for state-funded CSOs.
In short, contrary to expectations, the new regulations ended up being a positive development for civil society.
3. What is the environment like for human rights defenders in Armenia?
In early 2016 a well-known human rights defender, Karen Andreasyan, stepped down as Armenia’s Human Rights Ombudsman without providing any reasons. It should be noted that in the autumn of 2015, during the presentation of his annual report to the National Assembly, Andreasyan was strongly criticised and personally insulted by Republican Party deputies. His resignation exposed the vulnerability of the Human Rights Ombudsman’s office. In December 2013 Andreasyan had published a well-substantiated report on the spread of corruption in courts and the lack of independence of judges, which was harshly criticised by the Prosecutor General's Office, the Republican faction of the National Assembly and several judges. None of the concerns raised by the report on the state of the judiciary have been considered or examined.
Following the National Assembly’s appointment of a new Human Rights Ombudsman, the concentration of oversight and protection mechanisms over different fields of human rights, including children’s rights and the rights of persons with disabilities, has increasingly raised serious concerns. Along with such centralisation, space for other human rights institutions is becoming more limited and the variety of human rights protection mechanisms is being reduced. Given that since the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office was introduced, all Ombudsmen have resigned before the end of their term under pressure from political and executive powers, the concentration of protection mechanisms in the hands of a single person makes the Human Rights Ombudsman and human rights protection mechanisms extremely vulnerable.
In early July 2016, an armed opposition group known as Sasna Tsrer seized a police station and took hostages. As Sasna Tsrer members underwent trial, significant restrictions were imposed on various stakeholders engaged with the Human Rights Ombudsman’s office, and particularly on attorneys and on the public monitoring group on penitentiary institutions. Before Sasna Tsrer’s surrender, members of the Group of Public Observers Conducting Public Monitoring in Penitentiary Institutions and Bodies of the Ministry of Justice were illegally banned from meeting Zhirayr Sefilyan, a political prisoner detained at the Vardashen penitentiary institution. Later, members of the Group of Public Observers were also banned from meeting Sasna Tsrer members detained at the Nubarashen penitentiary institution, after information was aired that on 28 June 2017 Sasna Tsrer members had been subjected to violence at the General Jurisdiction Court of the Avan and Nor Nork administrative districts.
It should be also noted that during the former Minister of Justice’s tenure, draft regulations were put forward suggesting that any new members of the Group of Public Observers would need to be confirmed by the Ministry of Justice, although the Group's Charter states that new members only need to be accepted by the Group itself. The draft regulation was rejected, but it was an attempt to restrict the activities and independence of the Group of Public Observers. The current Human Rights Ombudsman has not reacted in any way to this attempt, which is yet further evidence of the dangers of concentrating human rights defence mechanisms.
Illegal attempts were made to search the defence attorneys of Sasna Tsrer members before they entered the courtroom. As the attorneys resisted those searches, the court adopted a tactic of imposing sanctions on the attorneys and replacing them with public defenders, which posed a risk of substantially reducing the protection of Sasna Tsrer members. The legal community also faces pressures through disciplinary proceedings initiated against lawyers on suspicious grounds. An added challenge is the behaviour of the Bar Association, which imposes its own disciplinary sanctions on individual attorneys. The Bar Association’s chairman has openly argued against laws preventing domestic violence and has repeatedly made homophobic statements.
The environment has also been unfavourable for journalists, including legislative restrictions and physical attacks, particularly during protests, as well as legal actions meant to silence them.
4. How have the authorities responded to peaceful protests over the years?
President Serzh Sargsyan's second term in office, which began in 2013, has been marked by increasing civic activism, which has in turn been suppressed by the police and other state bodies. Citizens’ protests have mostly been related to various issues of public or social significance, particularly transportation and electricity price hikes, the introduction of a mandatory funded pension system, the dismantling and destruction of cultural monuments and environmental issues.
On 2 December 2013, the day of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Armenia, a large number of citizens held protests in Yerevan, the capital, against Armenia joining the Eurasian Customs Union and Eurasian Economic Union. The police dispersed the protests using violence and apprehended 110 peaceful protesters, who were kept in police stations for eight hours without access to legal assistance.
The summer of 2015 was marked by the so-called ‘Electric Yerevan’ protests against the hike in electricity prices, which lasted almost two weeks. On 23 June 2015 at 5am, the police used water cannons to disperse a peaceful sit-in on Baghramyan Avenue. Using physical violence, the police apprehended around 240 protesters and attacked 21 journalists, damaging their equipment. Following the police violence, the number of sit-in participants dramatically rose, but at the end of June 2015 protesters split up as some of them obeyed police warnings and moved to Liberty Square. The number of sit-in participants on Baghramyan Avenue gradually decreased, and on 6 July 2015 the police eventually dispersed the demonstration. Criminal proceedings were initiated, against both protesters and police officers that used violence against them. Four police officers faced charges for using violence against journalists, but none has so far been held liable for the violence.
In July 2016, following the Sasna Tsrer incident, a series of mass protests was held in Khorenatsi Street and Liberty Square in Yerevan, and the police again used violence against the demonstrators. Hundreds of people were illegally apprehended and the protests were brutally dispersed through excessive force. According to official data, between 17 July and 4 August 2016, 775 people were arrested. On 20 and 29 July 2016 police used unprecedented violence against protesters; as a result, several protesters and journalists received serious bodily injuries. For the first time in the entire history of the Republic of Armenia, protesters were violently taken to the Police Internal Troops barracks and illegally deprived of their freedom. Many people compared this with the situation in Chile in 1973 when dictator Augusto Pinochet kept people captive in a football stadium.
As a rule, no police officer that uses violence against protesters or violates their rights in any way are held accountable, while protesters are liable for administrative and criminal offences. In this regard, it should be noted that in 2012 a Police Disciplinary Commission was created with a provision allowing for the inclusion of representatives from five CSOs. The Disciplinary Commission’s membership and procedures were decided by the government. However, through a decree issued on 31 March 2016, the government handed this power over to the Chief of Police. This change may lead to a conflict of interests and to a further reduction of the Commission’s independence.
5. Have any civil society freedoms been restricted around the 2017 elections?
The new draft Electoral Code resulting from the constitutional amendments first became available on 22 February 2016 on the official website of the Venice Commission (the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters), in English. Its Armenian version was posted on the Armenian government’s website no sooner than 3 March 2016.
Unlike what had happened with the draft constitutional amendments and the initial draft of the Electoral Code, which had been prepared within a narrow pro-government circle, wider participation was ensured during the further amendment of the Electoral Code. At the suggestion of Levon Zurabyan, a deputy with an opposition party, the Armenian National Congress, negotiations on the draft Electoral Code started between the ruling party, the political opposition and civil society in a 4+4+4 format. As a result, the Electoral Code included a number of recommendations, mostly of an administrative nature, put forward by the opposition and civil society. However, the authorities made no concessions on issues of political significance or that would affect the distribution of power in the parliament to be formed. It should be noted that civil society members took part in the negotiations only at the initial stage and refused to sign the agreements that were eventually reached by the government and the opposition.
The Electoral Code adopted in May 2016 imposed significant restrictions on observers and mass media representatives. In particular, the Code gave precinct electoral commissions the right to set a maximum number of observers and mass media representatives allowed at a polling station. The Code set a requirement for election observation organisations to have had a provision on human rights and democracy in their statutory goals for at least the past year and imposed an accreditation requirement for mass media, allowing for only a limited number of representatives. As a result, a media outlet may have a maximum of 50 representatives throughout the country. The new Electoral Code also stipulates that commission members may remove observers, mass media representatives and proxies from a polling station by a vote.
It is noteworthy that the Electoral Code considers CSOs as the main entities engaged in civic oversight and particularly in electoral observation, but it gives them no right to appeal against the actions or inactions of electoral commissions, or election results, or to file any other complaints.
The Code extended the voting population, as the right to vote was granted to persons who have committed crimes of minor and medium gravity and have served their sentences, and to persons doing military study abroad; however, the rest of the approximately 450,000 to 500,000 Armenian nationals living abroad were not granted the opportunity to vote.
As a result of amendments passed a few months later, the Electoral Code also provided for the publication of signed voter lists, something that the opposition and civil society had been demanding for years. Citizens were given the right to file an application for voter impersonation cases, although the Armenian Criminal Code included an article on false statements regarding such applications. According to the Central Electoral Commission’s report, only one person filed an application on voter impersonation in the context of the National Assembly elections of 2 April 2017. Among other reasons, this might have been due to the relevant article of the Criminal Code, though it is widely held that the number of cases of multiple voting or voter impersonation during the elections was not considerable, and the authorities mostly distorted the election through the abuse of administrative resources and vote-buying.
During the National Assembly elections of 2 April 2017 and the Yerevan City Council elections of 14 May 2017, widespread abuses were identified that took the form of fake observation. The Central Electoral Commission accredited around 28,000 observers from 49 organisations to observe the National Assembly elections. The overwhelming majority of those observers acted at polling stations mostly as proxies representing the interests of the Republican Party or the Tsarukyan Bloc, which came second in the election.
6. What needs to change for the quality of democracy to improve in Armenia?
First, more protection of labour rights is needed in both the government and business sectors, where rights are not protected. This was explicitly revealed during the recent elections. At the same time, the independence of the business sector and the protection of their rights from the ruling elites should be ensured as well.
The second important issue is judicial independence from executive power. Control of the judiciary is the main tool that the government uses to reinforce impunity, and this is an obstacle for the effective protection of citizens and civil society groups.
- Civic space in Armenia is rated as ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor, indicating the existence of significant restrictions on civil society rights.
- Get in touch with HCA Vanadzor through their websiteor Facebookpage, or follow @HCAVanadzor on Twitter
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ARMENIA: ‘Lack of compelling international action allowed the attack on Nagorno-Karabakh to occur’
CIVICUS speaks about the humanitarian crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh– the disputed territory within Azerbaijan that until recently was governed by ethnic Armenians –withLida Minasyan, a feminist peace activist and Resource Mobilisation Consultant at theCentral Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central and North Asia (CEECCNA) Collaborative Fund.Founded in 2022, the CEECCNA Collaborative Fund is a feminist fund that mobilises sustainable resources for social justice movements across the CEECCNA region.
What is the current security and human rights situation in Nagorno-Karabakh?
The ethnic Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh was forcibly displaced within days of the Azerbaijani government launching a full-scale attack on 19 September. A week later, 100,632 people had arrived in Armenia, having left behind their homes, their belongings and the lives they had built.
Several actions deliberately targeted against civilians occurred before the start of the ethnic cleansing of the Armenian population from Nagorno-Karabakh. In December 2022, Azerbaijan blocked the Lachin corridor, the only road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, leaving the 120,000 Armenians who lived there completely isolated. People endured nine months of severe food insecurity, fuel shortages, electricity outages, communications breakdowns and medical supply shortages. This resulted in a humanitarian crisis that put people, particularly those with vulnerabilities, at risk. Many pregnant women had miscarriages and stillbirths, people with chronic illnesses couldn’t receive their medication and treatment, and risk of infection increased due to the lack of hygiene products. These were just a few of the severe challenges people faced during the blockade.
The Lachin road was reopened several days after the Azerbaijani offensive, when people, already traumatised and starving, experienced a direct threat to their lives. They had no choice but to leave their homes in search of safety in Armenia.
Why did Azerbaijan initiate the blockade and military offensive?
The nine-month blockade and the offensive were meant to achieve the ethnic cleansing of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh. The intentional deprivation of essential resources for survival followed by the direct attack to take over Nagorno-Karabakh, along with the creation of conditions for the Armenian population to leave, indicate that Azerbaijan is not contemplating any peaceful end to the conflict or human rights guarantees for Armenian people to feel safe in their homes and continue living in Nagorno-Karabakh.
By leveraging additional threats against Armenians and Armenian sovereign territories, demonstrating its military power, and consistently introducing new conditions in the negotiation process with Armenia, Azerbaijan intends to assert its dominance. This approach reinforces a policy of hatred towards Armenians spanning decades and undermines the peacebuilding process between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
How has Armenian civil society responded to the humanitarian crisis?
Displaced people endured a journey of over 20 hours to reach Armenia, during which they had no access to food, water or sanitation facilities. As a result, most of them arrived thirsty, hungry and in need of medical attention. When they began arriving, local organisations, activists and volunteers were among the first to give them food, hygiene products and assistance to register for the state support system.
Local civil society organisations engage in continuous needs assessments of displaced people, using dynamic data collection approaches, as the situation is changing rapidly. In addition to the immediate provision of goods, there are medium and long-term needs to address. Displaced people need psychological assistance to overcome trauma, sustainable medical support, permanent housing, access to education and employment and services to prevent and address gender-based violence.
As part of the CEECCNA Collaborative Fund, we provide timely updates about the situation to our international partners and mobilise and direct resources to local organisations. Due to limited resources, Armenian civil society activists worked under a lot of pressure because they had to initiate fundraising efforts while simultaneously providing emergency response.
The Armenian government has provided displaced people with one-time financial support, essential products and access to temporary accommodation. For all its good intentions, however, the government also lacks resources and capacity to provide adequate long-term assistance to displaced people.
Has the international community’s response been adequate?
The response has been slow and inadequate. A few months into the blockade, the international community refused to call the situation a humanitarian crisis and many turned a blind eye to the deteriorating conditions of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population.
After numerous appeals and demands from civil society, some international agencies began releasing statements urging the Azerbaijani government to open the Lachin corridor. They mainly referred to the International Court of Justice’s orders of 22 February and 6 July 2023, which unequivocally mandated Azerbaijan to ensure unrestricted movement of people, vehicles and cargo along the corridor in both directions.
Despite these decisions, the road remained blocked. A group of four United Nations experts also expressed their concern about the continued closure of the Lachin corridor and called on the Azerbaijani authorities to promptly reinstate unimpeded and safe movement along the road, as stipulated by the November 2020 ceasefire agreement.
The lack of more compelling action by the international community created an unhindered environment for the attack to occur. Many organisations are currently responding by issuing new alerts and appeals, along with providing much-needed humanitarian support. However, the people of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia require sustainable peace and human security, which will only be achievable through a negotiation that is inclusive of the voices of those most profoundly affected by the conflict. We advocate specifically for the inclusion of women in formal negotiations, in order to pave the way to sustainable peace.
The international community’s crisis-response support is highly appreciated, but it should be complemented by long-term funding for dialogue, peacebuilding and the reestablishment of human security. Armenian civil society working to alert about potential risks of conflict escalation on the borders of Armenia could also benefit from their support.
Civic space in Armenia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Learn more aboutCEECCNA Collaborative Fund in thisblog.
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ARMS CONTROLS: ‘Greater women’s participation in male-dominated mechanisms would increase prospects for peace’
CIVICUS speaks with Aaron Lainé, Policy and Government Liaison Officer, and Raluca Muresan, Programme Manager at Control Arms, a civil society coalition that advocates for greater controls in the international arms trade to end the human suffering caused by the irresponsible arms trade, and to stop arms transfers that fuel conflict, systemic armed violence, poverty and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.
It was quite surprising to hear that the 2019 Conference of States Parties to theArms Trade Treaty (ATT) would focus on gender. What is the connection between gender and weapons, and between women’s rights and gun control?
The thematic focus of the Sixth Conference of States Parties to the ATT (CSP6) on gender and gender-based violence (GBV) was the result of long-term efforts by progressive governments and civil society who called for more integration in the areas of sustainable development, women, peace and security and arms control. Building on the fact that the ATT is the first legally binding instrument to recognise the link between GBV and the international arms trade, efforts were concentrated on ensuring that governments recognise the importance of stopping arms transfers that perpetuate GBV and creating gender-sensitive arms control policies and programmes.
A gender perspective in arms control requires governments to examine how socially constructed gender roles affect policy decisions, particularly related to arms exports and controls. It also requires a better understanding of the gendered impact of armed violence and conflict, including of how women and men are impacted on, due to their sex or prevailing expectations about gender. It must be noted here that gender is not limited to women and girls but also includes men and boys and LGBTQI+ people.
While the body of evidence that connects women and peace and security with arms control policies is continually growing, several studies outline the disproportionate effect of irresponsible arms transfers and arms proliferation on women and children and the gendered impact of modern armed conflicts. While men and boys are both perpetrators and the primary victims of armed violence and conflict, women and girls bear a substantial and differentiated burden, including because of GBV, displacement and lack of access to medical care during pregnancy and childbirth due to the destruction of medical facilities. Research on the gendered impact of conflict also indicates that bombs, missiles, mortars and rockets, when used in populated areas, result in disproportionate casualties among women and children.
Therefore, Control Arms – along with other civil society organisations following the ATT process – has been urging governments to go beyond examining the risks that transferred arms may be used to commit violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, and look at the gendered impact of the use of weapons as part of a thorough examination of the potential for GBV facilitated by transferred arms. This is an essential component in reducing human suffering, the key purpose of the ATT.
While gender and GBV are beginning to be receive proper recognition by various United Nations mechanisms, including in disarmament forums, what is more important is to see meaningful action on the ground. In the case of the ATT, Control Arms hopes that states parties will base arms export control decisions on the recognition of the risk of commission or facilitation of GBV. The Control Arms practical guide on how the ATT can address GBV was specifically designed to help states parties implement GBV criteria effectively when conducting a risk assessment before authorising an arms export, and help push for meaningful change by using the ATT to address GBV.
Can you tell us more about the ATT and the role played by Control Arms in its negotiation and implementation?
The ATT, which was adopted in 2013 and entered into force on 24 December 2014, is part of the international response to the tremendous human suffering caused by the widespread proliferation of conventional weapons and poorly regulated trade in them. The ATT sets common international standards for the transfer of conventional arms and ammunition, with the express purpose of reducing human suffering. The ATT represents a significant paradigm shift in the world of arms control through its prohibitions on certain arms transfers (Article 6) and the establishment of a detailed export risk assessment mechanism (Article 7). Under these articles of the Treaty, states parties must determine if an arms transfer would violate specific international obligations or arms embargos or if the arms would be used to commit or facilitate genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, serious human rights or humanitarian law violations, to enable terrorism or organised crime, or to commit or facilitate GBV, and stop it in case it risks having any of these consequences. With the inclusion of Articles 6 and 7, for the first time in history, states are required to place international human rights and humanitarian law at the core of their arms export decisions.
The Treaty also sets out guidelines for importing, transit and transhipment states, requiring them to cooperate and share the information necessary to conduct the mentioned assessment.
Today, the ATT’s membership comprises 105 states parties and 33 signatories.
The Control Arms Coalition formed and launched a campaign in 2003 that tirelessly pushed for states to accept the idea of and negotiate the first global treaty to regulate the conventional arms trade. Since the adoption of the ATT in 2013, Control Arms has continued to push, first, for the 50 ratifications required for its entry into force, and then to hit a target of 100 states parties and for effective implementation. Through each stage of the ATT process, the role of civil society has evolved from primarily one of advocacy and awareness-raising to where we are today – where civil society plays an instrumental role in shaping the discussions and agenda of the Conferences of States Parties, advancing the Treaty’s universalisation and implementation, and ensuring transparency and accountability in the ATT through mechanisms such as the Control Arms’ ATT Monitor Report.
What does the Arms Trade Treaty say about GBV, and how could its provisions be used to protect women and children?
According to ATT’s Article 7.4, ‘[t]he exporting State Party, in making this [risk] assessment, shall take into account the risk of the conventional arms covered under Article 2.1 or of the items covered under Article 3 or Article 4 being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of GBV or serious acts of violence against women and children’.
The aim of Article 7.4 is to ensure that an exporting state party takes into account the risk that the arms transferred will be used to commit or facilitate acts of GBV, when conducting its export assessment outlined in Article 7.1. It is an explicit requirement aimed at reducing the historical tendency to overlook GBV.
In practical terms, if applied correctly, the ATT will help deprive human rights abusers of the arms that help facilitate violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including acts of GBV and violence against women and children.
What kind of advocacy work has Control Arms been doing in the area of GBV?
The Control Arms Coalition played a key role in advocating for the inclusion of Article 7.4 in the Treaty. Since then, Control Arms has sought to raise awareness about the importance of this provision, through bilateral and regional meetings, social media campaigns such as 10 Reasons to #StopGBV, and interventions and statements in ATT-related meetings.
Control Arms also produced a range of resources such as the Practical Guide on how to use the ATT to address GBV, a paper that provides interpretations on key terms from Article 7 and a factsheet on gender in the ATT. These resources were used in the first-ever training programme for export control officials on the implementation of the GBV criteria. Organised by Control Arms and the government of Latvia, the training session brought together representatives from 12 Central and Eastern European governments to learn in greater detail about the links between GBV and arms transfer decisions and the application of the ATT risk-assessment criteria that take these risks fully into account.
Do you think women’s participation in disarmament and arms control negotiations and processes could increase the prospects for peace?
Greater women’s participation in male-dominated disarmament and arms control mechanisms would without a doubt contribute to greater prospects for peace. Several studies, for example by the Council on Foreign Relations and a 2018 study by Jana Krause, Werner Krause and Piia Bränfors, highlight the positive impact of women in conflict resolution, concluding that “women’s participation in conflict prevention and resolution can improve outcomes before, during, and after conflict.” Similarly, gender equality among participants in international multilateral mechanisms can lead to more inclusive, effective and sustainable policy outcomes. This is relevant particularly for disarmament and arms control forums that have remained largely male-dominated and are stuck in an ideological window characterised by aggression, dominance, egotism and other characteristics of toxic masculinity.
A recent study by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Still Behind the Curve, outlines the state of gender balance in arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament diplomacy. Its main conclusion is that “the proportion of women participating in arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament diplomacy… has grown steadily over the last four decades, but women remain underrepresented.” This applies to the ATT as elsewhere: only 27 per cent of representatives at the 2018 Conference of States Parties were female.
Get in touch with Control Arms through itswebsite andFacebook page, or follow@controlarms and@AaronLaineRicoy on Twitter.
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As resistance grows against the Myanmar military, the Council must ensure accountability for violations
Statement at the 49th Session of the UN Human Rights Council
Item 4: Interactive Debate on the High Commissioner’s report on Myanmar
Delivered byLisa Majumdar
Thank you Mr President, and Madame High Commissioner.
In Myanmar, a human rights catastrophe is compounded by a humanitarian emergency.
For the past year, civil servants mobilised alongside students and the workers’ movement to resist the military’s attempt to seize control. In response, the Myanmar security forces intensified their crackdown on protests, escalating to battlefield weapons against protesters, killing nearly fifteen hundred people.
Resistance against the military continues to grow and unify within Myanmar, despite the great risk. At this critical point, we call for the immediate recognition of the National Unity Government as the legitimate government of Myanmar.
Over 9,000 are currently in arbitrary detention. They include human rights defenders, lawyers, trade unionists, activists and monks. Some were taken in terrifying night-time raids. Others were abducted off the streets, held in secret facilities and denied access to lawyers. We call on Myanmar to immediately release all those arbitrarily detained.
Internet shutdowns and willful restrictions to humanitarian aid prevent much-needed supplies from reaching those in dire need. ASEAN’s efforts to halt the grave violations have failed.
The ongoing impunity for serious crimes despite clear evidence is a travesty. We welcome particularly the High Commissioner’s recommendation to support the referral of the situation to the International Criminal Court, by the UN Security Council or by duly recognised national authorities, and we urge the Council to seriously consider further steps towards accountability.
As immediate steps towards protecting those on the ground, the junta must be deprived of resources and arms. To this end, we urge States to follow the recommendations of the High Commissioner to take immediate action to prevent arms flows to the Myanmar military, and apply other targeted sanctions on military economic interests as appropriate; and to encourage businesses that maintain connections with Myanmar military owned or affiliates to cease their operation.
To the High Commissioner, what are the further measures the Council must take to ensure that accountability and justice can be achieved?
Civic space in Myanmar is rated as repressed by the CIVICUS Monitor
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ASEAN: ‘Laos’s leadership raises serious human rights concerns’
CIVICUS speaks about the implications of Laos chairing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with Mary Aileen Diaz Bacalso, Executive Director of the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA).Founded in 1991, FORUM-ASIA is a network of 85 organisations across 23 countries, mainly in Asia. It works to strengthen movements for human rights and sustainable development through research, advocacy, capacity development and solidarity actions in Asia and beyond. It has consultative status with the United Nations and maintains a consultative relationship with the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights.
What are the main challenges ASEAN will likely face in 2024?
ASEAN is a regional alliance comprising of 10 Southeast Asian countries, plus Timor-Leste, which is on track to join. It was established in 1967 to preserve peace and stability in the Cold War era. Nowadays it oversees collaborative efforts on its three pillars of economic, socio-cultural and political and security matters. It is also meant to promote and safeguard human rights through a regional mechanism within the political-security pillar.
With Laos as chair, ASEAN will face three significant challenges in 2024. The first is related to its reliance on consensus politics and non-interference, which means that progress depends on each member state’s unique circumstances. Political events such as elections in Indonesia, attempted coups in Myanmar and regressions in human rights and democracy in countries across the region, including in Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, obstruct advances in the protection and promotion of human rights and put the ability to achieve consensus to the test.
The second challenge is the result of a notable lack of optimism and growing scepticism by human rights organisations about Laos’s role as chair. Laos’s reputation for human rights abuses and violations of fundamental freedoms raises doubts about its ability to lead ASEAN effectively in improving human rights protections.
The third challenge is linked to external factors, particularly geopolitical tensions between China and the west, which will influence the regional bloc. These pressures may impact on economic, socio-cultural and political-security cooperation within ASEAN, adding another layer of complexity to the challenges the organisation will face in 2024.
What does the fact that Laos is chairing ASEAN in 2024 mean for China’s standing and role in the region and globally?
Laos continues to have the same voting power as other ASEAN members, but as chair, it has greater influence in shaping the organisation’s agenda. For instance, it has chosen ‘Enhancing Connectivity and Resilience’ as the theme for 2024 and has shown commitment to fostering connections with the East Asia bloc, including China. An official statement issued by the 2024 ASEAN Foreign Ministers Retreat emphasised the importance of enhancing ties between ASEAN and East Asian countries. It highlighted mechanisms such as the East Asia-ASEAN Summit, which includes the 10 ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea.
Two key concerns arise under Laos’s leadership, particularly regarding human rights. First, it’s uncertain how it will approach the Myanmar crisis, particularly due to the continued reliance on ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus as the primary reference, despite calls from civil society to move beyond this plan.
Laos has designated a seasoned diplomat as the ASEAN Special Envoy, tasked with meeting junta leader Min Aung Hlaing in Myanmar. However, the lack of a clear agenda for engaging with supporters of democracy such as the National Unity Government, the National Unity Consultative Council and the Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations raises doubts that ASEAN is playing a progressive role. Given historical and political ties between the military junta and the government of Laos, concerns linger about ASEAN’s alignment with the interests of people in Myanmar.
Second, the future of the human rights agenda is uncertain given Laos’s dubious human rights track record, which includes cases like the 2012 enforced disappearance of a prominent member of Laotian civil society, Sombath Somphone, and the deportation of the Chinese human rights lawyer Lu Siwei in October 2023. Plans have already been outlined for the 2024 ASEAN Human Rights Dialogue, but it is unclear whether civil society will be included or whether Laos will ensure a secure environment for it to take part.
Another pending topic on the human rights agenda is the revision of the terms of reference of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, which are supposed to be revised every five years but haven’t experienced any improvement in one and a half decades.
Does Laos’s role as chair create any significant opportunity for Laotian civil society?
We are quite sceptical about the potential impact of these changes in regional institutions on the domestic civil society landscape of a country with closed civic space.
Laos systematically represses civil society activists and dissenters through a variety of legal and extra-legal measures, including surveillance, threats and violence. The decision to choose Timor-Leste over Laos as the host for the ASEAN Civil Society Conference/ASEAN Peoples’ Forum despite Laos holding the ASEAN chair underscores the apprehensions of civil society regarding safety within Laos.
Given the principle of non-interference on which ASEAN is based, it remains an unresolved question whether other ASEAN countries will scrutinise Laos’s human rights track record.
Nonetheless, from a civil society standpoint, this situation presents an opportunity to amplify efforts in advocating for justice and accountability for victims of human rights violations in Laos.
FORUM-ASIA is steadfast in its commitment to monitor the human rights situation, document violations and hold the Laotian government, as well as all ASEAN governments, accountable for upholding their commitment to protect and promote human rights in accordance with international human rights standards.
It is key to strengthen solidarity with Laos and leverage the momentum of Laos’s chairing of ASEAN. We urge the international community to participate in campaigns and advocacy initiatives. We must join forces to amplify the voices of the oppressed, shine the spotlight on Laos and the region and undertake collective action to address human rights concerns.
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ASIA: ‘Under the pandemic, racism against Indigenous peoples has intensified’
CIVICUS speaks to Gam Shimray, Secretary General of the Asian Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP), about the situation of Indigenous groups in Asia amid the COVID-19 pandemic. AIPP is a regional federation of Indigenous peoples’ movements in Asia that works to promote and defend Indigenous peoples’ human rights, including land rights and cultural rights. Because of their subordination and distinctiveness from mainstream culture and politics,Indigenous peoples are subjected to gross human rights violations, systematic racism, discrimination and dispossession. As a result of the denial of their rights to land, territory and resources, many Indigenous peoples are among the most disadvantaged and vulnerable groups.
Can you tell us about the work of AIPP?
The work of AIPP is guided by our belief in universal human rights and the inherent right to self-determination of all peoples, including Indigenous peoples. The rights to self-determination and self-government are a social necessity for the continuity of Indigenous social processes and self-development.
While our advocacy work is primarily focused on the regional and global levels, linkages with country-level processes are built through our members and networks. AIPP consolidates a common position of Indigenous organisations for regional and global advocacy. For this, we focus on building capacity in communities, consolidating Indigenous movements and setting a common agenda for collective campaigning and advocacy at the country level.
AIPP also focuses on building leadership and promoting distributive leadership across Asia, including among women, young people and persons with disabilities.
What was the situation of Indigenous peoples in Asia prior to the COVID-19 pandemic?
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the political situation in Asia had been deteriorating, particularly in the past few years. We have seen an increasing clampdown on civil society and the restriction of democratic space for public debate and opinion formation in several Asian countries. Some public intellectuals attribute this trend to the retreat of political leadership from democracy and human rights.
The transitions to democracy from authoritarian governments in recent decades, such as the Philippines in the 1980s, Indonesia in the late 1990s and Nepal in the 2000s, have remained incomplete. Other countries, such as China, Laos and Vietnam, have de jure one-party systems, and Cambodia has a de facto one. In Myanmar, the military still holds a grip on the government, while Thailand’s tradition of high tolerance is yet to produce a stable democratic modern state. Further, rising populism is posing a serious threat to democracies. In India, the world’s largest democracy and arguably one of Asia’s strongest, we are seeing a continuous assault on autonomous institutions, from the judiciary to the central bank and the free press, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s populist government.
The result is that in the last few years, most of the human rights defenders killed have been Indigenous peoples. They lost their lives defending their rights, homes, lands, territories and resources.
These problems are also evidence of deeper and underlying issues that relate to the inadequacy of political and institutional capacity to address effectively the challenges of democracy and human rights in Asian countries. We are faced with moral and political questions that call for serious examination of the erosion of human rights standards and practices and the weakening of political and institutional capacity to respond to present social and political issues. The suffering experienced by poor people during the COVID-19 pandemic is evidence of this.
What challenges have Indigenous groups and activists faced under the pandemic?
Issues and challenges vary across countries as the situation differs. One of the main challenges relates to the fact that most governments in Asia initiated countrywide lockdowns without much preparation, leading to chaos. The situation was simply overwhelming, and we could not respond to the needs of activists, communities, or migrant labourers.
Migrant workers, refugees and stateless persons suffered the most, and those without ID cards struggled to prove their citizenship, which they needed to receive government aid. Most migrants and refugees lack proper documentation and errors in registration abound. Those left out from national registries are denied national ID cards.
Under the pandemic, racism against Indigenous peoples has intensified. The situation has been worst in India, where people from the north-eastern part of the country have been thrown out of their hotels and rented houses. They have been denied the ability to buy food from grocery shops and board public transport. They have been spat on and taken into custody without an explanation. Many people, including women, have been beaten up for no reason, and many in cities across India are living in fear.
In some countries, governments are using the situation as a cover for conducting military campaigns, grabbing land, granting permission for large-scale development projects, rolling back protective rights and weakening environmental laws and safeguards. Several activists and community members have been killed or jailed under trumped-up charges in countries such as Bangladesh, India, Myanmar and the Philippines. Community leaders have also been stopped by police and security forces from carrying out relief work and helping starving communities.
These incidents are grave in nature and there is extraordinarily little that we can do about them, as people cannot go out and protest or campaign, and can hardly access the courts. In India, e-petitions are allowed, and urgent matters are still heard by courts through video conferencing, but most communities are not familiar with such complicated processes and many do not even have proper internet access.
How have AIPP and other Indigenous rights organisations responded to the situation?
The first thing we did was reach out to our members and networks to gather information from the ground. We also responded to those reaching out to us for support. Our first action was to provide or mobilise relief, and particularly food for those in critical need, in different areas through our members and networks. Our outreach also focused on sharing information concerning Indigenous communities. This was necessary because misinformation has been overwhelming, leading to panic-driven reactions from communities. We shared appeals to communities calling for humane responses and disseminating good practices that communities could implement.
The situation is complicated because it is not just about responding to the pandemic. Indigenous peoples face multiple underlying issues. The least we could do was register our protest and conduct our campaigns through digital channels.
The COVID-19 pandemic has unfolded many hidden issues and poses new challenges. So we are assessing and making efforts to take the next steps to cope with the longer-term impact of the pandemic. In this regard, we have also formed a regional network for COVID-19 response, which is in the process of expansion. We will be coming up with a preliminary regional assessment report soon, which will help us plan better. We can already see that capacity building will be crucial as we adapt to what is called the ‘new normal’.
What further support do Indigenous groups need at this time?
The support that Indigenous communities need is enormous as the impact is going to be long term. But few things that must be stressed are the following.
First, we need to set up COVID-19 response cells with designated funds at the local level, with a team of designated nodal officers to coordinate with state or provincial authorities and civil society organisations to monitor Indigenous issues and provide the necessary support. The response team should also coordinate with the appropriate authorities to cater to the special needs of women, children, older people and persons with disabilities in Indigenous areas.
Second, we need to ensure that appropriate guidelines and instructions are issued to provincial and local authorities on measures to be taken for Indigenous peoples to deal with COVID-19 and lockdown, including on ensuring compliance.
Third, it is critical to raise awareness and ensure access to healthcare. It is important to prepare community-friendly information materials that clearly explain the nature of the disease, quarantine and containment measures and testing, helping dispel myths. Coordination between health department workers and traditional healers is needed to ensure that Indigenous knowledge systems are part of these response mechanisms. Localised and separate quarantine strategies encouraging natural environment and community participation should be promoted. COVID-19 care centres can be set up at the community level, managed by community healers and nurses.
In remote areas, mobile health units should be deployed involving community healers and health workers. Special attention should be given to areas with migrant workers who have returned home. Testing and quarantine facilities should be immediately provided to them. Access to health services in case of emergencies, including transportation, should also be provided. Access to safe water for cleaning and drinking is another critical need that should be ensured.
Ensuring food security and incomes and protecting livelihoods is also crucial given the known evidence of undernourishment in many Indigenous areas. Over at least the next six months it will be necessary to distribute free rations of nutritional food to everybody, irrespective of people’s migratory status or whether they have an ID card.
Lastly, it is urgent to strengthen non-timber forest produce (NTFP)-based livelihoods by urgently devising effective institutional mechanisms for collection, storage, procurement and sale. Dependence on NTFP is high across Asia. Financial and logistical support should be provided directly to the communities to help generate sustainable livelihoods. Communities living in protected areas must be allowed to have access to forests for livelihood purposes.
What lessons you have learned so far about the situation of Indigenous people under the pandemic?
Under the pandemic, the situation has been overwhelming, and the measures imposed by governments have led to acts of brutality from police and security forces. We saw hundreds of poor people die of starvation and those venturing out in desperation brutalised by the police.
The potential impact was looking grim, and had we not put our trust in the people and the communities, the efforts we made would have been far less successful. Relief work had to be efficient and putting our trust in community volunteers to do the job was the key to success, for instance in Malaysia and Thailand. Whatever resources were generated were transferred to them and they reported back on the actions carried out through phone or other means available to them.
Further, in our observation, several communities responded very well to the situation by initiating village lockdowns, regulating visits, quarantining returnees, or self-isolating themselves despite having little information or no appropriate resources and equipment. There were fears too but communities were quick in overcoming them and improved their responses. Communities have not just received relief from us or others, but some of them also contributed food for other communities in need. Most of those communities had worked with us and had successfully managed their food production systems and natural resources. They were not worried about food shortages; rather, their leaders used the opportunity to create awareness about the importance of improving local production and sustainable resource management. Personally, this has been inspiring.
We have also been inspired by communities organising themselves and using local healing practices and medicine to improve immunity and resistance to the disease, or establishing food exchange systems with little or no help from the state, at a time when state-run programmes were not functional or did not arrive in time. Most importantly, this showed that devolution and community empowerment can be more effective in dealing with the crisis if resources and support are provided to such self-governing local institutions.
Spontaneous community responses came almost naturally because these are historically self-governing communities. Looking forward, trusting people and empowering communities will enable the state to deal more efficiently with public health crises and their long-term impacts.
Get in touch with the Asian Indigenous Peoples Pact through itswebsite andFacebook page, and follow@aippneton Twitter.
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AUSTRALIA: ‘Indigenous Australians must be represented at the heart of policy-making’
CIVICUS speaks about Indigenous peoples’ rights in Australia with Paul Wright, National Director of Australians for Native Title and Reconciliation (ANTaR), a civil society organisation (CSO) that works in solidarity with and advocates for the rights of Indigenous peoples in Australia, including by aiming to change the attitudes and behaviours of non-Indigenous Australians.What is the current situation of Indigenous peoples in Australia?
As soon as colonisation began in 1788, Australia’s First Nations peoples, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, were systematically persecuted and marginalised. They were dispossessed of their lands and denied the rights afforded to settlers or colonisers.
In 2022, more than 230 years since colonisation began and 120 years after the former colonies federated into the Commonwealth of Australia, Indigenous Australians continue fighting for their rights and to have their sovereignty recognised.
Through the years, there have been big wins, frustrating disappointments and broken promises from governments. Human rights have been consistently denied or violated. Australia was one of the last nations to ratify the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), and following ratification it has done very little to honour or domesticate the articles of the declaration.
More positively, the Australian Human Rights Commission includes an Indigenous Social Justice Commissioner whose role is to advocate for the rights of Indigenous peoples and keep Indigenous issues on the agenda of the Australian federal government. The position is currently filled by a Bunuba woman, Dr June Oscar, who is a great source of information on the human rights situation of Indigenous Australians.
While things are slowly improving, Indigenous Australians continue to have a lower life expectancy, live in poorer health and have worse employment and education outcomes than non-Indigenous Australians.
The wide health gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities was highlighted by the Close the Gap Campaign, co-chaired by the Indigenous Social Justice Commissioner and the CEO of the National Association of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Workers and Practitioners. In response, the Australian government entered into the National Agreement on Closing the Gap with the Coalition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peak Organisations, committing to implementing tangible policy reforms. In July 2020 it issued its second Annual Data Compilation Report that tracks the implementation of the agreement.
Do you think Australian Indigenous peoples are well represented in policy-making processes?
They are not, so the current political battle in Australia is to make sure Indigenous Australians are represented at the heart of the policy-making that affects them. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have issued the Uluru Statement from the Heart, an invitation to ‘walk with us in a movement of the Australian people for a better future’. It calls for structural reforms, including constitutional change, to establish a First Nations’ ‘Voice to Parliament’ and kick off a national process of truth-telling and reconciliation. The current federal Labor government has committed to holding a referendum to decide this question. This is a major moment for Australia.
Since the 1992 Mabo High Court decision, which recognised that a group of Torres Strait Islanders, led by Eddie Mabo, held ownership of Mer (Murray Island), native title has been recognised for all Indigenous people in Australia. In response to that seminal High Court ruling, the government introduced the Native Title Act, and over the next 30 years, 40 per cent of the Australian landmass has been returned to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples that have made claims. Not all claims have been successful, however: native title rights are limited and do not entail self-determination at the level outlined in the UNDRIP and other international standards.
How is ANTaR working to advance the rights of Indigenous Australians?
ANTaR is a national advocacy organisation that promotes the rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people that was founded 25 years ago. We began as a grassroots protest movement to resist government attempts to water down legislation on native title rights. We have subsequently worked alongside many Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander leaders, organisations and communities to advocate for rights and justice. Our priorities have included health equality, justice, anti-racism, advocacy for a treaty, reconciliation and much more.
As an ally organisation, we operate under the principle of not speaking for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and instead look to their leadership and direction to channel our resources and support. There are a growing number of solid connections between Indigenous peoples globally, which is encouraging. Australia has learned many lessons from Indigenous affairs in Canada, Norway, New Zealand and elsewhere.
Civic space in Australia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with ANTaR through itswebsite orFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@ANTaR_National on Twitter. -
AUSTRALIA: ‘There will be little change on First Nations people’s recognition, representation and rights’
CIVICUS speaks with Peter Lewis, president of Australians for Native Title and Reconciliation (ANTaR), about the recent defeat in areferendum of a proposal to recognise Indigenous Australians in the constitution and create a permanent institution so they can speak directly to government and parliament on matters relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.ANTaR is a civil society organisation (CSO) that works in solidarity with and advocates for the rights of Indigenous peoples in Australia,conducting independent research and analysis and providing Australians with quality information on priorities concerning First Nations rights.
What was the process leading to the referendum?
In December 2010, an Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous Australians was established and started discussing how to constitutionally recognise First Nations peoples. In January 2012, the panel suggested a new section be added to the Constitution – ‘Section 51A’ – to recognise First Peoples as the original inhabitants of the nation now known as Australia. The federal government later announced that a referendum on the matter would be delayed by two to three years due to an absence of widespread public support.
In December 2015, a Referendum Council was established and began consultations on how best to establish constitutional recognition of First Nations peoples. A discussion paper was released in October 2016 and articulated the central suggestions for constitutional reform to include a declaration of recognition, a ban on racial discrimination and a First Nations Voice to Parliament, with the right to be consulted on legislation relevant to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.
In May 2017, a convention at Uluru heard the outcomes from the First Nations Dialogues, with 250 First Nations leaders and representatives in attendance. Despite the generosity of spirit embodied by the Uluru statement, in October 2017 the government of then Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull outrightly rejected its proposals, breaking is promise of ‘doing things with’ Aboriginal people instead of to them. Turnbull made this decision unilaterally, without any consultation with or regard for the National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples, a national representative body, or members of the Referendum Council.
In March 2018 the government established another Joint Select Committee that was tasked to again inquire into and report on constitutional change. Its final report endorsed a constitutionally enshrined Voice to Parliament. By the end of 2018, the Labor opposition had promised to establish a Voice for First Nations people and vowed to take the issue of constitutional recognition to referendum if elected to government in 2019.
On 29 September 2022, the inaugural meeting of the Referendum Working Group and the Referendum Engagement Group discussed the steps to a 2023 referendum on a First Nations Voice to Parliament. The Constitutional Alteration (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Voice) 2023 Bill was introduced to parliament on 30 March 2023. On the same day, a Joint Select Committee was formed to analyse and report on the bill.
The committee heard from witnesses and published submissions, and recommended that parliament pass the bill without amendment. The House of Representatives passed it on 31 May and the Senate did so on 19 June. This meant a referendum would be called within the next six months.
A constitutionally enshrined First Nations Voice to Parliament would offer a first step toward structural and symbolic reform, ensuring that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders peoples can have a say about the laws and policies that impact on their lives and communities.
Who sided for and against?
The federal leadership of conservative parties – the Liberal and National parties – did not support the referendum. However, there was some support for the Voice within the conservative parties federally and in some states and territories.
There was also some opposition by a minority of First Nations leaders on the basis that the Voice did not represent an adequate transfer of power and that a treaty should come before any changes to the constitution. But a vast majority of First Nations leaders and organisations supported recognition and voice, as did most civil society organisations and some business organisations.
ANTaR was active in the Yes campaign and worked with others to establish Allies for Uluru. In October 2022 we initiated a Yes to Voice, Truth and Treaty Campaign.
The Yes campaign also received support from international CSOs such as Amnesty International and Oxfam, and its measures were supported by United Nations (UN) experts, and specifically by successive Special Rapporteurs on the rights of Indigenous Peoples.
But the referendum was used by neo-Nazi and QAnon adherents to stoke fear about First Nations peoples’ aspirations.
What kind of disinformation was circulated?
The No side of the debate made a number of false claims ranging from the misleading to clear lies. There were claims that the Voice would be a third chamber of parliament and that it would delay all decision making. There were claims that Australians would lose their homes as a result, and that it would enable First Nations people to establish their own military, and even that it would allow the UN to take over Australia. There were claims that the move was legally risky and that it would divide the nation – although currently the federal government can legislate for First Nations people through the ‘race powers’, a constitutional clause that says the government can make special laws for people of any particular race. So the nation is clearly already divided.
Why do you think the initiative failed, and what will the consequences be?
In Australia referendums rarely succeed, and in fact have never succeeded without support from all major parties.
The No case included much disinformation and fearmongering and a majority of the electorate responded negatively. It should however be noted that many inner-city and inner suburban areas, as well as First Nations-dominated remote areas, voted yes.
Because of this result, there will be little change and First Nations people’s recognition, representation and rights will depend on whoever is in government at the time. First Nations organisations will renew their calls for justice and recognition of their sovereignty and press on issues such as treaty-making, truth-telling and reducing disadvantage by providing greater agency for First Nations communities.
Civic space in Australia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with ANTaR through itswebsite orFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@ANTaR_National on Twitter.
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Australia: millions say no to jailing of peaceful climate activists
Over 220 organisations representing millions of members across the country have united to condemn the recent 15 month jail sentence for climate activist Deanna ‘Violet’ Coco and to express concern about increasing repression, including the recent introduction of new anti protest laws in multiple states.“We are seeing fundamental democratic principles stripped before our eyes at an alarming rate. Violet is the 5th person to receive a jail sentence* in the last 12 months for peaceful climate activism, as repression mounts against community activists across the nation. She is one of thousands taking extraordinary action in the face of an urgent crisis” saidKelly O’Shanassy of Australian Conservation Foundation
On 2 December, Violet, from Fireproof Australia, was sentenced to 15 months in custody with a non parole period of 8 months. Her appeal for bail will be heard on 13th December. A solidarity action will take place outside Downing Centre Court.
We reject the claim from Premier Perrottet that protest should not inconvenience people, and are concerned about the message this sends in a democracy. Peaceful but disruptive protests have won many of the rights we take for granted today, including the 8 hour day, voting rights, end to conscription, and to enjoy the forests and precious places we defended. Australia is a signatory to conventions protecting our right to freedom of movement, association, peaceful assembly, and political speech which the government must respect, and we must defend.
"The freedom to protest has been a central part of many of the most important movements across this country, from land rights for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, to voting rights, to achieving the eight hour work day. Governments across Australia need to recommit to our democracy, and repeal these laws that criminalise protest."Alice Drury, Acting Legal Director, Human Rights Law Centre.
We welcome the support from the UN and international human rights organisations, including the recent statement from Clement Voule, UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Association and Peaceful Assembly who expressed “I am alarmed at NSW court's prison term against climate protester Deanna Coco and refusal to grant bail until a March 2023 appeal hearing. Peaceful protesters should never be criminalised or imprisoned.”
Violet was charged with several offences, including disrupting vehicles, failing to comply with police direction and resisting or hindering police. The charges arose from her action blocking one lane of traffic on the Sydney Harbour Bridge for approximately 25 minutes.
“It's outrageous that the statewastes resources seeking jail time and locking up peaceful protestors in custody at the expense of taxpayers. In contrast, fossil fuel corporations are contributing to climate collapse, yet have bi-partisan support for further mining and their subsidies continue at a rate of $22,000 a minute” - Lucy Manne, 350.org
Protestors from Fireproof Australia, Extinction Rebellion, Blockade Australia and Frontline Action on Coal and many more have engaged in peaceful civil disobedience in recent years in support of urgent action on climate change. Thousands have been involved, representing the voices of many more.
Karly Warner of Aboriginal Legal Service NSW said “The Aboriginal Legal Service was born out of a protest movement in the 1970s. You would be hard-pressed to find any win for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ rights that wasn’t brought about by public protest.
There is no climate justice without racial justice. The right to assemble and demonstrate in our streets, towns and cities is a fundamental cornerstone of democracy. For marginalised communities, public protests enable us to be seen and heard, even — and especially — when those in power would rather suppress our voices.
We condemn in the strongest terms this government crackdown on our right to protest.”
The vast majority of Australians across the political spectrum support, and voted for, strong action on climate. People should not be concerned they could risk heavy penalties simply for taking to the streets. New anti-protest legislation in several states is wide open to police misinterpretation. NSW has already seen increased policing of peaceful NGO-led climate protests and police threats of invoking the laws against a wide variety of actions since their introduction in April.
“This state's ongoing repression of protestors through parliament passing harsher laws, police seeking draconian bail conditions and surveilling protestors, and prosecutors seeking custodial sentences shows just how much contempt this government holds for protestors and the environment. The repression of peaceful protestors must end” concluded Josh Pallas, NSW Council for Civil Liberties
Peaceful protest should not be a crime. Anti protest laws must be repealed. People engaged in peaceful protest should never be sentenced to jail.
Signatories to the open letter
350.org Australia
Dr David Abello, on behalf of the 78ers, the First Mardi Gras Inc
Aboriginal Legal Service (NSW/ACT) Limited
ACF Community Geelong
Action Ready
ADAC - A Different Approach Community
Aid/Watch
Amnesty International Australia
Andrew Denton
Animal Liberation NSW
Antipoverty Centre
Arid Lands Environment Centre
Armidale Action on Coal Seam Gas and Mining
Arshak Makichyan
Asylum Seeker Resource Centre (ASRC)
Australian Communist Party
Australian Conservation Foundation
Australian Democracy Network
Australian Forests and Climate Alliance
Australian Lawyers Alliance
Australian Lawyers for Human Rights
Australian Manufacturing Workers Union (NSW State Division)
Australian Manufacturing Workers Union
Australia
Australian Marine Conservation Society
Australian Nonviolence Projects
Australian Progress
Australian Religious Response to Climate Change
Australian Services Union NSW ACT (Services) Branch
Australian Services Union Victorian Private Sector Branch
Australian Unemployed Workers' Union
Australian Youth Climate Coalition
Author - The 99th Koala
Bayside Climate Crisis Action Group
Bellingen Activist Network
Beyond Gas Network
Beyond War
Black Flag Sydney
Black Wallaby Forest Action
Blockade Australia
Bob Brown Foundation
Dr Luke Buckmaster
Bushfire Survivors for Climate Action
Caldera Environment Centre
Castan Centre for Human Rights Law (Monash University)
Central Victoria Climate Action
Centre for Climate Safety
CFMEU Construction and General Division
Chipstop Campaign Against Woodchipping
CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
Cristy Clark
ClimActs
CLIMARTE
Climate Action Monaro
Climate Action Network Australia
Climate Action Radio Show
Climate and Health Alliance (CAHA)
Climate Change Action Network
Climate Council of Australia
Climate for Change
Climate Justice Programme
Climate Justice Union
Commons Social Change Library
Comms Declare
Community Action for Rainbow Rights
Community Legal Centres Australia
Community Legal Centres NSW
Community Power Agency
Conservation Council ACT Region
Conservation Council of SA
Conservation Council of WA (CCWA)
CoPower (Co-operative Power Australia)
CounterAct
Darebin Climate Action Now
Defend the Right to Protest
Digital Rights Watch
Do Gooder
Drum Rebellion
East Gippsland Climate Action Network
Edmund Rice Centre for Justice and Community Education
Environment Centre NT Inc
Environment East Gippsland inc
Environment Victoria
Environmental Justice Australia
Environs Kimberley
Extinction Rebellion Australia
Extinction Rebellion Cairns
Fireproof Australia
First Dog on the Moon
FlightFree Australia
Flinders University
Frenzal Rhomb
Friends of Bats and Habitat Gippsland
Friends of the Earth Australia
Friends of the Earth Melbourne
Friends of the Forest - Mogo
Frontline Action on Coal
Galilee Rising
Geelong Sustainability
GetUp
El Gibbs, writer, disability advocate
Glen Eira Emergency Climate Action Network (GECAN)
Goongerah Environment Centre
GraceTree
Grassroots Action Network Tasmania
Grata Fund
Green Institute
Green Music Australia
Greenpeace Australia Pacific
Gudanji For Country
Heal the Earth Now ॐ (international)
Healthy Connection For All
Dr Tamar Hopkins
Human Rights Law Centre
Dr Rebecca Huntley, Author,”How to Talk About Climate Change in a Way That Makes a Difference”
Dan Ilic
Institute of Collaborative Race Research
International PEN Melbourne Centre
International Service for Human Rights
Jews Against Fascism
Ketan Joshi, Author “Windfall: Unlocking a fossil free future”
Jumbunna Research, UTS
Justice Reform Initiative
Knitting Nanas Hunter Loop
Sydney Knitting Nannas & Friends
Kooyong Climate Change Alliance
Lane Cove Sustainability Action Group
Carmen Lawrence, academic, Ex WA Premier, Head Australian Labor Party
Legal Observers NSW
Liberty Victoria
Lighter Footprints
Lincoln Ave Progressives
LIVE
Loud Jew Collective
Mackay Conservation Group
Margaret River Regional Environment Centre
Maritime Union of Australia (Sydney Branch)
Melbourne Activist Legal Support
Muslim Collective
Nannas for Native Forests
National Justice Project
National Tertiary Education Union (NSW)
Nature Conservation Council NSW
George Newhouse, Adjunct professor
Nillumbik Climate Action Team
North East Forest Alliance
North Queensland Conservation Council
NSW Council for Civil Liberties
Claire O’Rourke
Oxfam Australia
PASA (Philippines Australia Solidarity Association)
Paul Gilding
Pax Christi Australia
Peace in Papua
People’s Climate Assembly
Peter Garret
Pride In Protest
Progressive Cinema, Armidale, NSW
Proposition One Campaign for a Nuclear-Free Future
Public Interest Advocacy Centre
Public Services International (Asia Pacific Regional Office)
Queensland Conservation Council
Queensland Council for Civil Liberties
Redfern Legal Centre
Retail and Fast Food Workers Union (RAFFWU)
Rising Tide
Save the Bay Coalition
School Strike 4 Climate
Scientists Warning Foundation, California, US
Seed Indigenous Youth Climate Network Ltd
Socialist Alliance
South East Forest Rescue
South East Region Conservation Alliance (SERCA)
Anna Spargo-Ryan, Writer / A Kind of Magic
Spirit of Eureka SA
Dr Joan Staples
Stop Fossil Fuel Subsidies
Stop Russell Vale Mine
Sweltering Cities
Tom Tanuki
The Australia Institute Tasmania
The Future Makers
The Independent and Peaceful Australia Network
The Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) Sydney Branch
The Sunrise Project
The Sustainable Hour Podcast
The Wilderness Society
Tomorrow Movement
Transition Streets Geelong
UnionsNSW
Uni Students for Climate Justice
United Workers Union
University of Melbourne Student Union Environment Department
UNSW Centre for Crime, Law and Justice
UTS Criminal Justice Cluster
Victorian Pride Lobby
Victorian Socialists
Vote Climate
Vote Earth Now
Wage Peace
Warriors of the Aboriginal Resistance VIC
Water for Rivers
What Can I Do? Australia
White Rose Society Australia
Wollongong Against War and Nuclear weapons (WAWAN)
Women’s Environmental Leadership Australia (WELA)
Women’s Justice Network
Workers for Climate Action
World Animal Protection
WSU Network for Law and Human Rights
Yarra Climate Action Now
Yassmin Abdel-Magied
Civic space in Laos is rated as "Narrowed" by the CIVICUS Monitor