africa

• Guinea placed on human rights watchlist ahead of referendum
  •  Guinea placed on CIVICUS Monitor watchlist ahead of referendum
  • Escalating rights violations include use of excessive force on protesters
  • CIVICUS calls for release of human rights defenders and urges President Condé to step down

  Guinea has been placed on the CIVICUS Monitor human rights watchlist ahead of the proposed referendum on 22^nd March. This list draws attention to countries where there has been a rapid decline in civic and democratic freedoms in recent months.

  Guinea was placed on the Monitor’s watchlist in October after deadly crackdowns and arbitrary arrests of protesters. It remains on the watchlist because the CIVICUS Monitor is concerned that if the government pushes ahead with the controversial referendum later this week, then further violence and unrest will follow.

  Guinea is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor, which is the third worst rating a country can receive by the global index, in the same category as Mali, Sierra Leone and Liberia. In obstructed countries, civic space is often monopolised by those in power and excessive force is commonly used by law enforcement agencies.

  Since October 2019, more than 30 people have been killed and dozens injured in widespread protests that have engulfed Guinea, as protesters call on the government to respect the provisions of the current constitution. The current constitution limits presidential tenures to two five-year terms and can only be changed via a referendum. If changed, it could pave the way for President Alpha Condé to remain in power.

  Le Front national de la défense de la Constitution, or the National Front for the Defence of the Constitution (FNDC), a movement composed of civil society and the political opposition, have been leading calls against a potential third term bid for President Condé.

  The leaders of the FNDC, human rights defenders Ibrahima Diallo and Sekou Koundouno, were arrested by masked men from the BRI (Investigation and Intervention Brigade) on 6 March and taken to an unknown destination. They were arrested immediately after expressing concerns over the ongoing arbitrary arrests of activists during a press conference. On 12^th March they were released on bail and placed under judicial control.

  In October 2019 thirteen FNDC leaders were arrested ahead of planned protests in Conakry and accused of organizing banned protests and inciting civil disobedience. Five of them were sentenced to jail terms ranging from six months to one year. Journalists have also been physically assaulted for covering the protests and their equipment seized to prevent them from broadcasting images of the protests.

  The arrest and detention of human rights defenders highlights how the Guinean authorities are trying to silence pro-democracy voices and pave the way for President Condé to extend his term in office:

  “By arresting human rights defenders, the Guinean authorities aim to silence the voices of those who are against a new constitution. It is time for President Condé and his administration to respect the wishes of Guinean people and allow a political transition which will usher in a new era in Guinea’s nascent democracy,” said David Kode, head of advocacy and campaigns at CIVICUS.

  CIVICUS calls on the government of Guinea to immediately release all human rights defenders in detention.

  CIVICUS also calls on the African Union to ensure that the government of Guinea respects provisions of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance: it urges President Condé to respect the current constitution and step aside when his mandate ends to allow for a peaceful political transition.

  ENDS

   

  Contact:

  Nina Teggarty, CIVICUS Communications Officer, Campaigns & Advocacy

  Email:

  Phone: +27 (0)785013500

  CIVICUS media team:

• GUINEA: ‘The democratic future of the region is at stake in our country’

  CIVICUS speaks about the lack of progress in the transition to democracy in Guinea since its 2021 military coup with Abdoulaye Oumou Sow, head of communications for the National Front for the Defence of the Constitution (FNDC).

  The FNDC is a coalition of Guinean civil society organisations and opposition parties founded in April 2019 to protest against former President Alpha Condé’s proposed constitutional change to seek a third term. The coalition continued to fight for a return to constitutional rule after the September 2021 military coup. On 8 August 2022, the transitional governmentdecreed its dissolution, accusing it of organising armed public demonstrations, using violence and inciting hatred.

  

  Why is there a delay in calling elections to restore constitutional order?

  The National Committee of Reconciliation and Development (CNRD), the junta in power since September 2021, is more interested in seizing power than organising elections. It is doing everything possible to restrict civic space and silence any dissenting voices that try to protest and remind them that the priority of a transition must be the return to constitutional order. It is imprisoning leaders and members of civil society and the political opposition for mobilising to demand elections, and has just ordered the dissolution of the FNDC under false accusations of organising armed demonstrations on the streets and acting as a combat group or private militia.

  What are the conditions set by the military and how has the democratic opposition reacted?

  In violation of Article 77 of the Transitional Charter, which provides for the duration of the transition to be determined by agreement between the CNRD and the country’s main social and political actors, the military junta has unilaterally set a duration of 36 months without listening to the opinion of social and political forces. The junta is currently set on not listening to anyone.

  The military are savagely repressing citizens who are mobilising for democracy and demanding the opening of a frank dialogue between the country’s social and political forces and the CNRD to agree on a reasonable timeframe for the return to constitutional order. Lacking the will to let go of power, the head of the junta is wallowing in arrogance and contempt. His attitude is reminiscent of the heyday of the dictatorship of the deposed regime of Alpha Condé.

  What has been the public reaction?

  Most socio-political forces currently feel excluded from the transition process and there have been demonstrations for the restoration of democracy.

  But the junta runs the country like a military camp. Starting on 13 May 2002, a CNRD communiqué has banned all demonstrations on public spaces. This decision is contrary to Article 8 of the Transitional Charter, which protects fundamental freedoms. Human rights violations have subsequently multiplied. Civic space is completely under lock and key. Activists are persecuted, some have been arrested and others are living in hiding. Despite the many appeals of human rights organisations, the junta multiplies its abuses against pro-democracy citizens.

  On 28 July 2022, at the call of the FNDC, pro-democracy citizens mobilised to protest against the junta’s seizure of power. But unfortunately, this mobilisation was prevented and repressed with bloody force. At least five people were shot dead, dozens were injured and hundreds were arrested. Others were deported to the Alpha Yaya Diallo military camp, where they have been tortured by the military.

  Among those arrested and currently held in Conakry prison are the National Coordinator of the FNDC, Oumar Sylla Foniké Manguè, the FNDC’s head of operations, Ibrahima Diallo and the Secretary General of the Union of Republican Forces, Saikou Yaya Barry. They are accused of illegal assembly, destruction of public buildings and disturbances of public order.

  How can the international community, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in particular, give the pro-democracy movement the support it needs?

  Today it is more necessary than ever for the international community to accompany the people of Guinea who are under the thumb of a new military dictatorship.

  The democratic future of the region is at stake in our country. If the international community, and ECOWAS in particular, remains silent, it will set a dangerous precedent for the region. Because of its management of the previous crisis generated by the third mandate of Alpha Condé, Guinean citizens do not have much faith in the sub-regional institution. From now on, the force of change must come from within, through the determination of the people of Guinea to take their destiny in hand.

  Civic space in Guinea is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with the FNDC through itswebsite or itsFacebook page and follow@FNDC_Gn on Twitter.

• Guinée : CIVICUS appelle à la libération des défenseurs des droits humains et place la Guinée sur la liste de surveillance des droits humains
  • L'alliance mondiale de la société civile CIVICUS demande la libération des défenseurs des droits humains Ibrahima Diallo et Sekou Koundouno.
  • La Guinée placée sur la liste de surveillance de CIVICUS Monitor à l'approche du référendum
  • Appel au retrait du président Condé à la fin de son mandat présidentiel

  CIVICUS, l'alliance mondiale des organisations de la société civile, appelle le gouvernement de Guinée à libérer les défenseurs des droits humains Ibrahima Diallo et Sekou Koundouno.

  Les deux défenseurs des droits humains ont été arrêtés le 6 mars par des hommes masqués de la BRI (Brigade d'Investigation et d'Intervention) et emmenés vers une destination inconnue. Ils ont été arrêtés immédiatement après avoir exprimé leurs préoccupations concernant les arrestations arbitraires en cours de militants lors d'une conférence de presse.

  Diallo et Koundouno sont les dirigeants du Front national de la défense de la Constitution, ou FNDC (National Front for the Defence of the Constitution), un mouvement composé de la société civile et de l'opposition politique. Ils ont mené des appels contre une éventuelle candidature pour un troisième mandat du président Condé.

  L'arrestation et la détention de défenseurs des droits de l'homme mettent en évidence la manière dont les autorités guinéennes tentent de faire taire les voix pro-démocratiques et d'ouvrir la voie à la prolongation du mandat du président Condé.

  Plus de 30 personnes ont été tuées et des dizaines d'autres blessées depuis que des manifestationsde grande ampleur contre une nouvelle constitution ont englouti la Guinée en octobre 2019. Les manifestants ont appelé le gouvernement à respecter les dispositions de la constitution actuelle qui prévoit que le mandat présidentiel ne peut excéder deux mandats de cinq ans.

  En octobre 2019, treize dirigeants du FNDC ont été arrêtés avant les manifestations prévues à Conakry et accusés d'avoir organisé des manifestations interdites et d'avoir incité à la désobéissance civile. Cinq d'entre eux ont été condamnés à des peines de prison allant de six mois à un an. Des journalistes ont également été agressés physiquement pour avoir couvert les manifestations et leur matériel a été saisi pour les empêcher de diffuser des images des manifestations.

  "En arrêtant Ibrahima Diallo et Sekou Koundouno ainsi que d'autres défenseurs des droits de l'homme, les autorités guinéennes visent à faire taire les voix de ceux qui sont contre une nouvelle constitution. Il est temps que le président Condé et son administration respectent la volonté du peuple guinéen et permettent une transition politique qui ouvrira une nouvelle ère dans la démocratie naissante de la Guinée", a déclaré David Kode, responsable du plaidoyer et des campagnes à CIVICUS.

  Pour contourner la constitution actuelle et ouvrir la voie à un troisième mandat, le président Condé a déclaré qu'il pourrait entamer le processus de modificationde la constitution par le biais d'un référendum.

  Le référendum a été reporté pour la deuxième fois le 11 mars 2020 et une nouvelle date n'a pas été fixée. Cependant, le CIVICUS Monitor a ajouté la Guinée à sa liste de surveillance car si le gouvernement poursuit ce vote controversé, de nouvelles violences et de nouveaux troubles sont à prévoir.

  La Guinée est classée dans la catégorie "Obstruée" par le CIVICUS Monitor. Dans les pays "obstrués", l'espace civique est monopolisé par ceux qui sont au pouvoir et la force excessive est couramment utilisée par les forces de l'ordre.

  CIVICUS demande à l'Union africaine de veiller à ce que le gouvernement de Guinée respecte les dispositions de la Charte africaine de la démocratie, des élections et de la gouvernance : elle exhorte le président Condé à respecter la constitution actuelle et à se retirer à la fin de son mandat pour permettre une transition politique pacifique.

  CIVICUS appelle également le gouvernement guinéen à libérer immédiatement Ibrahima Diallo et Sekou Koundouno, ainsi que tous les défenseurs des droits de l'homme en détention.

  FIN

  Contact:

  Nina Teggarty, Responsable de la communication, des campagnes et du plaidoyer chez CIVICUS

  Email:

  Téléphone: +27 (0)785013500

  CIVICUS media team:

   

• Hope for citizen voice, despite ‘narrowed’ civic space

  By Ine van Severen and Corlett Letlojane

  President Jacob Zuma heads to China this week to meet with the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India and China at the the 9th Brics Summit. As far as respect for civic space is concerned, South Africa outshines its counterparts in the Brics bloc, whose members together account for more than 40% of the world’s population. But President Zuma now heads to Xiamen with that record looking worse for wear, in the midst of increasing restrictions on South Africans’ basic rights to organise, speak out and take action.

  Read on:Mail and Guardian 

• HORN OF AFRICA: ‘De-escalation must be the primary objective’

  CIVICUS speaks with Mengistu Assefa, Program Manager at the Center for the Advancement of Rights and Democracy (CARD), about a port deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland and the possibility of it escalating into an armed conflict with Somalia.

  CARD is an Ethiopian civil society organisation that advocates for democracy and human rights through citizen empowerment.

  What’s the relevance of the recent port deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland?

  Following Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia became a landlocked nation, placed in a challenging position for international trade. Since then, Djibouti has emerged as its primary access point to the sea, handling over 95 per cent of its trade volume. This dependence comes at a cost, with Ethiopia paying more than US$1 billion annually in fees to Djibouti’s ports and infrastructure. With its estimated population of 126 million, the second largest in Africa, Ethiopia views sea access as critical for its economic, political and demographic future.

  To achieve this, on 1 January 2024 the Ethiopian federal government signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on commercial port access with Somaliland, a self-proclaimed autonomous territory that is internationally recognised as part of Somalia.

  While this MoU is not a legally binding agreement, it carries significant implications for the region because it walks a tightrope between cooperation and recognition. For Somaliland, the MoU represents a potential step towards international recognition of its de facto autonomy. Although the agreement’s full details remain undisclosed, it also reportedly grants Ethiopia access to Somaliland’s Red Sea coast, potentially including a military base. Ethiopian authorities have not been explicit about Somaliland’s recognition, saying the MoU allows for an ‘in-depth assessment’ of Somaliland’s quest for recognition.

  Somalia vehemently rejects the MoU, viewing it as a violation of its territorial integrity and political sovereignty. It is actively mobilising diplomatic pressure against the deal. Somali president Hassan Sheik Mohamed has visited Egypt and Eritrea, Ethiopia’s long-standing competitors, seeking support. Additionally, the Arab League, of which Somalia is a member, has denounced the MoU. Egypt’s leader, already locked in negotiations with Ethiopia over a Nile dam project, has assured Somalia of potential support if requested, further escalating regional tensions.

  What’s the political status of Somaliland?

  Somaliland, with an estimated population of five million, broke away from Somalia and declared its independence in 1991 after 30 years of civil war. It fought for its independence based on the argument that it had a distinct historical heritage. Somaliland was a UK protectorate, while Somalia was under Italian control. For Somalilanders, this is enough argument to prove they are different territories. Moreover, in June 1960 Somaliland was briefly recognised as an independent state by around 35 nations for a span of five days, before it relinquished its sovereignty to reunite with the Somali Republic.

  Somaliland declared its independence more than three decades ago but Somalia has never recognised it. Neither has any international organisation. Even so, Somaliland has managed to become a stable, functional state. It established its own army and democratic institutions and has held six elections with peaceful transitions of power.

  In late 2022 and early 2023, a local armed movement, the Dhulbahante militias, rose against Somaliland’s government, declaring its intention to rejoin Somalia. This uprising posed significant political and security challenges to the Somaliland government, partly contributing to the postponement of 2023 elections. It cast a shadow of instability over Somaliland’s bid for international recognition, which hinges on its ability to demonstrate long-term stability and democratic institutions.

  Could the port deal lead to international recognition of Somaliland’s independence?

  Somaliland has made clear that a binding legal agreement could only be signed once it is officially recognised as an independent nation state. But the Ethiopian side of the story is quite different. Ethiopia hasn’t ruled out the possibility of that happening but hasn’t explicitly said it would take a stance on the recognition of Somaliland. The signing of a binding legal international agreement with Somaliland would however result in Ethiopia’s de facto recognition of its independence.

  Looking at the bigger picture, this deal could affect the regional security architecture, particularly when it comes to fighting Al-Shabaab, an Islamist terrorist group based in Somalia and allied with Al-Qaeda. Al-Shabaab is perceived as a global security threat and has explicitly targeted Ethiopia. Consequently, Ethiopia is engaged in fighting Al-Shabaab in Somalia alongside the Somali army. If Ethiopia recognises Somaliland, Somalia will likely force Ethiopia to pull out its troops. However, as Somalia cannot take charge of its security on its own, Ethiopia could use it as leverage to force Somalia to back down from a strong reaction.

  Ethiopia’s potential recognition of Somaliland carries significant implications. Located in a strategically crucial area along the Gulf of Eden, where Houthis and pirates constantly attack international ships, Somaliland’s 850-kilometre coastline attracts interest from various countries seeking a potential military base. Ethiopia’s explicit recognition of Somaliland could trigger a domino effect, with other countries following suit, although recognition would likely face significant hurdles at the African Union (AU).

  The AU adheres to the principle of respecting colonial borders and has expressed concerns about setting a precedent for secessionist movements in other African states, including Morocco and Nigeria. Ethiopia will likely weigh this carefully before explicitly recognising Somaliland’s independence. However, the rapidly shifting landscape of international interests suggests that it’s not an impossibility. This possibility is further amplified by the growing involvement of great and emerging powers in the Red Sea region, driven by economic and security interests.

  Could tensions escalate into a conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia?

  Ethiopia and Somalia have had difficult relations in the past. In 1964, they clashed in a three-month border conflict. This initial skirmish foreshadowed a larger and bloodier conflict that erupted between 1977 and 1978. During this period, Somalia invaded Ethiopia with the intent of annexing the Ogaden region, inhabited by ethnic Somalis. The conflict quickly became a proxy war for the contenders of the Cold War, with the western bloc supporting Somalia and the Soviet Union backing Ethiopia. Ultimately, Ethiopia repelled the Somali army.

  In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a group aiming to unite all Somalis across Ethiopia, Somalia and Somaliland under Islamic rule, gained control of Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital. This development raised concerns in Ethiopia, which perceived it as a threat to its national security and regional stability. Supported by the USA in the context of the ‘war on terror’, Ethiopia militarily intervened in Somalia and removed the ICU from power.

  Several years later, Ethiopia and Somalia signed a bilateral agreement aimed at stabilising the region. This agreement facilitated the deployment of Ethiopian security forces to assist the Somali National Army in its fight against Al-Shabaab and support the ongoing Somali transition process. It’s important to note that these Ethiopian troops are currently integrated into the AU Transition Mission in Somalia, a peacekeeping mission.

  Since October 2023, Ethiopia has declared its intention to gain access to the sea by peaceful means. In exchange for access Ethiopia has offered Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia land-swaps and stakes in a successful state-owned business such as Ethiopian Airlines, Africa’s biggest and most successful airline, and even in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. But none of these countries accepted Ethiopia’s offer, leaving Somaliland as a seemingly more amenable option.

  Somalia viewed Ethiopia’s signing of the port deal with Somaliland as betrayal. It reacted strongly and aggressively because it considers it an encroachment on its territory and an act against its sovereignty.

  Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence could open a Pandora’s box. In fear that it could lead to regional and global recognition, Somalia said that if Ethiopia moved forward in implementing the agreement, consequences would follow.

  This all brings us to the final and crucial point: where will this take the region? While the possibility of conflict cannot be entirely dismissed, it’s important to consider various factors and perspectives to assess its likelihood.

  First, military capabilities and intentions play a role. While Somalia’s military power is not comparable to Ethiopia’s, the potential for escalation and regional instability cannot be ignored. Additionally, Ethiopia’s stated commitment to peaceful resolutions needs to be weighed against its historical engagements and potential strategic calculations.

  Second, the international community’s role matters. The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region are already grappling with complex conflicts and any further instability would have significant repercussions. International pressure and diplomatic efforts to de-escalate tensions and promote dialogue will be crucial in preventing conflict.

  Further, Somalia’s response to the MoU adds another layer of complexity. Its seeking of support from Ethiopia’s historical competitors, such as Egypt and Eritrea, as well as regional entities such as the Arab League, could potentially lead to increased diplomatic pressure against Ethiopia. This, in turn, could further strain relations between the two countries for the foreseeable future.

  Finally, the MoU is likely to ignite discussions about the status of Somaliland, both within the AU and at the United Nations Security Council.

  What should the international community do to address this potential crisis?

  The international community plays a crucial role in navigating the complex situation surrounding Ethiopia’s pursuit of sea access and its MoU with Somaliland. It is essential to engage with all stakeholders, particularly the Somali government and Somaliland’s authorities. It should be a top priority to facilitate negotiations to find a lasting solution that ensures both peaceful coexistence and normalised relations, as people in the Horn of Africa are ultimately bearing the brunt of this disagreement.

  Regardless of the outcome, be it Somaliland’s reunification with Somalia or its international recognition as a separate state, the two countries must establish a mutually agreeable arrangement for peaceful coexistence. The international community can play the role of facilitating a genuine conversation between the two. This is of course easier said than done, given the historical complexities of their relationship and the vested interests of various states and organisations, including western nations and other international players, who prioritise their security and economic interests in the region.

  International involvement should also aim to support Ethiopia and Somalia in reaching a mutually agreeable solution. This requires careful diplomacy to avoid exacerbating existing tensions or creating new problems. It’s also essential to urge those with vested interests in the region to avoid exploiting this situation for their agendas. De-escalation must be the primary objective.

  ---

  Civic space in bothEthiopia andSomalia is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with CARD through itswebsite or itsFacebook orInstagram pages, and follow@CARDEthiopia and@mengistu_dadi on Twitter.

• It’s not all doom and gloom on the ICC and Africa

  At the recent summit of the African Union (AU), states adopted what appeared to be a plan to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC), the global body that prosecutes grave crimes and challenges impunity. This followed the announcement in 2016 by three states, Burundi, the Gambia and South Africa, that they would pull out of the Court, although the Gambia’s new president, Adama Barrow, subsequently reversed his country’s position. While the prospects could seem bleak for the ICC, Netsanet Belay, Africa Director, Research and Advocacy of Amnesty International, suggests that there are reasons to be more optimistic.

  1. What is the current state of play on African withdrawal from the ICC?

  Contrary to what many believe and what is being reported, 2016 saw a tempering of the rhetoric of African mass withdrawal from the ICC. While people expected a domino effect following last year’s decision of Burundi, the Gambia and South Africa to withdraw from the ICC, the outcome went in the opposite direction. Since the last Assembly of State Parties to the ICC in November 2016, many African states unequivocally rejected calls for mass withdrawal. A number of countries, including those who had been silent supporters, publicly affirmed their support of the ICC. This includes Botswana, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Lesotho, Mali, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Zambia.

  Building on this momentum, at the 28th AU Summit in January 2017, many African countries effectively refuted any myth of mass withdrawal. While the AU Summit adopted what is called a mass ‘withdrawal strategy’, it is actually nothing like this. To the contrary, the strategy sets out a roadmap for engagement with the ICC and other stakeholders. It makes clear that the concept of mass withdrawal is not recognised under international law and clarifies that if member states chose to withdraw, they should do so according to their domestic mechanisms. Further, many states - Cape Verde, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Tunisia and Zambia - made reservations on the decision. Others, notably Nigeria, opposed the adoption of this strategy.

  What this is telling us is that what once looked like a trend of mass withdrawal by African nations is not there. Those countries that were silent before are now saying they will not stay silent any more and will support the ICC. The Gambia’s return is also a significant game-changer for a number of reasons: it was the only misfit in West Africa, a region that’s traditionally a staunch supporter of the ICC. The Gambia is also the human rights capital of Africa, given it is the seat of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Burundi and South Africa are left alone at the moment, and they need to use this opportunity to change their minds.

  But despite the tampering of anti-ICC rhetoric in Africa, we should not downplay the legitimate concerns that African member states have about the ICC. The Court is a far from perfect institution. There are legitimate questions to be raised about why the ICC has not progressed on its preliminary investigations on non-African situations

  The role of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the politicised nature of referrals is also a very important question that should be addressed – not by the ICC but by the UNSC itself. As we saw with the failures on Syria, South Sudan and elsewhere, the UNSC is in dire need of reform and needs to be engaged.

  There are also legitimate reform proposals on the table with respect to the Rome Statue system that sets out the ICC’s rules and procedures. For instance, weeks before its decision to withdraw, the South African government tabled a proposal on the development of rules and procedures for consultation processes with ICC members, under Article 97 of the Rome Statute. One of South Africa’s concerns was the lack of a clear process on consulting with the ICC when the country was faced with a dilemma on whether to arrest Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir when he attended the AU Summit in South Africa in 2015. The government felt that the procedures were not clear enough and suggested clearer procedures. The organisation I represent, Amnesty International, agrees that there is a gap there that needs to be filled and has proposed recommendations on how this proposal should be taken forward.

  2. Outside Africa, what are the current or emerging threats to the ICC?

  The biggest threat approaching for the ICC and international justice globally seems to from powerful nations outside Africa, as the Court moves to undertake preliminary examinations and ultimately investigations on crimes committed in Afghanistan and Palestine. The ICC has been investigating crimes committed in Palestine by Israeli forces as well as Palestinian armed groups, and in Afghanistan, by members of the Taliban, Afghani forces and US nationals, including allegations of torture. If reports are correct, the ICC is very close to opening an investigation into crimes under international law committed in Afghanistan in particular, which could possibly result in some US nationals facing prosecutions. Even though the US is not a member state of the ICC, because the crimes were committed in Afghanistan, a member state, US citizens suspected of committing crimes there might face prosecution. This move is likely to face stiff political challenge and backlash from the US.

  Already we see signs of countries putting pressure on the ICC about its examination on Palestine. Israel is lobbying a number of European governments. In a possible sign of things to come, at the last Assembly of States Parties session, the ICC was squeezed on its budget to its absolute limit by the Court’s key financial contributing states, including Canada, France, Germany, the UK and others.

  So the next biggest threat to the ICC will come from outside Africa, from powerful nations in the global north. Hence all the more reason why the global south, including Africa, which has been demanding a balancing of ICC prosecutions, should strongly support the ICC at a time when it is becoming more courageous.

  3. What other challenges does the current global context offer?

  Broadly speaking, with the rise of toxic populist agendas in US and Europe, global accountability and human rights mechanisms are facing threats. We are increasingly seeing the US, for instance, threatening to withdraw its financial and political support to the UN. The deadlocks at the UNSC continue and can be expected to worsen, enabling mass atrocities to continue unabated. There is also the UK’s eventual withdrawal from the European Union, including from the European Human Rights Convention. All of these point to what I would call the normalisation of indifference in the face of mass atrocities. This indifference is growing. One possible outcome of this trend will be weakening of international accountability mechanisms, including the ICC. This is another reason why civil society needs to come together to stand in support of these mechanisms.

  4. What can civil society in South Africa and Burundi do?

  South Africa has a dynamic and engaged civil society and, amidst the threats, there are clear opportunities emerging to defend international justice. Despite the recent High Court decision that revoked the Government’s notification of withdrawal, there are concerns that the government might press on with its withdrawal agenda. The government has tabled a draft bill for the repeal of the Rome Statute Implementation Act, the act that domesticates the Rome Statute, and has also announced its intention to introduce a new draft Bill on International Crimes to replace it. As draft bills are opened for pubic consultation, civil society has an immediate task and responsibility to engage with these processes and engage the government and members of parliament in challenging the decision to withdraw from the ICC.

  Beyond engagement with government, there is more pressing need for public awareness campaigns. Views are quite polarised in South Africa, as elsewhere, about the ICC: to some extent state propaganda has worked and quite a significant part of the population believes what the government is saying, that the ICC is a western, imperialist tool that is attacking Africa. Civil society’s starting point should be to demystify the facts from the myths and win people’s heart and minds. For example, not a lot of people know that the reason so many African cases have come before the ICC is because of self-referrals by African states. Civil society needs to explain why the ICC was created and how it operates, as a court of last resort. South Africans need to know the historic, moral and legal implications of withdrawal, including the fact that this nation stands to withdraw from one of the few international instruments that codifies apartheid as a crime against humanity. For a country that has lived through that experience and a nation that was born out of such crime, and as a nation that led the creation of the ICC to ensure that such a crime will not happen again anywhere in future, it cannot afford to withdraw. Now more than ever, South Africa leadership in promoting justice and human rights is needed in the global arena.

  Burundi, on the other hand, is a very different context. It is quite a closed country, and there are hardly any spaces for people and civil society express dissent. The motive of the government for withdrawing from the ICC is partly self-serving: it is protecting itself from future prosecutions. This is a whole different challenge and civil society will not find it easy to engage with the government to shift thinking about that. I see more difficulties in Burundi than in South Africa.

  5. What about regional alternatives?

  Nobody, including civil society, is challenging the advantage and significance of having a regional accountability mechanism. In principle, it is to be welcomed, as an additional accountability mechanism where people can obtain redress and victims seek justice, and where African-specific contexts can be addressed. The Malabo Protocol – the AU’s agreement to extend the jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and People’s rights – goes beyond the ICC’s four core crimes, of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crime of aggression, to criminalising transnational crimes such as corruption, illicit financial flows and terrorism. This shows a lot of potential.

  The problem is that the proposal as it currently stands has several problematic legal and institutional implications. The fact that the Protocol stands to give immunity from prosecution to heads of state and senior government officials while they are still in power is a serious deviation from international standards on accountability, and also contrary to the AU’s own constitutive act, which champions a complete rejection of impunity. A deviation from this ideal is regressive. It would only embolden dictators who commit atrocities and human rights violations to remain in power. Secondly the definition of some of the transnational crimes is problematic and violates the international principle of legality. For example, terrorism is vaguely defined. The risk of peaceful dissent being criminalised as terrorism remains high. In Africa, there are so many living examples where peaceful dissent is being crushed as terrorism, so this is a huge risk.
  
  Apart from legal standards, the second issue is the implication of adding a criminal jurisdiction to an already existing, heavily under-resourced and weak human rights court, given that the proposal is to expand the jurisdiction of the African Court. The new Court, if and when it becomes operational, would have a human rights mandate, a general affairs mandate and a criminal mandate. There is no such comparable model out there. It's a heavy and ambitious undertaking, and an expensive and complex venture. As such, it is highly doubtful that the continent will have the right political will and sufficient financial and other resources to enable this proposed Court to succeed.

  The proposal also runs the risk of weakening the existing human rights mandate of the African Court. For instance, the number of judges currently proposed under the Malabo Protocol means a reduction in the number of judges that will be dealing with human rights issues. Already the current African Court is overloaded with casework, and reducing the number of judges will undoubtedly have a heavy impact on the capacity of the court to deliver on human rights protection needs in the continent. The proposal might also hamper or slow down future ratifications of the statues of the only existing human rights court in Africa. Member states may only be presented with the option to ratify and domesticate all of the successive amendments as outlined under the Malabo Protocol, and will not be able to pick and choose which instrument to adopt and ratify. As such, countries that do not want to commit to the expansion of the current court to have a criminal jurisdiction but want to strengthen the human rights jurisdiction of the exiting Court will not be able to do so easily.

  So broadly, while in principle the decision to establish a regional criminal court is a good idea, there are a number of legal and institutional implications of the current proposal that may necessitate rethinking the model and discussing substantive amendments before member states rush to sign and ratify the Malabo Protocol. In any case, as a viable alternative to the ICC, and a permanent international justice mechanism, it is not there yet.

• Joint Letter to Human Rights Council: Upholding international law in South Sudan

  To Permanent Representatives of member and observer States of the United Nations Human Rights Council

  RE: Renewing the mandate of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan and addressing the need for accountability for past and on-going crimes under international law and human rights violations in South Sudan

• Joint Statement: Grave concern over recent raids on Ugandan civil society groups

  We, the undersigned civil society organisations (CSOs), strongly condemn the Ugandan authorities’ flagrant and repeated attempts to suppress the peaceful and legitimate activities of civil society organisations in Uganda through the recent unwarranted raids on the offices of four independent CSOs. We urge the Government of Uganda to end its campaign to silence independent civil society groups and publicly recognise the indispensable role that civil society plays in promoting and protecting fundamental human rights.

  In the last two weeks, the Ugandan Police and Security Services have raided and searched the offices and documentation of four prominent organisations, including ActionAid Uganda, Great Lakes Institute for Strategic Studies, Solidarity Uganda and the UHURU Institute.

  Initially on 20 September 2017, nearly two dozen police and state security officials cordoned off and entered the ActionAid Uganda offices in Kansanga, Kampala. Police served a warrant alleging that ActionAid is involved in unnamed illicit activities. Upwards of 25 staff members were held in the office for several hours, while police interrogated staff, searched the premises and confiscated organisational laptops, phones and documents. On the same day, the offices of the Great Lakes Institute for Strategic Studies were raided and police prevented staff from leaving the premises.  On 21 September, the police raided the offices of Solidarity Uganda in Lira and detained a member of staff. 

  Most recently, on 2 October 2017, police raided the offices of the UHURU Institute. During the raid, they cordoned off the premises and confiscated computers and phones belonging to staff of the Institute. 

  The explicit reason for the raids has not been disclosed, and we remain deeply concerned that they are part of a wider crackdown to silence a civil society campaign which opposed a parliamentary proposal to remove presidential age limits. The organisations targeted in recent raids supported civil society in expressing concerns over the removal of age limits for the presidency and have called for the constitution to be respected. 

  The authorities’ attempts to suppress the work of Ugandan civil society through harassment and intimidation represent a clear violation of fundamental civic rights and casts severe doubt over the Government’s commitment to supporting civil society. As allies and supporters of Uganda human rights we urge the authorities to immediately end its campaign to persecute CSOs in the country and their staff. 

  • ARTICLE 19 – Eastern Africa
  • Afro Leadership – Cameroon
  • Brainforest Gabon
  • Campaign for Good Governance – Sierra Leone
  • CIVICUS
  • Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation, Malawi
  • DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project)
  • Dynamique OSCAF Gabon
  • Frontline Defenders
  • Greenpeace Africa
  • Human Rights Institute of South Africa (HURISA)
  • The International Civil Society Centre
  • JOINT - League of NGOs in Mozambique
  • KEPA – Finland
  • Mauritius Council for Social Services
  • Nigerian Network of NGOs
  • Orhionmwon Youth Forum Nigeria
  • Réseau Ouest Africain des Défenseurs des Droits Humain
  • Solidarity Center
  • Zambian Council for Social Development

  David Kode

  Advocacy and Campaigns Lead, CIVICUS,

  Tel: + 27 (0)11 833 5959.

   

  Grant Clark

  CIVICUS Media Advisor

• KENYA: ‘Holding police officers accountable for killings in a court of law will be the main deterrent’

  CIVICUS speaks about police brutality in Kenya with Joseph Kariuki, Communications and Media Lead of International Justice Mission and editor of the Missing Voices project. Missing Voices Kenya is an initiative of a group of civil society organisations (CSOs) aimed at filling the evidence gap regarding police brutality, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. It layers victims’ testimony with consolidated quantitative data and tracks processes to hold those responsible legally accountable.

  What is Missing Voices Kenya trying to do?

  Missing Voices was launched in August 2018, by a coalition of partners working on police reform. The main aim of the project was to produce a database of police killings and enforced disappearances in Kenya. This was critical since efforts by most CSOs to share their individual statistics proved untenable because of the different numbers each organisation had. This created confusion and gave the government a window to deny what seemed to be a systematic trend of extrajudicial killings.

  Our production of verified data was in itself a big success, considering the efforts put into denying this reality. Missing Voices has so far released two annual reports, in 2019 and 2020, and has held campaigns both online and offline to advocate for the end of extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances in Kenya.

  Our website is meant to showcase victims’ stories and provide a platform for their families to agitate for justice. Every confirmed story is published on our website, including the name and photograph of the victim, along with any information that can help resolve their murder or discover someone’s whereabouts in case they are missing and still alive. We have seen cases being reopened right after they were published on our platform.

  In what ways has the COVID-19 pandemic and the enforced curfew worsened human rights in Kenya?

  The Missing Voices Kenya report ‘The Brutal Pandemic’ documented 157 cases of police killings and an additional 10 cases of enforced disappearances during 2020. Not all the cases were the result of COVID-19 containment measures, but some – around 23 – were the direct result of these.

  The measures put in place increased the prevalence of police brutality, which has been a systemic issue in Kenya for years. Most families, especially those living in poor neighbourhoods, bore the brunt of the measures after police officers were given orders to use force if necessary to ensure the 7pm curfew was enforced. Most families were caught unawares after public transport vehicles were ordered to carry half their maximum load, which meant there was a shortage of transport to get back home before the curfew.

  Why is police brutality targeted at young people in informal settlements, and what can be done about this?

  The fact that young people in poor neighbourhoods are the primary targets of police brutality can at least partly be explained by the high crime rates in such areas and the police strategy of using force to fight crime. This has worsened by the trend of arbitrary arrests of young men leaving their workplaces for home late at night. In informal settlements there seems to be a permanent curfew in place, since well before the pandemic.

  There are police squads that move around in unmarked cars arresting young men, many of whom have been killed. This has led to distrust between the public and the police. Lack of trust has hampered efforts to fight crime, because police depend heavily on the public for tips on criminal activity and perpetrators.

  This bad blood can be prevented if police officers stop looking at young men as suspects of crime and start moving around in marked cars. Poverty is still the leading cause of conflict between police and the public, so the government should put in place measures to empower and improve the opportunities for young people. And above all, the main deterrent will be if police officers are held accountable for killings in a court of law.

  What challenges has Missing Voices Kenya faced in ensuring accountability?

  The biggest challenge has taken the form of threats to victims or their families, which has deterred many from following up on their cases in court. Cases of police killings take a long time to investigate and even longer to process through the judicial system, which often leads to discouragement and apathy in the community.

  In response to this, in June 2021 the Missing Voices coalition ran a campaign on delayed justice, which highlighted cases that had taken a very long time to resolve but had eventually resulted in justice being served.

  Have there been other citizen responses to police brutality?

  A number of protests have been held against police brutality and we have also organised public dialogues in which we have shared the statistics we have collected and urged for an end to the violence. Our Brutal Pandemic report was handed to the Senate and another report was released in November 2021 making a number of recommendations. During the pandemic, our campaigns forced the government to condemn police brutality. It must be noted that before this the government had denied anything was wrong, so this kind of acknowledgment is a welcome first step.

  How can international civil society best support Kenyan civil society efforts to bring an end to these human rights abuses?

  More advocacy is needed for the government to accept that police brutality, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings are systemic issues that need addressing. There is a need to empower local justice centres and survivor groups so that people can count on safe spaces and are enabled to speak up more about these issues. And there is need for bigger capacity to take witnesses into the witness protection programme, without which we are unlikely to make much additional progress.

  Civic space in Kenya is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Missing Voices through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@MissingVoicesKE and@kariukimwangi on Twitter.

• KENYA: ‘People are discouraged from voting when they think that voices do not matter’

  CIVICUS speaks about the recent presidential election in Kenya with Ken Ogembo, programme manager of Siasa Place.

  Siasa Place is a civil society organisation (CSO) founded in 2015 with the aim of promoting youth participation in politics. It educates people about the importance of voting and how the government can be held accountable.

  Did you observe an increase in civic space restrictions around the 9 August election?

  We observed several civic space restrictions during the election. The media did not provide fair coverage to all candidates, and the most popular candidates had a clear advantage because everything they did was widely covered and they got a lot of propaganda. Media are powerful tools that can be used to influence the views of people and in this case were used to promote some parties and bring down others. Social media was also used to spread misinformation that influenced many people’s voting decisions.

  Further, there was violence in some counties, which we believe was organised to spark fear. As a result, people no longer felt comfortable attending campaigns for some candidates because of fear they could be attacked. 

  There were also cases of candidates being attacked. Some female politicians were attacked and assaulted; unfortunately not much was done to protect them or follow up on their cases. William Ruto, announced as the winner of the election, was also attacked in Kisumu. His vehicles were destroyed but fortunately he was not hurt. 

  There was also a situation in Kakamega county between the two main coalitions, Kenya Kwanza and Azimio la Umoja: they were fighting over access to a stadium and a number of people got hurt in the process.

  However, I do not believe violence was serious or widespread to the point that we could say it was what marked the electoral process.

  Why was there such low voter turnout?

  There are a number of factors that could have possibly contributed to it, but I think it is first and foremost about people being demotivated from voting because they do not see any change happening as a result of elections. Government corruption is pervasive no matter who is in the government, and economic performance is consistently poor. Public services are of very low quality: there are not enough healthcare facilities, doctors are often going on strike, markets are dirty. Youth unemployment continues to be very high, and most people don’t think this will change, so many do not see any reason for voting.

  We also need to look at how candidates are nominated. Presidential candidate Raila Odinga’s party, Azimio la Umoja, did not conduct democratic internal processes in most of its strongholds and often nominated people who had long been in power and had performed dismally. People are discouraged from voting when they think their voices do not matter.

  I would also say it is also ignorance that drives young people away from the polls. They should understand that regardless of whether they get out to vote, a government will get elected and will rule over them. The fact that they did not vote takes away their moral authority to question those in power. Of course they still have a constitutional right to do so, but their questioning will lack substance and they will not have any alternative to offer.

  Through our engagement with young people, we have noticed they lack confidence in the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IBEC), the institution that manages elections, which many consider unable to deliver free and fair elections. They view it as pointless to go out and vote if the IBEC can’t ensure their votes will count.

  This is probably a mistake, because there have been improvements in the electoral process, including by making it clear that the results received from voting stations are final. However, the IBEC still has a lot of work to do make people trust the electoral process.

  Finally, I think the government played a huge role by not providing any civic education. It only started doing the basics when it was already too late, as most people who didn’t vote had already made up their minds not to. And when the government did, the content was not of the right kind, in the sense that would make people understand why voting is important and how to play their role as citizens.

  Has civil society been able to play its role in the electoral process?

  Civil society’s role has been somewhat restricted. Many CSOs would need more support and resources to play their full range of roles during elections. During this election we saw many CSOs unable to provide civic education programmes because of lack of funding and government support.

  Our job as civil society is to advocate on people’s behalf, inform them about the process and raise awareness of their rights. But most of us were denied the right to do our work due to lack of resources. My organisation, Siasa Place, played a key role in the previous election because it received the required resources in time. But this year the support we needed came about two months before the elections, which is rather late for us to start doing our work at the community level. This affected our role, but we hope things will improve in the coming years. We need government and civil society to work together to inform people around elections so they know what they are doing.

  There were also cases of CSOs being instrumentalised by political parties to influence voters. That defeats the whole purpose of having an active civil society. We urge the concerned CSOs to remember their original goals and mission and refocus on them. We should be the voice of marginalised people and communities, not of political parties. It is our duty to hold political parties accountable, not root for them at elections.

  Given the very close result, do you think there could be a recount or even an election re-run?

  If the defeated candidate can convince the court that there have been irregularities so gross that they have affected the outcome, then the court could nullify the results. But if votes are recounted and the result comes out the same, there won’t be a need for a rerun.

  Civic space in Kenya is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Siasa Place through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@siasaplace on Twitter. 

• KENYA: ‘Protests against femicides encouraged survivors to seek justice’

  CIVICUS speaks with Wangechi Wachira, Executive Director of the Centre for Rights, Education and Awareness (CREAW), about recent protests demanding justice for femicide victims and policy changes to combat gender-based violence (GBV) in Kenya.

  Founded in 1999, CREAW is a national feminist women’s rights civil society organisation (CSO) dedicated to protecting and promoting women’s and girls’ rights and addressing systemic gender inequalities, oppression, exploitation and discrimination.

  Why did protest recently erupt in Kenya?

  On 27 January, thousands of women and men took the streets to protest against femicides. The protests were triggered by 14 cases in January alone, and their primary objective was to demand accountability from state agencies, particularly law enforcement and the judiciary, in prosecuting perpetrators of femicide and ensuring justice for the victims. The case of John Matara, accused of killing Starlet Wahu, highlighted the failures of the legal and judicial systems, because he had been previously reported for GBV multiple times but had remained free.

  Femicide Count reported 48 cases in January and February 2024, compared to 152 cases during 2023, which itself was the highest number in the past five years. Data from Africa Data Hub indicates that over 500 women were killed in acts of femicide from January 2016 to December 2023. It also acknowledges the number is likely much higher, with many killings of women not properly categorised as femicide.

  The protest also aimed to raise awareness about the issue, as many people, including those in public office, do not fully understand the severity of femicide as the most extreme form of GBV. A 2021 report by the United Nations (UN) Office on Drugs and Crime revealed that 56 per cent of all female homicides globally are committed by intimate partners or family members.

  Protesters sought to educate the public on victim-blaming, which empowers perpetrators and deters survivors from reporting abuse. By addressing the victim-blaming and shaming associated with GBV, the protests challenged societal norms and encouraged survivors to seek support and justice.

  What were protesters’ demands to the government?

  We urged the president to issue a declaration recognising GBV and femicides as a national crisis requiring an emergency response. Such a declaration must be accompanied by annual reports provided during the State of the Nation address, outlining measures taken to combat the problem.

  We also urge the government to establish a national public inquiry and official review of events or actions ordered by a government body for all femicide cases to track and ensure accountability.

  Given the lack of integrated official data, we also demand the government improves data collection on femicides and GBV, aligning it with international frameworks. This data is crucial for evidence-based policymaking and effective criminal justice responses.

  Additionally, we call for increased funding for GBV prevention programmes and demand an inclusive appointment process for all public positions, ensuring representation from grassroots feminist organisations and youth groups.

  How big a problem is GBV in Kenya, and what are its root causes?

  GBV is pervasive in Kenya, mirroring global trends. It exists in several forms, including physical, sexual, verbal, emotional and economic abuse. According to the 2022 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey, over 40 per cent of women have experienced physical or sexual violence from an intimate partner at some point in their lives. GBV also manifests in harmful practices such as female genital mutilation and child marriages. Femicides are a frequent occurrence and appear to be on the rise.

  The roots of GBV are found in patriarchal underpinnings of our society, which promote harmful social and cultural practices often reinforced by religious beliefs. Power is concentrated in men’s hands and women have little to none. Such unequal dynamics cannot but foster violence.

  Economic factors such as poverty help perpetuate GBV by pushing women to stay in abusive relationships due to lack of financial independence. They also push families in famine-hit areas to marry off young girls for economic gain, and specifically to be able to acquire livestock in return.

  Conflict, crises and displacement leave women and girls especially vulnerable to violence. A recent example is the COVID-19 pandemic, which saw an 80 per cent increase in intimate partner violence in 2020.

  How does civil society work to address GBV in Kenya?

  Civil society plays key roles in addressing GBV. CREAW specifically has a workstream focused on ending violence against women and girls. Over the years, we have provided free legal aid and psychosocial support to over 20,857 GBV survivors. We are among the few CSOs that offer these services. We collaborate closely with state-sponsored legal aid programmes, such as the National Legal Aid Service, to ensure integrated, efficient and timely GBV service delivery. Our work is enhanced by strategic partnerships with various GBV working groups, Court User Committees, relevant health institutions, parts of criminal justice system and community dispute resolution mechanisms.

  CREAW actively engages with legislators and policymakers at both national and county levels to advocate for the development and implementation of regulatory frameworks on GBV. Our advocacy contributed to the passage of the 2006 Sexual Offences Act, 2013 Matrimonial Property Act, 2014 Marriage Act and the 2015 Protection Against Domestic Violence Act.

  The aim of the Sexual Offences Act is to set out what constitute sexual offences, provide ways to prevent illegal sexual acts and protect all people from them. The Matrimonial Property Act sought to provide clear rules for what belongs in a marriage’s matrimonial estate and provide a legal framework for the ownership, management and distribution of matrimonial property that would apply to all types of unions. This was a monumental achievement because it recognised rights women didn’t previously have, such as owning and buying land.

  The Marriage Act consolidated various laws on marriage, provided procedures for separation and divorce and regulated the custody and maintenance of children in the event of separation or divorce. The Protection Against Domestic Violence Act provides avenues for victims and survivors of violence to report their circumstances to relevant authorities, seek legal redress and receive justice.

  CREAW also supports the county governments of Kilifi and Meru, the Kenya Police Service and the Kenyan judiciary in strengthening their mechanisms for implementing existing GBV laws and policies.

  CREAW’s commitment to supporting survivors extends to financial inclusion. Since 2020, we have implemented a programme, the Jasiri Fund (‘bold’ in Swahili) that provides GBV survivors with quality financial services to mitigate the effects of GBV and enable economic empowerment. To date, the project has supported around 1,000 survivors with a total of US$400,000, leading to the establishment of at least 878 women-owned enterprises. The Jasiri Fund offers complementary support, including access to justice, psychosocial support, shelters, business grants and case management grants, accompanied by financial training and business development support. Its success led to its scaling up to cover more counties and support more survivors.

  We are also part of the National Gender Based Violence working group, coordinated by the National Gender and Equality Commission and the National Women’s Steering Committee, and of the National Council on the Administration of Justice Working Committee on GBV.

  CREAW served as a co-convener of the Kenya Chapter of the Africa Unite campaign against GBV. We are also members of the Solidarity for African Women’s Rights and the Sustainable Development Goals Group. We contribute to various campaigns such as Gender is My Agenda and globally contribute to the Generation Equality Forum commitments.

  ---

  Civic space in Kenya is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with CREAW through itswebsite or itsFacebook orInstagram pages, and follow@CREAWKenya and@Wwangechi_leah on Twitter.

• KENYA: ‘The denial of resources for civic education has been a massive blow for civil society’

  CIVICUS speaks about the upcoming elections in Kenya with Paul Okumu, head of the Secretariat of the Africa Platform (AP). AP is a pan-African civil society platform based in Nairobi, Kenya, that works to strengthen state-society relations to achieve more effective and inclusive development.

  With elections still a few months away, is it clear who the contenders will be?

  Many are unaware that Kenya has only one election day in which all political positions are filled. But although the focus is on the presidential race, the forthcoming elections will bring in 349 members of the National Assembly, the lower house of parliament, including 290 elected from the constituencies, 47 women elected from the counties and 12 nominated representatives, plus 69 members of the Senate, 47 of whom are elected directly while the rest are elected to represent women, young people and other excluded groups.

  In addition, Kenyans will be electing 47 governors, the regional leaders directly responsible to county assemblies, that is, their respective regional parliaments. Kenyans will elect a further 1,450 county assembly members. So the election is a complex one.

  For the presidential race, some likely frontrunners are already emerging. The current president, Uhuru Kenyatta, is ineligible to stand for re-election after completing his second term; his deputy, William Ruto, is among the leading candidates alongside former prime minister Raila Odinga. It is worth noting that this is the fifth time Odinga is running for president, having lost his previous attempts and withdrawn once in 2017.

  By law candidacies for the presidency will be made official in mid-May, and there are currently almost 45 people who have submitted their names as possible candidates. The election body, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, will have the final word on which candidates fulfil the legal criteria to run.

  The question many are likely to ask is why there are only two leading contenders. The answer is as complex as the country’s elections.

  In a bid to exercise a divide-and-rule strategy, the British colonial government divided Kenya into regional ethnic units, with people from one unit not allowed to travel to other units without the authority of the colonial government under a system known as Kipande (Identity) system. In addition, people in regions closest to where white people lived were given access to education much earlier so they could work for whites. As a result, these regions (mainly central, Rift Valley and Western) progressed much faster and became dominant in the period leading to and after independence. It helped that these regions are also the most agriculturally productive, which is part of the reason the whites chose them as their residence.

  There are about 43 ethnic groups in Kenya, but just five of them constitute over half of its population of about 50 million. Due to the combined effects of colonial boundaries, which the 2010 Constitution kept intact – a story for another day – and the numeric dominance of these few ethnic groups, the country’s politics, in a quite similar fashion to that in South Sudan, continue to revolve around five ethnic groups. Leading presidential candidates always emerge from these five. Currently, the two leading candidates represent a coalition of three and two of these largest ethnic groups.

  What will be at stake in the upcoming elections?

  The current president is seen to have spent his time investing in sections of the economy that benefited his vast family businesses. From infrastructure to hospitals to the dairy and transport sectors, most of the investments have been in areas that are perceived directly to add value or make it easy for the president’s family businesses to thrive. As a result, there is a perception that what is at stake is the protection of these investments, hence the current complex coalition supported by the president that has brought together people seen to be those who will preserve the status quo.

  But at a deeper level, the country is in a serious crisis. The economy has been in recession for over eight months now. Half of its recurrent budget is used on civil service salaries. The latest economic report by the government shows that for the first time in the country’s history, debt costs will surpass the recurrent expenditure, projected at Sh1.34 trillion (US$1.3 billion) for the coming year. The debt binge is mainly from Eurobond offerings, a package of Chinese loans and syndicated commercial loans taken in recent years. Distress levels are so high that the Central Bank has begun to ration foreign reserves, especially US dollars. Fuel prices have risen by nearly 53 per cent in the past one year, largely due to the fact that fuel has always been an easy target for taxation.

  And that is not all: European countries have always used Kenya as a trade gateway to the continent and have largely made it a multinational headquarters for European companies working across Africa. This has led to massive losses through tax evasion and avoidance and skewed double taxation agreements, and has killed countless small businesses that could not manage the massive resources and subsidies given by European development finance institutions or donor agencies (such as the CDC Group of the UK) to European corporations so they can win contracts and set up businesses in the country.

  But there is a bigger underlying fear among citizens. In 2017 the Supreme Court was forced to overturn the results of the presidential elections after it emerged that the government, through Ot Morpho, a French company fronted by the French government, had manipulated the vote counting and tallying, handing victory to the incumbent president. The subsequent repeat elections were boycotted by the opposition at the last minute on the grounds that the government had refused to make the changes demanded by the Supreme Court to ensure transparent vote counting. This massive collusion and rejection of changes proposed by the judiciary severely eroded confidence in the electoral system. It is believed to be the part of reason for the current low voter registration.

  What are the civic space conditions like in the run-up to the election?

  The executive and the political class had made attempts to water down the constitution significantly through a process known as Building Bridges Initiative, but they were stopped in their tracks by the courts, including the Supreme Court. This has preserved citizens’ freedoms and has strengthened confidence in the judiciary. Because of this there is still considerable freedom of assembly and expression.

  But the government has also tried to limit the work of civil society around the election. In July 2021, the Kenyan Foreign Affairs Ministry sent a confidential memo to all foreign missions and international civil society organisations (CSOs) that usually support civic education, instructing them not to put any resources, either directly or through local CSOs, into civic education and civic advocacy without the express authorisation of the government. To date, such authorisation has not been granted, and it’s not clear if partners have even requested it.

  Interestingly, foreign missions kept quiet and refused to divulge this information to local CSOs. It is not clear why the government took this drastic measure, but it is even more baffling why foreign missions have been so quick to obey it when a few years ago they defied a similar directive by the Russian government and funded civic education in that country. A possible reason lies in Kenya’s centrality, alongside Rwanda, for the politics of Africa and the economies of Europe, which these foreign countries are keen to preserve. 

  As a result of this decision, this year Kenya has had the lowest voter registration in its history and levels of civic awareness have plummeted. The denial of resources for civic education has been a massive blow for civil society, and with the elections under 90 days away, it is not yet clear what role civil society will play around them.

  The window for registration as election observers, usually played by the African Union, the Carter Foundation, the European Union and a coalition of civil society groups, is still open, and it is still possible that with alternative sources of funding, CSOs may still engage in some way.

  What is the potential for electoral violence?

  Violence is highly unlikely. Despite ethnic politics rooted in the colonial regionalisation arrangement, Kenyans are largely peaceful. Most of the post-election violence that Kenya has experienced has been mostly confined to power struggles among the five dominant ethnic groups and has never been about the entire country. Over the past five months, these five ethnic groups have formed two large coalitions, making violence unlikely.

  Of course, conflict between these two coalitions cannot be ruled out if one of them loses the elections, but if it occurs, this violence is unlikely to have an impact on the rest of the communities.

  Civic space in Kenya is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Africa Platform through itswebsite.

• KENYA: ‘The government has put all the burden of addressing homophobia on civil society’

  CIVICUS speaks about the situation ofLGBTQI+rights in Kenya and the ongoing impacts of the British colonial legacy with Stephen Okwany, programme director of Talanta Africa.

  Talanta Africa is a civil society organisation (CSO) that uses art to promote the rights of LGBTQI+ people and advocates for an inclusive society in which LGBTQI+ and young people have a say in the decisions that affect their lives.

  What is the current situation of LGBTQI+ people in Kenya?

  The Kenyan LGBTQI+ community continues to celebrate amazing gains brought by progressive organising and its focus on opening conversations around queer lived realities, discussing bodily autonomy and deconstructing cis hate.

  This has been met with mixed reactions from different quarters. Our gains have elicited organised opposition from anti-gender and anti-rights movements highly resourced by illiberal populists and very active in the religious, cultural and legal arenas. These movements perpetrate organised rights violations against LGBTQI+ people, including by promoting conversion therapy practices, profiling LGBTQI+ people and queer activists, deliberately denying access to basic human rights such as healthcare and education, perpetrating online attacks and outing queer people, and even through the murder of queer people, the most recent case being that of Sheila Lumumba, a 25-year-old non-binary lesbian who was attacked, sexually assaulted and killed in her home on 17 April.

  How does legislation discriminate against Kenyan LGBTQI+ people?

  The Kenyan government recognises the existence of queer people in the country. However, there are still regressive laws in place that threaten the existence of the queer movement, such as Sections 162-165 of the Penal Code, which discriminate against consensual same-sex relationships and criminalise those who live on the proceeds of sex work, limiting the independence of LGBTQI+ sex workers in Kenya.

  Additionally, queer people and collectives face restrictions on their freedoms of association and peaceful assembly, as the government shies away from registering queer collectives and the police typically use excessive force to disrupt queer parades.

  The government has not put in place mechanisms to address homophobia. The burden to do so has been left to civil society. Queer survivors of deliberate homophobic attacks have been denied justice by a judicial system built upon cis hate and in violation of the provisions to integrate LGBTQI+ community members as equal participants in the Kenyan development process. No progress can be achieved if a section of the population continues to be excluded on the basis of prejudiced perceptions.

  How does your organisation work to counter those perceptions?

  Talanta Africa is an artivist collective of queer human rights defenders. We put the power of strategic communications tools such as arts, culture, media and tech at the service of queer storytelling to promote a change in narratives and improve the civic space of LGBTQI+ people.

  Our organisation is largely a strategic communications platform that convenes queer people who believe that silence is too high a price to pay in the face of injustice and inequality. We believe that conscious art and culture play a key role in shaping narratives and telling stories while also countering regressive narratives that advance cis hate.

  Not surprisingly, our work has been met with extreme opposition and has been branded as a queer ‘recruitment’ process. This has resulted in attacks on our offices, the intimidation of our artivists, the profiling of our work and intentional exclusion from activist spaces and platforms.

  How can Kenya and other Commonwealth countries work together to advance LGBTQI+ rights?

  Commonwealth countries should establish multilateral instruments to affirm and advance the bodily autonomy of LGBTQI+ people. These could provide a platform for auditing legal instruments at a country level and assessing the development and implementation of new legal frameworks to replace regressive legal provisions.

  International organisations have a mandate to raise human rights awareness, including of the human rights of LGBTQI+ people, and denounce human rights violations, including those faced by LGBTQI+ community. To do so, they must promote progressive queer narratives. They must be deliberate in resourcing queer-affirming spaces through the equal rights and equal opportunities framework.

  Civic space in Kenya is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Talanta Africa through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@TaAfrika on Twitter.

• KENYA: ‘We have concerns about state functions being used to dictate and define morality’

  CIVICUS speaks about LGBTQI+ rights in Kenya and the criminalisation of activism with Ivy Werimba, Communications and Advocacy Officer at galck+.

  galck+ is a national coalition of Kenyan LGBTQI+ organisations advocating for issues related to sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression and representing LGBTQI+ voices across the country.

  How significant is the recent Supreme Court ruling in favour of allowing the National Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (NGLHRC) to register? Has it brought any anti-rights backlash?

  The Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the lower court rulings was highly significant. This decision sets an important precedent for future cases involving discrimination against marginalised communities and underscores the importance of the judiciary in upholding the rule of law and protecting human rights. It was the first of its kind by the Supreme Court of Kenya. We applaud their decision to uphold the Constitution.

  There has been a lot of backlash from various societal leaders and there is now a Family Protection Bill that’s been created and awaiting being gazetted. This bill, which closely resembles the anti-homosexuality bills of Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda, has given fodder to the opposition, which is rallying support for it online and continuing to spread misinformation and disinformation by tying it to other issues that political leaders refuse to address, such as the poor economy, the rise in teenage pregnancies and alcohol abuse, election violence and election violations, widespread corruption and unrest in secondary schools.

  The NGLHRC fought for 10 years to register because its name contained the words ‘gay’ and ‘lesbian’. Has galck+ faced similar challenges?

  No, our struggle has been different. As a coalition made up of 18 member organisations catering to people of diverse sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics, we changed our name in 2022. We are now galck+ and our name is no longer an abbreviation. galck+ reflects the growth and intersectionality we have witnessed in the Kenyan LGBTQI+ movement, with inclusion and diversity at the heart of what we do. Our updated resolve is to create a space that doesn’t feel segmented since our fight for freedom and love is the same regardless of what makes us different from each other.

  How do you manage to work in a context where being LGBTQI+ is illegal?

  Our work in Kenya is not hindered by the illegality of being openly LGBTQI+. Although Kenya is a patriarchal, conservative and sexist state, the perception of a person’s gender or sexuality is what gets people in trouble. Through its existence and work, the LGBTQI+ community in Kenya continues to challenge conformity to societal norms that expect men to be courageous and women to be homemakers.

  There have been significant milestones in establishing laws and policies that support gender equality and social inclusion. However, several factors – including limited resources, weak links among ministries and between the national and county levels, negative pervasive norms and attitudes about inclusion – hinder the effective implementation of laws and policies.

  Despite all these tribulations, we use our work and our spaces to push back on these norms and celebrate the limited but important progress made on the rights of LGBTQI+ people in Kenya over the last 10 years. This has largely been obtained through victories in court, where Kenyan activists have challenged criminalising provisions and the treatment of LGBTQI+ people and organisations. This includes a case that established that the use of forced anal exams is illegal, a case that upheld the right of LGBTQI+ people to form and register organisations and a case that upheld the right to change gender on legal documents. The Family Protection Bill threatens to destroy all this progress and so our work continues to be a reminder that the freedoms we fight for are for all Kenyans, and not only for the LGBTQI+ community.

  Do prohibitions of ‘same-sex behaviour’ apply in practice?

  Violence and discrimination against LGBTQI+ people in Kenya are a harsh reality. Despite claims that sexual orientation and gender identity are non-issues, LGBTQI+ people in Kenya experience stigma, discrimination, physical and verbal abuse, assault, harassment, eviction from their homes, loss of their jobs, suspension or expulsion from school and many other rights violations that significantly affect their wellbeing and quality of life.

  The Penal Code’s sections 162(a), 162(c) and 165 criminalise sexual activities that are perceived to be against the ‘order of nature’. While these sections apply to all Kenyans, they are selectively used to criminalise same-sex relationships. The ambiguous language used in these sections also makes it difficult to define ‘gross indecency’ since it criminalises even innocent actions like hugging or holding hands between people of the same sex. These laws also affect the transgender and intersex communities. The misguided narrative that limits people’s understanding of the difference between sexual orientation and gender identity leads many Kenyans to assume that transgender and intersex people are homosexual or bisexual.

  Although few people have been charged under these laws, they are often used to justify violence and discrimination against LGBTQI+ people, creating a perception that they are criminals. This is a perception that subsets of the state and religious institutions advance to further perpetuate human rights violations and acts of violence.

  In other words, there is a connection between legal prohibitions and violence against LGBTQI+ people, even if the laws are not consistently applied. This hostility is underpinned by discriminatory laws, including the law that criminalises same-sex activities and other laws used by the state to target LGBTQI+ people.

  These laws also create a culture of fear and secrecy among LGBTQI+ people, making them vulnerable to harassment, assault and other forms of violence. In addition, the inconsistent application of these laws can lead to arbitrary arrests and prosecution, including under laws criminalising ‘loitering’, ‘solicitation’ and ‘impersonation’, to extort money or sex from LGBTQI+ people, or to deny services to LGBTQI+ survivors of violence.

  How are LGBTQI+ organisations in Kenya working to change this?

  LGBTQ+ organisations in Kenya are working to change discriminatory laws and social norms by engaging in various advocacy and awareness-raising campaigns, providing legal aid, sharing security directives with our constituents and offering healthcare services to the LGBTQI+ community. These organisations are also working to create safe spaces for LGBTQI+ people to express themselves, network and access information.

  Some of the main issues on the LGBTQI+ agenda in Kenya include the repeal of discriminatory laws such as Penal Code sections 162(a), 162(c) and 165 and the promotion of laws and policies that are intersectional for LGBTQI+ people and organisations, including the Employment Act (2007), which recognises the rights of employees to basic conditions of employment, the Sexual Offences Act (2006), which outlaws all forms of sexual violence, and the National Gender and Equality Commission Act (2011), which spells out the National Gender Equality Commission’s function, which is to promote, monitor and facilitate gender equality and freedom from discrimination in the country’s laws at the national and county levels.

  Other issues include ending violence and discrimination against LGBTQI+ people, addressing the challenges faced by transgender people, and promoting education and awareness on issues affecting the LGBTQ+ community.

  Do you see your struggle as part of a bigger regional or global struggle?

  Yes, the Kenyan LGBTQI+ movement is part of the regional and global struggle to achieve various goals ratified in regional and international agreements such as Resolution 275 of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights – on protecting people against violence and other human rights violations on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity – and reducing inequalities, as laid out in the Sustainable Development Goals.

  The Kenyan government has adopted legal and policy frameworks aimed at promoting gender equality and reducing discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. Such initiatives include the Kenya Vision 2030, which highlights the government’s commitment to reducing income inequality through economic growth, job creation and social safety nets. In addition, Kenya has adopted several legal and policy frameworks aimed at promoting gender equality and reducing discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.

  However, significant inequalities still exist, particularly in the wake of the pro-religious government that has been openly homophobic, inciting violence that threatens the lives of queer people. There is a lot of uncertainty regarding the new government’s impact on LGBTQI+ organising and funding, with concerns about the evangelisation of the state and state functions being used to dictate and define morality.

  Despite these challenges, the Kenyan LGBTQI+ movement remains resilient. We are mobilising together and collaborating with LGBTQI+ organisations in other countries in the region, including Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda, on issues such as the anti-homosexuality bills of Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda, that are now spreading to Kenya, Malawi, Zambia and many other African countries, and exchanging best practices.

  To continue doing this, we need various forms of support, including in raising awareness around the issues brought about by state and non-state-sponsored homophobia and flexible funding to respond to rising insecurity and mental health issues. We need our allies working on other thematic areas to highlight intersectionalities, showing how these regressive laws will affect sexual health and reproductive rights, children’s rights, the economy and more.

  ---

  Civic space in Kenya is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with galck+ through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@Galck_ke onTwitter.

• Kenya: Civil Society Condemns Attempted Raid and Deregistration of Human Rights Organisations

  NAIROBI – Leading global and regional civil society groups have strongly condemned the targeting of two Kenyan national human rights organisations by the authorities.

  The National Coalition of Human Rights Defenders – Kenya (NCHRD-K), DefendDefenders (the East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project), global civil society alliance, CIVICUS and Civil Rights Defenders condemn the de-registration of the NGOs and an attempted raid on the offices of one of them.

  On 16 August, in the wake of general elections, the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA), accompanied by Kenyan police officers, attempted to gain entry to the offices of the African Centre for Global Governance (AfriCOG) without notice and with a defective search warrant. The attempted raid came two days after AfriCOG, together with the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), was served with a notice of deregistration by the NGO Coordination Board.

  The Board has accused the organisations of operating “illegal bank accounts”, employing expatriates without the necessary permits and tax evasion, among other offences. KHRC denies the allegations.

  The attempted raid was eventually prevented by instructions from Acting Interior Cabinet Secretary, Fred Matiangi, who called for the formulation of an inclusive and representative committee to work with the NGO Coordination Board to ascertain the compliance of the two organisations with NGO regulations. Secretary Mitiangi’s instructions suspended any actions against AfriCOG and KHRC for a period of 90 days to enable the committee carry out its functions.

  The accusations in question had already been adjudicated before the high Court of Kenya in 2015 (KHRC vs. NGO Coordination Board 495 of 2015) when the KHRC was first deregistered by the Board. On April 2016, Justice Louise Onguto entered that the adverse actions taken to deregister KHRC and freeze its bank accounts is unconstitutional, null, and void.

  Said Kamau Ngugi, Executive Director of the National Coalition of Human Rights Defenders – Kenya: “The persistent harassment of civil society organisations at the hands of Fazul Mahamed, the Executive Director of the NGO Coordination Board, is unacceptable. CSOs should be able to take part in public affairs and hold government to account without fear of reprisal.”

  Further, in a letter dated 15 August 2017, the NGO Coordination Board wrote to the Directorate of Criminal Investigations to order it to close down the operations of AfriCOG and arrest its members and directors for contravening section 22 (1) of the NGO Coordination Act, which requires any person operating an NGO to be registered under the same Act. It further called on the Central Bank to freeze the accounts of the organisation.

  Civil society is free to select under which regime to register an association and AfriCOG is registered under the Companies Act as a company limited by guarantee. Therefore, the NGO Coordination Board has no mandate over the operations of the institution. Furthermore, such direction is in contravention of Article 47 of the Constitution of Kenya that provides for fair administrative action and contravenes the fundamental right to freedom of association protected by Article 36 of the Constitution of Kenya as well as under international treaties to which Kenya is a State Party.

  The move against the two organisations comes a week after the 8 August national elections, which were contested by the opposition. Throughout the electoral process, KHRC and AfriCOG have been vocal in their demand for transparency and have acted as monitors of the elections. KHRC Executive Director George Kegoro told Capital FM news in an interview that moves to deregister his organisation aimed to prevent it from issuing a legal petition challenging the recent election results in the Supreme Court.

  The undersigned organisations hereby call on the NGO Coordination Board to:

  1. Desist from harassing civil society organisations and immediately lift any restrictions on the activities of KHRC and AfriCOG until they are given the right to due process;
  2. Respect Article 47 of the Constitution of Kenya, which provides for the right to “administrative action that is expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.”
  3. Publicly acknowledge the important role played by civil society in promoting rule of law and accountability; and ensure an enabling environment in which human rights defenders and civil society can operate free from hindrance and insecurity.

  CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation

  Civil Rights Defenders

  DefendDefenders (the East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project)

  National Coalition of Human Rights Defenders – Kenya

   

  For more information contact:

  Kamau Ngugi

  Executive Director, National Coalition of Human Rights Defenders-Kenya

  Telephone: +254 712 632 390

   

   

• Kenya’s fresh election lights up Africa with hope

  On 26 October 2017, Kenya returns to the polls after the Supreme Court declared the election held on 8 August 2017 null and void. CIVICUS speaks to governance specialist Paul Okumu on the coming election re-run, the announcement by the main opposition that it will not contest the poll and what this means for Kenya’s democracy

  Q: What is the mood in the country after the Supreme Court judgement ordering for a fresh election to be held this October?

  On the whole, this has been the most exciting moment for Kenyans — both here at home and abroad.

  But beyond Kenya, we have received several messages of solidarity and excitement from across Africa, with many African citizens and civil society telling us that this is a victory for the continent and not just for Kenya.

  Never in their existence have the courts overruled the executive in the manner that the Kenya judiciary did. The judiciary has always shied away from challenging orders seen or perceived to touch the executive, and this ruling was totally unexpected, considering that the incumbent President is for all purposes the final appointing authority of members of the judiciary (based on recommendations from the Judiciary Service Commission and Parliamentary approval).

  But the most ecstatic part is that citizens, as well as all arms of government, respected the judiciary and agreed to follow the orders. It has given citizens a renewed breath of fresh air and confidence in the judiciary.

  It also reaffirmed the supremacy of the Constitution and the power of citizens, something that is seen as new in Kenya, considering that the Constitution is less than ten years old.

  There is however some slight apprehension that being the first time, perhaps the excitement is temporary and it is not clear if indeed this is a reflection of a new activist and accountability nature of the judiciary, or this is limited just to the Supreme Court. Many of you may have also heard that the ruling party is using its new majority in both house of Parliament to push through two new laws that will dramatically weaken the Supreme Court and the electoral oversight body, Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC).

  One must recall, however, that the groundwork that led to the nullification of this case was in fact another ruling by a lower court. In May this year, human rights activist Maina Kiai, who is the former Special UN Rapporteur on the Rights to Peaceful Assembly, went with others to court to challenge the Elections Act. He asked that the law be changed to ensure that the counting of votes is done at the polling station so that they cannot not be altered by the electoral body.The court ruled in his favour and the electoral body took the matter to the Court of Appeal, where the ruling was upheld.

  At least 70% of the ruling by the Supreme Court was based on the ruling made in favour of Maina Kiai.

   Q: There are concerns that there are many issues that the Electoral body must first rectify and will not be able to do this in the given time before the election. What are your views on this?

  This is Kenya's greatest fear, and right now the opposition is already holding demonstrations to demand that some of these matters be rectified as conditions for participating in the fresh election. But the hands of the Supreme Court were tied here. The Constitution allows for only the electoral body, (Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), to conduct elections. The Constitution also requires for those elections to be held within 60 days of the nullification of a previous one.

  The concerns are  therefore justified when one considers that the electoral body has decided to retain the three companies accused by the opposition of complicity in delivering a result that was not the will of the people — Al Ghurai, a Dubai based Company, Safaricom, Kenya’s largest Mobile company, and OT Morpho, a French company. Part of this is the lengthy procurement rules.

  Kenyans are waiting with bated breath to see how the electoral body will address what the Supreme Court described as "systemic" and "institutional" failures within the IEBC. These failures were not just a failure of equipment, but a failure of oversight and accountability.

  But remember that the main thrust of the judgement was not the manner in which the elections was conducted. The majority ruling of the Supreme Court accused the IEBC of redefining democracy and ignoring that democracy is a process that ends with elections. It rejected the view that democracy begins with elections.

  In doing so the IEBC was accused of not following the entire democratic process that leads to elections — from public confidence-building to ensuring transparency in the entire process in the period leading to and the period after the elections.

  So the challenges facing the IEBC are much bigger and it’s not clear if they will address these systemic and institutional challenges in the few days remaining to elections.

  Q: The President has said he is disappointed by the Supreme Court Ruling. Why is this and what may it mean for the independence of the judiciary?

  The President’s disappointment is understandable, and to an extent it appears justified since one of the dissenting judges insists that he had won the last election by 54%.

  But unlike 2013 where the Supreme Court based its judgement on numbers, this time the court departed from this and refused to be drawn into recounting of votes. In their view, the court argued that if the process was flawed, and if there is proof that the Constitution was violated in the process leading to and after the elections, then the numbers do not matter.

  This was a departure, not just from previous rulings, but other rulings within the Commonwealth jurisdiction and even the United States of America. But it is this kind of ruling that set the Supreme Court of Kenya apart from other courts.

  While the judiciary around the world has refrained from helping advance society in its democratic agenda, the Kenya Supreme Court decided that Kenya should move forward and define democracy in a much broader way than just elections.

  This is a game changer for other Supreme Courts around the world. For Africa, the judiciary has stamped its authority as the guardian of democracy, not just an arbiter in electoral disputes.

  It means that Kenya's Supreme Court is not just asserting its role as pace-setters for society, but it is exercising its independence and the right to disagree with broader society. For a long time many Kenyans have had a very narrow definition of democracy. The Supreme Court offered a more superior definition.

  Q: The opposition has just pulled out of the elections, claiming that the electoral body has refused to meet its demands and the demands required by the Supreme Court ruling. What does this mean for the credibility of the election?

  The Supreme Court termed this a FRESH election, not a repeat poll. Under Kenya's Constitution, if there is only one candidate in a fresh election, the election is cancelled and the candidate is declared the winner. It is silent on what to do if a party boycotts. But the same Constitution states that fresh elections needs to be preceded by party nominations, which obviously cannot be done under the short period of 60 days allowed by law.

  In pulling out of the elections, the main opposition cited a statement by the Supreme Court in the 2013 electoral dispute where the Court considered what options are left if a candidate pulls out. The court at that time interpreted the scenario to mean a candidate had died and so fresh nominations must be held and another election held within 90 days. It’s not clear because there are arguments that the court was merely discussing scenarios and was in no way giving directions.

  In my opinion, this is the kind of crisis that hits societies that want to lead themselves purely by law. Laws alone cannot legislate morality, and in fact there is nowhere where society is managed by laws alone. An element of trust and compromise among its members is always needed - - which is what a proper social contract achieves in society.

  Kenya has opted to let laws define its democracy, and hence its social contract.

  There is a price to pay for that, and right now there will certainly be a price to pay because the law did not envisage the situation that we are in. The IEBC wanted to rectify that by bringing on board previous presidential candidates to run in this elections, but they quickly realised that that the law is not clear on this either.

  Since the political players have chosen the path of legality rather than political compromise, my fear is that over the next few days we are going to see Kenya’s elections not as a democracy, but a battle between the judiciary and the executive.

  It is never a good battle, and often one side ends up losing – its known who is the weaker of the two.

  Q: One of the IEBC Commissioners resigned on 18 October 2017, citing threats over her life. In an interview in the media she admitted that the electoral body is not prepared and that the body has been hijacked by a section of its members aligned to the ruling government. What does this mean for the elections and for the credibility of the elections?

  The situation is actually more delicate than that. You may be aware that on 12 October 2017, both Houses (Senate and Parliament) rushed through a new law that takes away considerable powers from the head of the IEBC and makes it difficult for the commission to reach decisions by compromise. The proposed law also seeks to return the country back to the manual system which was the cause of the problems in past elections, and which is blamed for the violence witnessed in 2007/2008. There are concerns that her resignation, added to the new proposed law, which by the way is only awaiting Presidential signature to become effective, may have dealt a big credibility blow to the electoral body, and in effect it short circuits the reforms that had been demanded by the Supreme Court. It certainly will have a huge impact on turnout because there is perception that the laws and the resignation have not just taken away the remaining teeth of the electoral body, but has effectively taken it back to the state it was that led to the crisis in the first place.

  But once again the issue must be seen from a broader perspective, and here are the lessons that those of us who promote democracy should know. It is impossible to have democracy without a proper social contract. Democracy is about managing diversity within society to deliver on a collective aspirations using the resources at the disposal of that society. Instead we have made democracy about power plays and about the strongest or the richest or the largest ruling over everybody else. You can see where it has led the United States. We must realise that unless we work with society to learn how to negotiate, manage its diversity and develop a culture of regular compromise, anything we do in the name of democracy is merely buying time. Kenya’s crisis is very simple to manage, but we appear to have resorted to using the law, rather than the friendships, to manage it. It will not end well.

  Q:   What role can civil society play now before the fresh election?

  There are three roles that civil society can play now and in the few days to come.

  First is to celebrate the power of activism —  whether in courts as did the Supreme Court, in each other as did Maina Kiai when he took the electoral body to court, or in other civil society who stood with the opposition and in fact provided the bulk of evidence that was used in court.

  Secondly civil society needs to use this opportunity to connect more with citizens and explain to them what the Supreme Court just did.Never in the history of democracy anywhere in the world has the judiciary come out to teach the society what constitutes democracy! If civil society can use this case to educate citizens on why the court opted to define elections as a process and NOT an event, they will have advanced democracy in ways they would never do with all the donor money used in governance programmes.

  Finally civil society need to come together. Currently there is great polarisation based on the ruling. A section of civil society, under the Elections Observer Group, had actually endorsed the elections and agreed with donors and observers that it was a free, transparent and fair election. They even agreed with the reported win of 54%, insisting it was based on their own scientific polling. They were left looking very foolish and seen as agents of donors and the government. They have not come out to explain themselves fully. The result is that they are now not seen as part of a neutral civil society.

  But the rest of civil society, especially those engaged in human rights, are not seen in good light either. This was the second time in as many elections that they were directly challenging the elections alongside the opposition. And so they are also seen as partisan, even though they were vindicated this time by the Supreme Court ruling.

  In a fractured and polarised society, civil society is not just about being on the right side or the legally correct path. It’s about understanding the dynamics of society and taking positions that rebuild that society. It is important that these two groups, whether they see their positions as superior or not, to come together and agree on how best to shepherd the nation and citizens at this time. Kenya is at a point where it does not need right or wrong, but truth. And that truth will only be found in taking a position that allows the society to build trust in a civil society that is removed from the emotions of politics, yet engaged in the ideals of democracy that leads to well understood social contract.

  Q:       Any other additional analysis you would like to share?

  The elections in Kenya have shown just how perceptions vary between Africa and Europe.

  In many of the European countries, the ruling by the Supreme Court has been treated with apprehension, fear and doom! They feel that Kenya is headed for another chaos and that the ruling should have at least balanced what they call "nascent democracy" and avoided a hard landing that this appears to be. Many of our colleagues that I have met and spoken to begin their conversation with: "So are you going to have war again?"

  On the contrary there has been jubilation and excitement across all of Africa and most of Asia. Citizens as far as Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Botswana and South Africa, and even India, have come out to rally behind Kenya. They see this as a renewed hope for a continent that has been defined by the West as unable to manage its democracy. For many of these citizens, this is a point of triumph and victory-on our terms as Africa. And the fact that it embarrassed the international community who had all but endorsed the elections, has given many Africans even more pride.

  Both sides may be right, and democracy is always muddy. But we need to be careful that we do not push a sliding car down the valley simply because that is what we have been conditioned to think and believe about Africa. It’s much harder to get people out of negativity than it is to encourage them on the positive progress they are making.

  Africa needs more messages of hope, not doom and constant suspicion. The negative descriptions we give to the continent — fragile, conflict-affected, war-torn, corrupt — appear to be what is keeping the citizens disillusioned.

  One act of hope and the entire continent lights up!

  • Civic space in Kenya is rated as‘Obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
  • Follow Paul Okumi on Twitter @paulokumu3. Read two other analytical articles he wrote on the ruling of the Supreme Courthere andhere.

   

• La Guinée placée sur la liste de surveillance des droits humains en amont du référendum
  • La Guinée placée sur la liste de surveillance de CIVICUS Monitor à l'approche du référendum
  •  L'escalade des violations des droits comprend l'usage d'une force excessive sur les manifestants
  • CIVICUS demande la libération des défenseurs des droits humains et exhorte le Président Condé à se retirer

  La Guinée a été placée sur la liste de surveillance des droits de l'homme de CIVICUS Monitor en vue du référendum proposé le 22 mars. Cette liste attire l'attention sur les pays où il y a eu un déclin rapide des libertés civiques et démocratiques au cours des derniers mois.
  La Guinée a été placée sur la liste de surveillance du Monitor en octobreaprès des répressions meurtrières et des arrestations arbitraires de manifestants. Elle reste sur la liste de surveillance car le CIVICUS Monitor craint que si le gouvernement poursuit le référendum controversé plus tard cette semaine, de nouvelles violences et de nouveaux troubles s'ensuivent.

  La Guinée est classée comme "obstruée" par le CIVICUS Monitor, ce qui représente la troisième plus mauvaise note qu'un pays puisse recevoir selon l'indice mondial, dans la même catégorie que le Mali, la Sierra Leone et le Liberia. Dans les pays obstrués, l'espace civique est souvent monopolisé par ceux qui détiennent le pouvoir et une force excessive est couramment utilisée par les forces de l'ordre.

  Depuis octobre 2019, plus de 30 personnes ont été tuées et des dizaines d'autres blessées lors des vastes manifestations qui ont embrasé la Guinée, alors que les manifestants appellent le gouvernement à respecter les dispositions de la constitution actuelle. La constitution actuelle limite le mandat présidentiel à deux mandats de cinq ans et ne peut être modifiée que par le biais d'un référendum. Si elle est modifiée, elle pourrait ouvrir la voie au maintien au pouvoir du président Alpha Condé.

  Le Front national de la défense de la Constitution(FNDC), un mouvement composé de la société civile et de l'opposition politique, a lancé des appels contre une éventuelle candidature au troisième mandat du président Condé.

  Les dirigeants du FNDC, les défenseurs des droits de l'homme Ibrahima Diallo et Sekou Koundouno, ont été arrêtés par des hommes masqués de la BRI (Brigade d'investigation et d'intervention) le 6 mars et emmenés vers une destination inconnue. Ils ont été arrêtés immédiatement après avoir exprimé leurs préoccupations concernant les arrestations arbitraires de militants en cours lors d'une conférence de presse.  Le 12 mars, ils ont été libérés sous caution et placés sous contrôle judiciaire.

  En octobre 2019, treize dirigeants des FNDC ont été arrêtés avant les manifestations prévues à Conakry et accusés d'avoir organisé des manifestations interdites et d'avoir incité à la désobéissance civile.  Cinq d'entre eux ont été condamnés à des peines de prison allant de six mois à un an.  Des journalistes ont également été agressés physiquement pour avoir couvert les manifestations et leur matériel a été saisi pour les empêcher de diffuser des images des manifestations. 

  L'arrestation et la détention de défenseurs des droits de l'homme mettent en évidence la manière dont les autorités guinéennes tentent de faire taire les voix pro-démocratiques et ouvrent la voie à la prolongation du mandat du président Condé :

  "En arrêtant les défenseurs des droits de l'homme, les autorités guinéennes visent à faire taire les voix de ceux qui sont contre une nouvelle constitution.  Il est temps que le président Condé et son administration respectent la volonté du peuple guinéen et permettent une transition politique qui ouvrira une nouvelle ère dans la démocratie naissante de la Guinée", a déclaré David Kode, responsable du plaidoyer et des campagnes à CIVICUS.

  CIVICUS appelle le gouvernement guinéen à libérer immédiatement les défenseurs des droits humains incarcérés.

  CIVICUS demande à l'Union africaine de veiller à ce que le gouvernement de Guinée respecte les dispositions de la Charte africaine de la démocratie, des élections et de la gouvernance : elle exhorte le président Condé à respecter la constitution actuelle et à se retirer à la fin de son mandat pour permettre une transition politique pacifique.

  FIN

   

  Contact:

  Nina Teggarty, Responsable de la communication, des campagnes et du plaidoyer chez CIVICUS

  Email:

  Téléphone: +27 (0)785013500

  CIVICUS media team:

• Lack of funding slowing down young African changemakers

  This article is part of the #StoriesOfResilience series, coordinated by CIVICUS to feature groups and activists on their journey to promote better resourcing practices for civil society and to mobilise meaningful resources to sustain their work.

  Never before have there been so many young people in the world, reports the United Nations. There are 1.8 billion people between the ages of 10-24 on our planet, who are increasingly taking action to drive change, development and innovation for themselves and their communities. They are also loudly expressing their discontent with Governments, corporations and other power holders who have failed to effectively address many of their needs and challenges. But while they are many and daring, young people still lack the resources, recognition and spaces to reach their full potential as agents of change.

• Les manifestants se transforment en milliers de personnes qui battent la fermeture d'Internet

  Read the interview in English 

  CIVICUS parle avec KEPOMEY Koffi Dela Franck de l'organisation non gouvernementale Concertation Nationale de la Société Civile au Togo des récentes manifestations dans le pays sur les limites du mandat présidentiel.

  Q : L’accès à l’internet et aux réseaux sociaux était restreint au Togo entre le 5 et 12 Septembre. Est-ce que vous pourriez donner plus d’information sur les raisons de cette action ?

  Effectivement l'accès à internet et aux réseaux sociaux a été restreint au Togo à cette période. La raison évoquée par le parti au pouvoir est une panne technique. Ce qui n'est pas vrai. La restriction est faite juste pour que l'opposition et les citoyens ne puissent pas utiliser les réseaux sociaux pour informer l'opinion internationale de la situation au Togo (grande manifestation de l'opposition et répression des forces de sécurité à partir de 22 heures). Sources proches du parti au pouvoir indiquent qu’ils l’ont fait pour prévenir que les gens diffusent des images qui incitent à la violence.

  Cette décision viole l'article10 de la résolution NA/HCR/RES/32/13 du 1 juillet 2016 adopté par le conseil des droits humains des nations unies sur la promotion, la protection et l'exercice des droits humains sur internet.

  Q. Quel était l’impact de cette restriction ?

  Cette restriction n'a pas été sans impacts négatifs sur l'économie et la vie sociale du pays. Les activités de plusieurs opérateurs économiques sont restreintes et aussi la population est privée d'information.

  Q. Le samedi 19 août 2017 des manifestants ont été tuées lors d’une manifestation menée par l’opposition. Est-ce que vous pourriez donner plus d’information de ce qui s’est passé ce jour?

  Le samedi 19 août 2017, le Parti National Panafricain, PNP, a organisé à Lome et dans certaines localités du pays (Anié, Sokodé, Bafilo, Kara) une marche pour dénoncer le retour à la constitution de 1992 et réclamer le droit de vote de la population de la diaspora.

  Au cours de cette manifestation il y’a eu plusieurs morts (2 selon des sources officielles et 7 selon les organisateurs) et de nombreux blessés. En même temps 66 personnes ont été arrêtées.

  Q. Savez-vous pourquoi la police a réagi avec cette violence contre les manifestants?

  Les organisateurs et le pouvoir n’ont pas pu s’entendre sur les itinéraires de la manifestation. Le jeudi 17 août 2017, les ministres de l’administration territoriale et de la sécurité ont déclaré, dans une conférence de presse, qu’aucun rassemblement ne sera toléré le 19 aout 2017 sur toute l’étendue du territoire et que les manifestations seront dispersées à leur point de départ.

  Il s’agit d’une manifestation pacifique qui aurait dû être fait sous la direction des forces de police (gendarmerie et police) selon la loi n° 2011-010 du 16 mai relative aux conditions de manifestations publiques.

  Malheureusement on a retrouvé sur les lieux de manifestation des militaires qui dispersaient les protestations. Ce qui peut expliquer l’agressivité des manifestants.

  Q.Comment la société civile togolaise a-t-elle réagi à la brutalité de la police et aux meurtres?

  La Concertation Nationale de la Société Civile au Togo (CNSC-Togo) a publié une déclaration publique de condamnation de la violence sous toutes ses formes au lendemain des tueries et a appelé le gouvernement à prendre d'urgence des mesures pour apaiser le climat social, y compris la libération des détenus. En outre, CNSC-Togo a appelé les partis politiques à améliorer le mentorat de leurs activistes/membres, entre d’autres.

  Les Collectifs des associations contre l'impunité au Togo (CACIT) ont également condamné la répression de l'assemblée. Le 24 août 2017, un groupe de 32 associations et réseaux a publié une déclaration appelant le gouvernement et les autres acteurs publics à assurer l'exercice de la liberté de réunion afin d'assurer le professionnalisme des forces de sécurité dans le cadre des réunions et appelle les membres/partis politiques à respecter les biens publics et les infrastructures.

  Q. Comment décririez-vous l’état de la liberté de réunion pacifique au Togo?
  La liberté de réunion et d’association pacifique au Togo dépend de la tendance politique de ceux qui organisent la manifestation. Les militants et sympathisants du parti au pouvoir organisent des manifestations en toute quiétude même les jours ouvrables. Ce qui n’est toujours pas le cas des partis de l’opposition. Ils font souvent face à des restrictions sur les itinéraires et les points de départ des manifestations. Cela signifie que les réunions pacifiques peuvent facilement dégénérer en raison des exigences des forces de sécurité.

  Q. Comment décririez-vous l’état de la démocratie au Togo?

  La démocratie au Togo a traversé des moments difficiles depuis que les partis d'opposition sont revenus sur la mise en œuvre de réformes institutionnelles et constitutionnelles suite aux recommandations de la Commission Vérité, Justice et Réconciliation (CVJR) que le gouvernement prend du temps pour compléter. Les partis d'opposition soupçonnent que le gouvernement retarde la prise de décision pour éviter de traduire les réformes en réalité.

  Le lundi 30 juin 2014, le projet de réforme constitutionnelle présenté par le gouvernement au Parlement après le dialogue connu sous le nom de Togotélécom II de mai 2014 a été rejeté, car les membres du parlement du parti au pouvoir ont voté contre le projet de loi.

  Depuis, des voix discordantes se sont multipliées et la pression s'est accrue, même au sein des organisations de la société civile œuvrant dans le domaine de la promotion de la démocratie et de l'état de droit. Il y a souvent des pressions sur les partenaires financiers pour priver les organisations de ressources qui leur permettent d'être autonomes dans leurs actions.

  Q. Quel type de soutien peuvent offrir les groupes régionaux et internationaux à la CNSC-Togo et aux autres organisations de la société civile du pays dans la situation actuelle?

  En effet, le CCSN-Togo a des difficultés à réunir des fonds et est satisfait de certains microprojets et de l'allocation de fonds provenants des donateurs/partenaires gouvernementaux traditionnels, en particulier de l'Union européenne, et du PNUD à l’approche des élections. Ces partenaires reçoivent d'abord une autorisation gouvernementale avant d'accorder les ressources. Ce qui conduit souvent à l'autocensure dans nos déclarations et réunions publiques.

  Nous devons entrer en contact avec d'autres partenaires / donateurs qui peuvent nous fournir un soutien financier durable.

  • L'espace civique au Togo est considéré comme «obstrué» par leCIVICUS Monitor, un outil en direct qui retrace l'espace civique autour du monde.

  • Suivez la Concertation Nationale de la Société Civile au Togo à:http://www.cnsctogo.org/

• LESOTHO: ‘We must work hand in hand to promote democracy and hold our leaders accountable’

  CIVICUS speaks about the 7 October election in Lesotho with Libakiso Matlho, executive director of Women and Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust-Lesotho (WLSA). 

  WLSA is a civil society organisation (CSO) based in Southern Africa and working to promote women’s leadership and eradicate gender-based violence. It contributed to the recent election process by providing voter education. 

  How would you assess the recent election   in  Lesotho in terms of its   transparency   and fairness?

  Looking at the overall proceedings I would say they were transparent and fair. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) did a good job. All candidates were given a  platform to share their manifestos as well as their campaigning approaches at different  levels, including through the media  and public gatherings. Independent candidates did not face any threats. Nobody experienced any restrictions in terms of the exercise of their right to reach out to members of the community and potential voters. Voters were free to attend candidates’ forums and political party rallies.

  There were two major challenges, however. One concerned voter civic education, which started a bit later than normal and therefore lasted only about three or four weeks, so it was not as broad as should have been.

   The other challenge had to do with the dynamics of the campaign, which was affected by conflict among candidates during public forums. Some participants invited to take part in the discussions also caused chaos. This  unfortunately led to a few discussions being cancelled before all the candidates could present their manifestos in some areas, especially those that were marked as hotspots.

  Do you foresee any election-related conflict?

  It is hard to predict, but this election seems to have been a bit different from others in the past, which makes me wonder.

  Around 65 political parties and 2,560 candidates competed in the 7 October election. For a small country with a population of two million, that is a huge number of people. And many might find it difficult to accept the outcome if things do not happen according to their expectations. 

  The election itself was peaceful, but political tension mounted as votes were counted over the following days. The results were announced on 11 October: the opposition Revolution for Prosperity party came first but was short of a majority, with 56 of 120 seats, while the incumbent All Basotho Convention party (ABC) came second. It is not clear whether ABC will contest the results and its supporters will take to the streets in protest. If this happens, clashes with rival parties might occur and security force repression could follow.

  I would not rule conflict out but rather consider it as likely to happen as not.

  Do you think the failure to pass constitutional reforms had an impact on the election results?

  I think the failure to pass the Omnibus Constitutional Bill, which had been years in the making, probably had a strong impact on the electoral process, and will definitely have an impact on what happens next.

  The bill sought to amend key provisions regarding political parties, candidate selection, floor-crossing in parliament, the appointment of senior officials and the role of the prime minister, whose removal would require a two-thirds majority. In May, all major parties in parliament committed to pass the bill by the end of June, but disagreements held it up much longer.

  One of the key issues of contention concerned the electoral law, which only allows party leaders to submit a proportional representation party list. With the current system, 80 members of parliament are elected in constituencies and 40 are elected through a proportional division of votes. Small parties are negatively affected because to get some proportional representation seats, they are forced to come together into a list with larger parties, and if they are unable to merge with other parties they are left out.

  Another key issue wasthe politicisation of the security sector, which contributes to political instability. The reforms proposed a way to deal with this.

  The reforms were eventually passed as parliament was reconvened for an urgent session but, following a series of legal challenges, the Constitutional Court declared them null and void at the last minute before the election.

  The failure to pass the reforms will also contribute to continuing difficulties in maintaining coalition governments. Lesotho has had coalition governments since 2012 that have never served a full five-year term due to conflicts that led to their dissolution. In 2017 ABC formed a six-party coalition government, but because of internal conflict Prime Minister Tom Thabane was forced to resign in 2020 and was replaced by Moeketsi Majoro.

  Coalitions have not made for stable and effective governments. The coalition-forming process also confuses voters because ideologies are not a big factor when putting them together. This makes voters a bit sceptical that their parties will remain faithful to their mandate.

  These were some of the issues the reform was meant to address, but unfortunately they remain unaddressed to this day.

  What did voters expect from the election?

  One of the expectations voters place on political parties is that they will work on improving service delivery. This includes fixing infrastructure and providing access to water and electricity, among other things. Lesotho also has high rates of unemployment and widespread problems of gender-based violence and femicides, as well as high crime rates that people hope will be addressed by the new government.

  Basotho people are not happy with the way the public sector has been managed over the years. Employment is mostly driven by nepotism and political affinities. People are uneasy because political parties on the campaign trail are quick to promise they will fix these things but once in power they fail to deliver.

  We have also seen a lot of instability in a key industry, the textile industry, with COVID-19 only making things worse. People were already dealing with bad working conditions and when the pandemic hit many were fired unfairly. This led to worker strikes and has negatively affected foreign investment. Elected leaders need to find means of retaining foreign investment while ensuring good work conditions.

  How can the international community support civil society’s work to strengthen democracy in Lesotho?

  During the election, civil society faced the challenge that almost all funding for civic education came from the IEC, that is, from the government budget. This could potentially compromise civil society’s watchdog role. Additionally, these funds are never sufficient to allow civil society to conduct its work thoroughly.

  The international community should support capacity building so that civil society can conduct robust advocacy during and after the election period. Collaboration between international and local CSOs is also important. For the recent election local CSOs took on voter education alone, without any involvement by international CSOs. We must work hand in hand to promote democracy in our countries and hold our leaders accountable.

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  Civic space in Lesotho is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with WLSA through itswebsite orFacebook page.