civic space

• USA: ‘Our aggressive tactics helped amplify the demands of the broader climate movement’

  CIVICUS speaks with Evan Drukker-Schardl of Climate Defiance about the disruptive tactics the organisation uses to put climate change on the agenda.

  Climate Defiance is a youth climate organisationdetermined to challenge political betrayal and fight for a just world. Through mass protest and peaceful direct action, it seeks to force politicians to address the existential climate crisis, rejecting the constraints of current political realities in favour of transformative change.

  What makes Climate Defiance different from other climate action groups?

  Climate Defiance takes a direct approach, confronting climate criminals wherever they are – whether they are being honoured by industry peers or speaking in public. We challenge their presence in society and highlight the damaging impact of politicians and fossil fuel executives on our collective future.

  This approach has resonated widely, particularly online, where millions have supported videos of young activists confronting those responsible for endangering their future. It has also allowed us to amplify the climate movement’s demands. Notably, our protests have had tangible results, such as the resignation of Harvard professor Jody Freeman from the board of ConocoPhillips. Similarly, Assistant Secretary of the Interior Tommy Beaudreau resigned just 15 days after we disrupted his participation at an event.

  What are your demands, and how has the US government responded to them?

  Our demands focus on ending coal, gas and oil infrastructure, both in specific cases and as a general policy. We have also joined others in calling for an end to new liquefied natural gas (LNG) export permits. Over the past year, we have consistently raised these issues, most notably during a meeting at the White House where we repeatedly stressed the need to address LNG exports. Shortly afterwards, the Biden administration announced a moratorium on new permits.

  While Climate Defiance cannot take sole credit for these developments, our aggressive tactics have helped amplify the demands of the broader climate movement. We understand we are not here to make friends; rather, we are focused on forcing those in power to listen and respond to our demands.

  Although the Biden administration and Congress may not meet all our demands, we have made it clear they have no choice but to address our concerns, even if it goes against the interests of fossil fuel companies that hold significant power. Our actions ensure that those in power are aware of and accountable to the demands of the climate movement.

  What forms of protest have you undertaken so far, and why?

  So far, our protests have taken a variety of forms, all aimed at holding climate criminals accountable. For instance, we recently targeted Senator Lisa Murkowski, who was instrumental in getting the Biden administration to approve the Willow Project in Alaska, allowing new drilling on federal lands. She was receiving an award at a non-profit gala in Washington DC, presented by Chevron’s top lobbyist. We interrupted her speech with a banner that read ‘Murkowski is a murderer’. This direct action brings our energised activists to where the powerful are being honoured and exposes the truth about their destructive actions.

  Similar actions led to the resignations of Beaudreau and Freeman. While we don’t expect Murkowski to resign, our actions ensure she cannot expect to go unchallenged in public forums. We specialise in these confrontational tactics, disrupting events like the Congressional baseball game, a bipartisan event attended by numerous climate offenders from both parties. This game symbolises a political consensus that perpetuates fossil fuel subsidies at the expense of our planet and its people.

  We’re present at such events to demand an end to these subsidies and highlight the bipartisan support for policies that harm our environment. While we cannot predict the immediate outcome of these protests, they are essential in raising awareness and pressuring policymakers to prioritise climate action over corporate interests.

  Are you seeing restrictions on protests?

  Climate Defiance has so far managed to protest effectively while minimising the risk of arrest for our activists. Avoiding arrest ensures the safety of our activists and conserves our resources and capacity.

  However, the broader protest landscape in the USA has seen concerning developments, particularly in relation to the Gaza and Palestine solidarity movements. Across university campuses in the USA and around the world, there has been a noticeable shift in how disruptive and confrontational protests are handled. Authorities have responded with excessive force and repression, seeking to silence criticism and dissent.

  While Climate Defiance focuses on confronting climate criminals, it is important to recognise and condemn any undemocratic actions taken by those in power to stifle legitimate dissent. Such behaviour reflects poorly on the democratic principles that should underpin society, and those responsible should be held to account.

  We stand in solidarity with all people protesting against genocide in Gaza. It is unconscionable that university administrations, police forces and politicians are brutalising and targeting student protesters instead of listening to their principled calls for justice and an end to massacres in our name and on our dime. Crackdowns on college campuses are a threat to us all and should alarm people even if they are not part of the Palestine solidarity movement in the USA.

  How has the public reacted to your protests?

  Public reaction to our protests has been mixed. While some people appreciate our direct approach and see the urgency of our cause, others are uncomfortable with our disruptive tactics. We build relationships with politicians who want them and whose values align with ours, but we are not afraid to criticise those in power who further the destruction of our planet, wherever they are on the political spectrum. Our priority is to be vocal, public and disruptive to drive home that our lives depend on transformative action now to end fossil fuels.

  Regardless of whether people agree with our methods, we have been able to achieve tangible results. Even those who don’t support us cannot ignore the impact we are having. We believe that discomfort can be a catalyst for change. We challenge people to confront uncomfortable truths to motivate them to act.

  Ultimately, our aim isn’t to win a popularity contest but to insist that everyone, regardless of their background, deserves a healthy and prosperous future. We see protest as a means of subversion, a way of challenging the status quo and demanding a better world for future generations and ourselves.

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  Civic space in the USA is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Climate Defiance through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow @ClimateDefiance onTwitter,Instagram andTikTok.

• USA: ‘We should shift away from overreliance on policing and promote community-based solutions’

  CIVICUS speaks about police violence in the USA with Abdul Nasser Rad, Managing Director of Research and Data at Campaign Zero (CZ).

  Launched in 2015, CZ is an activist-led and research-driven civil society organisation that works to end police violence and promote public safety beyond policing.

  What factors affect the level of police brutality in the USA?

  Police violence remains a threat in some parts of the country, and particularly to some communities. In 2022, US law enforcement officers killed 1,251 people. While this number is the highest to date since our data tracking began in 2013, it’s crucial to note that trends vary across regions. Some cities have witnessed an increase in such incidents, while others have seen improvements.

  Several factors help explain variations in police violence and use of force across the USA. Racial segregation and socio-economic neighbourhood indicators, for instance, have been found to predict police violence, along with individual-level demographic factors such as the race of the officer involved.

  A combination of historical disinvestment and a societal tendency to respond to social issues with enforcement and prison-related measures rather than restorative or human-centred solutions are leading drivers of the disproportionate impact police violence has on communities of colour. A book by Khalil Gibran Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness, provides a comprehensive analysis of the myth of Black criminality and the use of the carceral state in perpetuating the second-class treatment of Black people in the USA.

  How are you working to end police violence?

  Our approach is to work both on immediate harm reduction and long-term transformational change, aiming to reshape the way society approaches public safety.

  CZ provides robust, accurate and up-to-date data on police violence in the USA, which is critical given the absence of such efforts by the federal government. We develop comprehensive datasets that help identify where harm is being caused and pilot solutions to remove the harm. We prioritise transparency and make all our work public. The campaigns we develop are meant to be accessible so other organisations and activists can take the lead in implementing similar initiatives.

  We align with the transformational change perspective. We recognise that the current system is deeply flawed and requires radical rethinking. At the same time, we see the value in harm reduction as a necessary parallel strategy in the short term.

  Our efforts are concentrated in two main areas. First, we engage in harm reduction initiatives through several campaigns. For example, ‘8 Can't Wait’ focuses on reducing police killings by advocating for the adoption of eight policies that restrict the use of force. Since the launch of the campaign in June 2020, over 340 cities have restricted the use of force and 19 states have changed their policies. Some changes include the banning of chokeholds, implementing a duty to intervene, requiring de-escalation and exhausting all alternatives before using deadly force.

  A campaign aimed at reducing unnecessary police deployment, ‘Cancel ShotSpotter’, achieved the cancellation of contracts or the prevention of the expansion of contracts in several large metropolitan centres. ShotSpotter’s technology often mistakes loud noises for gunshots, leading to more police encounters with civilians, sometimes resulting in fatal outcomes. Another campaign, ‘End All No Knocks’, was launched after the tragic police killing of Breonna Taylor, and seeks the cessation of no-knock warrants. It has resulted in six states restricting their use.

  While running these campaigns, we also actively work towards systemic change, consisting of the dismantling and transformation of the policing system. Beyond harm reduction, our goal is to fundamentally transform public safety strategies. We advocate for a shift away from overreliance on policing and instead promote holistic, community-based solutions that prioritise safety and wellbeing for everyone.

  What challenges have you faced in doing your work?

  A common challenge relates to data inconsistencies, lack of data transparency and ensuring the accuracy of our data platforms and analyses.

  But one of the most severe challenges lies not in the data but in the ways it can promote harm rather than foster more thoughtful approaches. For example, when the crime rate increases, the system responds with enforcement and incarceration rather than human and restorative solutions. It’s devastating to see the same punitive strategies over and over again. Combating fear and punitive social responses deters us from our long-term work of dismantling oppressive systems, creating frustration and a sense of moving backward.

  At its core, the problem is that society doesn’t treat or view every individual as a human being of equal value. If it did, it wouldn’t support punitive responses to people experiencing crises. It can be frustrating to work towards dismantling this system while simultaneously mitigating harm from the same system we’re trying to dismantle.

  We confront challenges and failures daily, often facing more obstacles than successes. This is the nature of social justice and liberation work. So building resilience is critical. It’s vital to maintain faith and keep engaging in restorative practices. The commitment and joy in the work endure as long as hope is kept alive and a vibrant community surrounds you.

  How do you collaborate with other local and international stakeholders?

  Our work is with and for communities most impacted on by the US carceral system. Domestically, we collaborate with any stakeholder willing to advance solutions aligned with our values. Direct engagement with stakeholders of diverse ideologies is necessary for policy change. As noted by the intersectional feminist writer Audre Lorde, it is not our differences that divide us, but our inability to recognise, accept and celebrate those differences.

  We are just beginning to build international relationships. Over the past year, we’ve engaged with the international community through sharing our research and expertise in building robust data systems and contributed to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ efforts to develop best practices on fatality counts and in-custody deaths.

  To achieve our mission, we need to keep building trust, and we do this by making our work as transparent, robust and easily accessible as possible. Partnerships will help us secure resources to sustain the work and gather the feedback we need to continuously improve.

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  Civic space in the USA is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Campaign Zero through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@CampaignZero on Twitter.

• VENEZUELA: ‘The government seeks to stoke nationalist sentiment to try to hold on to power’

  CIVICUS speaks with Mariano de Alba, Senior Adviser at the International Crisis Group, about the recent referendum called by the Venezuelan government on the status of the Essequibo territory, disputed with neighbouring Guyana, and its possible implications for democracy in Venezuela and peace in the region.

  The International Crisis Group is an independent organisation that works to prevent wars and design policies to build a more peaceful world.

   

  Why did the Venezuelan government decide to submit the Essequibo issue to a referendum?

  The announcement of the referendum came first as a reaction by the Venezuelan government to the recent oil bidding rounds conducted by Guyana in maritime areas that Venezuela considers as pending delimitation. As the referendum was being organised, it became clear that the Venezuelan government was attaching additional value to it as a tool to test its capacity for electoral mobilisation a few months in advance of the presidential election due to take place later this year.

  In addition, by placing the dispute with Guyana on the public agenda, the Venezuelan government seeks to stoke nationalist sentiment in the Venezuelan population, and most particularly among the armed forces, a key group in its strategy to retain power.

  What’s the legal value of the referendum?

  According to jurisprudence by the Supreme Court of Justice, Venezuela’s highest judicial body, consultative referendums, a mechanism established in the Venezuelan constitution, are not binding. This view was publicly ratified by the chief lawyer who was appointed by the government to prepare the referendum questions.

  But for political reasons, since before the referendum and particularly in view of its results, the government has insisted that it does have a binding character in order to justify a series of actions it has announced in relation to the territory in dispute. These, however, have been no more than symbolic announcements, since Venezuelan armed forces have not effectively entered the disputed territory, which has been under Guyanese administration for many, many years.

  How did the opposition react to the referendum, and how will this impact on the 2024 elections?

  There were differences among various opposition groups on how to position themselves in relation to the referendum. First of all, it should be noted that on 17 October, when the government and the opposition met in Barbados to sign an agreement on the conditions to hold elections, they also signed another agreement in which they committed themselves to ‘ratify the historical rights’ of Venezuela and to ‘uphold the full validity of the 1966 Geneva Agreement’, the treaty that reignited the dispute, in which Guyana, Venezuela and the UK agreed to seek a solution to the conflict. As a result, at least part of the opposition leadership found it difficult to oppose the referendum.

  However, María Corina Machado, the main opposition leader, elected as a unity candidate in primaries held in late October 2023, did criticise the referendum, arguing that ‘sovereignty must be exercised, submitted to consultation’. The most important difference within the opposition is that some opposition leaders believe that one should participate in all electoral processes, regardless of the conditions, while others do not. Some voted in the referendum, while others didn’t.

  Ahead of the presidential elections, a key element of the government’s strategy is to foster division among the opposition, so that one part ends up calling for non-participation due to lack of sufficient guarantees and another part decides to participate. In the face of a divided opposition the government has a real chance of winning the election, since under the current electoral system whoever gets the most votes, even if short of 50 per cent, is elected. The election will take place in an authoritarian context in which the conditions for the competition will be poor and there is a high risk of government repression.

  What has been Guyana’s reaction?

  Guyana is focused on seeking a favourable decision at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where in 2018 it filed a lawsuit seeking ratification of the validity of the 1899 arbitral award that gave it the territory it now controls and administers, and which Venezuela ignores, arguing that the award was the product of procedural fraud.

  However, recent tensions complicate the picture for Guyana. First, because, at least on paper, the Venezuelan armed forces have substantially superior capabilities compared to Guyana’s. Hence Guyana’s intention to seek to strengthen its military alliances and obtain guarantees from allied states. Second, the uncertainty resulting from these tensions could affect the remarkable recent economic growth of Guyana, a country with a small population but high income due to the recent discovery and exploitation of oil resources. Already in mid-December 2023, London’s Lloyd’s insurance market rated the Guyanese exclusive economic zone as risky, which could increase the cost of shipping oil from there.

  What are the risks of an escalation into armed conflict?

  The referendum has substantially increased tensions between Guyana and Venezuela. Guyana saw the referendum and the subsequent actions of the Venezuelan government as a threat. But Guyana has also taken advantage of the tensions to try to strengthen its diplomatic and military alliances with states such as the UK and the USA.

  In the short to medium term, the risk of these tensions escalating into armed conflict is low, partly because the international reaction would be so critical of it. Moreover, while the Venezuelan government has announced and gone through with actions such as appointing an authority for the territory in dispute, it has been careful to ensure that the implementation of these actions has remained on Venezuelan territory for the time being.

  But escalation is not out of the question. Tension could lead to a limited confrontation, following which it could become difficult for one or both of the countries to de-escalate.

  From the Venezuelan perspective, escalation is a risky gamble because it could generate greater discontent among the Venezuelan armed forces, which would have to risk their lives, particularly if Guyana receives the support of a key ally such as the USA. Moreover, the Venezuelan government is striving to reintegrate itself into the international community, and initiating a conflict with Guyana would derail those efforts.

  On the Guyanese side, it is uncertain whether military support would actually come in the event of a substantial military conflict. Such a conflict could also make it very risky for some companies operating in Guyana to continue doing business there. Therefore, at least in the short and medium term, barring any surprises, attempts to keep tensions on the public agenda will predominate, but without resulting in any real escalation.

  At the end of the day, both countries, as the neighbours they are, will be obliged to try to negotiate. Even if Guyana obtains a favourable ICJ decision, that will hardly be the end of it, as without Venezuela’s cooperation it will be very difficult to enforce the judgment. Moreover, the maritime area will still be pending delimitation, so sooner or later negotiations will have to take place in any case.

  What is the status of diplomatic negotiations?

  Serious diplomatic efforts have been undertaken by various countries to try to convince both governments of the importance of lowering tensions and avoiding armed conflict. These efforts resulted in an agreement signed in St Vincent and the Grenadines on 14 December. There, it was agreed to de-escalate tensions and hold a new meeting in Brazil before the end of March.

  However, distrust between the two governments remains deep. The visit of a British warship to Guyana in late December, which Venezuela interpreted as a threat to which it responded by conducting military exercises on its territory, did not help a bit.

  The outlook is complicated by the fact that both governments believe they can make political gains out of these tensions, Venezuela for predominantly domestic political reasons, and Guyana first and foremost to strengthen its military alliances, and secondarily because, if it manages the situation well, the ruling party’s prospects could improve ahead of elections in 2025.

  Behind the scenes, diplomatic efforts continue because in the face of the war in Ukraine and the conflict in Gaza, the idea prevails that there is no international space for another armed conflict, and even less so in Latin America and the Caribbean, which for so many years has been a zone of peace, at least as far as inter-state conflicts are concerned.

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  Civic space in Venezuela is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the International Crisis Group through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram accounts, and follow@CrisisGroup and@marianodealba on Twitter.

• VENEZUELA: ‘The government wants a civil society aligned with its interests, tamed and silent’

  CIVICUS discusses the ‘anti-NGO law’ recently passed in Venezuela with Alí Daniels, Co-Director of Acceso a la Justicia, a civil society organisation (CSO) dedicated to monitoring justice administration and the rule of law in Venezuela.

  On 15 August, Venezuela’s National Assemblyapproved a bill known as the ‘anti-NGO law’, which severely restricts freedom of association. The law requires CSOs to declare the origin of their funding, imposes strict reporting obligations, including a requirement to provide sensitive information, and bans organisations deemed to promote ‘fascism, intolerance and hatred’. The measure, proposed some time ago, was finally adopted after the28 July presidential election, which the opposition won by a large margin. The government has ignored the results, violently suppressed democracy protests and sought to stifle all sources of dissent.

  What’s the anti-NGO law, and what’s its place within the ruling regime’s repressive machinery?

  This new law has been presented as an instrument to regulate the exercise of freedoms of association and expression, when in fact it seeks to hinder it. One third of its 39 articles contain severe sanctions such as fines, deregistration, expulsion of foreigners and the dissolution of organisations. Although it claims to seek greater transparency and accountability, it contains only two articles on this issue, which was already regulated by the Civil Code.

  One of the most worrying aspects of the new law is that it obliges CSOs to reregister within 180 days and could leave them in legal limbo if they don’t receive a response from the authorities. It also imposes annual reviews, creating an unnecessary administrative burden even for those lacking financial resources.

  The anti-NGO law is part of a long-standing strategy of repression that includes human rights violations such as enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions and extrajudicial executions. It’s another cog in a repressive machine that includes measures such as revoking the passports of human rights defenders and activists, illegal surveillance of phones and social media and censorship of platforms such as WhatsApp and Twitter/X. Senior government officials have already labelled us terrorists, encouraging and justifying the intensification of repression.

  The anti-NGO law can also be seen as a response to international pressure questioning the legitimacy of the 28 July election. With it, the government is doubling down on its willingness to punish anyone who questions its legitimacy.

  What impact could this law have?

  We are very concerned that the new law is very similar to Nicaragua’s, which in just one year has led to more than 3,000 CSOs being made illegal.

  In the medium term, the new law could have a serious impact on the humanitarian situation. The new restrictions could lead to a reduction in the number of CSOs, while those that still operate may be forced to reduce their capacity to implement projects. Many CSOs may end up opting to become informal groups. While this would reduce costs, it would also limit their ability to receive funding, as donors often prefer to work with formal legal entities.

  The damage this could cause is not limited to CSOs – it also affects the people who depend on their services. For political reasons, the Venezuelan government adopts contradictory positions: it forces bankrupt companies to keep operating, allegedly to ‘protect jobs’, but it dissolves CSOs for failing to pay a fine. It claims to protect jobs, but dissolves organisations that create jobs in the humanitarian field.

  The anti-NGO law is designed to limit the independence of civil society, allowing only likeminded CSOs to operate. The government wants a civil society that’s aligned with its interests, tamed and silent.

  How is civil society working for a democratic transition in Venezuela?

  In a context marked by censorship of political expression and press freedom, Venezuelan civil society is playing a crucial role in the struggle for a democratic transition. In the face of restrictions on political parties and government control of the media, CSOs have become reliable sources of information, providing an alternative analysis to the official narrative. We provide data the government would rather hide, such as the rise in child malnutrition. We show reality as it is, and that’s why they want to suppress us.

  CSOs act as monitors and whistleblowers, offering critical analysis and proposing alternatives for Venezuela’s future. We advocate for dialogue and a negotiated transition, but we also set clear ethical and legal boundaries to ensure those responsible for crimes against humanity are brought to justice.

  How can the international community support civil society in Venezuela?

  The international community can help us keep what is happening in Venezuela in the global debate by echoing our condemnation of human rights violations and crimes against humanity. This is extremely important so those more ideologically reticent can recognise that human rights violations have no ideology and torture is unacceptable and must be condemned and punished no matter who commits it.

  It’s important that states with influence over the Venezuelan government, such as Brazil and Colombia, use their position to encourage dialogue. Diplomatic pressure and mediation by friendly countries could facilitate a process of negotiation and peaceful resolution. We have been facing a complex humanitarian emergency for more than two decades; any support to alleviate the crisis is greatly appreciated and will continue to give us hope and strength to face the very serious situation we are in.

  Civic space in Venezuela is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Acceso a la Justicia through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@AccesoaJusticia and@alijdaniels on Twitter.

• VENEZUELA: ‘We need a multilateral, flexible and creative approach from the international community’

  CIVICUS speaks with Feliciano Reyna, founder and president of Acción Solidaria, a Venezuelan civil society organisation (CSO) established in 1995 with the mission to contribute to reducing the social impact of the HIV epidemic. As a result of the multiple crises facing Venezuela, Acción Solidaria has expanded its scope of action and provides medicines and medical supplies to wider vulnerable populations.

  

  How has the current crisis come about in Venezuela?

  A process of dismantling the rule of law has taken place over several years and is still ongoing. The judiciary has long ceased to be independent and now operates according to the interests of the government. Added to this is a high level of corruption. Many documents and reports, such as a recent one by the United Nations (UN) Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela, describe how a non-independent justice structure was put in place, taking advantage of the opacity of public data and discretionary state management.

  As a result, many people, acting in their own interest, destroyed the economic and productive apparatus. Nowadays the Venezuelan economy is 20 per cent of the size it was in 2013. This has impacted on poverty levels, the quality of public services and the resulting lack of protection.

  An initial period of enormous income, lasting many years, allowed for a great waste of wealth, with resources reaching the major groups that supported Hugo Chávez’s government, from 2005 to 2013. But money was just spent on individual benefits, not invested in public services. Thus, little by little, the public sector was left in a state of total abandonment: hospitals, roads, lighting, electrical system, water distribution. Everything is pretty much destroyed. There are about four million people who cook with firewood or charcoal because they don’t receive gas. Where I live, we get water once a week for 24 hours, and sometimes we don’t get water for two or three weeks.

  There was a major shift in the global economy, with a sharp drop in oil prices coinciding with Chávez’s last days in office. When Nicolás Maduro took power in 2013, the fragility of a regime largely based on Chávez’s personality was exposed. Maduro’s victory triggered political protests because his mandate was questioned, and very harsh repressive practices were adopted in response. The situation has deteriorated ever since, leading to the current human rights crisis. CSOs have documented arbitrary detentions, torture and cruel treatment under detention. There has been a sustained attack on dissent and political opponents. Anyone in a position of power who is viewed as a political threat is taken out of play.

  The years between 2014 and 2016 were terrible. In addition to human rights violations, there was widespread harm caused to the population in terms of health, nutrition, access to water, education and other rights. As the economy deteriorated, there began to be many social protests, not for political reasons but regarding income, lack of resources, power cuts, lack of transportation and public services, and so on. With two major exceptions – the 2017 and 2019 protest waves, in which people expressed political grievances – the vast majority of protests have been social protests, not ideological ones, through which many people who ultimately supported and voted for the government expressed their discontent.

  While the attack on opposition and dissent has driven many into exile, economic shortages have led to a massive emigration wave. More than four million Venezuelans have emigrated, including many professionals, teachers and doctors, further weakening service delivery systems.

  What is the context in which civil society works?

  There state has been greatly weakened and is unable to control all the territory under its jurisdiction, so it has handed over control to other groups. Power is increasingly in the hands of local parastate actors who enjoy small bubbles of well-being within the context of immense poverty in which the vast majority of the population lives.

  Because of the weakening of the state and the deterioration of the oil industry, which has always been the main source of national income, the government has opened some spaces for a freer economy. That means that in order to serve the populations we work with, we have been able to import medicines and supplies thanks to international cooperation. Our international donors send us supplies or pay for transportation so that we can receive them, using a door-to-door delivery system.

  Since 2017 Acción Solidaria has brought in almost 240 tons of aid. We have grown from nine staff in 2016 to 40 in 2021. Every week about 120 people come to the offices of Acción Solidaria to seek medicine. Most of them are women and people with very little resources, over 55 years old. The things they need may be available in the parallel economy, but at prices they can’t afford.

  But the environment for civil society remains a high-risk one. Last year we experienced a raid by the Special Action Forces, the most fearsome command of the Bolivarian National Police. What they did to us was not an official operation but a criminal action. CSOs doing human rights advocacy are criminalised, and CSOs conducting humanitarian action face serious problems of access and are subject to extortion by these autonomised groups and paramilitary actors. We have become targets not because we are opponents or dissidents, but because we have coveted resources.

  One colleague of ours was imprisoned 160 days ago and five comrades from an organisation that works alongside the UN Refugee Agency were imprisoned for a month in a military facility.

  As the electoral process was underway, the government’s information networks among the population seemed to have become aware that government programmes – which transfer the equivalent of about US$4 a month to their beneficiaries – could not compete with the nearly US$60 that humanitarian organisations were transferring to people in their target populations, without demanding anything in return, simply as part of the humanitarian response. So they immediately stepped in and suspended the 38 humanitarian aid programmes that were making cash transfers.

  Following the elections, the transfer ecosystem has started to begin again, but so far only transfers from the Food and Agriculture Organization and UNICEF have been reactivated.

  How much popular support does the Maduro government have left? Did it have enough to win the November regional elections, or did it resort to fraud?

  In November 2021, regional elections were held to renew all executive and legislative seats in the country’s 23 federal entities and 335 municipalities. The official turnout was just over 40 per cent, and the government won 19 governorships, compared to four won by the opposition. The government also won 213 mayorships, but various opposition groups won 121, a not insignificant number.

  The conditions of electoral competition were set up well before the selection of candidates, the campaigns and the voting took place, as new members to the National Electoral Council (CNE) were appointed. The CSO Foro Cívico had proposed names of independent candidates for the CNE: people with a strong electoral background who could build a bridge of dialogue with the people in government who wanted a less authoritarian rule. This resulted in a more balanced CNE, with one independent rector and one from the opposition among the five full members, and three out of five alternates proposed by civil society. This allowed us to expect an election with greater legitimacy than previous ones.

  The electoral process was very tense. While there was no fraud in the sense that voting figures were changed, there was a lot of pressure and obstacles to prevent opposition supporters from voting. Leading opposition politicians were disqualified and unable to stand as candidates. The conditions in voting centres, including schedules, were altered for the government’s benefit, and many people were brought out to vote, despite the fact that the government no longer has the same mobilisation capacity as in previous elections. Turnout was low for several reasons: because millions of people have emigrated, and because many popular opposition figures were not taking part in the election.

  The opposition also bore a great deal of responsibility for this, because it viewed the elections with a lot of suspicion. Many of its key spokespeople were opposed to participating, and it did not reach the kind of broad agreements that would have allowed it to win as many as 10 or 12 governorships. In part, its growth was limited not just by the obstacles imposed by the government, but also by its own inability to reach an agreement.

  Still, it is important to emphasise that the playing field was not level. The opposition could have won more governorships than it did, but there was a clear limit to this. This was seen in Hugo Chávez’s home state of Barinas, which the government could not afford to lose to the opposition. An opposition candidate clearly won there, so after the fact the Supreme Court ruled that the winning candidate did not actually meet the conditions to be eligible to compete, and ordered a rerun.

  Faced with these limitations, which were foreseeable, there was a part of the opposition that from the beginning opposed participating in the elections and left the way open for many pro-government victories that might not otherwise have taken place.

  How consolidated is the Maduro regime, and what are the chances that a democratic transition can take place?

  A democratic transition does not seem to be an option in the short term. The opposition is very diverse and is dispersed both programmatically and in terms of its institutional approach, so it is questionable whether it would be able to govern if it had the opportunity right now.

  What lies ahead of us is a long trek through the desert. The government suffers from many weaknesses, but it has the support of China, Iran, Russia, Turkey, and a lot of political support from Cuba and other countries in the region, as is apparent in the UN Human Rights Council. Maduro’s government has adopted a deft approach in the image of these supportive states: despite corruption and lack of transparency, it has allowed an opening in the economy while keeping its repressive behaviour intact.

  The international support that the government receives is important and has been systematically underestimated, while the support received by the interim government led by Juan Guaidó has been overestimated. It has been said that he has the USA and 60 other countries on his side, but those who support him with real actions are in fact much fewer.

  For many in the opposition, the interim government has itself been a big problem, partly because it became associated with the Donald Trump administration, and partly because since the interim government was established what it did became the only thing that mattered, and the space of the National Assembly, which had enjoyed broad popular support, was abandoned.

  The interim government was prompted on the basis of Article 233 of the Venezuelan Constitution. Since by virtue of his fraudulent re-election in 2018 Maduro was not recognised by the opposition as a legitimate president, the opposition-dominated National Assembly proclaimed its president, who at the time was Juan Guaidó, as interim president of Venezuela. I think that the opposition should have continued to work through the National Assembly, an elected and legitimate body whose presidency alternated between the parties with the most votes. Evidence of corruption could have been collected and mechanisms sought to protect the country’s assets with the help of the international community.

  Instead, the opposition named itself as a legitimate government without having any control over internal processes. And when it took over, it set out expedited conditions and deadlines, demanding that Maduro should first leave office so that the interim government could constitute itself as a transitional government and organise free elections.

  The choice of the opposition to proclaim an interim government was the result of it underestimating the government’s forces and overestimating its own. When expectations were not met, as was bound to happen, disaffection with the interim government began to grow. There is still an enormous desire for change, because things remain bad for the vast majority of the population, but the hope that this change would be achieved through the interim government has faded.

  What kind of support should the international community provide to facilitate a democratic transition?

  What we would like to see from the international community is a multilateral, flexible and creative approach. The change of administration in the USA has been extremely important because the approach of the Trump administration was unilateral and overbearing. Fortunately, the Biden administration appears to adhere to a multilateral approach and to include Europe, Canada and other countries in our region.

  Regarding Europe, it was very important that the European Union sent an election observation mission for the 21 November elections, as it was for the UN and the Carter Center to send their election experts. The UN also has essential contributions to make in humanitarian and human rights matters, both in terms of mobilising resources to address the humanitarian emergency in the country and to support migrants and refugees across the region, as well as with regard to the human rights violations that continue to occur.

  The international community must listen to civil society and pay attention to the grievances of the people who are directly affected by the measures that external actors take in relation to Venezuela. Many of the sanctions that have been imposed on the government, such as the US secondary sanction that penalises the exchange of oil for diesel, end up not affecting the government, which has alternative courses of action, and instead harm users and consumers, ordinary people whose already complicated lives are complicated even further.

  If this part of Venezuelan society were listened to, it would be possible to think of alternative policies to generate spaces for negotiation and agreements that would allow us to return to the path of democracy and human rights in a non-violent manner.

  Civic space in Venezuela is rated as ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Acción Solidaria through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@AccionSolidaria and@fjreyna onTwitter.

   

• VENEZUELA: ‘With the new NGO law, the government aims to take control of the entire associational fabric’

  CIVICUS speaks with Rigoberto Lobo Puentes, founder of Promotion, Education and Defence of Human Rights (Promoción, Educación y Defensa en Derechos Humanos, PROMEDEHUM), about Venezuela’s NGO bill which, if passed, will further hinder civil society’s work.

  PROMEDEHUM brings together people whose common goal is education about and the promotion and defence of human rights.

  How has civic space in Venezuela changed recently?

  Civic space has experienced tensions for more than a decade. In 2010 the government implemented the Law of National Sovereignty and Self-Determination to restrict access to funding by human rights organisations, citing alleged external threats against the Venezuelan government. This law was only the first step. Starting in 2016, when the ruling party lost control of the National Assembly, the government began to issue emergency decrees granting powers to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to audit any agreement signed with international bodies by organisations or individuals to implement projects in Venezuela. This was part of a strategy to suffocate human rights organisations financially until they were forced to shut down.

  In 2020 the government body that regulates the banking system ordered banks to monitor the financial operations of civil society organisations (CSOs), supposedly to prevent money laundering and terrorism financing. Following criticism from international human rights protection bodies, in 2021 the provisions of the National Office against Organised Crime and Terrorist Financing in relation to CSOs were slightly amended. However, they continue to violate international human rights standards. Among other things, they provided for the creation of a new body in charge of authorising the registration and operation of CSOs and obliged CSOs to provide sensitive information.

  This attack caused fissures in civil society, as many thought that since the focus was on human rights organisations, other CSOs, including humanitarian organisations, were out of harm’s way, even if they also in one way or another defended human rights. Many CSOs said they had no problem with the obligation to register. The situation was very confusing. It was never clear where the registry was or would be, and in each city, organisations were given different information.

  In 2021, the ruling party-controlled National Assembly unanimously approved a national legislative plan that included a Law on International Cooperation, which also established a mandatory registry for CSOs. The aim again was to limit access to funding for CSOs.

  In 2022, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force refuted the idea that all these regulations were needed. Its assessment of Venezuela concluded that there was no evidence the proposed or implemented CSO registries could prevent potential abuses linked to terrorism financing.

  Finally, in January 2024 the National Assembly approved in first reading of the draft Law on Control, Regularisation, Operations and Financing of Non-Governmental and Related Organisations, better known as the NGO law. If passed, this law will allow the government to further restrict the functioning of civil society, as it broadly prohibits ‘political activities’ without clearly defining what this refers to, and could result in the imposition of sanctions or the closure of CSOs deemed to be engaging in ‘political activities’. In the session where the bill was approved, more than 60 CSOs were singled out as enemies and traitors to the homeland.

  The continued threats to and vilification and persecution of CSOs and human rights defenders, and restrictions and attacks on media and journalists, raids on offices and jailing of humanitarian workers, have created a climate of great fear. Many CSOs have lost members, some have closed, and many human rights defenders have migrated for various reasons, including because they have been persecuted or fear persecution in the near future. Some organisations, including media outlets, have adopted self-censorship or changed the nature of their activities to prevent reprisals.

  What impacts would the NGO law have in this context?

  The NGO law seeks to limit citizen participation and human rights advocacy. It would turn the freedom of association into a matter of public order, exposing organisations to surveillance and police control. Organisations that fail to register or disclose their sources of funding could face fines, deregistration and criminal prosecution. They could be criminalised under charges of terrorism, money laundering, destabilisation, conspiracy and foreign interference.

  Although the draft law may appear to target only human rights organisations, its impacts will be much broader, as it aims to take control of the entire associational fabric. All organisational forms, including political parties and education and academic organisations, are potential targets. Victims of human rights violations could lose all legal support. People affected by Venezuela’s humanitarian emergency could lose access to civil society humanitarian programmes, which could be replaced by government programmes with restrictive access conditions.

  In short, the government seeks a tailor-made civil society. It has an interest in the continuity of humanitarian organisations, as they relieve it of a burden and help it maintain an image of openness with the international community. But it wants humanitarian organisations to play a purely welfare role, with no connection to human rights, and to refrain from publishing any information that might project a negative image of Venezuela.

  The government has already made progress in this area. To some extent it already controls the activities of humanitarian organisations and obtains constant information on their activities throughout Venezuela.

  Why has the NGO law been revived after it was put on hold last year?

  The government has moved forward with this law as prospects increase of an election in the near future. The law can be used not just against human rights CSOs. It can be used against any organisational form that is considered a space for critical thought or dissent. This particularly applies to CSOs working on civil and political rights issues, demanding electoral transparency, monitoring campaigns and observing elections.

  From the government’s perspective, civil society jeopardises its prospects of staying in power. Under fair electoral conditions, civil society’s monitoring, documentation and denunciation of human rights violations perpetrated by an already unpopular government could harm its electoral standing. For years the government has sought to subdue, suffocate or nullify CSOs, and this will intensify as it faces the need to ensure its continuity in power.

  The NGO law had been suspended but not forgotten. The government simply waited for the right time to resume its attacks. Recently, there have been accusations against and arrests of members of the military, political parties and journalists in connection with an alleged assassination plot that has been classed as terrorism. This is part of a situation created by the government to justify actions to neutralise those who might become obstacles in the face of an election. In this context, the possibility of the NGO law being passed should not be ruled out.

  How have civil society and the public reacted to these attacks?

  Despite the seriousness of the law, there is a lot of misinformation and a high level of ignorance among Venezuelan citizens. Even some CSOs are unaware of its existence or its importance.

  However, civil society has issued numerous criticisms. Between 2022 and 2024, national and international CSOs have published at least 15 statements and analyses of the NGO law and the law on international cooperation. Numerous forums, talks and awareness campaigns have been held, inside and outside Venezuela.

  Many organisations and human rights defenders have participated in interactive sessions at the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council and in side events at the UN, the Organization of American States and the Summit of the Americas, and have submitted reports to human rights bodies. As a result of this advocacy, between 2021 and 2023, 11 statements and reports about these laws were published by international bodies.

  Those of us outside Venezuela have also advocated with the governments of our host countries. In Argentina, where I am at the moment, politicians and civil society have publicly condemned the NGO law.

  The Venezuelan government doubled down and on 12 January launched a public consultation on the law, without making the official text of the draft law public or inviting human rights CSOs to participate. According to the information that has come to light, most of the participants in the consultation have been state officials, including police officers. From what we have been able to observe in consultation events, which take place relatively spontaneously in various places and without an established format, and in the discussions on the issue in the National Assembly, the prevailing discourse has delegitimised CSOs, which are referred to as enemies of the state.

  What guarantees does Venezuelan civil society need to keep doing its work?

  To continue our advocacy work in defence of civic space we need more international organisations and people to come on board to help report on the deteriorating situation. CSOs need access to more accurate and reliable information to help build alliances more quickly and effectively.

  Venezuelan CSOs continue to work to communicate any changes that occur and to raise the alarm when attacks on rights take place. We continue to advocate with other states, especially when there are changes of government that could affect international policies of states. One imminent risk is of the non-renewal of the mandate of the International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela, established by the UN Human Rights Council in 2019. This would be a serious blow to Venezuelan civil society.

  Venezuelan organisations should also evaluate and rethink strategies in terms of the impact of the information we produce. We should better showcase the strengths of the Venezuelan human rights movement. Perhaps proactive transparency, to the extent that it does not put organisations and their members at greater risk, could serve to influence both the international community and the public. It is crucial that people in Venezuela understand the dimensions of the losses that the deterioration of civic space and the extinction of CSOs pose to our country.

  ---

  Civic space in Venezuela is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with PROMEDEHUM through itswebsite orFacebook account, and follow it onInstagram and Twitter.

• VIETNAM: ‘Failure to address torture of political prisoners should trigger a review of trade deals’

  CIVICUS speaks with Kaylee Uland and Jessica Nguyen, co-director and advocacy officer with The 88 Project, about the criminalisation and repression of human rights activism in Vietnam.

  The 88 Project is a civil society organisation (CSO) that advocates for and shares the stories of Vietnamese political activists who are persecuted because of their peaceful activism for human rights.

  What does The 88 Project do?

  The 88 Project is a research and advocacy organisation that maintains the most comprehensive and up-to-date database on the situation of political prisoners and human rights activists in Vietnam. Our database informs media coverage and policy debates on Vietnam and is used by journalists, diplomats and policymakers. According to our database, as of 24 June 2022, there are at least 208 known political prisoners behind bars in Vietnam, the highest number of any country in Southeast Asia.

  What is the current situation of civic freedoms in Vietnam?

  The 88 Project has tracked very negative trends regarding the Vietnamese government’s crackdown on political dissent. These include an increase in arrests of those in formal and informal media professions over a period of four years from 2018 to 2021. The arrests of media workers as a percentage of total activist arrests went up from less than three per cent in 2018 to 18 per cent in 2020 and 34 per cent in 2021.

  The use of harsh sentences of at least five years in prison to stifle critical voices has also increased: while such sentences were 23 per cent of total sentences of activists in 2018, the rate rose rapidly to 44 per cent in 2019, 48 per cent in 2020 and 72 per cent in 2021.

  The practice of holding activists and political prisoners incommunicado for extended periods of time – of eight months or more – has become increasingly common: it was applied to 12 per cent of all activists arrested in 2018 and to 21 per cent in 2019, surging to 49 per cent in 2020, before slightly decreasing to 42 per cent in 2021.

  The crackdown on dissent has also expanded to include new issues and groups, as seen in the recent arrest and imprisonment of four CSO leaders working on climate change and environmental issues. They were charged with ‘tax evasion’, a tactic used by the government to silence critics who cannot be tried under the national security provisions of the criminal code. This sent tremors of fear through the environmental movement in Vietnam.

  Efforts to censor social media have intensified, as has compliance with government censorship requests by US-based tech companies. With a population of 98 million, Vietnam is one of Facebook’s top 10 markets by user numbers, with 60 to 70 million people on the platform. Facebook provides one of the few spaces where Vietnamese people can communicate relatively freely. This space is, however, rapidly closing as Facebook increasingly complies with censorship requests from the government and allows bad actors to exploit content moderation rules to have accounts locked and posts deleted. Exacerbating the situation, Vietnam is now planning to impose new rules that require social media firms to take down content it deems illegal within 24 hours.

  Further, the deliberately complex law regulating the ability of CSOs to receive and spend domestic or foreign funding gives the government control over organisations and individuals. CSOs find it hard to comply fully with these laws, which makes them vulnerable to government scrutiny. Punishment for tax violations may include heavy fines, closure and criminal charges that lead to the imprisonment of CSO managers.

  What is the situation of political prisoners?

  The authorities commonly use torture and other inhumane treatment against political prisoners, particularly those in pretrial detention. The most common perpetrators of these violations are public security officers at the provincial level, followed by those at the district and city levels, and then those at the national level. Occasionally, activists who are at risk but not imprisoned are assaulted or otherwise harassed by people suspected to have ties to the government, such as plainclothes police.

  The government insists that there is no incommunicado detention in Vietnam, while acknowledging that for national security cases, a ‘very special measure’ applies, under which detainees are not allowed to see their defence counsel until after the investigation has concluded. Activists are often subjected to unobservable interrogation and to conditions that begin to break down their emotional and physical health. Isolation also removes their plight from the public eye, as information about their condition is sporadic and incomplete at best. Thirty-five activists arrested in 2020 and 2021 were held in incommunicado pretrial detention for eight months or longer.

  Eight people who were arrested in 2020 have not yet been brought to trial. Journalist Le Anh Hung, arrested in July 2018, has not only not yet been brought to trial but has also been repeatedly transferred to mental health facilities for forced psychiatric treatment. 

  Political prisoners are often denied legal representation during the investigation period and at trial. The 88 Project has documented the cases of at least 14 political prisoners who were denied legal representation in 2020 and 2021. When political prisoners are denied legal representation, they are often less aware of their rights and lack a critical communication channel to their families and the outside world. Often, families do not know about trial dates well in advance; sometimes, they learn nothing until after activists have been sentenced. An emblematic case of denial of legal representation is that of two activists from the Hmong minority, Lau A Lenh and Sung A Sinh, who were charged with overthrowing the state and attempting to establish a separate state in north-western Vietnam and sentenced to life in prison.

  Prisoners are often denied medical treatment and family members are prevented from providing medication to them. Many with pre-existing conditions or those who experience health problems while imprisoned have claimed that inadequate medical treatment resulted in greater long-term health complications. Some, including Huynh Huu Dat, have died in prison due to lack of proper healthcare. 

  The government claims that prison conditions have improved, but political prisoners and their families continue to report unclean food, overcrowding, lack of access to clean water, poor sanitation and lack of lighting. Virtually all prisoners suffer from harsh prison conditions, and they are often disciplined and retaliated against if they try to petition for improved prison conditions for themselves or others.

  Cutting prisoners off from family and support networks is yet another way to mistreat them without using force. The authorities often limit family visitation rights or detain political prisoners in places far from their homes, making it extremely difficult for families to visit. Under the pandemic, ‘COVID restrictions’ were also used as an excuse to deny family visits. The 88 Project identified at least 21 political prisoners subjected to this treatment in 2020 and 2021.

  We have also documented many cases of physical and psychological pain, which often amount to torture as defined under international law, inflicted to coerce confessions, obtain information, or punish political dissidents for their opinions. A frequent form of psychological abuse consists in sending political prisoners to mental health institutions against their will, even if they have no history of mental illness. Examples of political prisoners subjected to forced mental health treatment include Le Anh Hung, Nguyen Thuy Hanh and Pham Chi Thanh. Another harsh aspect of prison treatment is the use of solitary confinement to isolate political prisoners and punish them for asserting their rights.

  Is there any accountability for cases of torture and ill-treatment?

  Unfortunately, there is very little accountability. Regarding COVID-19-related restrictions, the government argued that the right to health of the community took priority over prisoners’ right to see family members. The authorities also justify forced mental health treatment tactics on ‘humanitarian aid’ grounds. They say they are respecting and protecting political prisoners’ right to health by sending them to mental health institutions for medical treatment. However, to the best of our knowledge, most cases are of forced treatment, used to isolate political prisoners from their support networks and to discredit them.

  The Vietnamese government has been repeatedly warned about its failure to meet its international obligations against torture. The United Nations (UN) Committee Against Torture (CAT) has stressed the importance of proper criminalisation of torture, fundamental legal safeguards, direct applicability of the Convention against Torture by domestic courts and independent investigation concerning allegations of excessive use of force or deaths under custody.

  During Vietnam’s 2019 UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a number of states raised concerns about allegations of torture and the Vietnamese government voluntarily agreed to several important recommendations, such as making sure that evidence obtained through torture is inadmissible at trial and taking steps to prohibit harassment and torture during the investigation process and detention.

  Despite these international warnings, in its responses to CAT’s comments and recommendations from the 2018 Concluding Observations, issued in September 2020, Vietnam continued to maintain that ‘allegations of the widespread use of torture and ill-treatment, particular in police stations, and in certain places where persons are deprived of their liberty [...] are all unsubstantiated and inaccurate claims’. This contradicts the findings of our report.

  How have domestic and international CSOs raised these issues?

  Many international groups report on allegations of torture and inhumane treatment in Vietnam as part of their ongoing human rights research. However, torture is a difficult topic to research and report on, as information flowing out of Vietnamese prisons is minimal and often censored, and prisoners and family members may fear further retaliation for raising their concerns. Prisoners are often better able to report on prison conditions upon their release, as was recently the case of Tran Thi Thuy.

  Thuy was imprisoned for eight years and was denied communication with her family and adequate medical treatment despite having severe tumours. The authorities demanded a confession in exchange for treatment. Thuy was also forced to work under extreme labour conditions; by the end of her sentence, she could barely walk. The international community should question the treatment prisoners face, and whether it may be even worse than what is reported in the news that reach international outlets.

  Regardless of the obstacles they face, activists, their families and CSOs continue to raise the issue of ill-treatment of political prisoners via research and direct advocacy. For example, in April, the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and the International Federation on Human Rights jointly issued an urgent appeal for international intervention in the case of land rights activist Trinh Ba Phuong. Groups also petition the UN, and especially its Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, to investigate cases where inhumane treatment is suspected. Further, abuse by Vietnam’s police force more broadly is well-documented.

  What can the international community do to address the issue of torture in Vietnam?

  Given the absolute nature of the right to freedom from torture, failure on the part of the Vietnamese government to address issues of torture and inhumane treatment of political prisoners should trigger a review of its trade deals and other relationships with international actors. We urge human rights advocates and representatives of the USA, the European Union, and others to demand that Vietnam implement the concrete actions that are clearly stated in CAT’s Concluding Observations in the Initial Report of Viet Nam of 208 and to follow up on the UPR recommendations that Vietnam accepted in 2019.

  We also urge the authorities to accept visits by the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, as well as visits by states’ consular representatives to conduct investigations of prison conditions in multiple locations.

  Civic space in Vietnam is rated ‘closed’by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with The 88 Project through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@The88Project on Twitter.

• VIETNAM: ‘The government hates losing face and has zero tolerance for criticism’

  
  CIVICUS speaks about recent arrests of leading environmental activists in Vietnam with Penelope Faulkner, President of Quê Me: Vietnam Committee on Human Rights (VCHR). The crackdown came just months after the Vietnamese government signed a deal to receive billions of dollars of international aid to tackle climate change, partly on the condition that it would involve grassroots activists in the effort.

  VCHR is a civil society organisation (CSO) founded in Paris in 1975 to promote and defend civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights in Vietnam. Working closely with other CSOs, it monitors human rights abuses, informs international opinion through reports and press alerts and mobilises international support for human rights and the release of prisoners of conscience in Vietnam.

  Has the situation of Vietnamese climate activists improved following the deal signed by the government to receive international aid to tackle climate change?

  The jailing of prominent climate activist Hòang Thị Minh Hồng on bogus charges of tax evasion answers your question. Hòang Thị Minh Hồng is founder and former CEO of CHANGE, a CSO that advocates for action on climate change, the environment and wildlife protection. She is a high-profile environmental activist and former Obama Foundation scholar, and was listed by Forbes magazine in 2019 as one of the 50 most influential women in Vietnam. She was forced to close CHANGE in 2022 in the wake of the arrests of other environmental rights activists, after being harassed by the government.

  Her arrest therefore came as a shock, but not a surprise. Her arrest is eminently political, because she has access to a high-level audience in the global environmental community, and her actions and international appeals have a strong influence on the movement for climate change worldwide.

  Hòang Thị Minh Hồng was arrested in June 2023. The Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) was signed in late 2022. To secure this US$15.5 billion deal, Vietnam pledged to involve civil society in accelerating the country’s shift from coal to renewable energy. Yet six months later, they broke this pledge, and the crackdown continues.

  Just this month, Vietnam arrested another prominent environmental rights defender, Ngô Thị Tố Liên, executive director of the Vietnam Initiative for Energy Transition. It is still unclear what charges she faces, but the trumped-up charge of tax evasion is a predictable option. At the time of her arrest, her organisation was working with the United Nations (UN) Development Programme to help implement the JETP.

  Ms Tố Liên is the seventh high-profile environmental rights defender arrested since the government launched this crackdown in June 2021. Vietnam clearly has no political will to respect its international commitments, and the repression of grassroots activists is bound to continue.

  Why is the Vietnamese government cracking down on the grassroots climate movement?

  Up until now, government repression had largely been targeted at political and religious dissidents, human rights defenders and activists calling for freedom and political reforms. Vietnam uses political repression, threats, harassment, arrests and detention under vaguely worded ‘national security’ provisions in the Criminal Code to crack down ruthlessly on bloggers, journalists, followers of non-recognised religious groups, people who participate in demonstrations and civil society activists from all walks of life. At least 200 prisoners of conscience are languishing in Vietnam’s prisons today, some serving sentences of up to 20 years in extremely harsh conditions.

  Until recently, the Vietnamese government did not perceive environmental rights defenders as a threat. On the contrary, the authorities have benefited massively from the diverse activities of Vietnamese associations in the fields of development and environmental protection, as well as from the substantial contributions of international CSOs working in Vietnam. In a recent report published in official media, Vietnam said it had received over US$677 million from international environmental CSOs between 2020 and 2022.

  Two elements drastically changed this: the ratification of the European Union (EU)-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA), which came into force in August 2020, and the impact of the rising global movement to reduce reliance on fossil fuels.

  As in all EU free trade agreements, EVFTA provides for a civil society pillar to monitor implementation of the chapter on trade and sustainable development, which includes environmental issues and labour rights. The pillar consists of two domestic advisory groups (DAGs), one in the EU and one in Vietnam.

  Mai Phan Lợi and Bạch Hùng Dương, leaders of the Centre for Media Educating Community, and lawyer Đặng Đình Bách, chair of the Law and Policy of Sustainable Development Research Centre, were Steering Committee members of VNGO-EVFTA, a civil society network created in Vietnam to raise awareness about EVFTA and encourage participation in the Vietnamese DAG. As such, they actively promoted the independent role of civil society in the monitoring process.

  These actions put them at odds with the government, whose intent was to maintain the Vietnamese DAG under tight state control. In June 2022, the three men were arrested and sentenced to terms of 30 months to five years in prison for alleged tax evasion. On 10 September 2023, just one day before US President Joe Biden’s visit to Vietnam, Mai Phan Lợi was given early release. But Đặng Đình Bách, who has refused to plead guilty or repay any alleged tax demands, is serving a five-year sentence in Prison No. 6 in Nghe An, where conditions are extremely harsh.

  How did the global movement against fossil fuels become a factor in the crackdown?

  The Vietnamese government hates losing face. It tolerates activists when they support government development programmes but has zero tolerance for criticism, especially in the international arena. And the ‘crime’ of this new generation of climate change activists in the eyes of the Vietnamese government is to speak out openly to advocate for cleaner energy policies in Vietnam.

  Đặng Đình Bách joined 353 CSOs from 58 countries in signing a letter to  the G7 Summit calling on world leaders to ‘stop all fuel finance from bilateral and multilateral funding sources, and encourage other governments to do the same’. Award-winning environmentalist Ngụy Thị Khanh, who was also sentenced to two years in prison for tax evasion in June 2022, had written to the government to denounce the disconnect between Vietnam’s international pledges to reduce carbon emissions and the Communist Party’s Power Development Plan aimed at building 27 new coal-fired power plants between 2021 and 2030. She also signed the Hanoi Declaration alongside other CSOs calling on the government to ‘guarantee implementation of provisions in the 2013 Constitution and related texts concerning grassroots democracy, which require consultations with the people and people’s representatives on energy projects from the very moment of their conception’.

  For Vietnam, these high-level public declarations are tantamount to threats against national security, and the authorities decided to silence their voices by any means. To avoid international condemnation, instead of charging them under national security laws, it has resorted to the old pretext of tax evasion charges, using loopholes and vague wording in tax laws to silence environmental rights defenders.

  Our organisation, VCHR, was among the first to denounce this crackdown on environmental rights defenders, which we see as the tip of the iceberg in a new and far-reaching assault on civil society, and we continue to denounce this at every opportunity. This month we presented the human rights situation in Vietnam at a meeting of the EU DAG in Brussels.

  How much space for civil society is there in Vietnam?

  In Vietnam’s one-party state, the space for civil society has always been restricted. However, in recent years the authorities have developed a whole range of tools, including new laws, technologies and repressive methods to stifle civil society voices.

  Despite government censorship, the internet used to provide a vital space for civil society, but the Cybersecurity Law and other regulations have seriously affected freedom of expression online. One prominent blogger, Nguyễn Anh Tuấn, recently left Vietnam to live in Canada because since the Cybersecurity Law came into force in 2019 he had found it impossible to continue any meaningful activism.

  To suppress protests, the government has set up squads of anti-riot police all over the country who are ready to intervene at a local level to nip protests in the bud and prevent them gaining momentum.

  New regulations have been enacted to limit CSO access to international funding and ban them organising conferences on topics such as human rights. We have documented these, and many other developments, in a recent report we published jointly with the International Federation for Human Rights. Despite these difficulties, civil society activists keep on. They are extremely brave and resilient. I admire them immensely.

  These restrictions also make it extremely difficult for CSOs such as VCHR, based in Paris, to support activists in Vietnam. We stay in contact with movements in Vietnam and circulate information in Vietnamese. VCHR has also conducted in-country human rights training, notably on freedom of religion or belief for the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam’s youth movement. However, the responsibility of supporting activists without putting them in danger is extremely heavy, and this work is getting increasingly difficult. I can happily say that no one was ever arrested because of VCHR’s training or other programmes, and this was thanks to the trust and confidence built over many years working in Vietnam.

  What international support does Vietnamese civil society need?

  The international community should do far more to denounce Vietnam’s repressive policies and practices. As a human rights defender for many decades, I am always surprised how Vietnam manages to escape condemnation for human rights abuses that would cause outcry if they happened in China, Myanmar or elsewhere. Political prisoners are dying in Vietnam due to ill-treatment and lack of medical care. Journalists and bloggers are serving 10 or 15-year sentences simply for exchanging emails. Now environmental activists are being imprisoned for trying to create a cleaner environment for their people. Yet at the same time, the UN Secretary-General applauds Vietnam at the UN General Assembly as a shining example of a country committed to climate change. How can this be?

  Economic pressure should be applied when Vietnam fails to uphold its commitments. The JETP should be blocked until Vietnam releases all environmental rights defenders, ceases the current crackdown and guarantees the involvement of civil society in this process. Countries with bilateral trade agreements should use them to press for human rights progress in Vietnam. So much can be done. VCHR is doing its best to amplify the voices of activists in Vietnam and engage in international advocacy to call for greater pressure from the international community. It is a long and hard path, but I believe that in the long run, as the song goes, we shall overcome.

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  Get in touch withVCHRthrough itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@vchr2016 on Twitter.

  Civic space in Vietnam is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

• VIETNAM: ‘The government is using non-state actors against minority religions’

  CIVICUS speaks with Thang Nguyen of Boat People SOS (BPSOS), a civil society organisation based in the USA and Thailand, about the challenges for civil society and religious minorities in Vietnam, and about their work to enable civil society responses.

  Can you tell us about BPSOS and the work it does?

  I’m currently the CEO and President of BPSOS, having joined initially as a volunteer. BPSOS was founded in 1980. We have two major divisions. The first, our domestic programme, is about serving refugees and migrants in the USA, across six locations. Second, we have our international initiatives, run from our regional headquarters in Bangkok, Thailand.

  In Bangkok, we provide a legal clinic to help refugees and asylum seekers with their asylum claims and with protection – not only those coming from Vietnam but also from other countries, including Cambodia, China, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. We have a programme to help Vietnamese human rights defenders at risk, whether they be in prison or in hiding in Vietnam or seeking refuge in Thailand or elsewhere. A major component is to build capacity for civil society in Vietnam at the community level. Finally, we have a religious freedom project, working with local, regional and global partners, to build up a network for advocates for freedom of religion or belief in South East Asia. We hold an annual conference, the Southeast Asia Freedom of Religion or Belief Conference (SEAFORB).

  What are the key current challenges experienced by civil society in Vietnam?

  The regime is still very oppressive. The government has heavy-handed policies against people coming together to form their own associations, which make it hard for organised civil society to develop. The government is now somewhat more tolerant with individuals speaking out, or perhaps it is that the government struggles to control expression on social media to the same extent.

  Another challenge comes with the people themselves. Living in a closed society, they don’t have many opportunities to develop the necessary skills or experience to come together and form associations.

  Further, there’s very little commitment or investment from the international community to develop civil society in Vietnam, compared for example to Cambodia or Myanmar. There are very few organisations from outside Vietnam that work hand in hand with groups in Vietnam to help them develop capacity to implement programmes.

  Because of this, there are very few truly functional independent civil society organisations in Vietnam and the number of these has decreased over the last five years because they cannot sustain themselves in the face of interference from the government. There are only individual human rights defenders, some of them well-known, but not organised civil society.

  In contrast, there are tens of thousands of government-owned ‘non-governmental’ organisations (GONGOs) that are controlled by the Communist Party. They present themselves as the civil society of Vietnam.

  What are the challenges minority groups face in Vietnam, particularly religious minorities?

  Many of the minority groups are indigenous peoples, but the government of Vietnam does not recognise them as such; it only classes them as ethnic minorities. They therefore face a fight for the right to be recognised as indigenous people. They are often separated from their ancestral land.

  For many groups, a religion that is a minority belief in Vietnam is part of their social and cultural makeup. For example, the Cham are Muslim and the Khmer Krom are Theravada Buddhists, which is very different from the Mahayana Buddhism practised by the majority of Vietnamese Buddhists. Then there are the Hmong and the Montagnards: Christianity has spread among the Montagnards for decades, and the government wants to control and stop this. Since the early 1980s, Christianity also started to develop in the Northwest Region among the Hmong population. The government of Vietnam viewed this as an undesirable influence from the west, and therefore it has taken drastic messages to stop its further spreading in the Northwest and Central Highlands regions.

  Most of these groups of people are located remotely and so don’t have access to the internet, and don’t know how to attract resources, even from within Vietnam. Other people in Vietnam aren’t aware of the situation, let alone the international community. Little information is available about these groups.

  The government authorities are directly suppressing independent house churches. In the Central Highlands, thousands of house churches have been closed, set on fire and destroyed. In 2004 the government issued an ordinance on belief and religion, meaning that house churches have to be registered. There are credible reports that the government trained a lot of its own people to become pastors, and they have set up new churches allowed by the government. These are run and controlled by the government.

  A major challenge is the forced renunciation of faith. Christians have been ordered to leave their parish churches and told not to follow any religion, or to join a government-controlled church. People who have resisted joining government-controlled churches have been harassed, persecuted and tortured. Several deaths in police custody have been documented. There are quite a lot of religious prisoners of conscience, many of them Montagnard Christians.

  The repression of the Hmong is even more drastic. In many parts of Northwest Region, Hmong Christians who have refused to renounce their faith have been evicted from their villages by the local authorities. Their villages have been declared as Christian-free zones. Tens of thousands of Hmong have been affected, something that continues to this day. They became itinerant, and it has taken them many years to coalesce into new communities, usually in previously uninhabited areas unknown to local government. Many moved to the Central Highlands. They are completely undocumented and so have become functionally stateless. They live outside society. Married people are not issued with marriage certificates, babies do not get birth certificates, children can’t formally receive education – although some slip into school unofficially – and people can’t get legal employment, set up a business, or open a bank account. They are restricted in their travel: pastors can’t travel into these communities, while they cannot travel to worship elsewhere.

  In many provinces Catholics, even when they are part of the major ethnic groups, have been persecuted by the government. And then there is the Cao Dai religion, a minority religion with about five million reported followers, although the government only recognises around 1.2 million Cao Daiists. Its church structures were disbanded in 1978. In 1997 the government created a new Cao Dai sect, and then 10 years later turned this into a new religion with a similar name and transferred all the property of the Cao Dai religion to it. To the world the government presents this sect as the representative of the Cao Dai religion.

  The government is also using non-state actors against minority religions. In Nghe An Province, the authorities use organised mobs known as Red Flag Associations, which are supported and encouraged by local authorities to attack churches and beat up parishioners. We have had several reports of this.

  What steps are needed to help civil society respond to these rights violations?

  Because of the restriction of organised civil society there’s very little response to the suppression of religious minorities. This lack of organised civil society also makes it difficult to foster partnerships between civil society groups in Vietnam and international human rights organisations. In response, we are trying to build community capacity to develop organisations in Vietnam to protect rights.

  We train a lot of people in Vietnam to know how to report human rights violations. So far we’ve trained about a thousand local rapporteurs and they have generated about 200 different reports that have been submitted to various United Nations (UN) special procedures and UN bodies, and shared with other governments and international human rights organisations to raise awareness of the situation in Vietnam.

  We are helping to form community-based CSOs in each minority community. So far there are about 20 of these, and we aim to have 100 by the end of 2020. We have incubated a number of CSOs specialising in different aspects of human rights, based on the international commitments Vietnam has made as a result of signing various conventions. For example, we have supported the creation and development of Vietnamese Women for Human Rights, the Vietnam Coalition Against Torture and the Vietnam Freedom of Religion or Belief Roundtable. We have worked with Montagnard people to form a CSO specialising in Montagnard minorities. Now we are connecting these specialist CSOs with their peers outside Vietnam. For instance Vietnamese Women for Human Rights is now a member of FORUM-ASIA, a network of human rights organisations throughout Asia and the Pacific. We are cultivating these kinds of partnerships.

  What more support is needed?

  Once CSOs in Vietnam have developed some capacity, there is a need to connect them with civil society outside Vietnam. We are advocating for organisations to offer internship and fellowship schemes to enable staff to develop skills, experience, connections and exposure outside Vietnam.

  We hope to see more projects geared at further developing civil society in Vietnam, through training, coaching and technical assistance as well as advocacy. There has been an almost complete lack of this kind of investment from civil society worldwide. Organisations are issuing statements about Vietnam and that is appreciated, but this is the next step needed. Amnesty International now has a Vietnamese national working on Vietnam, who was with BPSOS before, so this is a positive step and a model to replicate.

  It would be much more effective if international human rights organisations working on Vietnam could coordinate among themselves, and with groups within Vietnam. For instance, a joint advocacy project on the functionally stateless Montagnard Christians, with pressure coming from multiple directions, would help.

  Civic space in Vietnam is rated as ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with BSPOS through itswebsite orFacebook page and follow@BoatPeopleSOS on Twitter.

• Why Trump, Brexit and populism could be an opportunity

  By Danny Sriskandarajah

  Many of the business and political leaders gathering in Davos this week will be focused on how to protect the global economic order - and their interests - after a year of major political and social upheavals. That is the last thing they should be doing. For me, the greatest lesson from 2016 is that we need to build new mechanisms for airing political grievances and addressing economic frustrations.

  Read on: Huffington Post

• With mentoring and incentives, CSOs venture into raising key resources and support at home

  FRENCH

  By Yessenia Soto, Community Engagement Officer on Civil Society Resourcing, CIVICUS

  

  The Change the Game Academy provides classroom training on local fundraising to CSOs.

  It’s something that many in the development and civil society sector have been painfully aware of for several years now. But the reality is hitting home harder than ever.

  Official Development Assistance (ODA) – government aid designed primarily to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries – is steadily decreasing. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development recently announced that ODA fell almost 3% from 2017, with even larger reductions for developing countries. As foreign aid has long been a significant source of funding for southern CSOs, this news reminds us that civil society can’t rely on it in the long term, so, those who haven’t started diversifying their resource base, should do it now.

  “There will be an end to foreign funding, at least as we now know it,” said Robert Wiggers, manager of programs and policy development at the Dutch Wilde Ganzen Foundation (WGF), during one of several panels about the financial sustainability of civil society held at the International Civil Society Week convened in Serbia from April 8-12. At ICSW, various organizations shared why and, most importantly, how CSOs can leverage more support, money and other resources in their own countries and communities to face financial pressures and gradually lessen dependence on ODA and other foreign aid.

  “This is more than a funding alternative, highlighted Wiggers. “CSOs that mobilise their own resources locally get closer to their communities and the people they serve, gain independence from donors, have more control of their own development and feel even more empowered to hold their governments accountable.”

  There is a wide consensus about the power of local resources to boost the financial sustainability, legitimacy, ownership and independence of CSOs. Even in a world with endless supplies of international assistance, weaning civil society off it should be the goal. But how can a small community organisation or one that has always relied on foreign aid start fundraising “at home” and on their own?

  Agencies, associations, and foundations like the WGF are providing special training, mentoring sessions, online learning platforms, campaigning support and even dedicated grants to prepare CSOs for this journey. And the results are encouraging.

  For example, the WGF partnered with the Smile Foundation from India, the Kenya Development Foundation and Brazil’s CESE, to create the Change the Game Academy, an innovative blended-learning program specially designed for civil society organisations that provides both online and classroom training on local fundraising, lobby and advocacy to hold governments and duty bearers accountable through civic participation.

  The classroom training is delivered in a total of six months by local certified trainers. It includes individual coaching sessions to implement a fundraising plan and uses materials adapted to country contexts. The online platform contains 11 interactive modules of e-learning available in four languages, plus 40 toolkits and 88 inspiring success stories, all freely accessible and free of charge.  

  More than 800 small NGOs and community based organisations have been trained through the Change the Game Academy in fourteen low- and middle-income countries. They intend to implement this initiative in four more countries this year.

  In the Balkans, there is a similar initiative called the Sustainability Academy, created by the SIGN Network, a group of indigenous grantmakers who support the sustainable development of local communities and civil society. This academy focuses mostly on CSOs at a grassroots level, which have an annual budget of less than 10,000 euros, on average.

  Their training program covers strategic planning, financial sustainability, networking, local fundraising techniques and campaign development, and is delivered in three modules over six months. At the end of the third module, the organisations receive small technical grants to implement their fundraising campaigns for four to six months. When the campaign is over and they meet their goal, the SIGN Network provides 100% matching grants.

  “We have had very successful examples where, through our training and accompaniment, small organisations managed to fundraise even half of their annual budget and developed relationships with many local donors,” said Biljana Dakic, director of the Trag Foundation, a SIGN network member. “And most of them consolidated their causes and work in their communities, which brings invaluable support.”

  Since 2014, the Sustainability Academy has supported over 100 CSOs in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro.

  CISU - Civil Society in Development, an association of Danish CSOs with members engaged in development work in Asia, Africa and Latin America, is also providing knowledge, training tools and assistance for local resource mobilisation in these regions. Additionally, they offer a co-funding modality through which the local CSOs can access 4-year grants if they leverage a small percentage of the total grant, explained Souad Bourrid, advisor at CISU.

  Together, these opportunities have been key to reducing the initial resistance and fear that keep some organisations from exploring and testing new resourcing avenues.

  “Many organisations still think that the only way to get funds is applying for donor grants. So, when we approach them about leveraging local support, they are skeptic and don’t believe is possible. But those who receive the training and try it, see how many more doors open to them and end up very thankful for the push,” emphasized Bourrid.

  Besides strengthening skills, many civil society networks and coalitions (including CIVICUS) around the world are also advocating the need to create or improve other crucial conditions for facilitating the mobilisation of domestic resources for civil society, including legal frameworks and incentives for local philanthropy, establishing alliances with the public and private sector, and promoting policies to support the financial sustainability of CSOs.

• Women’s bodies are the battleground for civil liberties

  By Teldah Mawarire and Sara Brandt

  Around the world, civic spaces are shrinking. In many countries, activists are under threat as governments increasingly use the law and violence as tools of oppression, according to a new report. For women human rights defenders, this means their bodies have become the battleground on which the fight for civil liberties is being waged.

  Read on:Mail and Guardian: Bhekisisa

   

• WOMEN’S RIGHTS: ‘Violence against women is a global crisis that needs urgent attention’

  

  CIVICUS speaks about civil society’s role in the fight against gender-based violence with Lina AbiRafeh, a feminist activist, women’s rights expert and Senior Advisor for Global Women’s Rights at the Arab Institute for Women at the Lebanese American University, where she served as Executive Director for seven years.

  How big a problem is violence against women(VAW)at the global level? 

  VAW is a muchbigger global problem than we tend to imagine:statistics showone in everythree women and girls will experience violence in their lifetime. The fact so many women and girls are denied the right tolivefreely without facing restrictions and danger makes this a global crisis that needs urgent attention. I personally do not know a woman who has not been affected by some form of this insidious violence. Women have the right to feel free and safe in their own bodies, at home, in the streets and in any public spaces, but unfortunately that is not–and has never been – theirreality.

  VAWis a human rights violation thatis embedded in our culture– andwomenare often silenced when they try to speakup.Women-led organisationsand women’s rights groups and movementsmust be supported because they are the voice of these women and girls who are silenced. They are the voice ofallwomen and girls.

  Having worked to endVAW around the worldfor 25 years, I knowthis is a very hard problem to crack. VAW stems from a global context of gender inequality where women and girls are viewed as less than men, as second-class citizens. There is lack of awarenessin our societies and lack of political willamong our leaders.Existing laws don’t enable women to access justice, security, services, orsupport.Nothing works the way itshouldto put an end to this violence.

  Women and girls remain unequal across every aspect of their lives – politics, economy, health, education and the law. Women and girls are the majority of the world’s poor.They are the majority of those who are illiterate. But they are a minority, an exception, and treated like an anomaly in every aspect of leadership and decision-making. Wage gaps are wide, and women are too often relegatedto the informal sector. And they continue to bear the burden of unpaid care. In too many countries, womenface discriminatory laws that refuse to recognisethem as equals with men.

  How much progress has been achievedso far?

  Women and girlsaround the worldstill do not have the opportunity to participate fully inevery aspect ofsocial, economic and political life, despite their right to do so.Wehave made progress, butnot enough.

  Although advances have been made in trying to reduceVAW, cases continue, and are often perpetrated with impunity.

  In many countries, women are being stripped of theirsexual and reproductive rights, compromising their health and denying theirright to decide about their own bodies and lives. In addition,the problem of girl-child marriagecontinues, and increased as a result of COVID-19, with12 million girlsunder 18 being married offevery year.Forthis and other forms ofVAW, rhetoric doesn’t match reality. There is more talk than action.

  Women-led organisationsmustbe involved in policydecisions– and be given full leadership.There is a lot of talk about localisation,but this seems to just be a buzzwordas most women’s rights and feminist organisations aremarginalised andunderfunded.This only sets them up for failure because it limits the scope of their work, keeping the support they offer out of reach for the majority of women and girls. We need to fund these organisations fully, andnot with thetypicalshort-term quick-fix project funding but with long-term, unrestricted, open-ended funding thatcan allow them to function and flourish. Local groupsshoulddictate the agenda, not the donors who are holding the strings.

  What work do you do to contribute topositive change? 

  I am committed to building a better world for women. I am a global women’s rights activist, author and speaker with decades of experience worldwide. 

  I worked for over 20 years as a humanitarian aid worker in contexts such as Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Haiti and Papua New Guinea.I now work independently, advising organisations and companies to enhance their engagement with women’s rights and gender equality. I also serve as the Senior Advisor for Global Women’s Rights at theArab Institute for Women at the Lebanese American University, where I was Executive Director until 2022.I am also the founder ofYalla, Feminists!, an online space and open platform dedicated to amplifying women’s voices worldwide.

  I was honoured to be able to share my passion and experience in ending VAW on global stages including aTEDx talk, a Women DeliverPowerTalk and akeynote address for Swedish International Development Agency annual meeting, among others.

  I’ve written two books:Gender and International Aid in Afghanistan andFreedom on the Frontlines. My next book outlines 50 years of Arab feminism and will be published in early 2023. I will keep using my voice in whatever ways I can to fight for women’s rights and remedy inequalities. That’s why I speak andpublish everywhere I can and I serve on the board of numerous global women’s rights organisations.

  What good practicesshould be implemented to prevent VAW?

  We need to start believing survivors so that perpetrators can be brought to justice.When women see the law is on their side, more willbe encouragedto speakup. Wealsoneed to make sure that survivorshave access to the full range of services and support, and security systems handle their cases with care.

  There is also a need to reform education so that more people are taught aboutVAW, consent, human rights and women’s rights – from a very young age.Education canbring us a step closer to defeating thisscourge. We need men to step up to support women and speak up against perpetrators.And yes, we need data, but not at the expense of action. Anyway, data will always underestimate the reality. And what we know is that no country is immune. This affects women and girls everywhere, in every culture and context and community.

  Get in touch with Lina AbiRafeh through herwebsite or herMedium blog, and follow@LinaAbiRafeh on Twitter.

• Worldwide attack on rights: over three billion people living in countries where civic freedoms are violated

  French | Spanish

  • Global impact laid bare by the CIVICUS Monitor, a new online research tool that rates civic space around the world and documents violations of rights
  • Governments shutting down civic space and shutting up dissenting voices

  Johannesburg, 24 October 2016 –More than three billion people live in countries where the rights to protest, organize and speak out are currently being violated according to the CIVICUS Monitor, the first-ever online tool to track and compare civic freedoms on a global scale.

  The new tool, launched in beta today by the global civil society alliance CIVICUS, rates countries based on how well they uphold the three fundamental rights that enable people to act collectively and make change: freedom of association, freedom of peaceful assembly, and freedom of expression.

• Worrying legislation to restrict Nigerian civil society sector underway

  CIVICUS, the global civil society alliance and the Nigeria Network of NGOs (NNNGO) are deeply concerned about impending legislation to restrict freedom of association in Nigeria.

  Nigeria’s National Assembly is currently considering a bill to provide for “the establishment of the Non-Governmental Organisations Regulatory Commission for the Supervision, Coordination and Monitoring of Non-Governmental Organisations, Civil Society Organisations etc. in Nigeria and for related matters.” First introduced in July 2016, the bill has since passed through the second reading in the House of Representatives. The bill has now been referred to the Committee on CSOs and Development Partners for further legislative input.

  “The bill is in conflict with Nigeria’s Constitutional and international law obligations,” says Oyebisi Oluseyi, Executive Director of NNNGO. “We must instead strengthen civic space in Nigeria, as our sector’s role in finding solutions to the enormous challenges facing our nation cannot be overemphasized”.

• YEMEN: ‘We are caught in limbo, neither at war nor at peace, with state institutions nearly collapsed’

  CIVICUS speaks about Yemen’s ongoing conflict and humanitarian crisis withRadhya Almutawakel, co-founder and chairperson of Mwatana for Human Rights (Mwatana).

  Founded in 2007, Mwatana is a Yemeni civil society organisation (CSO) that advocates for humanrights, documentsviolations, creates awareness and provides legal support to victims.

  What’s the current situation in Yemen, and what are the prospects of the conflict being resolved in the near future?

  First, it’s crucial to note that the conflict in Yemen goes beyond a mere civil war, as it spans three distinct dimensions: local, regional and international. It started in 2014 when the Ansar Allah (Houthi) armed group seized control of Sana’a, the capital, and escalated with the intervention of a Saudi-led coalition in 2015. The ongoing conflict has been marked by relentless intensity and violations of international humanitarian law such as aggressive actions targeting civilians and critical infrastructure, resulting in what is now recognised as the world’s most severe humanitarian crisis.

  Since the ceasefire agreement in April 2022, direct military operations have ceased, providing temporary relief for civilians. While movement between specific Yemeni governorates and cities has improved, the country is caught in a state of limbo, neither at war nor at peace, grappling with the near-total collapse of state institutions. A significant proportion of public sector workers hasn’t been paid their salaries since 2016. Various armed groups control extensive territories, exacerbating the severe economic crisis and food insecurity. These are the primary challenges in Yemen’s humanitarian crisis.

  Despite the ceasefire, numerous human rights violations continue to be perpetrated by various parties to the conflict. Since late 2022, Oman has mediated the ongoing negotiations between the Houthi group and Saudi Arabia. Throughout 2023, reciprocal visits between both parties have taken place in Sana’a and the Saudi capital Riyadh with recent reports suggesting progress in negotiations that may lead to the resolution of this decade-long conflict.

  How has the war impacted on civilians?

  Throughout the years-long war, civilians in Yemen have faced two types of profound impacts. First, as direct victims. Thousands of civilians have been killed and many more have been injured. Civilian infrastructure has been destroyed, including schools, hospitals, bridges, historical and archaeological sites, farms, water and food sources and civil service structures.

  People have also been indirect victims: as the economy collapsed, hundreds of thousands lost their sources of income. Parties to the war enforced widespread starvation, landmines were planted, thousands of children were recruited to fight and public freedoms gained over decades of pre-war struggle, including women’s rights, have regressed. Minorities have faced persecution, and the conflict has had extensive economic, social and political ramifications.

  What role has Yemeni civil society, including Mwatana, played since the beginning of the conflict?

  Yemeni CSOs have been crucial partners of international institutions in implementing humanitarian response plans across different regions during years of conflict. Their programmes and interventions have addressed the needs of many vulnerable groups, bridging gaps deepened by the war.

  Both local and international civil society have successfully reshaped the global narrative of the war, shifting the focus from the perspectives of conflict parties to amplifying the voices of victims and shedding light on the humanitarian and human rights tragedy. They’ve actively advocated for the establishment of an international mechanism to investigate violations committed by all parties to the war. Human rights organisations have monitored and documented violations and advocated for criminal accountability.

  Mwatana for Human Rights monitors and documents human rights violations in Yemen through extensive field investigative research aimed at gathering precise information, evidence and testimonies to establish the facts and the identities of victims and perpetrators. We also provide legal support to victims of arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances and torture.

  We are currently documenting the plight of refugees and internally displaced people and the violations they’ve endured from various conflict parties. The challenges faced by hundreds of thousands of refugees in temporary shelters underline the critical need for peace efforts to prioritise the safe return of forcibly displaced people to their homes and communities.

  Mwatana’s mission extends to raising awareness and fostering a culture supportive of human rights through positive engagement with the public on social media platforms. We are actively involved in constructive dialogue with influential stakeholders to address the human rights challenges in Yemen through local and international advocacy mechanisms.

  How is Mwatana working to hold perpetrators accountable?

  We have a specialised unit dedicated to seeking justice, reparations and accountability for victims of rights violations. The judicial system has structural, technical and integrity challenges, including corruption and inability to ensure fair trials. As a result, civilian victims have endured widespread impunity.

  Even though Yemen isn’t a party to the Rome Statute and therefore falls outside the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Mwatana has been gathering evidence to ensure justice for all victims and accountability for all violators.

  First, we conduct comprehensive research and organise workshops and meetings with legal experts, academic institutions and experienced entities to explore available avenues for holding perpetrators accountable, including through international and United Nations (UN) mechanisms and the limited investigative procedures initiated by the conflict parties.

  Second, we collaborate with the international community to enhance accountability within international legal frameworks. Along with the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) and other partners, Mwatana submitted a file to the ICC. Further, in collaboration with the ECCHR and the Italian Network for Peace and Disarmament, we filed a complaint with the Italian Prosecutor and the European Court of Human Rights. Additionally, in coordination with Amnesty International, the ECCHR and Sherpa, we submitted a file to the French prosecutor. We also filed a legal intervention in the administrative case brought by the Campaign Against Arms Trade before the British judiciary. There are ongoing efforts to build cases in other countries.

  Third, we’ve actively engaged with UN mechanisms through the submission of shadow reports on Yemen and Saudi Arabia to the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review process and UN treaty bodies, namely the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Committee Against Torture. We also provide written and oral briefings to various UN Special Rapporteurs and special procedures mandate holders.

  Finally, we undertake a range of actions to directly pressure violating parties and relevant bodies. We conduct workshops and discussions on accountability, reparations and truth-telling, drawing upon experiences from other countries. We have released a report on reparation mechanisms, and we plan to issue another in 2024 on viable criminal accountability options. These aim to establish informed foundations for future transitional justice in Yemen.

  What should the international community do to address the crisis and support Yemeni civil society?

  The international community’s response to the Yemen crisis has been weak and restricted due to conflicting interests with the involved parties, ranging from economic concerns and political alliances to arms trade deals. As a result, the conflict and numerous rights violations persist without any robust international action being taken. To address this, the international community must intensify efforts for a human-rights-secure settlement, enhancing the role of civil society and upholding the rule of law, justice and mechanisms for a transition to democracy.

  This requires the allocation of larger resources for civil society programmes and expansion of CSOs’ activities to extend their sphere of influence. Increased financial support is also needed to build capacity and ensure the continuity of CSO operations. It’s crucial that substantial resources are invested to support the work of local civil society in the upcoming period so that we are able to contribute to peace efforts effectively.

  Beyond financial aid, it’s important to endorse the work of Yemeni CSOs on the ground. The international community should exert pressure on all conflict parties to remove any impediments that hinder the efforts of CSOs, such as annual work permit barriers. Standing by civil society while it’s facing retaliation, defamation and smear campaigns for its work and stances is an essential part of expressing international solidarity.

  ---

  Civic space in Yemen is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Mwatana through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@MwatanaEn and@RAlmutawakel on Twitter.

• ZAMBIA: ‘Electoral practices seen so far do not indicate good lessons for the region’

  CIVICUS speaks to McDonald Chipenzi, Executive Director of the Governance, Elections, Advocacy, Research Services (GEARS) Initiative and Chair of the NGO Council in Zambia, about the state of civic space ahead of the crucial general election being held on 12 August 2021.

  What is the state of civic space and media freedoms ahead of the elections?

  The civic and media space in Zambia remains fragile and has been shrinking due to legal restrictions. This has now been compounded by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and newly crafted rules and guidelines that have heightened restrictions on citizens’ freedom of movement and freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression. This has led to ineffective citizens’ participation in national affairs.

  COVID-19 rules and guidelines have compounded the already delicate and restricted state of the civic, media and political space in Zambia. These restrictions are the result of the selective application of archaic legislation such as the Public Order Act of 1955 and newly enacted laws such as the Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act of 2021, which is aimed at intercepting, monitoring and interfering with citizens’ conversations, correspondence and communications, even without a court order or warrant. This new law, viewed as aimed at shrinking virtual civic space, has instilled fear in citizens, deterring them from effectively engaging online. As a result, many have opted to remain silent or opted out of online platforms such as WhatsApp and Facebook.

  The media space also remains intimidated, harassed and cowed as a result of restrictive laws and the actions of ruling elites. The closure of Prime TV, a private television station, in March 2021, sent a chilling wave through the media community. Most of them now fear hosting critical voices and opposition leaders. They fear losing government advertising and other business opportunities. Those associated with the powers that be also distance themselves from those media houses giving platforms to critical voices.

  What are the main concerns of civil society in the lead up to the elections?

  Civil society’s main concern is the security of all stakeholders, as the police are not committed to providing security to all. The police have been reluctant to deal with the violence perpetuated by ruling party elites and have even been instrumental in it. The fear is that on election day, when some parties feel that they are losing in some polling stations, they may engage in disruptive activities to push for a re-vote, which may give them advantages. Another concern is the possibility of a shutdown of internet, mobile services and social media, especially after the vote, to try to black out results.

  A third concern is the COVID-19 pandemic, which was seen to have the potential to be spread by political parties had they held rallies. According to the Ministry of Health and the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ), rallies were seen as potential superspreading events for COVID-19, and therefore they recommended a ban. This mostly affected the opposition while ruling party officials were busy campaigning in the name of launching and inspecting developmental projects.

  Note that ECZ constituted a task force on COVID-19 to develop guidelines that was dominated by government institutions. Out of 14 institutions represented, nine were in government with only three spaces for the media, and two for civil society organisations in gender and water and sanitation. To prevent violence and keep violence under control if it happens, civil society is engaging with the police, encouraging them to be more professional and ethical, and with political parties to provide leadership to their cadres. 

  Regarding the possibility of a media and internet shutdown, civil society organisations have sent petitions to the President of the Republic to refrain from shutting down the internet or social media during and after the elections. For the purpose of this election, the GEARS Initiative developed what it termed as the “Ing’ombe Ilede strategy” to allow for the collection of election results in an event of an internet shutdown. A common place has been designated for constituency and provincial coordinators involved in the election to share their documents without needing to meet with each other. This strategy is borrowed from the old trade tactics at a place called Ing’ombe Ilede in the Gwembe Valley of Southern Province in Zambia. We feel this strategy will help navigate the possible internet shutdown, which the government has already signalled.

  How is polarisation increasing ahead of the election, and what are the election’s likely impacts on social and political division?

  The election has polarised the country as politicians from the ruling party are now using regionalism and tribalism to win votes from their perceived strongholds. The impact of this will be deep divisions after elections, especially if the ruling party now wins the elections as it will marginalise those they feel did not support them during the elections. Already, the groups or regions perceived as strongholds for the biggest opposition party have been marginalised and discriminated against in terms of development and economic opportunities, including political positions in government.

  Employment and trading opportunities are also a preserve of those perceived to support the ruling party. Markets and bus stations are all in hands of ruling party supporters and not the councils. This has shrunk the civic space for many citizens who survive through trading in markets and bus stations as it has led to them adopting what they have termed the ‘watermelon strategy’, symbolic of a watermelon fruit which is green on the outside (the colour of the ruling party) and red on the inside (the colour of the opposition) in order to survive at these markets, bus stops, stations and taxi ranks. This situation may be escalated should the ruling party retain power.

  What is the state of the economy and how will this influence the choices of voters?

  The state of the Zambian economy is not pleasing but biting to many ordinary people. The local currency, the kwacha, has continued to depreciate against major convertible currencies. The cost of living has quadrupled and the cost of essential commodities is skyrocketing. The poor are barely managing to live while the ruling political elites are sleeping on top of money due to excessive corruption and abuse of state resources in the absence of controls and accountability. The poor eat in order to live rather than live in order to eat. This will have effect in the peri-urban areas of major cities like Lusaka and the Copperbelt towns.

  The rural population, on the other hand, may not be as badly affected by the state of the economy as most of them had harvested good crops during the past rainy seasons and further benefited from a scheme involving social cash transfers targeted at older and vulnerable people, which has now been converted into a campaign tool. In addition, rural voters tend to be conservative and vote for the traditional political parties preferred by their forefathers.

  Zambia has been known as a bastion of democracy in the region. What impact will this election have on democracy both in Zambia and the region?

  This election is key to the unfolding of a unique trend in the region on how elections can and will be handled. If it is handled very poorly and it results in chaos, it has potential to influence the region in a negative way, as the leaders of most Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries tend to copy from each other. This being one of the few elections held in the region during the COVID-19 pandemic after Malawi’s landmark election, Zambia has an opportunity to show the region that it remains the bastion of democracy in SADC.

  However, the practices seen so far do not indicate good lessons for the region. For instance, the cancellation of rallies and other campaign activities, mainly targeted against the opposition while the ruling party and public officials continue to run their campaigns, is a very bad lesson for democracy, fair competition and credible elections. The selective application of the electoral code of conduct by the electoral manager is also a very bad example for the region. Therefore, the region will have to cherry-pick the good lessons from the bad ones. However, most electoral institutions and political leaders are more inclined to cherry-pick the bad lessons and leave the good ones aside, since bad electoral practices benefit incumbents.

  What can regional and global civil society groups do to support Zambian civil society during this period of elections and after?

  Regional and global civil society have a larger role to play to ensure that peace prevails in Zambia and targeted intimidation and harassment of the civil society movement does not occur after elections. There is a need to keep a watchful eye over the post-election events, especially regarding manoeuvres to shrink civic space. With the election a few days away, on 9 August the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Amos Malupenga, issued a statement warning citizens that the government might shut down the internet ahead of the election, a direct threat to the enjoyment of citizens’ online freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression during and after the elections.

  The army and other defence forces besides the police have been deployed on the streets around the country on pretext of quelling any possible political and electoral violence, which can potentially be abused and undermine physical civic space. Therefore, physical and online civic and political space will constantly be under threat from the establishment during and after the elections, as it has been before.

  Civil society and critical media outlets are potential targets of post-election intimidation and harassment, hence the need for global and regional civil society to support civil society in Zambia with strategies to counter the reprisals that may be imposed on them by the state machinery after the elections. If the current government wins, its categorisation, marginalisation and discrimination of civil society organisations according to their real or perceived party affiliation will get worse after the elections.

  There will be need for solidarity strategies and legal funds to help those who may be incriminated and litigated against using archaic laws. There is need to continue challenging the existence of the Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Law, the Public Order Act and the NGO Act. To this end, regional and global civil society needs to support, defend, promote and protect the civic and media space in Zambia before, during and after the elections.

  Civic space in Zambia is rated as ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with GEARS through its Facebook page and follow @GearsZambia on Twitter.

• Zambia: State of Emergency signifies worrying signs for civic space

  The declaration of State of Public Threatened Emergency in Zambia is a glaring indication of plans by the government to increase restrictions on civic space in an effort to consolidate the regime of President Edgar C Lungu, global civil society alliance CIVICUS and the Zambian Council for Social Development (ZCSD) noted today.

• ZIMBABWE: ‘Election violence is a cover for ideological ambivalence and lack of substantive programmes’

  CIVICUS speaks about the general election in Zimbabwe and the role of civil society with Wellington Mbofana, former director ofthe Civic Education Network Trust (CIVNET), a civil society organisation (CSO) that recently shut down due to lack of funding, and a former board member of several Zimbabwean CSOs.

  What was at stake in this election?

  It’s difficult to pinpoint a single crucial issue that was at stake. Over a considerable period, Zimbabwean elections, much like those in other parts of Africa, have ceased to revolve around substantive issues and have instead become centred on political parties and personalities. This trend is evident in this election, in which major political parties failed to present their manifestos in a timely manner. The main opposition party, Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), unveiled its programme merely two weeks prior to voting, while the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) didn’t even bother.

  Given the crumbling state of the economy, reflected in record-breaking unemployment, pervasive economic informality, escalating poverty, the world’s second-highest inflation rate and a sense of hopelessness, economic strife remained the most prominent concern for voters. Ideally, the competition should have revolved around two or three contrasting strategies for addressing these economic woes. However, what we observed was a cloud of obfuscation. The ruling party advanced a narrative that conditions are improving and investors are flocking to the country, but progress would be even greater if it weren’t for sanctions imposed by Western states. The opposition pledged to outperform ZANU-PF across all fronts. But neither specified how they would fund their proposed initiatives.

  To deal with Zimbabwe’s predicament effectively the government would need to confront a range of issues, including land reform and productivity, water shortages, electricity generation, infrastructure development and urbanisation and, most importantly, guarantee the required funding.

  It should have been important to ensure the meaningfulness of this election because when elections fail, civil unrest and coups ensue, a truth that Africa has repeatedly witnessed.

  Was there any election-related violence?

  The prevalence of violence in all its manifestations – physical, structural and cultural – remains an unfortunate hallmark of Zimbabwean elections. Lives have been lost, injuries endured and property destroyed as a result.

  It is also important to note that because of its fractured politics, the country is in a perpetual election mode. Over the past five years, we have had multiple recalls from parliament and local authorities, leading to by-elections. Instances of intra-party violence have also occurred during parliamentary and primary elections. The culture upholding the idea that wielding the strongest fist is the key to ascending to power must change. Violence is a cover for ideological ambivalence and lack of substantive programmes. Who needs a manifesto when you can use force?

  What tactics did the government use to stifle dissent in the run-up to the election?

  The ruling party stands accused of engaging in lawfare, a tactic that uses laws to constrain the opposition and human rights defenders. These efforts are facilitated by an allegedly captured judiciary. A prominent CCC legislator, Job Sikhala, along with other political activists and human rights defenders, languish in remand prisons on spurious allegations after being denied bail.

  The government introduced controversial laws aimed at silencing dissent. The Private Voluntary Organisations Amendment Bill and the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Amendment Act, commonly called the Patriotic Bill, are clearly designed to deal with critics of the government.

  The Patriotic Bill came into force on 14 July 2023. With this bill, the government created a new crime of ‘wilfully injuring the sovereignty and national interest of Zimbabwe’.  The scope and definition of this offence is vague. There are valid concerns that law enforcement agencies will interpret the law broadly and use it to stifle and penalise the work of independent civil society.

  Citizens and permanent residents of Zimbabwe will be found guilty if they participate in meetings aimed at discussing or plotting armed intervention in Zimbabwe, subverting or overthrowing its government and implementing or extending sanctions or trade boycotts against Zimbabwe. A meeting encompasses any form of communication involving two or more people, regardless of whether it takes place offline or online.

  Participating in discussions about armed intervention can result in life imprisonment or the death penalty if the meeting involves planning such an intervention. Discussing subversion or overthrow of the government is punishable by up to 20 years in prison. Taking part in meetings discussing sanctions or trade boycotts can lead to a fine of up to US$12,000 or up to 10 years in prison, or both. Aggravated offences may lead to consequences such as the termination of citizenship for those who are not citizens by birth or descent, cancellation of residence permits for non-citizens and disqualification from voting or holding public office for five to 15 years.

  In the hands of overzealous and partisan law enforcement agents, this punitive law is very dangerous. It seems to target not only the opposition and civil society but also factions within the fractured ruling party and the military. It likely seeks to prevent a recurrence of a military-assisted transition, which brought the current government to power in 2017. That coup was willingly accepted by powerful global players, including the African Union and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which inadvertently endorsed the idea of military change of power.

  How did Zimbabwean civil society engage with the electoral process?

  Civil society was actively involved in electoral activities throughout the electoral cycle. CSOs play a pivotal role in providing voter education, observing elections, advocating for electoral reforms, safeguarding human rights and offering legal, medical and psycho-social assistance to victims of human rights violations.

  Both local and international observers were generally allowed and accredited. However, there were isolated cases, such as the denial of accreditation to Musa Kika, allegedly due to security risks, while some local citizens encountered intimidation, harassment and threats from unidentified people after engaging with international observers.

  But unfortunately, the last couple of years have been very difficult for Zimbabwean. Several CSOs have shut down. CIVNET, a major organisation providing civic education, closed its doors this year due to lack of funding.

  The Zimbabwean economy is too fragile to support a strong civil society, which heavily relies on international donors and solidarity. Further international support should be rendered to all groups promoting development, good governance, human rights, justice and the rule of law. The international community should also amplify local voices and exert pressure on the Zimbabwean government to act in accordance with international human rights and democratic standards.

  What did CIVNET work on?

  CIVNET operated through three main programmes: the Citizen Participation Programme, including two projects on constitutionalism and voter education, the Leadership Development Programme and the Peace Building Programme.

  The Citizen Participation Programme encouraged citizen engagement in governance and development, fostering collaboration between communities and local authorities through participatory workshops and development projects. The Constitution and Constitutionalism Project aimed to raise awareness about the significance of the new constitution and share information on how to use it to exercise human rights and honour obligations as citizens.

  The Leadership Development Programme enhanced leadership skills of people engaged in community projects. Our graduates now lead various Zimbabwean CSOs and work in local authorities and parliament. CIVNET contributed to the formation and development of CSOs such as the Zimbabwe Election Support Network, the Zimbabwe Peace Project and the Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe. It was also a key member of the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGOs Forum.

  The Peace Building Programme helped people and communities divided by conflict to reach out to each other and mend broken relations. This was done through creatively designed workshops that provided security and safety to both victims and perpetrators of violent conflicts. Mediators were also trained to address local disputes, resulting in transformed relationships and improved dialogue within previously divided communities.

  To what extent could the election be called free and fair?

  The concept of free and fair elections involves political freedoms and fair processes prior to elections, culminating in the casting of votes by well-informed eligible voters able to vote freely for candidates and parties of their choice. A transparent tally of all valid votes, accurate result announcements and universal acceptance of the election outcomes by all parties are integral components of this concept.

  Past elections in Zimbabwe have been contested at courts and other institutions. For Zimbabwe to uphold its position within the international community, this election would have to gain universal recognition as credible, legitimate and conducted in a free and fair manner. It would be key to ensure the acceptance of its outcome and secure peace and stability to attract investors.

  The 2023 election was disputed in the legal arena even before a single ballot was cast. This may be a harbinger of future developments. On 12 July, the Electoral Court disqualified a presidential candidate, Savior Kasukuwere, whose participation had been previously permitted by the Nomination Court. Then the High Court disqualified 12 CCC parliamentary candidates, ostensibly for late filings, although the Nomination Court had accepted their submissions. Both decisions favoured the ruling party. However, following an appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s verdict on the 12 CCC candidates, leading to their reinstatement on the ballot. On 19 July the electoral court ruled in favour of a leader of the opposition United Zimbabwe Alliance party, Elizabeth Valerio, whose candidacy had been initially rejected by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), also for alleged untimely filing.

  Declaring the election to be free and fair would be unreasonable given the political environment characterised by violence, intimidation and voter suppression, non-transparent processes with the electoral roll and ballot paper printing, pre-voting by security personnel, biased media coverage, opposition rallies barred by the police, vote buying through handouts, influence from traditional and religious leaders on voters, misuse of government resources for party campaigns and indications that some parties will reject any outcome other than their own victory, implying that the ruling party wouldn’t have handed over power if it had lost. Indeed, SADC decided to abandon the term ‘free and fair’ regarding Zimbabwean elections, instead referring to them as ‘legitimate’.

  What electoral reforms are needed?

  Adherence to rule of law and impartial management of elections is essential. The ZEC should enforce the Electoral Code of Conduct, safeguarding the right for all to express their political views and campaign freely. It must also ensure fairness by curbing the misuse of state resources, preventing intimidation, harassment and destruction of campaign materials and improving voter education.

  The police should fulfil their constitutional duties impartially, without bias, fear, or favour. Political parties should adhere to the Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Candidates. This entails refraining from violence, misuse of public resources for partisan ends, coercion and intimidation of the electorate and inciting violence through hate speech and derogatory language.

  Were there any issues with people being prevented from voting, and what do you expect to happen next?

  A high turnout was to be expected given the high stakes. The economy has done its own campaign, motivating people to participate. The ruling party also mobilised people, especially in rural areas, by any means necessary.

  However, many voters might not have been able to locate their names on the register. The polling station-based system is such that people living in a specific neighbourhood can only vote at a certain polling station. In the 2018 election, a lot of people found their names had been removed from their usual stations without a change having been requested, while others who requested changes after moving to other districts saw those changes unimplemented. Following the election, many constituencies and councils had elected representatives recalled by political parties in power. Since there are no guarantees that this won’t happen again, some people may have been discouraged from voting.

  Based on experience, disputes around results and their resolution by the courts are to be expected. Given that the judiciary is perceived to be captured and judges were given significant ‘housing loans’ before the election, judgements against the opposition are also rightly likely to be perceived as unfair.

  ---

  Civic space in Zimbabwe is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

• ZIMBABWE: ‘This so-called election was a circus and a waste of resources’

  CIVICUS speaks about Zimbabwe’sAugust general election and its aftermath with Obert Masaraure, national president of Amalgamated Rural Teachers Union of Zimbabwe and spokesperson of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, which brings together 84 Zimbabwean civil society organisations (CSOs).

  What was at stake in this election?

  This was an important election. We were expecting both a democratic and an economic breakthrough after years of dictatorship and economic stagnation. Millions of young people are dropping out of school, thousands are dying after failing to secure healthcare and millions are unemployed. We expected change to happen.

  But we were disappointed. Civil society tried to engage with the electoral process and play a monitoring role but was criminalised. Those who were doing voter tabulation were arrested. After the Election Management Board barred civil society groups we had to monitor the electoral process clandestinely. In the run-up to the election we also did a lot of voter education. We managed to generate excitement among voters, but on voting day they were frustrated.

  What’s your assessment of the credibility of the results?

  According to the results announced by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) on 26 August, President Emmerson Mnangagwa of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) received 52.6 per cent of the vote, while the leading opposition candidate, Nelson Chamisa of Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), received 44 per cent. But these results are not credible because the polls were held on a flawed electoral field and the ZEC failed to discharge its duty to run a reasonably free and fair election, as evidenced by multiple acts and omissions.

  First, the ZEC didn’t supply ballot papers or the voter roll in time to many polling stations in the provinces of Bulawayo, Harare and Manicaland, which are traditional opposition strongholds. This was a clear attempt to suppress voters and help the incumbent stay in power.

  The Electoral Act mandates ZEC to display the voter roll at all polling stations 48 hours before the polls open, but most polling stations only received it on election day. This had consequences for the opposition, because in urban areas, where the opposition is stronger, at least 180,000 voters couldn’t find their names at the designated polling stations on election day. Their names had been moved after a shambolic delimitation process but as voter rolls had been unavailable until the last minute, these voters were unable to locate their new polling stations.

  According to a ZEC statement, only 23 per cent of polling stations opened on time in Harare, with 75 per cent doing so in Bulawayo and 85 per cent in Manicaland. Some polling stations in Harare were still waiting for ballot papers as late as 6pm, one hour before closing. In contrast, in the majority of the ruling party’s strongholds, typically in harder-to-reach areas, election materials were received early and all polling places were open at the scheduled time.

  In urban areas there were waiting times of up to 12 hours. Many people were unable to vote within that period and voting had to be extended to 48 hours. In rural areas, where the ruling party is strongest, the maximum waiting period was 30 minutes. Additionally, an estimated 42,000 civil servants who were working as polling officials could not vote after the ZEC refused to facilitate their voting.

  The overall impact of this was to disenfranchise millions of voters and suppress opposition voters while encouraging those of the ruling party.

  There were also lots of fraudulent and deceptive practices. There were cases where local candidates were taken off the ballot, as happened to CCC’s Shepherd Sithole in ward 1 of Bulawayo. A shocking incident was also recorded in which party symbols for ZANU-PF and the CCC were switched, confusing voters and making it impossible to record their actual choice.

  There were reports from at least 50 polling stations in rural areas that the supposedly indelible ink used could easily be washed away. This was suspected to be a deliberate attempt to allow rural voters to vote multiple times to inflate the results for ZANU-PF. The postal ballot mechanism also appeared to be abused for ballot stuffing, as at least 35 polling stations reported receiving more postal ballots than they had voters registered.

  There were numerous instances of intimidation at polling stations. A ZANU-PF affiliate, Forever Associates Zimbabwe (FAZ), set up ‘exit survey tables’ in at least 1,340 polling stations. Individual voters were asked to declare who they had voted for and provide their personal details. FAZ also recorded the serial numbers of voters’ ballot papers and told voters they would be able to tell who they voted for. Needless to say, this intimidated voters who have experienced a long history of serious political violence.

  This was a sham, not an election. It was a circus and a waste of resources that subverted the will of the people and illegally kept the incumbent in power.

  What needs to happen next to bring about democracy in Zimbabwe?

  The Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition has demanded the immediate announcement of a date for a fresh free, fair and credible election. We must put an end to the long history of disputed elections in Zimbabwe and usher in a legitimate government that can lift Zimbabwe up from the category of a pariah state, rebuild its economy and improve the lives of its people.

  Zimbabwe needs an inclusive national dialogue to broker a political settlement leading to credible elections supervised by the Southern African Development Community and the African Union. Zimbabweans should play their role in exerting pressure on the government to force it to agree to dialogue.

  Zimbabwean pro-democracy organisations must be strengthened through international support so that they can play their proper role in a transition to democracy. The international community is also invited to exert pressure so that the government agrees to engage in an inclusive national dialogue. And while it does not, the international community must isolate the country from the family of nations. A dictatorship does not deserve a seat on any international platform.

  Civic space in Zimbabwe is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Obert Masaraure through itsFacebook page and follow@omasaraure on Twitter