democracy

• TUNISIA: ‘The new constitution will guarantee the president extensive powers, enabling further violations’

  CIVICUS speaks about Tunisia’s 25 July constitutional referendum with Amine Ghali, director of Al Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center (KADEM). 

  KADEM is a civil society organisation (CSO) that aims to promote civil society’s contribution to democracy and transitional justice in Tunisia and the wider Middle East and North Africa region, through awareness-raising, capacity-building and documentation.

  Why is President Kais Saied holding a constitutional referendum on 25 July?

  Changing the constitution or revising it is part of the president’s private project – a plan he didn’t announce either when running for the presidency in 2019 or during his first two years in office. This all started with President Saied dismissing the prime minister and suspending parliament in July 2021.

  At that time, he didn’t even announce the revision of the constitution. It was only in mid-December that the president had to spell out a roadmap under international and local pressure. At the heart of Saied’s roadmap is a new constitution.

  Unlike the 2014 constitution, which was based on broad consensus, the process leading to a constitutional referendum didn’t gain public support. When people were asked their opinion on revising the constitution, as part of online consultation organised in early 2022, only around 30 per cent of respondents agreed. Still, the president has gone ahead with the constitutional review process, with a referendum campaign asking Tunisians to vote ‘yes’ to ‘correct the course of the revolution’.

  To what extent has civil society engaged in the process leading to the upcoming referendum?

  Civil society has gone through unprecedented times in recent months. When it comes to its stance on the issue, in broad terms civil society has mostly been either silent or supportive.

  At the start of the president’s July 2021 power grab, some civil society activists who were fed up with problems we have encountered in the past few years, with an inefficient democracy, saw Saied’s move as a political attempt to correct the trajectory of our democracy. One of Saied’s early promises was to fight corruption and bad governance.

  But as soon as the president revealed his intention to change the constitution, political parties, influential people and some civil society groups started to oppose him. 

  Civil society is not one group or in one position – of course there is some diversity. The most vocal and influential groups are critical of him, especially since the planned new constitution was shared with the public; they realised its aim is not to ‘restore democracy’, but rather attack it. Now many are trying to stop the referendum process happening.

  How has civil society organised against the referendum?

  Although civil society’s response is late, they have recently used a range of means to oppose the referendum. Coalitions have been built, civil society has published position papers, conferences have been held.

  Some groups are calling for a boycott of the referendum while others are trying to bring a case to court, although they do so in the face of presidential attack on justice: in June the president fired 57 judges, accusing them of corruption and protecting ‘terrorists’. In protest against judicial interference, Tunisian judges went on strike, only returning to work very recently.

  The Tunisian League of Human Rights, a prominent CSO, has called on the president to withdraw his proposal and instead enter a wider dialogue with Tunisian society. 

  How free and fair might the referendum be?

  When democratic transition took place in 2011 our country strived to create independent institutions such as the electoral commission and an anti-corruption body, among others. The proposed constitution dissolved almost all these independent bodies.

  The only one it keeps is the electoral commission, which President Saied seized control of in May by firing its members and appointing new ones. In February he dissolved the High Judicial Council, as well as sacking the judges in June. 

  Given that context, the independence of this ‘independent commission’ running the referendum, and the integrity of the whole election, must be questioned.

  What are your expectations for the results, and what impact will they have on the quality of democracy?

  By examining the latest polls on President Saied’s approval ratings, he still has huge public support. But this is the result of his populism. He is a populist president and populism – at least in its early years – has many supporters. But once a populist president fails to deliver on their promises, they lose popularity and support. In Tunisia, we are still going through the early stages of populism.

  Despite his popularity, I believe that his upcoming referendum will have a very low participation rate. With a small turnout, the legitimacy of the result will be questioned.

  But the president and his regime don’t care about legitimacy. For example, when the national consultation took place months ago, it was a complete failure in terms of the participation rate. Yet President Saied used it as a justification to hold this referendum. 

  If the referendum is approved, it will be followed by parliamentary elections in December, according to his roadmap; parliament was dissolved in April. Meanwhile, there will probably be several ‘reforms’ and new laws. I am afraid to say that the next phase is quite scary because the president has the ultimate power to change laws without any checks and balances, in the absence of an independent judiciary, constitutional court and parliament. 

  Democracy means the separation of powers, checks and balances, and participation, but all of these have been cancelled by the president since July 2021. He has tightened his grip over the entire executive body, the entire legislative body, and even part of the judiciary. With an attack on the judiciary, we can count less on judges to be the ultimate defenders of rights and freedoms. Our democracy is probably at its worst level since the 2010 revolution that ousted autocrat Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali.

  The human rights situation is worsening with the decline of democracy. We have witnessed several human rights violations, some of which reminded us of the kind of abuses that were committed during the early years of the revolution. The difference between that time and now is the absence of any accountability. The president hasn’t been held accountable for any decision he has made during the last year. 

  From our side, civil society has condemned these violations, but it was not enough, so we have been trying to network with various defenders of democracy in Tunisia as well as abroad. In the next phase, civil society will continue its pressure and mobilise against any deviations from democracy, given that the new constitution will guarantee the president extensive powers and open the doors for further violations.

  How has the international community responded? 

  We feel the international community has left Tunisia behind. The international community is offering a very weak response to this attack on democracy and the loss of a democratic country. The community of democratic countries is not putting in much effort to keep Tunisia within its family.

  Many of us are very disappointed by their reactions to the closure of parliament and what followed. The result is a very bad draft constitution that will probably cancel Tunisia’s democracy. But there has been no solid response from democratic friends of Tunisia.

  In this way, they encourage the president to commit more violations. These countries are back to their policies of the past decades in prioritising security and stability over democracy and human rights in our region.

  Civic space in Tunisia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with KADEM through itswebsite or itsFacebook page. 

• TURKEY: ‘All critical voices are repressed under the pretext of combating disinformation’

  In the run-up to Turkey’s general election, CIVICUS speaks with Fatih Polat, editor-in-chief of Evrensel, about the state of press freedoms and the Turkish government’s attacks on critical media.

  Founded in 1995, Evrensel is an independent daily newspaper. In August 2022, the Turkish Press Advertisement Agency permanentlybanned all public announcements and advertisements with Evrensel despite the Turkish Constitutional Court’s decision that advertisement bans on Evrensel and other newspapers violated freedom of expression and press freedom.

  What are the conditions for the exercise of journalism in Turkey?

  In Turkey state representatives routinely refuse to answer journalists’ questions. In any developed western democracy, this would be a serious matter and would be considered an obstruction of journalistic work. But in Turkey, this is no longer seen as a problem. For a very long time, the government has routinely imposed a variety of obstacles both on the critical Turkish press and on our foreign colleagues covering Turkey for international press organisations.

  Ever since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) gained power 21 years ago, independent media have been in trouble. The government pressures critical media both financially and politically. It seeks to financially asphyxiate them by blocking the flow of official announcements and advertisements and imposing fines for alleged infractions concerning news, commentaries or television programmes. Political pressures range from lawsuits filed against individual journalists and newspaper managers to the detention, arrest and use of torture against journalists.

  Critical television channels can also be subjected to temporary screen blackouts. Online media, which have developed significantly over the past 20 years, experience pressures ranging from court-ordered removal of content to lawsuits. Even cartoonists are subjected to punishment and arrest. Moreover, journalists are frequently exposed to police violence and detained while following the news on the streets.

  On top of this, if the government is uncomfortable with the publication of a newspaper, a state official calls the agency that distributes advertisements and makes veiled threats to stop the flow of private advertisements. In contrast, newspapers and TV channels supporting the government receive serious financial aid from the state.

  How has Evrensel been specifically targeted?

  Evrensel is a 28-year-old, well-established newspaper that stays afloat thanks to readers’ contributions and advertisements placed by municipalities run by the opposition. On 22 August 2022, the Turkish Press Advertisement Agency, whose budget comes from tax money, banned Evrensel from receiving any public announcements and advertisements. This tactic is aimed at making a newspaper financially unviable. In response we filed a lawsuit, which is currently underway.

  The new press law, which was recently introduced by the government under the pretext of ‘combating disinformation’, has led to a new period of repression of anyone who expresses a critical stance towards the regime. Lawsuits are filed against us for news and articles published in our print newspaper and on our website. Our website is frequently subjected to access-blocking orders.

  Are journalists from certain groups particularly vulnerable?

  The Kurdish media are under particularly strong attack. There is an ongoing conflict between the state and various Kurdish insurgent groups who demand either separation from Turkey or greater autonomy within Turkey. The government has increased pressure on Kurdish media, and on all Kurdish actors, after putting an end to negotiations. For example, Kurdish journalists have been arrested alongside legislators and politicians of the pro-minority People’s Democratic Party (HDP), including the HDP’s co-presidents Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, and mayors have been replaced by trustees. In April and early May alone, 34 Kurdish journalists and press workers have been arrested.

  How has the repression of press freedoms affected the popularity of the ruling regime?

  Your question reminds me of another important element of repression. In Turkey, insulting the president is punishable with prison sentences of up to six years. I am among the many journalists who have been tried for insulting the president; I was acquitted in 2019. This has been applied not only against journalists but also against social media users.

  But for a significant segment of AKP voters, media censorship or corruption allegations against the president are not that important. Only bad economic performance can result in the erosion of their support.

  On 14 May Turkey will hold a critical general election, both for president and parliament. The unity of the opposition has brought hope for a change. Right now, the prospect of a time when we will be able to breathe a little more freely again seems within reach.

  What kinds of domestic or international support do Turkish independent media and journalists currently receive, and what would help?

  There are several domestic journalists’ organisations in Turkey. For example, I am a member of the Journalists’ Union of Turkey and the Journalists’ Association of Turkey, the largest press unions in the country. In the last 15 to 20 years, various international journalists’ organisations have also provided important support, standing in solidarity with the independent press and journalists from Turkey, spreading awareness and advocating for our rights. It is very valuable for us that they follow the many cases of repression of critical media and include them in their countries’ political agenda.

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  Civic space in Turkey is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Evrensel through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@EvrenselDaily and@fpolat69 onTwitter.

• TURKEY: ‘For the embattled LGBTQI+ movement, simply persisting in taking to the streets is an achievement’

  CIVICUS speaks about 2023 Pride and the civil society response to the Turkish government’s anti-LGBTQI+ campaign with Damla Umut Uzun, international relations and fundraising officer atKaos Gay and Lesbian Cultural Research and Solidarity Association (Kaos GL).

  Founded in 1994, Kaos GL is one of the oldest and largest LGBTQI+ organisations in Turkey, dedicated to creating visibility and understanding and promoting LGBTQI+ human rights.

  How have Turkish authorities reacted to Prideevents?

  Since 2015, Pride events have been increasingly banned by city governors. The first ban was introduced in Istanbul, which in 2014 had the largest Pride gathering, with at least 50,000 participants. But despite the growing number of bans, the number of Pride events across the country has also consistently increased.

  This year in Istanbul, several Pride events were banned by district governor offices, resulting in detentions, police brutality and restrictions on journalists. A Pride movie event organised by the University Feminist Collective in Şişli was banned for ‘potentially causing societal resentment’ and ‘threatening social peace’. The screening of the film ‘Pride’, scheduled by the cinema collective, and a tea gathering event organised by the LambdaIstanbul LGBTQI+ Solidarity Association were banned in Kadıköy district. The police detained and later released at least eight people who came to watch the film, using physical violence. The LGBTQI+ group Queer Baykuş of Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University had their posters violently confiscated by the university’s security units before a planned press release. On 18 June, during the Trans Pride Parade in Beyoğlu district, the police handcuffed and detained 10 people, including a child, and released them later that day after taking police statements. Journalists were prevented from taking pictures during the intervention.

  The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey compiled a detailed report of rights violations in the context of 2023 Pride events between 2 June and 10 July 2023. Various Pride celebrations, including parades, picnics and press statements, were banned by multiple governorships and disrupted due to targeted threats and societal reactions in Adana, Ankara, Antalya, Eskişehir, Izmir, Kocaeli and Muğla. A total of 241 people, including four minors and seven lawyers, were detained on the grounds of Article 2,911 of the law on gatherings and demonstrations. The main reasons cited by authorities were non-compliance with regulations, disruption of public order and violation of ban decisions. Although most detainees were typically released on the same day, they might face prosecution and lawsuits months later.

  Police interventions during Pride events are a reflection of the government’s hostility towards LGBTQI+ people. They are waging a kind of war against us. The recurring violence is fuelled by a sense of impunity: the fact that law enforcement officials face no consequences for harming, insulting or harassing LGBTQI+ people further emboldens them.

  Why is the Turkish government hostile towards LGBTQI+ people?

  Oppression of the LGBTQI+ community in Turkey is not new: the government’s crackdown first intensified following the 2016 attempted coup. But the main reason behind the increasing hatred is the attempt of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to mobilise conservative segments of society. To mask the effects of its corrupt rule and economic mismanagement, the government is employing populist rhetoric and polarisation tactics, seeking to designate an enemy to blame.

  Repression hasn’t been limited to LGBTQI+ people but rather targeted at any opposition or independent views. Dissenting voices, including those of Kurdish people, feminists and human rights defenders, are labelled as ‘terrorists’.

  Among these groups, LGBTQI+ people are a particularly easy target due to societal conservatism and religious tendencies. Censorship and rights violations of LGBTQI+ people affect all aspects of life, including access to goods and services, education, healthcare and housing and media representation. In line with the global anti-gender trend, the government has employed a rhetoric focused on ‘protecting the sacred Turkish family structure against perversion’, using LGBTQI+ people and feminists as scapegoats.

  What role did anti-LGBTQI+ rhetoric play in the2023 presidential elections?

  Anti-LGBTQI+ rhetoric played a significant role in the election campaigns of the AKP government and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, aimed at mobilising conservative voters, including those on the left side of the political spectrum. Former Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu openly mobilised hate speech against LGBTQI+ people at public events. President Erdoğan used similar rhetoric, accusing the opposition of being ‘pro-LGBTQI+’.

  Unfortunately, two radical Islamist parties, Hüdapar and New Welfare, have entered parliament, and their primary election promise was to close down LGBTQI+ organisations. They are now working actively towards this goal, and we anticipate that such rhetoric and efforts will intensify in the run-up to local elections in a few months.

  How are LGBTQI+ organisations, including Kaos GL,responding to these attacks?

  Despite facing oppressive conditions and lack of opportunities, the LGBTQI+ movement in Turkey remains resilient and strong. Alongside feminists, we are the only groups that continue to take to the streets and demonstrate for our rights, showing immense bravery in the face of police violence and detention. Simply persisting in organising demonstrations is an achievement in itself.

  In addition to street activism, Turkish LGBTQI+ organisations are actively engaged in advocacy, the promotion of visibility and capacity building. We recognise that we won’t be able to change policies at the national level due to the AKP’s absolute majority, so we focus our efforts on grassroots societal transformation. We educate professionals who encounter LGBTQI+ people in their daily work, such as doctors, nurses, teachers, lawyers and social and municipal workers, to increase their understanding and capacity to work with LGBTQI+ people and respond to their needs in the respectful manner.

  We document human rights violations and hate crimes, providing a factual basis for our advocacy campaigns. We also report on the situation of LGBTQI+ employees in the public and private sectors. Other organisations focus on reporting the challenges faced by LGBTQI+ students, people living with HIV, elderly people and refugees.

  We also organise cultural events, including queer film festivals such as Pink Life Queer Fest and exhibitions and art programmes like the Ankara Queer Art Programme and the Women-to-Women storytelling contests, aimed at fostering expression and community engagement.

  What obstacles do you encounter in your work, and what supportdo you need?

  Since the attempted coup, the government has intensified its crackdown on civil society organisations (CSOs), subjecting them to frequent state audits to identify alleged mistakes, impose fines or even shut them down. Laws such as the Law on the Prevention of the Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction have made it increasingly difficult for CSOs to receive funds, further hindering their work.

  Turkish LGBTQI+ organisations maintain close contact with European human rights organisations, Council of Europe representatives, the European Union (EU) delegation and United Nations mechanisms. We regularly update them about the developments and shrinking human rights space in Turkey, and in turn, they issue statements expressing deep concern about the government’s actions. However, these efforts have proven ineffective as the AKP government demonstrates a complete lack of regard and even fails to implement decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.

  Turkish LGBTQI+ organisations have generally benefitted from EU funding, but this has started to decrease. It appears that the EU has somewhat given up on Turkey, since the government is making no effort to improve human rights standards. Additionally, the fact that Turkey is keeping millions of refugees out of Europe has limited the EU’s consistency in supporting human rights in Turkey.

  As LGBTQI+ individuals living in Turkey, we are constantly pressured to hide our identities, pushed to the margins of society and silenced. But as LGBTQI+ organisations we continue to fight for our rights and freedoms. To advance our cause, we need more systematic financial resources, increased collaboration with international organisations, more vocal campaigns and international pressure on the Turkish government.

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  Civic space in Turkey is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Kaos GL through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@KaosGL on Twitter.

• TURKEY: ‘The government does not tolerate opinions different from its own’

  CIVICUS speaks with lawyer Eren Keskin, chair of the Human Rights Association (IHD), about the Turkish government’s attacks on critical media and the state of press freedoms in the context of Turkey’s current elections.

  Founded in 1986, IHD is one of Turkey’s oldest and largest human rights civil society organisations. It documents human rights violations and campaigns for the protection of human rights and civic freedoms in Turkey.

  What are the conditions for journalism in Turkey?

  Problems in the area of freedom of expression have existed in Turkey since the foundation of the republic. From the very beginning there were issues that the republic’s official ideology of Turkish-Islamic synthesis prohibited speaking about. Issues such as the Kurdish conflict, the 1915 Armenian Genocide and, later on, Turkey’s military presence in Cyprus, have long been forbidden topics.

  What’s changed under the present government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party is that the opposition’s freedom of expression has been severely restricted across the board. As a result, obstacles have mounted for opposition journalists to express their views.

  The government does not tolerate opinions different from its own. It recklessly issues arrest warrants for articles, speeches and social media messages if they express diverging opinions. The state of Turkey recognises freedom of expression in its domestic legislation and is bound to respect it as a state party to the European Convention on Human Rights, but it continues to violate its own laws and the international conventions and covenants it has signed.

  What tactics does the government use against independent media and how have you been affected?

  Because it does not tolerate any kind of diverging opinion, the government is extremely aggressive towards independent media and the free press, the majority of which are Kurdish media outlets.

  Dissident journalists are commonly charged with making propaganda for an illegal organisation. Particularly with news reports on the Kurdish war, most lawsuits are filed on charges of making propaganda for the Kurdish political movement or Kurdish armed forces. Apart from this, a large number of cases are filed on charges of insulting the president, insulting the forces of the state and inciting the public to hatred and enmity.

  Many journalists are under arrest or subject to international travel bans merely for expressing their thoughts in writing. There is almost no journalist who is not being subjected to judicial control.

  I was once the volunteer editor-in-chief of the daily Özgür Gündem, one of the newspapers that has faced the most repression, and have stood trial in 143 cases just because my name appeared on the newspaper as volunteer editor-in-chief.

  I’ve been sentenced to a total of 26 years and nine months in prison for alleged crimes such as membership of an illegal organisation, making propaganda for an illegal organisation and insulting the president, even for articles I did not write. These sentences are pending a decision of the Court of Cassation. As soon as they are final, I may go to prison. I have also been unable to travel abroad for six years now because of an international travel ban.

  Has the intensification of repression affected the popularity of the president in any way?

  Considering that the ruling regime is the main culprit for all the rights violations currently taking place in Turkey, and that power is concentrated in the hands of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, it must be admitted that the main perpetrator of rights violations is the president himself. The judiciary is completely dependent on the president. Judges and prosecutors render compliant decisions out of fear. Where judges and prosecutors are afraid, it is unthinkable for the judiciary to be independent.

  The president’s attitude towards the press, especially the opposition press, and the language of hatred and violence he uses, does not detract from his popularity but is instead a major reason his followers support him. However, we think that a large part of society, hopefully a growing part, is also disturbed by his blatant violations of freedom of expression.

  What do you make of the results of the 14 May general election?

  The AKP had relative success in the presidential and parliamentary elections held on 14 May. The president did better than expected, considering the economic situation and the criticism he’s faced over the response to the earthquakes in February. His party has maintained control of parliament. But he didn’t win re-election outright: he received 49.5 per cent of the vote while his opposition challenger, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) received almost 45 per cent. Now there’s going to be a runoff on 28 May.

  None of this should come as a surprise. Society has become extremely polarised, especially as a result of Erdoğan’s rhetoric of fear, hatred and violence. We also witnessed many practices that violated the constitution and electoral laws, such as government ministers becoming parliamentary candidates without resigning and therefore using state resources for campaigning. The ruling party monopolises a large part of the media and used it exclusively on its own behalf. The elections were therefore held under extremely unequal conditions.

  It’s hard to predict what the outcome of the runoff will be. The election may end in favour of Erdoğan or Kılıçdaroğlu. Much will depend on the practices that develop during the election.

  How will the situation of vulnerable minorities in Turkey be affected by the election results?

  Erdoğan uses language that is completely against human rights and the AKP has retained its parliamentary majority by coalescing with an extremist party. The situation will become dangerous if Erdoğan wins once again, especially for women, LGBTQI+ people and Kurdish people.

  Withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention – the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence – has already affected the feminist movement a lot. Now Law No. 6,284 on violence against women is being questioned. This poses a great danger for women and LGBTQI+ people.

  Similarly, if Erdoğan wins again, pro-security approaches to the Kurdish issue will continue to dominate, preventing progress towards peace.

  As for Syrian asylum-seekers, the AKP presents itself as having provided a good environment for them, but it is not really the case. Asylum-seekers in Turkey do not qualify as refugees because of the state’s reservation to the 1951 Refugee Convention. They are subjected to racist attacks. They work as cheap labour in extremely difficult conditions. Women and girls live under permanent risk of violence. An AKP win will not give them a chance.

  But it must be noted that the CHP’s proposal regarding refugees is not any more democratic or inclusive, and its discourse also has racist overtones. Therefore, first and foremost, the discriminatory, double-standard approach to the Refugee Convention should be questioned.

  What kinds of domestic or international support do Turkish independent media and journalists currently receive, and what more would you need?

  Journalists working in independent media in Turkey, and especially in Kurdistan, are clearly not receiving sufficient international support. The Republic of Turkey is a state party to many international conventions that guarantee freedoms of expression and the press. The state has committed to respecting them on paper, but it violates them in practice. All these conventions have monitoring mechanisms, but unfortunately, they are not being properly implemented for Turkey. In this sense, the European Union has left Turkey alone.

  We believe that Turkey should be questioned more, especially by western media organisations and by Turkey’s co-signatory states of international rights conventions, to contribute to the lifting of repressive measures against the dissident press.

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  Civic space in Turkey is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Human Rights Association through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@ihd_genelmerkez on Twitter.

• TURKMENISTAN: ‘There is nothing resembling real civil society – and no conditions for it to emerge’

  CIVICUS speaks with Farid Tukhbatullin, founder and director of the Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights (TIHR), about the upcoming election and the environment for civil society in Turkmenistan.

  TIHR is a civil society organisation (CSO) based in Austria, where Farid lives in exile, that collects information from sources inside Turkmenistan to report internationally on human rights and civic space violations and advocate for democratic change.

  What is the state of the space for civil society in Turkmenistan?

  In the early 1990s, several independent CSOs appeared in Turkmenistan. The fingers of one hand were enough to count them. These included our organisation, Dashoguz Ecological Club.

  But by the late 1990s, the first president of the country, Turkmenbashi, viewed them as a danger to the system he was building. Independent CSOs were liquidated and only a few quasi-CSOs remained - the Union of Women, the Union of Veterans and the Union of Youth, all of which were remnants of the Soviet era.

  Turkmenistan not only lacks anything resembling real civil society – it also does not meet the minimal preconditions for its emergence.

  There are no independent media outlets in Turkmenistan. Not surprising, in Reporters Without Borders’ Press Freedom Index, the country constantly ranks second-to-last or last, next to North Korea.

  People who dare express opinions critical of the government publicly, through YouTube or on social media, end up in prison. Recent examples include Murat Dushemov and Nurgeldy Khalykov, both sentenced to four years in prison, and Pygamberdy Allaberdiyev, who received a six-year sentence.

  Special services also harass relatives of activists who are working or studying abroad and run opposition blogs from outside the country. They try to silence them by threatening their families back home.

  What have been the implications of Turkmenistan’s policy of insisting it has no COVID-19 cases?

  Unfortunately, there is no reliable information regarding the real impact of the pandemic in Turkmenistan, and of course no assistance for those who have been badly hit. According to our sources, the number of people hospitalised is now decreasing. But before this there was a large number of deaths. Small towns were holding several funerals a day. According to local traditions, a large part of the local population takes part in funeral rites, so the whole town knows who died and when.

  Why has President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov called an early election, and what is its likely outcome?

  President Berdimuhamedov started promoting his son Serdar as his heir quite a long time ago. We became aware of the planning of an extraordinary meeting of the People’s Council, the upper house of parliament, in November 2021. The idea of holding early presidential elections was voiced at this meeting; that’s when preparations for the next step for a formal change of power began.

  But there is no reason to believe this process will trigger real political change in Turkmenistan. No one doubts that on 12 March the younger Berdimuhamedov will become the country’s next president. But his father is not going to give up the reins. In violation of the constitution, he is now both president and leader of the People’s Council. After the election, he will retain his second position.

  Moreover, it has already been announced that changes will be made to the constitution. We have no details yet, but changes will surely create further opportunities for father and son to lead the country in tandem.

  Even leaving the presidency to his son frightens President Berdimuhamedov. The younger Berdimuhamedov will certainly want to make changes in the cabinet of ministers, replacing some with proxies of a younger age, and this may create some turbulence in the highest spheres of power. So Gurbanguly will most likely remain the real ruler at the beginning, with Serdar’s leadership a formality.

  How is civil society, and TIHR specifically, working to defend human rights and monitor violations in Turkmenistan?

  A CSO, the Helsinki Group of Turkmenistan (HGT), was founded in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, in July 2002 to monitor the human rights situation on the ground. HGT was the predecessor organisation to TIHR. It operated underground and its members were systematically persecuted and repressed. I was detained on 23 December 2002 and sentenced to three years in prison for my peaceful activism. Fortunately, the campaign ran by international CSOs and pressure from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) paid off and I was pardoned and released on 2 April 2003. I left the country in June and received refugee status in Austria in November 2003. I led the establishment and registration of TIRH in Austria in November 2004.

  TIHR has the vision of a democratic Turkmenistan based on the rule of law, respect for human rights and cooperation with civil society. We work to create the conditions that would allow for the emergence and evolution of a so far non-existent civil society and to raise citizens’ legal awareness, particularly regarding human rights. 

  We collect, analyse and publish information on various human rights issues, including prison conditions, the treatment of ethnic minorities, child labour, the education system and restrictions on the freedom of association. Our reporting is based on information from sources inside Turkmenistan whose identities we must keep confidential to protect them and their families.

  In 2006 we established a website, Chronicle of Turkmenistan, which provides first-hand information in English, Russian and Turkmen and has become one of the most widely cited sources on Turkmenistan. And in 2007 we started making YouTube videos. We have so far published 244, which have overall reached almost 50 million views.

  This format has allowed us to use humour effectively as a political tool. For instance, in August 2017 we published one of our many satirical videos about President Berdimuhamedov, based on official state TV footage of his meetings with military personnel Rambo-style. The video instantly became a meme on social media and was republished by leading global media outlets. The president with the ‘hard-to-pronounce last name’ became a YouTube star and we gained millions of viewers.

  The popularity snowball effect reached the USA with Trevor Noah’s The Daily Show, which in February 2018 awarded President Berdimuhamedov the prize for ‘best performance by a dictator in a propaganda video’. And in August 2019, it further snowballed when John Oliver reused our content in a Last Week Tonight episode about the Turkmen president, amassing 10 million clicks. Finally, in December 2019 Netflix released the action movie ‘6 Underground’, about the overthrow of the dictator of the fictional state of Turgistan, which very much resembled Turkmenistan.

  We do all this to shed light on the human rights violations that continue to happen in this very isolated country. We have submitted several shadow reports – 16 since 2008 – to the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council and to nearly all UN treaty bodies, often together with other human rights organisations. We have also submitted dozens of analytical reports and briefing papers to intergovernmental organisations, and have published countless statements and open letters, often in cooperation with other CSOs. In 2020 alone, we published 10 analytical reports, four briefing papers, two press statements and six open letters.

  Our analytical reports include a series focusing on civic space, which since 2017 we have published quarterly together with CIVICUS and the International Partnership for Human Rights. We cooperate with all major international human rights CSOs, all of which rely – at least partly – on our work when it comes to Turkmenistan.

  What can the international community, including international civil society, do to support civic space and human rights in Turkmenistan?

  What helps the most is targeted advocacy at the international level and reporting to inform, shape and guide the policies of outside actors – international institutions such as the European Union, OSCE and UN, but also individual governments and others that have political or economic interests in the country – with respect to human rights issues in Turkmenistan.

  Civic space in Turkmenistan is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with TIHR through the Chronicles of Turkmenistanwebsite orFacebook page. 

• UGANDA: ‘Closure of the UN office will result in the loss of a crucial player in the field of human rights’

  CIVICUS speaks about the human rights situation and the closure of the United Nations (UN) office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Uganda with Dr Livingstone Sewanyana, founder and Executive Director of the Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI) andUN independent expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order.

  Founded in 1991, FHRI is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) working to advance democratic development and fundamental freedoms in Uganda.

  What were the achievements of the UN human rights office in Uganda, and why is it closing?

  The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights was established in Uganda during a period of conflict that particularly affected northern Uganda, with a head office in Kampala and regional offices based in north and northeastern Uganda. Its main objective was to promote reconciliation and peacebuilding, which was successfully achieved.

  The UN office played a key role in creating awareness among communities about their rights and ways to defend them. It conducted extensive human rights monitoring to expose violations and contributed significantly to building the capacity of the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) – the national human rights institution – and various local CSOs through technical assistance and, at times, financial support for their programmes.

  After the goal of rebuilding northern Uganda was achieved, the agreement was extended multiple times, with 2023 agreed as a potential cut-off. The Ugandan authorities cite the achievement of its goals as a reason not to prolong the UN office’s mandate. Civil society groups, however, think its closure will result in the loss of a crucial player in the field of human rights, given the critical role it played in terms of democratisation in Uganda, capacity development, technical assistance and human rights monitoring.

  How do you assess the work of the UHRC?

  The UHRC is entrusted with a broad mandate, encompassing both promotional and protective functions, along with a tribunal for handling human rights complaints. As the national human rights institution, it consistently submits annual reports to parliament.

  While the UHRC’s promotional efforts are commendable, challenges arise in its protective role because this requires goodwill from the state. Insufficient resources and lack of political will, particularly on controversial issues, hinder its ability to function effectively.

  The UHRC’s independence has always been questioned. Although the authorities may not interfere directly with its work, the lack of executive action on its recommendations undermines its potential and credibility. The UHRC needs more space to execute its mandate effectively.

  How does FHRI defend and promote human rights?

  For over 32 years, we’ve monitored, documented and reported human rights abuses. Our reports reach various stakeholders, including government, parliament, international bodies, the media and civil society. We also engage with young people through university programmes, fostering an understanding of rights and obligations. We actively assist victims of human rights violations through our legal aid programme, which handles over 1,000 cases every year, and provide mediation and administrative support services.

  Our campaigns include a 30-year effort to abolish the death penalty. Although Uganda has retained it, the death penalty is now restricted to the most ‘serious crimes’, and opportunities for a prerogative of mercy have been established. If someone who’s been sentenced to death is not executed within three years, their sentence is automatically commuted to life imprisonment. We have consistently challenged the application of the death penalty in the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court.

  We also engage in legislative advocacy, analysing bills and voicing our position on their human rights implications, as seen in our response to the Anti-Homosexuality Act 2023, which unfortunately retained a provision for the death penalty. However, we succeeded in securing the removal of the mandatory death penalty provision by parliament.

  We actively report to the UN Human Rights Council and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. As a UN independent expert, I recently presented my sixth report to the Human Rights Council, sharing findings from my visit to the Republic of Georgia.

  In sum, our work cuts across community, district, national and international divides. Taking a holistic approach, we conduct awareness raising, capacity development and advocacy campaigns and provide legal protection to victims of abuse through recourse to courts. We are affiliated with the World Coalition Against the Death Penalty and the International Federation of Human Rights Defenders.

  What challenges do Ugandan human rights organisations face?

  Civic space is getting more and more restricted and civil society is becoming more apprehensive. We have limited funding to carry out our work and regularly face legislative challenges, such as the restrictive Public Order and Management Act of 2013, which constrains assemblies and public meetings.

  Civil society groups are confined to operating within the narrow framework of the law, and it’s difficult to expand the frontiers of your work. Recently, 54 CSOs have had to suspend their operations due to non-compliance with the NGO Act 2016.

  To ensure the sustainability of our day-to-day operations we need expertise, and retaining experienced staff is difficult due to the potential lure of international organisations.

  There’s a need to broaden civic space and ensure an enabling environment for everyone to exercise their rights. For this to happen, the state must implement recommendations from the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review process and UN treaty bodies.

  What international support do you receive, and what support do you need?

  CIVICUS has been instrumental in supporting our human rights monitoring and reporting work. We have submitted several joint reports to the UN Human Rights Council and UN Human Rights Committee.

  We also require assistance in capacity development to promote better understanding of the human rights architecture. Most crucially, financial support is needed to empower human rights defenders to participate in forums and carry out their work effectively. In a society grappling with poverty and high unemployment, the demand for technical and financial assistance is high, and human rights organisations are often looked upon as potential providers.

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  Civic space in Uganda is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with FHRI through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@FHRI2 and@LSewanyana onTwitter.

• UGANDA: ‘The UN human rights office was instrumental in addressing human rights concerns in the conflict and post-conflict period’

  CIVICUS speaks about the closure of the United Nations (UN) office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Uganda with Robert Kirenga, Executive Director of the National Coalition of Human Rights Defenders-Uganda (NCHRD-U).

  Founded in 2013, NCHRD-U is a civil society organisation (CSO) that coordinates Ugandan human rights defenders (HRDs) to work collectively to safeguard their work and protect their safety.

  What work did the UN human rights office in Uganda do?

  The UN human rights office in Uganda had a great impact on human rights over its 18 years. Initially, when Uganda was still plagued by a civil war that lasted almost 20 years, this office was instrumental in addressing human rights concerns in the conflict and post-conflict period. The UN set up sub-regional offices to monitor, document and report on the human rights situation and build state and non-state capacities in the field of human rights protection and promotion.

  The UN office cooperated well with law enforcement agencies, the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC), which is the national human rights institution, and CSOs. By supporting or holding joint activities aimed at defending human rights, the UN contributed to the visibility of various national institutions. It provided civic education materials to enhance the capacities of HRDs to understand, appreciate and apply treaty and charter-based mechanisms for upholding human rights in Uganda. Sometimes the UN provided funding for initiatives commemorating international human rights events, including Human Rights Defenders Day on 9 December, Human Rights Day on 10 December, International Day for Persons with Disabilities on 3 December and the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture on 26 June, among others.

  Why is the UN office closing, and what’s been the reaction of Ugandan human rights organisations?

  The UN human rights office is closing because the Ugandan government decided not to renew or extend its mandate, stating it believes it has fulfilled its role. Reactions to this decision have been mixed, with some feeling it was premature, as the office had still significant work to do, particularly since it was providing crucial support to the severely underfunded UHRC.

  The closure of the office also had a significant impact on its employees and service providers, as it resulted in job losses and affected the income of landlords and other service suppliers. Many CSOs that had joint programmes with the UN office are experiencing a serious gap in their operations.

  Some believed the local capacities the UN had developed over time were sufficient for local institutions to take on the responsibility of protecting and promoting human rights in Uganda, while others argued that the office had become compromised by the condition that whatever it did had to be in a joint venture with the UHRC. This led some to perceive the office as weak and ineffective when it came to reporting on and condemning significant human rights abuses during the 2021 general election, which included extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances and torture.

  How do you assess the work of the UHRC?

  The UHRC has made efforts despite being underfunded. Its robust legal and policy gives it the authority to carry out its mandate impartially, so what it truly needs are human and financial resources so it can execute the full range of its duties. In can be independent if it’s adequately resourced and its members are guaranteed the security of tenure.

  For a long time, the UHRC was hampered by lack of leadership due to the executive’s delays in appointing its members. There’s a public perception that appointees serve the interests of the appointing authority rather than the country, as the appointment process lacks public involvement and rigorous scrutiny. The appointment procedure must be reformed to become more transparent and participatory, embedding scrutiny at every stage, from nominations to parliamentary vetting.

  The UHRC has also faced criticism for not fully exercising its powers, including the ability to summon state officials accused of serious human rights violations to hold them accountable and use quasi-judicial powers such as the power to release unlawfully detained people.

  What work does NCHRD-U do?

  Our mission as a coalition of HRDs is to safeguard the rights of HRDs and advance their work in a secure environment by collaborating with national, regional and international like-minded organisations. We pursue this mission in three key programme areas: capacity building, emergency support and protection, and advocacy.

  In our capacity-building programme, we focus on enhancing the capabilities of HRDs to maintain their personal security, including digital safety. Our emergency support and protection initiative provides assistance from various security angles to HRDs under threat. Our advocacy efforts focus on improving the working conditions for HRDs by advocating for conducive laws and policies that protect human rights activism within local jurisdictions.

  We also serve as the coordinating body for UN Charter and treaty-based mechanisms in Uganda. In this capacity, we bring together Ugandan CSOs to prepare and compile shadow reports for the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review process and human rights treaty bodies.

  What human rights violations are experienced by LGBTQI+ people in Uganda?

  LGBTQI+ people face human rights violations and abuse from a homophobic and intolerant society. They are often victims of discrimination in employment, are forcibly evicted by landlords and subjected to humiliation, derogatory name-calling, arrests, physical assaults and, in extreme cases, homicide. LGBTQI+ people can’t register organisations to advance their rights and can’t exercise their freedom of expression due to the fear of being identified, so they’re denied basic human rights. Communities are hostile to LGBTQI+ people. In essence, they do not enjoy the same freedoms and rights as others in society.

  As for the Anti-Homosexuality Act of 2023, there appears to be some confusion and a lack of clarity around the fact that it criminalises homosexual acts, not the fact of being homosexual. But there are mixed signals regarding who can be prosecuted under the act and what charges they can face. The law was enacted in May 2023 and is in effect. The best that civil society could do was file a petition at the Constitutional Court questioning its constitutionality, and we are currently awaiting a hearing date.

  What are conditions for human rights organisations in Uganda?

  We face a number of challenges ranging from accessibility of financial resources to a restrictive legal environment that imposes redundant documentation and information requirements from different statutory bodies that often overlap and are very costly, cumbersome and time-consuming.

  Moreover, we confront threats of closure, non-renewal of operating licences, illegal freezing of organisational accounts and intimidation, mainly from overzealous state officials, including arrests and assaults, particularly when attempting to exercise the right to protest.

  Ability to operate in this challenging context varies among organisations. Some adopt a cautious approach and practise self-censorship, while others have become even more resilient and continue to pursue their agendas while challenging the status quo through legal avenues. While not many independent CSOs have had to shut down or relocate, the inability to mobilise resources and the long suspension and eventual winding up of the Democratic Governance Facility, a donor vehicle that supported CSOs, have heavily contributed to the crisis we are currently facing.

  Some resources and funding continue to flow into human rights organisations from foreign missions accredited in Uganda and international organisations and foundations headquartered outside the country. However, there is a pressing need for solidarity with human rights CSOs facing challenges related to obtaining operating licences and funding constraints. Such international support is crucial to keep them afloat so they can continue their vital work.

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  Civic space in Uganda is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with NCHRD-U through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@NCHRD_UG and@BRKirenga onTwitter.

• UKRAINE: ‘If we share information, leaders won’t be able to turn blind eye to human rights violations’

  CIVICUS speaks with Yaropolk Brynykh of Truth Hounds about Ukrainian civil society’s response to the Russian invasion.

  Truth Hounds is a civil society organisation (CSO) aimed at fighting against the impunity of perpetrators of international crimes and grave human rights violations through investigation, documentation, monitoring, advocacy and problem-solving assistance for vulnerable groups. Jointly with Brussels-based International Partnership for Human Rights, The Truth Hounds team has carried out over 50 fact-finding missions to document war crimes in eastern Ukraine and Crimea.

  What are the main ways in which your organisation is responding to the Russian invasion?

  I’m a board member of the Ukrainian human rights organisation Truth Hounds, which has focused on documenting war crimes and crimes against humanity in war contexts since 2014. We wouldn’t be able to tackle this mission without a highly qualified team of human rights professionals with experience in conflict areas – not only in the east of Ukraine and occupied Crimea but also in neighbouring countries, including in Nagorno Karabakh, a territory disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan. Having prepared three extensive submissions to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, we have developed thorough knowledge of international standards and best practices of evidence collection and systematisation of war crimes.

  Thus, when Russia began its invasion of Ukraine on 24 February, I immediately joined a field team of investigators working day and night to document Russian war crimes in our country. Since then, our team members have collected evidence of indiscriminate shelling, targeted attacks against civilians, ecological crimes and other violations of customs of war. On the basis of that, our team has already prepared and published 13 reports revealing grave human rights violations and war crimes committed by the Russian military.

  Most of our current efforts in response to the Russian invasion focus on monitoring human rights violations and war crimes committed by the Russian army, international advocacy, support for professional groups and humanitarian and legal aid to people in need.

  Our team also supports the Ukrainian prosecutor’s office in chasing perpetrators of war crimes through documentation and monitoring of human rights violations. We also share reports and evidence as much as possible to provide international judicial bodies, including the ICC, with evidence that can one day be used to bring perpetrators to justice.

  In the context of the war, we also understand the importance of information, so our team works to produce accurate and reliable information as quickly as possible and shares it with international media groups. We believe that if we share information about Ukraine, global leaders won’t be able to turn a blind eye to the human rights violations that Russia is perpetrating here. Our nation needs support from the whole world; hence, our current mission is to deliver facts from the field to the international community.

  How is the conflict affecting Ukrainian civil society’s work?

  Ukrainian civil society is in the same boat as the whole nation, and as everyone else, we are trying to keep working despite the difficult circumstances. Some civil society representatives, including well-known human rights defenders, have joined the army to fight and protect the country. Others have had to leave Ukraine, but they are doing their best to operate in exile within their limited possibilities.

  While many CSOs moved to western Ukraine to try and resume their activities despite limited technical and financial opportunities, others decided to stay in the eastern and southern parts of the country, to cover humanitarian needs and help with the logistics of relocation of the civilian population. But their capacities are down to a minimum because they are not able to receive much support from international CSOs.

  Only a tiny segment of civil society took on board information about a possible Russian invasion and was prepared enough. They have managed to continue working for the past weeks. But even this small group cannot be as effective as it used to be because of the need to hide in shelters during chaotic air and rocket attacks.

  Overall, civil society is under tremendous mental pressure, which will have long-lasting effects. This will become yet another challenge for the country once the war is over. Civil society will suffer from post-traumatic syndrome.

  What should the international community do to help?

  Ukrainian civil society needs advocacy and communications support. Our partners must help us deliver our messages to our allies and governments worldwide. Needless to say, Ukraine cannot win this fight alone. But we share the same democratic values and we need your support.

  All of us in contemporary Ukrainian civil society grew up believing in democratic values and we heard time and again that these were the most important principles for the western world. Now we are fighting for these values, we ask the international community to amplify our voices. If it doesn’t, it will be clear that western countries choose their business interests over democratic values. We don’t want to be let down.

  Ukraine also needs the humanitarian assistance of international organisations. We understand how hard it is for organisations such as the World Health Organization and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to organise proper fieldwork. But there is one thing even harder: explaining to people from war-affected regions why these organisations disappear when they need them the most.

  Since 2014, when Russia occupied Crimea and invaded Ukraine for the first time this century, Ukrainians have seen thousands of international organisations’ representatives spending their time here, mostly in expensive hotels and restaurants. We were told that were here to try and save Ukrainian lives. But now that Ukrainian lives are in fact under immediate threat, international organisations are not here anymore. For us, they are now invisible and silent.

  Civic space in Ukraine is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Truth Hounds through itswebsite orFacebook page.

• UKRAINE: ‘International organisations are clearly not up to their historic responsibilities’

  CIVICUS speaks with Oleksandra Matviichuk, head of the board of the Center for Civil Liberties (CCL), about human rights violations in Ukraine amid the Russian invasion and civil society’s response.

  Established in 2007, CCL is a Ukrainian civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes human rights and democratic values in Ukraine and Europe.

  How has Ukrainian civil society organised in the wake of the Russian invasion?

  Ukrainian civil society came together and issued the Kyiv Declaration, an appeal made by 100 civil society leaders that includes six points: to establish safe zones that protect civilians from air and ground attacks; to provide immediate defensive military aid, including lethal and non-lethal weapons; to implement crippling economic and financial sanctions to undermine Russia’s war machine; to provide immediate aid to local humanitarian organisations; to freeze the assets and revoke the visas of Putin’s cronies; and to provide the technology and support required to record war crimes.

  There are a lot of CSOs in Ukraine, and therefore lots of initiatives happening. CCL has an initiative called Euromaidan SOS, which we launched a while back, in 2013, to provide legal help to activists detained during the Revolution of Dignity. This initiative involves hundreds of volunteers and focuses on legal and logistics support, humanitarian assistance and the documentation of war crimes to help bring perpetrators to justice.

  We work alongside international organisations, foreign governments and the Ukrainian diaspora. We have a campaign dedicated to the establishment of humanitarian corridors and we work with partners in several countries to provide aid in occupied cities. Russians have deliberately isolated occupied cities, attacking people who try to evacuate and obstructing humanitarian assistance. We are working to help those people.

  We also engage with partner human rights organisations in European countries, such as France and Germany, so that they put pressure on their national governments. Some countries have continued doing business as usual with Russia, even though they have repudiated the war. We need their governments to make the kind of political decisions that will save Ukrainian lives.

  As well as producing information to disseminate abroad so that the world knows what is happening in Ukraine, we use Facebook, Twitter and YouTube to spread information among people within Ukraine. One of the ways Russian invaders try to isolate the local population is by cutting off communications. We work to bypass these obstacles and provide life-saving information regarding evacuation procedures, medical care and official decisions, among other things.

  We have all adapted our work to the needs of the moment. I for instance am a human rights lawyer, so my field is the law, but I have somewhat shifted my priorities. I do not have military experience or expertise, but I have had to learn a number of things to be able to help. My work now not only involves research on war crimes for the quest for international justice, but also advocating and finding ways to pressure for the war to be stopped. So while I still conduct work in the field of law and gather evidence for future use, I also do other things, such as connecting with international organisations to try to get them to maintain their presence in Ukraine.

  What are you asking the international community to do?

  We work to force the international community to act in ways that are consistent with their words. Western politicians have expressed their support for Ukraine and its people, but their actions say otherwise. They have established economic sanctions against Russia, but there are still too many loopholes. A clear example is that of the SWIFT network, which has banned only a few Russian banks. Sberbank, one of the biggest banks, has not been excluded. We want all Russian and Belarusian banks expelled from the system, which would hopefully obstruct funding for the war and put enough pressure so that they will push for stopping it. Another urgent measure would be to put an embargo on Russian oil and gas, which are enabling the Russian government to fund its invasion of Ukraine.

  We don’t want the international community to get comfortable with what is happening in Ukraine. They must stand in solidarity with us and help us fight this. Our number one priority is to be able to defend ourselves, but we are fighting not only for ourselves but also for the values of a free world. Russia started this war because it is afraid of NATO. Putin is afraid of freedom. We hope our example will also impact on other post-soviet states and we will get to decide what our region will be like.

  We want the international community to provide tangible solutions. Now that the bulk of refugees have been got to safety, it is time to reach for a more ambitious goal. We need strategic measures that will stop war crimes and force the invasion itself to stop. In occupied territories, we have already seen people being beaten up, arrested and tortured. Detentions, kidnappings and torture are being used against the brave Ukrainians who go out with the Ukrainian flag and face Russian soldiers. It is only a matter of time before human rights defenders, journalists, religious leaders and civil society activists and organisations start to be deliberately targeted. We need to find ways to protect people. 

  What is your assessment of the international response to the Russian invasion so far?

  We feel and appreciate the huge wave of solidarity across the globe, but it is not enough to address our situation. What we need is a serious response to the Kyiv Declaration.

  Unfortunately, our advocacy asks have not been met. International organisations and our allies are focusing on providing humanitarian assistance to refugees outside Ukraine. This is very important because there are more than three million Ukrainian refugees now. But it is also the easiest thing to do in this horrible situation, when tens of millions remain in Ukraine, where war is still happening. The people who have stayed also need protection and humanitarian assistance, and they need it even more urgently.

  This is why we urged the establishment of a no-fly zone and the supply of long-range distance weapons, defence systems and fighter planes. We have been asking for weeks but have not received anything yet. What we got instead from the international community has been drones, that’s all. But drones will not protect civilians from Russian attacks.

  Our own allies sometimes offer us aid that is not useful. Instead of listening to our requests, people who have no idea what it is to be under this kind of attack insist on providing the help they think we need. For instance, I have received calls from international CSOs who wanted to send us vests and helmets, which hopefully would arrive in Kyiv within a few weeks. That sounded funny because right now we don’t know what will happen within the next few hours. I had to explain to them that if Russians came to occupy Kyiv and found us wearing their nice helmets, they would kill us all. Their helmets won’t protect us from the dangers we face.

  I think the architecture of the international governance system is not working properly because it has a fundamental design defect. Russia is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. The mandate for this body is to maintain international peace and security, but we have seen the total opposite of that take place in Ukraine. And there is also a lack of understanding of their responsibilities by those who are in positions where they could help. When the war started, international organisations evacuated their staff from Kyiv and other places under attack. International organisations are clearly not up to their historic responsibilities. 

  I remain in Kyiv and have spent yet another horrible night in which residential buildings have been targeted by Russian missiles. I really don’t understand what the international community is waiting for. We need their urgent help. The people who died last night in Kyiv couldn’t wait.

  Civic space in Ukraine is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with the Center for Civil Liberties through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@ccl_ua on Twitter.

• UKRAINE: ‘The presence of international organisations is key to ensure safe humanitarian corridors’

  CIVICUS speaks with Sasha Romantsova, executive director of the Center for Civil Liberties (CCL), about Ukrainian civil society’s response to the Russian invasion.

  Established in 2007, CCL is a Ukrainian civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes human rights and democratic values in Ukraine and Europe.

  What are the main ways in which your organisation is responding to the Russian invasion?

  In the face of the unprecedented situation in Ukraine, on the first day of the Russian invasion CCL renewed its Euromaidan SOS initiative. This was launched in 2013 to provide legal help to activists detained during the peaceful protests held in the context of the Maidan Revolution, or Revolution of Dignity, which erupted in response to the then-president’s sudden decision not to sign a political and free trade agreement with the European Union.

  This initiative, which brings together hundreds of volunteers, is now working on various aspects of Russia’s human rights violations in Ukraine. More specifically, our volunteers are documenting war crimes and gathering information about prisoners and missing persons.

  Other volunteers help spread the word about what is going on in Ukraine through our social media accounts on Facebook and Twitter. They share useful information 24 hours a day. They publish content in various languages on YouTube. There is a whole group of volunteers who provide translations and specialists who tirelessly work on video editing.

  At the international level, we maintain communication channels through our diaspora, international human rights networks, partners and friends. We discuss with diplomats the urgent need for the protection of human rights in Ukraine. One significant issue we have discussed is the need for the presence of the missions of international organisations to ensure safe humanitarian corridors to evacuate civilians from war zones.

  Additionally, to respond to requests from people in need, we have created a special chatbot for the Telegram app.

  We are also constantly conducting advocacy actions and campaigns, such as #CloseTheSky, supporting President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s international demand for a no-fly zone over Ukraine. We are now starting a new campaign regarding the need for safe humanitarian corridors – safe evacuation routes for those fleeing the war.

  Alongside us, many other human rights organisations are involved in various areas of documenting Russia’s war crimes. Additionally, there are numerous public initiatives on all fronts, among them efforts to provide humanitarian cargo and logistics, evacuate civilians and organise art events and media campaigns, including some aimed to a Russian audience. These are very important because otherwise the truth about what is happening in Ukraine would never get reach the Russian population. We maintain a database of initiatives across the country. 

  How is the conflict affecting Ukrainian civil society’s work?

  Most CSOs have been forced to suspend their activities on the ground, and some have had to leave Ukraine for the time being. Many CSO staff members and activists who have stayed have at the very least sent their families away. There are some cities – such as Kharkov in the northeast and Mariupol in the southeast – where it is impossible for any CSO to continue to work. In other cities, such as Berdyansk, Kherson and Melitopol, activists are being kidnapped for their work.

  CCL continues to operate from Ukraine and our team members have not left the country. We are truly blessed to have a group of fantastic people who have run the Euromaidan initiative since Russia started this war.

  What should the international community do to help?

  Our demands to global leaders are to close the skies over Ukraine, provide weapons for our effective protection and fully enforce all the sanctions imposed on Russia, including the disconnection of all Russian banks from the SWIFT network and the cessation of oil and gas purchases from Russia.

  Given that most international organisations, including the United Nations (UN), have evacuated their international staff from Ukraine due to serious threats to their lives, we urge them to send in international missions qualified to work in military conditions.

  These missions’ duty should be to monitor the actions of both parties. The UN should establish an international tribunal to establish the facts of the Russian Federation’s military aggression, while the International Criminal Court should consider and promptly rule on war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ukraine. The International Committee of the Red Cross should be in charge of organising the exchange and removal of the dead from both sides.

  We stress the urgent need for international presence and international monitoring of violations during the evacuation of the civilian population from destroyed cities, villages and settlements. We therefore urge international civil society to support the advancement of our demands to the governments of democratic countries and the leadership of international organisations.

  Civic space in Ukraine is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with the Center for Civil Liberties through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@ccl_ua on Twitter.

• USA: ‘The framers of the constitution envisioned an accountable president, not a king above the law’

  CIVICUS discusses the recent US Supreme Court ruling on presidential immunity and its potential impact on the 5 November presidential election with Praveen Fernandes, Vice President at the Constitutional Accountability Center, a US think tank and public interest litigation organisation dedicated to studying and applying the constitution’s text, history and values.

  On 1 July, the US Supreme Courtruled that presidents have absolute immunity for the exercise of their core constitutional powers and are entitled to a presumption of immunity for other official acts, although they don’t enjoy immunity for unofficial acts. The decision comes as Donald Trump faces criminal charges for trying to overturn his 2020 election loss to Joe Biden. The question now is whether Trump’s actions will be considered official or unofficial. But it’s unlikely he’ll be tried before the election, and if he returns as president he could pardon himself. Critics claim the Supreme Court ruling violates the spirit of the US Constitution by placing the president above the law.

  What has the Supreme Court said about presidential immunity?

  In Trump v. United States, the Supreme Court’s conservative majority ruled that a former president can be granted a measure of immunity from criminal prosecution for acts committed while in office.

  The majority opinion held that there is absolute immunity from prosecution for acts within the president’s ‘exclusive and preclusive authority’ – powers the constitution specifically assigns to the president and no other branch of government. There is a presumption of immunity for official acts that are part of a president’s duties, although this can be rebutted if the government can show that prosecution would not threaten the powers and functions of the executive branch. There is no immunity for unofficial acts.

  As the dissenting opinions make clear, the court’s doctrine of presidential immunity departs not only from the text and history of the constitution, but also from the court’s own precedent.

  How does this ruling affect the criminal charges against Trump?

  While it’s impossible to know with certainty how this Supreme Court decision will affect all of the pending criminal cases against Trump, what we do know is that it will cause additional delays in prosecutions that have already been delayed far too long.

  For instance, the federal criminal case related to the 6 January 2021 attempted overturning of the 2020 election was paused for over 200 days until the Supreme Court issued its decision. Now the district court has to deal with issues such as which alleged crimes involve unofficial acts and can therefore be prosecuted.

  However, it is highly unlikely that the federal trial will reach a verdict before the presidential election in November. As a result, voters will likely be forced to cast their ballots without knowing whether one of the candidates is criminally responsible for attempting to overturn the results of the last election.

  Do you think this ruling could allow for an unfettered second Trump presidency?

  The danger seems great in a possible future Trump presidency where the fear of prosecution has been largely removed. But this goes far beyond Trump – it’s a danger that extends to anyone who holds such a powerful role without being held accountable to the same criminal laws that bind all other individuals.

  But there are still safeguards. Prosecutors can still pursue crimes related to unofficial acts, and there are still political accountability mechanisms, such as the ability to impeach a president for high crimes and misdemeanours by a vote in the House of Representatives and conviction in a trial in the Senate.

  What are the broader implications of this ruling for US democracy?

  The conservative majority opinion in Trump v. United States challenges the accountability envisioned by the framers of the constitution and moves the nation closer to the monarchical systems they sought to avoid. The framers envisioned a president accountable to the governed, not a king above the law.

  Immunising such a powerful position in the federal government from criminal accountability poses a significant risk and should be sobering to all Americans.

  This ruling is the latest reminder that even when the constitution is clear, we depend on judges to interpret it fairly. Judicial nominations matter. Electing presidents who will nominate fair and principled judges is important. Electing senators who will rigorously scrutinise those nominations is important. Let’s not forget that.

  Civic space in the USA is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Constitutional Accountability Center through itswebsite and follow@MyConstitution on Twitter.

• VENEZUELA: ‘The government seeks to stoke nationalist sentiment to try to hold on to power’

  CIVICUS speaks with Mariano de Alba, Senior Adviser at the International Crisis Group, about the recent referendum called by the Venezuelan government on the status of the Essequibo territory, disputed with neighbouring Guyana, and its possible implications for democracy in Venezuela and peace in the region.

  The International Crisis Group is an independent organisation that works to prevent wars and design policies to build a more peaceful world.

   

  Why did the Venezuelan government decide to submit the Essequibo issue to a referendum?

  The announcement of the referendum came first as a reaction by the Venezuelan government to the recent oil bidding rounds conducted by Guyana in maritime areas that Venezuela considers as pending delimitation. As the referendum was being organised, it became clear that the Venezuelan government was attaching additional value to it as a tool to test its capacity for electoral mobilisation a few months in advance of the presidential election due to take place later this year.

  In addition, by placing the dispute with Guyana on the public agenda, the Venezuelan government seeks to stoke nationalist sentiment in the Venezuelan population, and most particularly among the armed forces, a key group in its strategy to retain power.

  What’s the legal value of the referendum?

  According to jurisprudence by the Supreme Court of Justice, Venezuela’s highest judicial body, consultative referendums, a mechanism established in the Venezuelan constitution, are not binding. This view was publicly ratified by the chief lawyer who was appointed by the government to prepare the referendum questions.

  But for political reasons, since before the referendum and particularly in view of its results, the government has insisted that it does have a binding character in order to justify a series of actions it has announced in relation to the territory in dispute. These, however, have been no more than symbolic announcements, since Venezuelan armed forces have not effectively entered the disputed territory, which has been under Guyanese administration for many, many years.

  How did the opposition react to the referendum, and how will this impact on the 2024 elections?

  There were differences among various opposition groups on how to position themselves in relation to the referendum. First of all, it should be noted that on 17 October, when the government and the opposition met in Barbados to sign an agreement on the conditions to hold elections, they also signed another agreement in which they committed themselves to ‘ratify the historical rights’ of Venezuela and to ‘uphold the full validity of the 1966 Geneva Agreement’, the treaty that reignited the dispute, in which Guyana, Venezuela and the UK agreed to seek a solution to the conflict. As a result, at least part of the opposition leadership found it difficult to oppose the referendum.

  However, María Corina Machado, the main opposition leader, elected as a unity candidate in primaries held in late October 2023, did criticise the referendum, arguing that ‘sovereignty must be exercised, submitted to consultation’. The most important difference within the opposition is that some opposition leaders believe that one should participate in all electoral processes, regardless of the conditions, while others do not. Some voted in the referendum, while others didn’t.

  Ahead of the presidential elections, a key element of the government’s strategy is to foster division among the opposition, so that one part ends up calling for non-participation due to lack of sufficient guarantees and another part decides to participate. In the face of a divided opposition the government has a real chance of winning the election, since under the current electoral system whoever gets the most votes, even if short of 50 per cent, is elected. The election will take place in an authoritarian context in which the conditions for the competition will be poor and there is a high risk of government repression.

  What has been Guyana’s reaction?

  Guyana is focused on seeking a favourable decision at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where in 2018 it filed a lawsuit seeking ratification of the validity of the 1899 arbitral award that gave it the territory it now controls and administers, and which Venezuela ignores, arguing that the award was the product of procedural fraud.

  However, recent tensions complicate the picture for Guyana. First, because, at least on paper, the Venezuelan armed forces have substantially superior capabilities compared to Guyana’s. Hence Guyana’s intention to seek to strengthen its military alliances and obtain guarantees from allied states. Second, the uncertainty resulting from these tensions could affect the remarkable recent economic growth of Guyana, a country with a small population but high income due to the recent discovery and exploitation of oil resources. Already in mid-December 2023, London’s Lloyd’s insurance market rated the Guyanese exclusive economic zone as risky, which could increase the cost of shipping oil from there.

  What are the risks of an escalation into armed conflict?

  The referendum has substantially increased tensions between Guyana and Venezuela. Guyana saw the referendum and the subsequent actions of the Venezuelan government as a threat. But Guyana has also taken advantage of the tensions to try to strengthen its diplomatic and military alliances with states such as the UK and the USA.

  In the short to medium term, the risk of these tensions escalating into armed conflict is low, partly because the international reaction would be so critical of it. Moreover, while the Venezuelan government has announced and gone through with actions such as appointing an authority for the territory in dispute, it has been careful to ensure that the implementation of these actions has remained on Venezuelan territory for the time being.

  But escalation is not out of the question. Tension could lead to a limited confrontation, following which it could become difficult for one or both of the countries to de-escalate.

  From the Venezuelan perspective, escalation is a risky gamble because it could generate greater discontent among the Venezuelan armed forces, which would have to risk their lives, particularly if Guyana receives the support of a key ally such as the USA. Moreover, the Venezuelan government is striving to reintegrate itself into the international community, and initiating a conflict with Guyana would derail those efforts.

  On the Guyanese side, it is uncertain whether military support would actually come in the event of a substantial military conflict. Such a conflict could also make it very risky for some companies operating in Guyana to continue doing business there. Therefore, at least in the short and medium term, barring any surprises, attempts to keep tensions on the public agenda will predominate, but without resulting in any real escalation.

  At the end of the day, both countries, as the neighbours they are, will be obliged to try to negotiate. Even if Guyana obtains a favourable ICJ decision, that will hardly be the end of it, as without Venezuela’s cooperation it will be very difficult to enforce the judgment. Moreover, the maritime area will still be pending delimitation, so sooner or later negotiations will have to take place in any case.

  What is the status of diplomatic negotiations?

  Serious diplomatic efforts have been undertaken by various countries to try to convince both governments of the importance of lowering tensions and avoiding armed conflict. These efforts resulted in an agreement signed in St Vincent and the Grenadines on 14 December. There, it was agreed to de-escalate tensions and hold a new meeting in Brazil before the end of March.

  However, distrust between the two governments remains deep. The visit of a British warship to Guyana in late December, which Venezuela interpreted as a threat to which it responded by conducting military exercises on its territory, did not help a bit.

  The outlook is complicated by the fact that both governments believe they can make political gains out of these tensions, Venezuela for predominantly domestic political reasons, and Guyana first and foremost to strengthen its military alliances, and secondarily because, if it manages the situation well, the ruling party’s prospects could improve ahead of elections in 2025.

  Behind the scenes, diplomatic efforts continue because in the face of the war in Ukraine and the conflict in Gaza, the idea prevails that there is no international space for another armed conflict, and even less so in Latin America and the Caribbean, which for so many years has been a zone of peace, at least as far as inter-state conflicts are concerned.

  ---

  Civic space in Venezuela is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the International Crisis Group through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram accounts, and follow@CrisisGroup and@marianodealba on Twitter.

• VENEZUELA: ‘The government wants a civil society aligned with its interests, tamed and silent’

  CIVICUS discusses the ‘anti-NGO law’ recently passed in Venezuela with Alí Daniels, Co-Director of Acceso a la Justicia, a civil society organisation (CSO) dedicated to monitoring justice administration and the rule of law in Venezuela.

  On 15 August, Venezuela’s National Assemblyapproved a bill known as the ‘anti-NGO law’, which severely restricts freedom of association. The law requires CSOs to declare the origin of their funding, imposes strict reporting obligations, including a requirement to provide sensitive information, and bans organisations deemed to promote ‘fascism, intolerance and hatred’. The measure, proposed some time ago, was finally adopted after the28 July presidential election, which the opposition won by a large margin. The government has ignored the results, violently suppressed democracy protests and sought to stifle all sources of dissent.

  What’s the anti-NGO law, and what’s its place within the ruling regime’s repressive machinery?

  This new law has been presented as an instrument to regulate the exercise of freedoms of association and expression, when in fact it seeks to hinder it. One third of its 39 articles contain severe sanctions such as fines, deregistration, expulsion of foreigners and the dissolution of organisations. Although it claims to seek greater transparency and accountability, it contains only two articles on this issue, which was already regulated by the Civil Code.

  One of the most worrying aspects of the new law is that it obliges CSOs to reregister within 180 days and could leave them in legal limbo if they don’t receive a response from the authorities. It also imposes annual reviews, creating an unnecessary administrative burden even for those lacking financial resources.

  The anti-NGO law is part of a long-standing strategy of repression that includes human rights violations such as enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions and extrajudicial executions. It’s another cog in a repressive machine that includes measures such as revoking the passports of human rights defenders and activists, illegal surveillance of phones and social media and censorship of platforms such as WhatsApp and Twitter/X. Senior government officials have already labelled us terrorists, encouraging and justifying the intensification of repression.

  The anti-NGO law can also be seen as a response to international pressure questioning the legitimacy of the 28 July election. With it, the government is doubling down on its willingness to punish anyone who questions its legitimacy.

  What impact could this law have?

  We are very concerned that the new law is very similar to Nicaragua’s, which in just one year has led to more than 3,000 CSOs being made illegal.

  In the medium term, the new law could have a serious impact on the humanitarian situation. The new restrictions could lead to a reduction in the number of CSOs, while those that still operate may be forced to reduce their capacity to implement projects. Many CSOs may end up opting to become informal groups. While this would reduce costs, it would also limit their ability to receive funding, as donors often prefer to work with formal legal entities.

  The damage this could cause is not limited to CSOs – it also affects the people who depend on their services. For political reasons, the Venezuelan government adopts contradictory positions: it forces bankrupt companies to keep operating, allegedly to ‘protect jobs’, but it dissolves CSOs for failing to pay a fine. It claims to protect jobs, but dissolves organisations that create jobs in the humanitarian field.

  The anti-NGO law is designed to limit the independence of civil society, allowing only likeminded CSOs to operate. The government wants a civil society that’s aligned with its interests, tamed and silent.

  How is civil society working for a democratic transition in Venezuela?

  In a context marked by censorship of political expression and press freedom, Venezuelan civil society is playing a crucial role in the struggle for a democratic transition. In the face of restrictions on political parties and government control of the media, CSOs have become reliable sources of information, providing an alternative analysis to the official narrative. We provide data the government would rather hide, such as the rise in child malnutrition. We show reality as it is, and that’s why they want to suppress us.

  CSOs act as monitors and whistleblowers, offering critical analysis and proposing alternatives for Venezuela’s future. We advocate for dialogue and a negotiated transition, but we also set clear ethical and legal boundaries to ensure those responsible for crimes against humanity are brought to justice.

  How can the international community support civil society in Venezuela?

  The international community can help us keep what is happening in Venezuela in the global debate by echoing our condemnation of human rights violations and crimes against humanity. This is extremely important so those more ideologically reticent can recognise that human rights violations have no ideology and torture is unacceptable and must be condemned and punished no matter who commits it.

  It’s important that states with influence over the Venezuelan government, such as Brazil and Colombia, use their position to encourage dialogue. Diplomatic pressure and mediation by friendly countries could facilitate a process of negotiation and peaceful resolution. We have been facing a complex humanitarian emergency for more than two decades; any support to alleviate the crisis is greatly appreciated and will continue to give us hope and strength to face the very serious situation we are in.

  Civic space in Venezuela is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Acceso a la Justicia through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@AccesoaJusticia and@alijdaniels on Twitter.

• VENEZUELA: ‘With the new NGO law, the government aims to take control of the entire associational fabric’

  CIVICUS speaks with Rigoberto Lobo Puentes, founder of Promotion, Education and Defence of Human Rights (Promoción, Educación y Defensa en Derechos Humanos, PROMEDEHUM), about Venezuela’s NGO bill which, if passed, will further hinder civil society’s work.

  PROMEDEHUM brings together people whose common goal is education about and the promotion and defence of human rights.

  How has civic space in Venezuela changed recently?

  Civic space has experienced tensions for more than a decade. In 2010 the government implemented the Law of National Sovereignty and Self-Determination to restrict access to funding by human rights organisations, citing alleged external threats against the Venezuelan government. This law was only the first step. Starting in 2016, when the ruling party lost control of the National Assembly, the government began to issue emergency decrees granting powers to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to audit any agreement signed with international bodies by organisations or individuals to implement projects in Venezuela. This was part of a strategy to suffocate human rights organisations financially until they were forced to shut down.

  In 2020 the government body that regulates the banking system ordered banks to monitor the financial operations of civil society organisations (CSOs), supposedly to prevent money laundering and terrorism financing. Following criticism from international human rights protection bodies, in 2021 the provisions of the National Office against Organised Crime and Terrorist Financing in relation to CSOs were slightly amended. However, they continue to violate international human rights standards. Among other things, they provided for the creation of a new body in charge of authorising the registration and operation of CSOs and obliged CSOs to provide sensitive information.

  This attack caused fissures in civil society, as many thought that since the focus was on human rights organisations, other CSOs, including humanitarian organisations, were out of harm’s way, even if they also in one way or another defended human rights. Many CSOs said they had no problem with the obligation to register. The situation was very confusing. It was never clear where the registry was or would be, and in each city, organisations were given different information.

  In 2021, the ruling party-controlled National Assembly unanimously approved a national legislative plan that included a Law on International Cooperation, which also established a mandatory registry for CSOs. The aim again was to limit access to funding for CSOs.

  In 2022, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force refuted the idea that all these regulations were needed. Its assessment of Venezuela concluded that there was no evidence the proposed or implemented CSO registries could prevent potential abuses linked to terrorism financing.

  Finally, in January 2024 the National Assembly approved in first reading of the draft Law on Control, Regularisation, Operations and Financing of Non-Governmental and Related Organisations, better known as the NGO law. If passed, this law will allow the government to further restrict the functioning of civil society, as it broadly prohibits ‘political activities’ without clearly defining what this refers to, and could result in the imposition of sanctions or the closure of CSOs deemed to be engaging in ‘political activities’. In the session where the bill was approved, more than 60 CSOs were singled out as enemies and traitors to the homeland.

  The continued threats to and vilification and persecution of CSOs and human rights defenders, and restrictions and attacks on media and journalists, raids on offices and jailing of humanitarian workers, have created a climate of great fear. Many CSOs have lost members, some have closed, and many human rights defenders have migrated for various reasons, including because they have been persecuted or fear persecution in the near future. Some organisations, including media outlets, have adopted self-censorship or changed the nature of their activities to prevent reprisals.

  What impacts would the NGO law have in this context?

  The NGO law seeks to limit citizen participation and human rights advocacy. It would turn the freedom of association into a matter of public order, exposing organisations to surveillance and police control. Organisations that fail to register or disclose their sources of funding could face fines, deregistration and criminal prosecution. They could be criminalised under charges of terrorism, money laundering, destabilisation, conspiracy and foreign interference.

  Although the draft law may appear to target only human rights organisations, its impacts will be much broader, as it aims to take control of the entire associational fabric. All organisational forms, including political parties and education and academic organisations, are potential targets. Victims of human rights violations could lose all legal support. People affected by Venezuela’s humanitarian emergency could lose access to civil society humanitarian programmes, which could be replaced by government programmes with restrictive access conditions.

  In short, the government seeks a tailor-made civil society. It has an interest in the continuity of humanitarian organisations, as they relieve it of a burden and help it maintain an image of openness with the international community. But it wants humanitarian organisations to play a purely welfare role, with no connection to human rights, and to refrain from publishing any information that might project a negative image of Venezuela.

  The government has already made progress in this area. To some extent it already controls the activities of humanitarian organisations and obtains constant information on their activities throughout Venezuela.

  Why has the NGO law been revived after it was put on hold last year?

  The government has moved forward with this law as prospects increase of an election in the near future. The law can be used not just against human rights CSOs. It can be used against any organisational form that is considered a space for critical thought or dissent. This particularly applies to CSOs working on civil and political rights issues, demanding electoral transparency, monitoring campaigns and observing elections.

  From the government’s perspective, civil society jeopardises its prospects of staying in power. Under fair electoral conditions, civil society’s monitoring, documentation and denunciation of human rights violations perpetrated by an already unpopular government could harm its electoral standing. For years the government has sought to subdue, suffocate or nullify CSOs, and this will intensify as it faces the need to ensure its continuity in power.

  The NGO law had been suspended but not forgotten. The government simply waited for the right time to resume its attacks. Recently, there have been accusations against and arrests of members of the military, political parties and journalists in connection with an alleged assassination plot that has been classed as terrorism. This is part of a situation created by the government to justify actions to neutralise those who might become obstacles in the face of an election. In this context, the possibility of the NGO law being passed should not be ruled out.

  How have civil society and the public reacted to these attacks?

  Despite the seriousness of the law, there is a lot of misinformation and a high level of ignorance among Venezuelan citizens. Even some CSOs are unaware of its existence or its importance.

  However, civil society has issued numerous criticisms. Between 2022 and 2024, national and international CSOs have published at least 15 statements and analyses of the NGO law and the law on international cooperation. Numerous forums, talks and awareness campaigns have been held, inside and outside Venezuela.

  Many organisations and human rights defenders have participated in interactive sessions at the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council and in side events at the UN, the Organization of American States and the Summit of the Americas, and have submitted reports to human rights bodies. As a result of this advocacy, between 2021 and 2023, 11 statements and reports about these laws were published by international bodies.

  Those of us outside Venezuela have also advocated with the governments of our host countries. In Argentina, where I am at the moment, politicians and civil society have publicly condemned the NGO law.

  The Venezuelan government doubled down and on 12 January launched a public consultation on the law, without making the official text of the draft law public or inviting human rights CSOs to participate. According to the information that has come to light, most of the participants in the consultation have been state officials, including police officers. From what we have been able to observe in consultation events, which take place relatively spontaneously in various places and without an established format, and in the discussions on the issue in the National Assembly, the prevailing discourse has delegitimised CSOs, which are referred to as enemies of the state.

  What guarantees does Venezuelan civil society need to keep doing its work?

  To continue our advocacy work in defence of civic space we need more international organisations and people to come on board to help report on the deteriorating situation. CSOs need access to more accurate and reliable information to help build alliances more quickly and effectively.

  Venezuelan CSOs continue to work to communicate any changes that occur and to raise the alarm when attacks on rights take place. We continue to advocate with other states, especially when there are changes of government that could affect international policies of states. One imminent risk is of the non-renewal of the mandate of the International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela, established by the UN Human Rights Council in 2019. This would be a serious blow to Venezuelan civil society.

  Venezuelan organisations should also evaluate and rethink strategies in terms of the impact of the information we produce. We should better showcase the strengths of the Venezuelan human rights movement. Perhaps proactive transparency, to the extent that it does not put organisations and their members at greater risk, could serve to influence both the international community and the public. It is crucial that people in Venezuela understand the dimensions of the losses that the deterioration of civic space and the extinction of CSOs pose to our country.

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  Civic space in Venezuela is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with PROMEDEHUM through itswebsite orFacebook account, and follow it onInstagram and Twitter.

• Without Free Speech, Democracy Dies

  By Nipuna Kumbalathara, CIVICUS Communications Lead.

  Democracy is hanging precariously in a world tilted upside down in the face of today’s endless crises. Our rights and freedoms are dwindling. Free speech, an essential precursor to all human rights, is faltering.

  Less than 4% of the world’s citizens enjoy a wide range of civic freedoms, and nearly three-quarters live in countries with little. With 1,100 violations and 45% of all violations, freedom of expression topped the CIVICUS Monitor list of global attacks on rights.

  States that once set an example as bastions of free speech are also faltering.

  Read on Common Dreams

• ZAMBIA: ‘The abolition of the death penalty is a victory for civil society calling for respect of the right to life’

  CIVICUS speaks about Zambia’s recent abolition of the death penalty and the role played by civil society with Macdonald Chipenzi, outgoing Executive Director of the Governance, Elections, Advocacy, Research Services (GEARS) Initiative Zambia, a civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes democracy and electoral integrity.

  What led to the recent decision to abolish the death penalty in Zambia?

  Though the issue of the death penalty has been controversial and divisive in Zambia for some years now, and some people wanted to keep it on the statute books, there were various reasons behind the government’s decision to abolish it.

  First, since Zambia was declared a ‘Christian Nation’ in 1992, only one execution of a death warrant was done, in 1997 by then-president Fredrick Titus Jacob Chiluba. Since then, no president has been willing to sign a death warrant for any convict condemned to death. Another president, Levy Patrick Mwanawasa, even vowed never to sign any such warrant because he did not want human blood on his hands. The abolition of the death penalty was necessary both for consistency with the declaration of Zambia as a ‘Christian Nation’ whose belief in the Bible is unequivocal and to keep up with regional and global trends.

  Second, Zambia committed to abolishing the death penalty in the course of its successive Universal Periodic Review (UPR) examinations at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the latest of which took place in 2017. Several donor missions repeatedly reminded the state of Zambia that it must do away with death penalty and several meetings were attended in Geneva by successive Ministers of Justice on the same matter. Arguably, the desire for Zambia to have a tangible presentation on its commitments to the UNHRC to offer at the next UPR session, slated for later this year, explains the speed at which the abolition process has proceeded.

  Third, there was consistent advocacy from a majority of civil society towards the abolition of the death penalty to comply with the principle of respect for the right to life enshrined in our constitution. The constitution has not been amended because this would require a referendum, but the elimination of the death penalty from the Penal Code means no court will be able to issue a death sentence and the highest sentence for those convicted of capital offices will be life imprisonment.

  The development is therefore a victory for the CSOs that have been consistent in calling for the abolition of the death penalty and for respect of the right to life in Zambia. The death penalty was in contradiction to both the provision on the right to life in the constitution and the ethos of Zambia as a Christian Nation. However, there remains the gigantic job of removing the death penalty from the constitution – which is important to do, because if one day the country is led by a bloodthirsty leader they could still apply it if they find a constitutional provision allowing it.

  How has civil society, and GEARS Initiative in particular, advocated for the abolition of the death penalty?

  We found the basis to anchor our advocacy work for the abolition of the death penalty in the decades-long practice by Zambian presidents of refusing to sign death warrants against convicts sentenced to death. This made the death sentence clause of the constitution redundant and strengthened the position of human rights and pro-life CSOs.

  Advocacy took the form of submissions to Constitutional Review Commissions and the African Union’s African Peer Review Mechanism as well as position papers presented at local and international meetings such as the UPR sessions where the Zambian government was present. CSOs also made presentations and submissions at international forums and had one-on-one meetings with foreign missions of countries that had abolished the death penalty and with those of states concerned with human rights, such as the European Union, the UK and the USA.

  UPR sessions and pre-sessions and parallel events, including a recent one that GEARS Initiative was able to attend with support from CIVICUS, were used as a platform to advocate for the repeal of the death penalty. The creation of a critical mass of human rights CSOs synergised partnerships for joint and consistent advocacy activities that helped build momentum and compelled the government to act. It was also very crucial to build working synergies with local and international media to disseminate advocacy initiatives.

  What are the next steps in your work?

  There are a number of remaining repressive or archaic laws that should be repealed, reviewed or amended. These include the Public Order Act (1955), the NGO Act (2009), the Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act (2021) and the Contempt of Court Law, which is part of the Penal Code, among others. Except for the latter, the rest are already under review, with draft bills ready to be presented before the National Assembly. The Public Order Act, for instance, is being replaced with a Public Gatherings Bill.

  Our next steps are to continue advocating for a speedy legal review process of these repressive laws by undertaking public engagement and media activities, auditing obnoxious sections of these laws and submitting our reports to state authorities and other stakeholders, including the media, CSOs, donor communities and parliamentarians. This may entail hiring legal consultants to do desk reviews, identify the sections that need to be replaced and recommend alternatives that are justifiable from the perspective of a democratic society. This, will of course, require the investment of more technical and financial resources.

  What kind of support do you need to continue doing this work?

  Last year, GEARS Initiative received short-term financial and technical support from CIVICUS and two US-based organisations – the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law and the National Democratic Institute – to conduct legal analyses of the NGO Act, the Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act and the Public Order Act and report back on what and why they needed to be repealed or replaced. The negative impact of the continued existence of these laws was analysed and shared, not only with media and civil society, but also with citizens, including in local and rural communities.

  But for 2023, GEARS Initiative has not yet secured any support for its advocacy work towards the repeal of repressive laws. All our projects had short-term funding that ended in 2022, and had visible positive impact: they kept the government on its toes and pushed it to close the year with draft bills that it promised to table before the National Assembly in its first session starting in February 2023. GEARS Initiative was included in the Technical Committee on repeal and replacement of the Public Order Act and was further requested to make submissions on the review of the NGO Act and the Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act.

  GEARS Initiative will need financial and technical support to be able to sustain the advocacy activities it embarked on in 2022. In collaboration with like-minded CSOs, GEARS Initiative wants to continue reviewing the various repressive laws that restrict civic and democratic space in Zambia, conducting community, stakeholders’, media and government engagement around the findings of those reviews, and advocating for the replacement of obsolete or repressive legislation.

  Civic space inZambia is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with GEARS Initiative through itsFacebook page.

• ZIMBABWE: ‘Election violence is a cover for ideological ambivalence and lack of substantive programmes’

  CIVICUS speaks about the general election in Zimbabwe and the role of civil society with Wellington Mbofana, former director ofthe Civic Education Network Trust (CIVNET), a civil society organisation (CSO) that recently shut down due to lack of funding, and a former board member of several Zimbabwean CSOs.

  What was at stake in this election?

  It’s difficult to pinpoint a single crucial issue that was at stake. Over a considerable period, Zimbabwean elections, much like those in other parts of Africa, have ceased to revolve around substantive issues and have instead become centred on political parties and personalities. This trend is evident in this election, in which major political parties failed to present their manifestos in a timely manner. The main opposition party, Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), unveiled its programme merely two weeks prior to voting, while the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) didn’t even bother.

  Given the crumbling state of the economy, reflected in record-breaking unemployment, pervasive economic informality, escalating poverty, the world’s second-highest inflation rate and a sense of hopelessness, economic strife remained the most prominent concern for voters. Ideally, the competition should have revolved around two or three contrasting strategies for addressing these economic woes. However, what we observed was a cloud of obfuscation. The ruling party advanced a narrative that conditions are improving and investors are flocking to the country, but progress would be even greater if it weren’t for sanctions imposed by Western states. The opposition pledged to outperform ZANU-PF across all fronts. But neither specified how they would fund their proposed initiatives.

  To deal with Zimbabwe’s predicament effectively the government would need to confront a range of issues, including land reform and productivity, water shortages, electricity generation, infrastructure development and urbanisation and, most importantly, guarantee the required funding.

  It should have been important to ensure the meaningfulness of this election because when elections fail, civil unrest and coups ensue, a truth that Africa has repeatedly witnessed.

  Was there any election-related violence?

  The prevalence of violence in all its manifestations – physical, structural and cultural – remains an unfortunate hallmark of Zimbabwean elections. Lives have been lost, injuries endured and property destroyed as a result.

  It is also important to note that because of its fractured politics, the country is in a perpetual election mode. Over the past five years, we have had multiple recalls from parliament and local authorities, leading to by-elections. Instances of intra-party violence have also occurred during parliamentary and primary elections. The culture upholding the idea that wielding the strongest fist is the key to ascending to power must change. Violence is a cover for ideological ambivalence and lack of substantive programmes. Who needs a manifesto when you can use force?

  What tactics did the government use to stifle dissent in the run-up to the election?

  The ruling party stands accused of engaging in lawfare, a tactic that uses laws to constrain the opposition and human rights defenders. These efforts are facilitated by an allegedly captured judiciary. A prominent CCC legislator, Job Sikhala, along with other political activists and human rights defenders, languish in remand prisons on spurious allegations after being denied bail.

  The government introduced controversial laws aimed at silencing dissent. The Private Voluntary Organisations Amendment Bill and the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Amendment Act, commonly called the Patriotic Bill, are clearly designed to deal with critics of the government.

  The Patriotic Bill came into force on 14 July 2023. With this bill, the government created a new crime of ‘wilfully injuring the sovereignty and national interest of Zimbabwe’.  The scope and definition of this offence is vague. There are valid concerns that law enforcement agencies will interpret the law broadly and use it to stifle and penalise the work of independent civil society.

  Citizens and permanent residents of Zimbabwe will be found guilty if they participate in meetings aimed at discussing or plotting armed intervention in Zimbabwe, subverting or overthrowing its government and implementing or extending sanctions or trade boycotts against Zimbabwe. A meeting encompasses any form of communication involving two or more people, regardless of whether it takes place offline or online.

  Participating in discussions about armed intervention can result in life imprisonment or the death penalty if the meeting involves planning such an intervention. Discussing subversion or overthrow of the government is punishable by up to 20 years in prison. Taking part in meetings discussing sanctions or trade boycotts can lead to a fine of up to US$12,000 or up to 10 years in prison, or both. Aggravated offences may lead to consequences such as the termination of citizenship for those who are not citizens by birth or descent, cancellation of residence permits for non-citizens and disqualification from voting or holding public office for five to 15 years.

  In the hands of overzealous and partisan law enforcement agents, this punitive law is very dangerous. It seems to target not only the opposition and civil society but also factions within the fractured ruling party and the military. It likely seeks to prevent a recurrence of a military-assisted transition, which brought the current government to power in 2017. That coup was willingly accepted by powerful global players, including the African Union and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which inadvertently endorsed the idea of military change of power.

  How did Zimbabwean civil society engage with the electoral process?

  Civil society was actively involved in electoral activities throughout the electoral cycle. CSOs play a pivotal role in providing voter education, observing elections, advocating for electoral reforms, safeguarding human rights and offering legal, medical and psycho-social assistance to victims of human rights violations.

  Both local and international observers were generally allowed and accredited. However, there were isolated cases, such as the denial of accreditation to Musa Kika, allegedly due to security risks, while some local citizens encountered intimidation, harassment and threats from unidentified people after engaging with international observers.

  But unfortunately, the last couple of years have been very difficult for Zimbabwean. Several CSOs have shut down. CIVNET, a major organisation providing civic education, closed its doors this year due to lack of funding.

  The Zimbabwean economy is too fragile to support a strong civil society, which heavily relies on international donors and solidarity. Further international support should be rendered to all groups promoting development, good governance, human rights, justice and the rule of law. The international community should also amplify local voices and exert pressure on the Zimbabwean government to act in accordance with international human rights and democratic standards.

  What did CIVNET work on?

  CIVNET operated through three main programmes: the Citizen Participation Programme, including two projects on constitutionalism and voter education, the Leadership Development Programme and the Peace Building Programme.

  The Citizen Participation Programme encouraged citizen engagement in governance and development, fostering collaboration between communities and local authorities through participatory workshops and development projects. The Constitution and Constitutionalism Project aimed to raise awareness about the significance of the new constitution and share information on how to use it to exercise human rights and honour obligations as citizens.

  The Leadership Development Programme enhanced leadership skills of people engaged in community projects. Our graduates now lead various Zimbabwean CSOs and work in local authorities and parliament. CIVNET contributed to the formation and development of CSOs such as the Zimbabwe Election Support Network, the Zimbabwe Peace Project and the Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe. It was also a key member of the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGOs Forum.

  The Peace Building Programme helped people and communities divided by conflict to reach out to each other and mend broken relations. This was done through creatively designed workshops that provided security and safety to both victims and perpetrators of violent conflicts. Mediators were also trained to address local disputes, resulting in transformed relationships and improved dialogue within previously divided communities.

  To what extent could the election be called free and fair?

  The concept of free and fair elections involves political freedoms and fair processes prior to elections, culminating in the casting of votes by well-informed eligible voters able to vote freely for candidates and parties of their choice. A transparent tally of all valid votes, accurate result announcements and universal acceptance of the election outcomes by all parties are integral components of this concept.

  Past elections in Zimbabwe have been contested at courts and other institutions. For Zimbabwe to uphold its position within the international community, this election would have to gain universal recognition as credible, legitimate and conducted in a free and fair manner. It would be key to ensure the acceptance of its outcome and secure peace and stability to attract investors.

  The 2023 election was disputed in the legal arena even before a single ballot was cast. This may be a harbinger of future developments. On 12 July, the Electoral Court disqualified a presidential candidate, Savior Kasukuwere, whose participation had been previously permitted by the Nomination Court. Then the High Court disqualified 12 CCC parliamentary candidates, ostensibly for late filings, although the Nomination Court had accepted their submissions. Both decisions favoured the ruling party. However, following an appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s verdict on the 12 CCC candidates, leading to their reinstatement on the ballot. On 19 July the electoral court ruled in favour of a leader of the opposition United Zimbabwe Alliance party, Elizabeth Valerio, whose candidacy had been initially rejected by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), also for alleged untimely filing.

  Declaring the election to be free and fair would be unreasonable given the political environment characterised by violence, intimidation and voter suppression, non-transparent processes with the electoral roll and ballot paper printing, pre-voting by security personnel, biased media coverage, opposition rallies barred by the police, vote buying through handouts, influence from traditional and religious leaders on voters, misuse of government resources for party campaigns and indications that some parties will reject any outcome other than their own victory, implying that the ruling party wouldn’t have handed over power if it had lost. Indeed, SADC decided to abandon the term ‘free and fair’ regarding Zimbabwean elections, instead referring to them as ‘legitimate’.

  What electoral reforms are needed?

  Adherence to rule of law and impartial management of elections is essential. The ZEC should enforce the Electoral Code of Conduct, safeguarding the right for all to express their political views and campaign freely. It must also ensure fairness by curbing the misuse of state resources, preventing intimidation, harassment and destruction of campaign materials and improving voter education.

  The police should fulfil their constitutional duties impartially, without bias, fear, or favour. Political parties should adhere to the Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Candidates. This entails refraining from violence, misuse of public resources for partisan ends, coercion and intimidation of the electorate and inciting violence through hate speech and derogatory language.

  Were there any issues with people being prevented from voting, and what do you expect to happen next?

  A high turnout was to be expected given the high stakes. The economy has done its own campaign, motivating people to participate. The ruling party also mobilised people, especially in rural areas, by any means necessary.

  However, many voters might not have been able to locate their names on the register. The polling station-based system is such that people living in a specific neighbourhood can only vote at a certain polling station. In the 2018 election, a lot of people found their names had been removed from their usual stations without a change having been requested, while others who requested changes after moving to other districts saw those changes unimplemented. Following the election, many constituencies and councils had elected representatives recalled by political parties in power. Since there are no guarantees that this won’t happen again, some people may have been discouraged from voting.

  Based on experience, disputes around results and their resolution by the courts are to be expected. Given that the judiciary is perceived to be captured and judges were given significant ‘housing loans’ before the election, judgements against the opposition are also rightly likely to be perceived as unfair.

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  Civic space in Zimbabwe is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

• ZIMBABWE: ‘This so-called election was a circus and a waste of resources’

  CIVICUS speaks about Zimbabwe’sAugust general election and its aftermath with Obert Masaraure, national president of Amalgamated Rural Teachers Union of Zimbabwe and spokesperson of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, which brings together 84 Zimbabwean civil society organisations (CSOs).

  What was at stake in this election?

  This was an important election. We were expecting both a democratic and an economic breakthrough after years of dictatorship and economic stagnation. Millions of young people are dropping out of school, thousands are dying after failing to secure healthcare and millions are unemployed. We expected change to happen.

  But we were disappointed. Civil society tried to engage with the electoral process and play a monitoring role but was criminalised. Those who were doing voter tabulation were arrested. After the Election Management Board barred civil society groups we had to monitor the electoral process clandestinely. In the run-up to the election we also did a lot of voter education. We managed to generate excitement among voters, but on voting day they were frustrated.

  What’s your assessment of the credibility of the results?

  According to the results announced by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) on 26 August, President Emmerson Mnangagwa of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) received 52.6 per cent of the vote, while the leading opposition candidate, Nelson Chamisa of Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), received 44 per cent. But these results are not credible because the polls were held on a flawed electoral field and the ZEC failed to discharge its duty to run a reasonably free and fair election, as evidenced by multiple acts and omissions.

  First, the ZEC didn’t supply ballot papers or the voter roll in time to many polling stations in the provinces of Bulawayo, Harare and Manicaland, which are traditional opposition strongholds. This was a clear attempt to suppress voters and help the incumbent stay in power.

  The Electoral Act mandates ZEC to display the voter roll at all polling stations 48 hours before the polls open, but most polling stations only received it on election day. This had consequences for the opposition, because in urban areas, where the opposition is stronger, at least 180,000 voters couldn’t find their names at the designated polling stations on election day. Their names had been moved after a shambolic delimitation process but as voter rolls had been unavailable until the last minute, these voters were unable to locate their new polling stations.

  According to a ZEC statement, only 23 per cent of polling stations opened on time in Harare, with 75 per cent doing so in Bulawayo and 85 per cent in Manicaland. Some polling stations in Harare were still waiting for ballot papers as late as 6pm, one hour before closing. In contrast, in the majority of the ruling party’s strongholds, typically in harder-to-reach areas, election materials were received early and all polling places were open at the scheduled time.

  In urban areas there were waiting times of up to 12 hours. Many people were unable to vote within that period and voting had to be extended to 48 hours. In rural areas, where the ruling party is strongest, the maximum waiting period was 30 minutes. Additionally, an estimated 42,000 civil servants who were working as polling officials could not vote after the ZEC refused to facilitate their voting.

  The overall impact of this was to disenfranchise millions of voters and suppress opposition voters while encouraging those of the ruling party.

  There were also lots of fraudulent and deceptive practices. There were cases where local candidates were taken off the ballot, as happened to CCC’s Shepherd Sithole in ward 1 of Bulawayo. A shocking incident was also recorded in which party symbols for ZANU-PF and the CCC were switched, confusing voters and making it impossible to record their actual choice.

  There were reports from at least 50 polling stations in rural areas that the supposedly indelible ink used could easily be washed away. This was suspected to be a deliberate attempt to allow rural voters to vote multiple times to inflate the results for ZANU-PF. The postal ballot mechanism also appeared to be abused for ballot stuffing, as at least 35 polling stations reported receiving more postal ballots than they had voters registered.

  There were numerous instances of intimidation at polling stations. A ZANU-PF affiliate, Forever Associates Zimbabwe (FAZ), set up ‘exit survey tables’ in at least 1,340 polling stations. Individual voters were asked to declare who they had voted for and provide their personal details. FAZ also recorded the serial numbers of voters’ ballot papers and told voters they would be able to tell who they voted for. Needless to say, this intimidated voters who have experienced a long history of serious political violence.

  This was a sham, not an election. It was a circus and a waste of resources that subverted the will of the people and illegally kept the incumbent in power.

  What needs to happen next to bring about democracy in Zimbabwe?

  The Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition has demanded the immediate announcement of a date for a fresh free, fair and credible election. We must put an end to the long history of disputed elections in Zimbabwe and usher in a legitimate government that can lift Zimbabwe up from the category of a pariah state, rebuild its economy and improve the lives of its people.

  Zimbabwe needs an inclusive national dialogue to broker a political settlement leading to credible elections supervised by the Southern African Development Community and the African Union. Zimbabweans should play their role in exerting pressure on the government to force it to agree to dialogue.

  Zimbabwean pro-democracy organisations must be strengthened through international support so that they can play their proper role in a transition to democracy. The international community is also invited to exert pressure so that the government agrees to engage in an inclusive national dialogue. And while it does not, the international community must isolate the country from the family of nations. A dictatorship does not deserve a seat on any international platform.

  Civic space in Zimbabwe is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Obert Masaraure through itsFacebook page and follow@omasaraure on Twitter