democracy

• EL SALVADOR: ‘The president’s aim is to concentrate power’

  CIVICUS speaks with Eduardo Escobar, executive director of Acción Ciudadana, an organisation that promotes transparency, accountability and the fight against corruption in El Salvador, about the political situation since President Nayib Bukele’s party won the February 2021 legislative election.

  

  Do you think that democracy and the rule of law are being eroded in El Salvador?

  We should first ask ourselves whether El Salvador ever had a full democracy with the rule of law. If we reduce democracy to its electoral dimension, we could say that the will of the people has been respected and elections have become the only road to power. Despite some irregularities, we have had democracy in that sense. Since 2009, some progress was also made in terms of the balance of powers: we got an independent Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, an independent Institute for Access to Public Information (IAIP) and a prosecutor’s office that was striving to do its job.

  Thus, when Nayib Bukele became president in 2019, there was a functioning electoral democracy, with some important advances being made in the republican dimension and the rule of law. President Bukele interrupted this process, constantly attacking the freedom of expression, the freedom of the press and the freedom of association. In the context of the pandemic, the government illegitimately and unconstitutionally violated the freedom of movement. What little progress had been made was completely lost.

  After the legislative elections held on 28 February 2021, which Bukele won by a wide margin, legal certainty ceased to exist. As soon as the new legislative assembly formed in early May, it dismissed the judges of the Constitutional Chamber and the head of the attorney general’s office. We had come to trust that the Constitutional Chamber would protect us from arbitrariness, but that certainty vanished in an instant. Shortly afterwards, the new Constitutional Chamber enabled the president’s immediate re-election for a second term, so far prohibited by the Salvadoran Constitution.

  Have the opposition or civil society been able to do anything about recent changes?

  The opposition was not smart. Until May 2021 it held an absolute majority in the legislative assembly but failed to take advantage of it. Opposition parties didn’t think they needed to hurry because they never thought they would lose. Now they have become irrelevant. Their presence is merely testimonial because the president’s party, Nuevas Ideas, and its allies have a supermajority. The opposition is limited to making statements and peddling proposals that everyone knows will not prosper.

  Most of civil society has been closed off from participating in the legislative process. It is not that in the past every civil society proposal was approved – in fact, they were often not even discussed – but there were certain thematic areas where civil society participation was vital to pass a law. That is over: now only pro-government organisations are invited and admitted to committee sessions. Independent civil society has little influence over public policy because the government does not understand its role and is unwilling to integrate its input into decision-making. Thus, it has been reduced to a voice of denunciation with no power to reverse illegal or unconstitutional decisions, as there are no independent institutions left to react to its demands.

  President Bukele campaigned on an anti-corruption programme. Has there been any progress in this regard?

  The instrumentalisation of the issue of corruption was one of the bases of Bukele’s victory; his campaign slogan was ‘give back what you stole’. The issue of corruption is broad and complex, but that slogan was clear and precise, and appealed to many people. But it was only a campaign strategy.

  Once in power, he deactivated all existing anti-corruption mechanisms, disregarding IAIP resolutions, preventing audits by the Court of Auditors of government ministries, denying the prosecutor’s office access to public bodies involved in corruption cases, and finally removing the prosecutor and imposing one of his unconditional supporters, who even has legal complaints filed against him. We have no way of knowing the government’s expenditure, particularly those related to the pandemic. The administration has been so opaque that we don’t even have reliable data on how many people were infected with COVID-19, how many were hospitalised and how many died. The government does not provide information, it hides it. And when there are revelations or allegations of corruption, it attacks and defames the whistle-blower.

  How has this situation affected Acción Ciudadana’s work?

  Acción Ciudadana promotes political reform, transparency, accountability, citizen participation and the fight against corruption and impunity. Hence, much of the work we do is monitoring: we monitor political financing, internal political party elections and electoral propaganda; the work of the attorney general’s office, transparency in public administration and obstacles to access information; and the functioning of institutional mechanisms for the prevention, detection and punishment of corruption.

  To do our investigations we need access to public information, but the avenues of access are being closed. For example, the law establishes that information on travel by public officials must be public; however, the government has decided that this information is to be kept confidential for seven years. In this particular case there has been some pressure in the media and on social media, and the government changed its criteria and now withholds this information for up to 30 days after each trip, supposedly to protect the security of the concerned official. This is still illegal.

  When we are denied information that should be public, we can no longer turn to the bodies that safeguard access to information because they are either co-opted or frightened. For example, some political parties – starting with the ruling party – do not hand over their financial information to us. We have repeatedly denounced this to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal for almost three years, but the Tribunal does not accept our complaints. So when a party does not provide us with information, we no longer appeal to the Tribunal, and when faced with an unconstitutional law, we no longer appeal to the Constitutional Chamber.

  We have also lost much of our advocacy capacity. Normally our monitoring would lead to legal complaints and criminal investigations. But nowadays the most we can do is publish the results of our investigations in some media outlets and offer them to the public. We can no longer feed them into institutional processes. For example, we found that in the 2019 presidential campaign a company donated US$1 million to the Grand Alliance for National Unity, Bukele’s electoral coalition, and in 2020 the government awarded that company a public-private partnership contract to manage and expand the airport. We see this as a case of conflict of interest, but we cannot take the issue to the prosecutor’s office or the Court of Auditors and ask them to investigate.

  President Bukele seems difficult to classify ideologically. What is his programme?

  If I had to classify the president’s party, I would say that it is a catch-all party, without an ideologically defined political project. Until he was expelled in 2017, Bukele belonged to the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, and he portrayed himself as a revolutionary leftist who embraced Hugo Chávez and spoke of social justice. Then, as president-elect, he gave a speech at the Heritage Foundation, one of the most conservative think tanks in the USA, and he couldn’t have sounded more neoliberal. He has always claimed that the issues that need solutions were not a matter of ideology, and Nuevas Ideas was set up with the logic that everyone could fit in it, regardless of whether they were on the left or on the right. And that’s how it has been; there’s a bit of everything in there.

  Bukele does not have an ideological programme; his aim is to concentrate power. He can take right-wing or left-wing measures, but not because he has one ideology or the other, but because it happens to be what benefits him the most. For example, most of the pension system in El Salvador is private and he will probably nationalise it, not because he believes that this essential public service should be managed by the state, but because the Pension Fund moves millions of dollars, and the government wants to get its hands on it because it is short of resources, in debt and without further sources of funding, since the possibility of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund has just collapsed. Of course, privatisation is being presented as an act of justice towards pensioners, who receive miserable pensions. Based on this measure, an outside observer might think that his is a leftist government, but this is not an ideological measure, but rather one made out of convenience. The government is driven by the pursuit of political and economic gain, which is why it often appears erratic or improvised. There is no vision to guide the government’s planning.

  What are the causes of the protests currently faced by the government?

  The protests that began in early September erupted in reaction to the adoption of bitcoin as an official currency alongside the US dollar. Many people who support and value Bukele have opposed this measure, because they thought it could adversely affect them. This is the first government measure that has been widely rejected, and I think it was not only because of opposition to the cryptocurrency, but also because of the way decisions are being made, in the absence of sufficient information, debate and participation. Bukele made the announcement of this measure at an event in Miami on a Saturday, and the following Monday the bill was submitted to Congress. By Tuesday it had been passed. Everything was resolved in three or four days, amid total secrecy.

  Unfortunately, the reaction on this issue has been an exception, possibly because it is a subject that many people don’t understand much about, which causes fear. Generally speaking, most people applaud the president, his handling of the pandemic and his Territorial Control Plan, which is a strategy for militarising citizen security. This is because the narrative constructed by the government has been successful. For example, when the judges of the Constitutional Chamber were dismissed – a manoeuvre that civil society denounced as a coup d’état – the government said that the corrupt had been thrown out and many people believed it. There were people who came out to protest, not only from organised civil society, but also citizens in general, but they were a minority. It is difficult to counter the official narrative.

  What support does Salvadoran civil society need to be able to play its full role?

  It is quite complicated. Journalists manage to get information leaked to them and get their stories out, but we are not journalists. To get the information we need to play our accountability role we look for it on institutional portals and make information requests. Any effort to get public institutions to disclose information a bit more would help us.

  We also need support in terms of personal and digital security, as well as in the area of communications, because evidently civil society has not been able to communicate our messages adequately and we have not been able to build an alternative narrative to the official one.

  Civic space in El Salvador is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Acción Ciudadana through itsFacebook page and follow@CiudadanaAccio1 and@esec76 on Twitter. 

• EQUATORIAL GUINEA: ‘The government uses violence to dominate through fear’

  CIVICUS speaks with Alfredo Okenve, president of the Centre for Studies and Initiatives for the Development of Equatorial Guinea (CEIDGE), about the political context in which civil society operates in Equatorial Guinea.

  CEIDGE is an independent civil society organisation that has advocated for the protection of human rights in Equatorial Guinea since 1997.

  Is there any space for civil society in Equatorial Guinea?

  There is no space for civil society. However, in addition to working to provide care for vulnerable people and promote community development, civil society activism strives to open civic space, promote human rights and create citizen networks for protection and education.

  We don’t do it because we want to be martyrs or to please anyone. We do it because this is our country, we want it to be a better place and this is the only way to bring about change. We do it under very difficult conditions, at great personal, family and professional cost. Activists in Equatorial Guinea are real heroes and they need all kinds of support – technical, technological, financial and political.

  How has Teodoro Obiang Nguema managed to become the world’s longest-serving dictator?

  Obiang has been president of Equatorial Guinea for 44 years. He is now an old man, weak and with diminished capacities. He is someone who has been very lucky. He is of very humble origins, the son of a Gabonese immigrant, and lost his mother at an early age. Thanks to the aid he received, especially from the Catholic Church, he was able to study and became a military officer. But despite all the power he later accumulated, he never overcame the complexes caused by his origins and his mediocre education. This has greatly affected the exercise of his roles.

  Macías Nguema, the first president of Equatorial Guinea after independence in 1968, was from the same family and administrative clan. As a result, Obiang became a key player in the army and the repressive apparatus. In 1979 he overthrew the president in a coup and has remained in power ever since.

  Obiang received his military training in Franco’s Spain. From the conception of power he absorbed there he became an Afro-fascist autocrat. He has been a mediocre professional and an incompetent ruler: he has been unable to make things work in a small country with enormous natural resources and a very undemanding population.

  To stay in power, he has been helped, first of all, by the historical past. Equatorial Guinea has known no freedoms. Its people have never been treated as citizens and have never considered themselves as such. They are ignorant of the basics of how a state functions and have no civic culture.

  He has also instrumentalised violence to dominate through fear and mistrust. He has used repression, with no limits and with total impunity, subjecting critics to torture, trumped-up charges, arbitrary trials and long prison sentences. The fear he instils in people has a real basis. There is no legal security and no conditions for a free press to function.

  The regime’s omnipotent control is facilitated by the small size of the country and the quantity of economic resources at its disposal. In recent decades, Obiang and his entourage have appropriated hydrocarbon revenues while condemning the majority of the population to social and economic exclusion. The system is set up in such a way that people’s ability to ensure their economic, social and political survival depends largely on Obiang’s blessing.

  What role does ethnicity play in Obiang’s rule?

  Equatorial Guinea is a multi-ethnic country with a very uneven ethnic distribution of the population. The majority ethic group, the Fang, accounts for more than 80 per cent of the population, while the Bubis constitute about 12 to 13 per cent and the other four ethnic groups – Annoboneses, Bissiós Fernandinos and Ndowés – make up only five to six per cent.

  The Obiang family belongs to the Fang ethnic group, and although the ethnic component is important, power is not exercised on an ethnic basis but rather on a clan and territorial basis. A family clan and a district clan from the district of origin of the former and current president have concentrated power for more than five decades. More than three decades ago, a third power base was established: the Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE) led by Obiang. While the country does not have a one-party system enshrined in its constitution, the PDGE functions as a quasi-single party.

  The exercise of power on the basis of control requires Obiang to have instruments of repression and co-optation in all corners of the country and in all ethnic groups. Through the distribution of privileges, Obiang has secured trusted people and enforcement arms in Equatorial Guinea’s six ethnic groups. In each territorial district, he has created a commission to monitor political allegiance.

  What do you think will be the effects of the entry of Teodoro Obiang’s son into politics?

  In 2012 the Constitution of Equatorial Guinea was reformed to introduce a new role of vice-president. Obiang appointed his son, Teodoro Nguema Obiang, to this post, revealing his intention to perpetuate the clannish, dictatorial and kleptocratic regime.

  For years the vice-president has shared power with his parents. He is a person who has limitations of all kinds: intellectual, professional, human, emotional and ethical. He is not a person with whom dialogue is possible, nor is he a person who understands power as emanating from popular sovereignty. If anything, since his rise to power the number of political prisoners, disappearances and deaths and the level of citizen insecurity have grown. Public administration is out of control, economic activity is virtually non-existent, and there are serious problems of unemployment and food insecurity.

  What should the international community do to promote a transition to democracy in Equatorial Guinea?

  Despite having many natural resources, Equatorial Guinea is very dependent on the international community, so if the international community really wanted to impose conditions on the regime, it could do so. Politically, the USA, the European Union and some African countries could push the country towards a peaceful transition to democracy. To this end, they should demand that President Obiang engage in inclusive and broad dialogue to reach agreements with pro-democracy social and political forces and appoint a transitional government over which he does not preside.

  International cooperation should also support, with technical assistance, financial resources and expressions of solidarity, the pro-democracy activists and groups who are taking risks every day to promote democracy and human development in Equatorial Guinea.

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  Civic space in Equatorial Guinea is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with CEID through itswebsite orFacebook account.

• ERITREA: ‘When the government reacts to our work, we know what we do is making an impact’

  CIVICUS speaks with about civil society work in Eritrea’s context of closed civic space with Helen Kidan, chairperson of the Eritrean Movement for Democracy and Human Rights (EMDHR).

  Founded in 2003 and based in South Africa, EMDHR is a civil society organisation (CSO) that raises awareness about the lack of civil and democratic freedoms and promotes the rule of law, human rights and democracy in Eritrea.

  What’s the situation for civil society in Eritrea?

  Eritrea has never truly implemented its 1997 Constitution and until Eritrea it is run by the rule of law, human rights abuses will continue with no recourse to justice. This includes completely closed civil society space, with no semblance of rights of association, assembly and expression.

  Since Proclamation No. 145 of 2005 went into effect nearly two decades ago, there has been no independent civil society in Eritrea. According to this law, the only way CSOs can implement programmes is in partnership with government agencies, which restrict the areas, themes and focus of the projects that can be implemented. There are obviously very few CSOs present and active in Eritrea.

  The only way to start creating any space for independent CSOs in Eritrea would be to have Proclamation 145/2005 revoked.

  What is EMDHR doing to try to improve the situation?

  EMDHR advocates against the ongoing human rights abuses in Eritrea as well as for the rights of Eritrean refugees in the diaspora. Our mission is to promote and defend human right values as established in international legal instruments and advance democratic change, rule of law and constitutionalism in Eritrea, with the ultimate aim of building a society in which people exercise their basic rights and live in peace, dignity and prosperity.

  We provide training, sustain networks and produce and disseminate information to create awareness of the situation of Eritreans. We have made several presentations at the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council in Geneva, and in July 2022 we made a presentation at the UN in New York.

  We are currently working with African CSOs to bring the ongoing crisis in Eritrea to the African level and get support for Eritrean refugees. We have also commissioned a report on the state of Eritrean CSOs that makes recommendations to the international community.

  In early September 2023 we co-organised the Africa Civil Society Organisations Summit held in Arusha, Tanzania. Through a joint project with Africa Monitors, Eritrean Satellite Television and Eritrean Diaspora for East Africa, a CSO based in Kenya, we have provided training to Eritrean human rights activists, including on digital activism, and created a space for Eritrean CSOs and activists to be able to work together.

  In 2019 we provided in-person training in a workshop held in Uganda. In 2017 we co-organised a conference in Brussels on the ongoing Eritrean refugee crisis, with which we tried to elicit a reaction from members of the European Parliament, commissioners and CSOs from across Europe. And in 2015 we campaigned and got asylum for Eritrean footballers in Botswana.

  What’s it like to be a diaspora activist? How do you connect with activists within Eritrea?

  It’s extremely frustrating because it makes our work less effective. Connecting with people inside Eritrea is very hard as internet penetration in Eritrea is only two per cent. The government basically controls all media: all independent media ceased to exist in 2001. This is why most information is brought to us by people who have recently left the country. But while the work is challenging, it is still possible to get information. And when the government reacts to our work, we know what we do is making an impact.

  A lot of funders provide funds to African organisations only when they operate in their home country. The fact that we are not able to operate inside Eritrea means we also suffer financially and hence a lot of Eritrean CSOs are forced to sustain themselves on the basis of voluntary work.

  Additionally, the work remains emotionally and psychologically draining, as many Eritrean activists in the diaspora are threatened with harm to family members still living in Eritrea for speaking out against the regime back home.

  As Eritrean human rights defenders, even if you are operating outside the country, the government will always discredit your work. All those that don’t agree with them are seen as traitors. The government uses social media as a means of trolling and tries to attack websites and other social media channels.

  What sparked recent protests by Eritrean refugees in Israel, and how has the Israeli government responded?

  Those protests appeared to have been organised by a new group called Brigade N’Hamedu, which is trying to overthrow the regime. Their members hold demonstrations across the world, and they particularly attack the festivals that the regime holds abroad, which they view as a means of raising funds for the regime and spreading its propaganda. They are tired of government interference and intimidate Eritreans who have left their country but still support the Eritrean government. They want all Eritreans who claim asylum but express support for the Eritrean government to have their asylum revoked.

  This is a movement of young Eritreans but a lot of veterans and older members of the community support them, as they see them as the most plausible means of removing the regime. Although they have succeeded in mobilising Eritreans, however, there seems to be no clear strategy and this could be a stumbling block. They are very unlikely to succeed.

  In response to these protests, and using their unprecedented violence as an excuse, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that he wants all Eritreans removed from Israel. The predicament of Eritreans in Israel was already dire, but this has now opened the doors for the far-right government in Israel to deport all Eritreans. However, the UN, Israeli human rights groups and other human rights groups outside Israel are asking that genuine refugees whose lives are at risk not be deported to Eritrea.

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  Civic space in Eritrea is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with EMDHR through itswebsite or Facebook page,and follow @emdhrorg on Twitter.

• ESTONIA: ‘Legal changes deepen the cultural shift favourable to LGBTQI+ rights’

  CIVICUS speaks about civil society’s role in the recentlegalisation of same-sex marriage in Estonia with Kelly Grossthal, head of strategic litigation at the Estonian Human Rights Centre (EHRC).

  Established in 2009, the EHRC is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) working to create anopen society where human rights are guaranteed by the state, and where everyone knows that their rights, as well as the rights of others, deserve equal protection. 

  How significant is the recent legalisation of same-sex marriage?

  Marriage equality has always been the ultimate goal of LGBTQI+ and human rights advocates. The previous arrangement, that of civil unions, was only a temporary compromise. In 2014, the Estonian parliament passed the gender-neutral Registered Partnership Act, which came into force in 2016. Under this law, couples entering a partnership agreement are entitled to joint property rights, succession rights, shared financial obligations, access to each other’s private information and resolution of issues related to the end of life. However, due to the law’s lack of implementation provisions, many couples had to resort to the courts to be able to actually exercise these rights.

  In 2018, the Supreme Court ruled that, regardless of the lack of implementing provisions, the Registered Partnership Act was in force and was part of the Estonian legal order. It stated that failure to issue implementing provisions did not automatically render the legislation unconstitutional, as some argued. This highlights that even with the Registered Partnership Act in place, the struggle for marriage equality persisted.

  How did the EHRC advocate for legal change?

  Since its establishment in 2009, the EHRC has monitored legislation that impacts on LGBTQI+ people and put forward suggestions to improve it. Our main advocacy goal has always been legal equality. However, we have encountered numerous obstacles, primarily stemming from the political climate and societal attitudes. For many years LGBTQI+ rights lacked support from public opinion, and therefore it was not advantageous for politicians to actively champion the cause.

  We have conducted public campaigns advocating for LGBTQI+ rights as human rights, engaged in research, contributed to public discussions and pursued legal cases through our strategic litigation programme. Strategic litigation aims to have a societal impact through specific cases and narratives. When selecting cases related to the LGBTQI+ community, our primary criterion is their potential to maximise a positive outcome for LGBTQI+ people’s human rights.

  We handled several cases that have improved access to social benefits and adoption rights for LGBTQI+ people and filed petitions for constitutional review of regressive laws. For instance, in 2019 the Supreme Court ruled that a provision in the Aliens Act that prevented the granting of temporary residence permits to same-sex registered partners of Estonian citizens for leading a family life in Estonia was unconstitutional and therefore invalid.

  Many of our advocacy efforts have been planned and executed in cooperation with the Estonian LGBT Association and the Equal Treatment Network, which unites 10 Estonian CSOs dedicated to protecting the equal rights of different target groups.

  How have public attitudes towards LGBTQI+ people evolved over time?

  Just a couple of years ago, the majority of Estonians opposed marriage equality. Resistance could have been influenced by personal values, religious beliefs, or a fear of change. Over the past few years, however, there has been intense societal debate over LGBTQI+ issues. Various video campaigns and petitions have been launched both in support of and against the Registered Partnership Act, marriage equality and LGBTQI+ rights more generally. Unfortunately, this has led to an increase in hate speech towards LGBTQI+ people, fuelled by conservative politicians. But it had the positive effect of making rainbow families more visible, as they shared their stories in response to anti-rights attacks.

  The ongoing debate and increased visibility have played a crucial role in driving cultural change and garnering support for LGBTQI+ rights. The adoption of the Registered Partnership Act and the legalisation of same-sex marriage were two big milestones. Legal changes seem to have further deepened the positive cultural shift.

  For over a decade the EHRC has commissioned public opinion surveys on LGBTQI+ issues from an independent research company, Turu-uuringute AS. According to the most recent one, conducted earlier this year, support for marriage equality has increased by six points in the past two years, with 53 per cent of Estonians currently in favour. Progress has been significant: a decade ago only 34 per cent were in favour and 60 per cent opposed it.

  Civil society has been instrumental in shifting public opinion about LGBTQI+ people, with numerous LGBTQI+ groups and networks organising events for both LGBTQI+ people and the public as a whole.

  The Estonian LGBT Association has been the main organiser of Baltic Pride, the most recent of which took place in the capital, Tallinn, in June, just before the parliamentary vote on marriage equality. It attracted over 7,000 participants from three Baltic states and there were no major incidents. It was a truly joyous march followed by an open-air concert with community artists and a picnic.

  Since 2017, Estonia has also hosted an LGBTQI+ film festival, Festheart, organised by a small CSO. Initially held in the town of Rakvere, by 2020 it had expanded to Tartu, Estonia’s second-largest city.

  Has the legalisation of same-sex marriage elicited any anti-rights backlash?

  As anticipated, there has been a conservative backlash in response to the new legislation. Two parties, the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia and Isamaa (Fatherland), have been vocal opponents of LGBTQI+ rights in general and marriage equality in particular. Their leaders and prominent members have expressed great dissatisfaction with the new law, and some politicians have pledged to reverse it should conservative parties regain power.

  The anti-LGBTQI+ civil society movement in Estonia is closely linked to conservative parties. A few weeks before the final parliamentary vote, conservative CSOs and parties organised a demonstration in front of parliament. Surprisingly, it attracted only a few thousand protesters and was not as visible and large as some previous demonstrations. Nonetheless, protests of this nature will likely continue in some form, although their scale and impact are difficult to predict.

  Do you think progress in Estonia can pave the way for similar developments in other post-Communist countries?

  We certainly hope so! At the same time, it is crucial to acknowledge that each country in our region is distinct, with its own language, culture and political landscape. In the case of Estonia, there’s currently a ruling coalition with all three members prioritising individual liberties, which has provided civil society with a historic opportunity to advance marriage equality. Hopefully, favourable conditions will also arise for our Baltic friends and beyond.

  Meanwhile, we are delighted to share our experiences, both failures and successes, with our regional allies. Although we are a traditional human rights advocacy organisation, we maintain strong connections with LGBTQI+ CSOs in Latvia and Lithuania. We have collaborated on several international projects related to combating hate speech, working with victims of hate crimes and promoting equal treatment.

  What forms of international support does Estonian civil society need to keep supporting LGBTQI+ people and advancing their rights? 

  International cooperation and support are incredibly important. Human rights work can be frustrating at times, and it is comforting to connect with others working in other countries and facing similar societal and personal struggles. While it may sound like a cliché, it is vital to establish connections, share experiences and learn from each other. This process is empowering and fosters development.

  It is crucial to recognise that marriage equality alone will not solve all the problems. Issues such as bullying of LGBTQI+ children, harassment of LGBTQI+ people, anti-LGBTQI+ hate speech, disinformation, intolerance and the denial of transgender rights continue to be pressing concerns. We have seen in other countries that progressive laws and legal precedents can be reversed. Therefore, it is essential for like-minded individuals and CSOs to cooperate across borders. Just as we are currently endeavouring to support the human rights of Hungarian LGBTQI+ people through various actions and means, we hope to receive support ourselves in times of urgent need.

  Civic space in Estonia is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Estonian Human Rights Centre through itswebsite or itsFacebook page.

• ETHIOPIA: ‘The June 2021 election is between democratic life and death’

  CIVICUS speaks to Mesud Gebeyehu about the political conflict in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia and the highly contested upcoming Ethiopian national election, scheduled to take place in June 2021 amidst an ongoing pandemic and a continuing state of emergency. Mesud is Executive Director of the Consortium of Ethiopian Human Rights Organisations (CEHRO) and vice-chair of the Executive Committee of CIVICUS’s Affinity Group of National Associations. Mesud is also Executive Committee member of the Ethiopian CSOs Council, a statutory body established to coordinate the self-regulation of civil society organisations (CSOs) in Ethiopia.

• Every single person is a potential activist today 

  Civil society actors and leaders from around the world gathered from 30 May to 3 June 2022 at the World Justice Forum in The Hague, the home of the United Nations’ International Court of Justice, and online to share insights and recommendations on three important priorities for strengthening justice and the rule of law.

  "Every single person with a phone is a potential activist today," @LysaJohnSA of @CIVICUSalliance at the #WorldJusticeForum's "Recommendations, Commitments, & Investments in the Rule of Law" plenary. pic.twitter.com/eY8jLvGgXi

  — World Justice Project (@TheWJP) June 2, 2022

  The forum, which focused on fighting corruption, closing the justice gap, and countering discrimination, served as an ideal platform to collectively address the declining state of civil society. I had the privilege of participating in the Ruth Bader Ginsburg Legacy conversation with Sherrilyn Ifill and the Recommendations, Commitments, and Investments to Advance Justice and Rule of Law plenary.  

  Throughout the conference, immense emphasis was placed on the constant threats to and continuously shrinking civic space. Our research from the CIVICUS Monitor shows that, currently, only 3% of the world’s population live in conditions of open civic space, where their governments broadly respect and promote the democratic freedoms of association, peaceful assembly, and expression and allow their citizens to participate meaningfully in the decisions that affect them. Data from the CIVICUS Monitor also shows that in the last year, the top two violations in relation to civic space were the detention of protestors and the intimidation of human rights defenders. This points to a trend of a lack of investment in and strengthening of institutions that are meant to defend human rights and the people that speak on behalf of human rights.  

  In the wake of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, we are witnessing a number of states, and international institutions, particularly in European democracies, divert funding and resources away from institutions and mechanisms that are devoted to defending human rights and strengthening civic space. Not only does this pattern of behaviour display a negative vote against democracy, but it contributes to the continuous fall of trust in public institutions, and not enough is being done to challenge the lack of investment in civil society from those in power. At this point, the fight for democracy rests solely on the shoulders of individuals who are constantly putting their lives at risk to fight against the worldwide decline of civic space.  

  While international and public institutions have the power and resources to address the humanitarian crisis that faces us, their abstinence from actively investing in and protecting civil society displays a glaring lack of moral empathy for those on the ground.   

  In light of these global challenges, the panel discussions at the World Justice Forum brought forth much-needed insights and recommendations to rebuild and strengthen civil society and the rule of law with respect to the three main priorities of the forum.  

  One of the key recommendations from the World Justice Forum’s Outcome Statement highlighted the need for states to create enabling environments for innovation and for civil society to operate. During the pandemic, we witnessed some of the most significant protest movements despite extreme COVID-19 restrictions; this indicates that people are able and willing to mobilise regardless of restrictive laws intended to silence dissent.  

  The #WorldJusticeForum brought participants from 116 countries together to learn & collaborate on advancing #EqualRights, #AntiCorruption, #OpenGov & #AccesstoJustice. But the Forum is not just a conference—it's just the beginning of action, as told in our final statement. 1/3 pic.twitter.com/QqWVNB45Kp

  — World Justice Project (@TheWJP) June 2, 2022

  Conversations during the forum also pointed to the dire need for people-centred approaches. A practical example is citizen assemblies whereby people-driven resolutions are prioritised at international levels. Access to information and access to solidarity mechanisms also play a vital role in enabling people on the ground to advocate for fundamental rights, and states must invest in creating spaces for citizen participation.  

  A stronger effort needs to be taken to ensure that institutions are open to scrutiny and to being held accountable. Too many a times do we witness leaders making promises of a better tomorrow on international stages but do not hold open dialogues with and remain accountable to those who elected them. This includes extending open standing invitations for UN experts to visit and provide recommendations to affected countries.  

  There is a need for norms, narratives and investments that will help stimulate larger segments of trust and support towards civil society from a wide range of state and non-state actors. Concrete examples of how this can be done are available from CIVICUS’ work on reviewing approaches to civil society sustenance and resilience, including in the context of the pandemic.  

  In the 2020 Sustainable Development Goals, we said that this would be the Decade of Action, it is actually the Decade of Agitation, and governments that wake up to this sooner will be wiser because every single person on the planet with a phone is a potential activist today.  

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  Lysa John is the Secretary-General of CIVICUS. She is based in South Africa and can be reached via her Twitter handle: @LysaJohnSA. 

• FINLAND: ‘We’ll have the most right-wing government since the 1930s’

  CIVICUS speaks about Finland’s new government with Silla Ristimäki, development policy specialist at Fingo.

  Founded in 2018, Fingo is an umbrella organisation comprising about 270 Finnish civil society organisations (CSOs). Fingo monitors and defends civic space in Finland and around the world with the aim of building a strong, diverse, open, active and free civil society with solid operating capacities.

  What was the relationship between government and civil society like under the government of former Prime Minister Sanna Marin?

  Sanna Marin’s government took measures to promote transparency and the rule of law and improve conditions for civil society. Under the previous government’s programme, Finland took an active role in promoting open government internationally. Several initiatives were undertaken to improve the participation of and dialogue with Finnish civil society to increase transparency, which was seen as an integral part of all national governance objectives. For example, a transparency register was developed in 2023 to keep track of lobbying with parliament.

  The previous government’s programme also aimed to harmonise procedures for tracking civil society funding while respecting CSOs’ autonomy and guaranteeing equal treatment of organisations. The objective was to reduce bureaucracy and increase the predictability of funding. Changes were made in accounting and fundraising regulations that particularly favoured small CSOs. Overall, official development assistance grew quite consistently. Fundamentally, the nature of relationships was about building a partnership between state and civil society to reduce inequality.

  What were the key issues that influenced the outcome of the 2023 parliamentary elections?

  Sanna Marin’s government was a coalition of left-wing parties that pushed, for example, for stricter climate policies and reduced inequalities, including gender-based one. During its term, the Finnish government’s debt grew significantly. At the same time, Russia’s attack on Ukraine resulted in an unprecedented change in Finnish popular opinion regarding NATO membership. So the elections were greatly influenced by two major issues: the severity of government debt and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

  The economic and security conditions increased the popularity of right-wing parties. The National Coalition Party that won the election has been the longest and loudest advocate of Finland’s NATO membership. It also pushed an agenda to urgently reduce Finnish public debt. The far-right Finns Party, which came second, ran an anti-immigration campaign and proposed balancing the budget by reducing climate measures and cutting development funding. On 18 June it was confirmed that Ville Tavio from the Finns Party will be the new minister for Trade and Development.

  The Social Democratic Party headed by Sanna Marin came third. This is politically noteworthy, since the ruling party generally tends to do much worse in parliamentary elections. There was a significant fall in support for The Greens and the Left Alliance, and some experts say that people voted strategically for the Social Democratic Party to try to prevent the emergence of a conservative right-wing government. However, the new government coalition formed with the Finns Party, Swedish People’s Party of Finland and the Christian Democrats will be the most right-wing government Finland has had since the 1930s. Their overall interpretation of the elections results is that Finland ‘needs a change in direction’, and that people particularly want new fiscal policies.

  How much public debate was there around Finland’s accession to NATO?

  There has never been a lot of public political debate over Finland’s accession to NATO. Politicians used to maintain a position that it was never the right time for it, and if Finland were to change its position of neutrality and consider accession to NATO, a referendum would be organised before a final decision was made.

  But the situation changed when Russia attacked Ukraine. Polls showed a significant increase in support for accession, rising to above 60 per cent. Almost no members of parliament publicly raised concerns or expressed an opinion against Finland’s accession. In the end, Finland applied for NATO membership without a referendum being held. It was considered that the polls were a strong enough indication of citizen support.

  What is the new government programme’s stance on civil society and human rights?

  All three parties that received the most votes in the election are largely committed to supporting civil society and recognise the value of safeguarding civic space. The new government’s programme, published on 16 June, confirms that a vibrant civil society is a prerequisite for social development and states that in all its activities Finland will promote the principles of democracy, civil society and the rule of law.

  However, it also states that Finland will reduce the number of refugees it welcomes, control immigration and limit the rights of migrants. It doesn’t mention the issues of loss and damage and climate finance. While it claims that Finland will stick to its national Climate Change Act, which commits it to become climate-neutral by 2035, it also states that this must not be done at the expense of increasing daily living costs or negatively impacting on the market competitiveness of Finnish industries.

  How is civil society working to safeguard human rights and democracy in Finland?

  Civil society works at the local and national levels to promote human rights and safeguard democracy in Finland.

  In regard to democracy, Finnish civil society has a role in providing training for democracy skills (such as decision-making in communities and communication skills); advocating towards policy-makers on a variety of societal issues; as well as working with decision-makers and officials for the implementation of democratic decisions. For example, with regards to social and health care services as well as development cooperation, this last role in implementation is quite crucial. Generally, the basis for the work of Finnish civil society is human rights: concretely this means for example working for the economic rights of vulnerable people in Finland or promoting the ‘leave no one behind’ -principle in development cooperation.

  Fingo has three main areas of work: advocacy, learning and communications. Advocacy is targeted towards political leaders. Fingo undertakes efforts to improve the operational environment and institutional support for CSOs and to protect civic space. The learning component is particularly targeted at building capacity among member CSOs, offering training on, for example, how to improve advocacy, communication and analytical skills and fundraising proposals, or how to mainstream gender. A significant portion of this component is to advance global citizenship education. Communications efforts are targeted at the broader public to uphold and generate further support for human rights and democracy through media engagement and campaigns.

  Following the publication of the new government’s programme, our next step is to re-evaluate the priorities of our advocacy efforts. For example, the new government has left reproductive rights out of development assistance priorities, so this may be an area that needs particular attention. All efforts to jointly protect civic space globally are valuable and support one another.

  Civic space in Finland is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Fingo through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@FingoFi onTwitter.

• GABON: ‘Civic space and the conditions for the exercise of human rights were difficult under the former regime’

  CIVICUS discusses the military coup in Gabon with Georges Mpaga, National Executive President of the Network of Free Civil Society Organisations of Gabon (ROLBG).

  Over the past decade, ROLBG has focused on enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, torture and arbitrary detention. It advocates to improve civic space in Gabon and Central Africa and campaigns on inhumane detention conditions.

  What’s your opinion on Gabon’s recent elections and subsequent military coup?

  The 26 August elections were undoubtedly fraudulent, as were the previous ones. The regime led by predatory dictator Ali Bongo had banned international and domestic observer missions and international media. ROLBG was the only organisation that carried out citizen observation through the parallel vote tabulation system. Because of Bongo’s despotic will, the election was held under totally irregular conditions, in flagrant violation of international norms and standards. The vote count was held behind closed doors, in an opaque context that allowed for large-scale electoral fraud and falsified results.

  On 30 August 2023, the salutary intervention of the defence and security forces put an end to this aberration. For me, as someone from civil society, what has just happened in Gabon is by no means a military coup; it is quite simply a military intervention led by patriots within the army, under the leadership of General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, that put an end to a 56-year imposture, a predatory system and an infernal cycle of rigged elections often punctuated by massive human rights violations. This is our reading of the situation, and it is the general opinion of the Gabonese people, who have just been freed from a criminal dictatorship and oligarchy.

  Why has military intervention taken place now, after so many years of Bongo family rule?

  The military intervention on 30 August was justified as a response to the desire shown by the Bongo clan and its Gabonese Democratic Party to remain in power by will or by force, through fraudulent elections and police repression orchestrated by the defence and security forces, which were instrumentalised and took orders from the former president.

  The Gabonese armed forces intervened to avert a bloodbath and replace the Bongo regime: an unrelenting regime that was ruthless towards the Gabonese people, tainted by clientelist relationships, shady business deals, predatory corruption and widespread violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, all sanctioned by fraudulent elections.

  In this sense, the coup in Gabon is not part of a regional trend, but the result of a purely internal process resulting from 56 years of dictatorship and its corollary of human rights violations and the destruction of the country’s economic and social fabric. However, the events underway in Gabon obviously have repercussions in the Central African region, home to some of the worst of Africa’s dictatorships.

  What’s your perspective on international criticism of the coup?

  Civil society welcomed the military intervention because it sounded the death knell for more than half a century of deceit and predation at the top of the state. Without this intervention, we would have witnessed an unprecedented tragedy.

  The Gabonese army, under the leadership of the Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions (CTRI), the military junta in power, allowed the country to escape a tragedy with incalculable consequences. Seen in this light, the military should be celebrated as heroes. As soon as he took power, General Oligui set about uniting a country that had been deeply divided and traumatised by such a long time of calamitous management by the Bongo family and the mafia interests around them.

  The attitude of the international community is unacceptable to civil society, human rights defenders and the people of Gabon, who have long paid a heavy price. In 2016, when Bongo planned and carried out an electoral coup followed by atrocities against civilians who opposed the electoral masquerade, the international community remained silent, leaving Gabon’s civilians to face their executioner. In view of this, we categorically reject the declarations of the international community, in particular the Economic Community of Central African States and the African Union, two institutions that have encouraged the manipulation of constitutions and presidencies for life in Central Africa.

  What were conditions like for civil society under Bongo family rule? Do you think there is any chance that the situation will now improve?

  Civic space and the conditions for exercising democratic freedoms and human rights were difficult under the former regime. The rights of association, peaceful assembly and expression were flouted. Many civil society activists and human rights defenders, including myself, spent time in prison or were deprived of their fundamental rights.

  With the establishment of the transitional regime, we are now seeing fundamental change towards an approach that is generally favourable to civil society. The new authorities are working in concert with all the nation’s driving forces, including civil society, which was received on 1 September by General Oligui and his CTRI peers, and I was the facilitator of that meeting. The transitional president, who was sworn in on 4 September, took to work to restore state institutions, human rights and democratic freedoms, and to respect Gabon’s national and international commitments. A strong signal was given on 5 September, with the gradual release of prisoners of conscience, including the leader of Gabon’s largest civil service union confederation, Jean Remi Yama, after 18 months of arbitrary detention.

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  Civic space in Gabon is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Georgesthrough hisFacebook page and follow@gmpaga on Twitter.

  The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

• GABON: ‘Under the old regime civil society was not taken into account’

  CIVICUS discusses the military coup in Gabon with Pepecy Ogouliguende, expert in human rights, governance, gender and peace mediation and founder and president of Malachie.

  Malachie is a Gabonese civil society organisation that combats poverty and promotes sustainable development and gender equality. It is active in a areas that include biodiversity protection, aid in the event of natural disasters, medical support, particularly for people living with HIV/AIDS, and human rights education, especially for the most vulnerable groups in society.

  What’s your opinion on Gabon’s recent general election and subsequent military coup?

  At around 3am on 30 August 2023, the Gabonese Electoral Commission announced the results of the presidential election, with incumbent Ali Bongo as the winner. A few minutes later, the military announced they had seized power. It is important to stress that this was not a coup d’état, but a seizure of power by the military. This distinction is justified by the fact that it took place without bloodshed.

  The election was marred by irregularities and the announcement of the results would have led to protests, albeit legitimate, but which would have ended in violence. I would therefore like to salute the bravery of the defence and security forces.

  The military then dissolved all governing institutions and set up a Transition Committee for the Restoration of Institutions (CTRI).

  Was your organisation able to observe the election?

  No, my organisation was unable to observe the election for the simple reason that no international or national observers were admitted. The election was conducted in total secrecy. Like all Gabonese people, I saw that the announced results did not correspond with the results at the ballot box.

  The seizure of power by the defence and security forces in this particular context of public distrust of the authorities and deep suspicion of the election results is rather akin to a patriotic act.

  Why has military intervention taken place now, after so many years of Bongo family rule?

  Our defence and security forces, along with the public, have observed numerous irregularities and dysfunctions in the state apparatus in recent years. They therefore decided to put an end to this regime, which no longer corresponded to the aspirations of the Gabonese people.

  The military saw an opportunity in the 26 August election to end the current system by assuming their responsibilities to save the nation and the rule of law. The aim of this seizure of power is to ‘restore the dignity of the Gabonese people’. As the CTRI spokesperson put it, ‘we are finally on the road to happiness’.

  What’s your perspective on international criticism of the coup?

  The international community simply acted by the book without first analysing the context. Gabon’s is a very special case.

  Celebrations on the streets of Gabon’s main cities showed the extent to which the old regime was no longer wanted, just tolerated. These scenes of popular jubilation, which contrast with the international community’s condemnation, should be a wake-up call to the international community, inviting it to review its approach, which is more focused on safeguarding stability at all costs, often to the detriment of real social progress, development or economic growth – in short, at the expense of the wellbeing of the majority.

  All those in the international community who spoke up condemned the ‘coup d’état’ and assured us that they were following developments in Gabon with interest, while reiterating their attachment to respect for institutions. Reactions from international organisations were very strong: the United Nations condemned the coup and the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) suspended Gabon because they directly associated this ‘coup d’état’ with those that had previously taken place elsewhere in the region.

  The USA has distanced itself somewhat by stating that it will work with its partners and the people to support the democratic process underway. This is where we look to the rest of the international community to help us work towards building strong institutions.

  We salute those states that have clearly understood the need for this change. We condemn AU and ECCAS sanctions. The international community should support states in respecting their laws and constitutions and ensuring that democracy and human rights are respected.

  Do you think this coup is part of a regional trend?

  First and foremost, it should be reminded that in the case of Gabon, this was a military takeover and not a coup d’état in the strict sense of the term. It was in fact the result of bad governance and failure to take account of the needs of the population, particularly social needs, but also of the thirst for change. It can have regional impacts in the sense that most African populations are experiencing the same difficulties – youth unemployment, poverty, lack of access to healthcare – and aspire to major change. When people don’t feel taken into account by policymakers, they become frustrated.

  We don’t rule out the possibility that this will have an impact on our neighbours. It is not too late for the regimes in power in Central Africa to seize this opportunity to rethink the way they serve their people.

  What were conditions like for civil society under Bongo family rule? Do you think there is any chance the situation will now improve?

  In Gabon, the operation of organisations and associations is governed by law 35/62, which guarantees freedom of association. That said, under the old regime civil society was not taken into account. It was only partly involved in the management of public affairs.

  Some leaders, particularly trade union leaders, could be arrested or intimidated if the regime felt they were being overzealous. Several Gabonese civil society leaders denounced arbitrary arrests linked to their opinions and positions.

  Like the Gabonese people, civil society is delighted at the change. Civil society as a whole is committed to taking an active part in the actions and reforms carried out by the authorities during the transition, to promote respect for human rights, equity and social justice, the preservation of peace and good governance.

  The CTRI has just authorised the release of some of Gabon’s leading trade unionists and prisoners of conscience. In view of the first decisions taken by the CTRI, the best is yet to come. I can safely say that the Gabon of tomorrow will be better. Today there is a glimmer of hope.

  Civic space in Gabon is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Malachie through itswebsite or itsFacebook page.

  The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

• GEORGIA: ‘Civil society must be ready for any further regressive move the government attempts’

  CIVICUS speaks about Georgian civil society’s successful campaign against the draft Agents of Foreign Influence Law with Nino Ugrekhelidze, co-founder of the CEECCNA (Central Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and Central and North Asia) Collaborative Fund, and Guram Imnadze, Director of the Democracy and Justice Programme of theSocial Justice Center.

  Founded in 2022, the CEECCNA Collaborative Fund is a feminist fund that moves sustainable resources for social justice movements across the CEECCNA region.

  The Social Justice Center is a progressive civil society organisation (CSO) working on human rights and social justice in Georgia. It seeks to identify the structural reasons for economic, social and political inequality, and share critical knowledge while contributing to change through democratic means.

  What was the draft Foreign Agents Law that was proposed in Georgia?

  On 20 February 2023, the ruling party presented a draft law on ‘Agents of Foreign Influence’. The initiative would affect any Georgian-language media and any CSO registered in Georgia that receive more than 20 per cent of their annual income from a ‘foreign power’, meaning a foundation or organisation registered outside Georgia. They would be forced to register on a ‘Foreign Influence Agents Registry’ and disclose foreign funding. If they failed to do          so, they would risk very high fines.

  But the need for more transparency is an excuse, because there are already numerous laws regulating the financial transactions and transparency of legal entities, CSOs included, such as the Law on Grants and the Law on Budgeting and Accounting. There have not been cases of CSOs not complying with the existing legal requirements. In fact, most large CSOs also use their media platforms to provide annual financial reports and list their donors.

  The draft law includes language that has negative connotations in Georgia due to our Soviet past. ‘Agent’ means ‘traitor’, especially if used together with the adjective ‘foreign’. It has the clear purpose of delegitimising independent CSOs and critical media by labelling us as enemies of the state, politically biased and aligned with the opposition.

  The government is doing everything it can to delegitimise CSOs as local actors voicing real local needs. They don’t want the public to listen to us when we criticise the government and provide information that is true and in the interest of the country – they want them to believe that we are the ones lying to them.

  This is part of a larger government stigmatising campaign against civil society and independent media, which gained momentum over the past few months.

  Who would be most affected if this law was passed?

  It is critical to highlight the role that CSOs have played in Georgia since we gained independence – civil society has played a key role in the democratic transition and in ensuring the provision of services the government could not provide, particularly to vulnerable groups. When the state could not fully perform its duties, it was civil society that stepped in and got the work done.

  If the law was passed, people with HIV and disabilities, survivors of domestic violence, women, children and LGBTQI+ people would be among the first to be directly impacted. Programmes targeted at these groups have been created and operated by Georgian CSOs, because the government is either not interested and therefore does not prioritise this work or does not have the money for it.

  Of course, as the government is not funding these programmes, Georgian CSOs operating them typically get their funding from outside the country. Domestically, there is very little interest in funding civil society; domestic funding is almost non-existent and CSOs are severely underfunded. Major civil society donors are various private and public foundations, and bilateral and multilateral institutions from the USA and the European Union, all of which maintain political neutrality. Many of them even fund the government agencies as well.

  If the law were adopted, given the difficulties in fundraising domestically, CSOs would be exposed to financial starvation. Numerous CSOs would have to shut down. And this would be no accident: it is part of a very intentional attack on the financial resilience of CSOs.

  How has civil society organised against the bill?

  Over 380 CSOs signed a statement explaining their strong opposition to the bill. Civil society and independent media worked hard to reach people with compelling messages, avoiding NGO jargon and explaining in simple terms why this bill is against the interests of the country and against democracy – why, in fact, this bill is a Russian import, part of a trend that is quickly gaining ground across the region.

  It took some effort to mobilise against the bill because civil society had been demonised for so long already, and many people did not want to support ‘foreign agents’. But our key message was that our government may have pro-Russian course, but our people do not, and we don’t intend to be part of the Russian Federation ever again. This connected with a widespread sentiment of Georgian people.

  This messaging dispelled the climate of resignation that things cannot change and helped mobilise people. On 7 March, parliament passed the draft law in the first reading, but just as the bill was being discussed, tens of thousands gathered outside parliament to protest in Tbilisi. There were protests day and night, for several days in a row. This was one of the largest demonstrations in Georgia’s modern history.

  The protests were repressed by riot police using rubber bullets, teargas and water cannon. At least one person lost an eye because of police brutality. Over 150 people were detained for ‘disobedience’ but later released following further pressure from protesters.

  As a result of the protests, the bill was recalled on 10 March. That day we realised that if we come together, things can change. There was a spirit of resistance, unity, dignity and solidarity in the protests. People who were not necessarily politicised became interested in politics. And it all started because civil society came together to stand up against a bill that posed an existential threat.

  Protesters connected in a very well-articulated way the situation in Georgia with the plight of Ukraine, and understood this as a fight against Russian political interests trying to absorb us as a country. That’s why they also showed solidarity with Ukraine, singing their anthem and displaying pro-Ukraine messages.

  The way young Georgians reacted gives us hope for the future. The way they came together, the way they protested, the messages they conveyed – it was so politically consistent and coherent. They protested, they resisted, and when the protest was over, they even cleaned the public space after themselves. They were truly amazing.

  Would you say danger has passed?

  Parliament is currently on its best behaviour because it had a moment of realisation that this might turn into a revolution. In pushing forward the bill, the government thought there was no limit to its power, but found such a limit in the protests. A sentiment started spreading among protesters that they could fire their representatives, send them home. But the government’s targeting of civil society is not over yet – it is only starting. Although the bill has been withdrawn, the prime minister has already said that they are going to continue pushing for it. He even doubled down as he mentioned that their step will be to tackle so-called ‘gay propaganda’, another Russian import that is part of the crackdown on progressive civil society.

  The government continues its campaign against civil society. Even if the law does not pass, the official narrative keeps labelling civil society and independent media as ‘foreign agents’, and the consequences of this will continue to be felt for a long time. In Kutaisi, for instance, a social justice activist saw their home vandalised, and someone marked it with a sign alerting that ‘an agent lives here’. It is to be expected that anti-rights forces will use this language as a weapon against civil society activists.

  And of course, the authorities continue to use other tools they have to obstruct civil society work. For instance, Georgia has a problematic administrative code that grants the police and the courts the right to use administrative sanctions such as fines and detentions without sufficient evidence and due process. Such measures are often used against civil society and human rights activists. Since 2016, administrative fines for most common administrative offences have quadrupled. This is a serious barrier for civil society work, as it is expensive for activists to pay the fines.

  What kind of international support does Georgian civil society currently need?

  Georgia is currently experiencing a rapidly shrinking civic space, and the government is sliding towards authoritarianism. International solidarity and conversations on the political situation in Georgia and the whole post-Soviet region are going to be critical.

  In post-Soviet countries, the influence of Russian politics is very strong. There is an actual war going on in Ukraine, and what is happening in Georgia is in a way war by different means. These are two fronts of the same fight against Russian imperialism. Understanding this is essential.

  Also, we need to talk more about where money comes from for anti-rights organisations. There are very clear mechanisms to track where money comes from when it comes to CSOs and independent media, but there are none to investigate where funding for anti-rights groups such as religious fundamentalist and far-right organisations comes from. One reason is that they often don’t register as CSOs – this means they wouldn’t even be under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Agents Law if it were passed. Lots of money for these organisations is coming from Russia without any conditionalities or reporting mechanisms in place.

  This is a way bigger problem than Georgia having a Foreign Agents Law. We need to make the connection to what is happening elsewhere. In Ukraine and Moldova there were also attempts to adopt a similar law and people pushed back. The logic of this law is already working in Mongolia, and it is effectively in place in Belarus.

  We need more complex conversations about what we are organising against, how this is impacting us, what tactics are being used and how human rights language and spaces are being co-opted. The obvious types of support needed are spaces for such conversations and funding, because ultimately, for us to resist, we need spaces to reflect, build strategies and develop our political imagination, and we need resources, given that we are already so underfunded across the region. We must be ready for any further regressive move the government attempts. We haven’t seen the last of it.

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  Civic space in Georgia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Social Justice Center through itswebsite andFacebook page, and follow@SjcCenter and@niiugre on Twitter.

• GEORGIA: ‘The foreign agents law poses a threat to the vibrancy and autonomy of civil society’

  CIVICUS speaks with Nino Samkharadze, policy analyst at the Georgian Institute of Politics, about thecontroversial ‘foreign agents’ law just passed in Georgia.

  The Georgian Institute of Politics is a Tbilisi-based non-profit, non-partisan research and analysis organisation dedicated to fortifying the foundations of democratic institutions and effective governance in Georgia.

  What’s the purpose of Georgia’s law on foreign agents?

  According to the government, the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, which has just been passed by parliament, aims to increase the transparency of civil society’s operations by requiring civil society organisations (CSOs) to disclose their sources of funding and provide details about the nature of their activities.

  In its transition from the post-Soviet era, Georgia faces economic and political challenges. Its evolving democracy is characterised by weak institutions and it’s heavily dependent on support from international sources, including financial grants from the European Union (EU), European states and the USA. The introduction of this law may have been a response to concerns about foreign influence, but it has sparked debate in Georgian society. It poses a threat to the independence and security of CSOs. Its vague language and broad room for interpretation provide the government with opportunities to influence and control civil society, potentially stifling dissenting voices and undermining the positive contributions of CSOs to democratic governance.

  Why did the government reintroduce the bill after failing to pass it last year?

  The process began with the introduction of a first version of the bill in February 2023. It wasn’t proposed directly by the ruling Georgian Dream party but by People’s Power, a splinter political group closely linked to Georgian Dream and espousing even more radical anti-western narratives. But it was met with considerable domestic and international opposition. Protests erupted in Tbilisi, Georgia’s capital, and criticism came from European institutions and the US government. In response, Georgian Dream announced it would vote against the bill, which ultimately led to its rejection by parliament. Following this failure, Georgian Dream underwent a period of reflection and intensified its propaganda. It softened the bill’s language and tone to make it appear less radical and reintroduced it in April 2024. Soon after, on 14 May, it was passed by parliament.

  Georgian Dream came to power in 2012 and is now in an unprecedented third term in office. Since it began its third term in 2020, it has increasingly shown anti-democratic tendencies. With a general election scheduled for October 2024, it’s under increasing pressure as polls indicate a decline in public support. If it doesn’t maintain its majority, it will have to seek cooperation from opposition parties. In this context, the government may see the passage of this law as a way to defuse opposition and strengthen its grip on power.

  How do you think the law would affect civil society?

  The impacts of the law on civil society are expected to be significant and multifaceted, affecting various dimensions of its functioning and autonomy.

  CSOs are likely to be negatively labelled as serving the interests of foreign powers, undermining public confidence in their activities and missions. This labelling could easily lead to stigmatisation and marginalisation, reducing the effectiveness of advocacy efforts and diminishing their influence in the public sphere.

  The law’s provisions for extensive monitoring also pose a threat to the autonomy of CSOs and the privacy of their staff. The government’s ability to access and publish personal data, including correspondence and communications, could hamper CSOs’ ability to operate freely and investigate cases of corruption and human rights abuses.

  Further, the ambiguity of the law leaves room for interpretation and potential abuse by the government. Similar to the situation in Russia, where laws targeting ‘foreign agents’ have been used to restrict civil society activities, the vague language of the law could allow for further restrictions on CSOs and their ability to operate independently.

  The law may also lead to a withdrawal of funding from international foundations and donors. Given the increased risks and restrictions on civil society activities, donors may be reluctant to continue supporting organisations in Georgia, further limiting the resources available for democracy and state-building efforts.

  Overall, the draft law poses a threat to the vibrancy and autonomy of Georgian civil society. It undermines the essential role CSOs play in promoting democratic values, defending human rights and holding the government to account. It could have far-reaching consequences for Georgia’s democratic development and its relationship with the international community.

  How has civil society reacted?

  Georgian civil society has vehemently opposed the bill, seeing it as a dangerous step towards authoritarianism. This law poses a threat to critical voices and raises fears of further concentration of power in the hands of the ruling elite, as has happened in Belarus and Russia.

  No wonder the bill is also often referred to as the ‘Russian law’ – it’s seen as a precursor to outcomes similar to those seen in Russia. It’s feared that dissenting voices will be marginalised or silenced under this law, mirroring the situation in Russia where government critics often face persecution or exile. Given the consolidation of the ruling party and the erosion of democratic principles in Russia, there are concerns in Georgia that the ruling party is also seeking to consolidate power and stifle dissent. Despite some differences between both legal texts, the broader implications for democracy and civil liberties are deeply worrying.

  Georgian society, known for its pro-European and pro-democracy stance, has taken to the streets to protest against this threat. International partners, including the EU and the USA, have also criticised the law and stressed the importance of upholding democratic values.

  How has the government responded to the protests?

  The government’s response to the mass protests has been one of dismissal, demonisation and repression.

  The government has tried to discredit the protesters, particularly younger people, by suggesting they are uninformed about the law and are being manipulated. However, this is contradicted by the fact that many of the protesters, many of whom are students, are well educated and have a clear understanding of the issues at stake.

  The government has also resorted to tactics of repression and intimidation, with reports of regular arrests, beatings and pressure on people associated with the protests. Civil servants, including teachers and academics, have been threatened with the loss of their jobs if they are found to be involved in the protests. This has a chilling effect and discourages dissent.

  CSOs have been targeted with demonisation campaigns that portray them as enemies of the country. While there has been no immediate closure or direct pressure on these organisations, the hostile rhetoric and stigmatisation contribute to an environment of fear and intimidation.

  This authoritarian approach reflects a concerted effort to stifle dissent and maintain control, even at the expense of democratic principles and human rights. It threatens to further undermine confidence in institutions and exacerbate social and political tensions.

  How can the international community best support Georgian civil society?

  The international community can play a crucial role in supporting Georgian civil society at this difficult time.

  High-level visits and engagement by representatives of the EU and the USA are essential. We hope they’ll lead to tangible measures to hold accountable those members of Georgian Dream who supported this law. This could include the introduction of targeted sanctions against people responsible for undermining democratic principles. In addition, the EU should use Georgia’s official status as a candidate for EU membership to impose conditions of adherence to democratic norms and respect for human rights. Sanctions or other forms of pressure could be imposed if these principles are violated.

  It’s also crucial that the EU and the USA continue to demonstrate their unwavering support for Georgia and its pro-European aspirations. Financial assistance and political support are essential to strengthen civil society and maintain momentum in the struggle for democracy. Without this support, civil society risks being further marginalised and weakened by the government.

  A combination of diplomatic pressure, conditionality and unwavering support from the international community is needed to support Georgian civil society in its struggle for democracy and human rights.

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  Civic space in Georgia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Georgian Institute of Politics through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@GIP_ge and@nincavar10 on Twitter.

• GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: ‘Every person on the planet should have an equal opportunity to participate in decision-making’

  CIVICUS speaks with Andreas Bummel, co-founder and Executive Director of Democracy Without Borders (DWB) and the Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly, about the deficits of the current global governance system and civil society’s proposals for reform.

  Founded in 2017, DWB is an international civil society organisation with national chapters and associates across the world, aimed at promoting global governance, global democracy and global citizenship.

  What’s wrong with existing global governance institutions?

  Global governance has rightly been described as a spaghetti bowl, and that’s because there is too much fragmentation, overlap, incoherence and opacity, with many parallel and siloed processes going on at the same time, involving who knows how many institutions, initiatives and projects.

• GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: ‘It may take a crisis as big as the one that originated the system to produce the reform it needs’

  CIVICUS speaks with John Vlasto, Board Chair of the World Federalist Movement (WFM), about the deficits of the existing global governance system and civil society’s proposals for reform.

  Founded in 1947, WFM is a non-profit, nonpartisan organisation seeking a just, free and peaceful world where humanity and nature flourish in harmony, through the creation of more effective, transparent and accountable global governance.

  What are the biggest shortcomings of the existing system of global governance?

  The main problem is that decisions are made in defence of the national interest rather than to serve the common good of humanity. This means we get the lowest-common denominator compromises rather than the profound changes that humanity needs.

  The way decisions are currently made is absurd. Take the ongoing COP28 climate summit: it’s a circus, a clear symptom of dysfunctional global governance. We are driving the planetary ecosystem over a cliff because although it’s clearly in humanity’s best interest to reduce carbon emissions straight away, it’s in no nation’s interest to move to do so first.

  Decision making is dysfunctional because of the nature of our global governance institutions. The United Nations (UN) is basically a congress of ambassadors tasked with defending each country’s national interest as perceived by their governments. The dynamic is of competition rather than collaboration, so you end up with the lowest-common denominator compromises.

  How could this problem be tackled?

  To tackle global challenges we need global governance. We are taking enormous risks with our planetary home – but we don’t have to. We know how to create a legitimate and accountable decision-making process that serves the common good – through carefully implemented democracy.

  We could think of global governance as a well-functioning Europe – or a well-functioning USA, for that matter – extended to the global scale.

  What the world is missing that Europe has is a parliament. There is a longstanding proposal for creating a parliamentary assembly at the UN. There’s a big difference between a parliament and a congress of ambassadors such as the UN General Assembly. As explained by Edmund Burke, a British philosopher and politician of the 18th century, a parliament isn’t a collection of ‘ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests each must maintain’ – it is ‘a deliberative assembly… with one interest, that of the whole’.

  In a federal system like the USA, Congress has two chambers, one representing the people and another representing the states. This is a model that could be followed on a global scale. For the USA it would make no sense to have only one chamber representing the states – but that’s what we currently have at the UN, with all nations, regardless of size, having one seat at the General Assembly, an organ that consequently has little real power.

  As Carlos Romulo of the Philippines said after the 1945 San Francisco conference that established the UN, ‘as a spokesman for a small nation, I want to make it very plain that my nation... would be very happy indeed to trade the fiction of equality in a powerless Assembly for the reality of a vote equal to our actual position in the world in an Assembly endowed with real power’.

  If it followed the federal model, the UN would still have a General Assembly representing the interests of nations. But it would also have a parliamentary assembly, representing the people, making decisions to serve the common good of humanity.

  I believe that ultimately representatives to such body should be elected on the basis of the ‘one person, one vote’ principle, but I don’t believe we should do that tomorrow. Right now, the principle ‘one nation, one vote’ means a range from one vote per 1.4 billion people to one vote per 12,000. If we were to establish a world parliament tomorrow we should use degressive proportionality, as does the European Parliament, which means that although more populous nations elect more representatives than smaller nations, smaller nations are allocated more seats than they would strictly receive in proportion to their population. This is an intermediate solution between one nation one vote and one person one vote.

  Is there anything else that can be done?

  We need profound changes, the most profound being a UN parliamentary body, but in the meantime, there’s a whole bunch of lower-hanging fruit. In particular, WFM has two projects that I would like to mention.

  One of them is MEGA – Mobilising an Earth Governance Alliance, (or ‘Make Earth Great Again’!). MEGA is a coalition of civil society organisations that will be working in cooperation with like-minded states to strengthen existing environmental governance mechanisms and institutions and establish additional ones. It will be officially launched in January 2024 and will offer a forum for environmental organisations, experts, like-minded governments, legislators, campaigners and other stakeholders to engage, share information and strategies and support advocacy for better global environmental governance. It will produce a wide range of reports, proposals and campaigns – some managed by MEGA itself, others by partner organisations. MEGA as a whole provides a comprehensive solution to the environmental crises we face, and a basis for global governance more broadly.

  MEGA is promoting the implementation of the recommendations of the Climate Governance Commission’s 2023 report. To that end, we will be mobilising ‘smart coalitions’ of state and non-state actors – a proven method for the reform of global governance, the International Criminal Court and the landmines ban treaty being cases in point. Countries least responsible for climate change and suffering the greatest impact are potential leading members of such coalitions.

  Another WFM project, launched in October, is LAW not War. This doesn’t seek to change the institutions of global governance, but to make better use of the ones we already have. It proposes to enhance the jurisdiction and use of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) so that international disputes can be resolved peacefully rather than through recourse to the threat or use of force.

  Specifically, the objectives of the campaign are to increase the number of states accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ; encourage more frequent use of the ICJ as a dispute resolution mechanism provided in international treaties; appeal to states to make use of ICJ jurisdiction through mutual agreement for specific disputes; support UN bodies to request ICJ advisory opinions on critical issues; and encourage states to adopt constitutional amendments or legislative measures to affirm the UN Charter’s prohibition of war and the obligation to resolve international disputes peacefully, including through recourse to the ICJ.

  Do you think global governance would benefit from greater civil society access and participation?

  The dysfunction of global governance is not fundamentally about civil society having poor access. That’s a symptom of the core dysfunction, which is about decision making and legitimacy. If there were a world parliament, by virtue of its role it would give a voice to civil society – not only to civil society but also to business, Indigenous peoples and everyone else. A system allowing greater access to more voices would be better informed, more representative and more legitimate. But the solution is not simply giving civil society more access, because what would be the point in giving civil society the most wonderful access to a broken system? But if you created a parliament, civil society access would follow.

  What would it take for the reforms that you propose to materialise?

  This decision making and legitimacy dysfunction goes back to the very origins of the current system when the winners of the Second World War gave themselves a veto. It may take a crisis as big as the one that originated the system to produce the profound reform it needs. As Milton Friedman noted, what’s done in a crisis depends on the plans that are lying around at the time, so part of WFM’s role is to write the plan and keep it alive in the minds of policy makers until the crisis occurs and the politically impossible becomes the politically inevitable.

  Exactly what such a crisis will be is unknowable, but I don’t think we’ve had a catalyst anywhere near the scale necessary yet. It took the Second World War to produce the current system, and it could take a third to produce a new one – though of course, it might be too late for that if as a result of this crisis we have been incinerated. The big question then is whether there will be sufficient catalyst for change before we pass some catastrophic tipping point.

  If one takes the view that catastrophe is inevitable, or on the other hand that everything will work out in the end, then there would be no point in advocating for better global governance. In my view it could go either way, so there remains a realistic path to a just, free and peaceful world, where humanity and nature flourish in harmony, and there is no better use of time than doing what one can to help steer humanity onto this path.

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  Get in touch with the World Federalist Movement through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@worldfederalist on Twitter.

  This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

• GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: ‘The main problem is that words do not translate into tangible actions’

  CIVICUS speaks about the challenges of global governance with Carlos Quesada, founder and executive director of the Institute on Race, Equality and Human Rights (Race & Equality).

  Race & Equality is an international civil society organisation (CSO) that works with activists and organisations in Latin America to promote and protect the human rights of people who are excluded because of their national or ethnic origin, sexual orientation or gender identity. It does so through training, documentation of human rights violations and advocacy work at the national and international levels.

  What opportunities does the current institutional system of global governance offer?

  The current system offers opportunities to work for the improvement of international standards for the protection and promotion of human rights, which we have taken advantage of. Race & Equality played a key role, for instance, in developing the Inter-American Convention Against Racism, Racial Discrimination and Related Forms of Intolerance (CIRDI) and the Inter-American Convention Against All Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance, the approval of which was achieved following 13 years of work with various countries in the region.

  We work closely with political bodies of the Organization of American States (OAS) such as the General Assembly and the Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs. In the global system of the United Nations, we help our national counterparts influence treaty bodies, during the Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review process in their countries, and in their interactions with Special Procedures – the Special Rapporteurs, Working Groups and Independent Experts.

  Our strategy focuses on supporting struggles for the rights of women, LGBTQI+ people, children and people of African descent using treaty bodies. In this way we ensure that our recommendations are integrated into the observations and conclusions of member states in bodies such as the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Committee on the Rights of the Child.

  What are the main problems with the current global governance system?

  Returning to the previous example, although we have achieved the adoption of two Inter-American conventions against racism and discrimination, unfortunately only six states in the Americas have ratified CIRDI and one of them, Brazil, has issued a reservation limiting its use to cases before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). Only two states in the hemisphere have ratified the Convention against All Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance.

  The main deficit of the global governance system lies in the lack of implementation of what has been agreed. There is a gap between states’ public declarations and promises in these instances and their real commitment to compliance. Despite progress, words are often not translated into tangible actions.

  Another example of this deficit is the low number of IACtHR rulings that are fully complied with. There is no mechanism to punish states that fail to comply with court rulings. The only positive aspect is that they are not time-barred, so there is always hope that a change of government takes place and the new government decides to comply with them.

  The fact that recommendations are not binding is a major challenge for both the Inter-American system and global systems and has been a fundamental structural problem since their inception. Sanctions should be binding, but they are not, and at the end of the day the process becomes a dialogue of good intentions where states promise to comply with recommendations, but in practice they rarely do.

  What do you think a more robust, effective and democratic global governance system would look like?

  The big challenge for civil society is to trigger a cascade effect from the local to the international levels. This involves strengthening democracy at the local level so that democratic principles are reflected in various spaces, even reaching international institutions such as the OAS. There should be real democratic political participation so that democratic states embrace a genuine commitment to respect and promote human rights and sanction violations.

  This commitment must not be merely declarative but must be genuine and accompanied by effective dialogue with civil society to advance standards for the promotion and protection of human rights. Currently, states and CSOs are engaged in monologues – we don’t engage in dialogue with each other. Civil society uses these spaces to make recommendations, but often lacks an interlocutor on the other side. States, for their part, make speeches for the world to hear, without establishing real dialogue. There is a need to move towards a more participatory and collaborative model.

  What reforms are you campaigning for?

  Race & Equality is promoting the CIRDI2024 campaign with the aim of achieving full ratification of CIRDI before the International Decade for People of African Descent ends next year. Our goal is to achieve the 10 ratifications needed to create an Inter-American Committee to Prevent and Punish Racial Discrimination in the Americas.

  We are also participating, alongside other CSOs in the Americas, in dialogues on how to improve civil society participation in the political bodies of the OAS. This way, we seek to transform current monologues into real dialogues between civil society and states. We want these dialogues to be real, tangible and effective, promoting more meaningful collaboration.

  In addition, we are promoting a campaign to make the rulings of the IACtHR binding. This step is essential to ensure the protection and prevention of human rights violations in the Americas. We are committed to producing significant and tangible changes to strengthen mechanisms for the protection and promotion of human rights.

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  Get in touch with Race & Equality through itswebsite and follow @raceandequality onInstagram andTwitter.

  

  This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

• GUATEMALA: ‘Disregard for the will of the people expressed at the ballot box is the greatest possible insult to democracy’

  CIVICUS speaks with Jorge Santos, General Coordinator of the Guatemalan Human Rights Defenders Protection Unit (UDEFEGUA), about the imminent inauguration of a new president, which comes after 100 days of mobilisation to demand respect for the election results.

  Founded in 2000, UDEFEGUA is a civil society organisation dedicated to documenting, verifying and recording attacks against human rights defenders in Guatemala.

   

  What was the significance of the election of Bernardo Arévalo as president, and what’s the reason for the enormous resistance he has faced?

  29 December 2023 marked 27 years since the signing of the peace accords that put an end to 36 years of internal armed conflict in Guatemala. That conflict claimed more than 200,000 direct victims and left deep scars on Guatemalan society. The peace accords established a structural transformation agenda to tackle the root causes of the conflict. Instead, the last three governments – and particularly that of current president Alejandro Giammattei – have done nothing but produce a severe authoritarian regression.

  The presidential elections held in June and August 2023 were meant to consolidate this authoritarian regression and to finish burying the peace and democracy-building agenda.

  More than 20 parties competed in the first round of the presidential election, most of them located on the right and far right and identified with the groups that have captured the state, closely linked to economic, political and military elites and organised crime.

  The mere fact that the election took place was a milestone. That the winning candidate had clear democratic and progressive views made it all the more remarkable. Bernardo Arévalo’s victory represents society’s repudiation of the corrupt political elite. We were at a historic crossroads, between an authoritarian past and a possible future in which we could build a democratic state.

  This explains the enormous resistance the president-elect has faced. Bernardo is the son of former president Juan José Arévalo, the first popularly elected president following the October 1944 revolution and the architect of what was called the democratic spring of those years. His legacy is still very much alive: it was then that the right to vote was extended to women, the labour code was passed and the Guatemalan Social Security Institute was established. In other words, it led to the transformation of the state.

  It’s been 79 years that we have been dominated by particular groups interested in maintaining the privileges of a small segment of the population. They would obviously resist a government like Arévalo’s coming to power. However, although very powerful, these groups are in the minority and at last it seems that they are beginning to lose the privileges they have always enjoyed.

  How has democracy in Guatemala been at risk?

  Recent governments have completely bypassed legality. The outgoing government practically broke the rule of law. One indicator of this, which we have identified as part of the overall context of aggression against human rights defenders, is the violation of the republican principle of the separation of powers. The three branches of the Guatemalan state – executive, legislative and judicial – have been captured by mafia elites.

  Repeated attempts to violate the popular will expressed at the ballot box only aggravated the situation. The Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Attorney General’s Office have pressured the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to reverse the election results, carrying out four illegal and arbitrary raids against the Tribunal.

  It is important to note that national and international election observation missions, including from the Organization of American States and the European Union, corroborated the transparency of the process and stated that the allegations of fraud were unfounded.

  Disregard for the will of the people expressed at the ballot box is the greatest possible insult to democracy. In the face of this, people have mobilised. Starting on 2 October, a national strike was called for an indefinite period of time to demand respect for the will of the people. 9 January marked the 100th day of peaceful resistance, led by Indigenous peoples, in defence of democracy.

  What was new about these protests?

  The protests called by the ancestral authorities of Indigenous peoples have been joined by numerous spontaneous expressions of citizen mobilisation. In the past, the urban and mestizo – mixed ancestry – middle classes opposed mobilisation by Indigenous peoples. This time, however, the protests led by Indigenous peoples have been supported and legitimised by broad segments of society. This broke with a long tradition of prejudice and racial discrimination by urban and mestizo society towards Indigenous peoples, and resulted in massive and widespread demonstrations throughout the country.

  The protests succeeded in bringing together the 23 peoples that make up Guatemala. Broad segments of society carried out road blockades at the country’s main transit points. Passage of vehicles transporting food or providing medical services was not obstructed, as protesters cleared the way for them.

  The blockades were an unprecedented demonstration of citizen joy. People rediscovered and recovered public spaces, danced on blocked streets and organised football games, yoga and chess classes on occupied spaces.

  A key characteristic of the protests was their peaceful character. In the face of provocations by external forces and the national police, people responded with non-violent actions. For 100 days they held a rally in front of the headquarters of the Public Prosecutor’s Office. The protesters did not leave their place and continued to demand the resignation of the attorney general, Consuelo Porras Argueta, for her repeated attempts to annul Bernardo Arévalo’s presidential victory.

  What should be the new government’s priorities?

  The Seed Movement – Arévalo’s party – faces important challenges. Although it will control the executive branch, the legislative branch remains highly captured by mafias. Out of 160 parliamentarians, around 130 belong to groups that make up what is popularly known in Guatemala as the ‘corrupt pact‘. The same is true of the justice system.

  Bernardo Arévalo faces the enormous challenge of rebuilding public institutions. Corruption and impunity have reached such levels that services as essential as obtaining an identity card have become an ordeal. Infrastructure must be rebuilt so that people can access essential services such as health and education free of charge. The long list of human rights violations experienced by the Guatemalan people must stop.

  Another major challenge is to generate a systematic and permanent process of dialogue with civil society. In particular, Indigenous peoples, historically excluded, their rights violated by the Guatemalan state, must be recognised as key political subjects.

  The government of the Seed Movement will have only four years to address these challenges. We hope that its mandate will be part of a transition that will usher in a long period of governments that respond to the interests of the majority of the population.

  What improvements in the situation of human rights defenders can be expected following the change of government?

  In 2014, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled in the case Human Rights Defender against the State of Guatemala, initiated following the murder of a human rights defender in 2004. Our request to the Court was to include as a reparation measure the introduction of a public policy for the protection of human rights defenders. The Court accepted this request and included it in its ruling, imposing five parameters for the design of such a policy.

  But efforts to develop this policy were truncated and there is only a draft document to date. It will therefore be a key responsibility of the new government to complete this process and commit itself to approving the policy and providing the resources required for its implementation.

  Another of its responsibilities in this area will be to push forward a legislative agenda to dismantle all the criminalising legislation passed in recent years. This process must go hand in hand with an activation of the institutions in charge of ensuring the state’s compliance with its human rights obligations.

  How can the international community support the strengthening of democracy in Guatemala?

  The risk of a break with the constitution remains. The new government will have to confront one of the continent’s most conservative and backward oligarchies, responsible for the crime of genocide. Stripping these groups of their privileges will be no easy task.

  Continued support and vigilance by the international community will be extremely necessary. Crucial forms of support would include the sharing of information and best practices, denouncing of human rights violations and provision of technical assistance.

  On 14 January, the date of the presidential inauguration, a period of democratic transition begins that promises to leave corruption and lawlessness behind. Both the new government and Guatemalan civil society will need all the support they can get in order to achieve this.

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  Civic space in Guatemala is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with UDEFEGUA through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@UDEFEGUA and@JorgeASantos197 on Twitter.

• GUATEMALA: ‘Our democracy is at risk in the hands of political-criminal networks’

  CIVICUS speaks with Evelyn Recinos Contreras about Guatemala’s general elections – where a candidate promising reform has surprisingly made the second round of the presidential race – and the prospects for democratic change and opening up civic space.

  Evelyn is a former investigator for the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) and former advisor to the Attorney General of Guatemala. She is currently living in exile because of her human rights activism.

  What is the state of civic space in Guatemala?

  Civic space in Guatemala is under serious threat. To understand this better, one must understand that, as a consequence of armed conflict, the social fabric is broken. There is hardly any grassroots citizen engagement to speak of. The sectors that for decades served as an engine of social change, such as teachers, trade unionists and high school and public university students, have been irreparably affected by the violence.

  Of these, probably the only grassroots sector that remains organised is Indigenous Mayan peoples, who fight for the defence of their territory and natural resources. In addition, in urban areas, civil society human rights and pro-democracy organisations have organised their work around strengthening democratic institutions, with much emphasis on the issue of justice.

  It is precisely these sectors that are once again being hit by authoritarianism and state violence. In the interior of the country, thousands of community leaders are being criminalised and entire communities are subject to arrest warrants and threatened with criminal prosecution. A similar situation is experienced in urban areas, where the justice system has been captured by political-criminal networks that use state platforms to fund their criminal endeavours and intimidate justice operators, human rights defenders and activists who fight for human rights and the strengthening of civic space and democracy.

  Networks of corruption and impunity affect the democratic space, as evidenced by the fact that people such as Thelma Cabrera of the People’s Liberation Movement were prevented from registering as candidates and participating in the elections.

  What are the causes of Guatemala’s democratic erosion?

  Democracy in Guatemala is being eroded by political-criminal networks that have taken over institutions and use them for their own benefit rather than the wellbeing of the public and the strengthening of democracy. But it has been a gradual and almost imperceptible process. Several key institutions have been weakened, such as the National Civil Police, which is in charge of two main tasks: crime prevention and the maintenance of citizen security, and collaboration in criminal investigations. For years, civil society worked with police commanders to build an institution at the service of democratic security, so that its work would serve to produce a civic space in which citizens could enjoy their fundamental rights and live a dignified life free of violence. But since 2017 we have seen the institution weakened, with commanders being dismissed and resources being misused.

  Similar problems can be found in the judiciary. High courts have not followed their normal process of renewal: they have not held elections for new magistrates. In addition, the last two elections they held were denounced and investigated for acts of corruption. The Public Prosecutor’s Office has also been weakened by a policy of criminal prosecution and criminalisation of justice operators, which has also meant the sidelining of investigation of crimes against life, violence against women and property crimes, which hit citizens hard. Rates of violence and insecurity in Guatemala are almost as high as in countries undergoing internal armed conflicts.

  Do you think that the anti-corruption struggle has failed in Guatemala?

  It is very difficult to provide an absolute answer to the question of the success or failure of the fight against corruption in Guatemala. I think the cases that were brought to trial were supported by evidence and due process was respected. In that sense they were successful. But this was only part of the fight against corruption, because the law provides a limited platform. The damage to society had already been done and resources had already been lost.

  The fight against corruption is only truly successful when there is a level of social involvement that leads to scrutiny of public officials and a sustained demand of accountability. Sadly, we are not there yet.

  For those who have been involved in the fight against corruption, the negative consequences have been obvious. Prosecutors, judges, human rights defenders, activists and community leaders are being persecuted on unfounded charges and pushed towards exile. This sends a strong message of fear to Guatemalan society. But I am convinced that the struggle does not end here. We deserve a country where we can all live in freedom and dignity. The Mayan people have been resisting for more than 500 years, so I think they are our best example to follow.

  Do you think a positive change could come out of this election?

  I believe there is hope. People have shown they are tired of the same murky forces that for years have embodied voracious economic interests that exploit peoples and territories and are characterised by discrimination, double standards and structural violence.

  The fact that one of the contenders in the runoff is the Semilla party, born out of the anti-corruption protests of 2015 and bringing together many people who have never participated in political parties before, is evidence of a desire for change. People rejected the usual political actors who represent archaic economic interests and embody authoritarian and corrupt forms of politics.

  For change to really materialise, we need the international community to turn its eyes to Guatemala. The risk to our democracy at the hands of political-criminal networks must not go unnoticed. We need the international community to draw attention to and speak out about the situation in our country, because the violation of the human rights of Guatemalans affects our shared humanity.

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  Civic space in Guatemala is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

• GUINEA: ‘The democratic future of the region is at stake in our country’

  CIVICUS speaks about the lack of progress in the transition to democracy in Guinea since its 2021 military coup with Abdoulaye Oumou Sow, head of communications for the National Front for the Defence of the Constitution (FNDC).

  The FNDC is a coalition of Guinean civil society organisations and opposition parties founded in April 2019 to protest against former President Alpha Condé’s proposed constitutional change to seek a third term. The coalition continued to fight for a return to constitutional rule after the September 2021 military coup. On 8 August 2022, the transitional governmentdecreed its dissolution, accusing it of organising armed public demonstrations, using violence and inciting hatred.

  

  Why is there a delay in calling elections to restore constitutional order?

  The National Committee of Reconciliation and Development (CNRD), the junta in power since September 2021, is more interested in seizing power than organising elections. It is doing everything possible to restrict civic space and silence any dissenting voices that try to protest and remind them that the priority of a transition must be the return to constitutional order. It is imprisoning leaders and members of civil society and the political opposition for mobilising to demand elections, and has just ordered the dissolution of the FNDC under false accusations of organising armed demonstrations on the streets and acting as a combat group or private militia.

  What are the conditions set by the military and how has the democratic opposition reacted?

  In violation of Article 77 of the Transitional Charter, which provides for the duration of the transition to be determined by agreement between the CNRD and the country’s main social and political actors, the military junta has unilaterally set a duration of 36 months without listening to the opinion of social and political forces. The junta is currently set on not listening to anyone.

  The military are savagely repressing citizens who are mobilising for democracy and demanding the opening of a frank dialogue between the country’s social and political forces and the CNRD to agree on a reasonable timeframe for the return to constitutional order. Lacking the will to let go of power, the head of the junta is wallowing in arrogance and contempt. His attitude is reminiscent of the heyday of the dictatorship of the deposed regime of Alpha Condé.

  What has been the public reaction?

  Most socio-political forces currently feel excluded from the transition process and there have been demonstrations for the restoration of democracy.

  But the junta runs the country like a military camp. Starting on 13 May 2002, a CNRD communiqué has banned all demonstrations on public spaces. This decision is contrary to Article 8 of the Transitional Charter, which protects fundamental freedoms. Human rights violations have subsequently multiplied. Civic space is completely under lock and key. Activists are persecuted, some have been arrested and others are living in hiding. Despite the many appeals of human rights organisations, the junta multiplies its abuses against pro-democracy citizens.

  On 28 July 2022, at the call of the FNDC, pro-democracy citizens mobilised to protest against the junta’s seizure of power. But unfortunately, this mobilisation was prevented and repressed with bloody force. At least five people were shot dead, dozens were injured and hundreds were arrested. Others were deported to the Alpha Yaya Diallo military camp, where they have been tortured by the military.

  Among those arrested and currently held in Conakry prison are the National Coordinator of the FNDC, Oumar Sylla Foniké Manguè, the FNDC’s head of operations, Ibrahima Diallo and the Secretary General of the Union of Republican Forces, Saikou Yaya Barry. They are accused of illegal assembly, destruction of public buildings and disturbances of public order.

  How can the international community, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in particular, give the pro-democracy movement the support it needs?

  Today it is more necessary than ever for the international community to accompany the people of Guinea who are under the thumb of a new military dictatorship.

  The democratic future of the region is at stake in our country. If the international community, and ECOWAS in particular, remains silent, it will set a dangerous precedent for the region. Because of its management of the previous crisis generated by the third mandate of Alpha Condé, Guinean citizens do not have much faith in the sub-regional institution. From now on, the force of change must come from within, through the determination of the people of Guinea to take their destiny in hand.

  Civic space in Guinea is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with the FNDC through itswebsite or itsFacebook page and follow@FNDC_Gn on Twitter.

• HAITI: ‘Civil society must get involved because political actors cannot find a solution to our problems’

  CIVICUS speaks about Haiti’s ongoing crisis and calls for foreign intervention with Monique Clesca, a journalist, democracy advocate and member of the Commission to Search for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis (Commission pour la recherche d’une solution haitienne a la crise, CRSC). CRSC, also known as the Montana Group, is a group of civic, religious and political organisations and leaders that got together in early 2021. Following the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, it promoted theMontana Accord, calling for a two-year provisional government to take over from acting Prime Minister Ariel Henry and hold elections as soon as possible, as well as a road map to reduce insecurity, tackle the humanitarian crisis and respond to social justice demands. The Monitoring Office of the Montana Accord continues to follow up on this roadmap.

  What are the causes of Haiti’s current crisis?

  People seem to associate the crisis with the assassination of President Moïse, but it started way before that, because there were various underlying issues. It is a political crisis but also a much deeper social crisis. The majority of people in Haiti have suffered the effect of profound inequalities for many decades. There are huge gaps in terms of health and education so there is a need for basic social justice. The problem goes far beyond the more visible political, constitutional and humanitarian issues.

  Over the past decade, we have had governments that tried to undermine state institutions so that a corrupt system could prevail: there have not been transparent elections and no alternation of power, with three successive governments of the same political party. Former president Michel Martelly postponed the presidential elections twice. He ruled by decree for more than a year. In 2016, fraud allegations were made against Moïse, his successor. In his time in office, Moïse dissolved parliament and never organised elections. He fired several Supreme Court judges and politicised the police.

  He also put forward a constitutional referendum, which has been repeatedly postponed, that is clearly unconstitutional. The 1987 Constitution defines how it should be amended, so by trying to rewrite it, Moïse went the unconstitutional way.

  By the time Moïse was killed, Haiti was left with his legacy of weak institutions, massive corruption and the lack of elections and renewal of the political class. After Moïse’s assassination the situation worsened further, because now there was no president and no functioning judiciary and legislative body. We had, and continue to have, a full-blown constitutional crisis.

  Ariel Henry, the current acting prime minister, clearly has no mandate. Moïse selected him as the next prime minister two days before he was killed and didn’t even leave a signed nomination letter.

  What has the Montana Group proposed as a way out of this crisis?

  The Montana Group formed in early 2021 out of the realisation that civil society must get involved because political actors could not find a solution to Haiti’s problems. A forum of civil society then put together a commission that worked for six months creating dialogue and trying to build consensus by speaking to all political actors, as well as to civil society organisations. As a result of all this input, we came up with a draft agreement that was finalised and signed by almost a thousand organisations and citizens: the Montana Accord.

  We put together a two-part plan: a governance plan and a social justice and humanitarian roadmap, which was signed as part of the agreement. To get consensus with wider participation, we proposed the creation of a checks and balances body that would carry out the role of the legislative branch and also an interim judiciary during the transition. Once Haiti can have transparent elections, there would be a proper elected legislative body and the government could go through the constitutional process to name the high-level judiciary body, the Supreme Court. That is the governance that we’ve envisioned for the transition, one that is closer to the spirit of the Haitian Constitution.

  Earlier this year, we met several times with Henry and tried to start negotiations with him and his allies. At one point, he told us he didn’t have the authority to negotiate. So he closed the door to negotiations.

  What are the challenges to holding elections in the current context?

  The main challenge is the massive insecurity. Gangs are terrorising the population. Kidnappings are rampant, people are being assassinated. People can’t go out of their homes: they can’t go to the bank, to the stores, to the hospital. Children can’t go to school: classes were supposed to start in September, then in October and now the government is silent on when they will start.

  There is also the dire humanitarian situation, only made worse when gangs blocked the main oil terminal of Varreux in Port-au-Prince. This impacted on power supply and water distribution, and therefore on people’s access to basic goods and services. Amid a cholera outbreak, health facilities were forced to reduce their services or shut down.

  And there is political polarisation and massive mistrust. People don’t only mistrust politicians; they also mistrust one another.

  Because of the political pressure and gang activity, citizen mobilisations have been up and down, but since late August there have been massive demonstrations calling for Henry’s resignation. People have also marched against rising fuel prices, shortages and corruption. They have also clearly rejected any foreign military intervention.

  What is your position regarding the prime minister’s call for foreign intervention?

  Henry has no legitimacy to call for any military intervention. The international community can help, but it is not up to them to decide whether to intervene or not. We first need to have a two-year political transition with a credible government. We have ideas, but at this point, we need to see a transition.

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  Civic space in Haiti is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Contact theCommission to Search for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis through itsFacebook page, and follow@moniclesca on Twitter.

• HAITI: ‘Gangs control the country instead of the authorities’

  CIVICUS speaks with freelance journalist Nancy Roc about the increase in gang violence and the political situation in Haiti.

  With 38 years of experience, Nancy is a Haitian-born journalist renowned for her work for press freedom. She is the recipient of numerous awards, including UNESCO’s Jean Dominique Prize for Press Freedom.

  What’s the current security situation in Haiti?

  The situation is untenable, to use the exact words of Volker Türk, the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights. Despite a state of emergency and a succession of curfews the government has declared since 4 March to try to regain control of the capital, Port-au-Prince, not a week goes by without kidnappings. Violence is a daily occurrence.

  People are holed up in their homes, most schools are closed and economic activity is severely affected. The same goes for roads, where gangs have been imposing their law for more than three months and many drivers are out of work. Virtually all the capital’s infrastructure has been destroyed or seriously affected by gang attacks.

  An attack on the National Penitentiary on 2 March came as a great shock to Haitians, even though they are used to living under the constant threat of violence. More than 4,500 inmates are believed to have escaped, including prominent gang members and people arrested in connection with the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021. There have been widespread looting and attacks, particularly against the National Library, which was stormed on 3 April.

  On the evening of 2 April, heavily armed bandits looted dozens of homes and seized private vehicles in the villages of Tecina and Théodat, in Tabarre municipality, northeast of Port-au-Prince. The vast majority of the population, already living in extreme poverty, have now been plunged into hell and left to fend for themselves.

  As for the police, despite some efforts, they are neither equipped nor numerous enough to deal with such a situation of urban guerrilla warfare against heavily armed gangs. There are currently around 23 gangs operating in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, divided into two major coalitions: G-Pèp, led by Gabriel Jean Pierre, known as Ti Gabriel, and G9 Family and Allies, led by Jimmy Chérizier, alias Barbecue. However, UN experts estimate there are between 150 and 200 gangs throughout Haiti.

  According to the UN, since the start of the year, 1,193 people have been killed and 692 injured as a result of gang violence. The health system is on the verge of collapse, and hospitals often lack the capacity to treat the injured. The economy is suffocating as the gangs impose restrictions on people’s movements. The main supplier of drinking water has stopped deliveries. The situation has led to a major food crisis: almost half of Haiti’s 11 million inhabitants need some form of food assistance.

  How did the gangs become so powerful?

  The gangs have powerful backers in government and the private sector. Under former de facto Prime Minister Ariel Henry, who resigned in March, the government funded 30 per cent of the members of the G9. It wouldn’t be surprising if some people, both in the private sector and former senior government officials, have continued to fund them, particularly those who have been sanctioned by the international community.

  A UN expert report published in 2023 also singled out former president Michel Martelly, in power between 2011 and 2016, as well as several prominent business leaders and legislators, as providing resources to armed gangs, whether in kind or in cash.

  The proliferation of gangs began under Martelly and intensified after Moïse’s assassination. By 2019, some 162 armed groups had been identified, more than half of them operating in the metropolitan area. In total, they are said to potentially have over 3,000 soldiers armed with firearms, including adolescents and children.

  Under Moïse, numerous massacres took place, such as the La Saline massacre in 2018, the Bel Air massacre in 2019 and the Cité Soleil massacre in 2020. All took place in neighbourhoods with significant electoral power where members of the opposition lived, and these crimes all went unpunished.

  In 2020, the situation worsened when Chérizier, a former police officer, federated the gangs with the G9 Family, allied to the nine most powerful gangs in the region. This enabled him to control a large part of Port-au-Prince – all while being covertly financed by high-ranking government officials.

  The federation of gangs was even hailed by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Haiti, who claimed that federating the gangs had reduced the number of homicides by 12 per cent in three months. This caused such a scandal that she was forced to retract her statement, describing it as a ‘misinterpretation‘.

  A year after the assassination of Moïse, as the situation worsened, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution establishing a sanctions regime that targeted gang leaders and those who financed them. Chérizier was the only gang leader named in an annex to the resolution, but to date no action has been taken against him.

  On 29 February 2024, the situation in the capital took a decisive turn for the worse when Chérizier announced, in a video posted on social media, the reconstitution of the coalition of armed groups known as Viv Ansanm (Living Together). In the video, he claimed responsibility for the tensions that have shaken Port-au-Prince and declared that the gangs’ primary objective was to overthrow the government. He also stated that a hunt was now on for ministers and the Director General of the National Police. He wanted to arrest them and prevent Henry, who was in Puerto Rico, returning to the country. Police officers were killed, police stations were attacked and several flights were cancelled following an assault by gangs at Toussaint Louverture international airport, which has since been closed.

  Chérizier claims to be launching a revolution to liberate the Haitian people from the authorities and the oligarchs. But the gangs have targeted every stratum of society, as well as the poor districts of Port-au-Prince and many state structures that serve the poor, such as the main public hospital. The destruction is such that the UN refers to Haiti as ‘a state on the brink of collapse’.

  By December 2023, more than 310,000 people had been displaced within Haiti. According to the International Organization for Migration, more than 50,000 people left Port-au-Prince in three weeks in March 2024. The scale of the disaster is staggering, and all the countries that had promised police or military aid are absent. Haiti has been abandoned to its sad fate and gangs are controlling the country instead of the authorities.

  Why hasn’t the government reacted to the growing gang threat?

  Four years ago, the Haitian National Police officially had a force of 15,498 police officers, among them only 1,711 women, although the actual number of officers was estimated to be much lower. Moreover, the humanitarian programme put in place by the Biden-Harris administration to make it easier for Haitians to live in the USA has put the police at risk of losing up to a third of its workforce to emigration.

  Against this backdrop, chaos and violence have reached unprecedented levels. Since Moïse’s assassination, the government has been unable to establish order with the police, and the army has only had around 2,000 soldiers. No legislative or general elections have been held since 2016. As a result, there are no longer any elected representatives, as the terms in office of the previously elected ones have expired. Critics of Henry, who was very unpopular, considered his government illegitimate.

  In October 2022, Henry appealed to the international community, requesting the intervention of a foreign force. Given his unpopularity, this aroused public mistrust, as people feared this intervention would strengthen an illegitimate government accused of colluding with gangs. What’s more, the composition of this mission turned into a headache.

  Almost a year later, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution authorising the use of force by an international security assistance mission in Haiti. Neither Canada nor the USA wanted to intervene directly, stressing that the solution had to come from Haitians themselves. But Haitians have been unable to reach agreement, and what’s more, they fear foreign intervention, given the catastrophic interventions led by the UN since 2004. Canada, which had been asked by the USA to take the lead in the intervention, withdrew in March 2023, passing the leadership on to Kenya.

  Deployment of a multinational intervention force was due to begin on 1 January 2024. Last July, Kenya offered to lead the mission with a thousand police officers. Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas and Jamaica had pledged to send security personnel, and more recently Belize and Guyana did as well. Canada has also pledged to participate in the mission. For its part, the US government pledged to fund the mission to the tune of at least US$100 million.

  As the gangs extended their hold over Port-au-Prince and formed an alliance with the declared aim of overthrowing Henry, he planned to travel to Kenya to sign a reciprocity agreement. While he was away, Chérizier’s criminal gangs launched their attacks on police stations, the airport and prisons. They threatened civil war if Henry returned to Haiti. He resigned on 11 March 2024. The next day, Kenya suspended the dispatch of police to Haiti.

  Who is in charge today, and what are the chances of democracy being restored?

  In the wake of Henry’s resignation, the government declared a state of emergency. On the same day, it was announced that a Presidential Transitional Council (PTC) had been formed to restore order. The Council is made up of nine members: seven voting members and two observers. It includes representatives of the main political parties, civil society and the private sector. Its 22-month mandate is due to end on 7 February 2026 after it has organised ‘democratic, free and credible elections’.

  There are already a number of obstacles to achieving this goal. First, how can security be re-established when the gangs are still receiving weapons from the USA? The latest twist is that when Henry issued the decree announcing the formation of the PTC, it didn’t include any of the members’ names. Since then, the organisations of the PTC’s appointed representatives have expressed their disagreement with the government decree published in the official gazette on 12 April 2024. Finally, the decree formalising the appointment of PTC members was published on 16 April.

  In addition, the Council wishes to be sworn in at the National Palace before the nation, even though the Palace has been targeted by gangs on several occasions. Who will provide security? How can peace be restored to Haiti in a context of such political uncertainty and economic fragility? Will the members of the Council, some of whom are frenemies, be able to look beyond their own interests for the benefit of the nation? And who will rebuild the country after so many young people have left? Will the diaspora finally be called upon?

  Further, the possibility of famine looms on the horizon and the World Food Programme fears that its food stocks will run out by the end of April.

  Finally, how can gangs be persuaded to lay down their arms when they are making millions from kidnappings and arms sales? Crime is a very lucrative business for gangs and for citizens facing great poverty.

  How can we restore justice and punish those who have committed so many crimes against humanity? As the saying goes, no justice, no peace. Finally, what about the gangs’ political ambitions? On 11 March, Chérizier declared that it would be ‘the Viv Ansanm alliance, along with the Haitian people, who will elect the person who will lead the country’. Will the PTC have to negotiate with the gangs?

  The challenges facing the PTC are therefore significant, and one of the most arduous will be to find a way of articulating a request for external aid without losing Haiti’s sovereignty.

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  Civic space in Haiti is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Nancy Roc on herFacebook page and follow@TheNancyRoc on Twitter.

• HAITI: ‘The international community has never addressed the root causes of the crisis’

  CIVICUS speaks with Nixon Boumba, a human rights activist and member of Kolektif Jistis Min nan Ayiti (Haiti Justice in Mining Collective), about the political situation in Haiti following the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse. Formed in 2012, Haiti Justice in Mining Collective is a movement of Haitian civil society organisations, individuals and partners pushing for transparency and social and environmental justice in the face of growing international interest in Haiti’s mining sector. It educates affected communities on the consequences of mining in five areas: the environment, water, work, agriculture and land.