elections

• OUGANDA : « Personne ne peut gagner les élections sans le vote des jeunes »

  CIVICUS s'entretient avec Mohammed Ndifuna, directeur exécutif de Justice Access Point-Uganda (JAP). Établi en 2018, le JAP cherche à faire avancer, encourager et renforcer la lutte pour la justice dans le contexte du processus de justice transitionnelle bloqué en Ouganda, des difficultés du pays à mettre en œuvre les recommandations de ses premier et deuxième examens périodiques universels au Conseil des droits de l’Homme des Nations Unies, et face à la réaction de certains États africains contre la Cour pénale internationale.

  Mohammed est un défenseur des droits humains et un travailleur de la paix expérimenté et passionné, avec plus de 15 ans d'activisme des droits humains et de prévention des atrocités aux niveaux local, national et international. En 2014, il a reçu le Prix des droits de l’Homme de l'Union européenne pour l'Ouganda ; Il a siégé au comité directeur de la Coalition for the Criminal Court (2007-2018) et au conseil consultatif du Human Rights House Network à Oslo (2007-2012). Il siège actuellement au comité de gestion du Comité national ougandais pour la prévention du génocide et des atrocités de masse.

  

  Quel est l'état de l'espace civique en Ouganda à l'approche des élections tant attendues en 2021 ?

  L'espace civique en Ouganda peut être caractérisé comme un espace harcelé, étouffé et pillé. La société civile semble être sur une sorte de pente glissante alors que les choses tournent de mal en pis. Par exemple, les organisations de la société civile (OSC) ont subi une vague d'attaques effrontées contre leur espace physique qui ont pris la forme d'effractions dans leurs bureaux en plein jour. Pendant ce temps, les attaques contre les OSC en général, et en particulier celles qui défendent les droits humains et encouragent la responsabilité, se sont poursuivies. Ces dernières années, un certain nombre de mesures législatives et administratives ont été adoptées à l'encontre des OSC et d'autres secteurs, comme la loi sur la gestion de l'ordre public (2012) et la loi sur les ONG (2016).

  Face aux élections générales et présidentielles, qui se tiendront le 14 janvier 2021, le ministre de l'Intérieur a établi que toutes les OSC doivent passer par un processus obligatoire de validation et de vérification pour pouvoir fonctionner. De nombreuses OSC n'ont pas été en mesure d'achever le processus. De ce fait, au 19 octobre 2020, seulement 2 257 OSC avaient terminé avec succès le processus de vérification et de validation, et celles-ci ne comprenaient que quelques OSC qui plaident en faveur des questions de gouvernance.

  Les OSC ougandaises sont fortement dépendantes des donateurs et étaient déjà aux prises avec des ressources financières réduites, ce qui a fortement affecté la portée de leur travail. Cette situation a été exacerbée par l'épidémie de COVID-19 et les mesures de verrouillage prises en réponse, qui ont sapé les efforts de mobilisation des ressources des OSC. Ainsi, la combinaison de ces trois forces - harcèlement, restrictions et accès limité au financement - a affaibli les OSC, obligeant la plupart à concentrer leurs efforts sur leur propre survie.

  Il semblerait que les enjeux des élections de 2021 soient bien plus importants que les années précédentes. Qu'est ce qui a changé ?

  La situation a commencé à changer en juillet 2019, lorsque Robert Kyagulanyi, mieux connu sous son nom de scène, Bobi Wine, a annoncé qu'il se présenterait à la présidence en tant que candidat à la plate-forme de l'opposition nationale pour l'unité. Bobi Wine est un chanteur, acteur, activiste et politicien. En tant que leader du mouvement du Pouvoir Populaire, Notre Pouvoir, il a été élu législateur en 2017.

  L'attention que Bobi reçoit des jeunes est énorme et il faut tenir compte du fait que plus de 75% de la population ougandaise a moins de 30 ans. Cela fait des jeunes un groupe qu'il est essentiel d'attirer. Aucun candidat ne peut remporter les élections ougandaises s'il ne recueille pas la majorité des voix des jeunes. Lors de la prochaine course présidentielle, Bobi Wine semble être le candidat le plus capable d'attirer ces votes. Bien qu'il n'ait pas beaucoup d'expérience en tant que politicien, Bobi est une personnalité très charismatique et a réussi à attirer non seulement des jeunes mais aussi de nombreux politiciens des partis traditionnels dans son mouvement de masse.

  Longtemps connu comme le « président du ghetto », Bobi Wine a utilisé son appel en tant que star de la musique populaire pour produire des chansons politiques et mobiliser les gens. Ses racines dans le ghetto l'ont également rendu plus attractif dans les zones urbaines. On pense que cela a motivé de nombreux jeunes à s'inscrire pour voter, il est donc possible que l'apathie des jeunes électeurs diminue par rapport aux élections précédentes.

  Face à la lutte acharnée actuelle pour les votes des jeunes, il n'est pas étonnant que l'appareil de sécurité se soit violemment attaqué aux jeunes, dans une tentative évidente de contenir la pression qu'ils exercent. De nombreux activistes politiques liés au Pouvoir Populaire ont été harcelés et, dans certains cas, tués. Plusieurs dirigeants politiques du Pouvoir Populaire ont été détenus intermittemment et poursuivis devant les tribunaux, ou auraient été enlevés et torturés dans des lieux clandestins. Dans une tentative évidente d'attirer les jeunes du ghetto, le président Yoweri Museveni a nommé trois personnes du ghetto comme conseillers présidentiels. Cela ouvre la possibilité que les gangs du ghetto et la violence jouent un rôle dans les prochaines élections présidentielles. 

   

  Lors des élections précédentes, la liberté d'expression et l'utilisation d'Internet ont été restreintes. Peut-on s’attendre à voir des tendances similaires cette fois ?

  Nous les voyons déjà. La préoccupation concernant la restriction de la liberté d'expression et d'information est valable non seulement rétrospectivement, mais aussi en raison de plusieurs événements récents. Par exemple, le 7 septembre 2020, la Commission ougandaise des communications (CCU) a publié un avis public indiquant que toute personne souhaitant publier des informations sur Internet doit demander et obtenir une licence de la CCU avant le 5 octobre 2020. Cela affectera principalement les internautes, tels que les blogueurs, qui sont payés pour le contenu qu'ils publient. De toute évidence, cela tente de supprimer les activités politiques des jeunes sur Internet. Et c'est aussi particulièrement inquiétant car, étant donné que les réunions et assemblées publiques sont limitées en raison des mesures de prévention de la COVID-19, les médias numériques seront la seule méthode autorisée de campagne pour les élections de 2021.

  La surveillance électronique a également augmenté, et la possibilité d'un arrêt des plateformes de médias sociaux à la veille des élections n'est pas écartée.

  Comment la pandémie de COVID-19 a-t-elle affecté la société civile et sa capacité à répondre aux restrictions d'espace civique ?

  La pandémie de COVID-19 et les mesures prises en réponse ont exacerbé l'état déjà précaire des OSC. Par exemple, la capacité de la société civile d'organiser des rassemblements publics et des manifestations pacifiques en faveur des droits et libertés fondamentaux, ou de protester contre leur violation, a été limitée par la manière dont les procédures opérationnelles standard (POS) ont été appliquées pour faire face à la COVID-19. Cela a entraîné des violations et des attaques contre l'espace civique. Par exemple, le 17 octobre 2020, les forces de police ougandaises et les unités de défense locales ont effectué une effraction conjointe lors d'une réunion de prière de Thanksgiving qui se tenait dans le district de Mityana et ont gazé gratuitement la congrégation, qui comprenait des enfants, des femmes, des hommes, des personnes âgées et des chefs religieux ; la raison alléguée était que les personnes rassemblées avaient désobéi aux POS pour la COVID-19.

  Dès que la mise en œuvre des POS pour la COVID-19 entre en contact avec la pression électorale, il est possible que la répression des libertés de réunion pacifique et d'association s'aggrave. Malheureusement, les OSC sont déjà fortement restreintes.

  Comment la société civile internationale peut-elle aider la société civile ougandaise ?

  La situation de la société civile ougandaise est telle qu’elle nécessite l’appui et la réponse urgents de la communauté internationale. Vous devez prêter attention à ce qui se passe en Ouganda et vous exprimer d'une manière qui amplifie les voix d'une société civile locale de plus en plus étouffée. Plus spécifiquement, les OSC ougandaises devraient être soutenues afin qu'elles puissent mieux répondre aux violations flagrantes des libertés, atténuer les risques impliqués dans leur travail et améliorer leur résilience dans le contexte actuel.

  L'espace civique en Ouganda est classé comme « répressif » par leCIVICUS Monitor.
  Contactez Justice Access Point via leursite Web ou leur pageFacebook, et suivez@JusticessP sur Twitter.

• PAKISTAN: ‘Democratic forces have become weak due to prolonged military regimes’

  As part of our 2018 report on the theme ofreimagining democracy, we are interviewing civil society activists and leaders about their work to promote democratic practices and principles, the challenges they encounter and the victories they score. CIVICUS speaks to Peter Jacob, the Executive Director of the Centre for Social Justice in Pakistan, a civil society organisation (CSO) engaging in research and advocacy on human rights, the democratic development and social justice. He has been an activist, researcher and freelance journalist for over 30 years.

  In Pakistan’s July 2018 elections, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, a party led by Imran Khan,emerged as the largest party in parliament, breaking the decades-long dominance of the Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz. The election wasovershadowed by hundreds of political arrests, a massive crackdown on the media and allegations that the powerful military covertly backed Imran Khan.

  What do you see as the key components of a functioning democracy, and how do you assess the quality of democracy in Pakistan against those standards?

  Just as anywhere else, a functioning democracy should have democratic norms, including constitutions and traditions, democratic institutions, including parliament and an opposition, basic freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression, and a robust civil society that advocates for exercising these freedoms. Pakistan is struggling to become an inclusive and vibrant democracy after transitioning from a military-led government, even though direct military rule ended 10 years ago.

  Pakistan faces an inherent challenge on account of having a constitution that provides for both a theocracy and a democracy, or a mix of religion and politics, posing specific risks to the rights of religious minorities.

  How would you assess the conduct of the July 2018 elections? To what extent do you feel they were free and fair? What were the key challenges encountered and lessons learned?

  The elections were held at a time when the previous government was facing trials on corruption and other charges, so there was a lot of speculation and allegations of gerrymandering. The government and the opposition have agreed to form a parliamentary commission to probe into these allegations. Whatever the outcome, one expects that it will help bring maturity and stability into the politics and governance of the country.

  Until recently Pakistan has faced enormous challenges such as terrorism and lawlessness, low economic performance and an expanding population. It is understandable that the government system is weak and recovery is expected to be incremental. Additionally, the electoral system is not strong enough to have full transparency of the electoral process.

  Nevertheless, one can say that there was wide participation by citizens in the recent elections and therefore the continuation of the democratic process presents hopes for building a fuller democracy. The decision of the opposition to become part of parliament has at least ensured that there isn’t a political crisis in the immediate post-election phase.

  How did conditions for civil society change in the run-up to the elections?

  A section of government has been always sceptical of CSOs; therefore, action against both international and domestic CSOs started back in 2015, largely through registration laws that were used to curtail their operations or their role in the social and public spheres. A smear campaign has also been going on, particularly against rights-based groups, which has pushed them to justify and maintain their own existence. CSOs also became victims of terrorism, and even though terrorist attacks have gradually decreased since 2015, a recovery from that situation has not come about. Therefore, the July 2018 elections did not do much to change the conditions for the civil society for the better.

  To what extent was civil society able to mobilise around the elections?

  Owing to these existential threats, during the recent elections, there were few organisations that could participate or even prepare to mobilise opinion around the elections.

  However, due to popular human rights campaigns in the past and present, all political parties were obliged to incorporate a section on human rights in their election manifestos, which provides space for CSOs engagement in the future.

  What are your key hopes and fears for the new administration that has come to power following the elections, and what should its priorities be?

  The new government presents hope as it has come up with a rather holistic version of a development agenda, so besides a capitalist or neoliberal agenda they have laid an emphasis on environmental conservation, austerity and fighting corruption. Pakistanis, including the opposition, want this agenda to succeed as much as the government does. But Imran Khan has assumed power for the first time at the federal level and is therefore prone to mistakes. The biggest fear is that this team might land themselves in a trouble politically or take on a challenge bigger than they can handle. For example, the government made high claims about reducing its dependence on foreign lending yet it was obliged to approach the International Monetary Fund for a bailout. This indicates some miscalculations or poor assessment of the challenges in the economy and the way forward.        

  Some delicate issues may serve as on-the-job training for the government. For instance if the government can handle religious extremism where they have shown some tendency to perform - as in the well-known case of Asia Bibi, a victim of blasphemy laws - there is a pretty good chance that they will take the country forward.

  Besides focusing on economic challenges, the government should also pay attention to the quality of education and cultural rights. At the moment, public education is mere indoctrination, and cultural and creative expressions are suffocated by censorship of various kinds, so they need to be unshackled.

  Are there other key challenges for civil society’s fundamental rights and democratic freedoms in Pakistan?

  The country is still passing through multiple transitions, such as in its external relations and the economy, which for too long have depended on US military aid and the World Bank’s financial assistance. The country needs to free itself economically and politically. Democratic forces were weakened by prolonged military regimes. The government is inclined to learn from the Chinese model, which is not a democratic one.

  The media is facing curbs on its freedoms and CSOs are facing severe restrictions including a clampdown on receiving foreign funding, although CSOs are fighting back. Given its tradition of struggle against autocratic regimes, civil society might still make a comeback; however, there is currently a lot of confusion as to how civil society space will be reclaimed. But since Pakistan is setting up human rights institutions for women’s, children’s and human rights more generally, these institutions may help to disseminate a stronger discourse and bring attention to fundamental standards of freedoms and rights.

  What support does Pakistani civil society need from the international community and international CSOs to help build greater respect for human rights and democratic freedoms?

  Human rights are all about internationalism and multilateralism, and countries must give and receive support from international actors, including international civil society, in their struggle for freedoms, which we strongly believe are interrelated. I would therefore like to encourage the international community and international CSOs to visit Pakistan, take stock of the ongoing developments and engage with the Pakistani people as well as the government.

  Civic space in Pakistan is rated as ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor

  Get in touch with the Centre for Social Justice on Pakistan through theirwebsite

• PAKISTAN: ‘It doesn’t matter who casts the vote as much as who counts the vote’

  CIVICUS speaks about Pakistan’s upcoming election with Muhammad Mudassar, Chief Executive Officer at the Society for Human Rights and Prisoners’ Aid (SHARP-Pakistan).

  Founded in 1999, SHARP is a human rights civil society organisation working for the rights and wellbeing of vulnerable groups, including refugees and internally displaced people, and working on issues related to people trafficking and smuggling of migrants, including through advocacy at the national and international levels, capacity development, community services and emergency response.

  What’s the political climate in Pakistan ahead of the election?

  Post-COVID-19, like many global south countries Pakistan grapples with security concerns, political instability and economic challenges that affect both its citizens and government. This means that uncertainty loomed over the upcoming election, but the situation is much clearer now and the country is all set to vote for the new parliament. It would be unconstitutional to extend the mandate of the existing caretaker government. The Chief Justice of Pakistan has confirmed that it is set in stone that the general election should be held on time.

  To what extent are conditions conducive to a free and fair election?

  As had always been the case, there’s controversy around the election, which many observers feel lacks conditions for fair competition. While some political parties are free to conduct their activities, others claim to face restrictions in submitting nomination papers and campaigning, and their members are subjected to arrests.

  Over the past 75 years, no prime minister of Pakistan has completed a full five-year term, and they have often ended up in jail. This trend started with Zulficar Ali Bhutto, deposed during martial law in 1977, followed by his daughter Benazir Bhutto, who was dismissed twice. A similar fate befell recent former prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan.

  Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) has had ample space for campaigning, even though Sharif, a three-time former prime minister, was ousted for alleged corruption in 2017 and sentenced to 10 years in prison. In October 2023, he returned to Pakistan from exile in the UK, where he had travelled on bail for medical treatment in 2018. Sharif’s corruption conviction and his lifetime ban from politics were overturned by the Supreme Court in early January. Now most political commentators are predicting that the PML-N will win the election.

  In comparison, Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party is complaining that it has been all but barred from participating in the election. The Electoral Commission of Pakistan disqualified Khan due to one conviction out of around 200 cases against him and barred the party from using its famous cricket bat symbol on ballot papers. Khan has also recently received 10 and 14-year sentences  on charges of leaking state secrets and corruption. Nomination papers of most national and provincial PTI leaders were rejected by District Returning Officers but appellate tribunals of higher judiciary subsequently accepted most and allowed them to context elections.

  Further, there’s no democracy within political parties due to nepotism and dynastic leadership. Most political parties function as family dynasties, which drives independent leaders away. It has rarely been about people’s choices. It doesn’t matter who casts the vote as much as who counts the vote.

  How have civic space conditions changed over the past years?

  The media and civil society are divided and, human rights activists comment, there is an atmosphere of discontent that somewhat hinders the freedom of speech. Further, unemployment and other pressing issues continue to prompt many people to leave Pakistan.

  Still, at SHARP-Pakistan we remain hopeful and keep analysing problems to try to offer solutions. As part of Pakistani civil society, we aspire to forge connections, work alongside and learn from international partners to be able to better promote human rights and democracy at home. We need free and fair elections so that results truly reflect the will of the people.

  How are you and other civil society groups engaging with the election?

  The role of civil society in the election takes the form of support for the institutional processes of a democratic vote well as the more substantive development of a democratic electorate. Civil society is also playing its due role in reducing election-related conflict dynamics and promoting a peaceful electoral environment.

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  Civic space in Pakistan is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

• Pakistan:‘International support to civil society must come with understanding of our political & societal context’

  

  CIVICUS speaks about the political situation in Pakistan since the removal of its Prime Minister Imran Khan with journalist and researcher Rabia Mehmood.

  Rabia Mehmoodis the co-founder of a bi-lingual multimedia news outlet Naya Daur TV and a web-show host covering human rights and social justice stories. She is the former South Asia Researcher for Amnesty International. Her work focuses on state repression, impunity and persecution of religious minorities.

  What led to the ousting of Imran Khan as prime minister through a no-confidence vote?

  Khan was ousted from power in April through a constitutional vote of no confidence brought about by the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), a parliamentary coalition of multiple parties. The coalition secured 174 votes in the 342-member house in support of the no-confidence motion.

  That was the tipping point after weeks of political upheaval. Khan’s administration was criticised by the opposition for failures in governance, soaring inflation and for plunging the country into a diplomatic crisis as his foreign policy distanced Pakistan from the USA.

  To try to block the vote, Khan dissolved the lower house of parliament, but the Supreme Court declared the dissolution unconstitutional. Following the parliamentary vote, Shehbaz Sharif, former Chief Minister of Punjab from the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PMLN) and brother of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, was appointed the new Prime Minister. Sharif is a long-time rival of Khan.

  Since the July 2018 election, the opposition claimed that Khan’s ascent to power was enabled by political engineering by the country’s military establishment. His administration was termed a ‘hybrid regime’, in which Khan was the civilian face of the generals. The key reason behind Khan’s removal is believed to be his falling out with powerful forces within the military, often referred to as the ‘deep state’.

  Regarding the involvement of the military in Pakistan’s political unrest, it is important to note that the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) is considered by many to be the most powerful position in Pakistan. The current COAS, Qamar Bajwa, appointed by Nawaz Sharif in 2016, is finally due to retire in November after six years.

  Sharif was disqualified in 2017 and put behind bars following a corruption scandal. But after Khan won the election in 2018, he granted Bajwa an extension in August 2019. Bajwa was at the time known to be a great believer in the Khan project, along with the former Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief General Faiz Hameed, now Commander of Peshawar Corps. But Bajwa, it appears, has now withdrawn support from Khan.

  Hameed is known to have a different relationship with Khan, and Khan was reliant on him. He was deeply involved in the Khan administration’s repression, in addition to engineering unrest on the streets by an alt-right Islamist group in 2017, which led to further disruption of Sharif’s party.

  It remains to be seen whether Bajwa is seeking yet another extension in November or a safe and comfortable exit, which would pave the way for a new COAS. Analysts estimate that Khan had to be got rid of due to these possible changes in November, and it was an easy task for the military to replace Khan because of his administration’s unsatisfactory governance and economic performance.

  The military has repeatedly claimed to be a ‘neutral umpire’ during this political fiasco. In the run-up to Khan’s ousting and afterwards, Khan’s tactics, of slamming the armed forces and the current ISI chief, show his dissatisfaction with the military institution’s neutrality.

  How has Khan responded?

  In response to the vote of no confidence, Khan also accused the US government of orchestrating regime change in Pakistan. This allegation is based on a diplomatic cable that he claimed was ‘evidence’. When Khan dissolved the assembly ahead of the vote, he had resolved to present the diplomatic cable as evidence of foreign intervention.

  It was later reported that the military explained to parliament’s National Security Committee in March that it had found no evidence of US involvement in regime change, something the White House concurred with.

  In April, as soon as Khan was ousted, he and his party leaders began using terms like ‘American conspiracy’ and ‘international conspiracy’, online and offline. Khan called his opponents ‘thieves’ and ‘traitors’, and one of his close aides called in a public rally for the execution of the ‘traitor opposition’. During his public and press addresses, Khan has called for mutiny, incited his party supporters to commit civil disobedience and encouraged them to retaliate physically.

  Since then Khan has held multiple public rallies across Pakistan and in July his party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), swept by-elections in Punjab, the country’s most populous province, and traditionally a PMLN stronghold. Now the already weak incumbent central government in the centre is facing further hostility from Punjab.

  Khan has been calling for general elections. His narrative has a strong following in the country, and his support base appears to be in resurgence.

  What is the current political and economic situation?

  Pakistan is stuck in limbo due to a worsening political, legal and economic crisis. The leadership is divided between the Sharif-led coalition government and federal ministries led by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), such as the ministry of foreign affairs. Provinces are also split between different parties, with Khan’s PTI leading in the two provinces.

  The coalition government is weak and uncertainty over its immediate future looms large. Analysts assume that the ‘deep state’ will not allow for a strong civilian central government, and that a divided parliament is what it seeks to achieve.

  The new government has taken over a fragile economy. Pakistan entered the International Monetary Fund programme in 2019, and the most recent funding was due in February, but fuel and power tariff caps imposed by the Khan administration halted the next cycle. The new government has now managed to negotiate and get clearance for another payment, but this has come at the price of tough economic decisions, with the burden impacting on the working masses and the salaried class.

  Fuel prices have increased exponentially, which are causing a rise in commodity prices and exacerbating food inflation. Meanwhile, political and economic uncertainty is also causing the currency to depreciate quickly. In the budget for the current fiscal year, the government increased tax and hiked fuel prices. Pakistan’s foreign debt is US$6.4 billion, but at least the immediate risk of bankruptcy has reduced for now.

  Access to basic services, free healthcare and education and adequate housing is increasingly out of reach of most of Pakistan’s 220 million people. Pakistan is essentially a poor country with some very rich families and an army with a massive budget. Instability is having severe repercussions for citizens in terms of their rights and the rule of law.

  Civilian and military rulers have been too reliant on seeking bailout packages instead of focusing on long-term solutions such as taxing the rich and the corporate sector, or developing agriculture and increasing industrial exports. Economic stagnation, however, is not the fault of just one government.

  Has the removal of Khan had a positive influence on Pakistan’s repressed civic space?

  Pakistan’s track record on the freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression has been murky for decades. Civil society groups and activists have long been labelled as foreign agents, funded by anti-Pakistan forces. It is one of the most dangerous countries in the world to be a journalist in. Religious minorities are persecuted and discriminated against through institutions, draconian laws and violence. Ethnic minorities are brutalised for demanding basic rights and protections from the state. The military establishment and security agencies operate with impunity.

  In that context, the battle to defend civic space and media freedom is not new. But since the run-up to the July 2018 election, Pakistanis have been subjected to one of the most repressive eras of the country’s history. Press censorship has been widespread, curtailing any media attempts to question or report on significant issues such as Sharif’s disqualification, the role of the judiciary and military and reports of election rigging.

  Khan established his place as a populist leader, and was called a press predator by Reporters Without Borders. During the Khan administration, journalists, human rights defenders (HRDs) and dissenting citizens were targeted with trumped-up charges of sedition, cyber terrorism and defamation of national institutions, along with arbitrary arrests, raids, disappearances, surveillance and beatings. Journalists were arbitrarily arrested for questioning and reporting on the alleged involvement in corruption of Khan’s wife, Bushara Bibi. Mainstream cable news networks were only allowed to attack opposition parties and their leaders, and portray Khan as the supreme leader. Civil rights movements, such as the Pashtun Tahaffuz Mahaz, were subjected to a discriminatory crackdown. Their rights to freedoms of movement, peaceful assembly and expression, online and offline, have been continuously violated.

  To a degree, Khan’s ousting has given slight breathing space to Pakistan’s repressed HRDs, civil society and journalists. The difference could be that reprisals can be documented in the press, by domestic rights monitors and be televised, with less fear. But this is only relative, as red lines for both the media and civil society still exist.

  The threats and discrimination against ethnic, religious and sexual minorities continue. There are incidents of the use of force against peaceful protesting families of disappeared members of Baloch people, enforced disappearances and discriminatory harassment of Baloch students. A former journalist was arbitrarily detained over online criticism of the army chief. While peacefully protesting, civil society collectives, HRDs and families of the disappeared were shelled in the city of Quetta on 21 July.

  Severely partisan journalists who acted as agents of disinformation and supported the Khan administration by actively targeting minorities, critical media, HRDs and the opposition are now on the receiving end of hostility from security agencies, as they are questioning the military over its alleged role in Khan’s ousting and lack of support for him.

  What is the future of Pakistan’s democracy?

  It appears to be bleak. Pakistan’s democratic process has been undermined severely by decades of dictatorships, the military establishment’s concealed intervention in civilian rule, the dubious role of the judiciary and a short-sighted, craven approach by civilian political parties.

  Since its inception, Pakistan has been ruled by military dictators directly for 33 years, and they have controlled who gets to rule and how from behind the scenes. No civilian prime minister has ever completed their full five-year term. Real power lies in the hands of the generals, who set up hybrid regimes in collaboration with civilian leaders.

  General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew the government of PPP’s charismatic Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in a coup d’état in 1977. In 1979, Bhutto was executed by a severely partisan Supreme Court, while Zia became president. Over the decades, the capitulation of the civilian ruling elite and the role of the judiciary in sanctioning coups have also contributed to the derailing of the country’s ever-fragile democracy.

  For example, former Prime Minister Sharif’s disqualification was widely believed to have been a consequence of a ‘judicial coup’. The National Accountability Bureau chaired by a former Supreme Court judge was severely partisan and flawed, and used to victimise leaders of the PMLN and PPP.

  Decades of conflict in the north-western region, the military’s reliance on militant groups as its proxies and the current resurgence of militant outfits at the border all pose a threat to Pakistan’s stability and consequently its democracy. Sectarian outfits are enduring. Nationalist ethnicities in Sindh and elsewhere are treated with extreme suspicion, which causes the growth of their young people’s resentment towards the state.

  For example, the armed insurgency in Balochistan province has its roots in a lack of trust in the military and the state’s discriminatory policies. The people of the mineral-rich province are poor and have been subjected to human rights abuses and violence for years. Meanwhile, barely any efforts to build trust among Baloch people have been made by state institutions. The militarisation of multiple regions and violence perpetrated on citizens are contrary to democratic norms.

  Unless the constitution and parliament are held supreme in the true sense of the word, and intervention by the powers-that-be isn’t kept in check, Pakistan’s democracy will not be able to address its many challenges and will remain at risk.

  How has civil society engaged with political developments? What kind of international support does Pakistani civil society need?

  Civil society and collectives of HRDs have responded to the political developments with caution but courage. Civil society and HRDs understand where the centre of power lies in Pakistan. Yet it has not stopped them from asking the right questions and leading human rights campaigns. Overall, from larger civil society organisations to smaller but critical collectives, civil society has stood in support of the primacy of parliament, the constitution and democratic processes.

  Years of demonisation of civil society and labelling of HRDs and journalists as anti-state and servers of foreign, western agendas have made it easy for propagandists and authoritarian sections of the state to put targets on the backs of people. International solidarity is essential for Pakistani civil society. But now with disinformation and propaganda smear campaigns on the rise, the support must come with an understanding of the political and societal context of Pakistan.

  Religious, ethnic, sexual and gender minorities, journalists, civil society workers and HRDs remain at risk, not only due to state reprisals but also the threat of violence from extremist groups.

  Relief and protection of at-risk communities are not possible without the support and alliance of regional and like-minded international civil society networks. Exchange among civil society networks across regions must also continue to come up with new ways of fighting systems of oppression.

  ---

  Civic space in Pakistan is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Rabia Mehmood through her Twitter account@Rabail26.

• PANAMA: ‘We’ll have to stay vigilant and resist any attempt to curtail rights and freedoms’

  

  CIVICUS discusses the results of Panama’srecent presidential election with Olga de Obaldía, executive director of the Foundation for the Development of Civic Freedom.

  The Foundation for the Development of Civic Freedom is a civil society organisation working to defend fundamental freedoms, empower citizens for democratic participation and strengthen democracy by promoting transparency and the struggle against corruption.

  Who is José Raúl Mulino, and why did he win the election?

  Mulino won the election in large part due to the popularity and charisma of former President Ricardo Martinelli, and also in part due to the peculiarities of the Panamanian electoral system.

  Martinelli campaigned despite being disqualified from running for or holding public office after being convicted of money laundering in a major corruption scheme involving overpriced road construction. He initially tried to register his wife as his running mate, presumably in order to give her his place if his legal troubles made it impossible for him to run. But he abandoned the plan because the constitution forbids the president appointing close relatives.

  Instead of his wife, he appointed Mulino, his security minister between 2009 and 2014. Martinelli’s conviction became final in February: he was sentenced to more than 10 years in prison and, in order to avoid prison, he sought asylum in the Nicaraguan embassy. The Electoral Court allowed Mulino to take Martinelli’s place. This decision was appealed on the grounds of unconstitutionality, but two days before the election the Supreme Court upheld the Electoral Court’s decision.

  Convicted or not, Martinelli maintained his enormous popularity and, from his embassy confinement, launched a media campaign based on the slogan ‘Mulino is me’, an attempt to transfer his core electoral support, estimated at between 30 and 35 per cent, to Mulino.

  Since Panama elects its president by a simple majority of votes, without a runoff, and there were eight candidates, Mulino won with 34 per cent of the vote.

  This electoral system should be revised to ensure the popular will is respected. However, it’s worth noting that Panamanians were civic-minded and accepted the result peacefully even though most had voted against the president-elect.

  What were Mulino’s campaign promises?

  Among other things, Mulino promised to ‘put money in people’s pockets’ and build infrastructure, notably a train linking the city of David, in the far east of the country, with Panama City. This was justified on the grounds that it would improve transport between the interior and capital and stimulate economic development in remote and neglected regions.

  Another recurring theme in Mulino’s campaign was the need to put an end to what was characterised as ‘judicial persecution’. Martinelli’s party contains many people indicted for corruption during his administration. Several of them have been elected to the Central American Parliament, which grants them immunity from prosecution under a treaty that equates their privileges with those of national deputies.

  During the election campaign, the possibility of ‘closing’ the Darién Gap, the border with Colombia, was also mentioned as a way of stemming the flow of migrants through the jungle. However, the feasibility and impact of this measure are unclear. Previous bans aimed at stopping migration have only encouraged clandestine approaches and exacerbated humanitarian problems. The situation in the Darién is complex and need far-reaching solutions.

  These promises were clearly popular with some parts of the public, but their feasibility and potential consequences should be carefully considered.

  Finally, another promise was to ‘help’ former President Martinelli. It is not yet clear what form this help will take. The president-elect has said his government will follow the rule of law, and his first major test will be to resolve the ex-president’s impasse in the Nicaraguan embassy, from where he continues to try to influence national politics.

  What should the new government do to address the country’s key social and economic challenges?

  The new government will have to make critical decisions in a context of deep economic crisis. One of them is to save the social security system.

  Panama is one of the most unequal countries in the world. Informal labour has reached 55 per cent, with 20,000 jobs not recovered since the pandemic. The social security system is on the verge of bankruptcy: it covers 80 per cent of people, but only 30 per cent pay contributions. The pension system now lacks the funds to meet its future obligations and could collapse.

  Economic problems are compounded by falling investment. Public debt has risen to US$49 billion, with no clear investment in infrastructure or job creation. The state is due to make its first major debt payment in three months, but does not appear to have sufficient funds to meet it.

  The president-elect has announced he will seek to form a government of national unity. It is unclear what form this will take, but it’s clear that given the scale of the problems, a coalition government or some form of cross-sectoral cooperation is the only way forward. According to the president-elect’s statements, business would be his natural ally in finding solutions.

  Under what conditions does civil society operate in Panama, and can changes be expected under the new government?

  As elections approached, our small civil society faced a recurring phenomenon: an exodus towards partisan political activity. While some civil society organisations like ours are professionalised – with a board, administrative staff, a budget and defined structures – most rely on volunteers. Traditionally, a reverse exodus from non-winning political parties towards civil society organisations happens after elections.

  In addition, few organisations focus their work on advocacy for civil and political rights and freedoms and democratic governance. Most focus on poverty alleviation or the provision of social services such as health and education. In these roles, they tend to be partners with the state in the implementation of official programmes. In recent years, however, we have witnessed an increase in activism and the formation of new identity-based groups demanding equal rights, while new youth groups have arisen at the national level as a political and social force largely responsible for the success of national mobilisations against open-pit mining in October and November 2023.

  In the 2024 electoral campaign, while civil society participation remained limited, since there are few organisations dedicated to promoting civic values or fundamental freedoms, we saw several non-partisan initiatives to enable informed voting, and several organisations, including us, joined together in this effort.

  We don’t know what will happen under the new government, but we are concerned about the Martinelli administration’s record of restricting civic space through intimidation of critical organisations and the judicial harassment of activists and journalists. It is unclear what trajectory the Mulino government will follow, but we’ll have to stay vigilant and resist any attempt to curtail fundamental rights and freedoms or restrict civic space.

  ---

  Civic space in Panama is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Foundation for the Development of Civic Freedom through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow @libertciudadana onInstagram andTwitter.

• PARAGUAY: ‘Very tough years are ahead for civil society that promotes human rights’

  CIVICUS discusses Paraguay’s recent general election with Marta Ferrara, executive director of Seeds for Democracy (Semillas para la Democracia).

  Founded in 2006, Seeds for Democracy is a civil society organisation (CSO) whose main objective is to contribute to the improvement of the quality of democracy in Paraguay by promoting citizen participation, social equity and accountable governance.

  What are Paraguay’s main challenges, and to what extent could the results of the recent election contribute to solving them?

  Paraguay’s main problems are fundamentally economic, stemming from deep inequality. In recent years, Paraguay has had very good macroeconomic indicators, with high growth, but has remained very unequal, with high unemployment, large numbers of people in informal work and lack of access to health, education and opportunities. It is a country run by immensely wealthy cattle-ranching and agro-exporting elites who rule for their own benefit and to the detriment of a terribly unequal society. I believe this is the central characteristic of Paraguayan society and economy. It is a deep, structural problem, and this election has done nothing to solve it. The same people as always have won: the same sectors that have kept the country in this situation for more than 70 years.

  At stake in this election was the possibility of alternation in power. However, that would not necessarily have meant radical change, because the presidential candidate of Concertación, the opposition coalition, was also a conservative, albeit from the Liberal Party. His running mate was a woman, but he still represented a conservative sector of society. These were not disruptive candidacies representing a real change in the way politics is conducted, in the way power is exercised, in terms of public policies or representing different social sectors.

  How do you explain the comfortable win for the Colorado Party, despite the incumbent president’s very low approval rating?

  The results can be explained to a large extent by the effects, which we already anticipated, of the system of unblocked lists with preferential voting in the context of a divided opposition.

  A couple of years ago there was an electoral reform that replaced the closed and blocked party lists with unblocked lists with preferential voting. In these, the voter can select a candidate within the list of their choice, in order to vote for both a party and a candidate; then, according to the number of votes obtained by each candidate and their list, seats are distributed by the D’Hont system.

  This system was introduced in the last municipal elections and we already knew that it would have some negative effects. A big problem with unblocked lists is that generally the candidate with the most money is the one who gets ahead. They also cause strong competition of all against all within parties.

  In addition, the old system was replaced by electronic ballot boxes without sufficient training, meaning that people were not well prepared to use the new system. This allowed the spread of so-called ‘assisted voting’, which is illegal, and which basically consists of having people at polling stations interfering with voting with the excuse of helping voters use the electronic system.

  All this benefited the Colorado Party, which has been at the helm of the state for a long time and is therefore the one with the most resources, and which has sufficient internal diversity to be able to provide replacement options for those who are dissatisfied with their government they lead.

  There were, however, some small improvements in women’s representation. For the first time two women have been elected governors and there are more women than before in both houses of Congress.

  But with the opposition divided, the Colorado Party won by the widest margin in Paraguay’s democratic history. In addition to winning the presidency, it won control of both houses of Congress and 15 of 17 governorships.

  The other defining feature of this election was the emergence of a third opposition political grouping with a populist-authoritarian and messianic style. Led by Paraguayo Cubas, it represents so-called ‘angry voters’, those dissatisfied with traditional parties and the way politics has been conducted for decades. This candidacy did not take votes away from the government but from the opposition, and unexpectedly came in a close third place, with more than 20 per cent.

  What is the basis for the allegations of fraud voiced by protesters?

  The followers of Paraguayo Cubas, joined by people from practically all sectors of the opposition, many of them young people disaffected with politics, have taken to the streets en masse across the country to denounce fraud, despite the fact that their candidate got a very good vote, which they did not expect. The fact that an anti-establishment group is mobilising protests on a scale not seen in a long time represents a major challenge for the future of democracy in Paraguay.

  This was a relatively peaceful election in which there was virtually no violence. What there was plenty of was disinformation, hate speech and social media attacks throughout the campaign. These aggressions strongly affected CSOs, including our own, Seeds for Democracy, and came mostly from the ruling party and the party and supporters of Paraguayo Cubas, although Concertación also launched similar attacks against its political opponents.

  What role did civil society play during the election?

  Civil society played a relatively important role, despite the restrictions it has faced. The Electoral Court initially did not authorise civil society election observation and instead issued a rather restrictive regulation. It finally accepted that the Sakã Consortium, a civil society coalition, would carry out observation and a parallel count, but with very many restrictions.

  Seeds for Democracy has been actively involved in denouncing the problems of political financing, an issue we have succeeded in placing on the agenda. The other major problem in Paraguay, along with enormous inequality, is corruption. Lack of control over money in politics has brought groups linked to organised crime to power, both in Congress and in governors’ offices.

  We will soon be working on political finance control. In Paraguay, campaign spending is controlled after elections. A month later, when the parties submit their statements, we begin to monitor them through the Electoral Court’s Citizen Observatory of Political Financing, cross-checking data on public contracts with the sworn statements published on public agencies’ websites. Paraguay’s freedom of information legislation is quite good and enables us to do this work.

  How do you see the future of democracy in Paraguay?

  In the medium to long term I see a very difficult situation. There are many things to be resolved in order to improve the quality of democracy. The emerging political group is violent, anti-rights, fundamentalist and messianic. Its inspiration is the popular authoritarian president of El Salvador, Nayib Bukele, and his way of ruling, so I think we are in for some very tough years ahead.

  The section of the Colorado Party that won the election is one whose leaders attack civil society. They are anti-rights: they define themselves as ‘pro-life’, they are against equal marriage and sexual and reproductive rights and they attack all issues related to gender rights. That’s why I think civil society is in for a very tough few years. The various segments of civil society, especially those working on rights issues, are going to have to make big efforts to join together and undertake collective action.

  At the moment, some organisations have some funding from international cooperation sources, and we hope that this support will increase and strengthen so that we can work together to face all these challenges. It will be a constant struggle, all the more difficult because we have already seen attacks against freedom of expression and press freedom.

  I do not expect much in the coming months. For the time being, we must stay vigilant to understand which way things are going. But what is certain is that very tough years are ahead for CSOs that promote human rights.

  ---

  Civic space in Paraguay is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Seeds for Democracy through theirwebsite orFacebook page, and follow@semillaspy on Twitter.

• PERU: ‘It is necessary to restore trust in elections’

  CIVICUS speaks with Iván Lanegra, secretary general of Transparency Civil Association (Asociación Civil Transparencia), about Peru’s recent presidential elections and the state of its democracy. Transparency is an independent civil society organisation that works to improve the quality of democracy and political representation by facilitating dialogue between political, governmental and civil society actors, implementing education and capacity-building programmes for citizen and political leadership, developing public policy proposals and observing electoral processes.

  

  What was different and what was at stake in this election?

  The recent general election was embedded in several political and social processes. First, it took place at the end of a very politically unstable five-year period, in which we had four presidents – Pedro Kuczynski, Martín Vizcarra, Manuel Merino and Francisco Sagasti – and Congress was constitutionally dissolved. At the same time, the economy was no longer growing as much, and social discontent began to increase. In this context, corruption scandals undermined the credibility of political parties. This was compounded by the socio-economic impact of the pandemic, which fuelled greater demands for redistribution.

  As a result of all these processes, there was an atomisation of citizens’ preferences. The effects of this situation translated into high fragmentation of the vote in the parliamentary elections of January 2020 and, again, in the first round of the presidential election, held in April 2021, in which the two candidates who came out on top, and therefore went on to the second round, jointly received barely 33 per cent of the vote. There are 10 different political parties represented in our 130-seat Congress.

  In the second electoral round, the victory of Pedro Castillo, of the left-wing Perú Libre (Free Peru) party over Keiko Fujimori, of the right-wing Fuerza Popular (Popular Force), showed the importance of the demands for change and rejection of conventional politics that grew in recent years.

  However, the announcement of the official results was severely delayed, which created a climate of great uncertainty. In a context of high polarisation, there was an exponential increase in the number of appeals against the election results: normally, fewer than a dozen are filed, but on this occasion there were more than a thousand, none of which were considered well-founded. These appeals were used instrumentally: unfounded allegations of fraud were used to prolong the process as much as possible and to try to prevent the announcement of the results. While this attempt was unsuccessful, it delayed the transfer of power and increased distrust of politics and electoral institutions.

  Why did many people not vote?

  The rate of absenteeism in the first electoral round was almost 30 per cent, somewhat higher than in the 2020 legislative elections, when it reached 26 per cent; however, it dropped to less than 24 per cent in the runoff election. It is important to bear in mind that the first round of election took place when the COVID-19 pandemic was at its highest point in Peru. In other countries, such as Chile, it was not even possible to hold a vote due to the health emergency, but the elections took place normally in Peru. In fact, what is remarkable is that absenteeism wasn’t any higher.

  What role did Transparency play in relation to the electoral process?

  In the run-up to the election, as part of the #DecideBien (#ChooseWell) campaign, Transparency disseminated systematic information about the parties, their candidates and their proposals, so that citizens could assess their options. We broke down the parties’ policy programmes so that each person could learn about and compare the proposals of each candidate on the issues that interested them, and vote on the basis on that knowledge.

  In addition, we invited citizens to register with the National Transparency Volunteer Network to become election observers. From our perspective, election observation consists of monitoring, providing guidance and bearing witness to the events that take place during election day, as well as educating citizens about electoral conduct and rules.

  With this network of volunteers, Transparency observed the election process and from the outset we noted that the electoral process had been conducted normally, with only the kind of minor incidents that tend to occur in all elections, but which do not affect the results.

  In view of the unfounded allegations that were made in an attempt to discredit the process, we also worked to counter electoral disinformation. The phenomenon of disinformation on social media, particularly after the runoff election, was much stronger than in previous elections, and the electoral authorities themselves had to set up teams dedicated almost exclusively to debunking ‘fake news’. The climate of polarisation surely contributed to increasing the impact of disinformation.

  What political challenges lie ahead in the aftermath of the election?

  The main challenges are how to reduce distrust in the state, how to address dissatisfaction with democracy and how to improve political representation. Although compared to these challenges, political polarisation, which was exacerbated in the electoral context, is less of a concern, it must also be considered. While the most radicalised sectors continue to fuel polarisation, they are in the minority. They managed to polarise the election because they were able to get through to the second round despite having received a low percentage of the vote, but after the election, the majority of citizens are far from the extremes. However, it is important to bear in mind that distrust, dissatisfaction and the feeling of lack of representation are elements that those who seek to exploit polarisation can use to their advantage.

  It is necessary to restore trust in elections. To this end, we must continue to educate and inform citizens about the rules of elections, politics and democracy. We must also improve the mechanisms available to us for combatting disinformation. It is also necessary to move electoral reforms forward, in order to create incentives for the strengthening of political parties, as well as to improve the quality of political representation.

  Civic space in Peru is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Transparency Civil Association through itswebsite or itsFacebook,Instagram andTik Tok pages, and follow@actransparencia and@ilanegra on Twitter.

   

• PERU: ‘Political and social instability has already cost dozens of lives’

  CIVICUS speaks about the political crisis in Peru with Nadia Ramos, CEO of the Women’s Leadership Centre of the Americas and official spokesperson for the Hemispheric Network Somos Lideresas, two organisations that promote women’s leadership and empowerment in Peru and Latin America.

• PHILIPPINES: ‘We fear the democracy those before us fought so hard for will be erased’

  CIVICUS speaks about the recent presidential election in the Philippines with Marinel Ubaldo, a young climate activist, co-founder of the Youth Leaders for Environmental Action Federation and Advocacy Officer for Ecological Justice and Youth Engagement of Living Laudato Si’ Philippines (LLS).

  Founded by Catholic lay people, LLS began in 2018 as an interfaith movement calling on Filipino financial institutions to divest from coal-related operations and other environmentally harmful activities. It aims to empower people to adopt lifestyles and attitudes that match the urgent need to care for the planet. It promotes sustainable development and seeks to tackle the climate crisis through collective action.

  

  From your perspective, what was at stake in the 9 May presidential election?

  The 2022 election fell within the crucial window for climate justice. As stated in the latest report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, we need to keep global warming below 1.5 degrees Celsius or we will suffer terrible consequences, such as a rise in sea levels that will submerge much of the currently populated land, including the Philippines. Upcoming leaders will serve for the next six years –and possibly beyond. They have the immense responsibility of putting a climate change mitigation system in place for our country and urging more countries to do the same.

  As shown by Super Typhoon Rai that hit the Philippines in December 2021, climate change affects all of us. Whole communities lost their loved ones and their homes. Young people will reap the fruits, or pay the consequences, for whatever our incoming leaders do in response to this crisis. This is why climate anxiety is so prevalent among young people.

  How did young people mobilise around this election?

  Young people campaigned house to house. We also went to grassroots communities to educate voters on how to vote wisely. Alongside other organisations that form the Green Thumb Coalition, our organisation produced a Green Scorecard and we used our social media platforms to promote the ‘green’ candidate.

  One of the biggest youth initiatives around the elections was ‘LOVE, 52’, a campaign aimed at empowering young people and helping them engage with candidates and make their voices heard in demand of a green, just, and loveable future through better governance. We wanted to shift the focus from candidates’ personality and patronage politics to a debate on fundamental issues, and to help young people move traditional powerholders towards a people-centred style of policymaking.

  We called this initiative ‘LOVE, 52’ in reference to the fact that young people – people under 40 – comprise 52 per cent of the Philippines’ voting population. We sought to appeal to younger voters’ emotions, and our central theme was love because a frequent response to the question ‘why vote?’ is to protect what we love: our families, our country, and our environment. The main element of this campaign was a ‘love letter’ drafted by several youth organisations and addressed to the country. It contained young people’s calls to incoming leaders, including those of prioritising environmental and social issues, coming up with a coherent plan to address the climate crisis, and supporting a vibrant democracy that will enable climate and environmental justice. We gathered all the love letters people wrote, put them in one envelope, and delivered them physically to the presidential candidates’ headquarters.

  What are the implications of the election results for civil society and civic freedoms?

  The results of these elections will have a lot of implications for the Filipino people. They will have a direct impact on civil society and our freedoms of association, expression and peaceful assembly.

  The winning candidate, senator Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos Jr., the son and namesake of a former dictator, has said that he will include his family in his administration. Just today, I saw the new president’s spokesperson on the news saying Marcos will make his own appointments, bringing in the people he trusts. I think he will really try to control the government with people who follow him unconditionally. He will put such people in all the positions available, so everyone will tell him what he wants to hear and no one will disagree with him. I think this is the scariest part of it all.

  I fear in a few months or years we will be living under a dictatorship. Marcos may even be able to stay in power for as long as he wants. After trying to reach power for so long, he has finally won, and he won’t let go of power easily.

  It’s very scary because the human rights violations that happened during his father’s dictatorship are not even settled yet. More human rights violations are likely to happen. It’s a fact that the Filipino people won’t be allowed to raise their voices; if they do so, they may risk being killed. This is what happened under martial law during Ferdinand Marcos’s dictatorship.

  This will definitely affect civil society. It will be very difficult for humanitarian workers to respond to any crisis since Marcos will likely aspire to micro-manage everything. We fear the democracy those before us fought so hard for will be erased.

  Regarding the specifics of policymaking, we don’t really know what the plan is. Marcos campaigned on vague promises of national unity and implied that all problems would be solved if people unite behind his leadership. Needless to say, he never mentioned any policy to tackle climate change and the environmental crisis.

  Against all signals, I keep hoping the new administration will be receptive to people’s demands. I really hope our new president listens to the cries of the people. Our leaders must reach out to communities and listen to our issues. I doubt Bongbong Marcos is capable of doing that, but one can only hope.

  What support does Filipino civil society need from international civil society and the international community?

  We need to ensure the international community sends out a consistent message and stands by our side when oppression starts. We also need them to be ready to rescue Filipinos if their safety is at risk. We activists fear for our lives. We have doubts about how receptive and accepting the new administration will be toward civil society. 

  Today is a gloomy day in the Philippines. We did our best to campaign for truth, facts, and hope for the Philippines. Vice President Leni Robredo campaigned for public sector transparency and vowed to lead a government that cares for the people and bolsters the medical system. If she had won the elections, she would have been the third woman to lead the Philippines after Cory Aquino and Macapagal Arroyo.

  Leni’s loss is the loss of the Philippines, not just hers. There are still too many people in the Philippines who believe Marcos’s lies. I don’t blame the masses for believing his lies; they are victims of decades of disinformation. Our system sadly enables disinformation. This is something that needs to be urgently tackled, but the next administration will likely benefit from it so it will hardly do what’s needed.

  We now fear every day for our lives and for the future of our country.

  Civic space inthe Philippinesis rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Living Laudato Si’ Philippines through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@LaudatoSiPH on Twitter and@laudatosiph on Instagram. 

• POLAND: ‘Civil society played a crucial role in ensuring the fairness of the election’

  CIVICUS speaks about Poland’s 15 October parliamentary election with Sonia Horonziak and Filip Pazderski, coordinator and head of the Democracy and Civil Society Programme at the Institute of Public Affairs (IPA).

  Founded in 1995, IPA is a leading Polish think tank and an independent centre for policy research and analysis that works to contribute to informed public debate on key Polish, European and global policy issues.

  What were the main campaign issues?

  The campaign was vicious, featuring hateful rhetoric, particularly directed at groups such as migrants. Opposition leaders, notably Donald Tusk, the head of the Civic Coalition, were targeted in every speech and interview given by members of the ruling Law and Justice party (PiS), even when it was completely unrelated to the subject matter.

  Despite the emotional nature of the campaign, opposition parties’ messaging focused on reversing the regressive changes introduced by PiS, in power since 2015. Their electoral promises included restoring the rule of law and improving cooperation with the European Union (EU) and international partners such as Ukraine, with whom relations have deteriorated in recent months. At times, however, they were caught in the trap set by the ruling party, especially regarding migration issues, and their rhetoric wasn’t always fair toward migrants. Nonetheless, the PiS campaign was way more aggressive and hateful.

  To react to that, in the final phase of the campaign the leaders of democratic opposition parties began to strongly emphasise their desire to temper social emotions and conflicts and bridge divisions. These were messages responding to the expectations of Poles, particularly from the group of undecided voters whose support was being fought for.

  What factors influenced the outcome of the election?

  Firstly, it’s crucial to note that, even though the official campaign started only weeks before the elections, PiS’s unofficial campaign has been underway for months, dominating the pre-election narrative. To this end, the ruling party extensively used public resources and received support from companies owned or controlled by the State Treasury. During the official campaign period, the public broadcaster exhibited a clear bias in favour of PiS, undermining the chances of any other party. Constant monitoring of the main news programme of the public TV broadcaster shows that PiS politicians were shown more often and only in a good light. By contrast, opposition party representatives were depicted only badly, and some very badly.

  Moreover, during the electoral campaign PiS introduced the idea of a referendum, which was clearly unconstitutional, on issues aligned with its political agenda. In the referendum, people were asked whether they approved of the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, an increase in the retirement age, the admission of immigrants under the EU relocation mechanism and the removal of the barricade on Poland's border with Belarus.

  The referendum allowed state-owned companies to engage in the electoral race and provide funding to the ruling party. This wasn’t subject to control or limitations, further contributing to an uneven and biased race in favour of PiS.

  However, the results favoured opposition parties, which secured enough seats to form a coalition excluding PiS. This indicated that people had grown tired of the hateful rhetoric and propaganda spread by the government. An IPA survey carried out earlier this year showed a significant increase in dissatisfaction with the country's political and economic situation. It was particularly high among young people and women, which contributed to their views being expressed at ballot boxes and the final outcome of the elections.

  No one expected PiS to gain enough votes to rule alone, but two possible outcomes were predicted. In one of them, PiS would be able to form a majority coalition with the far-right Confederation grouping. In the other, which eventually materialised, opposition parties would have the opportunity to govern together. A more even race might have yielded even higher results for the opposition bloc.

  How different are the parties that form the winning coalition?

  Each of the three groups forming the winning coalition – the Civic Coalition, the Third Way and the Left – comprises multiple parties. This raises the question of whether they will be able to stay together and form a unified front, or whether they will eventually split. Even though they have shared objectives, particularly those of restoring the rule of law and addressing corruption by implementing the EU’s whistleblower directive, they are divided on several issues.

  While all parties oppose the strict abortion ban introduced by PiS, the Third Way is more conservative on women’s rights, in contrast to the Left, which holds more liberal and progressive views. Harmonising positions on social contributions also presents a significant challenge: while all agree that over the past eight years PiS has drained the public budget, there is no agreement as to which social groups should receive continued support and which should see their assistance reduced. The Polish People’s Party, a member of the Third Way, could prioritise agricultural workers, while the Left might want to focus on upholding minority rights and the Civic Coalition may emphasise support for older people. But the interests of these groups can ultimately be reconciled, perhaps as a result of a compromise leaving some of the expectations of members of these groups unanswered. It will be a little more difficult to align policies aimed at supporting business activities, a particularly important issue for the Civic Coalition and the Third Way. And for entrepreneurs, the reduction of the tax burden is mostly an important issue, while the Left's ideas may lead to tax increases.

  There might also be tensions when it comes to appointing key positions and achieving a fair distribution of posts among coalition members, as several ambitious party leaders are vying for prominent roles.

  But opposition parties know people expect change. We hope they’ll be wise and prioritise crucial reforms in areas such as the rule of law and tackling corruption over personal and political disagreements. This election result also marks Poland's return to the centre of European policy debates and the possibility of unlocking much-needed funds from the EU’s National Recovery Plan.

  How did Polish civil society, including your organisation, engage with the electoral process?

  Civil society played a crucial role in ensuring the fairness of the election. Several organisations conducted extensive training for thousands of people who volunteered to become electoral observers, empowering them to oversee the elections and ensure compliance with the law. Civil society educated voters on election participation and organised several extensive campaigns to encourage turnout, especially dedicated to women and young people, resulting in a remarkable 74.4 per cent voter turnout, a record in Poland. Civil society engagement particularly contributed to increased participation by women and young people, with turnout among young people 20 per cent higher compared to previous elections. We did our best to increase people’s engagement because it’s essential to achieve a truly representative democracy.

  Another area of civil society involvement was in relation to the referendum. Almost all major civil society organisations (CSOs), including IPA, stated that the referendum was unconstitutional, manipulative, violated human rights and solely served the interests of the ruling party. We worked to inform and encourage people to vote in the parliamentary election while boycotting the referendum. This had a positive outcome: for the referendum, turnout was only 40 per cent, below the minimum validity threshold of 50 per cent, so its results were non-binding.

  Do you think the government’s relationship with civil societywill change under the new administration?

  Expectations are high for the new government to improve relations with CSOs. The PiS government propagated a narrative that part of civil society was politicised and worked against the interests of Polish nation. It was hostile towards organisations whose objectives didn’t align with government policies. During calls for public funds from ministries and government agencies, numerous well-established and renowned CSOs were excluded while organisations that had only existed for a few months or weeks and were clearly linked to PiS or its supporters were granted large amounts of money.

  Over the past eight years, civic space in Poland has not only shrunk but also shifted towards increasing support of CSOs aligned with the government’s ideology. These organisations have often received long-term support that will enable them to sustain their activities long after a change of government. Certain segments of civil society, mostly those working on human rights, anti-discrimination, LGBTQI+ rights, migrants and refugees, environmental protection and watchdog activities, have faced harassment as well as insufficient support.

  The major opposition parties have pledged collaboration with civil society and the implementation of policies formulated by CSOs across Poland in 17 thematic areas. The new government is expected to remain open to international cooperation, and not to marginalise independent CSOs but instead incorporate them into the political process, including on decision-making regarding the introduction or amendment of laws. There’s also a hope for fairer competition for public funds. We need to work on equal and non-discriminatory tools to support civil society and ensure its sustainability.

  What forms of international support does Polish civil society currently need?

  International solidarity has always played a crucial role for Polish civil society, particularly during the last eight years, when many CSOs wouldn’t have survived without it. The hope is that international CSOs and agencies, including those from the EU and the USA, will keep providing support and collaborating with Polish CSOs and the new government. This support is particularly important in the areas of democracy, the rule of law and anti-corruption.

  The international community might mistakenly believe that the positive election outcome resolves all issues in Poland, potentially diverting attention to other problematic regimes. We have already been through this once, when after 2010 many foreign donors left Poland, deeming their job finished. Shortly afterwards, populist-nationalist forces returned to power and it turned out that legal mechanisms and democratic standards were not strong enough to stop them taking control of the state.

  We need to understand this is just one victory, and there is much work ahead for both Polish civil society and the international community. Some donors have already withdrawn support for activities to defend and improve civic space across Europe. It is crucial for other donors, including private foundations, to step in and support each EU member so the union can develop and thrive.

  ---

  Civic space in Poland is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with IPA through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@ISPThinkTank onTwitter.

• POLAND: ‘The crisis of democracy and human rights will deepen’

  CIVICUS speaks with Małgorzata Szuleka about Poland’s recent presidential elections, held under the COVID-19 pandemic, and the ruling party’s use of anti-LGBTQI+ rhetoric to mobilise its electorate. Małgorzata is a lawyer at the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (HFHR) Poland, one of the largest and oldest human rights organisations in Poland and the region. HFHR Poland represents victims of human rights abuses in court proceedings, conducts research and monitors human rights violations. Since 2015 it has actively monitored the increasing rule of law violations in Poland. It works with partners in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the European Union (EU) and the USA.

  

  After rescheduling, the Polish elections were held in June and July 2020. What was civil society’s position on having an election during the COVID-19 pandemic?

  The elections were originally scheduled for May 2020 and organising them posed a huge legal problem because there was no legal mechanism to postpone them. The only way to reschedule them was to announce a state of emergency, as provided for by the constitution. No elections may be organised during a state of emergency or within the next 90 days of it ending. From a constitutional perspective, an official declaration that the country was experiencing an epidemic would give the government the prerogative to introduce the state of emergency. This would automatically extend the term of office of the president until after regular elections could be scheduled, once the epidemic was over. However, the government did not follow this process. The elections were rescheduled and the run-off vote between the two leading candidates was held on 12 July 2020 on very dubious legal grounds. However, this wasn’t questioned by neither the government majority, nor the opposition.

  Civil society organisations (CSOs) first pushed the government to organise the elections in a proper way, urging it to announce a state of emergency. Once this didn’t happen, CSOs tried to raise the issue of international monitoring, mainly in terms of fairness and financing of the campaign. The problem was that the election was expected to be free but not fair. Public media was biased towards the candidate supported by the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party, President Andrzej Duda, and extremely critical and unprofessional towards any opposition candidate. Even though no state of emergency had been declared, many fundamental rights such as the freedoms of assembly and access to information were limited. These were major concerns.

  There was also the problem of the Supreme Court confirming the validity of the elections. On 12 July, President Duda was re-elected for a second term by a tight margin. He received 51 per cent of the vote while the opposition Civic Coalition contender received 49 per cent. Turnout was barely above 68 per cent, and more than 5,800 complaints were submitted regarding irregularities in the process. The Supreme Court ruled that 92 of those complaints were justified but had not influenced the final result, so it declared the results valid. Sadly, this decision completely ignored the problem of the constitutional and legal grounds for organising the elections in the first place.

  Were measures adopted to protect people during the campaign and voting process? Did the pandemic have any impact on turnout?

  The organisation of the campaign involved sanitary measures regarding social distancing and mask use. But these provisions were not fully respected on both sides. For campaigning purposes, the government loosened some restrictions; for example, even though face mask use was mandatory, pictures were published of the prime minister not wearing one in public. Also of concern was the fact that many public authorities engaged in political campaigning alongside President Duda. Public institutions were instrumentalised by ruling politicians. The government security centre, responsible for coordination and information in case of natural calamities or danger, sent out mass text messages on election day. Every voter received a message that said that people over 60 years old, pregnant women and people with disabilities could vote without waiting in line. This might have been used to mobilise the core electorate of the ruling party. This is just one example, but it could be an indication of the role played by official institutions to tilt the playing field in favour of the PiS party.

  Was media coverage during the election fair?

  Public media coverage was absolutely unfair. The rest of the coverage, mainly by private media, was relatively good; it definitely was not as bad as public media coverage, which was used for propaganda and enhanced President Duda’s campaign.

  One of elections complaints brought to the Supreme Court specifically referred to media coverage. It stated that public television supported the incumbent while systematically discrediting his rival, and that public institutions and officials repeatedly violated correct conduct by supporting only one of the candidates. But the problem with the entire institution of election complaints is that you need to prove not only that the alleged irregularity happened, but also that it had an impact on the election results. In presidential elections such as this one, this is very difficult to prove. Additionally, the electoral code doesn’t regulate the work of the media, so it’s hard to make the legal claim that the media should operate differently. And if you do, it is also difficult to prove that particular coverage of a particular candidate, or the lack of coverage, resulted in a particular election result. We can intuitively assume this, particularly in view of such tight results, but it is very difficult to create a solid legal case.

  What does President Duda’s re-election mean for democracy and human rights in Poland?

  It is a continuation of a very worrying trend. Out of all possible campaign issues, President Duda chose to focus on stoking homophobia. The campaign took place in a context of a years-long backsliding of the rule of law, in the middle of a crisis of relations between Poland and the EU, during a huge healthcare challenge and on the verge of an economic crisis that will affect everyone in Poland. But none of these issues were the focus of the political campaign and public discussion. President Duda mainly spoke about LGBTQI+ people posing a threat to our Christian traditional heritage, equating homosexuality with paedophilia. The issue was narrowed down to this divisive, outrageous and dehumanising narrative by the PiS party. It was a very pragmatic move from PiS spin doctors because it mobilised the very core of the electorate. All of a sudden LGBTQI+ groups and communities became the scapegoat for everything that is wrong in Poland. It is outrageous how much this issue was politicised and how it was used to dehumanise this minority group. It was painful and heartbreaking to watch.

  And the campaign was far from the end of it. President Duda is just a representative of the ruling PiS party, so he will say whatever he needs to keep them aligned. This is just a matter of calculation and internal power struggles. In June, the PiS party targeted LGBTQI+ people. In July, it targeted victims of domestic violence by starting discussion on withdrawing from the Istanbul Convention. In August, it proposed to register CSOs that are financed from abroad. Now I don’t know who is going to be their next enemy. It’s not only about being homophobic but rather about this governing majority always needing an enemy to confront or blame.

  We just entered a phase in which there will be no elections for the next three years so we can expect a huge consolidation of power and the government doing everything that it dreams of, such as creating pressure on CSOs, further polarising the media, targeting specific minority groups and escalating the conflict with the EU. We can expect all of this to happen over the next three years. The only thing that can stop them is pragmatic evaluation about whether this is needed at this time or whether there might be something more important to do. But I think the crisis of democracy and human rights in Poland will deepen.

  Civic space in Poland is rated as ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights-Poland through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@hfhrpl and@m_szuleka on Twitter.

• Police reforms must go beyond IPCMC

  By Josef Benedict

  The change of government on May 9 has offered a real opportunity for Malaysians to fix the gaps and problems that currently plague the various state institutions in the country.

  Read on: Malaysiakini

• POLOGNE : « La crise de la démocratie et des droits humains va s'aggraver »

  CIVICUS parle à Małgorzata Szuleka à propos de la récente élection présidentielle en Pologne, qui s'est tenue pendant la pandémie COVID-19, et sur l'utilisation par le parti au pouvoir de la rhétorique anti-LGBTQI+ pour mobiliser son électorat. Małgorzata est avocate à la Fondation Helsinki pour les droits humains (HFHR) - Pologne, l'une des plus grandes et des plus anciennes organisations de défense des droits humains en Pologne et dans la région. La HFHR Pologne représente les victimes de violations des droits humains dans les procédures judiciaires, mène des enquêtes et surveille les violations des droits humains. Depuis 2015, elle surveille activement les violations croissantes de l'État de droit en Pologne. Elle travaille avec des organisations partenaires en Europe de l'Est, en Asie centrale, dans l'Union européenne (UE) et aux États-Unis.

  

  Après avoir été reprogrammées, les élections polonaises ont eu lieu en juin et juillet 2020. Quelle était la position de la société civile sur la tenue d'élections pendant la pandémie de la COVID-19 ?

  Les élections étaient initialement prévues pour mai 2020 et leur organisation posait un gros problème juridique car il n'y avait pas de mécanisme légal pour les reporter. La seule façon de les reporter était de déclarer l'état d'urgence, comme le prévoit la Constitution. Les élections ne peuvent pas être organisées pendant l'état d'urgence ou dans les 90 jours suivant sa fin. D'un point de vue constitutionnel, une déclaration officielle reconnaissant que le pays subissait une épidémie aurait donné au gouvernement la prérogative d'imposer l'état d'urgence. Cela aurait automatiquement prolongé le mandat du président jusqu'à ce que des élections régulières puissent être programmées, une fois l'épidémie terminée. Cependant, le gouvernement n'a pas suivi cette procédure. Les élections ont été reprogrammées et le second tour entre les deux principaux candidats a été reporté au 12 juillet 2020 sur la base d'arguments juridiques très douteux. Cependant, cela n'a été contesté ni par la majorité gouvernementale ni par l'opposition.

  Les organisations de la société civile (OSC) ont d'abord fait pression sur le gouvernement pour que les élections se déroulent correctement, l'exhortant à déclarer l'état d'urgence. Lorsque cela ne s'est pas produit, les OSC ont essayé de soulever la question du contrôle international, principalement en termes d'équité et de financement des campagnes. Le problème était qu’on s’attendait à ce que les élections soient libres mais non justes. Les médias publics ont fait preuve de partialité à l'égard du président Andrzej Duda, le candidat soutenu par le parti au pouvoir Droit et Justice (PiS), et se sont montrés extrêmement critiques et plutôt peu professionnels à l'égard de tout candidat de l'opposition. Bien que l'état d'urgence n'ait pas été déclaré, de nombreux droits fondamentaux, tels que la liberté de réunion et l'accès à l'information, se sont vus limités. Telles étaient les principales préoccupations.

  Il y avait aussi le problème de la Cour suprême qui confirmait la validité des élections. Le 12 juillet, le président Duda a été réélu pour un second mandat avec une faible marge. Il a obtenu 51 % des voix, tandis que son adversaire de l'opposition, la Coalition civique, en a obtenu 49 %. Le taux de participation a été légèrement supérieur à 68 % et plus de 5 800 plaintes pour irrégularités ont été déposées. La Cour suprême a jugé que 92 de ces plaintes étaient justifiées mais n'avaient aucune influence sur le résultat final, elle a donc déclaré les résultats valables. Malheureusement, cette décision a complètement négligé le problème des bases constitutionnelles et juridiques sur lesquelles ces élections avaient été convoquées.

  Des mesures ont-elles été prises pour protéger les gens pendant la campagne et le processus de vote ? La pandémie a-t-elle eu un impact sur la participation électorale ?

  L'organisation de la campagne a impliqué des mesures sanitaires en termes de distanciation sociale et d'utilisation de masques. Mais ces dispositions n'ont pas été pleinement respectées par les deux parties. Pour les besoins de la campagne, le gouvernement a assoupli certaines restrictions ; par exemple, bien que le port du masque facial soit obligatoire, des photographies ont été publiées dans lesquelles le premier ministre n'en portait pas en public. Le fait que de nombreux fonctionnaires aient participé à la campagne électorale aux côtés du président Duda est également préoccupant. Les institutions publiques ont été instrumentalisées par les hommes politiques du parti au pouvoir. Le centre de sécurité du gouvernement, responsable de la coordination et de l'information en cas d'urgence ou de catastrophe naturelle, a envoyé des SMS de masse le jour des élections. Chaque électeur a reçu un message disant que les personnes de plus de 60 ans, les femmes enceintes et les personnes handicapées pouvaient voter sans faire la queue. Cela aurait pu être utilisé pour mobiliser l'électorat du parti au pouvoir. Ce n'est qu'un exemple, mais il pourrait être révélateur du rôle joué par les institutions de l'État pour faire pencher la balance en faveur du parti PiS.

   

  La couverture médiatique pendant les élections a-t-elle été équitable ?

  La couverture médiatique publique était absolument injuste. Le reste de la couverture, principalement par les médias privés, a été assez bon ; il n'a certainement pas été aussi mauvais que les médias publics, qui ont été utilisés à des fins de propagande et ont renforcé la campagne du président Duda.

   

  L'une des plaintes électorales déposées auprès de la Cour suprême portait spécifiquement sur la couverture médiatique. Elle a déclaré que la télévision publique soutenait le président tout en discréditant systématiquement son rival, et que les institutions et les fonctionnaires publics ont violé à plusieurs reprises le code de conduite en soutenant un seul des candidats. Mais le problème avec le mécanisme de plaintes électorales est qu'il exige la preuve non seulement que l'irrégularité alléguée a eu lieu, mais aussi qu'elle a eu un impact sur les résultats des élections. Lors d'élections présidentielles comme celle-ci, c'est une chose très difficile à prouver. De plus, le code électoral ne réglemente pas le travail des médias, il est donc difficile de soutenir juridiquement que les médias devraient fonctionner différemment. Et si on y parvient, il est également difficile de prouver que la couverture (ou l'absence de couverture) reçue d'un média par un candidat particulier a abouti à un résultat électoral particulier. C'est une chose que nous pouvons intuitivement supposer, en particulier face à des résultats aussi serrés, mais il est très difficile de créer un argument juridique solide.

  Quelles sont les implications de la réélection du président Duda pour la démocratie et les droits humains en Pologne ?

  Elle représente la poursuite d'une tendance très inquiétante. Parmi tous les objets de campagne possibles, le président Duda a choisi d'alimenter l'homophobie. La campagne s'est déroulée dans le contexte d'un processus de longue date de recul de l'État de droit, au milieu d'une crise dans les relations entre la Pologne et l'UE, au cours d'un énorme défi sanitaire et au bord d'une crise économique qui touchera tous les Polonais. Mais aucune de ces questions n'a été au centre de la campagne électorale et du débat public. Le président Duda a surtout parlé des personnes LGBTQI+ qui représentent une menace pour notre héritage chrétien traditionnel, assimilant l'homosexualité à la pédophilie. La question s'est distillée dans le récit diviseur, scandaleux et déshumanisant du parti PiS. C'était un geste très pragmatique des astucieux propagandistes du PiS car il a mobilisé le noyau même de l'électorat. Soudain, les groupes et communautés LGBTQI+ sont devenus le bouc émissaire de tout ce qui ne va pas en Pologne. Il est scandaleux de constater à quel point cette question a été politisée et comment elle a été utilisée pour déshumaniser cette minorité. Ce fut un spectacle douloureux et déchirant.

  Et cela ne s'est pas terminé avec la campagne. Le président Duda n'est qu'un représentant du parti PiS, il dira donc tout ce qu'il faut pour le maintenir aligné. Ce n'est rien d'autre qu'une question de calcul et de lutte de pouvoir interne. En juin, le parti PiS a ciblé la population LGBTQI+. En juillet, elle a ciblé les victimes de violence domestique en lançant un débat sur le retrait de la Convention d'Istanbul. En août, il a proposé un système de registre pour les OSC qui reçoivent des fonds de l'étranger. Maintenant, je ne sais pas qui sera son prochain ennemi. Ce n'est pas seulement que la majorité actuelle au pouvoir est homophobe, mais aussi qu'elle a tout le temps besoin d'avoir un ennemi à affronter ou à blâmer.

  Nous venons d'entrer dans une phase où il n'y aura pas d'élections pendant trois ans, alors attendez-vous à une consolidation majeure du pouvoir qui permettra au gouvernement de faire ce qu'il veut : exercer plus de pression sur les OSC, polariser davantage les médias, attaquer les groupes minoritaires et intensifier le conflit avec l'UE, entre autres choses. On peut s'attendre à ce que tout cela se produise au cours des trois prochaines années. La seule chose qui pourrait les arrêter est l'évaluation pragmatique de la question de savoir si c'est quelque chose qui répond au besoin du moment ou s'il pourrait y avoir autre chose de plus important. Mais je crois que la crise de la démocratie et les droits humains en Pologne va s'aggraver.

  L'espace civique en Pologne est classé« rétréci »par leCIVICUS Monitor.
  Contactez la Fondation Helsinki pour les droits humains - Pologne via sonsite web ou sa pageFacebook, et suivez@hfhrpl et@m_szuleka sur Twitter. 

• PORTUGAL: ‘The rise of the populist right only further weakens trust in the political system’

  Also available in Portuguese

  CIVICUS speaks about early elections taking place in Portugal on 10 March with Ana Carmo from Akto, a Portuguese civil society organisation that promotes human rights and democratic values through advocacy, campaigning and education.

  What are the main issues the new government will have to deal with, and how are candidates proposing to address them?

  The most pressing issues that should be addressed by the new government and have been central to election debates are housing, health, pensions, education, immigration and the climate crisis. There are several other issues that are also on the agenda and should be addressed, including some related to the police and the justice system.

  These are issues that allow for very different answers depending on where you are on the ideological spectrum. The more left-wing parties propose measures that require greater state intervention and public investment, while those towards the right present proposals that benefit the private sector and investors, and require less state intervention, arguing this will lead to economic growth and subsequently greater wellbeing.

  Portuguese politics tend to revolve around two parties, the Socialist Party (PS) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD), both close to the centre. In this campaign, Pedro Nuno Santos, head of the PS ticket, has put forward proposals that are further to the left than usual for the PS, while Luís Montenegro, who leads the ticket of the Democratic Alliance (AD), a coalition led by the PSD, has followed his party’s usual ideological line.

  What’s more, the PS is wearing out, perhaps due to its eight consecutive years in power, while the PSD, instead of preparing to succeed it, is also getting weaker. Instead, more radical right-wing parties are growing, notably Chega, identified as a ‘catch-all’ party, ideologically amorphous, populist and opportunistic, which adapts its discourse to whatever allows it to win the most votes.

  A climate of discontent, frustration and perhaps revolt has led more and more people to vote for Chega as a form of protest. However, the growth of a party like Chega only further weakens trust in the political system.

  Have disinformation or hate speech been a problem during the campaign?

  There have been problems with disinformation, particularly spread by Chega, whose discourse is not based on facts. That’s why we often hear false statements or fallacious ideas coming from its leader and members of parliament. Chega has been running an anti-immigration campaign that appears to have instigated hate speech and expressions of xenophobia within society. On 3 February, a far-right march against the ‘Islamisation of Europe‘ took place in Lisbon’s Martim Moniz neighbourhood, an area known for its multicultural diversity. The march was banned by Lisbon City Council and the courts for its content and the danger it posed to citizens. Nevertheless, people still took to the streets.

  Some media and the other political parties are making an effort to challenge fallacies about immigration, emphasising that the truth is that Portugal is a country of emigrants. They also highlight positive facts about immigrants, such as their great contribution to Portuguese social security, which allows pensions to be paid. It is a very strong argument in favour of immigration.

  During its campaign, Chega also made the absurd and impactful proposal to ‘end support for gender equality’. This statement once again needed a deconstruction and fact-checking effort by the media and forced the other political parties to take a stand.

  With the increasing spread of ‘fake news’, Portuguese media have set up fact-checking programmes to help counter the trend and maintain journalistic rigour. However, disinformation campaigns are more difficult to combat on social media, where Chega has succeeded in meddling. Because of this, polls point to a significant percentage of young people potentially voting for this populist party that jeopardises our fundamental rights.

  To encourage debate about ideas, Portuguese media joined forces to organise political debates between the leaders of all parties represented in parliament, as they did in 2015. In the version implemented this year, candidates debate each other for around 25 minutes and these debates are broadcast and commented on in various news channels. This allows civil society to be better informed about their choices and people have shown interest, because debates have received top ratings.

  What do you think the result of the elections could be?

  Since the resignation of Prime Minister António Costa in November 2023 due to a corruption investigation that implicated him in influence peddling, corruption and malfeasance in energy projects, the political landscape has become increasingly unpredictable.

  First, as he was elected PS leader, Nuno Santos was viewed as Costa’s unequivocal successor as prime minister, due to his charisma as well as the fact that his party had an absolute majority. Montenegro, in comparison, is not a charismatic leader and has had a career of setbacks. The PSD has been losing strength to more radical and populist parties such as Chega and Liberal Initiative, which is not seen so much as a populist party and still has space on the spectrum of the political right. The PSD doesn’t want to ally itself with Chega, and Liberal Initiative rejected a coalition with the PSD, causing it to ally with the CDS-Popular Party and the Monarchist Party.

  By entering a coalition with two parties without parliamentary seats, the PSD resurrected a 1979 solution in an attempt to confront the PS’s absolute majority. But even so, it didn’t initially gain the ground it wanted.

  The left has also lost relevance: the Left Bloc currently has five parliamentary seats, the Portuguese Communist Party has six and Livre has one.

  In the presence of a left that some commentators describe as ‘asleep’, a one-party centre bloc and a right without an assertive leader, Chega is the only party flourishing.

  In late 2023, opinion polls pointed to a new PS majority, but since the formation of the AD coalition, some polls suggest a potential AD victory. At the moment, there is great uncertainty and the large number of undecided voters will potentially decide the country’s direction. Every time there is a new electoral debate, new trends emerge. In the last debates he took part in, Nuno Santos called for a ‘useful vote’ in fear of a victory for AD and the right.

  What are your expectations for the post-election period?

  Depending on which party wins, the majority it gets, the coalitions that are formed and the number of seats that the opposing parties manage to obtain, there are various possible scenarios.

  These legislative elections could lead to Portugal joining the trend we’ve been seeing across Europe with far-right and populist parties entering government, or they could lead to Portugal standing out with a more socialist and left-wing government. And even these two scenarios are reductive, because the outcome will also depend on the composition of the parliamentary opposition, which is so important for the proper functioning of our democracy.

  ---

  Civic space in Portugal is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Akto through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@Akto_org on Twitter.

• PORTUGAL: ‘These elections have reminded us that democracies are fragile and imperfect’

  PORTUGUESE

  CIVICUS speaks about the results of Portugal’s 10 Marchelectionwith Ana Carmo ofAkto, a Portuguese civil society organisation that promotes human rightsand democratic values through advocacy,campaigning and education.

  What were the key election campaign themes and the main parties’ proposals?

  Parties’ campaigns for the 10 March election focused on issues such as housing, health, economic growth, education, social protection – particularly pensions – and the fight against corruption. During debates, other issues were also addressed, such as negotiations with the police – who held some protests and covertly threatened to boycott the election, the formation of coalitions, an issue that arose based on polling data, and the country’s governability.

  This election campaign was very atypical and perhaps because of this, equal attention was given to all parties with parliamentary representation, something unusual in Portugal, where competition has been mostly bipartisan, between the Socialist Party (PS) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD). Discussion of political coalitions forced us to think about politics in ideological terms, with major contenders placed on the left, right and far right.

  The contest for the prime minister position was between Pedro Nuno Santos of the PS and Luís Montenegro of the PSD as part of the Democratic Alliance (AD) coalition. Nuno Santos’ main proposals placed him as the continuation of the incumbent government with a focus on strengthening public investment on all of the campaign’s focus areas. His strategies to deal with the key issues included negotiation, strengthening institutions and greater public investment in public policy. Luís Montenegro, in comparison, centred his campaign on strengthening and stimulating the private sector, establishing public-private partnerships and reducing personal income tax and corporate income tax rates to encourage investment.

  It’s important to note that the campaign saw little discussion of proposals or in-depth analysis of political programmes. The pitch-style debates didn’t take us beyond the headlines, creating some confusion as it was hard to tell the political programmes of the different parties apart. Following the debates, the over-abundance of commentary on all TV channels, each with its own bias, also contributed to the confusion of ideas. Even so, and contrary to what was expected due to the presence of a populist party, the debates and the other parties’ campaigns managed to maintain a good level of cordiality and political seriousness.

  What led to the AD and PS winning almost the same number of seats?

  The wear and tear of the PS government became very apparent during the campaign. Despite Nuno Santos’ great effort to disassociate from former Prime Minister António Costa and present himself as the party’s new face, many people were unhappy and didn’t trust the PS.

  According to polls, the number of undecided voters increased as election day approached. The media’s excessive and sensationalised coverage may have contributed to this. With so many people undecided, confused and saturated, an expression of a desire for change was to be expected.

  However, it’s important to remember thattwo years ago the PS won an absolute majority in an election that came about because the Left Bloc rejected the state budget. But it subsequently failed to satisfy people’s major needs, and for the second time its government fell, leading to elections. Nuno Santos’ political ability and perceptions of him, the other parties’ campaigns, leaning mainly towards the right, the influence of mainstream and social media and the European and international context all contributed to a paradigm shift. The fact that, as a result, the PS went from 120 parliamentary seats to around 76 has far-reaching implications.

  What are the consequences of this tie?

  As a result of the technical tie between the AD and PS, the climate of uncertainty that dominated the campaign continues. If parties are faithful and uncompromising with their positions and their word, it’s very likely that there will be another election in November because the state budget won’t get approved. If this happens, another highly likely scenario is that the far-right Chega party will continue to gain ground and further strengthen its position in parliament.

  So this is a critical moment and a window of opportunity for Portuguese democracy to prove its strength – or weakness. Will political parties be able to engage in dialogue for the sake of political stability? What will their approach be to dealing with a populist party that has become a solid third political force? Will the centre bloc be maintained?

  If these elections have reminded us of anything, it is that democracies are fragile and imperfect. We’ll see what capacity we have to adapt to democracy’s new contours.

  How worrying do you find Chega’s performance?

  Chega’s performance has been similar to that of its counterparts in other countries: Donald Trump’s Republican Party, Jair Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally and Matteo Salvini’s Northern League. Its growth is not surprising – it’s even predictable. This is a party that feeds on fear, disinformation and revolt, and follows thegrowth of similar parties across Europe. Its tactics are no different from those used by other far-right parties.

  Chega attracts historical revanchists, xenophobes and racists, the angry and the disaffected. The Algarve region, a district won by Chega, is an example of a region that resents the way it’s been treated by successive governments. This is a region that’s very much affected by seasonal changes and experiences constant failures in dam management, leading to water shortages. Its feeling of being abandoned may explain the election result.

  The growth of a populist party is always worrying, as history can attest. It’s all the more concerning given that Portuguese democracy is still young. Just as we celebrate the 50th anniversary of the 25 April Carnation Revolution when our democracy was born, we are faced with narratives and behaviours that go against the principles of our democracy and our rights and freedoms. The growth of a far-right party is particularly concerning when it comes to the most excluded people: women, the lower and lower-middle classes and young people. That’s why the majority of its voters are male.

  How did civil society engage with the elections and how has it reacted to the results?

  Despite the high percentage of undecided voters, abstention appeared to decrease. Abstention has always been a concern, hovering around 40 per cent, but historic figures are not accurate due to the unusual number of non-habitual residents and newly registered voters. In these parliamentary elections, abstention was around 34 per cent, but turnout wasn’t up significantly from previous years.

  Until the new government takes office, it’s difficult to gauge civil society’s reaction to the election results. There is indeed great concern about the growth of the far right, but if these were protest votes, to what extent can we deduce that voters are satisfied with the result? There is a desire for change, but we don’t know if the desired change will materialise.

  When will a new government be formed, and what role might Chega play in it?

  It’s not certain there will be a coalition government. Montenegro repeated several times during and after the campaign that he will not enter into a coalition with Chega, and for the PS it doesn’t pay to form a coalition with left-wing parties, as the number of right-wing MPs remains higher or the same. Chega has said on a number of occasions that it would never enter into a coalition, but we are talking about a party that says everything and its opposite, and after the elections it has been pushing for a coalition with AD and says it’s willing to govern together.

  Chega’s role will depend more on how the other parties deal with its existence than on its own actions. The other parties have created a firewall around Chega, which has ended up strengthening its presence, and they have shown there’s no desire for this party to be part of a political solution. The PS is focused on being the leader of the opposition. Whether it succeeds in doing so and how effectively will determine the Portuguese political scene.

  Would a government that includes the far right pose a real danger to fundamental rights and freedoms?

  It depends on how it is included and with what intentions. If AD coalesced with Chega and adopted its ideological line, there would be a real risk.

  It’s not desirable for there to be a reactionary force with racist, xenophobic, sexist and revanchist discourse in parliament, but there are ways to mitigate this. Portugal lived through 41 years of dictatorship and has been a democracy for 50 years. It is because of the nature of our past dictatorship experience that our constitution forbids fascist parties and recalls the overthrow of the fascist regime in its preamble.

  Portuguese political history shows that there has been more progress in guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms with left-wing socialist governments in power than with right-wing social democratic governments.

  When we consider the speeches and proposals of the far right, fundamental rights and freedoms are called into question. However, as a democratic country, there is room for a party like this to exist, just as there are many other parties in opposition that are fiercely in favour of extending these fundamental rights and freedoms. It is up to democracy to demonstrate that it defends these rights and freedoms.

  Civic space in Portugal is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Akto through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@Akto_org on Twitter.

• RÉPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE : « Nous avons peut-être une période de changement positif devant nous »

  CIVICUS discute des élections qui ont eu lieu récemment en République dominicaine, dans le contexte de la pandémie de COVID-19, avec Hamilk Chahin, coordinateur du Manifeste citoyen pour la transparence électorale, et Addys Then Marte, directrice exécutive d’Alianza ONG. Le Manifeste citoyen, une initiative multipartite menée par la société civile, a été lancé en décembre 2019 pour suivre les élections municipales, législatives et présidentielles de 2020 et pousser à la consolidation des institutions démocratiques. Alianza ONG est un réseau comprenant 40 organisations de la société civile (OSC) de la République dominicaine. Fondé en 1995, il se consacre à la promotion du développement durable par des initiatives visant à renforcer la société civile, le dialogue intersectoriel, la formation et le partage d’informations, le plaidoyer politique et la promotion de la solidarité et du volontariat.

  Avant même l’apparition de la pandémie de COVID-19, le paysage électoral était déjà compliqué. Quelle était la situation vers mars 2020 ?

  Ces dernières années, le parti au pouvoir, le Parti de la libération dominicaine (PLD), a accumulé beaucoup de pouvoir dans toutes les institutions de l’État, affectant la qualité de la démocratie. Le même parti a été réélu pour plusieurs mandats et les élites politiques se sont bien établies dans leurs positions et ont pris l’habitude d’exercer le pouvoir pour leur propre bénéfice et au détriment des intérêts de la collectivité. Petit à petit et sans s’en rendre compte, la société a également commencé à accepter cette situation. La gestion exceptionnellement efficace des mécanismes de communication par les gouvernements successifs y a beaucoup contribué. Avec les bonnes alliances internationales et la bonne fortune dans la gestion économique, les structures de publicité et de propagande ont facilité la perpétuation du gouvernement.

  Heureusement, il existe dans chaque société une graine pratiquement impossible à déraciner : la société civile. Elle peut parfois être en état de sommeil ou en hibernation, mais à un moment donné, quelque chose se produit qui la met en mouvement. Dans notre cas, c’est l’extrême confiance de nos gouvernants dans l’assurance de leur pouvoir qui les a conduits à des pratiques de plus en plus effrontées, au point que les citoyens, qui pour la plupart les avaient longtemps tolérés, ont un jour dit que ça suffisait et sont entrés en effervescence. La première grande manifestation de cette lassitude a été le mouvement de la Marche verte, lancé en janvier 2017.

  Née de l’indignation populaire suscitée par le scandale Odebrecht, qui impliquait des hauts fonctionnaires de trois gouvernements dominicains successifs, la Marche Verte a rassemblé un large éventail d’OSC et s’est concentrée sur la mobilisation de rue. Tout a commencé par une modeste marche de protestation que nous avons organisée par l’intermédiaire d’une OSC appelée Foro Ciudadano, qui a déclenché un grand phénomène de mobilisation dont la principale réussite a été de briser l’indifférence des citoyens, de faire sortir la classe moyenne de cette zone de confort où elle critiquait sans agir. Les partis d’opposition ont commencé à profiter de cette dynamique, mais le gouvernement, certain de disposer de tous les leviers du pouvoir, lui a d’abord accordé peu d’importance. Cependant, le phénomène est allé bien au-delà des marches : des signatures ont été recueillies, des réunions communautaires ont été organisées et de nombreuses formes de mobilisation ont été encouragées. C’était un état d’éveil motivé par la dignité. Les citoyens ont perdu leur peur de s’exprimer et cela a déconcerté le gouvernement.

  Comment le processus électoral 2020 a-t-il commencé, et comment le Manifeste citoyen a-t-il été formé ?

  Le début du processus électoral a également marqué le début de la fin du gouvernement actuel. En octobre 2019, les primaires des partis politiques ont eu lieu ; il s’agissait des premières primaires à être organisées dans le cadre de la nouvelle législation sur les élections et les partis politiques, et elles ont été gérées par le Conseil électoral central (JCE). Alors que le PLD a opté pour des primaires ouvertes, permettant la participation de tous les électeurs éligibles, le principal parti d’opposition, le Partido Revolucionario Moderno (PRM), a organisé des primaires fermées, permettant la participation de ses seuls affiliés. Les primaires du PRM ont clairement fait ressortir la candidature de Luis Abinader, qui sera finalement élu président. En revanche, à l’issu des primaires du PLD, Gonzalo Castillo n'est devenu le candidat officiel que de justesse par rapport au président triomphant à trois reprises Leonel Fernández.

  Les élections primaires du parti au pouvoir étaient bien plus qu’un processus de sélection de candidats : ce qui était réellement en jeu dans ces élections était le pouvoir du président, Danilo Medina. Au pouvoir depuis 2012, Medina avait été réélu en 2016, et avait tenté en vain de réformer la Constitution pour se faire réélire. En tant que président du parti, Leonel Fernandez s’était opposé à ces manœuvres, si bien que Medina ne l'a pas soutenu lorsqu'il a décidé de se présenter aux primaires. Il est devenu évident que le gouvernement recourait aux ressources de l'État pour soutenir l'héritier désigné de Medina ; en conséquence, le PLD s’est divisé et Fernandez a rejoint le bloc d’opposition. Ces élections ont été très contestées, et ont donné lieu à de nombreuses manipulations. Elles ont laissé un goût amer parmi les citoyens : étant donné la possibilité que la fraude ait été utilisée dans une élection primaire, beaucoup se sont demandés ce qu’il adviendrait de l’élection nationale.

  À ce moment-là, de nombreuses OSC ont commencé à réfléchir à ce qu’il fallait faire : nous avons établi des liens entre nous et avec les acteurs politiques, nous avons partagé des informations et nos évaluations de la situation. Nous avons décidé d’exprimer notre préoccupation et d’exiger des mesures correctives de la part des institutions et entités responsables de l’organisation des élections, à commencer par la JCE et en nous tournant vers le Tribunal Supérieur Electoral et le Bureau du Procureur Général de la République, qui sont chargés de poursuivre les crimes et les irrégularités. C’est ainsi qu’est née l’initiative du Manifeste Citoyen (Manifiesto Ciudadano), qui regroupe des acteurs du monde de l’entreprise, de la religion, du travail, des syndicats et du monde paysan. Nous avons fait campagne pour attirer l’attention de la société sur la nécessité de défendre et de surveiller le processus d’institutionnalisation démocratique à l’approche des élections. Et surtout, nous avons fait du plaidoyer auprès des acteurs politiques. Nous avons organisé des réunions avec les représentants des partis, afin que le manifeste bénéficie du soutien de tous les secteurs. Cela a également fait de nous un interlocuteur direct de la JCE.

  Quand les élections étaient-elles prévues ?

  Le cycle électoral comprenait une série d’élections : les élections municipales, prévues en février, et les élections nationales, tant présidentielles que législatives, initialement prévues en mai. Les élections municipales ont inauguré un nouveau système de vote double, entièrement électronique pour les zones urbaines à forte densité de population et manuel pour les zones rurales. Suite aux demandes du Manifiesto Ciudadano d’apporter certaines garanties et certitudes au processus, le système de vote électronique comportait également une composante manuelle dans la phase de dépouillement des bulletins déposés ; nous avons également réussi à faire enregistrer les décomptes et avons ajouté un système de capture des empreintes digitales et des codes QR.

  Bien que les mesures de sécurité aient été renforcées, la mise en œuvre du nouveau logiciel a posé de sérieux problèmes. Le 16 février, plusieurs heures après le début du vote, la JCE a découvert qu’il y avait un problème avec environ 60% des machines à voter électroniques, et a décidé de suspendre les élections municipales dans tout le pays.

  Cela a provoqué une crise de confiance et des milliers de personnes sont descendues dans la rue pour protester presque quotidiennement. Le 17 février, une manifestation devant le siège de la JCE a exigé la démission de tous ses membres. Le mécontentement a également touché le gouvernement, car de nombreux manifestants ont estimé qu’il avait tenté de tirer profit du mauvais fonctionnement des machines. Le 27 février, jour de l’indépendance, une manifestation massive a eu lieu pour demander une enquête sur ce qui s’était passé et une plus grande transparence dans le processus électoral. La diaspora dominicaine dans différents pays du monde a organisé des manifestations de solidarité pour soutenir la démocratie dans leur pays. 

  Les élections municipales ont été reprogrammées pour le 16 mars et se sont déroulées sans vote électronique. A cette époque, la pandémie de COVID-19 avait déjà commencé, mais suspendre les élections une seconde fois aurait été un coup dur. C’est pourquoi la République dominicaine a déclaré tardivement l’état d’urgence : le gouvernement a attendu que les élections aient lieu pour décréter trois jours plus tard l’état d’urgence et le couvre-feu.

  En avril, face à cette situation prolongée, le corps électoral a décidé de reporter les élections nationales au 5 juillet, après consultation des partis et de la société civile. Il n’y avait pas beaucoup de marge car il fallait prévoir l’éventualité d’un second tour des élections qui devrait avoir lieu avant le 16 août, date à laquelle le changement de gouvernement devait avoir lieu. Bien sûr, il a même été question de la possibilité d’un amendement constitutionnel pour reporter le jour de l’investiture ; la société civile a dû jouer un rôle important pour désamorcer ces alternatives et organiser un calendrier électoral comprenant toutes les mesures sanitaires nécessaires. Heureusement, les médias ont fourni les espaces nécessaires aux OSC ; nous disposions d’une bonne tribune de communication.

  Étant donné que les élections ont eu lieu pendant la pandémie, des mesures ont-elles été prises pour limiter le risque de contagion ?

  Du côté de la société civile, nous avons essayé de faire en sorte que des mesures sanitaires adéquates soient imposées. Nous avons exhorté la JCE à suivre les recommandations de l’Organisation mondiale de la santé et de l’Organisation des États américains afin d’avoir la certitude que les mesures nécessaires seraient prises pour que les élections puissent avoir lieu. Ce fut un effort titanesque, car en République dominicaine, nous n’avions pas encore de politique efficace de prévention et de dépistage rapide, mais nous avons pu imposer des protocoles sanitaires comprenant la désinfection et l’assainissement, la distribution de matériel de protection et des mesures de distanciation physique.

  La vérité est que l’importante épidémie de COVID-19 que nous connaissons aujourd’hui n’est pas exclusivement due au jour des élections, mais surtout aux deux mois et demi de campagne désorganisée et irresponsable menée principalement par le parti au pouvoir. Le gouvernement a tenté de tirer profit de la pandémie et des limites imposées par l’état d’urgence. Cependant, cela a pu jouer en sa défaveur. Il y a eu un tel gaspillage de ressources en faveur de la candidature du parti au pouvoir que les gens l’ont mal supporté. C’était grotesque : par exemple, tout comme en Chine, on a adopté la mesure consistant à asperger les rues de désinfectant ; mais alors qu’en Chine un robot ou un véhicule parcourait les rues la nuit et passait dans tous les quartiers, ici nous avons eu droit à un défilé d’une caravane de véhicules officiels à 20 heures, avec sirènes, drapeaux, musique, tout un spectacle de campagne. Les gens n’ont pas apprécié, car cela a été interprété comme un gaspillage de ressources à des fins de propagande qui auraient pu être utilisées pour contrôler efficacement la pandémie.

  Quelles possibilités l’opposition avait-elle de faire campagne dans le contexte de l’urgence sanitaire ?

  Les conditions de la campagne étaient très inégales, car les fonctionnaires jouissaient d’une liberté de mouvement au-delà des heures fixées de couvre-feu, et les partis d’opposition se sont plaints que le parti au pouvoir pouvait poursuivre sa campagne sans restriction alors qu’ils étaient limités aux heures autorisées. L’accès aux médias était également inégal : la propagande en faveur du candidat au pouvoir était omniprésente, car elle était confondue avec la propagande du gouvernement. Dans ce sens, il y a eu une publicité qui a généré beaucoup de malaise, qui disait quelque chose comme « restez chez vous, nous nous occupons de l’aide sociale », et comportait les images des candidats officiels à la présidence et à la vice-présidence.

  La pandémie a été utilisée politiquement de nombreuses manières. À un moment donné, la peur de la contagion a été utilisée pour promouvoir l’abstention : il y a même eu une campagne qui présentait le dessin d’une tête de mort avec le slogan « sortir tue ». Alors que nous menions une campagne avec le message « protégez-vous et allez voter », le gouvernement pariait sur l’instillation de la peur dans la classe moyenne indépendante, tout en prévoyant de faire voter ses partisans en masse. La réaction négative a été si forte qu’ils ont été contraints de retirer cette publicité après quelques jours.

  De plus, l'État a été absent de la plupart des politiques mises en œuvre contre la pandémie, et a laissé la fourniture de l’aide sociale et la prévention entre les mains du candidat du parti au pouvoir. Ainsi, ce n’était souvent pas le gouvernement qui se chargeait de la fumigation, mais les entreprises du candidat. Ce sont les jets de la compagnie d’aviation du candidat, et non les avions d’État ou militaires, qui ont ramené les Dominicains bloqués à l’étranger. Les premiers kits de test ont été apportés de Chine par le candidat lui-même, bien sûr avec de grandes opérations de propagande.

  Avec tous les atouts en sa faveur, comment expliquer que le gouvernement ait perdu les élections ?

  En effet, le candidat du PRM, Luis Abinader, l’a emporté dès le premier tour, avec plus de 52% des voix, tandis que le candidat du gouvernement arrivait en deuxième position avec 37% et l’ancien président Fernandez n’a atteint que 9%. La division du parti au pouvoir à la suite des allégations de fraude lors des primaires a eu un effet, car si le parti avait été uni et non affecté par ce scandale, les résultats auraient pu être différents.

  Face au fait qu’un seul parti a gouverné pendant 20 des 25 dernières années, les citoyens en ont eu assez et ont cherché des alternatives. Les citoyens se sont exprimés non seulement par la mobilisation et la protestation, mais aussi par un processus de sensibilisation qui durait depuis plusieurs années. Des plateformes d’expression très intéressantes ont vu le jour, comme le média numérique Somos Pueblo (Nous sommes le peuple), qui a joué un rôle très important avec sa chaîne YouTube. Le gouvernement faisant campagne dans les rues et les citoyens étant isolés par la pandémie, des stratégies créatives ont également été mobilisées pour contourner les limitations et protester sans sortir de chez soi, comme les « cacerolazos ».

  Le désir de participer afin d’obtenir un changement s’est reflété dans le taux de participation aux élections, qui a dépassé 55%. Si ce chiffre est bien inférieur à la moyenne de 70% enregistrée lors des élections de la dernière décennie, il est remarquable dans le contexte de la pandémie. Face à la mauvaise gestion de la pandémie par le gouvernement actuel, les espoirs placés dans le nouveau gouvernement sont très élevés. Si nous parvenons à surmonter ce défi, nous aurons peut-être devant nous une ère de changements positifs en termes de renforcement des institutions et de consolidation de la démocratie.

  L’espace civique en République dominicaine est classé « rétréci » par leCIVICUS Monitor.

  Contactez Manifiesto Ciudadano via sonsite web ou son profilFacebook, et suivez@ManifiestoCiuRD sur Twitter. Contactez Alianza ONG via sonsite web ou son profilFacebook, et suivez@AlianzaONG et@AddysThen sur Twitter. 

• RUSSIA: ‘Human rights activism can be expected to increase in reaction to repression’

  CIVICUS speaks with Leonid Drabkin, a coordinator with OVD-Info, an independent human rights civil society organisation (CSO) that documents and helps the victims of political persecution in Russia. Through a hotline and other sources, OVD-Info collects information about detentions at public rallies and other cases of political persecution, publishes the news and coordinates legal assistance to detainees.

• Russia’s presidential election: a decline in citizen rights

  By Natalia Taubina and Bobbie Jo Traut

  The re-election of Vladimir Putin has been preceded by a significant crackdown on freedom of assembly and rule of law. The CIVICUS Monitor, which tracks and rates civil society conditions across all UN member states in close to real-time, has found that civic space in Russia has closed dramatically as civil society groups have been publicly vilified and marginalised.

  Read on: Open Democracy 

   

• RUSSIE : « L'activisme des droits humains devrait s'intensifier en réaction à la répression »

  CIVICUS s'entretient avec Leonid Drabkin, l'un des coordinateurs d'OVD-Info, une organisation indépendante de défense des droits humains de la société civile (OSC) qui documente et assiste les victimes de persécutions politiques en Russie. Par le biais de sa hotline et d'autres sources, OVD-Info recueille des informations sur les arrestations de manifestants et autres cas de persécution politique, publie des informations et coordonne l'assistance juridique aux détenus.

  

  Pouvez-vous nous parler du travail de OVD-Info ?

  Nous travaillons principalement sur la question de la liberté de réunion pacifique en Russie, en surveillant les violations et en aidant les victimes, bien que nous couvrions également d'autres cas de persécution politique non liés aux manifestations. Nous définissons la persécution politique comme une persécution par le gouvernement ou une personne liée au gouvernement qui implique la violation des libertés civiques, c'est-à-dire de la liberté de réunion pacifique, de la liberté d'expression, de la liberté d'association et de certaines libertés électorales. Nous travaillons dans deux directions : nous aidons les personnes dont les libertés ont été bafouées, et nous recueillons et diffusons des informations, qui à leur tour alimentent notre plaidoyer et nos campagnes pour le changement.

  Nous aidons les personnes détenues grâce à une ligne téléphonique qui fonctionne 24 heures sur 24, 7 jours sur 7. C'est à la fois un moyen facile de signaler une persécution et une occasion de consulter des professionnels qui savent à quoi s'attendre dans chaque situation, quoi faire et comment le faire. Notre ligne d'assistance reçoit des appels de partout dans le pays et nous recevons également des SMS via Telegram. Nous offrons une aide juridique par ces moyens et également en envoyant des avocats dans les commissariats de police où des personnes sont détenues. Nous soutenons également ceux qui sont poursuivis devant les tribunaux. Par exemple, en octobre 2020, nous avons fourni une aide juridique dans 135 affaires judiciaires - environ cinq ou six par jour ouvrable - dans différentes régions de Russie, étant donné que cette année a été assez particulière pour diverses raisons, y compris le fait que les grandes protestations à Khabarovsk, le district le plus à l'est de la Fédération, se poursuivent. Dans ce cas particulier, le décalage horaire a été un gros problème pour nous. Nous sommes basés à Moscou et nous recevions normalement des appels pendant nos heures de travail, mais durant cette période nous recevons des appels à 4 ou 5 heures du matin et nous avons dû adapter notre façon de travailler.

  Nous travaillons également avec la Cour européenne des droits humains et aidons ceux qui ont besoin de notre aide là-bas. Ce qui nous distingue, c'est notre devise « l'information protège », ce qui signifie que nous aidons non seulement en offrant une assistance directe mais aussi en diffusant des informations, si bien que nous fonctionnons également comme un média et une agence de presse. Nous avons un site Web que nous tenons à jour, et nous avons des journalistes qui font un travail d'enquête et rédigent des articles et des rapports. C'est une autre des façons dont nous aidons les gens, étant donné que ces informations sont utilisées pour tenter de changer les choses à travers un travail de plaidoyer et de clarification de la citoyenneté. Nous publions des bases de données sur une grande variété de sujets. Nous conservons bien les dossiers, donc si quelqu'un veut savoir, par exemple, combien de personnes ont été arrêtées en Russie en 2019, il peut trouver ces informations sur notre site Web.

  Je suis fier de dire que 70 à 80% de notre budget provient de sources privées. Cela reflète la force de notre communauté de donateurs, composée de quelque 6 000 personnes qui versent des contributions mensuelles. Notre organisation a vu le jour en décembre 2011, dans le contexte d'une vague de manifestations de masse qui a abouti à des arrestations massives. Cela a commencé avec une publication sur Facebook et a été fondé en tant que petit groupe de bénévoles, et neuf ans plus tard, nous sommes toujours là : nous sommes devenus une organisation plus durable avec un personnel professionnel et spécialisé, où le bénévolat et le soutien communautaire continuent de jouer un rôle important. Nous avons environ 600 bénévoles, dont certains nous aident au quotidien, tandis que d'autres le font sur une base mensuelle ou sporadique.

  De votre point de vue, quels sont les principaux risques auxquels les activistes et les journalistes sont actuellement confrontés en Russie ?

  Les activistes et les journalistes sont confrontés à de nombreuses menaces, mais peut-être en raison de l'orientation de notre travail, je dirais que les principales sont liées à la restriction de la liberté de réunion pacifique. Ces restrictions opèrent à chaque tournant. Si vous organisez une manifestation pacifique, il est fort probable que vous vous retrouviez en détention, même si cela dépend du problème, de la région où vous vous trouvez et de votre chance. Il y a beaucoup d'incertitude, donc vous ne savez jamais si vous allez être arrêté ou non.

  Avant de protester, vous devez informer le gouvernement local que vous souhaitez organiser une réunion, et pour ce faire, vous avez besoin de leur approbation. Dans de nombreux cas, le processus d'approbation échoue. Le fait même que cette procédure existe est en soi une menace. Selon les normes internationales, ce n'est pas ainsi que cela devrait fonctionner. En Russie, il est nécessaire de demander une autorisation à l'avance. Le délai varie d'une région à l'autre, mais supposons que vous deviez soumettre la demande 7 jours à l'avance, puis attendre le permis et alors seulement, s'ils vous le donnent, pouvez-vous faire votre déclaration. Cela signifie que vous n'avez pas la capacité de réagir rapidement lorsque quelque chose de grave se produit, par exemple en cas de meurtre ou en cas de doute sur les résultats des élections. Il n'est pas possible de protester en réaction à ces événements car vous devez soumettre la demande d'autorisation et attendre plusieurs jours à ce qu'elle vous soit remise, et ce si elle vous est donnée. L'enthousiasme et l'énergie que ces événements provoquent ont tendance à diminuer avec le temps, et il est fort probable que dans une semaine ou deux ils se soient calmés, ce que la législation actuelle prévoit.

  Si votre rallye est approuvé, ils ne vous arrêteront probablement pas. Mais les protestations sur des questions controversées ne sont généralement pas approuvées, et si vous n'avez pas d'autorisation et que vous vous exprimez de toute façon, il est très probable que vous soyez arrêté, puis envoyé dans un poste de police et ensuite jugé. Lorsque les manifestations sont réprimées, vous pouvez également être frappé par les forces de police. Ce n'est pas si courant, mais parfois la police a frappé les manifestants avec leurs matraques, ou leurs « démocratiseurs » comme nous les appelons.

  Si vous êtes poursuivi et qu'il s'agit de votre première violation des règles qui s'appliquent à la manifestation, vous ne serez condamné qu'à une amende, mais si vous êtes un récidiviste, vous pourriez être emprisonné pendant 10 ou 15 jours. Si vous êtes un activiste, vous faire prendre une deuxième ou une troisième fois n'est qu'une question de temps. Or, le système est absurde, car il implique que la nature du crime change lorsqu'il est commis à plusieurs reprises : lorsque vous enfreignez la réglementation pour la première fois, c'est un crime mineur qui est poursuivi par le tribunal administratif, mais quand vous le faites pour la troisième fois, il est considéré comme un crime grave, qui est donc poursuivi par le système pénal, avec d'autres crimes graves tels que le meurtre ou l'enlèvement. Nous disons que c'est le seul article politique de notre Code pénal, car il a été créé pour être utilisé politiquement et constitue une grande menace pour l'activisme.

  Les règles ou leur application ont-elles été renforcées pendant la pandémie de la COVID-19 ?

  Oui, le gouvernement russe a utilisé la pandémie comme excuse pour violer les droits humains. La Russie a été l'un des pays les plus touchés par les infections et les décès causés par le COVID-19, mais elle a également été l'un des rares pays d'Europe à autoriser les gens à se rendre dans les stades de football, les cinémas et les théâtres ; même le métro, toujours plein, fonctionne comme d'habitude, alors que toutes les mobilisations et manifestations sont interdites, selon l'allégation de la pandémie.

  La société civile comprend mieux que le gouvernement tous les impacts négatifs du COVID-19 et n'a pas l'intention de déclencher une grande manifestation. Tout ce que nous voulons, c'est que les gens puissent organiser de petites manifestations, même des manifestations à une personne ou des piquets de grève individuels, qui sont en principe les seuls types de manifestation que nous pourrions faire sans préavis ni demande d'autorisation des autorités. C'est l'une des raisons pour lesquelles les piquets individuels ont augmenté ces dernières années. Mais la répression à leur encontre s'est également intensifiée et les restrictions ont également continué de s'appliquer pendant la pandémie, même si ces manifestations ne présentent aucun risque pour la santé publique. Au cours du premier semestre 2020, quelque 200 manifestants ont été arrêtés, plus que lors de toute année précédente. En fait, j'étais l'une des personnes arrêtées, même si je n'ai pas été arrêtée en relation avec le travail que nous faisons à OVD-Info. En tant qu'OSC, nous essayons de rester politiquement neutres, tandis que moi, en tant qu'individu et activiste, j'ai fait un piquet de grève individuel et j'ai été arrêté pour cela. Je porte actuellement mon cas devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme.

  Y a-t-il eu des restrictions sur d'autres libertés civiques ?

  Bien que je considère que notre plus gros problème soit la restriction de la liberté de réunion, il y a bien sûr aussi une censure en Russie. Certains sites Web sont parfois interdits, mais ce n'est pas très courant. En fait, là où la liberté d'expression devient souvent problématique, c'est en relation avec la liberté de réunion. Par exemple, il y a eu le cas d'une personne qui a été arrêtée pendant 30 jours pour avoir téléchargé un message sur Facebook invitant d'autres personnes à participer à une manifestation qui n'avait pas été approuvée par le gouvernement. Bien que cette personne ait été arrêtée pour avoir exercé son droit à la liberté d'expression, la violation était associée à la restriction de la liberté de réunion, qui rend illégale la convocation à une manifestation non autorisée.

  Il existe un nombre croissant de lois qui interdisent certaines formes de discours, du « manque de respect » envers le gouvernement à la diffusion de la « propagande LGBT ». On peut être accusé d'avoir dit ou posté quelque chose de critique au point d'être perçu comme irrespectueux, ou même juste d’avoir évoqué des droits des personnes LGBTQI +, car en 2013 une loi connue comme « loi sur la propagande gay » ou « loi anti-gay » a été passée ayant supposément pour objectif de protéger les enfants en criminalisant la distribution de « propagande non traditionnelle sur les relations sexuelles » aux mineurs. Cette loi interdit fondamentalement de parler aux mineurs, et dans tout autre contexte, des sujets LGBTQI +.

  Ces dernières années, les restrictions à la liberté d'association ont également augmenté. Des dizaines d'OSC ont été classées comme « agents étrangers » et de nombreux groupes d'activistes ont été traités comme des terroristes ou des extrémistes, même s'ils n'ont rien fait. Un exemple clair s'est produit il y a quelques mois, lorsque sept jeunes activistes ont été condamnés pour extrémisme et certains ont été condamnés à plusieurs années de prison. Ils n'avaient eu que des conversations dans un groupe de discussion infiltré par un agent du FSB (Service fédéral de sécurité), qui avait poussé à un agenda politique radical pour tendre un piège aux autres participants, qui ont ensuite été contraints de faire de faux aveux.

  Compte tenu de l'accent mis par OVD-Info sur l'information, êtes-vous préoccupé par les tactiques de désinformation utilisées par les responsables du gouvernement russe ?

  Je suis de nombreux politiciens sur Facebook et parfois je vois qu'à côté de leurs messages, il y a une légende qui dit quelque chose comme « s'il vous plaît vérifiez cette information car elle pourrait être fausse », comme avec les tweets de Trump. Je ne considère pas que ce soit un si gros problème en Russie, ou peut-être que nous ne sommes pas pleinement conscients parce que cela a toujours été le cas. En interne, je ne vois pas la désinformation comme une nouvelle tactique. En Russie, nous n'avons jamais fait confiance à notre gouvernement, sur aucune question - ni en relation avec les statistiques COVID-19, ni en relation avec l'inflation ou les taux de chômage. Cela a toujours été comme ça. Les chiffres sont inventés et personne ne les croit.

  Concernant les sources d'information, je pense qu'en Russie, nous avons deux publics différents, qui se mélangent que très rarement : le public de la télévision et les internautes. Les personnes âgées et celles qui vivent dans des zones plus rurales ont tendance à regarder la télévision, tandis que les plus jeunes et ceux des zones urbaines utilisent Internet. La plupart de ce que l’on voit à la télévision est de la propagande, pas de l'information ; si vous voulez vous y référer en tant qu'information, alors ce serait une « fausse information ». Mais si vous surfez sur Internet, vous avez la possibilité de trouver des informations fiables. Il est nécessaire de bien chercher, car il y a beaucoup d'informations et souvent les informations fausses et vraies sont mélangées, mais au moins vous en avez accès.

  Pouvez-vous nous parler du référendum constitutionnel de juin 2020 ?

  Je pense que vous, qui le regardez de l'extérieur, y avez prêté plus d'attention que nous en Russie. En fait, référendum n'est même pas le mot juste. Le gouvernement n'a jamais qualifié le vote de référendum ; ils l'appelaient une « enquête nationale ». Il n'est même pas nécessaire de tenir un référendum pour amender la Constitution. En fait, il n'y a pas longtemps, lorsque la Russie a conquis la péninsule de Crimée, la Constitution a dû être amendée pour inclure une région supplémentaire de la Russie, mais aucun référendum n'a eu lieu ; d'autres mécanismes ont été utilisés à la place.

  Le gouvernement aurait pu emprunter la voie législative, mais il voulait que les modifications soient légitimées par une grande majorité de la population. Cependant, ils n'ont pas pu organiser de référendum car ce mécanisme devait être appelé des mois à l'avance et les règles permettaient uniquement aux personnes ayant des problèmes de santé de voter de chez elles. Ils ont donc appelé cela une « enquête nationale », une figure qui n'est réglementée par aucune loi - contrairement au référendum, qui doit être organisé selon des directives spécifiques. Cela a donné au gouvernement une grande souplesse en termes de dates et de règlements. Dans de nombreuses régions, les gens pouvaient voter à distance par des moyens électroniques, ce qui ne serait pas en soi négatif, mais dans ce contexte, cela offrait des possibilités supplémentaires de violations. Une semaine complète a été ajoutée pour voter avant le jour du vote, ce qui était une bonne décision du point de vue de la santé publique, mais a ajouté encore plus de possibilités de fraude. Et il n'y a pas eu de contrôle indépendant, donc les résultats ne peuvent être fiables, selon lesquels une écrasante majorité de 70% s'est prononcée en faveur de la réforme.

  J'ai été indigné par les modifications possibles de la Constitution, qui comprenaient de nouvelles dispositions faisant référence aux limites du mandat présidentiel et permettaient de ne pas compter les périodes précédemment détenues par ceux qui occupaient le poste, permettant à Poutine de concourir pour deux mandats présidentiels supplémentaires de six ans. Par ailleurs, l'accent était mis sur la « famille traditionnelle », l'introduction de l'éducation patriotique dans les écoles, une mention explicite de la foi en Dieu et une déclaration qui place la Constitution au-dessus du droit international.

  J'étais également très préoccupé par le fait que personne autour de moi n'était assez en colère. Les partis politiques et les dirigeants de l'opposition n'ont pas appelé les gens à voter contre ; ils n'ont simplement rien dit. Ils n'étaient même pas opposés au vote pendant la pandémie. Pour moi, c'était une décision criminelle, mettant inutilement en danger des dizaines de millions de personnes en les faisant voter en pleine pandémie. Je fais partie d'un comité électoral et à toutes les élections je travaille aux tables de vote ; je me présente à l'école locale et je reste assis toute la journée à chercher les noms des électeurs dans les registres, à leur remettre leurs bulletins de vote et à signer à côté de leurs noms, mais cette fois-ci je ne l'ai pas fait parce que j'avais peur pour ma santé. Je ne voulais pas être dans une pièce avec autant de monde en pleine pandémie.

  La société civile n'était pas non plus très active. L'une des OSC russes les plus connues, Golos, qui travaille sur les questions d'observation électorale, a fait la lumière sur la question, dénonçant que le vote a été manipulé et que les résultats ont été falsifiés. Mais la société civile dans son ensemble n'a pas vraiment été confrontée au problème, et je pense que la pandémie pourrait avoir quelque chose à voir avec cela, car en temps normal, elle serait sortie pour protester, mais à l'heure actuelle, la pandémie rend les choses extrêmement compliquées.

  Les activistes des droits humains ont-ils trouvé des formes de résistance créatives et alternatives ?

  Les activistes des droits humains sont comme des champignons après la pluie : nous nous multiplions en réaction aux violations des droits humains. Après chaque nouvelle vague de répression, l'activisme augmente et de nouvelles OSC émergent. OVD-Info est né en réaction à la répression des grandes manifestations qui ont eu lieu après les élections législatives, et neuf ans plus tard, nous continuons à grandir. 2019 a été une année de persécutions massives et de nombreux projets prometteurs ont été développés en conséquence. Par exemple, nous avons maintenant un excellent tchat Telegram appelé « paquets aux postes de police », qui est activé lorsqu'une personne est détenue et a besoin d'eau, de nourriture, d'un chargeur de téléphone portable ou de tout autre élément essentiel, et à travers laquelle nous nous coordonnons afin que quelqu'un aille tout simplement au poste de police et remette les éléments à la personne détenue. De cette manière, tout le monde peut exprimer sa solidarité. En participant à cette initiative, même ceux qui ont peur de protester peuvent être utiles sans risque. Nous avons une autre initiative, « taxi pour prisonniers », à travers laquelle les gens se portent volontaires pour vous chercher ou vous chercher un taxi si vous êtes détenu et ils vous libèrent au milieu de la nuit, quand il n'y a pas de transports publics. Lorsqu'ils m'ont arrêté plus tôt cette année, ils m'ont infligé une amende, et alors j'ai bénéficié d'une autre initiative qui soutient le piquetage individuel en utilisant « crowdfunding » afin de recueillir les fonds nécessaires au paiement de l'amende. De nouvelles initiatives continuent de voir le jour pour lutter contre chaque nouvelle violation des droits, et à mesure que de nouvelles restrictions sont imposées, on peut s'attendre à ce que l'activisme des droits humains s'intensifie.

  L'espace civique en Russie est qualifié de « répressif » par leCIVICUS Monitor.
  Entrez en contact avec OVD-Info via leursite Web ou pageFacebook, et suivez@Ovdinfo sur Twitter. 

• SADC should urge respect of the rule of law in Zimbabwe’s post-elections crisis

  JOHANNESBURG: The Southern African Development Community (SADC) should urge Zimbabwean authorities to show restraint and respect of the rule of law in the wake of a violent crackdown on post-election protests.

  Global civil society alliance, CIVICUS, is calling on SADC to engage Zimbabwe on its response to protesters who express dissatisfaction with the administration of the July 30 general elections.

  At least six people were killed and many more injured when security forces used live ammunition against protesters in the capital Harare, as the country awaited the results of the historic vote.  Riot police and military in armoured vehicles swept through the streets, targeting bystanders and forcing others to shutter businesses and return home.  Several journalists covering the event were intimidated and forced to stop working.

  On August 4, riot police dispersed a press conference organised by the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in the capital, Harare.  Before that, police raided MDC headquarters, arresting party members and charging them with inciting and engaging in political violence.  Most are currently being held in Harare’s notorious Chikarubi Maximum Security Prison.  Security forces have intimidated the political opposition and ordinary citizens, arresting supporters of the MDC.  Some have been abducted and others have gone into hiding.  The army is also harassing, under the cover of darkness, activists it suspects of leading the organization of protests.

   The release of the results of the 30 July elections and the actions of the army and riot police have brought back traumatic memories of decades of repression suffered by Zimbabweans, under the regime of ousted president Robert Mugabe.

   “The use of live ammunition against unarmed civilians can never be justified,” said David Kode, CIVICUS Campaigns and Advocacy lead.

  “As responsible neighbours and stakeholders of peace in the region, SADC leaders should send a clear message to Zimbabwean authorities to act with integrity and respect the rule of law including exercise of fundamental freedom.”

  The 30 July elections were expected to usher in a new era of democratic governance in Zimbabwe after the military coup in November 2017 but the post elections crisis has led to uncertainty and demonstrated that the military continues to cast an ominous shadow over politics.  Zimbabwean authorities invoked the restrictive Public Order and Security Act to enable the armed forces intervene.  

  The right to freedom of expression, association and assembly is enshrined in the Zimbabwean constitution. SADC should call on the government and security forces to exercise restraint and respect these fundamental rights of citizens including the right to assemble peacefully.  

  CIVICUS Monitor, an online tool that tracks threats to civil society in all countries around the world, rates the space for civil society in Zimbabwe as “repressed.”

  ENDS.

   

  For more information, please contact:

  David Kode

   

  Grant Clark