elections

• SÉNÉGAL : « Après avoir été un exemple de démocratie en Afrique, on tend de plus en plus vers l’autoritarisme »

  CIVICUS échange avec Abdou Aziz Cissé, chargé de plaidoyer d’AfricTivistes, au sujet de la décision du Président Macky Sall de reporter l’élection présidentielle prévue le 25 février et de ses implications pour la démocratie au Sénégal.

  AfricTivistes est une organisation de la société civile (OSC) panafricaine qui promeut et défend les valeurs démocratiques, les droits humains et la bonne gouvernance à travers la civic tech. Elle vise à autonomiser les citoyens africains afin qu’ils deviennent des acteurs actifs dans la construction de leurs sociétés et puissent demander des comptes à leurs gouvernements.

  Pourquoi le Président Sall a-t-il reporté l’élection présidentielle du 25 février ?

  Cette nouvelle crise au Sénégal est partie d’une allocution solennelle du président Sall le 3 février dernier, la veille du jour prévu pour le lancement de la campagne pour l’élection du 25 février, au cours de laquelle son successeur devait être élu. Il a abrogé le décret convoquant le corps électoral qui avait fixé l’élection présidentielle le 25 février.

  Il a invoqué trois raisons : une supposée crise institutionnelle entre l’Assemblée nationale et le Conseil constitutionnel concernant une présumée affaire de corruption de juges, la nécessité de mettre en place une commission parlementaire pour enquêter sur des suspicions d’irrégularités dans le processus de vérification des parrainages en vue de l’élection, et la révélation de la binationalité d’un des candidats retenus par le Conseil constitutionnel.

  Il est à noter que Karim Wade, fils de l’ancien président Abdoulaye Wade et candidat du Parti démocratique sénégalais (PDS) ne figurait pas sur la liste définitive des candidats à l’élection présidentielle annoncée le 20 janvier. Pour contester cette décision du Conseil Constitutionnel, les députés du PDS ont demandé la mise en place d’une commission d’enquête parlementaire pour éclairer sur le processus de vérification des candidatures. Ils ont également accusé de corruption deux magistrats du Conseil constitutionnel. La mise en place de cette commission a été approuvée au parlement le 31 janvier.

  Le 5 février, une proposition de loi visant à reporter l’élection présidentielle au 15 décembre a été adopté après l’évacuation des députés de l’opposition par des gendarmes à l’intérieur de l’hémicycle. Pour rappel, le 3 juillet 2023, après avoir renoncé à un troisième mandat, M. Sall avait promis de remettre le pouvoir le 2 avril à la suite d’élections libres, inclusives et transparentes.

  Pourquoi cette décision a-t-elle été qualifiée de « coup d’État constitutionnel » ?

  Cet acte du président a été décrit comme un coup d’État constitutionnel parce que le président ne peut pas interrompre un processus électoral déjà enclenché. En effet, le report d’une élection est une prérogative exclusive du Conseil constitutionnel.

  La décision du président viole également d’autres articles de la Constitution, notamment l’article 27, qui prévoit un mandat présidentiel de cinq ans et une limitation à deux mandats consécutifs donc ne peut de lui-même proroger son mandat. Il y’a également l’article 103, qui dispose que « la forme républicaine de l’Etat, le mode d’élection, la durée et le nombre de mandats consécutifs du Président de la République ne peuvent faire l’objet de révision ».

  Je tiens à souligner que conformément à l’article 52 de la Constitution, le président peut interrompre le processus seulement « lorsque les institutions de la République, l’indépendance de la Nation, l’intégrité du territoire national ou l’exécution des engagements internationaux sont menacées d’une manière grave et immédiate… ». Hors toutes les institutions de la république marchent de manière régulière. L’établissement d’une commission d’enquête parlementaire et le vote d’une proposition de loi en sont les preuves patentes.

  En prenant cette décision illégale, M. Sall est devenu le premier président de l’histoire du Sénégal à ne pas organiser une élection présidentielle à date échue depuis 1963.

  Quelle a été la réaction de la société civile ?

  La réaction de la société civile a été spontanée. Plusieurs OSC dont AfricTivistes ont condamné cet acte antidémocratique soit par des communiqués ou des déclarations médiatiques. Les autres forces vives de la nation, comme les syndicats de tous les secteurs, ont aussi marqué leur désaccord.

  Sur les réseaux sociaux, les citoyens ont aussi fait montre de leur indignation, internationalisant du coup leur colère face à la décision.

  Le 4 février, 19 candidats ont tenu un point de presse pour réaffirmer leur volonté de faire campagne ensemble, rejoints par des membres de la société civile.

  Une autre manifestation a été déclarée pour le 5 février, le jour du vote parlementaire, mais n’a pas pu se tenir car toutes les artères stratégiques menant à l’Assemblée nationale ont été quadrillées. Depuis juin 2023, les autorités administratives interdisent systématiquement les manifestations, même pacifiques.

  La plateforme « Aar Sunu Election » (« Protégeons notre élection ») a rassemblé plus de 100 OSC rejetant le report de l’élection. Les pressions ont payé car le 15 février au soir, le Conseil constitutionnel a invalidé le décret présidentiel du 3 février et la loi votée par l’Assemblée nationale le 5 février.

  Comment le gouvernement a-t-il réagi ?

  Le gouvernement a commencé par réprimer les manifestations du 4 février, au lendemain de l’annonce du président et le jour où la campagne électorale était censée commencer. La censure a également été imposée ce jour-là, lorsque l’internet via les données mobiles a été coupé, selon le ministre de tutelle, pour arrêter « la diffusion de messages haineux et subversifs ». Les mêmes raisons ont été invoquées pour justifier les actes de censure au cyberespace en juin, juillet et août 2023. Les données mobiles ont été rétablies le 7 février, puis à nouveau restreintes le 13 février avec des plages horaires.

  Les coupures d’Internet et autres formes de restrictions en ligne constituent des violations à la constitution et à plusieurs conventions internationales ratifiées par le Sénégal. Ce sont des violations de la liberté d’expression, de l’accès à l’information et des libertés économiques. Selon les syndicats des opérateurs télécoms sénégalais, la censure a causé des pertes s’élevant à 3 milliards de francs CFA (environ 4.9 millions de dollars).

  En ce sens, AfricTivistes et deux journalistes sénégalais portent plainte contre l’Etat du Sénégal devant la Cour de justice de la Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest, l’organisation régionale, pour mettre fin aux coupures intempestives des données mobiles d’internet.

  De plus, la suspension de la licence de la télévision Walfadjri, l’objet d’un acharnement de la part des autorités, a survenu en pleine couverture des protestations consécutives à l’annonce de l’annulation de l’élection. Leur signal a été rétabli le 11 février.

  Le 9 février, un rassemblement pacifique appelé par les forces vives du Sénégal sur la Place de la Nation à Dakar a été dispersé dès le départ par la police. Les gens se sont mobilisés dans tout le pays, notamment à Saint-Louis, dans le nord. Les manifestants pacifiques ont été violemment réprimés avec un usage disproportionné de la force, faisant trois morts, plusieurs blessés, dont certains ne participaient pas à la manifestation, et plus de 200 arrestations

  La presse a aussi été empêchée de couvrir les manifestations afin de fournir une information juste et vraie aux citoyens. Au même titre que les manifestants classiques, des journalistes, la plupart des femmes ont été gazés, arrêtés et brutalisés. Au moins 25 journalistes ont été attaqués, détenus ou aspergés de gaz lacrymogène lors des manifestations selon le Comité de Protection des Journalistes. La journaliste Absa Anne, du site d’informations générales Seneweb, a été traînée dans un véhicule de police et battue jusqu’à perdre connaissance, devenant le symbole de cette répression aveugle sur la presse ce jour-là.

  La marche silencieuse déclarée par la plateforme « Protégeons notre élection » a été interdite le 13 février par l’autorité administrative. Toutefois celle du 17 février a été autorisée et a vu une participation massive des Sénégalais pour communier et jouir de leur liberté constitutionnelle longtemps confisquée. Cette communion nationale est la preuve que lorsqu’elles sont autorisées par l’autorité administrative, les manifestations se passent paisiblement.

  Comment voyez-vous l’avenir de la démocratie au Sénégal ?

  Après avoir été un exemple de démocratie et de stabilité politique en Afrique, avec des alternances démocratiques et pacifiques en 2000 et 2012, le Sénégal tend de plus en plus vers l’autoritarisme, symbolisé par la confiscation des droits et libertés fondamentaux.

  Même si la libération depuis le 15 février de plus de 600 détenus politiques arrêtés pour des délits d’opinion ou appartenance à l’opposition participe de la décrispation du climat politique, la crise que vit le pays actuellement ne présage pas d’un avenir radieux pour la démocratie sénégalaise.

  Mais je suis optimiste, car même si la classe politique est engagée dans une lutte acharnée pour le pouvoir, la société civile est forte et jouit d’une force de contestation considérable dans tous les secteurs de la vie sociale du pays. Sans oublier la nouvelle force de contestation qui a vu le jour avec l’avènement des technologies civiques. Les réseaux sociaux amplifient les voix citoyennes et leur donnent une dimension internationale, d’où les tentatives des autorités de faire taire les voix qui s’expriment à travers l’outil numérique.

  Le Sénégal a aussi une justice et une administration qui ont toujours joué leur rôle de contre-pouvoir. Il faut aussi prendre en compte la non-linéarité de tout système démocratique. Comme tous les systèmes démocratiques, celui du Sénégal est à parfaire. Il a connu des avancées notables bien que des soubresauts comme ceux que nous vivons actuellement. Et il faut prendre en considération que c’est à partir des crises que les opportunités émergent.

  Que devrait faire la communauté internationale pour contribuer à la résolution de cette crise ?

  La résolution d’une crise politique interne est souvent complexe, La communauté internationale peut jouer un rôle important pour soutenir un processus démocratique transparent et équitable en envoyant des missions d’observation électorale.

  Outre le soutien à la société civile, les partenaires internationaux peuvent aussi exercer une pression diplomatique, comme l’ont fait Antony Blinken, secrétaire d’État des États-Unis, Joseph Borell, Haut représentant de l’Union européenne pour les affaires étrangères, et le Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies aux droits de l’homme, qui a demandé des enquêtes indépendantes pour faire la lumière sur les manifestants tues. Toutes ces bonnes volontés peuvent aussi contribuer à encourager un dialogue inclusif. Cela pourrait favoriser la recherche de solutions consensuelles.

  La communauté internationale doit aussi condamner toute violence politique et rappeler l’importance du respect des droits humains fondamentaux comme la liberté d’expression, la liberté de la presse et la liberté de manifestation.

  Comment voyez-vous la situation de la démocratie en Afrique de l’Ouest, et comment AfricTivistes travaille-t-elle pour aider les activistes dans les pays touchés par des coups d’État ?

  La démocratie a reculé dans la région au cours des trois dernières années. De 2020 à 2022, l’Afrique de l’Ouest a vécu cinq coups d’État dans un double contexte de terrorisme dans le Sahel et sur un fond de discours anti-impérialiste. La société civile joue un rôle crucial dans le façonnement de la démocratie, mais l’espace civique est étouffé dans les pays où les militaires ont pris le pouvoir.

  Toutefois, chaque pays a ses propres dynamiques historiques et politiques. Les tendances démocratiques varient considérablement en fonction de facteurs historiques, culturels et socio-économiques. Les pays qui ont réussi à mettre en œuvre des réformes institutionnelles pour lutter contre la corruption ont généralement vu la qualité de leur démocratie s’améliorer, comme le montre le Cap-Vert, champion de la bonne gouvernance en Afrique de l’Ouest.

  Plusieurs pays ont maintenu une stabilité politique relative, comme le Sénégal avant les derniers développements. Le dernier pays à avoir organisé une élection présidentielle c’est la Côte d’Ivoire, après des incidents post électorales et la violation de la constitution ivoirienne, qui limite à deux le nombre de mandats présidentiels.

  Forte d’une large communauté qui nous permet d’internationaliser nos plaidoyers, AfricTivistes apporte du soutien moral aux militants prodémocratie en publiant des communiqués pour rappeler l’illégalité de leur arrestation et leur censure.

  Nous leur apportons aussi un soutien technique afin qu’ils puissent contourner les censures auxquelles ils font face dans leur pays. À ce jour, nous avons soutenu sept activistes pro démocratie et journalistes en danger.

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  L’espace civique au Sénégal est classé « réprimé » par leCIVICUS Monitor.

  Contactez AfricTivistes sur sonsite web ou sa pageFacebook, et suivez@afric_tivistes et@frican_excellency sur Instagram et@AFRICTIVISTES et@AbdouJCisse sur Twitter.

• SÉNÉGAL : « La situation devient plus tendue au fur et mesure qu’on s’approche des élections de 2024 »

  CIVICUS échange sur la dégradation de l’espace civique à l’approche des élections sénégalaises de l'année prochaine avec Sadikh Niass, Secrétaire Général de laRencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme(RADDHO), etIba Sarr, Directeur des Programmes de la RADDHO.

  La RADDHO est une organisation de la société civile (OSC) nationale basée à Dakar, Sénégal. Elle travaille pour la protection et la promotion des droits humains au niveau national, régional et international par le biais de la recherche, de l’analyse et du plaidoyer afin de fournir des alertes d’urgence et de prévenir les conflits.

  Quelles sont les conditions pour la société civile au Sénégal ?

  La société civile sénégalaise reste très active mais est confrontée à plusieurs difficultés liées à la restriction de l’espace civique. Elle subit beaucoup d’attaques verbales de la part de certaines lobbies proches du pouvoir qui les considèrent comme des opposants ou faisant la promotion de « contre valeurs » comme l’homosexualité. Elle est aussi confrontée aux restrictions de libertés de manifestations. La société civile travaille dans des conditions difficiles avec peu de moyens financiers et matériels. En effet les organisations de défense des droits humains ne reçoivent aucun soutien financier de l’Etat.

  La situation devient plus tendue au fur et mesure qu’on s’approche des élections de février 2024. Depuis mars 2021, l’opposition la plus radicale et le gouvernement ont tous opté pour la confrontation. Le gouvernement tente d’affaiblir l’opposition en la réduisant au minimum. Il s’attaque particulièrement à l’opposition la plus dynamique, la coalition Yewi Askan Wi (« Libérer le peuple »), dont le principal leader, Ousmane Sonko, est aujourd’hui en détention.

  Toutes les manifestations de l’opposition sont systématiquement interdites. Les manifestations spontanées sont violemment réprimées et se soldent par des arrestations. Le judiciaire est instrumentalisé pour empêcher la candidature du principal opposant au régime, Sonko, et les principaux dirigeants de son parti sont arrêtés.

  Nous avons également assisté ces dernières années à une recrudescence des menaces verbales, physiques et judiciaires envers les journalistes, ce qui constitue un vrai recul du droit à l’information.

  Quels seront les enjeux de l’élection présidentielle de 2024 ?

  Avec la découverte du pétrole et du gaz, le Sénégal devient une destination attrayante pour les investisseurs. La gestion transparente de ces ressources reste un défi dans un contexte marqué par la recrudescence des actes terroristes. Les populations confrontées à la pauvreté voient en cette découverte un moyen d’améliorer leur niveau de vie. Avec la percée de l’opposition lors des élections locales et législatives de 2022 on sent que l’électorat exprime de plus en plus fortement son désir de transparence, de justice et d’amélioration des conditions socio-économiques.

  Le 3 juillet 2023 le président sortant a déclaré qu’il ne participera pas aux prochaines élections. Cette déclaration pourrait constituer une lueur d’espoir d’une élection libre et transparente. Mais le fait que l’État soit tenté d’empêcher certains ténors de l’opposition d’y prendre part constitue un grand risque de voir le pays sombrer dans des turbulences.

  La société civile reste alerte et veille à ce que l’élection de 2024 soit une élection inclusive, libre et transparente. A cet effet elle a beaucoup multiplié des actions en faveur du dialogue entre les acteurs politiques. Également les OSC s’activent à travers plusieurs plateformes pour accompagner les autorités dans l’organisation des élections apaisées par la supervision du processus avant, pendant et après le scrutin.

  Qu’est-ce qui a déclenché les récentes manifestations ? Quelles sont les revendications des manifestants et comment le gouvernement a-t-il réagi ?

  Les récentes manifestations ont été déclenchées par la condamnation de Sonko à deux ans de prison le 1er juin 2023. Ce jour-là, un tribunal s’est prononcé sur l’affaire dite « Sweet Beauty », dans laquelle une jeune femme employée dans un salon de massage accusait Sonko de l’avoir violée et d’avoir proféré des menaces de mort à son encontre. Sonko a été acquitté des menaces de mort, mais les accusations de viol ont été requalifiées en accusations de « corruption de la jeunesse ».

  Est venu se greffer à cette condamnation l’arrestation de Sonko le 31 juillet 2023 et la dissolution de son parti politique, le PASTEF (Patriotes africains du Sénégal pour le travail, l’éthique et la fraternité).

  Les manifestations sont animées par le sentiment que leur leader fait l’objet de persécutions et que les affaires pour lesquelles il a été condamné ne servent qu’à l’empêcher de participer aux prochaines élections. La principale revendication des manifestant est la libération de leur leader et des personnes illégalement détenus.

  Face aux manifestations le gouvernement a opté pour la répression. En effet les autorités considèrent qu’elles font face à des actes de défiance de l’Etat et ont appelé les forces de sécurité à faire usage de la force.

  La répression s’est soldée par la mort de plus de 30 personnes et de plus 600 blessés depuis mars 2021, quand les premières repressions ont commencé. En plus de ces pertes en vies humaines et de blessés on dénombre aujourd’hui plus de 700 personnes arrêtées et croupissent dans les prisons du Sénégal. Nous avons aussi noté l’arrestation de journalistes mais aussi de coupure de signal de chaines de télévisions et de restriction de certaines d’internet.

  Comment la société civile sénégalaise, y compris la RADDHO, travaille-t-elle à la défense des droits humains ?

  La RADDHO travaille au niveau national en aidant les victimes de violations de droits humains, et mène des activités de sensibilisation, d’éducation aux droits humains et de renforcement de capacités.

  La RADDHO collabore avec les mécanismes régionaux et internationaux, notamment la Commission africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples, le Comité Africain des Experts sur les Droits et le Bien-être de l’Enfant, la Cour Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples et le Conseil des Droits de l’Homme des Nations Unies. A cet effet elle mène plusieurs activités de vulgarisations des Instruments juridiques de protection et de promotion des droits humains. En tant que membre observateur de la Commission Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples, elle participe régulièrement aux forums de la société civile lors des sessions de celle-ci. Également la RADDHO coordonne la coalition des OSC pour le suivi et la mise en œuvre des recommandations de l’Examen Périodique Universel des Nations unies pour le Sénégal.

  Quel soutien international la société civile sénégalaise reçoit-elle et de quel soutien supplémentaire aurait-elle besoin ?

  Dans le cadre de leurs missions, les OSC sénégalaise reçoivent des appuis de la part d’institutions internationales telles que l’Union Européenne, les agences de coopération bilatérale des États-Unis et de la Suède, USAID et SIDA, et des organisations et fondations tels qu’Oxfam NOVIB des Pays Bays, le NED des États-Unis, la NID de l’Inde et la Fondation Ford, entre autres. Cependant, du fait que le Sénégal a longtemps été considéré comme un pays stable, l’appui reste insuffisant.

  Compte tenu des restrictions de l’espace civique constatées depuis quelques années et de la crise politique, la société civile a besoin d’être soutenue pour mieux assister les victimes de violations de droits humains, pour contribuer à l’avènement d’une véritable culture des droits humains, et pour travailler à l’élargissement de l’espace civique et le renforcement de l’Etat de droit, de la démocratie et de la bonne gouvernance.

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  L’espace civique au Sénégal est classé « entravé » par leCIVICUS Monitor.

  Contactez la RADDHOsur sonsite web ou sa pageFacebook, et suivez@Raddho_Africa sur Twitter.

• SENEGAL: ‘After being an example of democracy in Africa, we are increasingly tending towards authoritarianism’

  CIVICUS speaks with Abdou Aziz Cissé, Advocacy Officer at AfricTivistes, about President Macky Sall’s decision to postpone the presidential election that was due on 25 February and its implications for democracy in Senegal.

  AfricTivistes is a pan-African civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes and defends democratic values, human rights and good governance through civic tech. It aims to empower African people to become active players in building their societies and holding their governments to account.

  Why did President Sall postpone the 25 February presidential election?

  This latest crisis in Senegal began with a solemn address by President Sall on 3 February, the day before the planned day for the start of the campaign for the 25 February election, in which his successor was to be elected. He repealed the decree convening the electoral body, which had set the presidential election for 25 February.

  He cited three reasons: a supposed institutional crisis between the National Assembly and the Constitutional Council concerning an alleged case of corruption of judges, the need to set up a parliamentary commission to investigate suspected irregularities in the process of verifying sponsorships for the election and the revelation that one of the candidates vetted by the Constitutional Council has dual nationality.

  It should be noted that Karim Wade, son of former president Abdoulaye Wade and candidate for the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), was not on the final list of candidates for the presidential election announced on 20 January. To contest this decision by the Constitutional Council, PDS members of parliament called for the creation of a parliamentary commission of enquiry to shed light on the process of candidacy verification. They also accused two Constitutional Council magistrates of corruption. Parliament approved the establishment of this commission on 31 January.

  On 5 February, a bill to postpone the presidential election until 15 December was passed after opposition legislators were ejected from parliament by security forces. It should be remembered that on 3 July 2023, after stating that he would not seek a third term in office, Sall promised to hand over power on 2 April following free, inclusive and transparent elections.

  Why has this decision been described as a ‘constitutional coup’?

  Sall’s actions have been described as a constitutional coup because he is not allowed to interrupt an electoral process that has already begun. The postponement of an election is the exclusive prerogative of the Constitutional Council.

  Sall’s decision also violates other articles of the constitution, notably article 27, which provides for a five-year presidential term and a limit of two consecutive terms, which means the president cannot extend his term of office. There is also article 103, which states that ‘the republican form of the state, the method of election, the duration and number of consecutive terms of office of the President of the Republic may not be revised’.

  I would like to emphasise that in accordance with article 52 of the constitution, the president can only interrupt the process ‘when the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity of the national territory or the fulfilment of international commitments are threatened in a serious and immediate manner’. However, all institutions of the republic were operating regularly. The establishment of a parliamentary commission of enquiry and the passage of a bill clearly proved it.

  By making this illegal decision, Sall became the first president in Senegal’s history not to organise a presidential election on its due date since 1963.

  What has the reaction of civil society been?

  The reaction of civil society was spontaneous. Several CSOs, including AfricTivistes, condemned this anti-democratic act in press releases and media statements. The nation’s other driving forces, such as trade unions from all professions, also voiced their disagreement.

  On social networks, citizens shared their indignation, internationalising their anger at the decision.

  On 4 February, 19 candidates held a press conference, joined by members of civil society, to reaffirm their willingness to campaign together.

  Another demonstration was declared for 5 February, the day of the parliamentary vote, but could not take place because all the strategic roads leading to the National Assembly were cordoned off. Since June 2023, the administrative authorities have systematically banned demonstrations, even peaceful ones.

  The ‘Aar Sunu Election’ (‘Let’s protect our election’) platform brought together more than a hundred CSOs to reject the postponement of the election. The pressure paid off, because on the evening of 15 February, the Constitutional Council declared the presidential decree of 3 February and the law passed by the National Assembly on 5 February invalid.

  How has the government reacted?

  The government began by cracking down on the demonstrations that took place on 4 February, the day after the president’s announcement and the day on which the election campaign was due to begin. Censorship was also imposed that day, with the internet via mobile data cut off, according to the minister in charge, to stop ‘the dissemination of hateful and subversive messages’. The same reasons had been provided to justify acts of internet censorship in June, July and August 2023. Mobile data was restored on 7 February, then restricted to specific time slots on 13 February.

  Internet blackouts and other forms of online restrictions violate the constitution and several international conventions ratified by Senegal. They are violations of freedom of expression, access to information and economic freedoms. According to Senegalese telecoms unions, censorship has caused losses amounting to 3 billion CFA francs (approx. US$ 4.9 million).

  With this in mind, AfricTivistes and two Senegalese journalists are taking the state of Senegal to the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States, the regional organisation, to seek an end to untimely cuts in mobile internet data.

  In addition, the licence of the Walfadjri television station was suspended at the height of the protests following the announcement of the postponement of the election. Walfadjri has been subjected to a relentless attack by the authorities. Its signal was restored on 11 February.

  On 9 February, a peaceful rally held by numerous organisations on the Place de la Nation in Dakar was dispersed by the police. People mobilised throughout the country, particularly in the northern city of Saint-Louis. Peaceful protesters were violently repressed with disproportionate use of force, resulting in three deaths and several people injured, some of whom were not even taking part in demonstrations, along with over 200 arrests.

  The press was also prevented from covering the demonstrations and providing people with fair and accurate information. Journalists, most of them women, were teargassed, arrested and roughed up in the same way as protesters. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, at least 25 journalists were attacked, detained or teargassed during the demonstrations. Journalist Absa Anne, of the news website Seneweb, was dragged into a police vehicle and beaten unconscious, becoming a symbol of the indiscriminate crackdown on the press that took place that day.

  A silent march announced by the ‘Let’s protect our election’ platform was banned on 13 February by the administrative authorities. However, another march on 17 February was authorised, and people came together in huge numbers to enjoy their long-threatened constitutional freedoms. This national moment of communion was proof that when authorised by the administrative authorities, demonstrations go off peacefully.

  How do you see the future of democracy in Senegal?

  After being an example of democracy and political stability in Africa, with peaceful democratic alternation in power in 2000 and 2012, Senegal is increasingly tending towards authoritarianism, symbolised by the restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms.

  Even if the release, since 15 February, of more than 600 political detainees arrested for crimes of opinion or belonging to the opposition is helping to ease the political climate, the crisis that we are currently experiencing does not augur a bright future for Senegalese democracy.

  But I am optimistic, because even if the political class is engaged in a fierce power struggle, civil society is strong and has a considerable ability to assert itself in all areas of the country’s social life. Not to mention the new force of protest that has emerged with the advent of civic technologies. Social media amplifies citizens’ voices and gives them an international dimension, hence the moves by the authorities to try to silence the voices that express themselves through online tools.

  Senegal also has strong justice and administrative systems, which have always played their role as a counterweight. We must also take into account that, like all democratic systems, Senegal’s needs to be perfected. It has made significant progress, albeit with ups and downs like those we are currently experiencing. And we must bear in mind that it is from crises that opportunities emerge.

  What should the international community do to help solve this crisis?

  The international community can play an important role in supporting a transparent and fair democratic process by sending election observation missions.

  As well as supporting civil society, international partners can exert diplomatic pressure, as Antony Blinken, the US Secretary of State, Joseph Borell, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights have done, calling for independent investigations to shed light on the killings of protesters. All this goodwill can help to encourage an inclusive dialogue. This could foster a search for consensual solutions.

  The international community must condemn all political violence and reiterate the importance of respecting fundamental human rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of peaceful assembly.

  How do you assess the state of democracy in West Africa, and how is AfricTivistes working to help activists in countries affected by coups?

  Over the past three years democracy in the region has declined. Between 2020 and 2022, West Africa experienced five coups against a backdrop of terrorism in the Sahel and anti-imperialist rhetoric. Civil society plays a crucial role in shaping democracy, but civic space is stifled in countries where the military has taken over.

  However, each country has its own historical and political dynamics. Democratic trends vary considerably depending on historical, cultural and socio-economic factors. Countries that have succeeded in implementing institutional reforms to combat corruption have generally seen the quality of their democracy improve, as seen in Cabo Verde, West Africa’s champion of good governance.

  Several countries have maintained relative political stability, such as Senegal before the latest developments. The last country to hold a presidential election was Côte d’Ivoire, following post-election incidents and the violation of the Ivorian constitution, which also limits the number of presidential terms to two.

  With a large community enabling us to internationalise our advocacy, AfricTivistes provides moral support to democracy activists by publishing press releases to point out the illegality of their arrest and censorship.

  We also provide them with technical support so they can circumvent the censorship they face in their countries. To date, we have supported seven democracy activists and journalists in danger.

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  Civic space in Senegal is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with AfricTivistes through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@afric_tivistes and@frican_excellency on Instagram and@AFRICTIVISTES and@AbdouJCisse on Twitter.

• SENEGAL: ‘The restriction of civic space remains civil society’s greatest concern’

  CIVICUS speaks with Malick Ndome, senior policy adviser and board member at the Council of Non-Governmental Organisations in Support of Development (CONGAD), about the recent election in Senegal.

  CONGAD was founded in 1982 by civil society organisations (CSOs) working in Senegal to coordinate relations with the state and other partners. CONGAD provides training for CSOs, local authorities and the media. It also advocates for a stronger civil society capable of influencing public policy.

  What was the significance of the victory of opposition candidate Bassirou Diomaye Faye in the recent presidential election?

  Faye’s first-round victory was difficult to predict. However, it is important to recognise the impact of his release from prison, as well as that of Ousmane Sonko, the leader of his party, Senegal’s Patriots (PASTEF), just 10 days before the election.

  Sonko had been barred from standing following a controversial conviction for youth corruption and defamation in 2023. Faye was nominated as a candidate in his place, but was also sent to prison for criticising the court’s decision in the Sonko case. Their release galvanised the support of PASTEF supporters and activists, and young people in general, who appreciated their message of change and their anti-corruption aura. In contrast, there seems to have been a noticeable lack of enthusiasm for the government coalition.

  In addition, there was much speculation and a lot of rumours about President Macky Sall’s lack of support for his party’s presidential candidate, which undoubtedly influenced the electoral landscape.

  Given the circumstances, the clear victory of an opposition candidate has profound implications for the strength of Senegalese democracy. First, it signifies a strengthened commitment to the rule of law, guaranteeing every Senegalese citizen a fair chance of access to the highest office. It also demonstrates the resilience of Senegal’s electoral institutions in the face of challenges. Further, despite persistent concerns about voter turnout, Senegalese citizens demonstrated a commendable level of confidence in electoral processes, underlining their commitment to democratic principles. Voter turnout was 61 per cent.

  This provides an opportunity for a comprehensive review of the electoral law and the electoral code, with a focus on correcting the main shortcomings identified by political stakeholders and civil society. It is imperative to review the role and effectiveness of institutions such as the National Autonomous Electoral Commission in overseeing elections, ensuring that it has the resources and capacity to fulfil its mandate impartially and effectively.

  In sum, while Faye’s victory may have been unexpected, it marks a crucial moment in Senegal’s democratic journey, highlighting both strengths and areas for improvement in its political system.

  Was civic space restricted before the election? What challenges did this pose and what can be expected in the future?

  Significant restrictions were observed in February, when Sall’s announcement of the postponement of the election led to violent demonstrations and deaths. The Constitutional Council’s positive response in favour of holding the election helped ease tensions, leading to the lifting of the suspension of TikTok and the restriction of Facebook, which had an impact on digital industries and small-scale workers in the informal sector.

  The restriction of civic space has been strongly criticised by various groups and people. Under the new government, we expect to see restrictions on civic space lifted, but I can’t prejudge that. It remains a strong demand from civil society and the political arena.

  How did civil society contribute to a free and fair election?

  Civil society’s actions were analysed and perceived differently depending on whether you were in the opposition or the presidential camp. There were many citizens’ initiatives to ensure that the electoral timetable was respected and free and transparent elections were held.

  Civil society initiatives included the setting up of digital platforms to facilitate communication and citizen mobilisation. Civil society formed groups to voice citizens’ concerns and influence political decisions. It organised forums to raise awareness and mobilise the population to ensure the electoral timetable was respected and the election was transparent.

  In addition, civil society organised meetings with presidential candidates to ask them questions and hear their proposals. It also helped to inform the public by publishing press articles and sharing information on electoral issues.

  In addition, civil society interacted with stakeholders in sensitive spheres such as religious leaders to promote a climate of peace and stability during the election period. It also facilitated the hosting and coordination of the local, regional and sub-regional structures responsible for overseeing the election, thus ensuring effective and transparent monitoring of the electoral process.

  What are civil society’s expectations of the new government?

  Civil society has a number of expectations and is advocating several policy measures to protect civic space and human rights and promote good governance.

  According to the information available to me, there has not yet been any formal request from civil society. However, it is clear that the restriction of civic space remains civil society’s greatest concern.

  Among the political measures advocated are the passing of a press code to provide a better framework for the exercise of journalism and the publication of implementing decrees, as well as the revision of article 80 of the Constitution concerning offences against the head of state. Civil society is also calling for the adoption of a law to protect whistleblowers and human rights defenders, as well as the publication of reports by the Court of Audit and the prosecution of offenders.

  Civil society calls for institutional change in the governance of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, and for the establishment of a financial prosecutor’s office with broad responsibilities.

  Finally, the fight against corruption and for better governance is a major concern for civil society, which hopes that the new government will take effective measures in this direction.

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  Civic space in Senegal is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with CONGAD through itswebsite.

• SENEGAL: ‘The situation is becoming more tense as we approach the 2024 elections’

  CIVICUS speaks about the deterioration of civic space in the run-up to next year’s elections in Senegal with Sadikh Niass, Secretary General of the African Meeting for the Defence of Human Rights (Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme,RADDHO), andIba Sarr, Director of Programmes at RADDHO.

  RADDHO is a national civil society organisation (CSO) based in Dakar, Senegal. It works for the protection and promotion of human rights at the national, regional and international levels through research, analysis and advocacy aimed at providing early warning and preventing conflict.

  What are the conditions for civil society in Senegal?

  Senegalese civil society remains very active but faces a number of difficulties linked to the restriction of civic space. It is subjected to many verbal attacks by lobbies close to the government, which consider them to be opponents or promoters of ‘counter-values’ such as homosexuality. It is also confronted with restrictions on freedom of assembly. Civil society works in difficult conditions with few financial and material resources. Human rights organisations receive no financial support from the state.

  The situation is becoming more tense as we approach the February 2024 elections. Since March 2021, the most radical opposition and the government have opted for confrontation. The government is trying to weaken the opposition by reducing it to a minimum. It is particularly targeting the most dynamic opposition group, the Yewi Askan Wi (‘Liberate the People’) coalition, whose main leader, Ousmane Sonko, is currently in detention.

  All opposition demonstrations are systematically banned. Spontaneous demonstrations are violently repressed and result in arrests. The judiciary was instrumentalised to prevent the candidacy of the main opponent to the regime, Sonko, and the main leaders of his party have been arrested.

  In recent years, we have also seen an upsurge in verbal, physical and legal threats against journalists, which is a real setback for the right to freedom of information.

  What will be at stake in the 2024 presidential election?

  With the discovery of oil and gas, Senegal is becoming an attractive destination for investors. Transparent management of these resources remains a challenge in a context marked by an upsurge in terrorist acts. Poverty-stricken populations see this discovery as a means of improving their standard of living. With the breakthrough of the opposition in the 2022 local and legislative elections, we sense that the electorate is increasingly expressing its desire for transparency, justice and improved socio-economic conditions.

  On 3 July 2023, the incumbent president declared that he would not compete in the next elections. This declaration could offer a glimmer of hope for a free and transparent election. But the fact that the state is being tempted to prevent leading opposition figures from running poses a major risk of the country descending into turbulence.

  Civil society remains alert and is working to ensure that the 2024 elections are inclusive, free and transparent. To this end, it has stepped up its efforts to promote dialogue among political players. CSOs are also working through several platforms to support the authorities in organising peaceful elections by monitoring the process before, during and after the poll.

  What triggered the recent demonstrations? What are the protesters’ demands and how has the government responded?

  The recent protests were triggered by Sonko’s sentencing to two years in prison on 1 June 2023. On that day, a court ruled on the so-called ‘Sweet Beauty’ case, in which a young woman working in a massage parlour accused Sonko of raping her and making death threats against her. Sonko was acquitted of the death threats, but the rape charges were reclassified as ‘corruption of youth’.

  This conviction was compounded by Sonko’s arrest on 31 July 2023 and the dissolution of his political party, PASTEF – short for ‘Senegalese African patriots for work, ethics and fraternity’ in French.

  Protesters are driven by the feeling that their leader is being persecuted and that the cases for which he has been convicted only serve to prevent him taking part in the forthcoming elections. Their main demand is the release of their leader and those illegally detained.

  Faced with these demonstrations, the government has opted for repression. The authorities consider that they are facing acts of defiance towards the state and have called on the security forces to use force.

  Repression has resulted in the deaths of more than 30 people and more than 600 injured since March 2021, when the repression first began. In addition to the loss of life and injuries, more than 700 people have been arrested and are languishing in Senegal’s prisons. We have also noted the arrest of journalists, as well as the interruption of television signals and the restriction of some internet services.

  How is Senegalese civil society, including RADDHO, working to defend human rights?

  RADDHO works at the national level to help victims of human rights violations and carries out awareness-raising, human rights education and capacity-building activities.

  RADDHO collaborates with regional and international mechanisms, notably the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Council. To this end, we carry out a number of activities to raise awareness of legal instruments for the protection and promotion of human rights. As an observer member of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, we regularly participate in civil society forums during the Commission’s sessions. RADDHO also coordinates the CSO coalition for the follow-up and implementation of the recommendations of the United Nations Universal Periodic Review for Senegal.

  What international support is Senegalese civil society receiving and what additional support would it need?

  To fulfil their missions, Senegalese CSOs receive support from international institutions such as the European Union, the bilateral cooperation agencies of the USA and Sweden, USAID and SIDA, and organisations and foundations such as Oxfam NOVIB in the Netherlands, NED in the United States, NID in India and the Ford Foundation, among others. However, because Senegal has long been considered a stable country, support remains insufficient.

  Given the growing restrictions on civic space of recent years and the political crisis, civil society needs support to better assist victims of human rights violations, to contribute to the emergence of a genuine human rights culture and to work towards widening civic space and strengthening the rule of law, democracy and good governance.

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  Civic space in Senegal is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with RADDHOthrough itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@Raddho_Africa on Twitter.

• Senegal’s Democracy Passes Crucial Test

  By Ines Pousadela, CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report

  The fact that Senegal’s election took place on 24 March was in itself a triumph for civil society. That an opposition candidate, campaigning on an anti-establishment and anti-corruption agenda, emerged from jail to become the continent’s youngest leader offered fresh hope for democracy.

  It wasn’t foretold. On 3 February, just as the campaign for the election scheduled for 25 February was to start, President Macky Sall announced he’d postponed the vote. Two days later, in a chaotic session during which security forces forced out opposition lawmakers who tried to block proceedings, parliament voted to postpone the presidential election until 15 December. Civil society saw this as a constitutional coup, since only Senegal’s Constitutional Council has the authority to postpone an election.

  Read on Inter Press Service

• SERBIA: ‘People are concerned that a critical tool to hold political elites accountable is being taken away’

  CIVICUS speaks about the results of Serbia’s recent elections and subsequent protests with Raša Nedeljkov, Programme Director of the Centre for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA).

  Founded in 2002, CRTA is a Serbian civil society organisation that works to develop a democratic culture and promote civic activism through civic education campaigns, electoral observation and the development of public policy proposals.

   

  What are civil society’s concerns about the recent Serbian elections?

  The most critical concerns revolve around the municipal elections in Serbia’s capital, Belgrade. CRTA has concluded that the announced results didn’t reflect the freely expressed will of the city’s voters. Our findings revealed that electoral engineering, particularly through organised voter migration, crucially influenced the outcome of the closely contested race for the Belgrade City Assembly.

  Organised voter migration is neither legal nor legitimate. Falsely registering residence for the purpose of voting in local elections outside one’s jurisdiction violates the law, undermines democratic representation and violates citizens’ right to local self-government.

  Local elections were strategically staggered and held in only a third of the local jurisdictions to enable temporary voter migration and secure the victory of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SPP) in Belgrade, where the opposition Serbia Against Violence party had strong chances of winning. As a result, Belgrade is now on the verge of being governed by people largely elected by non-residents who won’t bear the consequences of the decisions they make.

  The SPP also gained significant unfair advantage in the parliamentary elections thanks to intensified political pressure on voters, misuse of public resources and institutions, and control of the most influential media. The national election wasn’t nearly fair, but this was overshadowed by the massive manipulation used to prevent political change in Serbia’s largest city.

  How has CRTA worked to document electoral manipulation?

  On election day CRTA deployed almost 3,000 observers and analysts. And for the first time, a CRTA observer team suffered a physical attack. Its members were attacked with bats while sitting in their parked car in the police station courtyard in Odzaci, a town in Vojvodina province. They were there to report criminal activity related to carousel voting – where people go from place to place to cast multiple voters – at a polling station. This case poignantly illustrates the tense atmosphere the elections took place in.

  Our observers had a very dynamic day in Belgrade, the epicentre of electoral irregularities. They took numerous photos and videos showing buses transporting voters to Belgrade from other towns and countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. They also identified several logistical centres used to coordinate the voter migration operation, which directed and transported people to polling stations across the city.

  Voter migration was facilitated by manipulation of the voter register, which our team also extensively documented. Prior to the elections, we received information from various sources pointing to illegal actions by local governing bodies and the highest state authorities, all aimed at shaping election results in Belgrade in favour of the SPP. Further analysis, which we’re currently conducting, indicates that significant alterations to the voter register were made over the course of a year.

  How have people reacted to election irregularities?

  Tens of thousands took to the streets shortly after the results were announced. Protests were sparked by the issues we’ve denounced. Protesters are angry about electoral engineering involving illegal manipulation of the voter register and organised voter migration. They urge the state to protect the integrity of elections by prosecuting those involved in illegal manipulation.

  Protesters are not necessarily supporters of opposition parties but rather citizens concerned that a critical tool to hold political elites accountable and drive change is being taken away from them. Their core demand is that fresh elections be held at all levels, contingent upon significant revisions to electoral conditions.

  How has the government responded to protesters’ demands?

  The government has responded with repression and defensive aggressiveness, denying all allegations, including those from international observers, and disregarding evidence of massive irregularities and criminal activities. The regime continues to assert that the elections were the cleanest ever.

  The government is also violating protesters’ human rights. Over 30 people, primarily university students, have been arrested during the protests and faced pressure to confess to crimes they didn’t commit, such as receiving bribes from the opposition to engage in violent activities during protests.

  Public officials have also accused CRTA of destabilising Serbia, and our staff members have been labelled as liars and subjected to hate speech by pro-regime media.

  What should the international community do?

  We urge the international community to look beyond immediate geopolitical considerations and consider the consequences that could follow if democracy in Serbia continues to erode. Further democratic backsliding would only bring it closer to the non-democratic part of the world.

  Serbian civil society is actively proposing solutions for the challenges of a captured state and diminishing democratic standards, and our international allies should give more serious considerations to these recommendations. The international community must act soon to prevent Serbia becoming an outright dictatorship

  What are civil society’s concerns about the recent Serbian elections?

  The most critical concerns revolve around the municipal elections in Serbia’s capital, Belgrade. CRTA has concluded that the announced results didn’t reflect the freely expressed will of the city’s voters. Our findings revealed that electoral engineering, particularly through organised voter migration, crucially influenced the outcome of the closely contested race for the Belgrade City Assembly.

  Organised voter migration is neither legal nor legitimate. Falsely registering residence for the purpose of voting in local elections outside one’s jurisdiction violates the law, undermines democratic representation and violates citizens’ right to local self-government.

  Local elections were strategically staggered and held in only a third of the local jurisdictions to enable temporary voter migration and secure the victory of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SPP) in Belgrade, where the opposition Serbia Against Violence party had strong chances of winning. As a result, Belgrade is now on the verge of being governed by people largely elected by non-residents who won’t bear the consequences of the decisions they make.

  The SPP also gained significant unfair advantage in the parliamentary elections thanks to intensified political pressure on voters, misuse of public resources and institutions, and control of the most influential media. The national election wasn’t nearly fair, but this was overshadowed by the massive manipulation used to prevent political change in Serbia’s largest city.

  How has CRTA worked to document electoral manipulation?

  On election day CRTA deployed almost 3,000 observers and analysts. And for the first time, a CRTA observer team suffered a physical attack. Its members were attacked with bats while sitting in their parked car in the police station courtyard in Odzaci, a town in Vojvodina province. They were there to report criminal activity related to carousel voting – where people go from place to place to cast multiple voters – at a polling station. This case poignantly illustrates the tense atmosphere the elections took place in.

  Our observers had a very dynamic day in Belgrade, the epicentre of electoral irregularities. They took numerous photos and videos showing buses transporting voters to Belgrade from other towns and countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. They also identified several logistical centres used to coordinate the voter migration operation, which directed and transported people to polling stations across the city.

  Voter migration was facilitated by manipulation of the voter register, which our team also extensively documented. Prior to the elections, we received information from various sources pointing to illegal actions by local governing bodies and the highest state authorities, all aimed at shaping election results in Belgrade in favour of the SPP. Further analysis, which we’re currently conducting, indicates that significant alterations to the voter register were made over the course of a year.

  How have people reacted to election irregularities?

  Tens of thousands took to the streets shortly after the results were announced. Protests were sparked by the issues we’ve denounced. Protesters are angry about electoral engineering involving illegal manipulation of the voter register and organised voter migration. They urge the state to protect the integrity of elections by prosecuting those involved in illegal manipulation.

  Protesters are not necessarily supporters of opposition parties but rather citizens concerned that a critical tool to hold political elites accountable and drive change is being taken away from them. Their core demand is that fresh elections be held at all levels, contingent upon significant revisions to electoral conditions.

  How has the government responded to protesters’ demands?

  The government has responded with repression and defensive aggressiveness, denying all allegations, including those from international observers, and disregarding evidence of massive irregularities and criminal activities. The regime continues to assert that the elections were the cleanest ever.

  The government is also violating protesters’ human rights. Over 30 people, primarily university students, have been arrested during the protests and faced pressure to confess to crimes they didn’t commit, such as receiving bribes from the opposition to engage in violent activities during protests.

  Public officials have also accused CRTA of destabilising Serbia, and our staff members have been labelled as liars and subjected to hate speech by pro-regime media.

  What should the international community do?

  We urge the international community to look beyond immediate geopolitical considerations and consider the consequences that could follow if democracy in Serbia continues to erode. Further democratic backsliding would only bring it closer to the non-democratic part of the world.

  Serbian civil society is actively proposing solutions for the challenges of a captured state and diminishing democratic standards, and our international allies should give more serious considerations to these recommendations. The international community must act soon to prevent Serbia becoming an outright dictatorship.

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  Civic space in Serbia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with CRTA through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@CRTArs and@rasaned onTwitter.

• SERBIA: ‘The government is allergic to pluralism and keeps discrediting dissenting voices’

  CIVICUS speaks about Serbia’s upcoming parliamentary elections and civic space conditions withVukosava Crnjanski, founder and director of the Centre for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA).

  Founded in 2002, CRTA is a Serbian civil society organisation (CSO) working to promote civic activism and develop a democratic culture through advocacy, civic education campaigns, electoral observation and the production of public policy proposals.

  What are the conditions for civil society in Serbia?

  The quality of civic space is worsening. In essence, the government is allergic to pluralism and keeps discrediting dissenting voices. Serbian CSOs face great pressure from pro-government media, particularly popular newspapers, which brand them as ‘mercenaries’ and ‘traitors’.

  On top of this chronic situation, the situation has at times greatly escalated. In acute phases, the oppression of civil society intensifies because the government seeks to divert public attention from pressing issues that it wants to conceal. For instance, in the summer of 2020 the Ministry of Finance initiated a campaign against several CSOs, independent journalists’ associations and activists. Harassment took the form of financial scrutiny, imposed under unfounded allegations of their involvement in money laundering and connections with terrorism. A year later, the targeted people and organisations asked that the ministry disclose the results of this inquiry to dispel those accusations – but of course, the results were never made public.

  What prompted the decision to call early elections?

  President Aleksandar Vučić has called early parliamentary elections, to be held on 17 December. He attempted to present this as a response to the opposition’s call for snap elections, a demand that arose when none of the requests of protests held under the motto ‘Serbia Against the Violence‘ were addressed. This movement has been going on for months throughout the country, following two mass shootings in early May that left 17 people dead and 21 injured.

  Vučić thrives in the campaigning phase of politics and in a political environment in which the normal functioning of institutions remains on hold. This has often happened following elections: in the past 11 years, a total of two years, four months and four days have been wasted between calls for elections and the approval of new governments. The president systematically benefits from situations of instability in which he is perceived as the sole stabilising factor.

  What are the main campaign issues?

  The ruling party’s key campaign message is that ‘Serbia Must Not Stop’, implying that any change would halt the country’s development. For over a decade, Vučić’s propaganda has pushed a narrative of Serbia’s alleged economic growth. It’s supported by an enormous media machinery that uses manipulative tactics and constantly calls Serbia ‘the Balkans’ tiger’, repeatedly mentioning ‘new jobs’, ‘foreign investments’ and having the ‘biggest’ infrastructure projects. This blurs the vision of some people, although most can definitely see the emptiness of their wallets.

  The pro-European opposition aims to articulate the rejection of structural violence into an electoral agenda, pledging to free the state from the dominance of a single party. Meanwhile, right-wing nationalist parties commit to ‘save Kosovo’ and strengthen ties with Russia. The new slogan of the Serbian Radical Party, of which Vučić was a prominent official in the 1990s, is ‘Our Fatherland Is Serbia, Our Mother Is Russia’.

  Relations with Kosovo and the imposition of sanctions on Russia stand out as critical issues and their significance is likely to grow. Yet there’s no substantive debate on these matters, which is confusing. The government tries to monopolise these topics, strictly controlling their discussion in the public sphere and labelling anyone else raising them as traitors. It aims to keep these matters opaque to the public, treating them as exclusive realms of backroom politics.

  I assume that the ideologically diverse pro-European opposition will try to avoid these topics out of fear that discussing them will make them an easy target. This decision may also be influenced by opinion polls that indicate that voters are a lot more interested in other topics, namely the economy and corruption.

  How is Serbian civil society, including CRTA, involved in the electoral process?

  As usual, CRTA is actively engaged in the electoral process. Our observation mission is already active across Serbia, monitoring media reporting and campaign activities on the ground and reviewing the work of the electoral institution. We are paying special attention to the problem of pressure on voters. As research we have been conducting for over a year now shows, a large number of people are captured in a network of clientelism and electoral corruption. People from socially vulnerable groups and public sector employees are continuously pressured to give their support to a political party. 

  In addition to monitoring the snap parliamentary elections, we are also observing the municipal elections in the capital, Belgrade.

  The quality of Serbian electoral processes has been deteriorating for years and there is little reason to believe that issues such as biased media, the abuse of public resources and the misuse of public office will magically disappear. However, we are actively working to motivate citizens to vote, and many other CSOs are also about to launch their ‘Get Out the Vote’ campaigns. Whatever problems the electoral process has, increased participation will make things better.

  We hope that the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights will deploy an election observation mission in a full capacity, as recommended by a prior needs assessment mission. This kind of international support is crucial not only on election day but also to boost our advocacy to achieve improvements in the electoral process.

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  Civic space in Serbia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with CRTA through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@CRTArs andVukosava Crnjanski onTwitter.

• SERBIA: ‘We live in a system that’s allergic to pluralism, with a government hostile to critical voices’

  CIVICUS discusses recent local elections in Serbia with Tamara Branković, deputy program director at the Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA). CRTA is an independent, non-partisan civil society organisation working to develop democratic culture and civic activism in Serbia.

  In Serbia’s 2 June local elections, the coalition led by President AleksandarVučić’snationalistSerbian Progressive Party won in the two largest cities, including the capital, Belgrade, where the polls were a rerun of a December election found by international observers to have serious irregularities, and which sparked months of protests. In Belgrade’s rerun, a new centre-right group came second and the left-wing greens third. This time, the elections appeared to be cleaner, but competitiveness was limited as the ruling party misused state resources to favour its candidates.

  Why did the ruling coalition win in the local elections?

  We only observed the elections for the Assembly of the City of Belgrade, but I believe our conclusion also applies to other local elections that took place on 2 June.

  It should be noted that the election in Belgrade was a rerun of last December’s election, which, as CRTA proved, was severely compromised by illegal and illegitimate electoral engineering, mainly through organised voter migration. The June election was the second, less bad half of an extremely dirty match.

  The campaign didn’t feel like a campaign for local elections but rather for national elections. The dominant political force, with President Aleksandar Vučić at its head, placed what it called issues of ‘national survival’ at the top of the agenda, charging the atmosphere with hardcore nationalist sentiments.

  This was further fuelled by a vote just a few days before the election in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on a resolution on genocide in Srebrenica. It drove an unparalleled propaganda surge, presented as a dignified national defence against a hostile west allegedly attempting to put a label of collective guilt on Serbian people.

  When I refer to the dominant political force, I mean not only the ruling Serbian Progressive Party but also state officials, because the line between the ruling party and the state has increasingly blurred, which is a key explanation of the election results. Political clientelism and pressures on voters contributed significantly to the ruling party’s victory.

  What role did civil society play in the elections, and what challenges did you face?

  Our role was to try to rescue what could be saved of the integrity of the electoral process. We tried to inform and educate citizens about their electoral rights and the ways those rights were being manipulated and abused. We sought to mobilise citizens to report any violations they saw to our observation mission. And most importantly, we tried to recruit and train enough citizen observers so we could get a full picture of the quality of elections. It was a large operation that lasted from April to June, involving 1,500 people.

  But we live in a system that’s allergic to pluralism. Our government is hostile to critical voices, so the space for civil society is constantly shrinking. We need our international friends to be aware of this and spread the word that democracy in Serbia is in danger.

  What other concerning trends did you see?

  Unfortunately, we’ve seen a growth of several negative trends. We witnessed a record number of cases of vote buying and numerous tense situations that approached or crossed the line into violence. All the chronic problems that have devalued elections for many years continued to grow, from people’s distrust of the voters’ register and extremely unequal media access for candidates, to abuse of state institutions and public resources, unscrupulous pressure on voters and deteriorating conditions for election observation.

  Since the December 2023 elections, a number of international voices have spoken out about the situation in Serbia. The UN Human Rights Committee issued a strong rebuke, criticising the Serbian authorities for their opaque handling of election violations. Various UN human rights experts reported serious state attacks on election observers, civil society and the media and asked for clarifications from the Serbian government, but barely received a response.

  These problems remain unresolved because of state capture. State institutions are subordinated to party interests, and the party in power shows no political will to change this situation.

  ---

   Civic space in Serbia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with CRTA through itswebsite, and follow@CRTArs and@nemaperspektive on Twitter.

• SERBIE : « La crise politique va s’approfondir parce qu’une grande partie des citoyens n’est pas représentée »

  CIVICUS s’entretient avec Ivana Teofilović sur les causes des récentes manifestations et la réaction du gouvernement à celles-ci, ainsi que sur les élections tenues en Serbie pendant la pandémie de la COVID-19. Ivana est coordinatrice du programme de politique publique à Civic Initiatives, une association de citoyens serbes qui vise à renforcer la société civile par l’éducation civique, la promotion des valeurs et des pratiques démocratiques et la création d’opportunités de participation citoyenne.

• SIERRA LEONE: ‘Civil society plays a crucial role in ensuring free and fair elections’

  CIVICUS speaks about Sierra Leone’s 24 June general election with John Caulker, founder and executive director of Fambul Tok.

  Founded in 2007, Fambul Tok (‘Family Talk’ in Krio language) is a civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes peace, restorative justice and community building in post-civil war Sierra Leone.

  What’s at stake in the 2023 general election?

  For many Sierra-Leonean voters, the most pressing concerns revolve around the economy. In his first term in office, President Julius Maada Bio of the Sierra Leone People’s Party, who has just won re-election, allocated 21 per cent of the government budget to support education, positioning himself as a champion of human capital investment. In his second presidential campaign, Bio expressed a commitment to overhaul Sierra Leone’s agricultural sector, believing it will lead to an economic turnaround.

  Bio’s supporters believe that the global economic crisis is the main reason for the current financial predicament in Sierra Leone. But Sierra Leone’s economic instability started a lot earlier, with the outbreak of Ebola in 2014, and subsequently deteriorated further with the decline in iron ore mine prices on the global market, the COVID-19 pandemic and the war between Russia and Ukraine. Inflation is in double digits, its highest level in almost two decades.

  The main opposition party, All People Congress, nominated the same candidate, Samura Kamara, who previously lost the presidential election in 2018. Kamara, who is an economist, pledged to revive Sierra Leone’s struggling economy and promote national unity.

  Both President Bio and Samura Kamara have significant support throughout Sierra Leone, while other candidates hoped that public dissatisfaction with the economy would turn votes against the two major parties.

  In addition to selecting a president, voters also elected new lawmakers, mayors and councillors.

  What changes have been introduced to the electoral law?

  As a result of a 2022 electoral reform, Sierra Leone now uses a proportional system for allocating parliamentary seats. The president decided to adopt this system to avoid by-elections and increase women’s representation, which can be done through legislative quotas when using party lists. The change was judicially challenged, leading to a landmark Supreme Court ruling that upheld the proportional representation system.

  Some people believe that by adopting party lists and using multi-member districts, the proportional system takes away their right to choose representatives directly and hands that power over to political parties. Chernor Maju Bah, the leader of the parliamentary opposition, expressed concerns regarding the limited timeframe for educating the public about the intricacies of the new system and argued that more time was necessary to ensure a smooth transition.

  Have fundamental civic and democratic freedoms been respected during the election process?

  In recent years Sierra Leone has made progress towards safeguarding and upholding freedoms of expression and association in line with its constitution and international human rights standards. However, the situation has varied over time and challenges have arisen in some instances. For example, ahead of the election the Political Parties Regulation Commission imposed a ban on all street rallies organised by political parties. Many viewed this as an infringement of their right to peaceful assembly. However, political parties were still able to gather peacefully in public spaces such as stadiums, large fields and town halls. The use of social media is also subject to limitations and regulations outlined in the Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act of 2021. Some arrests have been made for violations of this law.

  Sierra Leone has also made significant steps to improve its electoral processes and ensure a transparent, democratic and inclusive political system. Civil society plays a crucial role in ensuring free and fair elections by promoting voter education, monitoring the electoral process and advocating for electoral reforms. Both the government and civil society have made considerable investments to ensure that citizens are well-informed about their rights, the electoral process and the importance of participating in elections, thereby creating a more knowledgeable and engaged electorate.

  Sierra Leone has also welcomed international election observers from various organisations and institutions, who provided an impartial assessment and promoted transparency. Moreover, political parties have collectively agreed to abide by a Code of Conduct setting out guidelines for ethical campaigning and peaceful behaviour during elections, encouraging parties to uphold democratic principles and discouraging any form of violence or intimidation.

  How has civil society, including Fambul Tok, engaged in the election process?

  CSOs have been vigilant and expressed concern over increasing ethnic-based campaigns, hate speech and unrest. These are viewed by civil society as early warning signs of conflict and election-related violence.

  Although Sierra Leone has made progress in holding generally peaceful and credible elections, there have been isolated incidents of violence during this election period, including clashes between supporters of different political parties and between opposition supporters and the police, and instances of property destruction such as arson. The opposition also called for public demonstrations following the resignation of the electoral commissioner.

  As a peacebuilding organisation, Fambul Tok is focused on promoting nonviolence and voter education through our community structures and is advocating for a culture of political tolerance. Fambul Tok facilitates stakeholders’ meetings to promote peace and national cohesion and avoid malice and violence despite political differences. This has promoted peaceful and inclusive political dialogue, raised awareness about electoral misconduct and ensured that appropriate measures are in place to prevent and address electoral violence, intimidation and any other actions that undermine the integrity of the process.

  What international support is Sierra Leone’s civil society receiving, and what other forms of support would you need?

  International support plays a crucial role in assisting Sierra Leone’s civil society in both the pre-election and post-election phases. Even though funding support for civil society has diminished during these elections, CSOs continue to collaborate with international institutions to uphold the values and principles of democracy.

  International organisations, in partnership with the CSO National Elections Watch, have provided capacity-building training and financial resources to strengthen the skills and knowledge of local CSOs in election monitoring, advocacy, voter education and human rights promotion. This support enhances the effectiveness of civil society in promoting free and fair elections and safeguarding human rights. However, there is also a need for technical resources such as communication tools, data analysis software and logistical support to further enhance the capabilities of civil society.

  In 2018 there was post-election violence throughout society. The international community should support CSOs to engage in post-election peace and cohesion campaigns. This involves encouraging communities to accept the outcome of the electoral process and respect the rights of individuals. Diplomatic missions and human rights organisations should remain engaged in the process and keep advocating for a conducive environment for free and fair elections. They can do this by applying diplomatic pressure, issuing public statements and engaging with national authorities to address concerns related to civic space, human rights and electoral integrity.

  It is crucial that international support is tailored to the specific needs and priorities of Sierra Leone’s civil society, in close consultation and collaboration with local groups. This approach ensures that support is context-specific, sustainable and responsive to challenges on the ground.

  ---

  Civic space in Sierra Leone is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Fambul Tok through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@fambultok onTwitter.

• SINGAPORE: ‘Opposition parties were given unfavourable coverage by the state media and had difficulty accessing voters’

  CIVICUS speaks to human rights defender Jolovan Wham about the recent elections in Singapore, which were held in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. TheCIVICUS Monitor has documented the use of restrictive laws in Singapore against civil society activists, human rights defenders, lawyers, independent online media outlets and members of the political opposition, who face prosecution, including through defamation suits and contempt of court charges.

  

   

  Has there been any disagreement around whether elections should be held, when, or how?

  Yes. Opposition parties were largely against it as the COVID-19 pandemic had not abated and holding the elections might pose a public health threat. They were also concerned that physical rallies and door-to-door visits would be disallowed, which would hinder their campaign efforts.

  And indeed, it was more difficult to connect face to face with voters when a one-metre distance had to be maintained during walkabouts and door-to-door visits. Everyone had to give their speeches and connect with voters online.

  Some changes were introduced so elections would proceed in the context of the pandemic. Voting time was extended by two hours to take the longer queues caused by social distancing into consideration. But the possibility of online voting was not discussed. And older people and those who were frail may have not participated for fear of getting infected with COVID-19.

  What was the state of civic freedoms ahead of the elections?

  The ruling People’s Action Party’s (PAP) control of all public institutions is a major civic freedom issue. It means it gets to shape the political discourse according to its agenda and set the rules of the game to its advantage. For example, the elections department, which draws electoral boundaries, reports to the prime minister himself. Most civil society groups are afraid of engaging in the elections in a meaningful way for fear of being seen as ‘partisan’. If a civil society association is associated with an opposition party, it may lose funding, support and patronage for its work.

  A recent report by the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Parliamentarians for Human Rights documented structural flaws that prevented the election from being fair, including the prime minister’s broad powers over the entire electoral process without any effective oversight. The environment in which the Singaporean people were able to exercise their right to participate in public life was heavily restricted. Key opposition candidates had been targeted with lawsuits by members of the PAP, and voters in opposition-led constituencies fear reprisals for not voting for the PAP. Fundamental freedoms, which are intrinsically linked to free elections, are limited as the government controls the media and uses restrictive laws against dissenting and critical voices.

  How did this affect the chances of the opposition?

  Opposition candidates and parties had to rely solely on social media to get their message out, because of unfavourable coverage by state media. They also had difficulty accessing voters because of the PAP’s monopoly, manipulation and control of national grassroots groups, unions and organisations, on top of the difficulties involved in holding physical rallies in the context of the pandemic.

  The elections were held on 10 July. The PAP secured 83 parliamentary seats but faced a setback as the opposition made minor but historic gains. The Workers’ party, the only opposition party in parliament, increased its seats from six to 10 – the biggest result for the opposition since independence. The PAP popular vote dipped to 61 per cent.

  What were the main issues the campaign revolved around?

  For the PAP, the campaign revolved around smearing opposition candidates, accusing them of peddling falsehoods and of having nefarious agendas and engaging in character assassination. Scaremongering tactics were also used: the electorate were told that only the PAP could get Singaporeans out of the COVID-19 pandemic and that having more opposition members in parliament would thwart these efforts.

  Opposition parties, on the other hand, focused on telling the electorate that they were in danger of being wiped out of parliament as they held fewer than 10 elected seats out of almost 90. Issues such as the high cost of living and immigration were other key issues raised by the opposition.

  Civic space in Singapore is rated as ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

• Singapore: Open letter to parliamentary candidates and political party leaders to prioritise fundamental freedoms

  🇸🇬Singapore: Three civil society organisations call on parliamentary candidates and political party leaders to commit to respecting and protecting human rights, particularly fundamental freedoms, during and after the #SGElection https://t.co/kpDykUxFZw pic.twitter.com/EGyzabme4h

  — CIVICUS (@CIVICUSalliance) July 3, 2020

  As Singaporeans prepare to go to the polls in parliamentary elections on 10 July 2020, the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation and the International Commission of Jurists urge all parliamentary candidates and political party leaders to commit to respecting and protecting human rights, particularly fundamental freedoms, as part of their mandate.

• SINGAPOUR : « Les partis d’opposition ont bénéficié d’une couverture défavorable de la part des médias d’État et ont eu des difficultés à accéder aux électeurs »

  CIVICUS s’entretient avec le défenseur des droits humains Jolovan Wham au sujet des récentes élections à Singapour, qui se sont déroulées sur fond de pandémie de COVID-19. LeCIVICUS Monitor a documenté l’utilisation de lois restrictives contre les activistes de la société civile, les défenseurs des droits humains, les avocats, les médias indépendants en ligne et les membres de l’opposition politique de Singapour, qui risquent d’être poursuivis, notamment par des procès pour diffamation et des accusations d’outrage à la cour.

  Y a-t-il eu des désaccords sur la question de savoir si, quand ou comment les élections doivent être organisées ?

  Oui. Les partis d’opposition s’y sont largement opposés car la pandémie de COVID-19 n’avait pas reculé et la tenue des élections pouvait constituer une menace pour la santé publique. Ils craignaient également que les rassemblements physiques et le démarchage en porte-à-porte ne soient pas autorisés, ce qui entraverait leurs efforts de campagne.

  Et, de fait, il était plus difficile d’établir un contact direct avec les électeurs lorsqu’il était nécessaire de maintenir une distance d’un mètre pendant les marches et les visites en porte-à-porte. Chacun a dû prononcer son discours et se connecter aux électeurs en ligne. Certains changements ont été introduits pour que les élections se déroulent dans le contexte de la pandémie. La période de vote a été prolongée de deux heures en prévision de files d’attente plus longues en raison de la distanciation sociale. Mais il n’a pas été question du vote en ligne. Et il est possible que les personnes âgées ou ayant des problèmes de santé n’aient pas participé par peur d’être infectées par le COVID-19.

  Quel était l’état des libertés civiques avant les élections ?

  Le contrôle du People’s Action Party (PAP) au pouvoir sur toutes les institutions publiques est un problème majeur de liberté civique. Cela signifie qu’il peut façonner le discours politique en fonction de son programme et fixer les règles du jeu à sa convenance. Par exemple, le département électoral, qui dessine les circonscriptions électorales, relève du Premier ministre. La plupart des groupes de la société civile ont peur de s’impliquer de manière significative dans les élections en raison des conséquences d’être perçus comme "partisans". Si une association de la société civile est liée à un parti d’opposition, elle peut perdre le financement, le soutien et les ressources nécessaires à son travail.

  Un récent rapport de l’ASEAN (Association des nations de l’Asie du Sud-Est) Parliamentarians for Human Rights a mis en évidence des failles structurelles qui ont empêché l’élection d’être équitable. Il s’agit notamment des pouvoirs étendus du premier ministre sur l’ensemble du processus électoral, sans qu'aucun contrôle efficace ne soit exercé. Le contexte dans lequel les Singapouriens pouvaient exercer leur droit de participer à la vie publique était sévèrement restreint. Les principaux candidats de l’opposition ont fait l’objet de poursuites judiciaires par des membres du PAP, et les électeurs des districts dirigés par l’opposition craignaient des représailles s’ils ne votaient pas pour le PAP. Les libertés fondamentales, qui sont intrinsèquement liées à l’existence d’élections libres, sont limitées car le gouvernement contrôle les médias et utilise des lois restrictives contre les voix critiques et dissidentes.

  Comment cela a-t-il affecté les chances de l’opposition ?

  Les candidats et les partis de l’opposition ont dû s’appuyer uniquement sur les médias sociaux pour faire passer leur message en raison de la couverture défavorable qu’ils ont reçue de la part des médias d’État. Ils ont également eu des difficultés à atteindre les électeurs en raison du monopole, de la manipulation et du contrôle exercés par le PAP sur les syndicats et les organisations et groupes de base dans tout le pays, auxquels s’ajoutent les difficultés liées à l’organisation de manifestations physiques dans le contexte de la pandémie.

  Les élections ont eu lieu le 10 juillet. Le PAP a remporté 83 sièges parlementaires, mais a également connu un revers, l’opposition ayant réalisé des gains plus modestes mais historiques. Le Parti des travailleurs, seul parti d’opposition présent au Parlement, a vu ses sièges passer de six à dix, ce qui constitue le meilleur résultat pour l’opposition depuis l’indépendance. Le vote populaire remporté par le PAP est tombé à 61%.

  Quelles étaient les principales questions autour desquelles s’articulait la campagne ?

  Pour le PAP, la campagne s’est concentrée autour de la diffamation des candidats de l’opposition, les accusant de colporter des mensonges et d’avoir des intentions néfastes, et s’est attachée à les discréditer. Des tactiques de peur ont également été utilisées : l’idée a été transmise à l’électorat que seul le PAP pouvait sortir les Singapouriens de la pandémie de COVID-19, et que la présence de plus de représentants de l’opposition au Parlement contrecarrerait ces efforts.

  Les partis d’opposition, quant à eux, se sont attachés à faire passer à l’électorat le message qu’ils étaient sur le point d’être éliminés du Parlement, puisqu’ils disposaient de moins de 10 sièges sur près de 90. Les autres questions clés soulevées par l’opposition étaient le coût élevé de la vie et l’immigration.

  L’espace civique à Singapour est classé « obstrué » par leCIVICUS Monitor. 

• SLOVAKIA: ‘The election result may reinforce the country’s image as a problematic EU member’

  CIVICUS speaks with Michal Piško, Director of Transparency International Slovensko, about Slovakia’s recent first-round presidential election and the upcoming runoff.

  Transparency International Slovensko is a Slovak civil society organisation aimed at increasing institutional transparency and combatting corruption.

  What’s at stake in this presidential election?

  Slovakia’s presidency holds limited powers, although it has strong legitimacy arising from its direct popular election. Its most significant powers include vetoing laws – which a parliamentary majority can relatively easily overcome – and appointing some key state positions, such as constitutional judges.

  However, it can become a key player in critical junctures, as seen at the beginning of 2024. The governing coalition pushed for a harmful amendment to the Criminal Code in a fast-track legislative procedure. The new rules would have complicated the investigation and punishment of serious corruption cases by significantly shortening penalties and statutes of limitations. The current president, Zuzana Čaputová, challenged the amendment in the Constitutional Court, which partially suspended it coming into effect.

  The role of the president is also crucial beyond their formal competencies, particularly in significant public debates.

  What are the main campaign issues and the candidates’ positions? 

  The first round of the presidential election was held on 23 March. Čaputová decided not to run for re-election. Ivan Korčok, a pro-European former foreign minister who emerged as a civic candidate that was later backed by opposition parties, challenged Prime Minister Robert Fico’s ally and current speaker of parliament, Peter Pellegrini. Representing the opposition and the government coalition respectively, they will now compete in the runoff that will take place on 6 April.

  The central campaign Issue is the role of the president: whether they are meant to be closely aligned with the government or provide a counterbalance. Given that the current administration is led by a four-time Prime Minister known for his aggressive rhetoric and actions undermining the rule of law, it has been key to have a critical president playing an active role. If Pellegrini wins, it would bolster the government’s capacity to implement its controversial policies.

  How free and fair has the election process been so far?

  Transparency International Slovakia, a well-known anti-corruption organisation, has been actively monitoring the transparency and fairness of election campaigns and financing for a long time.

  Unfortunately, the current campaign cannot be considered transparent or fair, particularly because of Pellegrini’s failure to disclose donor information and the significant lack of information on his campaign expenses.

  The process has also been marred by negative campaigning orchestrated by politicians or hidden sources targeting Korčok, portraying him as a war promoter. It has also been distorted by the parallel election campaign for the European Parliament, in which both coalition and opposition parties indirectly support or criticise presidential candidates.

  What can we expect in the runoff?

  In the first round, pre-election opinion polls generally underestimated voter turnout and Korčok’s performance. Despite expectations, first-round voter turnout exceeded 50 per cent, a notable increase compared to previous years. Another surprise was Korčok’s relatively significant result, with more than 42 per cent of the vote and a 5.5-point lead over Pellegrini. Most pollsters expected more balanced results.

  However, the situation could still change in the runoff, as Pellegrini may receive the support of third-placed candidate Štefan Harabin’s anti-west and anti-system voters.

  Right now, both candidates seem to have fairly balanced chances of success. While Pellegrini is primarily targeting his messaging at anti-system voters, Korčok is attempting to mobilise pro-European voters.

  It is still unclear which candidate most Hungarian voters, who make up almost 10 per cent of Slovakia’s population, will support. Historically, they have leaned towards pro-European and democratic politicians, but their decision may also be influenced by the fact that Hungary’s authoritarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, is aligned with the current Slovak government.

  Despite Pellegrini not being openly pro-Russia, his victory would strengthen the current government’s position and reinforce Slovakia’s image as a problematic country with anti-democratic tendencies within the European Union. It would also intensify the existing division within the Visegrad Group, a Central European alliance of four countries, two of which – the Czech Republic and Poland – would continue leaning towards the west, while Hungary and Slovakia would further lean towards Russia.

  ---

  Civic space in Slovakia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Transparency International Slovensko through itswebsite orFacebook,Instagram andLinkedin pages, and follow@transparencysk on Twitter and@TISlovensko on Youtube.

• Slovenia: New research on the state of civic freedoms ahead of elections

  SLOVENIAN

  New research on the state of civic freedoms ahead of Slovenia's parliamentary elections - journalists & civil society facing restrictions

  • The ruling SDS party has interfered & undermined the work of the Slovenian Press Agency and the largest public broadcaster, RTVSLO
  • Budget cuts have targeted organisations and media critical of the Prime Minister’ Janez Janša’s government
  • COVID-19 used as a pretext to restrict protest rights & the work of civil society

  Global civil society alliance CIVICUS and the European Civic Forum are concerned about the ongoing decline of civic freedoms in Slovenia under Prime Minister Janez Janša’s government.  

  Ahead of Parliamentary elections on 24 April, the government has stepped up its political interference in the public broadcaster, while anti-government protesters and independent journalists continue to  be harassed.

  Our latest research brief released today highlights how in the last two years under Janez Janša’s government, civic freedoms are deteriorating. In December 2020 the CIVICUS Monitor downgraded the country’s civic space rating from ‘open’ to ‘narrowed’ signalling the  decline. In June 2021 the country was also placed on the rights index's periodic Watchlist, a roundup of countries where a rapid decline in civic freedoms has occurred. The fundamental civic and democratic rights of freedom of peaceful assembly, expression, and association are under attack ahead of the elections.

  Since Janša came to power in March 2020, Slovenians have staged weekly, spontaneous cycling anti-government protests. The government has responded by intimidating protesters, with the State Prosecutors Office bringing cases against so-called organisers of unannounced or unregistered protests to recover the costs of police intervention. Jaša Jenull, a prominent protester at the anti-government protests is facing fines amounting to over 40,000 Euros.

  “These repressive practices have wider repercussions beyond targeted activists. For example, administrative courts are now kept busy with reviewing these unlawful fines, reducing their capacity to work on other cases. State resources which are being deployed to enforce disproportionate pandemic restrictions and silence dissent could have been used to address people’s needs which have been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and initially triggered ongoing protests,” said Giada Negri, Research and Advocacy coordinator for the European Civic Forum.

  The current government has ramped up its political interference at public broadcaster RTV Slovenia (RTVSLO). In March 2022 RTVSLO staff staged protests over the appointment of Igor Pirkovič as acting editor of the public broadcaster’s web portal Multi Media Centre (MMC), who was previously paid by the government as a screenwriter of state celebrations. The MMC’s editorial board claims that Pirkovič is biased in favour of the ruling SDS party and believes that he was brought in to change the portal's pre-election reporting in favour of the ruling coalition. Last year, the appointment of Director General Andrej Grah Whatmough at RTVSLO sparked a series of editorial and programming changes, which were approved by RTV SLO’s Programme Council, an editorial decision-making body which has been infiltrated by the ruling SDS Party. 

  Prime Minister Jansa has used the current Ukraine crisis as an excuse to attack RTVSLO’s political debate channel Tarča for its coverage of the war against Ukraine, accusing it of playing “Putin’s Agenda”. This led to the Programme council reprimanding RTVSLO journalists and announcing that it would now only be using BBC News coverage on the Ukraine crisis. 

  “While Jansa has condemned Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, at home he is adopting Putin style tactics through repeated political interference at the public broadcaster RTVSLO and vilification of independent journalists. His government has increasingly harassed peaceful protesters and slashed funding to civil society. The European commission must take action to ensure that repressive measures against journalists and civil society are redressed,” said Aarti Narsee, Civic Space Research Lead Europe, CIVICUS.

  Slovenia is rated "Narrowed" on the CIVICUS Monitor. 40 other countries have this rating including Romania, Italy and South Korea (see all). The narrowed rating means that while the state generally allows individuals and civil society organisations to exercise their rights to peaceful assembly, freedom of speech and freedom of association, violations of these rights also take place.

  ---

  More information

  Download the Slovenia country research brief here. Also available in Slovenian here.

  ---

  Interviews

  To arrange interviews, please contact Aarti Narsee, CIVICUS European & Central Asia Civic Space Researcher  and 

   
• Slovenia: New research on the state of civic freedoms ahead of elections

  SLOVENIAN

  New research on the state of civic freedoms ahead of Slovenia's parliamentary elections - journalists & civil society facing restrictions

  • The ruling SDS party has interfered & undermined the work of the Slovenian Press Agency and the largest public broadcaster, RTVSLO
  • Budget cuts have targeted organisations and media critical of the Prime Minister’ Janez Janša’s government
  • COVID-19 used as a pretext to restrict protest rights & the work of civil society

  Global civil society alliance CIVICUS and the European Civic Forum are concerned about the ongoing decline of civic freedoms in Slovenia under Prime Minister Janez Janša’s government.  

  Ahead of Parliamentary elections on 24 April, the government has stepped up its political interference in the public broadcaster, while anti-government protesters and independent journalists continue to  be harassed.

  Our latest research brief released today highlights how in the last two years under Janez Janša’s government, civic freedoms are deteriorating. In December 2020 the CIVICUS Monitor downgraded the country’s civic space rating from ‘open’ to ‘narrowed’ signalling the  decline. In June 2021 the country was also placed on the rights index's periodic Watchlist, a roundup of countries where a rapid decline in civic freedoms has occurred. The fundamental civic and democratic rights of freedom of peaceful assembly, expression, and association are under attack ahead of the elections.

  Since Janša came to power in March 2020, Slovenians have staged weekly, spontaneous cycling anti-government protests. The government has responded by intimidating protesters, with the State Prosecutors Office bringing cases against so-called organisers of unannounced or unregistered protests to recover the costs of police intervention. Jaša Jenull, a prominent protester at the anti-government protests is facing fines amounting to over 40,000 Euros.

  “These repressive practices have wider repercussions beyond targeted activists. For example, administrative courts are now kept busy with reviewing these unlawful fines, reducing their capacity to work on other cases. State resources which are being deployed to enforce disproportionate pandemic restrictions and silence dissent could have been used to address people’s needs which have been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and initially triggered ongoing protests,” said Giada Negri, Research and Advocacy coordinator for the European Civic Forum.

  The current government has ramped up its political interference at public broadcaster RTV Slovenia (RTVSLO). In March 2022 RTVSLO staff staged protests over the appointment of Igor Pirkovič as acting editor of the public broadcaster’s web portal Multi Media Centre (MMC), who was previously paid by the government as a screenwriter of state celebrations. The MMC’s editorial board claims that Pirkovič is biased in favour of the ruling SDS party and believes that he was brought in to change the portal's pre-election reporting in favour of the ruling coalition. Last year, the appointment of Director General Andrej Grah Whatmough at RTVSLO sparked a series of editorial and programming changes, which were approved by RTV SLO’s Programme Council, an editorial decision-making body which has been infiltrated by the ruling SDS Party. 

  Prime Minister Jansa has used the current Ukraine crisis as an excuse to attack RTVSLO’s political debate channel Tarča for its coverage of the war against Ukraine, accusing it of playing “Putin’s Agenda”. This led to the Programme council reprimanding RTVSLO journalists and announcing that it would now only be using BBC News coverage on the Ukraine crisis. 

  “While Jansa has condemned Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, at home he is adopting Putin style tactics through repeated political interference at the public broadcaster RTVSLO and vilification of independent journalists. His government has increasingly harassed peaceful protesters and slashed funding to civil society. The European commission must take action to ensure that repressive measures against journalists and civil society are redressed,” said Aarti Narsee, Civic Space Research Lead Europe, CIVICUS.

  Slovenia is rated "Narrowed" on the CIVICUS Monitor. 40 other countries have this rating including Romania, Italy and South Korea (see all). The narrowed rating means that while the state generally allows individuals and civil society organisations to exercise their rights to peaceful assembly, freedom of speech and freedom of association, violations of these rights also take place.

  ---

  More information

  Download the Slovenia country research brief here. Also available in Slovenian here.

  ---

  Interviews

  To arrange interviews, please contact Aarti Narsee, CIVICUS European & Central Asia Civic Space Researcher  and 

   
• SOUTH KOREA: ‘North Korean defectors and activists face increasing pressure to stay silent’

  CIVICUS speaks with Ethan Hee-Seok Shin, a legal analyst with the Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG), a Seoul-based civil society organisation (CSO) founded by human rights advocates and researchers from five countries. Founded in 2014, it is the first Korea-based CSO focused on transitional justice mechanisms in the world’s most repressive regimes, including North Korea. TJWG aims to develop practical methods for addressing massive human rights violations and advocating justice for victims in pre and post-transition societies. Ethan works on TJWG’s Central Repository project, which uses a secure platform to document and publicise cases of enforced disappearances in North Korea. He uses legislative and legal action to raise awareness about North Korean human rights issues.

   

  Can you tell us about the work being done by South Korean civil society groups about the human rights situation in North Korea?

  There is a rather broad range of CSOs working on North Korean human rights issues. TJWG has been working to prepare the ground for transitional justice in North Korea, in line with its core mission of human rights documentation.

  TJWG’s flagship project has resulted in a series of reports mapping public executions in North Korea, based on interviews with escapees living in South Korea. We record the geospatial information of killing sites, burial sites and record storage places, including courts and security service facilities, by asking our interviewees to spot the locations on Google Earth. The report’s first edition was released in July 2017 and was based on 375 interviews, and its second edition was launched in June 2019 after conducting 610 interviews.

  We are also currently in the process of creating an online database of abductions and enforced disappearances in and by North Korea, called FOOTPRINTS. This uses Uwazi, a free, open-source solution for organising, analysing and publishing documents, developed by HURIDOCS, a CSO. When launched to the public, FOOTPRINTS will provide an easily accessible and searchable platform to track individuals taken and lost in North Korea.

  Other than documentation and reporting work, we have been active in international and domestic advocacy. Jointly with other human rights CSOs, TJWG drafted and submitted an open letter urging the European Union to strengthen the language and recommendations in the annual human rights resolutions adopted by the United Nations’ (UN) General Assembly and Human Rights Council on North Korea. We have also made case submissions to the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and other UN human rights experts.

  In July 2020, the South Korean government revoked the registration of two CSOs and issued a notice of administrative review and inspections of ‘defector-run’ groups working on human rights in North Korea. Why are these groups being targeted?

  The direct catalyst was the June 2020 provocations by North Korea. On 4 June, Kim Yo-Jong, sister of supreme leader Kim Jong-Un and the first vice department director of the Workers’ Party of Korea’s Central Committee, criticised the ‘anti-DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] leaflets’ flown to North Korea by ‘North Korean escapees’ and threatened the cessation of Mount Kumgang tourism, the complete demolition of the Kaesong industrial region, the closure of the inter-Korean liaison office, or the termination of the 9/19 military agreement (the 2018 agreement to create demilitarised buffer zones) unless the South Korean authorities took ‘due measures’.

  Just four hours after Kim Yo-Jong’s early morning bombshell, the South Korean Ministry of Unification (MOU) announced that it would prepare legislation banning the distribution of leaflets to North Korea. This was a complete reversal of the government’s longstanding position, which consistently avoided such legislation for fear of infringing upon the freedom of expression.

  On 10 June 2020, the MOU announced that it would file criminal charges against Park Sang-Hak and Park Jung-Oh, two defectors from North Korea, for violating article 13 of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act, which requires prior approval of any inter-Korean exchange of goods, and would revoke the incorporation of their organisations, Fighters For Free North Korea (FFNK) and KuenSaem, for sending leaflets in air balloons and rice-filled PET bottles on sea currents to North Korea, as they did on 31 May 2020.

  While the North Korean government eventually toned down its rhetoric, the South Korean government began to take actions against North Korean human rights and escapee groups, viewed as a hindrance to inter-Korean peace.

  On 29 June 2020 the MOU held a hearing and on 17 July it announced the revocation of the legal incorporation of FFNK and KuenSaem for contravening incorporation conditions by grossly impeding the government’s reunification policy, dispersing leaflets and items to North Korea beyond the stated goals of their incorporation and fomenting tension in the Korean peninsula under article 38 of the Civil Code, a relic from the authoritarian era. 

  The MOU also launched ‘business inspections’ of other North Korean human rights and escapee settlement support groups among the over 400 associations incorporated by MOU’s permission, possibly with a view to revoking their incorporation. On 15 July 2020, the Association of North Korean Defectors received a notice from the MOU that it would be inspected for the first time since its incorporation in 2010. The following day, MOU authorities informed journalists that they would first conduct business inspections on 25 incorporated North Korean human rights and escapee settlement support groups, 13 of them headed by North Korean defectors, with more to be inspected in the future. While acknowledging that the leaflet issue triggered the inspections, the MOU added that the business inspections would not be limited to those involved in the leaflet campaign.

  How many groups have been reviewed or inspected after the announcements were made?

  Because of the international and domestic uproar caused by the obviously discriminatory nature of the inspections targeting North Korean human rights and escapee groups, the MOU has somewhat toned down its approach, and has belatedly begun to argue that it is focusing on all CSOs registered under the MOU.

  On 6 October 2020, the MOU told reporters that it had decided to inspect 109 out of 433 CSOs for failing to submit annual reports or for submitting insufficient documentation. According to the information provided, 13 of the 109 groups to be inspected are headed by North Korean escapees; 22 (16 working on North Korean human rights and escapee settlement, five working in the social and cultural fields and one working in the field of unification policy) have already been inspected and none has revealed any serious grounds for revocation of registration; and the MOU intends to complete the inspection for the remaining 87 CSOs by the end of 2020.

  In any case, the government appears to have already succeeded in its goal of sending a clear signal to North Korea that it is ready to accommodate its demands in return for closer ties, even if it means sacrificing some fundamental principles of liberal democracy. The government has also sent a clear signal to North Korean human rights and escapee groups with the intended chilling effect.

  How has civil society responded to these moves by the government?

  Civil society in South Korea is unfortunately as polarised as the country’s politics. The ruling progressives view the conservatives as illegitimate heirs to the collaborators of Japanese colonial rule between 1910 and 1945, and post-independence authoritarian rule up to 1987. The previous progressive president, Roh Moo-Hyun, who served from 2003 to 2008, killed himself in 2009 during a corruption probe, widely seen as politically motivated, under his conservative successor. The incumbent Moon Jae-In was elected president in 2017, riding a wave of public disgust at his right-wing predecessor’s impeachment for corruption and abuse of power.

  Most CSOs are dominated by progressives who are politically aligned with the current Moon government. The progressives are relatively supportive of the human rights agenda but are generally silent when it comes to North Korean human rights because of their attachment to inter-Korean rapprochement. The same people who talk loudly about Japanese ‘comfort women’ – women forced into sexual slavery by Imperial Japan before and during the Second World War – or authoritarian-era outrages readily gloss over present North Korean atrocities in the name of national reconciliation.

  Most North Korean human rights groups are formed around North Korean escapees and the Christian churches of the political right that passionately characterise leftists as North Korean stooges. Many are also generally hostile to contemporary human rights issues such as LGBTQI+ rights, which is rather ironic as Australian judge Michael Kirby, the principal author of the 2014 UN report that authoritatively condemned the grave human rights violations in North Korea as crimes against humanity, is gay.

  The largely progressive mainstream CSOs have not been on the receiving end of persecution by the government led by President Moon; on the contrary, prominent civil society figures have even been appointed or elected to various offices or given generous grants. Some do privately express their dismay and concern at the government’s illiberal tendencies, but few are ready to publicly raise the issue because of the deep political polarisation.

  Is the space for civil society – structured by the freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression – becoming more restrictive in South Korea under the current administration?

  The Moon government has displayed worryingly illiberal tendencies in its handling of groups that it views as standing in its way, such as North Korean human rights and escapee groups, who have faced increasing pressure to stay silent and cease their advocacy. 

  President Moon has reopened a dialogue with the North Korean government to establish peaceful relations, neutralise the North’s nuclear threat and pave the way for family reunification, along with other estimable goals.

  However, along with US President Donald Trump, President Moon has employed a diplomatic strategy that downplays human rights concerns. Notably, neither the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration between North and South Korea nor the Joint Statement issued after the 2018 Trump-Kim summit in Singapore make any mention of the North’s egregious human rights abuses.

  In the weeks before President Moon met North Korean leader Kim in Panmunjom, there were reports that North Korean defector-activists were being prevented from carrying out their activism. In October 2018, South Korea acquiesced to North Korea’s demand to exclude a defector journalist from covering a meeting in North Korea. On 7 July 2019, there was an extraordinary rendition of two defectors, fishers who were allegedly fugitive murderers, to North Korea five days after their arrival without any semblance of due process.

  The Moon government has resorted to illiberal tactics on other perceived opponents as well. A man who put up a poster mocking President Moon as ‘Xi Jinping’s loyal dog’ (referring to the Chinese president) at the campus of Dankook University on 24 November 2019 was prosecuted and fined by court on 23 June 2020 for ‘intruding in a building’ under article 319 (1) of the Penal Code, even though the university authorities made clear that they did not wish to press charges against him for exercising his freedom of expression. Many criticised the criminal prosecution and conviction as a throwback to the old military days.

  The government has also moved to exercise ever more control over state prosecutors. The Minister of Justice, Choo Mi-ae, has attacked prosecutors who dared to investigate charges of corruption and abuse of power against the government, claiming a conspiracy to undermine President Moon.

  Another worrying trend is the populist tactic by ruling party politicians, notably lawmaker Lee Jae-jung, of using the internet to whip up supporters to engage in cyberbullying against reporters.

  What can the international community do to support the groups being targeted?

  In April 2020 the ruling party won the parliamentary elections by a landslide, taking 180 of 300 seats, thanks to its relative success in containing the COVID-19 pandemic. The opposition is in disarray. All this has emboldened rather than humbled the government, and its illiberal tendencies are likely to continue. Due to the severe political polarisation, ruling party politicians and their supporters are not likely to pay much heed to domestic criticism.

  The voice of the international community will therefore be crucial. It is much more difficult for the government to counter concerns raised by international CSOs as politically motivated attacks. A joint statement or an open letter spearheaded by CIVICUS would be helpful in forcefully delivering the message that human rights in North Korea are of genuine concern for the international community.

  Furthermore, South Korea will soon be submitting its fifth periodic report to the UN Human Rights Committee in accordance with the list of issues prior to reporting (LOIPR). Because North Korea-related issues and concerns are not included in the LOIPR, it would be extremely helpful if international CSOs joined forces to include them in the oral discussion with the members of the Human Rights Committee and in their concluding observations.

  In the shorter run, country visits to South Korea by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders would be excellent opportunities to internationalise the issue and put pressure on our government.

  Even progressives may support a reform of the outdated law on CSO registration, for instance, as a matter of self-interest, if not of principle, in case of change of government.

  Civic space inSouth Korea is rated ‘narrowed’by the CIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with the Transitional Justice Working Group through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@TJWGSeoul on Twitter.

• SPAIN: ‘Democratic rules are being used to promote an anti-rights ideology’

  CIVICUS speaks about the recent election in Spain with Núria Valls, president of the Ibero-American League of Civil Society Organisations (Liga Iberoamericana), a platform that brings together 29 civil society organisations from 17 Ibero-American countries, specialising in human, social and community development. Legally incorporated in Spain, the Ibero-American League has worked on childhood, youth, education and labour issues from a human rights perspective for 20 years, by providing advice to governments, monitoring and evaluating programmes and building networks and doing public policy advocacy at the local, domestic and international levels.

  

  What were the causes of the political instability that required Spain to hold two elections in 2019?

  The widespread rejection of the political system that was established following the transition from dictatorship to democracy in the 1970s led to a significant deterioration of the two traditional parties: the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) and the Popular Party (PP). These political parties were very used to bipartisanship and ruling with the support of large majorities. When other parties appeared on stage, pacts and coalitions became necessary, which until then had only been a feature of local politics. It became necessary to include more minority parties and nationalist parties from the country’s periphery, which does not always pay electorally.

  In addition, the political conflict in Catalonia had radicalised the positions of parties present at the state level, which entered into a sort of competition to show who was the most Spanish. Even leftist parties do not dare to speak in recognition of Spain’s national plurality because the media, and particularly those from the capital, Madrid, criticise them aggressively.

  In the first elections of 2019, held in May, the PSOE felt uncomfortable when negotiating with the leftist and independent parties that had supported the motion of censure leading to the replacement of the conservative government led by the PP. On top of this, the personal ambitions of the leaders of both the PSOE and Unidas Podemos, the left-wing coalition formed in 2016 by the Podemos political movement and several other political forces, made a pact impossible at that time.

  The PSOE misread the polls and believed that a second election would give them the majority, and therefore the possibility of governing alone. But ahead of the November elections, people were angry because, as they saw it, due to their leaders’ personal egos parties had not done their job, and instead had made us waste time and money. All of this further deepened dissatisfaction with politics.

  Would you say that the extreme right party Vox benefited from this?

  Vox was one of the parties that benefited the most from the second election. It doubled its number of votes and became the third most represented party, with 52 seats, right behind the two major parties.

  Traditionally in Spain it was considered that there was no extreme right because the PP encompassed the entire right wing. But Vox emerged with great force and with a Francoist, aggressive anti-human rights discourse, presenting itself as the guarantor of the unity of Spain against separatism. In fact, the way the situation in Catalonia has been handled has been a breeding ground for the acceptance of increasingly right-wing discourse, justified in the need to preserve the unity of Spain.

  Another electoral result worth mentioning is that of Ciudadanos, a seemingly liberal party, which not long ago thought it would soon be in government, but which practically disappeared given its meagre results. Ciudadanos had focused its discourse on territorial conflict and on the unity of Spain. Voters who prioritised this issue preferred Vox, which has a more radical stance.

  Despite the good results obtained by Vox, however, it was the left that won the elections and this time they worked fast. In just 24 hours a pact between the PSOE and Unidas Podemos was forged, which had previously been impossible to achieve. Citizens found it hard to understand why what a few months ago had been impossible was now possible. But what is important is that the formation of a government was prioritised against the feeling of instability and paralysis that has prevailed in recent years. Faced with this broad pact among leftist parties, the right wing reacted with a very aggressive discourse, strongly rooted in the Francoist tradition.

  Finally, due to the abstention of Catalan pro-independence parties, it was possible to form a government. Governing will not be easy, but it promises to be a very interesting experience, which offers the possibility of creating change. It will be a very broad government, with 22 ministerial portfolios, notably characterised by gender parity.

  How would you characterise Vox as a political force and ideological trend?

  Vox is a far-right party that does not hide its xenophobic anti-human rights discourse. It prioritises two major issues: the unity and centralisation of Spain, and the elimination of gender policies.

  This is a worrying phenomenon that is not only happening in Spain. Extreme right parties arise in times of citizen frustration in the face of economic and social inequalities in a globalised world. There is an international movement – which spans Brazil, France, Italy, Norway, the USA and many other countries – that focuses on stigmatising and criminalising migration and so-called ‘gender ideology’. The support for these speeches by some religious congregations should also be analysed.

  These parties use democracy’s rules to promote an anti-human rights ideology. It is paradoxical that democracy, which was born under the values ​​of participation and respect for rights, is currently being used to strengthen and foster an ideology that is totally opposed to those values.

  How did this right turn take place just a few years after so many people had taken part in protests for economic and social justice?

  An element of this turn has to do with the anger that a section of the population feels toward politics. Corruption of political parties has had a great impact on society, as people think that politicians are in politics only to enrich themselves. There is no idea of politics in the broader sense as linked to the common good.

  In particular, there is a bloc of young people who see a very difficult future for themselves. They have very low expectations and view a vote for Vox is an anti-system choice. This is the vote of those who think that migration will deprive them of jobs and state resources, and that gender policies are an exaggeration. Vox is very apt at using social media with direct messages often based on falsehoods but that are reaching the population.

  The territorial conflict between Spain and Catalonia has also functioned as a catalyst for this anger. The message of ‘we’ll go after them (‘A por ellos’) used to despatch police units from the rest of Spain towards Catalonia to try to prevent the referendum on 1 October 2017, later reinforced by a message from the King, aroused an anti-Catalan sentiment. The right bloc, and especially Vox, appropriated the defence of the monarchy against republican leftist parties.

  How is this process being experienced by civil society? Do you think that the space for civil society is being degraded in Spain?

  Organised civil society was caught a little off guard. On the one hand, we did not believe that electoral support for Vox would be so strong, and on the other hand, we had a debate about whether we should respond to them, and therefore give them more media coverage, or whether it was best to ignore them. The second option prevailed, among political parties as well. And the strategy of ignoring them contributed to the increase in votes for Vox. There was nobody left to respond to their expressions bluntly and with clear arguments.

  Now civil society debate revolves around the need to defend human rights clearly and forcefully and respond to any expression that hurts or stigmatises any population group.

  In the territories where it is governing together with the PP and Ciudadanos, such as Andalusia, Madrid and Murcia, one of Vox's first actions has been to press for the end of aid to organisations working with women or vulnerable groups.

  We are experiencing a risk of regression in freedoms and therefore it is necessary for us to work in a more united way than ever as civil society. A clear communication strategy must be developed to reach all people. Often we in civil society remain locked in our own spheres and find it hard to take our message beyond our circles.

  Another strategy used by the right wing, and especially by Vox and the PP, is to use the justice system to settle political disagreements. Much of the judiciary in Spain is still very ideological, since many conservative judges remain as heirs of the Franco regime. As a result, sentences have abounded against the freedom of expression on social media, including censorship of songs. And many people have also been convicted for protesting publicly, especially in Catalonia.

  How has the situation in Catalonia evolved since the 2017 referendum?

  The referendum of 1 October 2017 was an act of empowerment by a section of the Catalan population that participated very actively, with a collective sentiment of civil disobedience, to achieve a better future against a state that did all it could to prevent it from happening. The violent state repression unleashed during the referendum and afterwards increased the collective feeling of a big section of the population in favour of independence, and especially in favour of the right to decide through elections.

  After the referendum, repression against Catalan pro-independence groups increased, and the state put all its police and judicial machinery in motion. In addition, it launched article 155 of the Constitution, which provides the state with a coercive mechanism to bind the autonomous communities that breach constitutional or legal obligations or seriously undermine Spain’s ‘general interest’. Article 155 suspended the autonomy of Catalonia from 27 October 2017 until 2 June 2018, when new regional elections were held. It amounted to almost a year of political, financial and administrative paralysis in Catalonia.

  Previously, on 16 October 2017, the leaders of the two most representative Catalan pro-independence groups, Jordi Cuixart and Jordi Sánchez, had been imprisoned for mediating in a spontaneous and peaceful demonstration in front of a building of the Generalitat, the Catalan government, where the police were conducting a search. They were imprisoned preventively, with no possibility of release before their trial.

  Following these arrests, judicial repression against the government of Catalonia increased, culminating in the detention of the vice president and five government ministers plus the president of the parliament of Catalonia, all of whom were placed in pre-trial detention. For his part, the president of the Generalitat went into exile in Belgium along with four more ministers, and two other politicians went into exile in Switzerland. The government of Spain made statements affirming that it had decapitated the pro-independence movement.

  This entire judicial and repressive process further complicated the political situation in Catalonia. The ruling issued on 14 October 2019, which sentenced independence leaders to prison terms of between nine and 13 years, amounting to a total of 100 years, caused new street protests to break out.

  Unlike all previous pro-independence demonstrations since 2012, the latest protests caused many riots and faced police repression. In addition, young people were the protagonists and adopted a more radical attitude towards repression. In that context, the anonymous Democratic Tsunami movement emerged. Inspired by the Hong Kong protests, this movement uses social media to call for large peaceful mobilisations in various locations, such as the border or the airport. The police have tried to discover who is behind this movement, but it really is just an instance of collective empowerment by pro-independence civil society.

  At present, following the latest Spanish elections in which the PSOE and Unidas Podemos required the abstention of the pro-independence party Republican Left of Catalonia to be able to form a government, the picture has changed. The government has pledged to initiate a dialogue with the government of Catalonia and to bring any agreements reached through dialogue to a citizen vote. This will not be easy because right-wing parties, using any judicial remedy at their disposal, are trying to boycott the process. An effort must be made to find a solution for the situation of pro-independence prisoners that facilitates a peaceful and political way out and allows a process of real dialogue to begin.

  Civic space in Spain is rated as ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with La Liga Iberoamericana through itswebsite andFacebook page, or follow@LigaIberoamOSC on Twitter.

   

• SPAIN: ‘Territory will become the backbone of Spanish politics’

  CIVICUS speaks with Spanish political scientist and political consultant Eva Silván about the recent re-election of Pedro Sánchez as Spanish prime minister at the head of a coalition with left-wing and pro-independence parties, in a country deeply divided by the Catalonia issue.

  How did socialist Pedro Sánchez manage to win a new mandate rather than a government that included the far right being formed?

  On 28 May 2023, municipal and regional elections were held in Spain. The results showed a political map clearly favourable to the centre-right Popular Party (PP), which received some 750,000 more votes than the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), from which it snatched almost all local power. The PP regained six of the 10 regional governments that were in the hands of the PSOE, but in five of them – Aragón, Baleares, Cantabria, Comunidad Valenciana and Extremadura – it needed the support of the extreme right-wing party Vox to reach a majority that allowed it to form a government. The PSOE was only able to retain three of the 17 regional governments: Castilla la Mancha, Navarra and the Principality of Asturias.

  Faced with this result, the following day socialist Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez made a surprise move, bringing forward general elections, scheduled for the end of the year, to 23 July. This served to curb internal contestation at the loss of territorial power. It was the first time that general elections have been held in July, in the middle of summer. These elections found an exhausted citizenry and political class, and came as Spain started its mandate at the head of the European Union.

  The context seemed favourable for the PP, as the results of the May elections seemed to anticipate an epochal shift. In the first weeks polls were indeed favourable to the PP. But its signing of government agreements with Vox brought a reaction of rejection among a very large part of public opinion, which mobilised in fear that the entry of the far right into government would mean a setback for hard-won rights.

  The PP also erred by focusing its electoral campaign on Sánchez and his alleged lies and shifts of position. This did not serve to mobilise the electorate and ended up working against the PP when the some of the arguments put forward by its leader, Alberto Núñez Feijóo, were exposed as false in the only election debate he took part in.

  Sánchez, for his part, ran a campaign in which he showed leadership, had an extensive media presence, including in outlets that had been hostile to his government, and spearheaded a social media campaign that enabled him to connect with new audiences. This, together with fear of the far right, ended up isolating the PP, which although it took the most votes performed much worse than expected.

  Having come first, Feijóo was given the task of forming a government, but he was unable to gather enough support. Vox’s backing did not suffice, and no other party wanted to be part of a government that included the far right.

  What will be the costs of the alliances formed by Sánchez to retain government?

  The political landscape resulting from the 23 July elections called for agreements. No party received sufficient support for its candidate to be elected prime minister without the backing of other political forces.

  Once Feijóo’s attempt to form a coalition government failed, it was the turn of Sánchez, who sought agreements with the nationalist parties in the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia.

  Throughout his career, Sánchez has shown great flexibility and adaptability: he knows how to read the situation and decide what to do to develop a progressive agenda that allows him to govern. In this case, this included admitting the possibility of an amnesty law for politicians prosecuted or tried for promoting Catalan independence, which during the campaign he denied he would do.

  The support gathered by the new government is the clearest manifestation of the fact that, following the break-up of the two-party system and the emergence of a multi-party politics, we have entered a stage of bloc politics characterised by polarisation, with two blocs led by the PP and the PSOE whose identities are defined not so much in terms of the left-right divide as in territorial terms.

  According to available data, the PSOE’s alliance with two pro-Catalan independence parties, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya and Junts per Catalunya, has the majority support of Catalan society, and the same is true in the Basque Country. In fact, the PSOE won the most votes in these two territories in the general elections.

  In the case of the Basque Country, the agreements reached between the PSOE and the nationalist forces are based on the transfer within two years of competences provided for in previous agreements, in addition to some longstanding demands such as the transfer of the financial management of social security and the development of an autonomous framework for labour relations.

  In Catalonia, the agreements focus on the transfer of the management of commuter trains and an increase in public resources earmarked for Catalonia or a debt write-off, a move that has been strongly rejected by the PP and Vox. And specifically in relation to Junts, the agreement was possible thanks to the PSOE’s promise, already fulfilled, to send an amnesty bill to parliament. In the event that the law is approved and then ratified by the Constitutional Court, it will put an end to the criminal status of all politicians involved in calling a Catalan independence referendum in 2017 and allow the return to Spain of separatist leader Carles Puigdemont, more than five years after he settled in Belgium, evading justice.

  How has the public reacted to the agreement?

  The amnesty law is, broadly, supported or rejected on the basis of geography. The biggest demonstrations against it have taken place in cities governed by the PP, while elsewhere they have been very small.

  As soon as it became known that there was going to be an agreement between PSOE and Junts, demonstrations and violent protests began outside the PSOE’s headquarters. Demonstrations by far-right groups included anti-constitutional symbols and flags and fascist and xenophobic chants. In competing for the leadership of anti-amnesty demonstrations, the PP called for Sunday demonstrations that were more peaceful in tone, but equally firm in their opposition.

  According to polling data, a majority of public opinion rejects the amnesty law. None of the government’s arguments in support of the law have public approval. The amnesty divides PSOE voters and unites those of the PP and Vox.

  A survey published in October found that 57 per cent of people rejected the amnesty. A more recent poll finds that support is concentrated among voters of the left-wing coalition Sumar and pro-autonomy parties. Territorially, there is majority support only in Catalonia and the Basque Country.

  Arguments against the amnesty law range from very simplistic claims, such as that it will ‘break Spain apart’, to legal arguments centred on the privilege it would entail for the accused and the violation of the principle of equality before the law. In contrast, Sánchez’s arguments underline the opportunity to advance coexistence among Spaniards and resolve a problem that has divided Spanish society for the past decade. It is undoubtedly one of Sánchez’s riskiest moves since he became prime minister, both in the public eye and within his party.

  What are the main problems that should be tackled by the incoming government?

  This will be the period of plurinationality. Territory will become the backbone of Spanish politics.

  But there are other important issues. One of them, which also causes fierce debate and has been demanded by the European Commission, is the renewal of the judiciary. The mandate of the Council of the Judiciary, tasked with ensuring judicial independence, expired five years ago, leading to its biggest institutional and reputational crisis since the transition.

  The main issues of concern to Spanish society are inflation, access to housing, healthcare and the situation of young people. Spain is among the European countries where it takes the longest time for young people to get jobs and become independent. The new government will have to find ways to improve the productivity of the Spanish economy, promote measures to tackle climate change and deal with a socio-demographic reality affected by a falling birthrate and an ageing population.

  The two parties that form the coalition government, PSOE and Sumar, dominate the progressive side of the political spectrum. Their government agreement seeks to advance the policies already promoted in the previous administration, with social measures such as the gradual reduction of the working week to 37.5 hours, the extension of paternity and maternity leave to 20 weeks, an increase in the public housing stock for affordable rentals and the commitment to continue raising the minimum wage. They also push for measures to respond to climate change, such as reducing domestic flights on routes with rail alternatives that take under two and a half hours and the production of cheap and clean renewable energy. It remains to be seen whether these measures receive the support of the rest of the parties that allowed the formation of this government, particularly those on the centre-right axis such as the Basque Nationalist Party and Junts.

  ---

  Civic space in Spain is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Eva Silván through herwebsite and follow@silvan_miracle on Twitter.