elections

• HAÏTI : « Les gangs contrôlent le pays en lieu et place des autorités »

  CIVICUS échange sur l’augmentation de la violence des gangs et la situation politique en Haïti avec Nancy Roc, journaliste indépendante.

  Avec 38 ans d’expérience, Nancy est une journaliste originaire d’Haïti, reconnue pour son travail en faveur de la liberté de la presse. Elle est récipiendaire de nombreux prix, dont le prix Jean Dominique pour la liberté de la presse décerné par l’UNESCO, entre autres.

  Quelle est la situation actuelle d’Haïti en matière de sécurité ?

  La situation est intenable, pour reprendre le terme exact du Haut-Commissaire des Nations Unies (ONU) aux droits de l’homme, Volker Türk. Malgré l’état d’urgence et la succession de couvre-feu déclarés par le gouvernement depuis le 4 mars pour regagner le contrôle de la capitale, Port-au-Prince, il n’y a pas une semaine qui ne s’écoule sans que des kidnappings aient lieu. La violence est quotidienne.

  La population est cloitrée chez elle, la plupart des écoles sont fermées et les activités économiques sont gravement affectées. Il en est de même sur les routes où depuis plus de trois mois les gangs imposent leur loi et de nombreux chauffeurs sont au chômage. Pratiquement toutes les infrastructures de la capitale ont été ou détruites ou gravement affectées par les attaques des gangs.

  L’attaque du Pénitencier national, le 2 mars, a été un grand choc pour les Haïtiens, même s’ils sont habitués à vivre sous la menace constante de la violence. Plus de 4.500 détenus se seraient évadés, parmi lesquels des membres éminents de gangs et des personnes arrêtées dans le cadre de l’assassinat du Président Jovenel Moïse en juillet 2021. Les pillages et les attaques ont été nombreux, notamment contre la Bibliothèque nationale, qui a été prise d’assaut le 3 avril.

  La veille, dans la soirée du 2 avril, des bandits lourdement armés ont pillé des dizaines de maisons et emporté plusieurs véhicules privés aux villages Tecina et Théodat, dans la municipalité de Tabarre, au nord-est de Port-au-Prince. La grande majorité de la population, qui vivait déjà dans une misère extrême, est aujourd’hui plongée dans un véritable enfer et laissée pour compte.

  Quant à la police, malgré certains efforts, elle n’est pas outillée ni assez nombreuse pour faire face à une telle situation de guérilla urbaine face à des gangs surarmés. Actuellement, environ 23 gangs opèrent dans la zone métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince, divisés en deux grandes coalitions : le G-Pèp, dirigé par Gabriel Jean Pierre, dit Ti Gabriel, et le G9 Famille et Alliés, dirigé par Jimmy Chérizier, alias Barbecue. Mais les experts de l’ONU estiment qu’il y en a entre 150 et 200 dans l’ensemble du pays.

  Selon l’ONU, depuis le début de l’année, 1.193 personnes ont été tuées et 692 blessées à cause de la violence des gangs. Le système de santé est au bord de l’effondrement et les hôpitaux n’ont souvent pas la capacité de traiter les personnes blessées. L’économie est asphyxiée car les gangs imposent des restrictions aux mouvements de la population. Le principal fournisseur d’eau potable a cessé ses livraisons. Cette situation a entraîné une crise alimentaire majeure : près de la moitié des 11 millions d’habitants d’Haïti ont besoin d’une forme d’assistance alimentaire.

  Comment les gangs sont-ils devenus si puissants ?

  Les gangs disposent de puissants financeurs au sein du gouvernement et du secteur privé. Sous l’ancien premier ministre de facto Ariel Henry, qui a démissionné en mars, le gouvernement finançait 30% des membres du G9. Il ne serait pas étonnant que certaines personnalités tant du secteur privé que d’anciens hauts dignitaires de l’État continuent à les financer, en particulier ceux qui ont été sanctionnés par la communauté internationale.

  Un rapport d’experts de l’ONU publié en 2023 a également pointé du doigt l’ancien président Michel Martelly, au pouvoir entre 2011 et 2016, ainsi que plusieurs hommes d’affaires et législateurs de premier plan, comme fournissant des ressources aux gangs armés, que ce soit en nature ou en espèces.

  La prolifération des gangs a commencé sous Martelly et s’est accentuée après l’assassinat de Moïse. Déjà en 2019, environ 162 groupes armés avaient été répertoriés sur le territoire national dont plus de la moitié opérait dans l’aire métropolitaine. Au total, ils auraient un potentiel supérieur à 3.000 soldats armés d’armes à feu, dont des adolescents et même des enfants.

  Sous Moïse, de nombreux massacres ont eu lieu, tels que le massacre de La Saline en 2018, le massacre du Bel Air en 2019 et le massacre de Cité Soleil en 2020. Tous ont eu lieu dans des quartiers à fort poids électoral et où résidaient des membres de l’opposition, et ces crimes sont tous restés impunis.

  En 2020, la situation s’est aggravée lorsque Chérizier, ancien policier, a fédéré les gangs avec la « famille G9 » alliée aux neuf bandes les plus puissantes de la région. Cela lui a permis de contrôler une bonne partie de la capitale – tout en étant financé en sous-main par de hauts fonctionnaires de l’appareil d’État.

  La fédération des gangs a même été saluée par la Représentante spécial du Secrétaire Général de l’ONU en Haïti, qui a affirmé que fédérer les gangs avait fait baisser le nombre d’homicides de 12% en trois mois. Cela a provoqué un tel scandale qu’elle a dû revenir sur ses propos en les qualifiant de « mésinterprétation ».

  Un an après l’assassinat du président Moïse, alors que la situation s’aggravait, le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU a adopté, à l’unanimité, une résolution établissant un régime de sanctions qui ciblait les chefs de gangs et ceux qui les finançaient. Chérizier était le seul chef de gang dont le nom figurait dans une annexe de la résolution mais, à ce jour, aucune mesure n’a été prise à son encontre.

  Le 29 février 2024, la situation dans la capitale a pris un tournant décisif et pour le pire lorsque Chérizier a annoncé, à travers une vidéo sur les réseaux sociaux, la reconstitution de la coalition des groupes armés dénommée « Viv Ansanm » (Vivre ensemble). Il y revendiquait la responsabilité des tensions qui ont secoué Port-au-Prince et a déclaré que l’objectif premier des gangs était de renverser le gouvernement. Il a précisé aussi qu’une chasse aux ministres, au directeur général de la Police Nationale, était désormais ouverte. Il voulait les arrêter et empêcher Ariel Henry, qui se trouvait à Porto Rico, de rentrer au pays. Des policiers ont été tués, des commissariats attaqués, plusieurs vols annulés suite à un assaut des gangs à l’aéroport international Toussaint Louverture qui, depuis, est fermé.

  Chérizier prétend lancer une révolution afin de libérer le peuple haïtien des autorités et des oligarques pourtant, ces gangs ont ciblé toutes les couches de la société, autant que les quartiers pauvres de la capitale et de nombreuses structures étatiques qui servaient aux pauvres comme le principal hôpital public. La destruction est telle que l’ONU parle d’Haïti comme « un État au bord de l’effondrement ».

  En décembre 2023 plus de 310.000 personnes étaient déplacées à l’intérieur du pays. Selon l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations, plus de 50.000 personnes ont quitté la capitale en trois semaines au mois de mars 2024. L’ampleur du désastre est stupéfiante et tous les pays qui avaient promis une aide policière ou militaire sont absents. Haïti est abandonnée à son triste sort et les gangs contrôlent le pays en lieu et place des autorités.

  Pourquoi le gouvernement n’a-t-il pas réagi à la menace croissante des gangs ?

  Il y a quatre ans, la Police Nationale d’Haïti disposait officiellement d’une force de 15.498 officiers de police (dont seulement 1.711 femmes), bien que le nombre d’officiers effectifs était estimé à beaucoup moins. En outre, le programme humanitaire mis en place par l’administration Biden-Harris pour faciliter le séjour des Haïtiens aux États-Unis a fait courir à la police le risque de perdre jusqu’à un tiers de ses effectifs en raison de l’émigration.

  Dans un tel contexte, le chaos et la violence ont atteint un niveau sans précédent. Depuis l’assassinat du président Moïse, le gouvernement a été incapable d’instaurer l’ordre avec la police, et l’armée ne comptait qu’environ 2.000 soldats. De plus, aucune élection législative ou générale n’a été organisée depuis 2016. Il n’y a donc plus d’élus, le mandat des précédents étant expiré. Les critiques d’Henry, très impopulaire, considéraient son règne comme illégitime.

  En octobre 2022, Henry a fait appel à la communauté internationale, sollicitant l’intervention d’une force étrangère. Vu son impopularité, cela a suscité la méfiance parmi la population qui redoutait que cette intervention vienne renforcer un gouvernement illégitime et accusé de connivence avec les gangs. De plus, la composition de cette mission a viré au casse-tête.

  Près d’un an plus tard, le Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU a adopté une résolution autorisant le recours à la force par une mission internationale d’assistance à la sécurité en Haïti. Ni le Canada ni les États-Unis n’ont voulu intervenir directement en Haïti, soulignant que la solution devait venir des Haïtiens. Mais ces derniers n’ont jamais pu s’entendre et, de plus, ils redoutent une intervention étrangère, compte tenu des interventions catastrophiques de l’ONU, depuis 2004. Le Canada, qui avait été sollicité par Washington pour prendre le leadership de l’intervention, s’est retiré en mars 2023, pour laisser la direction au Kenya.

  Le déploiement de la force d’intervention multinationale devait commencer le 1er janvier 2024. En juillet dernier, le Kenya avait proposé de diriger la mission avec un millier de policiers. Antigua et Barbuda, les Bahamas et la Jamaïque s’étaient engagés à envoyer du personnel de sécurité, et plus récemment le Belize et la Guyane. Le Canada s’était également engagé à participer à la mission. Pour sa part, le gouvernement américain s’était engagé à financer la mission à hauteur d’au moins 100 millions de dollars.

  Alors que les gangs étendaient leur emprise sur Port-au-Prince et formaient une alliance dans le but déclaré de renverser le Premier ministre, Henry prévoyait de se rendre au Kenya pour signer un accord de réciprocité. Pendant son absence, les bandes criminelles de Chérizier ont attaqué des commissariats de police, l’aéroport de la capitale et des prisons. Ils ont brandi la menace d’une guerre civile si Henry revenait en Haïti. Il a démissionné le 11 mars 2024. Le lendemain, le Kenya a suspendu l’envoi de ses policiers en Haïti.

  Qui est aux commandes aujourd’hui, et quelles sont les chances que la démocratie soit rétablie ?

  Dans la foulée de la démission d’Henry, le gouvernement a déclaré l’état d’urgence. Le même jour, la formation d’un Conseil Présidentiel de Transition (CPT) chargé de rétablir l’ordre a été annoncée. Le conseil est constitué de neuf membres, soit sept votants et deux observateurs. Il intègre des représentants des principaux partis politiques, ainsi que du secteur privé et de la société civile. Son mandat de 22 mois prendra fin le 7 février 2026 après avoir organisé des « élections démocratiques, libres et crédibles ».

  De nombreux obstacles se dressent déjà pour atteindre cette finalité. En premier lieu, comment rétablir la sécurité alors que les gangs continuent de recevoir des armes des États-Unis ? Dernier coup de théâtre : lorsque Ariel Henry a sorti le décret annonçant la formation du CPT, aucun nom des membres n’y figurait. Depuis, les organisations des représentants désignés du CPT ont exprimé leur désaccord avec le décret du Gouvernement publié dans le journal officiel le 12 avril 2024. Finalement, l’arrêté officialisant la nomination des membres du CPT a été publié le 16 avril.

  De plus, le Conseil souhaite prêter serment au Palais National devant la nation alors même que le Palais a été la cible des gangs à plusieurs reprises. Qui assurera sa sécurité ?  Comment rétablir la paix en Haïti dans un contexte d’incertitude politique et de fragilité économique ? Est-ce que les membres du Conseil, dont certains sont des frères ennemis, pourront dépasser leurs propres intérêts au profit de la nation ? D’autre part, qui reconstruira le pays après le départ de tant de jeunes ? Le pays fera-t-il enfin appel à sa diaspora ?

  Par ailleurs, la possibilité d’une famine se dessine à l’horizon et le Programme Alimentaire Mondial craint que ses stocks alimentaires ne s’épuisent d’ici la fin du mois d’avril.

  Enfin, comment convaincre les gangs de déposer leurs armes alors qu’ils accumulent des millions à travers les kidnappings et la vente des armes ? Il s’agit d’une activité très lucrative, tant pour les gangs que pour de simples citoyens qui font face à une grande pauvreté.

  Comment aussi rétablir la justice et punir les criminels qui ont commis tant de crimes contre l’humanité ? L’adage ne dit-il pas qu’il n’y a pas de paix sans justice ? Enfin, que dire des ambitions politiques des gangs ? Le 11 mars, Chérizier a déclaré qu’il serait « l’alliance Viv Ansanm, avec le peuple haïtien, qui élira celui qui dirigera le pays ». Le CPT devra-t-il négocier avec les gangs ?

  Les défis qui se dressent devant le CPT ne sont donc pas des moindres et l’un des plus ardus sera de trouver le moyen d’articuler une demande d’aide externe sans perdre la souveraineté d’Haïti.

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  L’espace civique en Haïti est classé « réprimé » par leCIVICUS Monitor.

  Contactez Nancy Roc sur sa pageFacebook et suivez@TheNancyRoc sur Twitter.

• HAÏTI : « Si la mission a du succès, les autorités n’auront pas à se tourner à nouveau vers la communauté internationale pour maintenir la paix »

  CIVICUS échange avec l’avocate haïtienne Rosy Auguste Ducéna sur la situation en Haïti et les perspectives d’une mission internationale nouvellement déployée.

  Rosy est responsable de programmes du Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH), une organisation de la société civile qui œuvre pour l’instauration d’un État de droit en Haïti.

  Suite à la démission du premier ministre de facto Ariel Henry en avril, un Conseil présidentiel de transition a été nommé pour tenter d’entamer le processus de rétablissement de la paix dans un pays assiégé par les gangs. En proie à des divisions internes, il a fallu attendre le mois de juin pour que le conseil nomme un nouveau premier ministre, l’universitaire et praticien du développement Garry Conille. Le même mois, le premier contingent de la Mission multinationale de soutien à la sécurité des Nations unies, dirigée par le Kenya et longtemps retardée, a commencé à arriver. Compte tenu de la longue histoire d’échecs des interventions internationales en Haïti, la société civile est sceptique et exige que la mission soit fortement axée sur les droits humains.

  Qu’est-ce qui a changé depuis la démission du premier ministre de facto Ariel Henry ?

  Après l’avoir soutenu tout au long de son gouvernement, la communauté internationale a finalement retiré son soutien à Henry, qui a démissionné dans la honte. Il était un prédateur des droits humains et nous étions donc heureux de le voir partir, même si ce n’était pas de la manière dont nous l’aurions souhaité.

  Un Conseil présidentiel de transition a été mis sur pied avec la participation de la communauté internationale via la Communauté caribéenne (CARICOM), l’organisation régionale. Il compte en son sein des personnalités issues de secteurs qui n’inspirent pas confiance à la population haïtienne. La seule femme qui fait partie du Conseil a un rôle d’observateur et tous les candidats au poste de premier ministre auditionnés étaient des hommes.

  Un mois après l’installation de ce conseil, avec le peuple haïtien dévasté par l’insécurité et les bandes armées, un premier ministre a enfin été élu : Garry Conille, lui aussi soutenu par la communauté internationale. La prochaine étape logique est la mise en place d’un gouvernement de transition.

  Qu’attend la société civile du nouveau premier ministre ?

  Nous attendons du nouveau Premier ministre qu’il tienne sa première promesse : celle d’établir un gouvernement dans lequel les femmes n’auront pas un rôle symbolique mais occuperont des postes de pouvoir. Et nous espérons que des femmes ayant un agenda de lutte pour les droits des femmes dans le contexte de la transition seront choisies. Il est important de respecter le quota minimal de 30% de femmes dans les organes de décision – sans pour autant s’y arrêter, puisque plus de la moitié de la population haïtienne sont des femmes –, mais il est également important que les femmes qui occupent ces postes s’impliquent dans la lutte contre les violences sexuelles et sexistes, les discriminations et les injustices sociales subies par les femmes.

  Nous espérons aussi que les décisions qui seront prises par ce gouvernement à venir tiendront compte des priorités de la population : combattre l’insécurité, lutter contre l’impunité dont ont toujours bénéficié les bandits armés et mettre les victimes de l’insécurité au cœur des décisions, ainsi qu’organiser les élections.

  Et, sachant que cette transition a une obligation de résultat, tout doit être mis en œuvre pour que la feuille de route du Conseil et du premier ministre soit réalisée.

  Quelle est la situation en matière de sécurité et de droits humains ?

  La situation des droits humains sur le terrain est très préoccupante : les vols, assassinats, viols, viols collectifs, massacres, attaques armées et enlèvements contre rançon, et les incendies des maisons et des véhicules de la population sont monnaie courante.

  Deux grandes coalitions de gangs armés qui jadis se battaient entre elles, le « G-9 an Fanmi e Alye » dirigé par Jimmy Chérizier, alias Barbecue, et le « G-Pèp », dirigé par Gabriel Jean Pierre, alias Ti Gabriel ou Gabo, se sont regroupées autour d’une fédération et s’attaquent à la population civile pour asseoir leur pouvoir.

  Les conséquences sur la vie et la sécurité de la population haïtienne sont énormes : les bandits armés contrôlent la circulation des biens et des services ainsi que les approvisionnements en carburant et en médicaments et sèment la terreur. Certaines zones se sont complètement vidées de leur population. Des victimes de l’insécurité vivent dans des camps d’accueil surpeuplés, dans la promiscuité et exposés à toutes sortes d’exactions et de maladies contagieuses.

  Les écoles ne fonctionnent pas toutes. Des milliers d’enfants en âge d’être scolarisés et de jeunes qui devaient fréquenter l’université viennent de perdre une année académique. Des hôpitaux et centres de santé ont dû fermer leurs portes en raison de l’insécurité. Des alertes à la crise alimentaire aigüe ont été lancées : en Haïti, nous vivons une crise humanitaire sans précédent. Et, si aucune mesure n’est prise, elle s’aggravera.

  Dans un pays appauvri, où le système éducatif n’était déjà pas inclusif et où les droits sociaux ont toujours été considérés comme des produits à se procurer, le fossé de l’accès à l’éducation et à des soins de santé de qualité se creuse. Les femmes, les enfants et les personnes vivant avec une déficience physique, sensorielle ou même cognitive, ont été les premiers touchés par les conséquences néfastes du chaos instauré par les bandits armés, avec la complicité de l’institution policière et des autorités au pouvoir dirigé par Henry.

  Dans ce contexte de violation massive et continue des droits humains, le Conseil présidentiel de transition n’a pas encore prouvé qu’il comprend la nécessité d’agir vite.

  Comment la nouvelle mission internationale a-t-elle été créée et en quoi diffère-t-elle de ses prédécesseurs ?

  Le 6 octobre 2022, Henry avait sollicité l’envoi d’une « force robuste » en vue, selon ses dires, « de combattre l’insécurité, rétablir la paix et de réaliser les élections ». Près d’une année plus tard, le 2 octobre 2023, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies a adopté une résolution autorisant le déploiement d’une force baptisée Mission Multinationale d’Appui à la Sécurité, après que le Kenya eut accepté d’en assurer le leadership.

  La mission a mis du temps à se mettre en place. Elle est en train de commencer, mais nous restons sceptiques.

  Elle sera la onzième mission depuis 1993. Toutes ses prédécesseuses ont été impliquées dans la commission de violations des droits humains à l’encontre de la population haïtienne : exécutions sommaires, bastonnades et atteintes à l’intégrité physique et psychique, marchandage sexuel, viols sur mineurs.es et sur femmes. Et la seule sanction à laquelle s’exposaient les auteurs de ces violations était le rapatriement.

  L’Organisations des Nations Unis a apporté le choléra, dont la propagation a causé la mort de plus de 10.000 personnes, et n’a accepté ses responsabilités que du bout des lèvres. Les promesses de dédommagement n’ont jamais été tenues.

  Les résultats des différentes missions en Haïti, qui ont coûté des millions de dollars, sont maigres. Les institutions policières et judiciaires, ainsi que l’organe électoral qu’on leur a toujours demandé de renforcer, n’ont jamais été aussi dysfonctionnels. Le calcul coût-bénéfice et leur implication dans les violations des droits humains suggèrent qu’elles sont contre-productives.

  Il faut toutefois reconnaitre que la population, fatiguée de l’insécurité qui lui vole sa vie et son humanité et ayant perdu confiance dans le système pénal haïtien, place ses espoirs dans cette force internationale. Actuellement, la police ne traque pas les bandits notoires, les tribunaux ne les jugent pas, même par contumace, alors que plusieurs centaines de victimes de massacres, accompagnées par le RNDDH, ont porté plainte contre leurs agresseurs. Les rares fois où ils sont emprisonnés, ils s’évadent ou passent des années en détention, sans que les faits qui leur sont reprochés ne soient jamais élucidés et sans que les victimes ne reçoivent justice.

  Comment la mission internationale doit-elle agir pour contribuer à une paix durable ?

  Avec six autres organisations de la société civile haïtienne, nous avons réfléchi à cette question et formulé des recommandations. Celles-ci portent notamment sur la définition des objectifs de la mission et la prise en compte des préoccupations des organisations de défense des droits humains dans l’élaboration du cadre réglementaire et du plan stratégique de sécurité de la mission.

  La résolution étant restée muette ou ayant utilisé des termes sibyllins sur certaines questions importantes, nous insistons sur la nécessité d’aborder les obligations des agents.es relatives à la gestion des eaux, aux normes déontologiques et de transparence, ainsi qu’aux mécanismes de monitoring et de suivi des comportements des agents.

  Nous recommandons également l’établissement de mécanismes de prévention des actes de violations des droits humains et la mise en place d’un mécanisme de plaintes pour les éventuelles victimes. Il est essentiel que les pays pourvoyeurs d’agents.es s’engagent à tout mettre en œuvre pour que les exactions soient punies et que les garanties judiciaires des victimes soient protégées et respectées.

  Plus que toute autre chose, nous espérons que la mission mènera ses opérations sur le terrain avec la participation des policiers.ères haïtiens, qui y gagneront en formation et en tactiques de lutte contre les bandes armées, afin qu’au départ de cette mission, les autorités haïtiennes n’aient pas à se tourner à nouveau vers la communauté internationale pour maintenir la paix et la sécurité.

  L’espace civique en Haïti est classé « réprimé » par leCIVICUS Monitor.

  Contactez le RNDDH sur sonsite web ou sa pageFacebook, suivez@RnddhAyiti et@AugusteRosy sur Twitter, et contactez Rosy Auguste Ducéna sur son compte d’Instagram ou sa pageFacebook.

  
  

   

• HAITI: ‘Civil society must get involved because political actors cannot find a solution to our problems’

  CIVICUS speaks about Haiti’s ongoing crisis and calls for foreign intervention with Monique Clesca, a journalist, democracy advocate and member of the Commission to Search for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis (Commission pour la recherche d’une solution haitienne a la crise, CRSC). CRSC, also known as the Montana Group, is a group of civic, religious and political organisations and leaders that got together in early 2021. Following the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, it promoted theMontana Accord, calling for a two-year provisional government to take over from acting Prime Minister Ariel Henry and hold elections as soon as possible, as well as a road map to reduce insecurity, tackle the humanitarian crisis and respond to social justice demands. The Monitoring Office of the Montana Accord continues to follow up on this roadmap.

  What are the causes of Haiti’s current crisis?

  People seem to associate the crisis with the assassination of President Moïse, but it started way before that, because there were various underlying issues. It is a political crisis but also a much deeper social crisis. The majority of people in Haiti have suffered the effect of profound inequalities for many decades. There are huge gaps in terms of health and education so there is a need for basic social justice. The problem goes far beyond the more visible political, constitutional and humanitarian issues.

  Over the past decade, we have had governments that tried to undermine state institutions so that a corrupt system could prevail: there have not been transparent elections and no alternation of power, with three successive governments of the same political party. Former president Michel Martelly postponed the presidential elections twice. He ruled by decree for more than a year. In 2016, fraud allegations were made against Moïse, his successor. In his time in office, Moïse dissolved parliament and never organised elections. He fired several Supreme Court judges and politicised the police.

  He also put forward a constitutional referendum, which has been repeatedly postponed, that is clearly unconstitutional. The 1987 Constitution defines how it should be amended, so by trying to rewrite it, Moïse went the unconstitutional way.

  By the time Moïse was killed, Haiti was left with his legacy of weak institutions, massive corruption and the lack of elections and renewal of the political class. After Moïse’s assassination the situation worsened further, because now there was no president and no functioning judiciary and legislative body. We had, and continue to have, a full-blown constitutional crisis.

  Ariel Henry, the current acting prime minister, clearly has no mandate. Moïse selected him as the next prime minister two days before he was killed and didn’t even leave a signed nomination letter.

  What has the Montana Group proposed as a way out of this crisis?

  The Montana Group formed in early 2021 out of the realisation that civil society must get involved because political actors could not find a solution to Haiti’s problems. A forum of civil society then put together a commission that worked for six months creating dialogue and trying to build consensus by speaking to all political actors, as well as to civil society organisations. As a result of all this input, we came up with a draft agreement that was finalised and signed by almost a thousand organisations and citizens: the Montana Accord.

  We put together a two-part plan: a governance plan and a social justice and humanitarian roadmap, which was signed as part of the agreement. To get consensus with wider participation, we proposed the creation of a checks and balances body that would carry out the role of the legislative branch and also an interim judiciary during the transition. Once Haiti can have transparent elections, there would be a proper elected legislative body and the government could go through the constitutional process to name the high-level judiciary body, the Supreme Court. That is the governance that we’ve envisioned for the transition, one that is closer to the spirit of the Haitian Constitution.

  Earlier this year, we met several times with Henry and tried to start negotiations with him and his allies. At one point, he told us he didn’t have the authority to negotiate. So he closed the door to negotiations.

  What are the challenges to holding elections in the current context?

  The main challenge is the massive insecurity. Gangs are terrorising the population. Kidnappings are rampant, people are being assassinated. People can’t go out of their homes: they can’t go to the bank, to the stores, to the hospital. Children can’t go to school: classes were supposed to start in September, then in October and now the government is silent on when they will start.

  There is also the dire humanitarian situation, only made worse when gangs blocked the main oil terminal of Varreux in Port-au-Prince. This impacted on power supply and water distribution, and therefore on people’s access to basic goods and services. Amid a cholera outbreak, health facilities were forced to reduce their services or shut down.

  And there is political polarisation and massive mistrust. People don’t only mistrust politicians; they also mistrust one another.

  Because of the political pressure and gang activity, citizen mobilisations have been up and down, but since late August there have been massive demonstrations calling for Henry’s resignation. People have also marched against rising fuel prices, shortages and corruption. They have also clearly rejected any foreign military intervention.

  What is your position regarding the prime minister’s call for foreign intervention?

  Henry has no legitimacy to call for any military intervention. The international community can help, but it is not up to them to decide whether to intervene or not. We first need to have a two-year political transition with a credible government. We have ideas, but at this point, we need to see a transition.

  ---

  Civic space in Haiti is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Contact theCommission to Search for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis through itsFacebook page, and follow@moniclesca on Twitter.

• HAITI: ‘Gangs control the country instead of the authorities’

  CIVICUS speaks with freelance journalist Nancy Roc about the increase in gang violence and the political situation in Haiti.

  With 38 years of experience, Nancy is a Haitian-born journalist renowned for her work for press freedom. She is the recipient of numerous awards, including UNESCO’s Jean Dominique Prize for Press Freedom.

  What’s the current security situation in Haiti?

  The situation is untenable, to use the exact words of Volker Türk, the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights. Despite a state of emergency and a succession of curfews the government has declared since 4 March to try to regain control of the capital, Port-au-Prince, not a week goes by without kidnappings. Violence is a daily occurrence.

  People are holed up in their homes, most schools are closed and economic activity is severely affected. The same goes for roads, where gangs have been imposing their law for more than three months and many drivers are out of work. Virtually all the capital’s infrastructure has been destroyed or seriously affected by gang attacks.

  An attack on the National Penitentiary on 2 March came as a great shock to Haitians, even though they are used to living under the constant threat of violence. More than 4,500 inmates are believed to have escaped, including prominent gang members and people arrested in connection with the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021. There have been widespread looting and attacks, particularly against the National Library, which was stormed on 3 April.

  On the evening of 2 April, heavily armed bandits looted dozens of homes and seized private vehicles in the villages of Tecina and Théodat, in Tabarre municipality, northeast of Port-au-Prince. The vast majority of the population, already living in extreme poverty, have now been plunged into hell and left to fend for themselves.

  As for the police, despite some efforts, they are neither equipped nor numerous enough to deal with such a situation of urban guerrilla warfare against heavily armed gangs. There are currently around 23 gangs operating in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, divided into two major coalitions: G-Pèp, led by Gabriel Jean Pierre, known as Ti Gabriel, and G9 Family and Allies, led by Jimmy Chérizier, alias Barbecue. However, UN experts estimate there are between 150 and 200 gangs throughout Haiti.

  According to the UN, since the start of the year, 1,193 people have been killed and 692 injured as a result of gang violence. The health system is on the verge of collapse, and hospitals often lack the capacity to treat the injured. The economy is suffocating as the gangs impose restrictions on people’s movements. The main supplier of drinking water has stopped deliveries. The situation has led to a major food crisis: almost half of Haiti’s 11 million inhabitants need some form of food assistance.

  How did the gangs become so powerful?

  The gangs have powerful backers in government and the private sector. Under former de facto Prime Minister Ariel Henry, who resigned in March, the government funded 30 per cent of the members of the G9. It wouldn’t be surprising if some people, both in the private sector and former senior government officials, have continued to fund them, particularly those who have been sanctioned by the international community.

  A UN expert report published in 2023 also singled out former president Michel Martelly, in power between 2011 and 2016, as well as several prominent business leaders and legislators, as providing resources to armed gangs, whether in kind or in cash.

  The proliferation of gangs began under Martelly and intensified after Moïse’s assassination. By 2019, some 162 armed groups had been identified, more than half of them operating in the metropolitan area. In total, they are said to potentially have over 3,000 soldiers armed with firearms, including adolescents and children.

  Under Moïse, numerous massacres took place, such as the La Saline massacre in 2018, the Bel Air massacre in 2019 and the Cité Soleil massacre in 2020. All took place in neighbourhoods with significant electoral power where members of the opposition lived, and these crimes all went unpunished.

  In 2020, the situation worsened when Chérizier, a former police officer, federated the gangs with the G9 Family, allied to the nine most powerful gangs in the region. This enabled him to control a large part of Port-au-Prince – all while being covertly financed by high-ranking government officials.

  The federation of gangs was even hailed by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Haiti, who claimed that federating the gangs had reduced the number of homicides by 12 per cent in three months. This caused such a scandal that she was forced to retract her statement, describing it as a ‘misinterpretation‘.

  A year after the assassination of Moïse, as the situation worsened, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution establishing a sanctions regime that targeted gang leaders and those who financed them. Chérizier was the only gang leader named in an annex to the resolution, but to date no action has been taken against him.

  On 29 February 2024, the situation in the capital took a decisive turn for the worse when Chérizier announced, in a video posted on social media, the reconstitution of the coalition of armed groups known as Viv Ansanm (Living Together). In the video, he claimed responsibility for the tensions that have shaken Port-au-Prince and declared that the gangs’ primary objective was to overthrow the government. He also stated that a hunt was now on for ministers and the Director General of the National Police. He wanted to arrest them and prevent Henry, who was in Puerto Rico, returning to the country. Police officers were killed, police stations were attacked and several flights were cancelled following an assault by gangs at Toussaint Louverture international airport, which has since been closed.

  Chérizier claims to be launching a revolution to liberate the Haitian people from the authorities and the oligarchs. But the gangs have targeted every stratum of society, as well as the poor districts of Port-au-Prince and many state structures that serve the poor, such as the main public hospital. The destruction is such that the UN refers to Haiti as ‘a state on the brink of collapse’.

  By December 2023, more than 310,000 people had been displaced within Haiti. According to the International Organization for Migration, more than 50,000 people left Port-au-Prince in three weeks in March 2024. The scale of the disaster is staggering, and all the countries that had promised police or military aid are absent. Haiti has been abandoned to its sad fate and gangs are controlling the country instead of the authorities.

  Why hasn’t the government reacted to the growing gang threat?

  Four years ago, the Haitian National Police officially had a force of 15,498 police officers, among them only 1,711 women, although the actual number of officers was estimated to be much lower. Moreover, the humanitarian programme put in place by the Biden-Harris administration to make it easier for Haitians to live in the USA has put the police at risk of losing up to a third of its workforce to emigration.

  Against this backdrop, chaos and violence have reached unprecedented levels. Since Moïse’s assassination, the government has been unable to establish order with the police, and the army has only had around 2,000 soldiers. No legislative or general elections have been held since 2016. As a result, there are no longer any elected representatives, as the terms in office of the previously elected ones have expired. Critics of Henry, who was very unpopular, considered his government illegitimate.

  In October 2022, Henry appealed to the international community, requesting the intervention of a foreign force. Given his unpopularity, this aroused public mistrust, as people feared this intervention would strengthen an illegitimate government accused of colluding with gangs. What’s more, the composition of this mission turned into a headache.

  Almost a year later, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution authorising the use of force by an international security assistance mission in Haiti. Neither Canada nor the USA wanted to intervene directly, stressing that the solution had to come from Haitians themselves. But Haitians have been unable to reach agreement, and what’s more, they fear foreign intervention, given the catastrophic interventions led by the UN since 2004. Canada, which had been asked by the USA to take the lead in the intervention, withdrew in March 2023, passing the leadership on to Kenya.

  Deployment of a multinational intervention force was due to begin on 1 January 2024. Last July, Kenya offered to lead the mission with a thousand police officers. Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas and Jamaica had pledged to send security personnel, and more recently Belize and Guyana did as well. Canada has also pledged to participate in the mission. For its part, the US government pledged to fund the mission to the tune of at least US$100 million.

  As the gangs extended their hold over Port-au-Prince and formed an alliance with the declared aim of overthrowing Henry, he planned to travel to Kenya to sign a reciprocity agreement. While he was away, Chérizier’s criminal gangs launched their attacks on police stations, the airport and prisons. They threatened civil war if Henry returned to Haiti. He resigned on 11 March 2024. The next day, Kenya suspended the dispatch of police to Haiti.

  Who is in charge today, and what are the chances of democracy being restored?

  In the wake of Henry’s resignation, the government declared a state of emergency. On the same day, it was announced that a Presidential Transitional Council (PTC) had been formed to restore order. The Council is made up of nine members: seven voting members and two observers. It includes representatives of the main political parties, civil society and the private sector. Its 22-month mandate is due to end on 7 February 2026 after it has organised ‘democratic, free and credible elections’.

  There are already a number of obstacles to achieving this goal. First, how can security be re-established when the gangs are still receiving weapons from the USA? The latest twist is that when Henry issued the decree announcing the formation of the PTC, it didn’t include any of the members’ names. Since then, the organisations of the PTC’s appointed representatives have expressed their disagreement with the government decree published in the official gazette on 12 April 2024. Finally, the decree formalising the appointment of PTC members was published on 16 April.

  In addition, the Council wishes to be sworn in at the National Palace before the nation, even though the Palace has been targeted by gangs on several occasions. Who will provide security? How can peace be restored to Haiti in a context of such political uncertainty and economic fragility? Will the members of the Council, some of whom are frenemies, be able to look beyond their own interests for the benefit of the nation? And who will rebuild the country after so many young people have left? Will the diaspora finally be called upon?

  Further, the possibility of famine looms on the horizon and the World Food Programme fears that its food stocks will run out by the end of April.

  Finally, how can gangs be persuaded to lay down their arms when they are making millions from kidnappings and arms sales? Crime is a very lucrative business for gangs and for citizens facing great poverty.

  How can we restore justice and punish those who have committed so many crimes against humanity? As the saying goes, no justice, no peace. Finally, what about the gangs’ political ambitions? On 11 March, Chérizier declared that it would be ‘the Viv Ansanm alliance, along with the Haitian people, who will elect the person who will lead the country’. Will the PTC have to negotiate with the gangs?

  The challenges facing the PTC are therefore significant, and one of the most arduous will be to find a way of articulating a request for external aid without losing Haiti’s sovereignty.

  ---

  Civic space in Haiti is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Nancy Roc on herFacebook page and follow@TheNancyRoc on Twitter.

• HAITI: ‘If the mission succeeds, the authorities won’t have to turn again to the international community to maintain peace’

  CIVICUS speaks with Haitian lawyer Rosy Auguste Ducéna about the situation in Haiti and the prospects for a newly deployed international mission.

  Rosy is Head of Programmes at the National Human Rights Defence Network (RNDDH), a civil society organisation working to support the establishment of the rule of law in Haiti.

  Following the resignation of de facto prime minister Ariel Henry in April, a Transitional Presidential Council was appointed to try to start the process of restoring peace in gang-besieged Haiti. Riven by internal divisions, it took until June for the council to appoint a new prime minister, academic and development practitioner Garry Conille. In the same month, the first contingent of a long-delayed Kenya-led United Nations Multinational Security Support Mission began to arrive. Given the long history of failed international interventions in Haiti, civil society is sceptical, and demands that the mission has a strong human rights focus.

  What has changed since the resignation of de facto prime minister Ariel Henry?

  After supporting him throughout his government, the international community finally withdrew its support for Henry, who resigned in disgrace. He was a human rights predator, so we are glad to see him go, even if it wasn’t in the way we would have liked.

  A Transitional Presidential Council was set up with the involvement of the international community through the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the regional organisation. It’s made up of people who don’t inspire confidence among Haitian people. The only woman on the Council has an observer role, and all the candidates for prime minister it interviewed were men.

  A month after the council was established, with Haitian people ravaged by insecurity and armed gangs, a prime minister was finally chosen: Garry Conille, backed by the international community. The next logical step is to set up a transitional government.

  What does civil society expect from the new prime minister?

  We expect the new prime minister to keep his first promise: to form a government where women don’t play a symbolic role but are in positions of power. And we hope women will be chosen with an agenda to fight for women’s rights in the context of the transition. It’s important to respect the minimum 30 per cent quota of women in decision-making bodies – without this being the ceiling, since over half of Haiti’s population is female – but it’s also important that the women who occupy these positions be involved in the fight against sexual and gender-based violence, discrimination and the social injustices suffered by women.

  We hope the new government’s decisions will take people’s priorities into account’: fighting against insecurity and against the impunity that benefits armed bandits, putting the victims of insecurity at the centre of decision-making and organising elections.

  And since this transition must produce results, everything must be done to ensure the roadmap drawn up by the Council and prime minister is implemented.

  What’s the security and human rights situation like?

  The human rights situation on the ground is very concerning: robberies, murders, rapes, gang rapes, massacres, armed attacks, kidnappings for ransom and the burning of people’s homes and vehicles are commonplace.

  Two large coalitions of armed gangs, formerly at war with each other – G-9 an Fanmi e Alye, led by Jimmy Chérizier, alias Barbecue, and G-Pèp, led by Gabriel Jean Pierre, alias Ti Gabriel or Gabo – have joined forces and are attacking civilians as they seek to consolidate their power.

  The consequences for the lives and security of Haitian people are enormous: armed bandits control the movement of goods and services, including fuel and medical supplies, and sow terror. Some areas have been completely emptied of their population. The victims of insecurity are living in overcrowded camps, in promiscuity, exposed to all kinds of abuse and contagious diseases.

  Not all schools are functioning. Thousands of school-age children and young people who should be attending university have lost an academic year. Hospitals and health centres have been forced to close due to insecurity. Warnings of an acute food crisis have been issued. Haiti is facing an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. And if nothing is done about it, it will only get worse.

  In an impoverished country where the education system was already not inclusive and social rights have always been seen as commodities to be bought, the gap in access to education and quality healthcare is widening. Women, children and people with physical, sensory or cognitive disabilities have been the first to suffer the harmful consequences of the chaos created by armed bandits, with the complicity of the police and Henry’s government.

  Against this backdrop of massive and continuing human rights violations, the Transitional Presidential Council has yet to demonstrate that it understands the need to act quickly.

  How was the new international mission set up and how does it differ from its predecessors?

  On 6 October 2022, Henry called for a ‘robust force’ to be sent, in his words, ‘to combat insecurity, restore peace and conduct elections’. Almost a year later, on 2 October 2023, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution authorising the deployment of a force called the Multinational Security Support Mission, after Kenya agreed to take the lead.

  Setting up the mission has taken a long time. It is now up and running, but we remain sceptical.

  This will be the 11^th mission since 1993. All its predecessors have been implicated in human rights violations against the Haitian people, including summary executions, beatings and attacks on physical and mental integrity, sexual trafficking and rape of minors and women. The only punishment for these violations has been repatriation.

  The United Nations brought cholera, the spread of which caused the deaths of over 10,000 people, and paid only lip service to its responsibility. Promises of reparations have never been fulfilled.

  The results of the various missions to Haiti, which have cost millions of dollars, have been meagre. The police and judicial institutions, and the electoral body they were supposed to strengthen, have never been more dysfunctional. The cost-benefit calculation of these missions and their involvement in human rights abuses suggest they are counterproductive.

  However, it must be acknowledged that many people, tired of the insecurity that robs them of their lives and their humanity, and having lost confidence in the Haitian criminal justice system, are pinning their hopes on this international force. At present, the police don’t pursue notorious bandits and the courts don’t try them, even in absentia, despite the fact that several hundred victims of massacres, supported by RNDDH, have filed complaints against their attackers. On the rare occasions they are arrested, they escape or spend years in prison without charges against them ever being cleared up and without their victims receiving justice.

  How can the international mission contribute to sustainable peace?

  Alongside six other Haitian civil society organisations, we have reflected on this question and come up with several recommendations. These include defining the mission’s objectives and ensuring the concerns of human rights organisations are taken into account in the development of the mission’s legal framework and strategic security plan.

  As the United Nations’ resolution is silent or says little on some important issues, we stress the need to address the obligations of security agents in relation to water management, ethical standards and transparency, as well as mechanisms for monitoring and following up on their conduct.

  We also recommend the establishment of mechanisms to prevent human rights abuses and a means for victims to have complaints heard. It is essential that countries that provide those coming to Haiti commit themselves to doing everything possible to ensure abuses are punished and the legal guarantees of victims are protected and respected.

  Above all, we hope the mission will carry out its operations on the ground with the participation of Haitian police officers, who will benefit from training in tactics to fight armed gangs, so when the mission leaves, Haitian authorities won’t have to turn again to the international community to maintain peace and security.

  Civic space in Haiti is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with RNDDH through itswebsite orFacebook page, follow@RnddhAyiti and@AugusteRosy on Twitter, and contact Rosy Auguste Ducéna on herInstagram account orFacebook page.

• HAITI: ‘There is opportunity for a meaningful shift from foreign interference to true leadership of Haitian people’

  CIVICUS speaks with Ellie Happel, professor of the Global Justice Clinic and Director of the Haiti Project at New York University School of Law. Ellie lived and worked in Haiti for several years, and her work continues to focus on solidarity with social movements in Haiti and racial and environmental justice.

  What have been the key political developments since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021?

  As an American, I want to begin by emphasising the role the US government has played in creating the present situation. The history of unproductive and oppressive foreign intervention is long.

  To understand the context of the Moïse presidency, however, we have to at least go back to 2010. Following the earthquake that devastated Haiti in January 2010, the USA and other external actors called for elections. People did not have their voting cards; more than two million people had lost their homes. But elections went ahead. The US government intervened in the second round of Haiti’s presidential elections, calling for candidate and founder of the PHTK party, Michel Martelly, to be put into the second round. Martelly was subsequently elected.

  During the Martelly presidency we saw a decline in political, economic and social conditions. Corruption was well documented and rampant. Martelly failed to hold elections and ended up ruling by decree. He hand-selected Moïse as his successor. The US government strongly supported both the Martelly and Moïse administrations despite the increasing violence, the destruction of Haitian government institutions, the corruption and the impunity that occurred under their rule.

  Moïse’s death is not the biggest problem that Haiti faces. During his tenure, Moïse effectively destroyed Haitian institutions. Haitian people rose up against the PHTK regime in protest, and they were met with violence and repression. There is evidence of government implication in mass killings – massacres – of people in areas that were known to oppose PHTK.

  Two weeks prior to Moïse’s assassination, a prominent activist and a widely known journalist were murdered in Haiti. Diego Charles and Antoinette Duclair were calling for accountability. They were active in the movement to build a better Haiti. They were killed with impunity.

  It is clear that the present crisis did not originate in Moïse’s assassination. It is the result of failed foreign policies and of the way the Haitian government repressed and halted opposition protests demanding accountability for corruption and violence, and demanding change.

  What currently gives me hope is the work of the Commission for Haitian Solution to the Crisis, which was created prior to Moïse’s assassination. The Commission is a broad group of political parties and civil society organisations (CSOs) that came together to work collectively to rebuild the government. This presents an opportunity for a meaningful shift from foreign interference to true leadership of Haitian people.

  What is your view on the postponement of elections and the constitutional referendum, and what are the prospects of democratic votes taking place?

  In the current climate, elections are not the next step in addressing Haiti’s political crisis. Elections should not occur until the conditions for a fair, free and legitimate vote are met. The elections of the past 11 years demonstrate that they are not an automatic means of achieving representative democracy.

  Today, there are many hurdles to holding elections. The first is one of governance: elections must be overseen by a governing body that has legitimacy, and that is respected by the Haitian people. It would be impossible for the de facto government to organise elections. The second is gang violence. It’s estimated that more than half of Port-au-Prince is under the control of gangs.  When the provisional electoral council was preparing for elections a few months back, its staff could not access a number of voting centres due to gang control. Third, eligible Haitian voters should have voter ID cards.

  The US government and others should affirm the right of the Haitian people to self-determination. The USA should neither insist on nor support elections without evidence of concrete measures to ensure that they are free, fair, inclusive and perceived as legitimate. Haitian CSOs and the Commission will indicate when the conditions exist for free, fair and legitimate elections.

  Is there a migration crisis caused by the situation in Haiti? How can the challenges faced by Haitian migrants be addressed?

  What we call the ‘migration crisis’ is a strong example of how US foreign policy and immigration policy towards Haiti have long been affected by anti-Black racism.

  Many Haitians who left the country following the earthquake in 2010 first moved to South America. Many have subsequently left. The economies of Brazil and Chile worsened, and Haitian migrants encountered racism and a lack of economic opportunity. Families and individuals have travelled northward by foot, boat and bus towards the Mexico-USA border.

  For many years now, the US government has not allowed Haitian migrants and other migrants to enter the USA. They are expelling people without an asylum interview – a ‘credible fear’ interview, which is required under international law – back to Haiti.

  The US government must stop using Title 42, a public health provision, as a pretext to expel migrants. The US government should instead offer humanitarian assistance and support Haitian family reunification and relocation in the USA.

  It is impossible to justify deportation to Haiti right now, for the same reasons that the US government has advised US citizens not to travel there. There are estimates of nearly 1,000 documented cases of kidnapping in 2021. Friends explain that anyone is at risk. Kidnappings are no longer targeted, but school kids and street merchants and pedestrians are being held hostage to demand money. The US government has not only declared Haiti unsafe for travel, but in May 2021, the US Department of Homeland Security designated Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, allowing eligible Haitian nationals residing in the USA to apply to remain there because Haiti cannot safely repatriate its nationals.

  The USA should halt deportations to Haiti. And the USA and other countries in the Americas must begin to recognise, address and repair the anti-Black discrimination that characterises their immigration policies.

  What should the international community, and especially the USA, do to improve the situation?

  First, the international community should take the lead of Haitian CSOs and engage in a serious and supportive way with the Commission for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis. Daniel Foote, the US special envoy for Haiti, resigned in protest eight weeks into the job; he said that his colleagues at the State Department were not interested in supporting Haitian-led solutions. The USA should play the role of encouraging consensus building and facilitating conversations to move things forward without interfering.

  Second, all deportations to Haiti must stop. They are not only in violation of international law. They are also highly immoral and unjust.

  Foreigners, myself included, are not best placed to prescribe solutions in Haiti: instead, we must support those created by Haitian people and Haitian organisations. It is time for the Haitian people to decide on the path forward, and we need to actively support, and follow.

  Civic space in Haiti is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Follow@elliehappel on Twitter.

• Honduras: ‘El conflicto generado por la reacción ciudadana contra el fraude puede hacernos perder un año ahora, pero nos hará ganar diez en el futuro’

  English

  A fines de 2017, tras lo que muchos en la sociedad civil percibieron como una elección fraudulenta, estalló la protesta en Honduras. CIVICUS conversa con Wilfredo Méndez, Director Ejecutivo del Centro de Investigación y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos (CIPRODEH), una organización de la sociedad civil hondureña que aboga por cambios orientados a la construcción de un Estado de derecho democrático, justo, inclusivo, participativo y respetuoso de los derechos humanos y las libertades ciudadanas. El CIPRODEH realiza labores de investigación e incidencia política y promueve los derechos humanos de los sectores más vulnerables en alianza con una variedad de actores cívicos y sociales hondureños, latinoamericanos e internacionales.

  1. La oposición política y numerosos actores de la sociedad civil hondureña denunciaron fraude en las elecciones del pasado 26 de noviembre. ¿Podría describir cómo fue el proceso electoral, de qué manera se produjo el fraude, y cuáles fueron las consecuencias?

  El 26 de noviembre de 2017 enfrentamos un proceso electoral sobre el cual teníamos muchas preocupaciones. Sabíamos que la situación iba a ser compleja no solo en materia electoral sino también en términos de posibles violaciones de los derechos humanos, dados los antecedentes de persecución, criminalización y represión que hemos presenciado desde el golpe de estado de 2009 contra el entonces presidente Manuel Zelaya.

  Los grupos que están hoy en el poder son los mismos que protagonizaron el golpe de estado. El actual presidente, Juan Orlando Hernández, viene acumulando poder desde 2010, cuando asumió la presidencia del Congreso. Luego fue electo presidente para el período 2014-2018, y en noviembre de 2017 se presentó a la reelección, para lo cual antes debió manipular a la Corte Suprema de Justicia para que revirtiera la prohibición constitucional de la reelección consecutiva. El mecanismo de revisión constitucional previsto en la Constitución suponía el llamado a una asamblea constituyente, de modo que el procedimiento empleado fue completamente irregular.

  Desde 2009 el gobierno se ha militarizado, se ha apartado cada vez más de sus obligaciones de derechos humanos y ha intensificado la represión, con números crecientes de asesinatos y desapariciones forzadas.

  Es por eso que el 26 de noviembre la atención de las organizaciones de derechos humanos estuvo enfocada en el monitoreo de los conflictos sociales y la persecución política. Lo que no imaginamos fue que el fraude electoral que muchos habían anunciado se pudiese enfrentar con relativo éxito, pues la Alianza contra la Dictadura, la coalición opositora, implementó una estrategia que complicó la imposición. Ellos crearon mecanismos para combatir el fraude, el cual normalmente se produce no solo en la mesa electoral receptora sino también en el manejo del Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE), y esto fue una sorpresa para el partido de gobierno.

  En la noche del domingo de elecciones, el TSE no anunció los resultados, pese a que en Honduras es costumbre que a las 7 u 8 de la noche ya se sepa quién es el presidente electo. Horas más tarde, a las 2:45 de la mañana del día lunes y con el 57% de votos escrutados, el TSE anunció una clara ventaja, de unos cinco puntos, para el candidato de la oposición, Salvador Nasralla. Ese día el país entero no habló de otra cosa que de cómo se había logrado enfrentar el tan anunciado fraude. Y luego, el martes, el sistema de cómputos se detuvo y permanecimos durante todo el día a la espera de datos que no llegaban. Finalmente, alrededor del mediodía del miércoles nos encontramos con la sorpresa de que los resultados se habían modificado a favor del candidato oficialista, quien después de varias semanas (el 17 de diciembre) fue declarado ganador con casi 43% de los votos, contra 41,5% para Nasralla.

  La Alianza contra la Dictadura denunció el fraude y la población se manifestó pacíficamente en las calles en demanda de transparencia electoral y respeto de los procedimientos democráticos, por lo cual fue duramente reprimida.

  2. ¿Cómo reaccionó la comunidad internacional frente a las denuncias de fraude, y cuál fue la respuesta del gobierno?

  Los observadores internacionales fueron contundentes, con la sola excepción de un funcionario de la Unión Europea, que dijo que había que tener confianza en los resultados y pronto fue desmentido por la propia Jefa de Misión de Observación. La Organización de los Estados Americanos (OEA), en particular, desempeñó un rol fundamental. El Jefe de la Misión de Observadores de la OEA declaró que no había certeza sobre los resultados de las elecciones. Según el informe preliminar difundido por la OEA, las numerosas irregularidades, errores y problemas sistémicos restaban confianza a los resultados, y ésta solo podría restablecerse mediante un acuerdo entre los dos candidatos para revisar las actas, volver a contar los votos y resolver las discrepancias. El segundo informe ratificó estos hallazgos, aunque para entonces el propio Secretario General de la OEA, Luis Almagro, decía que ya no bastaría con un recuento de votos y que era recomendable volver a celebrar las elecciones con las garantías necesarias de rectitud y transparencia. El 4 de enero de 2018 Almagro instó al Consejo Permanente de la OEA a aprobar el informe de observación electoral. Puesto que el informe concluye que las numerosas irregularidades no permiten reconocer un ganador, su aprobación sustentaría el pedido de repetición de las elecciones.

  Entretanto, la oposición exigió la anulación de los resultados electorales, pero el recurso de nulidad fue rechazado. Esto era previsible, ya que la Corte Suprema, el Ministerio Público y el Tribunal Electoral están, todos ellos, subordinados al presidente.

  Por su parte, la reacción del gobierno fue declarar de inmediato y por diez días el estado de excepción, que restringió la libertad de movilización. Impuso también la suspensión de otras garantías constitucionales, no solo para el ejercicio de la libertad de reunión sino también para la libertad de expresión, entre otras. Los medios fueron advertidos de no difundir las acusaciones de fraude de la oposición, y las protestas fueron duramente reprimidas. Esto resultó en más de 30 muertos, decenas de heridos y centenares dedetenciones arbitrarias, además de allanamientos ilegales. Diversos videos filmados por los propios manifestantes mostraron a agentes de seguridad persiguiendo e incluso disparando contra manifestantes. Tres relatores especiales de las Naciones Unidas y de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) condenaron la represión, y el Secretario General de la OEA pidió al gobierno de Honduras que recibiera a un delegado especial de la OEA para relevar la situación de las protestas y la respuesta del Estado.

  3. ¿Cuáles son las chances de que el gobierno responda a la presión callejera y a los reclamos internacionales?

  Las presiones internacionales motivaron al gobierno a empezar a hablar de un “gran diálogo nacional” para buscar una solución a la situación. Sin embargo, en el discurso gubernamental el foco de atención no estuvo colocado en las irregularidades electorales ni en las violaciones de derechos humanos que se estaban produciendo sino en el hecho de que las manifestaciones inicialmente pacíficas supuestamente se habían vuelto violentas por la acción de maras, pandillas y grupos del crimen organizado. En mi experiencia, estos llamados del gobierno al diálogo están dirigidos a aplacar las aguas, reorientar los esfuerzos y mantener el control. Si no se tocan los temas de fondo, el diálogo no tendrá sentido y, peor aún, solo servirá para legitimar el fraude.

  Por otra parte, es importante resaltar que el pueblo hondureño ha cambiado, y tiene hoy una experiencia de movilización que no tenía en el pasado. No mucho tiempo atrás era un pueblo más bien apático e indiferente, pero desde 2009 ha forjado una nueva conciencia al calor de la resistencia contra el golpe de estado. Así, en el 2015, cuando se reveló el desfalco del Instituto Hondureño del Seguro Social – se supo entonces que cantidades millonarias se habían desviado de sus fines, incluso para financiar la campaña del actual presidente, tal como él mismo lo reconoció – el pueblo se movilizó masivamente durante meses, en lo que se llamó la Marcha de las Antorchas. Fue una movilización sin precedentes, y logró que finalmente se instalara la Misión de Apoyo contra la Corrupción y la Impunidad en Honduras (MACCIH) de la OEA.

  Cientos de miles de personas se han movilizado en el país contra el fraude electoral, y ni la más cruda represión las ha detenido. Tampoco se desmovilizaron cuando el candidato cuya elección estaban defendiendo los decepcionó, al menos temporariamente, cuando anunció (para luego dar marcha atrás) que se desvinculaba de la Alianza contra la Dictadura para conformar un frente más amplio. Esto por supuesto desmotivó a la ciudadanía movilizada, pero no la llevó a abandonar las calles, porque mucho más que por una candidatura, la gente se había movilizado contra la corrupción. Justamente, si algo representaba para ellos Nasralla era la honestidad.

  A principios de enero de 2018, sin embargo, Nasralla anunció que el sábado 6 de reactivarían las movilizaciones y que a partir del 27 de enero, fecha prevista para la asunción presidencial, actuaría como legítimo presidente de Honduras. También se convocó a un paro general del 20 al 27 de enero, para exigir la renuncia del presidente Hernández. De modo que la población ha regresado a las calles: el 6 de enero se realizó una movilización en San Pedro Sula en la que hubo más de 80 mil personas. En suma, pienso que hay buenas posibilidades de ejercer presión a nivel nacional para que se alcance un acuerdo en torno de la revisión del fraude electoral. En conjunción con las presiones de la OEA para que se repitan las elecciones, es posible que la presión de la ciudadanía movilizada tenga un efecto.

  4. ¿Piensa que es posible que la represión se intensifique?

  Sí, pienso que la situación se está volviendo más complicada cada día, porque la gente está saliendo a las calles, los líderes políticos opositores se mantienen firmes en sus planteos y los líderes sociales no se están echando atrás. Desde las organizaciones de derechos humanos hemos sostenido que la ciudadanía tiene un legítimo derecho a protestar – hemos dicho incluso que la gente tiene que salir a protestar para evitar esta violación de los derechos políticos que sin duda repercutirá sobre la vigencia efectiva de los demás derechos humanos.

  Ante esto, la respuesta del gobierno ha sido más militarización. A principios de diciembre la Policía Nacional se rebeló contra el actual presidente con el argumento de que no iba a obedecer órdenes ilegales de reprimir al pueblo movilizado a causa de un problema político que el propio gobierno había creado. Después de un día de huelga y habiendo alcanzado un acuerdo salarial favorable con el gobierno, la Policía Nacional regresó a las calles, supuestamente a cuidar y no a reprimir las manifestaciones. Pero la conducta policial ha sido atroz; además de la cantidad de muertos, hemos visto una estrategia de generar un clima de mucho miedo en las calles, con levantamiento de perfiles, persecución de líderes políticos y sociales y campañas de desprestigio contra defensores y defensoras de derechos humanos.

  Sin embargo, el miedo no ha detenido a la gente, y estamos muy preocupados por lo que podría pasar si no se alcanza una salida concertada a esta crisis. En estos días estamos teniendo reuniones a nivel de nuestra organización, con la red de movimientos sociales y con la Mesa Nacional de Derechos Humanos para decidir cómo vamos a enfrentar la amenaza de derechos humanos que se nos viene, porque la reacción represiva que hemos visto hasta ahora no augura nada bueno.

  Esperamos también que la CIDH pueda agilizar su visita al país. La presencia de observadores internacionales y de la prensa internacional ha sido hasta ahora muy importante para sacar a relucir la verdad atravesando el cerco mediático interno, y es ahora más necesaria que nunca.

  En las próximas semanas será fundamental el rol de la OEA. Si el informe que ha emitido, que desconoce los resultados electorales, no es ratificado por el Consejo Permanente, ya no tendría sentido que la OEA volviera a hacer nunca más una observación electoral. La Carta Democrática Interamericana ya no tendría sentido si la OEA terminara reconociendo a un gobierno cuya elección denunció como fraudulenta. Por su parte, los países miembros de la OEA, incluido Estados Unidos, deberían actuar en la misma dirección. Es inconcebible que un país que se invoca principios y valores democráticos otorgue su reconocimiento a un gobierno surgido del fraude, la violencia y la violación de derechos humanos, y Estados Unidos (junto con otros países de la región) no ha manifestado hasta ahora grandes reparos en reconocer la reelección fraudulenta de Hernández.

  Antes del 26 de noviembre, el tiempo parecía dividirse en un antes y un después de la elección; nunca imaginamos que tendríamos un durante tan prolongado sin un presidente electo. Nuestro horizonte luego se desplazó al 27 de enero, fecha de inauguración de un gobierno ilegítimo, y las reacciones populares no se hicieron esperar. El presidente no tomó posesión en un lugar abierto porque se esperaban protestas importantes. Lo hizo en el Estado Nacional, con seguridad militarizada y con la población protestando afuera. Con ello se abrió un período de conflicto político y social que difícilmente permita que el país avance en otros temas importantes.

  Con todo, tenemos claro que lo más importante es el hecho de que la población esté consciente y no permita un fraude electoral y de corrupción como este. Podremos perder un año ahora, pero ganaremos diez en el futuro en razón de la lucha contra la corrupción y la impunidad. El pueblo hondureño merece nuestro aplauso, porque ha demostrado que ya no está dispuesto a permitir que políticos de esta naturaleza sigan gobernando a nuestro país.

   

  • El espacio cívico en Honduras es calificado por elCIVICUS Monitor como ‘obstruido’, una categoría indicativa de la existencia de restricciones considerables sobre las libertades de expresión, asociación y reunión pacífica.
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• HONG KONG : « La loi sur la sécurité nationale viole la liberté d’expression et intensifie l’autocensure »

  CIVICUS s’entretient avec Patrick Poon, chercheur indépendant sur les droits humains, de la situation des droits humains à Hong Kong à la suite de l’adoption d’une nouvelle loi sur la sécurité nationale (LSN) en juin 2020. Patrick est un chercheur en doctorat à l’Université de Lyon en France,a précédemment travaillé comme chercheur sur la Chine à Amnesty International, et a occupé différents postes au sein du China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, du Independent Chinese PEN Center et du China Labor Bulletin.

  L’espace civique à Hong Kong est de plus en plus assiégé depuis le début d’une vague demanifestations de masse pour les libertés démocratiques en juin 2019, déclenchée par l’introduction d’un projet de loi sur l’extradition. LeCIVICUS Monitor a documenté l’usage excessif et mortel de la force contre les manifestants par les forces de sécurité, l’arrestation et la poursuite d’activistes pro-démocratie, ainsi que des attaques contre les médias indépendants.

• HONG KONG: ‘The National Security Law infringes on freedom of expression and is intensifying self-censorship’

  CIVICUS speaks with Patrick Poon, an independent human rights researcher, on the human rights situation in Hong Kong after a new National Security Law (NSL) was passed in June 2020. Patrick is a PhD researcher at the University of Lyon, France, and has previously worked as a China Researcher at Amnesty International and in various positions at China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, Independent Chinese PEN Center and China Labour Bulletin. 

  Civic space in Hong Kong is under renewed attack sincemass protests for democratic freedoms, sparked by a proposed Extradition Bill, began in June 2019. TheCIVICUS Monitor has documented excessive and lethal force by the security forces against protesters, arrests and the prosecution of pro-democracy activists as well as a crackdown on independent media.

     

  Why has the NSL been imposed in Hong Kong and what have its impacts been so far?

  The NSL, imposed by the Chinese government on 20 June 2020, without any consultation or legislative oversight, empowers China to extend some of its most potent tools of social control from the mainland to Hong Kong. The law includes the creation of specialised secret security agencies, allows for the denial of the right to a fair trial, provides sweeping new powers to the police, increases restraints on civil society and the media and weakens judicial oversight.

  The new law undermines Hong Kong’s rule of law and the human rights guarantees enshrined in Hong Kong’s de facto constitution, the Basic Law. It contravenes the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which is incorporated into Hong Kong’s legal framework via the Basic Law and expressed in its Bill of Rights Ordinance.

  The Chinese government’s intention is to use the NSL to curb advocacy and support for independence as more people, especially young people, have increasingly embraced Hong Kong’s autonomy and their identity as Hongkongers. Although Hong Kong’s Basic Law enshrines a high degree of autonomy, the Chinese government apparently regards calls for autonomy and self-governance as a ‘danger to national security’.

  The NSL has seriously infringed Hong Kong people’s freedom of expression and is intensifying self-censorship in the city. Under the NSL, people who advocate for independence, as well as politicians and prominent figures who support foreign governments’ sanctions on Hong Kong and Chinese officials who are responsible for enacting the NSL, have been the target of the arbitrary arrests. The government is obviously attempting to scare off others not to follow these people’s calls. 

  Independent media have also been affected by the crackdown. The arrests of Jimmy Lai, media mogul and founder of popular local paper Apple Daily, and senior executives in his company, signify the government’s attempt to punish news media that are critical of it. Reports about criticism against the NSL and calls for sanctions by foreign government officials become the excuse for the crackdown on independent media. This will have long-term impact on Hong Kong media, even further intensifying self-censorship for some media outlets.

  How have civil society and the pro-democracy movement responded?

  Civil society has reacted strongly against the law because the process to enact it violated the principle of the rule of law and procedural justice in Hong Kong, and the vague and broad definitions of various provisions of the law exceed the normal understanding of law in the city. Pro-China politicians and government officials have been trying hard to justify the law, but their arguments are preposterous. 

  How have the opposition and civil society reacted to the government’s decision to postpone the legislative election due to the COVID-19 pandemic?

  The 2020 Hong Kong Legislative Council election was originally scheduled for 6 September 2020, but in July the Hong Kong Chief Executive, Carrie Lam, cited an upsurge in COVID-19 infections and used her emergency powers to postpone it for a whole year, so now it’s expected to take place on 5 September 2021. She denied that the change was due to any political speculation, but it was in fact a blow for pro-democracy activists, who were seeking a majority on the Legislative Council. 

  In the midst of massive protests, pro-democracy candidates had already won by a landslide in the 2019 District Council election. Along with the new NSL, the postponement of the election was viewed as part of the government’s strategy to neutralise the pro-democracy movement. Just prior to the announcement that the election was being postponed, 12 opposition candidates were disqualified from running, and four young former members of a pro-independence student group were arrested under the NSL for their pro-independence posts on social media.

  The postponement of the election created some conflict among the pro-democracy camp, with some calling for keeping up the fight in the Legislative Council and others urging a boycott over the government’s decision to postpone the elections. From the government’s decision to disqualify some pro-democracy candidates for their political views, it is clear that the government doesn’t want to hear any opposition voices in the legislature.

  What can the international community and international civil society organisations do to support civil society in Hong Kong?

  Civil society in Hong Kong needs to work together to ensure that the Chinese government and the Hong Kong government will not abuse the NSL to curb all dissenting views and closely monitor if the government abides by the principle of the rule of law and international human rights standards.

  The international community should continue speaking up against the Chinese and Hong Kong government’s crackdown on  civil society and keep raising concerns about the NSL, which is being forcibly imposed on Hong Kong by the Chinese government in the name of national security, but in fact is no more than an attempt to silence dissenting views in the city. The international community should send a clear message that national security should not be used as an excuse to crack down on the freedom of expression.

  Civic space in China is rated as ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor. 

• HONG KONG: ‘We urge governments to protect exiled human rights defenders within their jurisdictions’

  

  CIVICUS speakswith Anouk Wear, research and policy adviser at Hong Kong Watch, about recent district council elections held in Hong Kong amid an ongoing crackdown on dissent.

  Founded in 2017, Hong Kong Watch is a civil society organisation (CSO) based in the UK thatproduces research and monitors threats to Hong Kong’s autonomy, basic freedoms and rule of law. Itworks at the intersection between politics, academia and the media to shape the international debate about Hong Kong.

   

  What was the significance of Hong Kong’s 2023 district council elections?

  On 11 December 2023, Hong Kong held elections spanning 18 district councils with a total of 479 seats. District councillors advise the Hong Kong government on local issues within their districts and have funding to promote recreational, cultural and community activities.

  These elections were especially significant because following the previous round, held in 2019 and won by pro-democracy candidates by a landslide, the Hong Kong government introduced several changes to ensure that the pro-China camp would maintain the majority in future elections.

  The 2023 election was marked by a record-low voter turnout of just 27.5 per cent. Many people abstained because they felt a sense of despair given that all candidates had to be vetted and approved by the Chinese state. This left no opposition voices to vote for, diminishing the significance of the election.

  We want genuine universal suffrage, not a ‘democracy with Chinese characteristics’, as the founding chairman of Hong Kong’s Democratic Party, Martin Lee, aptly warned in 2014. Unfortunately, the situation has only worsened since then.

  What tactics did the government use to control the election?

  As analysed in a briefing we published recently, the election fit into a broader trend of democratic erosion in Hong Kong.

  In 2021, changes to Legislative Councils were introduced under the slogan ‘Patriots Governing Hong Kong’,  aimed at screening out democrats and ensuring that only pro-establishment candidates aligned with Beijing could run for seats. To that effect, candidates are now required to pass two major political barriers before participating in the election.

  First, they must secure nominations from all five sectors of the Election Committee, a 1,500-member electoral college made up of representatives of various constituencies, including industry, professions, grassroots organisations, the government and Hong Kong representation in Chinese bodies. Second, they are screened by the Candidate Eligibility Review Committee, mainly composed of government officials. Candidates who don’t have a strong pro-China agenda can be disqualified on grounds of not being ‘patriotic’ enough.

  A similar approach was applied to district council candidates. In April 2023, Chief Executive John Lee announced that upcoming district council elections would be open exclusively to patriots, with only a certain number of ‘depoliticised’ seats focused on administrative tasks elected by the public. He added that people who love the country and are willing to serve can participate in district councils through ‘various other ways’. In line with these reforms, only 88 seats were directly elected by the public, compared to 452 in the previous election, with 179 to be appointed by the chief executive.

  Moreover, in the lead-up to the elections, three members of the League of Social Democrats were followed and arrested for planning a protest against the election, which they called a ‘birdcage’, stating that ‘Hong Kong people’s right to vote and to be elected seems to be absent’.

  What should be done to restore democratic freedoms in Hong Kong?

  Civil space has drastically shrunk since the 2019 district council elections. Following the imposition of the National Security Law in 2020, over 60 organisations have been disbanded, including CSOs, political parties, trade unions and media outlets. Many organisations have relocated abroad, while others have adjusted the scope of their work to protect their members who remain in Hong Kong.

  It’s crucial that discussions are continued, the human rights situation is monitored and detailed reports are provided as steps towards restoring democratic freedoms in Hong Kong. We shouldn’t accept new repressive laws as the norm but instead stay vocal about any regressive legislation and rights violation.

  It’s important to keep speaking up for people in Hong Kong and human rights defenders in exile. For example, recently the Hong Kong national security police issued five arrest warrants offering HK$1 million (approx. US$ 128,000) bounties for exiled pro-democracy Hong Kong activists based in the UK and USA. We strongly condemn this illegal attack against our friends and colleagues. We urge governments to take a stand and protect Hong Kong human rights defenders within their jurisdictions.

  How is Hong Kong Watch working towards this end, and what international support do you need?

  We work to inform and educate legislators, policymakers and the media, as well as raise awareness among the wider public about violations of human rights, basic freedoms and the rule of law in Hong Kong. We advocate for actions to assist victims of rights violations through a combination of in-depth research reports, opinion editorials, monthly media briefings, interviews and advocacy campaigns.

  It’s crucial to hold Hong Kong and China accountable for their violations of international human rights law and urge them to fulfil their obligations. For instance, the 2022 review of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee, tasked with monitoring compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), found that Hong Kong violated its international legal obligations and recommended that the authorities take tangible steps, with a clear timeline, to introduce universal suffrage and reform the electoral system in compliance with the ICCPR.

  We’re engaging in this effort through submissions to the Human Rights Committee and other treaty bodies, including the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as to the upcoming Universal Periodic Review at the UN Human Rights Council.

  We deeply appreciate the support we receive from governments, legislators, civil society and people worldwide. But we need more international solidarity, particularly at the governmental level, to pressure Hong Kong authorities to comply with their obligations under international law and ensure that other states refrain from conducting business as usual with Hong Kong, in view of the grave and systematic nature of human rights violations the current regime commits.

   

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  Civic space in Hong Kong is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Hong Kong Watch through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@hk_watch and@anoukwear onTwitter.

  The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

• INDIA: ‘Anti-Muslim hate speech sustains polarisation that benefits the ruling party’

  CIVICUS speaks about India’s ongoing elections with Aakar Patel,board chair of Amnesty International India.

  Amnesty International is a global movement of over 10 million people committed to creating a future where human rights are enjoyed by everyone. Amnesty International India was forced to halt its operations on 30 September 2020 as part of the Indian government’s crackdown on civil society.

  How has the election developed so far, and what roles is civil society playing in it?

  This is our lengthiest election yet, spanning from 19 April to 1 June. We expect to know the results on 4 June. This is an anomaly considering the advancements in technology that should have made the process faster. Previous elections have been completed in under three weeks, and even in the 1950s, when balloting was physical and counting manual, the process was swifter. One explanation for this election’s extended duration is that Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the focal point of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), needs time to campaign across all 28 states. The Election Commission, purportedly impartial, has been very accommodating to his needs.

  This campaign has been notably acrimonious, with Modi exploiting religion to polarise voters. Anti-Muslim hate speech sustains polarisation, and this benefits the BJP disproportionately because it leverages religious identity unlike any other party. This polarisation effect is compounded by the BJP’s implementation of divisive policies, such as the criminalisation of marriages between Hindus and Muslims. Such measures are reshaping segments of society and are likely to have enduring impacts on our social fabric.

  Modi also propagates baseless insinuations and accusations against the opposition, often left unchecked by the media. Political parties, particularly the BJP, adeptly harness digital tools for maximum impact, unbound by any ethical considerations.

  Civil society in India faces significant challenges that have intensified under the BJP and Modi. Despite this, many groups have actively countered the communal and divisive rhetoric as effectively as possible, and have engaged with voters to provide information on relevant issues.

  What are the major issues for voters?

  So far, voter turnout has been lower than expected, and this seems to be the result of lack of enthusiasm. The BJP is placing its bets on polarisation rather than putting forward substantive proposals to tackle voters’ material concerns. These move briefly onto the centre stage when the opposition is able to thrust them under the spotlight. And still, major media outlets, predominantly owned by corporate entities and seemingly tethered to the government, tend to sidestep pressing issues like unemployment, inflation and violence in Manipur state.

  Regional issues hold significant importance, particularly in the southern states where the BJP’s political influence is not as entrenched as in the north and west. The simultaneous holding of legislative assembly elections in Andhra Pradesh alongside the national election will undoubtedly influence dynamics. In Karnataka, where the Indian National Congress party secured victory last year, its performance in delivering on its promises will likely shape its electoral fortunes this time around.

  What are the chances of the united opposition coalition winning?

  The opposition has a chance, although it appears to be a slim one, for several reasons.

  The first is that the election is neither free nor fair due to the fact that many opposition leaders are currently in jail, even though they haven’t been convicted. They have been arrested just so that they cannot campaign. Opposition bank accounts have been frozen by Modi for the same reason.

  There is also the fact that the BJP is also the wealthiest party by far and has a highly efficient and experienced ground campaigns team.

  However, I would say that Modi’s performance over the last decade is a major concern for many voters and will likely impact negatively on his support among those still undecided.

  Coalitions have always been good in our part of the world because they impose a sense of moderation and prevent bouts of insanity. Ranged against the might of the BJP, the largest political party in the world, there is no option for non-BJP and non-communal parties but to ally.

  ---

  Civic space in India is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Amnesty International India through itsFacebook page and follow @AIIndia onTwitter andInstagram.

• INDIA: ‘Civil society efforts will be crucial to the quality of the elections’

  CIVICUS speaks with Anjali Bhardwaj, founding member of the Society for Citizen Vigilance Initiatives (Satark Nagrik Sangathan, SNS), about recent electoral reforms and civil society efforts to ensure the quality of India’s upcoming election.

  Established in 2003, SNS is a civil society organisation (CSO) working to promote government transparency and accountability and foster active citizen participation.

  What recent changes have been made to rules on campaign financing?

  On 15 February, the Supreme Court ruled the electoral bond system currently used to finance election campaigns unconstitutional. This is a positive change, with a potential to bring transparency to campaign financing.

  Introduced in 2018, the electoral bond scheme allowed people and organisations to buy designated bank bonds ranging from 1,000 to 10 million rupees (approx. US$12 to US$120,000) to donate to political campaigns in a completely anonymous way. When it introduced this system, the ruling Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) presented it as a measure to combat corruption and increase transparency in political financing.

  Before the bond system was introduced, political parties could receive funds in cash or through the banking system, but large corporate donations were often made in cash. All cash donations below 20,000 rupees (approx. US$240) were anonymous under the Income Tax Act. So to hoodwink the system, parties often reported large cash donations as multiple donations of amounts smaller than 20,000 rupees.

  The electoral bond scheme was presented as a measure to increase transparency but the anonymity it ensured had the opposite effects. The opacity it enabled allowed single donors to provide unlimited funding. It hasn’t allowed people, CSOs, opposition political parties or even the Election Commission of India to track the flow of money in politics. It has compromised the public’s right to information, as voters are unable to discern the extent or sources of funding political parties receive. This limited people’s democratic right to make informed voting decisions.

  What was the reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s decision?

  The Supreme Court first addressed this issue as early as 2019, acknowledging the bond system’s potential harm to democracy but allowing it to continue while it analysed the substance of the case. But even back then, it emphasised the deepened information imbalance created by a system that allowed the ruling party to access information about donors and donations through the government-controlled bank while leaving opposition parties and the public in the dark.

  In its recent ruling, the Supreme Court stressed that electoral bonds infringe article 19 of the constitution because without the right to information in electoral matters, the rights to free speech and expression guaranteed by article 19 cannot be fully realised.

  Voters in India predominantly support parties, rather than individual candidates. When large corporations contribute generous funds to political parties, there is the presumption that they do so in the expectation of receiving favours in return once parties become part of governments. When favours are returned, policy is guided not by promises made to voters or by people’s needs but by the interests of funders. This is why funding transparency is crucial for informed voting. Without this information, voters cannot know what to expect when parties access government.

  Electoral bonds exacerbated corruption through anonymous funding that gave free rein to large corporations to influence policy. They also made the playing field even more uneven, as the BJP consistently received a substantial share of electoral bonds.

  The Supreme Court judgment declared the scheme and associated amendments unconstitutional, emphasising the importance of the right to information. The court prohibited further transactions and mandated disclosure of past transactions, marking a significant move towards restoring transparency and fairness in India’s electoral process.

  How has civic space evolved under Prime Minister Narendra Modi?

  Regrettably, since the beginning of the Modi government in 2014 we have seen a significant contraction of civic space, due to systematic attacks on the crucial right to dissent, a cornerstone of any democracy.

  The essence of democracy lies in people’s right to question those in power. But in India, this right has been under attack in three primary ways.

  First, those who express dissent, criticise government policies or challenge legislation are labelled as anti-national. The governments files legal cases against them, leveraging draconian laws, terror-related legislation and money laundering statutes to silence them.

  Second, the government has deliberately weakened the laws that empower citizens. The Indian Right to Information Act, lauded as one of the world’s most progressive, has been amended twice in the last five years. Regressive amendments have severely affected people’s right to access information and question the authorities. Similarly regressive amendments to other laws, such as the Representation of People Act and the Income Tax Act, along with the electoral bonds, have further curtailed people’s right to access vital information to hold the authorities to account.

  The government has also undermined the independence of institutions responsible for upholding fundamental rights, including the right to free expression and protest. This has eroded the constitutional protection people should enjoy when expressing dissent. Protesting and questioning the government have therefore become increasingly difficult.

  The cumulative effect of these developments has dealt a severe blow to civic space in India.

  Are there enough guarantees for a free and fair election?

  India has needed electoral reform long before the current administration. For decades civil society has advocated for changes to strengthen the electoral process. While India takes pride in conducting relatively free and fair elections, concerns over the quality of elections have increased over time.

  Civil society has repeatedly expressed alarm over issues including the influence of money over elections, the security and reliability of electronic voting machines and manipulation of the voter roll.

  Regarding the undue influence of money over elections and consequently over policymaking, electoral bonds have long been a matter of major concern. Civil society has also expressed apprehension about glitches in and tampering with electronic voting systems, prompting debate and ongoing legal challenges in the Supreme Court. Alarms were also sounded by recent elections that saw arbitrary deletions and additions to voter lists.

  Civil society continues to bring attention to these issues, urging authorities to find solutions. The resolution of these challenges is essential for India to genuinely claim it conducts free and fair elections.

  Who are the major contenders in the 2024 election, and what are the main issues the winner will need to tackle?

  India has numerous political parties that actively participate in elections. The BJP and its allies have successfully formed a government twice and are currently strong contenders to secure a third term in office. The opposition landscape includes the Indian National Congress, historically prevalent prior to the BJP’s rise. But there are many other national and regional parties that contribute to the diversity of the political spectrum.

  As a developing country, India, faces multifaceted challenges. Among the most significant are deep-seated socio-economic inequality and high incidence of poverty, with a small number of families holding a substantial portion of the country’s wealth and a substantial percentage of the population living below the poverty line. There is much need for policies to uplift those on the margins of society and reforms to the structures that perpetuate inequality.

  Equally crucial is the protection of civic freedoms, particularly for those who criticise the government, including through peaceful protests. Those who express dissent and demand accountability must be protected rather than criminalised.

  The next government should prioritise these issues, addressing inequalities and working to create an environment where citizens can freely express themselves and participate fully in the democratic process.

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  Civic space in Indonesia is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the SCVI through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow @sns_india on Twitter.

• INDONESIA: ‘We must become an example of successful societal resistance against the threat of autocratic rule’

  CIVICUS speaks about the upcoming general election in Indonesia with Muhammad Isnur, chairperson of the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) and Secretary of the Board of theHuman Rights Working Group.

  Founded in 1970, YLBHI is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) that provides legal aid to excluded communities throughout Indonesia and engages in research, advocacy and empowerment initiatives. Every year the organisation receives at least 3,500 legal complaints and requests for assistance.

  What is at stake in the upcoming general election?

  The upcoming election will define Indonesia’s trajectory amidst a trend of growing authoritarianism. The incumbent government led by President Joko Widodo, known as Jokowi, is responsible for numerous human rights violations. It has targeted poor people through evictions and arrests, weakened anti-corruption efforts and criminalised civil society.

  Jokowi has expressed support for the presidential candidacy of Prabowo Subianto, who faces allegations of crimes against humanity, including abductions and enforced disappearances of activists during mass protests in 1998 that led to the downfall of the Suharto dictatorship. He was dismissed from the military but hasn’t faced accountability and his victims haven’t received reparations, and some remain missing. His victory would be the worst possible scenario for civil society.

  Jokowi has also undermined the rule of law to pave the way for his 36-year-old son, Gibran Rakabuming, to become a vice-presidential candidate. The controversial Constitutional Court ruling issued in October 2023 to grant him an exception to the legal minimum age of 40 to run for president or vice-president was delivered by Chief Justice Anwar Usman, who happens to be Jokowi’s brother-in-law. Gibran represents the interests of the Jokowi government and corrupt and authoritarian economic elites.

  If the ruling elite succeeds in arbitrarily extending its power, there is risk of a resurgence of the kind of authoritarian and oligarchical rule we saw during dictatorship from 1966 to 1998.

  Who are the other contenders, and what are their human rights records?

  The other candidates are Ganjar Pranowo and Mahfud MD of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, which has a long history of wielding power and currently holds the highest number of ministers in the government. Mahfud has defended the Jokowi government for many years and denied the gross human rights violations committed by Indonesian security forces against Indigenous Papuans.

  We’ve also documented numerous human rights violations in Central Java during Ganjar’s tenure as governor. In Kendeng, despite a court decision favourable to the local community opposed to the construction of a cement factory, Ganjar reissued an environmental permit for the construction to proceed. In Wadas, he facilitated the implementation of a mining project aligned with Jokowi’s agenda, disregarding opposition from the local community, which also faced extraordinary repression, including arrests and beatings by the police and disruptions of internet and electricity services.

  The third pair of candidates, Anies Baswedan and Muhaimin Iskandar, in contrast, position themselves as advocates for change. Anies has a social agenda focused on protecting poor people. But they receive support from parties that are integral to the existing power structure and have also backed laws that weakened labour rights and undermined the Corruption Eradication Commission.

  What are the prospects of the election being free and fair?

  The public is concerned about Jokowi’s numerous efforts to make the election unfree and unfair. First, although he later denied it, under the pretext of COVID-19 he planned to amend the constitution to stay for a third term. He then focused on building a political dynasty. He supported his son-in-law and his son to be elected as mayors in Medan and Surakarta. Civil society reports suggest the police and army played an influential role in their victories. Concern persists as Jokowi has signalled support for the Prabowo-Gibran pair and ordered his officials to back his son’s campaign, even though they are required to remain neutral.

  There are also significant concerns about potential fraud, which have prompted civil society to intensify efforts to establish an election monitoring system and set up monitoring mechanisms at polling stations. Civil society remains vigilant, scrutinising any statements, policies or threats that could undermine the integrity of the election.

  Civil society is joining forces to prevent the election of Prabowo. Online activists have created the Four Fingers Movement to urge voters to choose a different pair than Prabowo-Gibran.

  Surveys currently indicate that Prabowo could receive about 40 per cent of the vote. To force a runoff, it’s essential to prevent fraud and secure turnout. If nobody takes over half of the vote on 14 February, civil society and the public may unite around an alternative candidate to counter Prabowo in the runoff. But there are concerns about a potentially low turnout. The number of people choosing not to vote was already high in the previous election.

  What should be done to counter democratic decline in Indonesia?

  Democracy in Indonesia is being eroded by a government that disregards constitutional principles and the rule of law and instead uses laws as tools of power to suit its interests. Jokowi has reinstated the army and police in various public roles and issued presidential decrees and enacted policies to undermine other political parties and eliminate the opposition.

  A key symptom of democratic decline is repression of government critics, including journalists, activists, academics and others advocating for human rights. A revealing example is the case against activists Haris Azhar and Fatia Maulidiyanti, who faced criminal defamation charges for exposing state corruption and human rights violations in the Papua region. Human rights are being violated across Indonesia as communities are evicted under the pretext of investment or national development projects, and people who denounce this are systematically criminalised.

  But there are other issues that should be tackled to foster democracy in Indonesia. Indonesian political parties lack a clear ideological orientation and don’t represent public interests. Their position depends on their leadership and decisions are often made by a few. There is no internal democracy in political parties. The high costs of campaigning lead parties to rely on support from wealthy investors and businesspeople, undermining transparency and enabling corruption.

  To foster change, we should work toward democratising parties, making them more transparent and accountable. Efforts should be made to involve the public in the legislative process. Laws are sometimes passed within a week without any consultation with civil society. Referendums and other mechanisms should be explored to enhance public participation.

  The upcoming election has additional significance in the face of a global surge in authoritarianism. We must avoid following the path of the Philippines, where the son and daughter of two authoritarian dynasties succeeded in getting elected. We must unite in the face of authoritarianism and become an example of successful societal resistance against the threat of autocratic rule.

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  Civic space inIndonesiais rated ‘obstructed’by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with YLBHI through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@YLBHI on Twitter.

• ITALY: ‘We anticipate hostility towards civil society working on human rights’

  CIVICUS speaks about the recent Italian election with Oiza Q Obasuyi from the Italian Coalition for Civil Liberties and Rights (CILD).

  CILD is a national network of civil society organisations (CSOs) working to protect and expand civil rights and freedoms by running public campaigns for policy change, advocating with governments and international bodies and taking cases to court.

  What are your main takeaways from the recent Italian election?

  The first thing to note is that a significant number of people – one in three – did not vote. One big reason for this is the increasing lack of trust in political institutions. This is important to consider in the face of Giorgia Meloni’s claim that she won thanks to the vote of all Italian citizens – which is not true.

  I personally think that left-wing parties have become increasingly distant from the masses, and especially the working class, which is now significantly underrepresented. The left should be working not only on civil rights but on social rights too: if the far right manages to convince even part of the working class to vote for it by using racist and anti-immigration propaganda, this means the left is not doing what it is supposed to do: campaigning for the social and civil rights of the worse-off, including working class people, low-wage earners, students, women and LGBTQI+ people.

  We are experiencing an economic crisis that is affecting the lower classes deeply. Inequalities have become unbearable and political institutions keep ignoring protest demands, be they from the Insorgiamo (‘We are rising up’) movement for workers’ rights or Fridays For Future Italia,which continues to call out the government for its inaction on climate change.

  In a context where there is no political force on the left reacting to these demands and promoting policies to protect and promote these basic rights, the fact that people have voted for a far-right candidate such as Giorgia Meloni shouldn’t surprise us.

  How did civic space conditions evolve in the run-up to the election?

  Hate speech and disinformation played a significant role during the campaign. Meloni’s entire propaganda is based on ultraconservative beliefs that she pushes by instrumentalising half-truths, a distortion of the facts and outright lies.

  Even though she has said she would not repeal Law 194, which protects the right to abortion, Meloni has repeatedly joined so-called ‘pro-life’ conferences organised by ultra-catholic and conservative associations, along with her League party colleague Matteo Salvini. She has often stated that children need a father and a mother and that’s the only type of family that has the right to exist, to the detriment of LGBTQI+ couples who continue to fight to have the same rights as heterosexual couples.

  To back her claims, Meloni often passes off prejudice as scientific fact and brings up conspiracy theories about ‘gay lobbies’ trying to indoctrinate children with their so-called ‘gender agenda’.

  In addition, during her campaign Meloni referred to drugs and alcohol as ‘youth deviations’. I think she will use these issues as yet another way to curb citizens’ civil rights. This can be expected in the light of her framing of drug-related issues as criminal rather than, say, health issues, particularly when the people concerned are of foreign descent.

  How significant is it that Giorgia Meloni downplayed her fascist heritage?

  I don’t think that makes her less of a threat. She has strong links with Hungarian far-right president Viktor Orbán, who is well known for his racist and illegal anti-migrant policies that systematically push migrants back at the border and his hostility towards LGBTQI+ people and more generally, towards any CSO working for the protection of human rights.

  Meloni’s entire propaganda was based on similar grounds, with a strong sense of nationalism and conservatism that derives from her party’s fascist past – not to mention her belief in the so-called ‘great replacement’ theory, a conspiracy theory that believes there is an ongoing plan to bring in more and more immigrants until white Europeans disappear from the continent. That is why, according to her, immigration must be stopped.

  How do you think the advances made by the far right will impact on the rights of excluded groups?

  I think we will face a situation in which it will be extremely hard to push for positive laws and policies that protect everybody’s social and civil rights.

  Italy is one of the few countries in the European Union that does not have a law that specifically protects LGBTQI+ rights. A proposed bill against homophobia, transphobia, biphobia and lesbophobia, popularly known as DDL Zan, was not passed.

  There is also a possibility that migrants’ right to request asylum could be further restricted, given Meloni’s hostility towards immigration and the current situation with the decreti sicurezza – decrees on security and immigration – issued by Matteo Salvini when he was Minister of the Interior between 2018 and 2019.

  Even though the current Minister of the Interior introduced ‘special protection’ for migrants, humanitarian protection was abolished and access to accommodation was extremely restricted by Salvini. His successor made some revisions to his policies, but various elements continue to raise concerns. The decision to allow the revocation of Italian citizenship of foreign-born Italians deemed a threat to national security was not questioned, although the process was amended.

  For 30 years, civil society has demanded citizenship law reform to guarantee access to Italian citizenship for people of foreign descent who were born or raised in Italy. There are over 800,000 such people, many of them children. They are de facto Italian citizens, but they’re not legally recognised as such. Although there have been left-wing governments that could have pushed toward reform, we still have an obsolete law based on jus sanguinis, or citizenship by blood, and it is very unlikely that a Meloni-led government would change that.

  As for our work, we anticipate hostility towards CSOs working on human rights, if the government goes down the same road as her ally Viktor Orbán did in Hungary.

  What kind of domestic and international support does Italian civil society need to continue doing its work?

  We need active support from European and international civil society as external observers, especially when international institutions are involved and called to scrutinise potential human rights violations and civic space restrictions.

  Economic support is also important: during their previous government, right-wing parties proposed to economically support police forces through 5x1000 funds, which is one of the fundamental ways in which CSOs fund their work, thanks to part of the money citizens voluntarily donate when filing their tax declarations. If this proposal becomes reality, then many CSOs will suffer budget cuts.

  Civil society must also stay vigilant on women’s reproductive rights, under the constant threat of new patriarchal and sexist laws to either make access to abortion more difficult or ban it completely. We must also ensure that civil rights protection goes hand in hand with social rights protection: poverty, unemployment and low wages are major problems that affect many vulnerable communities.

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  Civic space in Italy is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Italian Coalition for Civil Liberties and Rights through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@Cild2014 and @OizaQueensday on Twitter.

• KENYA: ‘People are discouraged from voting when they think that voices do not matter’

  CIVICUS speaks about the recent presidential election in Kenya with Ken Ogembo, programme manager of Siasa Place.

  Siasa Place is a civil society organisation (CSO) founded in 2015 with the aim of promoting youth participation in politics. It educates people about the importance of voting and how the government can be held accountable.

  Did you observe an increase in civic space restrictions around the 9 August election?

  We observed several civic space restrictions during the election. The media did not provide fair coverage to all candidates, and the most popular candidates had a clear advantage because everything they did was widely covered and they got a lot of propaganda. Media are powerful tools that can be used to influence the views of people and in this case were used to promote some parties and bring down others. Social media was also used to spread misinformation that influenced many people’s voting decisions.

  Further, there was violence in some counties, which we believe was organised to spark fear. As a result, people no longer felt comfortable attending campaigns for some candidates because of fear they could be attacked. 

  There were also cases of candidates being attacked. Some female politicians were attacked and assaulted; unfortunately not much was done to protect them or follow up on their cases. William Ruto, announced as the winner of the election, was also attacked in Kisumu. His vehicles were destroyed but fortunately he was not hurt. 

  There was also a situation in Kakamega county between the two main coalitions, Kenya Kwanza and Azimio la Umoja: they were fighting over access to a stadium and a number of people got hurt in the process.

  However, I do not believe violence was serious or widespread to the point that we could say it was what marked the electoral process.

  Why was there such low voter turnout?

  There are a number of factors that could have possibly contributed to it, but I think it is first and foremost about people being demotivated from voting because they do not see any change happening as a result of elections. Government corruption is pervasive no matter who is in the government, and economic performance is consistently poor. Public services are of very low quality: there are not enough healthcare facilities, doctors are often going on strike, markets are dirty. Youth unemployment continues to be very high, and most people don’t think this will change, so many do not see any reason for voting.

  We also need to look at how candidates are nominated. Presidential candidate Raila Odinga’s party, Azimio la Umoja, did not conduct democratic internal processes in most of its strongholds and often nominated people who had long been in power and had performed dismally. People are discouraged from voting when they think their voices do not matter.

  I would also say it is also ignorance that drives young people away from the polls. They should understand that regardless of whether they get out to vote, a government will get elected and will rule over them. The fact that they did not vote takes away their moral authority to question those in power. Of course they still have a constitutional right to do so, but their questioning will lack substance and they will not have any alternative to offer.

  Through our engagement with young people, we have noticed they lack confidence in the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IBEC), the institution that manages elections, which many consider unable to deliver free and fair elections. They view it as pointless to go out and vote if the IBEC can’t ensure their votes will count.

  This is probably a mistake, because there have been improvements in the electoral process, including by making it clear that the results received from voting stations are final. However, the IBEC still has a lot of work to do make people trust the electoral process.

  Finally, I think the government played a huge role by not providing any civic education. It only started doing the basics when it was already too late, as most people who didn’t vote had already made up their minds not to. And when the government did, the content was not of the right kind, in the sense that would make people understand why voting is important and how to play their role as citizens.

  Has civil society been able to play its role in the electoral process?

  Civil society’s role has been somewhat restricted. Many CSOs would need more support and resources to play their full range of roles during elections. During this election we saw many CSOs unable to provide civic education programmes because of lack of funding and government support.

  Our job as civil society is to advocate on people’s behalf, inform them about the process and raise awareness of their rights. But most of us were denied the right to do our work due to lack of resources. My organisation, Siasa Place, played a key role in the previous election because it received the required resources in time. But this year the support we needed came about two months before the elections, which is rather late for us to start doing our work at the community level. This affected our role, but we hope things will improve in the coming years. We need government and civil society to work together to inform people around elections so they know what they are doing.

  There were also cases of CSOs being instrumentalised by political parties to influence voters. That defeats the whole purpose of having an active civil society. We urge the concerned CSOs to remember their original goals and mission and refocus on them. We should be the voice of marginalised people and communities, not of political parties. It is our duty to hold political parties accountable, not root for them at elections.

  Given the very close result, do you think there could be a recount or even an election re-run?

  If the defeated candidate can convince the court that there have been irregularities so gross that they have affected the outcome, then the court could nullify the results. But if votes are recounted and the result comes out the same, there won’t be a need for a rerun.

  Civic space in Kenya is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Siasa Place through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@siasaplace on Twitter. 

• KENYA: ‘The denial of resources for civic education has been a massive blow for civil society’

  CIVICUS speaks about the upcoming elections in Kenya with Paul Okumu, head of the Secretariat of the Africa Platform (AP). AP is a pan-African civil society platform based in Nairobi, Kenya, that works to strengthen state-society relations to achieve more effective and inclusive development.

  With elections still a few months away, is it clear who the contenders will be?

  Many are unaware that Kenya has only one election day in which all political positions are filled. But although the focus is on the presidential race, the forthcoming elections will bring in 349 members of the National Assembly, the lower house of parliament, including 290 elected from the constituencies, 47 women elected from the counties and 12 nominated representatives, plus 69 members of the Senate, 47 of whom are elected directly while the rest are elected to represent women, young people and other excluded groups.

  In addition, Kenyans will be electing 47 governors, the regional leaders directly responsible to county assemblies, that is, their respective regional parliaments. Kenyans will elect a further 1,450 county assembly members. So the election is a complex one.

  For the presidential race, some likely frontrunners are already emerging. The current president, Uhuru Kenyatta, is ineligible to stand for re-election after completing his second term; his deputy, William Ruto, is among the leading candidates alongside former prime minister Raila Odinga. It is worth noting that this is the fifth time Odinga is running for president, having lost his previous attempts and withdrawn once in 2017.

  By law candidacies for the presidency will be made official in mid-May, and there are currently almost 45 people who have submitted their names as possible candidates. The election body, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, will have the final word on which candidates fulfil the legal criteria to run.

  The question many are likely to ask is why there are only two leading contenders. The answer is as complex as the country’s elections.

  In a bid to exercise a divide-and-rule strategy, the British colonial government divided Kenya into regional ethnic units, with people from one unit not allowed to travel to other units without the authority of the colonial government under a system known as Kipande (Identity) system. In addition, people in regions closest to where white people lived were given access to education much earlier so they could work for whites. As a result, these regions (mainly central, Rift Valley and Western) progressed much faster and became dominant in the period leading to and after independence. It helped that these regions are also the most agriculturally productive, which is part of the reason the whites chose them as their residence.

  There are about 43 ethnic groups in Kenya, but just five of them constitute over half of its population of about 50 million. Due to the combined effects of colonial boundaries, which the 2010 Constitution kept intact – a story for another day – and the numeric dominance of these few ethnic groups, the country’s politics, in a quite similar fashion to that in South Sudan, continue to revolve around five ethnic groups. Leading presidential candidates always emerge from these five. Currently, the two leading candidates represent a coalition of three and two of these largest ethnic groups.

  What will be at stake in the upcoming elections?

  The current president is seen to have spent his time investing in sections of the economy that benefited his vast family businesses. From infrastructure to hospitals to the dairy and transport sectors, most of the investments have been in areas that are perceived directly to add value or make it easy for the president’s family businesses to thrive. As a result, there is a perception that what is at stake is the protection of these investments, hence the current complex coalition supported by the president that has brought together people seen to be those who will preserve the status quo.

  But at a deeper level, the country is in a serious crisis. The economy has been in recession for over eight months now. Half of its recurrent budget is used on civil service salaries. The latest economic report by the government shows that for the first time in the country’s history, debt costs will surpass the recurrent expenditure, projected at Sh1.34 trillion (US$1.3 billion) for the coming year. The debt binge is mainly from Eurobond offerings, a package of Chinese loans and syndicated commercial loans taken in recent years. Distress levels are so high that the Central Bank has begun to ration foreign reserves, especially US dollars. Fuel prices have risen by nearly 53 per cent in the past one year, largely due to the fact that fuel has always been an easy target for taxation.

  And that is not all: European countries have always used Kenya as a trade gateway to the continent and have largely made it a multinational headquarters for European companies working across Africa. This has led to massive losses through tax evasion and avoidance and skewed double taxation agreements, and has killed countless small businesses that could not manage the massive resources and subsidies given by European development finance institutions or donor agencies (such as the CDC Group of the UK) to European corporations so they can win contracts and set up businesses in the country.

  But there is a bigger underlying fear among citizens. In 2017 the Supreme Court was forced to overturn the results of the presidential elections after it emerged that the government, through Ot Morpho, a French company fronted by the French government, had manipulated the vote counting and tallying, handing victory to the incumbent president. The subsequent repeat elections were boycotted by the opposition at the last minute on the grounds that the government had refused to make the changes demanded by the Supreme Court to ensure transparent vote counting. This massive collusion and rejection of changes proposed by the judiciary severely eroded confidence in the electoral system. It is believed to be the part of reason for the current low voter registration.

  What are the civic space conditions like in the run-up to the election?

  The executive and the political class had made attempts to water down the constitution significantly through a process known as Building Bridges Initiative, but they were stopped in their tracks by the courts, including the Supreme Court. This has preserved citizens’ freedoms and has strengthened confidence in the judiciary. Because of this there is still considerable freedom of assembly and expression.

  But the government has also tried to limit the work of civil society around the election. In July 2021, the Kenyan Foreign Affairs Ministry sent a confidential memo to all foreign missions and international civil society organisations (CSOs) that usually support civic education, instructing them not to put any resources, either directly or through local CSOs, into civic education and civic advocacy without the express authorisation of the government. To date, such authorisation has not been granted, and it’s not clear if partners have even requested it.

  Interestingly, foreign missions kept quiet and refused to divulge this information to local CSOs. It is not clear why the government took this drastic measure, but it is even more baffling why foreign missions have been so quick to obey it when a few years ago they defied a similar directive by the Russian government and funded civic education in that country. A possible reason lies in Kenya’s centrality, alongside Rwanda, for the politics of Africa and the economies of Europe, which these foreign countries are keen to preserve. 

  As a result of this decision, this year Kenya has had the lowest voter registration in its history and levels of civic awareness have plummeted. The denial of resources for civic education has been a massive blow for civil society, and with the elections under 90 days away, it is not yet clear what role civil society will play around them.

  The window for registration as election observers, usually played by the African Union, the Carter Foundation, the European Union and a coalition of civil society groups, is still open, and it is still possible that with alternative sources of funding, CSOs may still engage in some way.

  What is the potential for electoral violence?

  Violence is highly unlikely. Despite ethnic politics rooted in the colonial regionalisation arrangement, Kenyans are largely peaceful. Most of the post-election violence that Kenya has experienced has been mostly confined to power struggles among the five dominant ethnic groups and has never been about the entire country. Over the past five months, these five ethnic groups have formed two large coalitions, making violence unlikely.

  Of course, conflict between these two coalitions cannot be ruled out if one of them loses the elections, but if it occurs, this violence is unlikely to have an impact on the rest of the communities.

  Civic space in Kenya is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Africa Platform through itswebsite.

• Kenya: Stop restrictions on civic freedoms ahead of national elections, says new report
  • Excessive force used against protesters
  • Twitter accounts shut down over calls to lower prices of food & basic commodities
  • Attacks on freedom of speech & political interference with media and judiciary

  As Kenyans head to the polls on 9 August to elect a new president, a new report by global civil society alliance, CIVICUS and the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) highlights the decline in civic rights in the country and urges the authorities to respect fundamental freedoms during this crucial period. Protest restrictions, attacks on journalists and the misuse of laws are of particular concern. 

  According to the new research brief, Kenyan authorities have used excessive force to clamp down on protests and suppress dissent in the run-up to the election. Recent demonstrations to protest the rising cost of food under the hashtag #Njaa-Revolution (‘Hunger Revolution’) have been met with unlawful arrests, detention and brutal force; in April, human rights defender Julius Kamau was violently assaulted outside the National Treasury after protesting rising food prices.  Lethal and crowd control weapons such as live ammunition, teargas and rubber bullets are commonly used by police to disperse gatherings. 

  CIVICUS and the KHRC are also concerned about the misuse of laws to undermine peaceful protest. The Public Order Act, a law from the British colonial period, requires activists to notify authorities of protests at least 3 days in advance. However, there have been cases of authorities tearing up notification letters and refusing to receive them. 

  Also, police have mistakenly understood the provision as a requirement for protests to be approved or denied, using it as an excuse to deem protests ‘unpermitted’, as was seen on 28 June 2022 when a letter notifying police about an intended protest by the Social Justice Centre, a Nairobi-based grassroots group, was rejected without explanation. Although the right to peaceful assembly is guaranteed in Kenya’s constitution, it is continually undermined.
   
  “The right to peacefully protest is fundamental in any functioning democracy. Authorities and law enforcement bodies must respect and ensure citizens can exercise their civic rights, this is critical in ensuring inclusive participation in the electoral process,” said Sylvia Mbataru, East Africa Researcher, CIVICUS.
   
  As the space for street protests becomes more closed and restricted, activists have turned to social media to air their grievances. The #NjaaRevolution attracted a huge online following with its calls to control soaring prices and other basic commodities. In May, the movement was silenced by Twitter with over 20 accounts being suspended for ‘violating Twitter Rules’ and acting ‘suspiciously’ - no further justification was given. Suspending the online accounts of major activists in the run-up to elections is tantamount to censorship.
   
  Attacks on freedom of speech extend to journalists. Incidents and violations against the press are on the rise ahead of elections, including the assault of two journalists covering an event at Raila Odinga’s party headquarters in March 2022. In a separate incident a Citizen TV journalist, Martin Kosgey, was threatened via text after airing a story implicating a governor's bodyguard in a murder case. Kosgey also reported that he had received intelligence that there was a plan to harm him over the story.  
   
  The apparent political capture of the country’s media regulatory body has also contributed to a decline in press freedom. In November 2021, President Uhuru Kenyatta appointed a new head of the Communications Authority, seemingly consolidating the ruling party's power over a strategically important body that is supposed to be non-partisan.  
   
  The possibility of political interference undermines the body's mandate to serve as a watchdog for public media and to monitor the operations of the state news agency. In theory, the authority is responsible for ensuring fair and impartial reporting for the upcoming elections, but there is a risk that it will be used to limit the space for independent media.
   
  Political interference in Kenya’s democratic institutions also extends to the judiciary. Most notably, in 2021 when the president defied the constitution by refusing to swear in six judges nominated by the Judicial Service Commission (JSC). Judicial Officers have also been subjected to numerous attacks from the political elite and the executive.
   
  Kenya was placed on the CIVICUS Monitor’s human rights ‘Watchlist’ in June 2022. The Watchlisthighlights countries where there has been a recent and steady decline in civic freedoms, including the rights of free speech and peaceful assembly.

  Kenya is currently rated Obstructed by the CIVICUS Monitor. There are 42 countries in the world with this rating (see all). This rating is typically given to countries where power holders heavily contest civic space and impose a combination of legal and practical constraints on the full enjoyment of fundamental rights (see the full description of ratings).

  More information

  Download the Kenya research brief here. 

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  Interviews

  CIVICUS:

• Kenya’s fresh election lights up Africa with hope

  On 26 October 2017, Kenya returns to the polls after the Supreme Court declared the election held on 8 August 2017 null and void. CIVICUS speaks to governance specialist Paul Okumu on the coming election re-run, the announcement by the main opposition that it will not contest the poll and what this means for Kenya’s democracy

  Q: What is the mood in the country after the Supreme Court judgement ordering for a fresh election to be held this October?

  On the whole, this has been the most exciting moment for Kenyans — both here at home and abroad.

  But beyond Kenya, we have received several messages of solidarity and excitement from across Africa, with many African citizens and civil society telling us that this is a victory for the continent and not just for Kenya.

  Never in their existence have the courts overruled the executive in the manner that the Kenya judiciary did. The judiciary has always shied away from challenging orders seen or perceived to touch the executive, and this ruling was totally unexpected, considering that the incumbent President is for all purposes the final appointing authority of members of the judiciary (based on recommendations from the Judiciary Service Commission and Parliamentary approval).

  But the most ecstatic part is that citizens, as well as all arms of government, respected the judiciary and agreed to follow the orders. It has given citizens a renewed breath of fresh air and confidence in the judiciary.

  It also reaffirmed the supremacy of the Constitution and the power of citizens, something that is seen as new in Kenya, considering that the Constitution is less than ten years old.

  There is however some slight apprehension that being the first time, perhaps the excitement is temporary and it is not clear if indeed this is a reflection of a new activist and accountability nature of the judiciary, or this is limited just to the Supreme Court. Many of you may have also heard that the ruling party is using its new majority in both house of Parliament to push through two new laws that will dramatically weaken the Supreme Court and the electoral oversight body, Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC).

  One must recall, however, that the groundwork that led to the nullification of this case was in fact another ruling by a lower court. In May this year, human rights activist Maina Kiai, who is the former Special UN Rapporteur on the Rights to Peaceful Assembly, went with others to court to challenge the Elections Act. He asked that the law be changed to ensure that the counting of votes is done at the polling station so that they cannot not be altered by the electoral body.The court ruled in his favour and the electoral body took the matter to the Court of Appeal, where the ruling was upheld.

  At least 70% of the ruling by the Supreme Court was based on the ruling made in favour of Maina Kiai.

   Q: There are concerns that there are many issues that the Electoral body must first rectify and will not be able to do this in the given time before the election. What are your views on this?

  This is Kenya's greatest fear, and right now the opposition is already holding demonstrations to demand that some of these matters be rectified as conditions for participating in the fresh election. But the hands of the Supreme Court were tied here. The Constitution allows for only the electoral body, (Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), to conduct elections. The Constitution also requires for those elections to be held within 60 days of the nullification of a previous one.

  The concerns are  therefore justified when one considers that the electoral body has decided to retain the three companies accused by the opposition of complicity in delivering a result that was not the will of the people — Al Ghurai, a Dubai based Company, Safaricom, Kenya’s largest Mobile company, and OT Morpho, a French company. Part of this is the lengthy procurement rules.

  Kenyans are waiting with bated breath to see how the electoral body will address what the Supreme Court described as "systemic" and "institutional" failures within the IEBC. These failures were not just a failure of equipment, but a failure of oversight and accountability.

  But remember that the main thrust of the judgement was not the manner in which the elections was conducted. The majority ruling of the Supreme Court accused the IEBC of redefining democracy and ignoring that democracy is a process that ends with elections. It rejected the view that democracy begins with elections.

  In doing so the IEBC was accused of not following the entire democratic process that leads to elections — from public confidence-building to ensuring transparency in the entire process in the period leading to and the period after the elections.

  So the challenges facing the IEBC are much bigger and it’s not clear if they will address these systemic and institutional challenges in the few days remaining to elections.

  Q: The President has said he is disappointed by the Supreme Court Ruling. Why is this and what may it mean for the independence of the judiciary?

  The President’s disappointment is understandable, and to an extent it appears justified since one of the dissenting judges insists that he had won the last election by 54%.

  But unlike 2013 where the Supreme Court based its judgement on numbers, this time the court departed from this and refused to be drawn into recounting of votes. In their view, the court argued that if the process was flawed, and if there is proof that the Constitution was violated in the process leading to and after the elections, then the numbers do not matter.

  This was a departure, not just from previous rulings, but other rulings within the Commonwealth jurisdiction and even the United States of America. But it is this kind of ruling that set the Supreme Court of Kenya apart from other courts.

  While the judiciary around the world has refrained from helping advance society in its democratic agenda, the Kenya Supreme Court decided that Kenya should move forward and define democracy in a much broader way than just elections.

  This is a game changer for other Supreme Courts around the world. For Africa, the judiciary has stamped its authority as the guardian of democracy, not just an arbiter in electoral disputes.

  It means that Kenya's Supreme Court is not just asserting its role as pace-setters for society, but it is exercising its independence and the right to disagree with broader society. For a long time many Kenyans have had a very narrow definition of democracy. The Supreme Court offered a more superior definition.

  Q: The opposition has just pulled out of the elections, claiming that the electoral body has refused to meet its demands and the demands required by the Supreme Court ruling. What does this mean for the credibility of the election?

  The Supreme Court termed this a FRESH election, not a repeat poll. Under Kenya's Constitution, if there is only one candidate in a fresh election, the election is cancelled and the candidate is declared the winner. It is silent on what to do if a party boycotts. But the same Constitution states that fresh elections needs to be preceded by party nominations, which obviously cannot be done under the short period of 60 days allowed by law.

  In pulling out of the elections, the main opposition cited a statement by the Supreme Court in the 2013 electoral dispute where the Court considered what options are left if a candidate pulls out. The court at that time interpreted the scenario to mean a candidate had died and so fresh nominations must be held and another election held within 90 days. It’s not clear because there are arguments that the court was merely discussing scenarios and was in no way giving directions.

  In my opinion, this is the kind of crisis that hits societies that want to lead themselves purely by law. Laws alone cannot legislate morality, and in fact there is nowhere where society is managed by laws alone. An element of trust and compromise among its members is always needed - - which is what a proper social contract achieves in society.

  Kenya has opted to let laws define its democracy, and hence its social contract.

  There is a price to pay for that, and right now there will certainly be a price to pay because the law did not envisage the situation that we are in. The IEBC wanted to rectify that by bringing on board previous presidential candidates to run in this elections, but they quickly realised that that the law is not clear on this either.

  Since the political players have chosen the path of legality rather than political compromise, my fear is that over the next few days we are going to see Kenya’s elections not as a democracy, but a battle between the judiciary and the executive.

  It is never a good battle, and often one side ends up losing – its known who is the weaker of the two.

  Q: One of the IEBC Commissioners resigned on 18 October 2017, citing threats over her life. In an interview in the media she admitted that the electoral body is not prepared and that the body has been hijacked by a section of its members aligned to the ruling government. What does this mean for the elections and for the credibility of the elections?

  The situation is actually more delicate than that. You may be aware that on 12 October 2017, both Houses (Senate and Parliament) rushed through a new law that takes away considerable powers from the head of the IEBC and makes it difficult for the commission to reach decisions by compromise. The proposed law also seeks to return the country back to the manual system which was the cause of the problems in past elections, and which is blamed for the violence witnessed in 2007/2008. There are concerns that her resignation, added to the new proposed law, which by the way is only awaiting Presidential signature to become effective, may have dealt a big credibility blow to the electoral body, and in effect it short circuits the reforms that had been demanded by the Supreme Court. It certainly will have a huge impact on turnout because there is perception that the laws and the resignation have not just taken away the remaining teeth of the electoral body, but has effectively taken it back to the state it was that led to the crisis in the first place.

  But once again the issue must be seen from a broader perspective, and here are the lessons that those of us who promote democracy should know. It is impossible to have democracy without a proper social contract. Democracy is about managing diversity within society to deliver on a collective aspirations using the resources at the disposal of that society. Instead we have made democracy about power plays and about the strongest or the richest or the largest ruling over everybody else. You can see where it has led the United States. We must realise that unless we work with society to learn how to negotiate, manage its diversity and develop a culture of regular compromise, anything we do in the name of democracy is merely buying time. Kenya’s crisis is very simple to manage, but we appear to have resorted to using the law, rather than the friendships, to manage it. It will not end well.

  Q:   What role can civil society play now before the fresh election?

  There are three roles that civil society can play now and in the few days to come.

  First is to celebrate the power of activism —  whether in courts as did the Supreme Court, in each other as did Maina Kiai when he took the electoral body to court, or in other civil society who stood with the opposition and in fact provided the bulk of evidence that was used in court.

  Secondly civil society needs to use this opportunity to connect more with citizens and explain to them what the Supreme Court just did.Never in the history of democracy anywhere in the world has the judiciary come out to teach the society what constitutes democracy! If civil society can use this case to educate citizens on why the court opted to define elections as a process and NOT an event, they will have advanced democracy in ways they would never do with all the donor money used in governance programmes.

  Finally civil society need to come together. Currently there is great polarisation based on the ruling. A section of civil society, under the Elections Observer Group, had actually endorsed the elections and agreed with donors and observers that it was a free, transparent and fair election. They even agreed with the reported win of 54%, insisting it was based on their own scientific polling. They were left looking very foolish and seen as agents of donors and the government. They have not come out to explain themselves fully. The result is that they are now not seen as part of a neutral civil society.

  But the rest of civil society, especially those engaged in human rights, are not seen in good light either. This was the second time in as many elections that they were directly challenging the elections alongside the opposition. And so they are also seen as partisan, even though they were vindicated this time by the Supreme Court ruling.

  In a fractured and polarised society, civil society is not just about being on the right side or the legally correct path. It’s about understanding the dynamics of society and taking positions that rebuild that society. It is important that these two groups, whether they see their positions as superior or not, to come together and agree on how best to shepherd the nation and citizens at this time. Kenya is at a point where it does not need right or wrong, but truth. And that truth will only be found in taking a position that allows the society to build trust in a civil society that is removed from the emotions of politics, yet engaged in the ideals of democracy that leads to well understood social contract.

  Q:       Any other additional analysis you would like to share?

  The elections in Kenya have shown just how perceptions vary between Africa and Europe.

  In many of the European countries, the ruling by the Supreme Court has been treated with apprehension, fear and doom! They feel that Kenya is headed for another chaos and that the ruling should have at least balanced what they call "nascent democracy" and avoided a hard landing that this appears to be. Many of our colleagues that I have met and spoken to begin their conversation with: "So are you going to have war again?"

  On the contrary there has been jubilation and excitement across all of Africa and most of Asia. Citizens as far as Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Botswana and South Africa, and even India, have come out to rally behind Kenya. They see this as a renewed hope for a continent that has been defined by the West as unable to manage its democracy. For many of these citizens, this is a point of triumph and victory-on our terms as Africa. And the fact that it embarrassed the international community who had all but endorsed the elections, has given many Africans even more pride.

  Both sides may be right, and democracy is always muddy. But we need to be careful that we do not push a sliding car down the valley simply because that is what we have been conditioned to think and believe about Africa. It’s much harder to get people out of negativity than it is to encourage them on the positive progress they are making.

  Africa needs more messages of hope, not doom and constant suspicion. The negative descriptions we give to the continent — fragile, conflict-affected, war-torn, corrupt — appear to be what is keeping the citizens disillusioned.

  One act of hope and the entire continent lights up!

  • Civic space in Kenya is rated as‘Obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
  • Follow Paul Okumi on Twitter @paulokumu3. Read two other analytical articles he wrote on the ruling of the Supreme Courthere andhere.

   

• KIRGHIZISTAN : « Le choix des citoyens lors du référendum sera décisif pour l'avenir »

  CIVICUS et l’International Partnership for Human Rights (Partenariat international pour les droits de l'homme) s’entretiennent avec Ulugbek Azimov, expert juridique à la Legal Prosperity Foundation, au sujet des manifestations qui ont eu lieu au Kirghizistan en octobre 2020 et des évolutions politiques qui s’en sont suivies. La Legal Prosperity Foundation (anciennement Youth Human Rights Group) est une organisation indépendante de la société civile qui œuvre à la promotion des droits humains et des principes démocratiques au Kirghizstan depuis 1995. L’organisation mène des programmes éducatifs, assure le suivi des droits humains, interagit avec les mécanismes internationaux des droits humains et promeut le respect des droits humains dans le cadre de réformes juridiques.

  Le Kirghizistan est souvent considéré comme la seule démocratie d’Asie centrale. Dans quelle mesure cette description est-elle proche de la vérité ?

  Il est vrai qu’au début des années 1990, c’est-à-dire dans les premières années de l’indépendance, la démocratie a émergé et a commencé à se développer au Kirghizistan. Par rapport aux autres pays de la région, le Kirghizistan se caractérisait par un niveau plus élevé de participation des citoyens, une société civile plus développée et des conditions plus favorables au fonctionnement et à la participation des partis politiques au processus politique. Pour cette raison, le Kirghizstan a été qualifié d’« île de la démocratie » en Asie centrale.

  Toutefois, au cours des 30 années qui ont suivi l’indépendance, le Kirghizistan a été confronté à de graves difficultés. Les tentatives des anciens présidents pour préserver et renforcer leur emprise sur le pouvoir, en faisant pression sur l’opposition, en persécutant les médias et les journalistes indépendants, en restreignant la liberté d’expression, en utilisant les ressources publiques en leur faveur, en soudoyant les électeurs et en falsifiant les résultats des élections, ont entraîné des bouleversements politiques majeurs à plusieurs reprises. Au cours des 15 dernières années, le gouvernement a été renversé à trois reprises lors des révolutions dites des tulipes, d’avril et d’octobre, respectivement en 2005, 2010 et 2020, deux anciens présidents ayant été contraints de fuir le pays et le troisième de démissionner avant le terme de son mandat.

  Chaque bouleversement a hélas été accompagné d'évolutions mettant à mal les acquis démocratiques antérieurs. Il n’est donc pas surprenant que Freedom House ait toujours classé le Kirghizistan comme étant seulement « partiellement libre » dans son enquête annuelle sur la liberté dans le monde. En outre, dans l’enquête la plus récente, publiée cette année, la note du Kirghizistan s’est détériorée pour devenir « non libre » en raison des retombées des élections législatives d’octobre 2020, qui ont été entachées de graves violations. Ainsi, le Kirghizistan se trouve désormais dans la même catégorie que celle dans laquelle se trouvent les autres pays d’Asie centrale depuis de nombreuses années. 

  Des restrictions liées à la pandémie ont-elles été imposées à l’approche des élections de 2020 ?

  En réponse à l’augmentation rapide des cas de COVID-19 au printemps 2020, les autorités kirghizes ont adopté des mesures d’urgence et instauré un confinement dans la capitale, Bichkek, et dans plusieurs autres régions du pays, ce qui a entraîné des restrictions du droit à la liberté de mouvement et d’autres droits connexes. Tous les événements publics, y compris les rassemblements, ont été interdits.

  Les mesures prises dans le contexte de la pandémie ont également suscité des inquiétudes quant aux restrictions de la liberté d’expression et de l’accès à l’information. Les autorités ont sérieusement resserré la vis contre les voix critiques, en réponse aux nombreuses critiques formulées à l’encontre des personnes au pouvoir, notamment le président de l’époque Sooronbai Jeenbekov, pour leur incapacité à lutter efficacement contre la pandémie. Les forces de l’ordre ont traqué les blogueurs et les commentateurs des médias sociaux gênants, leur ont rendu visite à leur domicile et ont engagé des discussions « préventives » avec eux. Dans certains cas, des utilisateurs de médias sociaux ont été placés en détention pour avoir soi-disant diffusé de fausses informations sur la pandémie, et ont été contraints de présenter des excuses publiques sous la menace de poursuites.

  La loi sur la « manipulation de l’information », adoptée par le Parlement en juin 2020, est particulièrement préoccupante. Bien que les initiateurs de la loi aient prétendu qu'elle avait pour seul but de résoudre le problème des faux comptes en ligne, il était clair dès le départ qu’il s’agissait d’une tentative de la part des autorités d’introduire la censure sur Internet et de fermer les sites indésirables à la veille des élections. Après une avalanche de critiques de la part de la communauté des médias et des défenseurs des droits humains, le président de l’époque, M. Jeenbekov, a refusé de signer la loi et l’a renvoyée au Parlement pour révision en août 2020. Depuis lors, la loi est restée au niveau du Parlement. 

  Qu’est-ce qui a déclenché les manifestations post-électorales d’octobre 2020 ? Qui a protesté, et pourquoi ?

  La principale raison des manifestations d’octobre 2020, qui ont à nouveau conduit à un changement de pouvoir, était le mécontentement de la population à l’égard des résultats officiels des élections législatives du 4 octobre. 

  Sur les 16 partis en lice pour un siège au Parlement, seuls cinq ont franchi le seuil des sept pour cent requis pour entrer au Parlement. Bien que le président de l’époque, M. Jeenbekov, ait déclaré publiquement qu’il ne soutenait aucun parti, celui qui a obtenu le plus de voix - Birimdik (Unité) – lui était lié puisque son propre frère et d’autres membres de l’élite dirigeante se présentaient sous sa bannière. Le parti arrivé en deuxième position, Mekenim Kyrgyzstan (Mère patrie du Kirghizistan), était également considéré comme pro-gouvernemental et associé à la famille de l’ancien haut fonctionnaire des services douaniers Raiymbek Matraimov, qui a été impliqué dans une enquête très médiatisée sur la corruption, publiée en novembre 2019. Le gouvernement de Jeenbekov a ignoré les conclusions de cette enquête et n’a pas engagé d’action pénale contre Matraimov, malgré les appels publics en ce sens.

  Il était prévisible que Birimdik et Mekenim Kyrgyzstan obtiennent de nombreux votes, compte tenu de l’utilisation de ressources publiques et des cas signalés d'achat de votes en faveur de leurs candidats. Ces deux partis, qui participaient pour la première fois à des élections législatives, ont obtenu près de la moitié des voix et donc la majorité absolue des sièges au Parlement. Les méthodes utilisées par les deux partis vainqueurs pour s’assurer le contrôle du Parlement ont suscité l’indignation des autres partis politiques ayant participé aux élections, de leurs électeurs et même des personnes apolitiques.

  Les élections se sont déroulées dans un contexte de mécontentement croissant face aux difficultés sociales et économiques causées par la pandémie, ainsi que de sentiments antigouvernementaux grandissants au sein de la population.

  Les élections « entachées », caractérisées par un nombre sans précédent de violations, ont servi de catalyseur aux événements qui ont suivi. Les manifestations ont commencé immédiatement après l’annonce des résultats préliminaires, le soir du jour de l’élection, le 4 octobre, et se sont poursuivies tout au long de la journée suivante. Les jeunes y ont joué un rôle décisif : la plupart de ceux qui sont descendus dans la rue pour protester et se sont rassemblés sur la place centrale de la capitale étaient des personnes jeunes. Malheureusement, la plupart de ceux qui ont été blessés, ainsi que le manifestant qui est décédé pendant les événements d’octobre, étaient également des jeunes.

  Quelle a été la réaction du gouvernement face aux manifestations ?

  Les autorités avaient la possibilité de prendre le contrôle de la situation et de la résoudre pacifiquement, mais elles ne l’ont pas saisie. Ce n’est que dans la soirée du 5 octobre que le président de l’époque, M. Jeenbekov, a annoncé qu’il rencontrerait les dirigeants des différents partis en lice pour les élections. Il a fixé une réunion pour le matin du 6 octobre, mais il était trop tard, car dans la nuit du 5 octobre, les manifestations pacifiques ont dégénéré en affrontements entre les manifestants et les forces de l’ordre à Bichkek, qui se sont terminés par la prise de la Maison Blanche (siège de la présidence et du Parlement) et d’autres bâtiments publics par les manifestants. Au cours de ces affrontements, les forces de l’ordre ont utilisé des balles en caoutchouc, des grenades assourdissantes et des gaz lacrymogènes contre les manifestants. À la suite de ces affrontements, un jeune homme de 19 ans a été tué et plus de 1 000 personnes ont dû recevoir des soins médicaux, dont des manifestants et des membres des forces de l’ordre, et plus de 600 policiers ont été blessés. Au cours des troubles, des voitures de police, des ambulances, des caméras de surveillance et d’autres biens ont également été endommagés, pour une valeur estimée à plus de 17 millions de soms (environ 200 000 USD).

  Les élections présidentielles anticipées organisées en janvier 2021 ont-elles permis de résoudre les problèmes soulevés par les manifestations ?

  La principale revendication des manifestants était d’annuler les résultats des élections législatives d’octobre 2020 et d’organiser de nouvelles élections équitables. Cette demande a été partiellement satisfaite le 6 octobre 2020, lorsque la Commission électorale centrale (CEC) a déclaré les résultats des élections invalides. Cependant, jusqu’à présent, aucune date n’a été fixée pour les nouvelles élections législatives. La CEC les avait initialement prévues pour le 20 décembre 2020, mais le Parlement a réagi en adoptant rapidement une loi qui suspendait les élections durant le temps de révision de la Constitution, et prolongeait le mandat des membres du Parlement sortant jusqu’au 1er juin 2021.

  La Commission de Venise - un organe consultatif du Conseil de l’Europe, composé d’experts indépendants en droit constitutionnel - a évalué cette loi et conclu que, pendant la période de transition actuelle, le Parlement devrait exercer des fonctions limitées et s’abstenir d’approuver des mesures extraordinaires, telles que des réformes constitutionnelles. Toutefois, le Parlement sortant a poursuivi ses travaux de manière habituelle et a approuvé la tenue d’un référendum constitutionnel en avril 2021. Le président nouvellement élu, Sadyr Japarov, a proposé d’organiser de nouvelles élections parlementaires à l’automne 2021, ce qui signifierait que les membres du Parlement sortant resteraient en poste même après le 1er juin 2021.

  Conformément à d’autres revendications des manifestants, la législation électorale du pays a été modifiée en octobre 2020 afin de réduire le seuil électoral de sept à trois pour cent, permettant aux partis d'être représentés au Parlement et de réduire le fonds électoral de 5 à 1 million de soms (environ 12 000 USD). Ces modifications ont été apportées pour faciliter la participation d’un plus grand nombre de partis, y compris les plus récents, et pour promouvoir le pluralisme et la concurrence.

  Les manifestants ont également exprimé leur mécontentement face à l’insuffisance des mesures prises pour lutter contre la corruption. Ils ont exigé que les autorités traduisent en justice les fonctionnaires corrompus, en particulier Matraimov, et restituent à l’État les biens volés. S’exprimant devant les manifestants avant de devenir président, M. Japarov a promis que M. Matraimov serait arrêté et puni.

  Il faut reconnaître que Japarov a tenu parole. Après son arrivée au pouvoir en octobre 2020, Matraimov a été arrêté dans le cadre d’une enquête sur des mécanismes de corruption au sein du service des douanes, a plaidé coupable et a accepté de réparer les dommages en remboursant plus de 2 milliards de soms (environ 24 millions de USD). Un tribunal local l’a ensuite condamné, mais lui a appliqué une peine réduite, sous la forme d’une amende de 260 000 soms (environ 3 000 USD) et a levé les mesures de gel de ses biens, car il avait coopéré à l’enquête. Cette sentence extrêmement clémente a provoqué l’indignation générale. Le 18 février 2021, Matraimov a de nouveau été arrêté pour de nouvelles accusations de blanchiment d’argent, mais quelques jours plus tard, il a été transféré du centre de détention provisoire où il était détenu vers une clinique privée pour y être soigné pour des problèmes de santé. Après cela, beaucoup ont qualifié de « populistes » les mesures anticorruption prises par les autorités actuelles.

  En janvier 2021, les citoyens kirghizes ont également voté lors d’un référendum constitutionnel. Quels ont été ses résultats, et quelles conséquences auront-ils sur la qualité de la démocratie ?

  Selon les résultats du référendum, qui s’est déroulé le même jour que l’élection présidentielle de janvier 2021, 84 % des électeurs ont soutenu le changement d'un système de gouvernement parlementaire à un système présidentiel.

  Sur la base d’une expérience comparative, de nombreux avocats et activistes de la société civile ne considèrent pas ce changement comme négatif en soi, à condition qu’un système de contrôle et d’équilibre des pouvoirs efficace soit mis en place. Cependant, ils sont sérieusement préoccupés par le fait que les autorités tentent de mener cette transition à un rythme anormalement rapide, en utilisant des approches et des méthodes discutables qui ne correspondent pas aux principes généralement acceptés et aux règles et procédures juridiques établies.

  Le premier projet de Constitution prévoyant un système de gouvernance présidentiel, présenté en novembre 2020, a été surnommé « khanstitution » en référence aux dirigeants autocratiques historiques d’Asie centrale. Ses détracteurs ont accusé M. Japarov, qui a plaidé en faveur de ce changement depuis son entrée en fonction en octobre 2020, de vouloir usurper le pouvoir.

  Le projet de Constitution accordait au président des pouvoirs pratiquement illimités, tout en réduisant au minimum le statut et les pouvoirs du Parlement, ce qui compromettait l’équilibre des pouvoirs et créait un risque d’abus de pouvoir présidentiel. Il prévoyait également une procédure d’impeachment compliquée, impossible à mettre en œuvre dans la pratique. En outre, alors qu’il ne mentionne pas une seule fois le principe de l’État de droit, le texte fait référence à plusieurs reprises à des valeurs et principes moraux. De nombreuses dispositions de la Constitution actuelle qui garantissent les droits humains et les libertés ont été exclues.

  En raison de critiques sévères, les autorités ont été contraintes d’abandonner leur projet initial de soumettre le projet de Constitution à un référendum le même jour que l’élection présidentielle de janvier 2021, et ont accepté d’organiser une discussion plus large. À cette fin, une conférence dite constitutionnelle a été convoquée et ses membres ont travaillé pendant deux mois et demi, malgré les accusations d’illégitimité de leurs activités. Au début du mois de février 2021, la conférence constitutionnelle a soumis ses suggestions au Parlement.

  Il faut reconnaître qu’à la suite de la discussion et des propositions soumises par la conférence constitutionnelle, certaines parties du projet de Constitution ont été améliorées. Par exemple, la référence au principe de l’État de droit a été rétablie et des modifications importantes ont été apportées aux sections relatives aux droits humains et aux libertés, notamment en ce qui concerne la protection de la liberté d’expression, le rôle des médias indépendants et le droit d’accès à l’information. Mais le projet est resté pratiquement inchangé en ce qui concerne les dispositions qui prévoient des pouvoirs illimités pour le président.

  En mars 2021, le Parlement a adopté une loi sur l’organisation d’un référendum sur le projet de Constitution révisé, fixant la date au 11 avril 2021. Cela a suscité une nouvelle vague d’indignation parmi les politiciens, les juristes et les activistes de la société civile, qui ont souligné que cela allait à l’encontre de la procédure établie pour les changements constitutionnels et ont de nouveau averti que la concentration du pouvoir entre les mains du président pourrait aboutir à un régime autoritaire. Leurs préoccupations ont été reprises dans un avis conjoint de la Commission de Venise et du Bureau des institutions démocratiques et des droits de l'homme au sein de l’Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe, émis en mars 2021 à la demande du médiateur du Kirghizistan.

  Le projet de Constitution comporte deux autres dispositions problématiques. L’une d’elles permet d’imposer des restrictions à tout événement qui contredit les « valeurs morales et éthiques » ou « la conscience publique du peuple de la République kirghize ». Ces concepts ne sont pas définis ou réglementés, ils peuvent donc être interprétés différemment selon les cas, ce qui crée un risque d’interprétation trop large et subjective et d’application arbitraire. Cela pourrait à son tour entraîner des restrictions excessives des droits et libertés humains, notamment des droits aux libertés d’expression et de réunion pacifique.

  L’autre disposition impose aux partis politiques, aux syndicats et aux autres associations publiques de garantir la transparence de leurs activités financières et économiques. Dans le contexte des récentes tentatives de renforcement du contrôle des organisations de la société civile (OSC), on craint que cette disposition ne soit utilisée pour faire pression sur celles-ci. Le jour même où le Parlement a voté en faveur de l’organisation d’un référendum sur le projet de Constitution, certains législateurs ont accusé les OSC de porter atteinte aux « valeurs traditionnelles » et de constituer une menace pour l’État. 

  Les activistes de la société civile continuent de demander la dissolution du Parlement actuel, qui a perdu sa légitimité à leurs yeux, et exhortent le président à convoquer rapidement de nouvelles élections. Les activistes organisent un rassemblement permanent à cette fin et, si leurs demandes ne sont pas satisfaites, ils prévoient de se tourner vers les tribunaux en invoquant l'usurpation du pouvoir.

  Le président a toutefois rejeté toutes les préoccupations exprimées au sujet de la réforme constitutionnelle. Il a assuré que le Kirghizistan resterait un pays démocratique, que la liberté d’expression et la sécurité personnelle des journalistes seraient respectées et qu’il n’y aurait plus de persécution politique.

  Les citoyens du Kirghizistan doivent faire leur choix. Le référendum à venir sur l’actuel projet de Constitution pourrait devenir un autre tournant dans l’histoire du Kirghizistan, et le choix des citoyens sera décisif pour l’évolution future vers la stabilité et la prospérité.

  L’espace civique au Kirghizistan est classé « obstrué » par leCIVICUS Monitor.
  Entrez en contact avec la Legal Prosperity Foundation via sa pageFacebook et suivezlpf_kg sur Instagram. 

• KYRGYZSTAN: ‘The citizens' choice in the referendum will be decisive for our future’

  CIVICUS and the International Partnership for Human Rights speak to Ulugbek Azimov, legal expert at the Legal Prosperity Foundation, about the protests that took place in Kyrgyzstan in October 2020 and subsequent political developments. The Legal Prosperity Foundation (previously the Youth Human Rights Group) is an independent civil society organisation that has worked to promote human rights and democratic principles in Kyrgyzstan since 1995. The organisation carries out educational programmes, conducts human rights monitoring, interacts with international human rights mechanisms and promotes respect for human rights in the context of legal reforms.

  Kyrgyzstan is often referred to as Central Asia’s only democracy. How close to truth is this depiction?

  It is true that in the early 1990s, that is, in the first years of independence, democracy sprouted and began developing in Kyrgyzstan. Compared to other countries in the region, Kyrgyzstan was characterised by a higher level of citizen participation, a more developed civil society and more favourable conditions for the functioning and participation of political parties in the political process. For this reason, Kyrgyzstan was called an ‘island of democracy’ in Central Asia.

  However, during the 30 years since independence, Kyrgyzstan has faced serious challenges. Attempts by former presidents to preserve and strengthen their hold on power by putting pressure on the opposition, persecuting independent media and journalists, restricting the freedom of expression, using public resources in their favour, bribing voters and falsifying the results of elections have resulted in major political upheavals on several occasions. In the past 15 years, the government has been overthrown three times during the so-called Tulip, April and October revolutions, in 2005, 2010 and 2020, respectively, with two former presidents being forced to flee the country, and the third forced to resign ahead of time.

  Each upheaval has, unfortunately, been followed by developments undermining previous democratic gains. It is therefore not surprising that Freedom House has consistently rated Kyrgyzstan as only ‘partially free’ in its annual Freedom in the World survey. Moreover, in the most recent survey published this year, Kyrgyzstan’s rating deteriorated to that of ‘not free’ because of the fall-out of the October 2020 parliamentary elections, which were marred by serious violations. Thus, Kyrgyzstan is now in the same category in which other Central Asian countries have been for many years. 

  Were pandemic-related restrictions imposed in the run-up to the 2020 elections?

  In response to the rapid increase in COVID-19 cases in the spring of 2020, the Kyrgyzstani authorities adopted emergency measures and introduced a lockdown in the capital, Bishkek, and in several other regions of the country, which led to restrictions on the right to the freedom of movement and other, related rights. All public events, including rallies, were banned.

  Measures taken in the context of the pandemic also gave rise to concerns about restrictions on the freedom of expression and access to information. The authorities seriously tightened the screws on critical voices in response to widespread criticism of those in power, including then-President Sooronbai Jeenbekov, for their failure to fight the pandemic effectively. Law enforcement authorities tracked down inconvenient bloggers and social media commentators, visited them in their homes and held ‘prophylactic’ discussions with them. In some cases, social media users were detained for allegedly posting false information about the pandemic and forced to apologise publicly under threat of prosecution.

  The law on ‘manipulation of information’, which parliament passed in June 2020, is of particular concern. Although the initiators of the law claimed that it was solely intended to address the problem of fake online accounts, it was clear from the start that this was an attempt by the authorities to introduce internet censorship and close down objectionable sites on the eve of the elections. Following an avalanche of criticism from the media community and human rights defenders, then-President Jeenbekov declined to sign the law and returned it to parliament for revision in August 2020. Since then, the law has remained with parliament. 

  What triggered the post-election demonstrations in October 2020? Who protested, and why?

  The main reason for the October 2020 protests, which again led to a change in power, was people’s dissatisfaction with the official results of the parliamentary elections held on 4 October. 

  Out of the 16 parties running for seats in parliament, only five passed the seven per cent electoral threshold required to get into parliament. Although then-President Jeenbekov publicly stated that he did not support any party, the one that received most votes – Birimdik (Unity) – was associated with him since his brother and other people from the ruling elite were running on its ticket. The party that ended up second, Mekenim Kyrgyzstan (Motherland Kyrgyzstan), was also viewed as pro-government and was associated with the family of former high-ranking customs service official Raiymbek Matraimov, who was implicated in a high-profile media investigation into corruption published in November 2019. Jeenbekov’s government ignored the findings of this investigation and failed to initiate a criminal case against Matraimov, despite public calls to this end.

  It was predictable that Birimdik and Mekenim Kyrgyzstan would fare well in the elections given the use of public resources and reported vote-buying in favour of their candidates. These two parties, which took part in parliamentary elections for the first time, received almost half of the votes and therefore an absolute majority of the seats in parliament. The methods used by the two winning parties to secure control over parliament caused indignation among other political parties that participated in the elections, their voters and even apolitical people.

  The elections took place against the backdrop of growing discontent with the social and economic difficulties caused by the pandemic, as well as growing anti-government sentiments among the population.

  The ‘dirty’ elections, characterised by an unprecedented scale of violations, became a catalyst for subsequent events. Protests began immediately after the announcement of the preliminary results on the evening of election day, 4 October, and continued throughout the next day. Young people played a decisive role in them: most of those who took to the streets to protest and gathered in the central square of the capital were young people. Unfortunately, most of those who were injured, as well as the protester who died during the October events, were young people too.

  What was the government’s reaction to the protests?

  The authorities had the opportunity to take control of the situation and resolve it peacefully, but they did not take it. Only in the evening of 5 October did then-President Jeenbekov announce that he would meet with the leaders of the different parties that competed in the elections. He set up a meeting for the morning of 6 October, but this turned out to be too late, as in the night of 5 October the peaceful protests devolved into clashes between protesters and law enforcement officials in Bishkek, ending with the seizure of the White House (the seat of the president and parliament) and other public buildings by protesters. During the clashes, law enforcement authorities used rubber bullets, stun grenades and teargas against the protesters. As a result of the clashes, a 19-year-old young man was killed and more than 1,000 people needed medical attention, including protesters and law enforcement officials, with over 600 police officers injured. During the unrest, police cars, ambulances, surveillance cameras and other property were also damaged, to an estimated value of over 17 million Som (approx. US$200,000).

  Did the snap presidential elections held in January 2021 solve the problems raised by the protests?

  The main demand of the protesters was to cancel the results of the October 2020 parliamentary elections and hold new, fair elections. This demand was partly satisfied on 6 October 2020, when the Central Election Commission (CEC) declared the election results invalid. However, up to now, no date has been fixed for the new parliamentary elections. The CEC initially scheduled them for 20 December 2020 but parliament responded by promptly adopting a law that suspended the elections pending a revision of the constitution and extended the terms in office of the members of the outgoing parliament until 1 June 2021.

  In its assessment of this law, the Venice Commission – an advisory body of the Council of Europe, composed of independent constitutional law experts – concluded that during the current transitional period parliament should exercise limited functions and refrain from approving extraordinary measures, such as constitutional reforms. However, the outgoing parliament has continued its work as usual and approved the holding of a constitutional referendum in April 2021. Newly elected President Sadyr Japarov has suggested holding new parliamentary elections in the autumn of 2021, which would mean that members of the outgoing parliament would continue in their positions even after 1 June 2021.

  In accordance with other demands of the protesters, the country’s electoral legislation was amended in October 2020 to reduce the electoral threshold from seven to three percentage points for parties to gain representation in parliament and to reduce the electoral fee from 5 to 1 million Som (approx. US$12,000). These amendments were made to facilitate the participation of a larger number of parties, including newer ones, and to promote pluralism and competition.

  The protesters also expressed resentment about the inadequate measures taken to fight corruption. They demanded that the authorities bring to justice corrupt officials, particularly Matraimov, and return stolen property to the state. Speaking in front of the protesters before he became president, Japarov promised that Matraimov would be arrested and punished.

  To be fair, Japarov kept his word. After Japarov rose to power in October 2020, Matraimov was arrested in connection with an investigation into corruption schemes within the customs service, pleaded guilty and agreed to compensate the damage by paying back more than 2 billion Som (approx. US$24 million). A local court subsequently convicted him, but handed him a mitigated sentence in the form of a fine of 260,000 Som (approx. US$3,000) and lifted freezing orders on his property, since he had cooperated with the investigation. This extremely lenient sentence caused public outrage. On 18 February 2021, Matraimov was arrested again on new charges of money laundering, but after a few days he was transferred from the pre-trial detention facility where he was being held to a private clinic to undergo treatment for health problems. After that, many labelled the anti-corruption measures of the current authorities as ‘populist’.

  In January 2021 Kyrgyz citizens also voted in a constitutional referendum. What were its results, and what consequences will they have for the quality of democracy?

  According to the results of the referendum, which took place on the same day as the presidential election in January 2021, 84 per cent of voters supported a transition from a parliamentary to a presidential system of government.

  Based on comparative experience, many lawyers and civil society activists do not view this change as negative per se, provided that a well-functioning system of checks and balances is put in place. However, they are seriously concerned that the authorities are attempting to push through the transition at an unjustifiably quick pace using questionable approaches and methods that do not correspond to generally accepted principles and established legal rules and procedures.

  The first draft constitution providing for a presidential system of governance, put forward in November 2020, was dubbed a ‘khanstitution’ in reference to the historic autocratic rulers of Central Asia. Critics accused Japarov, who has advocated for this change since taking office in October 2020, of trying to usurp power.

  The draft constitution granted the president practically unlimited powers, while reducing the status and powers of parliament to a minimum, thereby jeopardising checks and balances and creating the risk of presidential abuse of power. It also provided for a complicated impeachment procedure that would be impossible to implement in practice. Moreover, while it did not mention the principle of the rule of law even once, the text repeatedly referred to moral values and principles. Many provisions of the current constitution that guarantee human rights and freedoms were excluded.

  Because of harsh criticism, the authorities were forced to abandon their initial plans to submit the draft constitution to referendum on the same day as the presidential election in January 2021 and agreed to organise a broader discussion. To this end, a so-called constitutional conference was convened and its members worked for two and a half months, in spite of facing accusations that their activities were illegitimate. At the beginning of February 2021, the constitutional conference submitted its suggestions to parliament.

  It should be acknowledged that as a result of the discussion and proposals submitted by the constitutional conference, parts of the draft constitution were improved. For example, the reference to the principle of the rule of law was restored, and significant amendments were made to the sections on human rights and freedoms, including with respect to protecting the freedom of expression, the role of independent media and the right to access information. But it remained practically unchanged with respect to the provisions that set out unlimited powers for the president.

  In March 2021, parliament adopted a law on holding a referendum on the revised draft constitution, setting the date for 11 April 2021. This sparked a new wave of indignation among politicians, lawyers and civil society activists, who pointed out that this was against the established procedure for constitutional change and warned again that the concentration of power in the hands of the president might result in authoritarian rule. Their concerns were echoed in a joint opinion of the Venice Commission and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, issued in March 2021 at the request of the Ombudsman of Kyrgyzstan.

  The draft constitution has two other problematic provisions. One allows for restrictions to be imposed on any events that contradict ‘moral and ethical values’ or ‘the public consciousness of the people of the Kyrgyz Republic’. These concepts are not defined or regulated, so they might be interpreted differently in different cases, creating the risk of overly broad and subjective interpretation and arbitrary application. This, in turn, might lead to excessive restrictions on human rights and freedoms, including the rights to the freedoms of peaceful assembly and expression.

  The other provision requires political parties, trade unions and other public associations to ensure the transparency of their financial and economic activities. Against the background of recent attempts to step up control over civil society organisations (CSOs), there are concerns that it might be used to put pressure on them. On the same day that parliament voted in favour of holding a referendum on the draft constitution, some legislators accused CSOs of allegedly undermining ‘traditional values’ and posing a threat to the state. 

  Civil society activists continue to call on the current parliament, which in their eyes has lost its legitimacy, to dissolve and on the president to call new elections promptly. Activists are holding an ongoing rally to this end and, if their demands are not met, they plan to turn to the courts on the grounds of the usurpation of power.

  The president, however, has rejected all concerns voiced about the constitutional reform. He has assured that Kyrgyzstan will remain a democratic country, that the freedom of expression and the personal safety of journalists will be respected, and that there will be no further political persecution. 

  The citizens of Kyrgyzstan must make their choice. The upcoming referendum on the current draft constitution may become another turning point in the history of Kyrgyzstan, and the choice made by citizens will be decisive for the future development towards stability and prosperity.

  Civic space in Kyrgyzstan is rated as ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with the Legal Prosperity Foundation through itsFacebook page and followlpf_kg on Instagram.