freedom of assembly

• POLAND: ‘In reaction to conservative backlash, public support for LGBTQI+ rights is on the rise’

  

  CIVICUS speaks about 2023 Pride and Polish LGBTQI+ rights organisations’ response to the conservative backlash against LGBTQI+ rights with Annamaria Linczowska, advocacy and litigation officer at Campaign Against Homophobia (KPH).

  Founded 2001, KPH is a Polish LGBTQI+ civil society organisation (CSO) working to counter violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity through political, social and legal advocacy.

   

• Poland: concerns over intimidation, violence and detentions of peaceful protesters

  Joint letter to:

  Clement Voule, UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Assembly and Association
  Mary Lawlor, UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders
  Irene Khan, UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Opinion and Expression
  Tlaleng Mofokeng, UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Physical and Mental Health
  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
  Palais Wilson, 52 Rue des Pâquis
  1201 Geneva, Switzerland

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• Poland: Escalating threats to women activists

  Investigate, Protect Rights Defenders, End Hateful Rhetoric

• Re: Proposed International Cooperation Bill
  Presidente de la República
  S.E. Hugo Chávez Frías
  Palacio de Miraflores, Caracas,
  Venezuela
  Fax:+58.212.806 3698
  E-mail:
   

  Your Excellency,

   
   

  Re: Proposed International Cooperation Bill

   
   
   
  I write as the Secretary General of CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, an international alliance of civil society with members and partners in over a hundred countries. CIVICUS works to strengthen civil society and citizen action throughout the world.
   
   
  We at CIVICUS, our members and partners, are deeply concerned about your recent comments urging National Assembly members to adopt a "severe" law to effectively stop international funding for NGOs. We would like to emphasise that Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) play an extremely important role in national life. Their constructive criticism and quest for greater accountability in public life are important assets for the nation. We therefore urge your government to respect expressions of legitimate dissent and unequivocally uphold civil society's rights to express, associate and assemble freely.
   
   

  We would like to draw your attention to the International Cooperation Bill, currently being discussed by law makers. We believe that the bill has been drawn up without adequate consultation with civil society. Moreover, we are deeply apprehensive that that passage of the Bill in its current form will severely curtail civil society space in the following ways:

  1. Subjecting CSOs to additional layers of bureaucracy by requiring them to register with the government in order to receive funds from international sources could increase the possibility of subjective denial of registration to CSOs who have been critical of official actions.
  2. The creation of an official fund for International Cooperation and Assistance for the collection of monetary grants from overseas and their subsequent disbursement by the government is likely to impede international cooperation activities between Venezuelan CSOs and their counterparts abroad. Moreover, it will lead to government ownership and prioritisation of international cooperation funds rather than democratic ownership by CSOs and local communities.
  3. By increasing executive discretion to monitor CSO affairs through the creation of an Agency for International Cooperation, limits of whose powers and have not been clearly defined, raising apprehension of increased restrictions on CSO affairs. 

  We believe that the registration and funding requirements of the Bill, given their ambiguity, have the potential to breach the right to freedom of association embodied in the Venezuelan Constitution, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Defenders Declaration. 

  We urge you to use your executive powers and influence to carry out consultations with civil society with regard to the need for an international cooperation law as well as the principles that should underpin any regulatory mechanism for civil society.

  Sincerely,

  Ingrid Srinath
  Secretary General
  CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation

• RUSSIA: ‘Human rights activism can be expected to increase in reaction to repression’

  CIVICUS speaks with Leonid Drabkin, a coordinator with OVD-Info, an independent human rights civil society organisation (CSO) that documents and helps the victims of political persecution in Russia. Through a hotline and other sources, OVD-Info collects information about detentions at public rallies and other cases of political persecution, publishes the news and coordinates legal assistance to detainees.

• Russia: Human Rights Council must respond to crackdown on civil society

  Joint statement ahead of the 46th Session of the Human Rights Council, condemning Russia (a new member of the body) for recent attacks against protestors (over 12,000 detained since late January).

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• SENEGAL: ‘After being an example of democracy in Africa, we are increasingly tending towards authoritarianism’

  CIVICUS speaks with Abdou Aziz Cissé, Advocacy Officer at AfricTivistes, about President Macky Sall’s decision to postpone the presidential election that was due on 25 February and its implications for democracy in Senegal.

  AfricTivistes is a pan-African civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes and defends democratic values, human rights and good governance through civic tech. It aims to empower African people to become active players in building their societies and holding their governments to account.

  Why did President Sall postpone the 25 February presidential election?

  This latest crisis in Senegal began with a solemn address by President Sall on 3 February, the day before the planned day for the start of the campaign for the 25 February election, in which his successor was to be elected. He repealed the decree convening the electoral body, which had set the presidential election for 25 February.

  He cited three reasons: a supposed institutional crisis between the National Assembly and the Constitutional Council concerning an alleged case of corruption of judges, the need to set up a parliamentary commission to investigate suspected irregularities in the process of verifying sponsorships for the election and the revelation that one of the candidates vetted by the Constitutional Council has dual nationality.

  It should be noted that Karim Wade, son of former president Abdoulaye Wade and candidate for the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), was not on the final list of candidates for the presidential election announced on 20 January. To contest this decision by the Constitutional Council, PDS members of parliament called for the creation of a parliamentary commission of enquiry to shed light on the process of candidacy verification. They also accused two Constitutional Council magistrates of corruption. Parliament approved the establishment of this commission on 31 January.

  On 5 February, a bill to postpone the presidential election until 15 December was passed after opposition legislators were ejected from parliament by security forces. It should be remembered that on 3 July 2023, after stating that he would not seek a third term in office, Sall promised to hand over power on 2 April following free, inclusive and transparent elections.

  Why has this decision been described as a ‘constitutional coup’?

  Sall’s actions have been described as a constitutional coup because he is not allowed to interrupt an electoral process that has already begun. The postponement of an election is the exclusive prerogative of the Constitutional Council.

  Sall’s decision also violates other articles of the constitution, notably article 27, which provides for a five-year presidential term and a limit of two consecutive terms, which means the president cannot extend his term of office. There is also article 103, which states that ‘the republican form of the state, the method of election, the duration and number of consecutive terms of office of the President of the Republic may not be revised’.

  I would like to emphasise that in accordance with article 52 of the constitution, the president can only interrupt the process ‘when the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity of the national territory or the fulfilment of international commitments are threatened in a serious and immediate manner’. However, all institutions of the republic were operating regularly. The establishment of a parliamentary commission of enquiry and the passage of a bill clearly proved it.

  By making this illegal decision, Sall became the first president in Senegal’s history not to organise a presidential election on its due date since 1963.

  What has the reaction of civil society been?

  The reaction of civil society was spontaneous. Several CSOs, including AfricTivistes, condemned this anti-democratic act in press releases and media statements. The nation’s other driving forces, such as trade unions from all professions, also voiced their disagreement.

  On social networks, citizens shared their indignation, internationalising their anger at the decision.

  On 4 February, 19 candidates held a press conference, joined by members of civil society, to reaffirm their willingness to campaign together.

  Another demonstration was declared for 5 February, the day of the parliamentary vote, but could not take place because all the strategic roads leading to the National Assembly were cordoned off. Since June 2023, the administrative authorities have systematically banned demonstrations, even peaceful ones.

  The ‘Aar Sunu Election’ (‘Let’s protect our election’) platform brought together more than a hundred CSOs to reject the postponement of the election. The pressure paid off, because on the evening of 15 February, the Constitutional Council declared the presidential decree of 3 February and the law passed by the National Assembly on 5 February invalid.

  How has the government reacted?

  The government began by cracking down on the demonstrations that took place on 4 February, the day after the president’s announcement and the day on which the election campaign was due to begin. Censorship was also imposed that day, with the internet via mobile data cut off, according to the minister in charge, to stop ‘the dissemination of hateful and subversive messages’. The same reasons had been provided to justify acts of internet censorship in June, July and August 2023. Mobile data was restored on 7 February, then restricted to specific time slots on 13 February.

  Internet blackouts and other forms of online restrictions violate the constitution and several international conventions ratified by Senegal. They are violations of freedom of expression, access to information and economic freedoms. According to Senegalese telecoms unions, censorship has caused losses amounting to 3 billion CFA francs (approx. US$ 4.9 million).

  With this in mind, AfricTivistes and two Senegalese journalists are taking the state of Senegal to the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States, the regional organisation, to seek an end to untimely cuts in mobile internet data.

  In addition, the licence of the Walfadjri television station was suspended at the height of the protests following the announcement of the postponement of the election. Walfadjri has been subjected to a relentless attack by the authorities. Its signal was restored on 11 February.

  On 9 February, a peaceful rally held by numerous organisations on the Place de la Nation in Dakar was dispersed by the police. People mobilised throughout the country, particularly in the northern city of Saint-Louis. Peaceful protesters were violently repressed with disproportionate use of force, resulting in three deaths and several people injured, some of whom were not even taking part in demonstrations, along with over 200 arrests.

  The press was also prevented from covering the demonstrations and providing people with fair and accurate information. Journalists, most of them women, were teargassed, arrested and roughed up in the same way as protesters. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, at least 25 journalists were attacked, detained or teargassed during the demonstrations. Journalist Absa Anne, of the news website Seneweb, was dragged into a police vehicle and beaten unconscious, becoming a symbol of the indiscriminate crackdown on the press that took place that day.

  A silent march announced by the ‘Let’s protect our election’ platform was banned on 13 February by the administrative authorities. However, another march on 17 February was authorised, and people came together in huge numbers to enjoy their long-threatened constitutional freedoms. This national moment of communion was proof that when authorised by the administrative authorities, demonstrations go off peacefully.

  How do you see the future of democracy in Senegal?

  After being an example of democracy and political stability in Africa, with peaceful democratic alternation in power in 2000 and 2012, Senegal is increasingly tending towards authoritarianism, symbolised by the restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms.

  Even if the release, since 15 February, of more than 600 political detainees arrested for crimes of opinion or belonging to the opposition is helping to ease the political climate, the crisis that we are currently experiencing does not augur a bright future for Senegalese democracy.

  But I am optimistic, because even if the political class is engaged in a fierce power struggle, civil society is strong and has a considerable ability to assert itself in all areas of the country’s social life. Not to mention the new force of protest that has emerged with the advent of civic technologies. Social media amplifies citizens’ voices and gives them an international dimension, hence the moves by the authorities to try to silence the voices that express themselves through online tools.

  Senegal also has strong justice and administrative systems, which have always played their role as a counterweight. We must also take into account that, like all democratic systems, Senegal’s needs to be perfected. It has made significant progress, albeit with ups and downs like those we are currently experiencing. And we must bear in mind that it is from crises that opportunities emerge.

  What should the international community do to help solve this crisis?

  The international community can play an important role in supporting a transparent and fair democratic process by sending election observation missions.

  As well as supporting civil society, international partners can exert diplomatic pressure, as Antony Blinken, the US Secretary of State, Joseph Borell, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights have done, calling for independent investigations to shed light on the killings of protesters. All this goodwill can help to encourage an inclusive dialogue. This could foster a search for consensual solutions.

  The international community must condemn all political violence and reiterate the importance of respecting fundamental human rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of peaceful assembly.

  How do you assess the state of democracy in West Africa, and how is AfricTivistes working to help activists in countries affected by coups?

  Over the past three years democracy in the region has declined. Between 2020 and 2022, West Africa experienced five coups against a backdrop of terrorism in the Sahel and anti-imperialist rhetoric. Civil society plays a crucial role in shaping democracy, but civic space is stifled in countries where the military has taken over.

  However, each country has its own historical and political dynamics. Democratic trends vary considerably depending on historical, cultural and socio-economic factors. Countries that have succeeded in implementing institutional reforms to combat corruption have generally seen the quality of their democracy improve, as seen in Cabo Verde, West Africa’s champion of good governance.

  Several countries have maintained relative political stability, such as Senegal before the latest developments. The last country to hold a presidential election was Côte d’Ivoire, following post-election incidents and the violation of the Ivorian constitution, which also limits the number of presidential terms to two.

  With a large community enabling us to internationalise our advocacy, AfricTivistes provides moral support to democracy activists by publishing press releases to point out the illegality of their arrest and censorship.

  We also provide them with technical support so they can circumvent the censorship they face in their countries. To date, we have supported seven democracy activists and journalists in danger.

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  Civic space in Senegal is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with AfricTivistes through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@afric_tivistes and@frican_excellency on Instagram and@AFRICTIVISTES and@AbdouJCisse on Twitter.

• SENEGAL: ‘The restriction of civic space remains civil society’s greatest concern’

  CIVICUS speaks with Malick Ndome, senior policy adviser and board member at the Council of Non-Governmental Organisations in Support of Development (CONGAD), about the recent election in Senegal.

  CONGAD was founded in 1982 by civil society organisations (CSOs) working in Senegal to coordinate relations with the state and other partners. CONGAD provides training for CSOs, local authorities and the media. It also advocates for a stronger civil society capable of influencing public policy.

  What was the significance of the victory of opposition candidate Bassirou Diomaye Faye in the recent presidential election?

  Faye’s first-round victory was difficult to predict. However, it is important to recognise the impact of his release from prison, as well as that of Ousmane Sonko, the leader of his party, Senegal’s Patriots (PASTEF), just 10 days before the election.

  Sonko had been barred from standing following a controversial conviction for youth corruption and defamation in 2023. Faye was nominated as a candidate in his place, but was also sent to prison for criticising the court’s decision in the Sonko case. Their release galvanised the support of PASTEF supporters and activists, and young people in general, who appreciated their message of change and their anti-corruption aura. In contrast, there seems to have been a noticeable lack of enthusiasm for the government coalition.

  In addition, there was much speculation and a lot of rumours about President Macky Sall’s lack of support for his party’s presidential candidate, which undoubtedly influenced the electoral landscape.

  Given the circumstances, the clear victory of an opposition candidate has profound implications for the strength of Senegalese democracy. First, it signifies a strengthened commitment to the rule of law, guaranteeing every Senegalese citizen a fair chance of access to the highest office. It also demonstrates the resilience of Senegal’s electoral institutions in the face of challenges. Further, despite persistent concerns about voter turnout, Senegalese citizens demonstrated a commendable level of confidence in electoral processes, underlining their commitment to democratic principles. Voter turnout was 61 per cent.

  This provides an opportunity for a comprehensive review of the electoral law and the electoral code, with a focus on correcting the main shortcomings identified by political stakeholders and civil society. It is imperative to review the role and effectiveness of institutions such as the National Autonomous Electoral Commission in overseeing elections, ensuring that it has the resources and capacity to fulfil its mandate impartially and effectively.

  In sum, while Faye’s victory may have been unexpected, it marks a crucial moment in Senegal’s democratic journey, highlighting both strengths and areas for improvement in its political system.

  Was civic space restricted before the election? What challenges did this pose and what can be expected in the future?

  Significant restrictions were observed in February, when Sall’s announcement of the postponement of the election led to violent demonstrations and deaths. The Constitutional Council’s positive response in favour of holding the election helped ease tensions, leading to the lifting of the suspension of TikTok and the restriction of Facebook, which had an impact on digital industries and small-scale workers in the informal sector.

  The restriction of civic space has been strongly criticised by various groups and people. Under the new government, we expect to see restrictions on civic space lifted, but I can’t prejudge that. It remains a strong demand from civil society and the political arena.

  How did civil society contribute to a free and fair election?

  Civil society’s actions were analysed and perceived differently depending on whether you were in the opposition or the presidential camp. There were many citizens’ initiatives to ensure that the electoral timetable was respected and free and transparent elections were held.

  Civil society initiatives included the setting up of digital platforms to facilitate communication and citizen mobilisation. Civil society formed groups to voice citizens’ concerns and influence political decisions. It organised forums to raise awareness and mobilise the population to ensure the electoral timetable was respected and the election was transparent.

  In addition, civil society organised meetings with presidential candidates to ask them questions and hear their proposals. It also helped to inform the public by publishing press articles and sharing information on electoral issues.

  In addition, civil society interacted with stakeholders in sensitive spheres such as religious leaders to promote a climate of peace and stability during the election period. It also facilitated the hosting and coordination of the local, regional and sub-regional structures responsible for overseeing the election, thus ensuring effective and transparent monitoring of the electoral process.

  What are civil society’s expectations of the new government?

  Civil society has a number of expectations and is advocating several policy measures to protect civic space and human rights and promote good governance.

  According to the information available to me, there has not yet been any formal request from civil society. However, it is clear that the restriction of civic space remains civil society’s greatest concern.

  Among the political measures advocated are the passing of a press code to provide a better framework for the exercise of journalism and the publication of implementing decrees, as well as the revision of article 80 of the Constitution concerning offences against the head of state. Civil society is also calling for the adoption of a law to protect whistleblowers and human rights defenders, as well as the publication of reports by the Court of Audit and the prosecution of offenders.

  Civil society calls for institutional change in the governance of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, and for the establishment of a financial prosecutor’s office with broad responsibilities.

  Finally, the fight against corruption and for better governance is a major concern for civil society, which hopes that the new government will take effective measures in this direction.

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  Civic space in Senegal is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with CONGAD through itswebsite.

• SERBIA: ‘People are concerned that a critical tool to hold political elites accountable is being taken away’

  CIVICUS speaks about the results of Serbia’s recent elections and subsequent protests with Raša Nedeljkov, Programme Director of the Centre for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA).

  Founded in 2002, CRTA is a Serbian civil society organisation that works to develop a democratic culture and promote civic activism through civic education campaigns, electoral observation and the development of public policy proposals.

   

  What are civil society’s concerns about the recent Serbian elections?

  The most critical concerns revolve around the municipal elections in Serbia’s capital, Belgrade. CRTA has concluded that the announced results didn’t reflect the freely expressed will of the city’s voters. Our findings revealed that electoral engineering, particularly through organised voter migration, crucially influenced the outcome of the closely contested race for the Belgrade City Assembly.

  Organised voter migration is neither legal nor legitimate. Falsely registering residence for the purpose of voting in local elections outside one’s jurisdiction violates the law, undermines democratic representation and violates citizens’ right to local self-government.

  Local elections were strategically staggered and held in only a third of the local jurisdictions to enable temporary voter migration and secure the victory of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SPP) in Belgrade, where the opposition Serbia Against Violence party had strong chances of winning. As a result, Belgrade is now on the verge of being governed by people largely elected by non-residents who won’t bear the consequences of the decisions they make.

  The SPP also gained significant unfair advantage in the parliamentary elections thanks to intensified political pressure on voters, misuse of public resources and institutions, and control of the most influential media. The national election wasn’t nearly fair, but this was overshadowed by the massive manipulation used to prevent political change in Serbia’s largest city.

  How has CRTA worked to document electoral manipulation?

  On election day CRTA deployed almost 3,000 observers and analysts. And for the first time, a CRTA observer team suffered a physical attack. Its members were attacked with bats while sitting in their parked car in the police station courtyard in Odzaci, a town in Vojvodina province. They were there to report criminal activity related to carousel voting – where people go from place to place to cast multiple voters – at a polling station. This case poignantly illustrates the tense atmosphere the elections took place in.

  Our observers had a very dynamic day in Belgrade, the epicentre of electoral irregularities. They took numerous photos and videos showing buses transporting voters to Belgrade from other towns and countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. They also identified several logistical centres used to coordinate the voter migration operation, which directed and transported people to polling stations across the city.

  Voter migration was facilitated by manipulation of the voter register, which our team also extensively documented. Prior to the elections, we received information from various sources pointing to illegal actions by local governing bodies and the highest state authorities, all aimed at shaping election results in Belgrade in favour of the SPP. Further analysis, which we’re currently conducting, indicates that significant alterations to the voter register were made over the course of a year.

  How have people reacted to election irregularities?

  Tens of thousands took to the streets shortly after the results were announced. Protests were sparked by the issues we’ve denounced. Protesters are angry about electoral engineering involving illegal manipulation of the voter register and organised voter migration. They urge the state to protect the integrity of elections by prosecuting those involved in illegal manipulation.

  Protesters are not necessarily supporters of opposition parties but rather citizens concerned that a critical tool to hold political elites accountable and drive change is being taken away from them. Their core demand is that fresh elections be held at all levels, contingent upon significant revisions to electoral conditions.

  How has the government responded to protesters’ demands?

  The government has responded with repression and defensive aggressiveness, denying all allegations, including those from international observers, and disregarding evidence of massive irregularities and criminal activities. The regime continues to assert that the elections were the cleanest ever.

  The government is also violating protesters’ human rights. Over 30 people, primarily university students, have been arrested during the protests and faced pressure to confess to crimes they didn’t commit, such as receiving bribes from the opposition to engage in violent activities during protests.

  Public officials have also accused CRTA of destabilising Serbia, and our staff members have been labelled as liars and subjected to hate speech by pro-regime media.

  What should the international community do?

  We urge the international community to look beyond immediate geopolitical considerations and consider the consequences that could follow if democracy in Serbia continues to erode. Further democratic backsliding would only bring it closer to the non-democratic part of the world.

  Serbian civil society is actively proposing solutions for the challenges of a captured state and diminishing democratic standards, and our international allies should give more serious considerations to these recommendations. The international community must act soon to prevent Serbia becoming an outright dictatorship

  What are civil society’s concerns about the recent Serbian elections?

  The most critical concerns revolve around the municipal elections in Serbia’s capital, Belgrade. CRTA has concluded that the announced results didn’t reflect the freely expressed will of the city’s voters. Our findings revealed that electoral engineering, particularly through organised voter migration, crucially influenced the outcome of the closely contested race for the Belgrade City Assembly.

  Organised voter migration is neither legal nor legitimate. Falsely registering residence for the purpose of voting in local elections outside one’s jurisdiction violates the law, undermines democratic representation and violates citizens’ right to local self-government.

  Local elections were strategically staggered and held in only a third of the local jurisdictions to enable temporary voter migration and secure the victory of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SPP) in Belgrade, where the opposition Serbia Against Violence party had strong chances of winning. As a result, Belgrade is now on the verge of being governed by people largely elected by non-residents who won’t bear the consequences of the decisions they make.

  The SPP also gained significant unfair advantage in the parliamentary elections thanks to intensified political pressure on voters, misuse of public resources and institutions, and control of the most influential media. The national election wasn’t nearly fair, but this was overshadowed by the massive manipulation used to prevent political change in Serbia’s largest city.

  How has CRTA worked to document electoral manipulation?

  On election day CRTA deployed almost 3,000 observers and analysts. And for the first time, a CRTA observer team suffered a physical attack. Its members were attacked with bats while sitting in their parked car in the police station courtyard in Odzaci, a town in Vojvodina province. They were there to report criminal activity related to carousel voting – where people go from place to place to cast multiple voters – at a polling station. This case poignantly illustrates the tense atmosphere the elections took place in.

  Our observers had a very dynamic day in Belgrade, the epicentre of electoral irregularities. They took numerous photos and videos showing buses transporting voters to Belgrade from other towns and countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. They also identified several logistical centres used to coordinate the voter migration operation, which directed and transported people to polling stations across the city.

  Voter migration was facilitated by manipulation of the voter register, which our team also extensively documented. Prior to the elections, we received information from various sources pointing to illegal actions by local governing bodies and the highest state authorities, all aimed at shaping election results in Belgrade in favour of the SPP. Further analysis, which we’re currently conducting, indicates that significant alterations to the voter register were made over the course of a year.

  How have people reacted to election irregularities?

  Tens of thousands took to the streets shortly after the results were announced. Protests were sparked by the issues we’ve denounced. Protesters are angry about electoral engineering involving illegal manipulation of the voter register and organised voter migration. They urge the state to protect the integrity of elections by prosecuting those involved in illegal manipulation.

  Protesters are not necessarily supporters of opposition parties but rather citizens concerned that a critical tool to hold political elites accountable and drive change is being taken away from them. Their core demand is that fresh elections be held at all levels, contingent upon significant revisions to electoral conditions.

  How has the government responded to protesters’ demands?

  The government has responded with repression and defensive aggressiveness, denying all allegations, including those from international observers, and disregarding evidence of massive irregularities and criminal activities. The regime continues to assert that the elections were the cleanest ever.

  The government is also violating protesters’ human rights. Over 30 people, primarily university students, have been arrested during the protests and faced pressure to confess to crimes they didn’t commit, such as receiving bribes from the opposition to engage in violent activities during protests.

  Public officials have also accused CRTA of destabilising Serbia, and our staff members have been labelled as liars and subjected to hate speech by pro-regime media.

  What should the international community do?

  We urge the international community to look beyond immediate geopolitical considerations and consider the consequences that could follow if democracy in Serbia continues to erode. Further democratic backsliding would only bring it closer to the non-democratic part of the world.

  Serbian civil society is actively proposing solutions for the challenges of a captured state and diminishing democratic standards, and our international allies should give more serious considerations to these recommendations. The international community must act soon to prevent Serbia becoming an outright dictatorship.

  ---

  Civic space in Serbia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with CRTA through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@CRTArs and@rasaned onTwitter.

• Serbia: CIVICUS calls on Serbian authorities to stop attacks against peaceful protesters

  CIVICUS urges Serbian authorities to stop using force to disperse protesters demonstrating against the government’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. CIVICUS calls for an independent investigation into violent attacks on protesters by police and condemns police violence against journalists covering the protests.

• SIERRA LEONE: ‘Civil society plays a crucial role in ensuring free and fair elections’

  CIVICUS speaks about Sierra Leone’s 24 June general election with John Caulker, founder and executive director of Fambul Tok.

  Founded in 2007, Fambul Tok (‘Family Talk’ in Krio language) is a civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes peace, restorative justice and community building in post-civil war Sierra Leone.

  What’s at stake in the 2023 general election?

  For many Sierra-Leonean voters, the most pressing concerns revolve around the economy. In his first term in office, President Julius Maada Bio of the Sierra Leone People’s Party, who has just won re-election, allocated 21 per cent of the government budget to support education, positioning himself as a champion of human capital investment. In his second presidential campaign, Bio expressed a commitment to overhaul Sierra Leone’s agricultural sector, believing it will lead to an economic turnaround.

  Bio’s supporters believe that the global economic crisis is the main reason for the current financial predicament in Sierra Leone. But Sierra Leone’s economic instability started a lot earlier, with the outbreak of Ebola in 2014, and subsequently deteriorated further with the decline in iron ore mine prices on the global market, the COVID-19 pandemic and the war between Russia and Ukraine. Inflation is in double digits, its highest level in almost two decades.

  The main opposition party, All People Congress, nominated the same candidate, Samura Kamara, who previously lost the presidential election in 2018. Kamara, who is an economist, pledged to revive Sierra Leone’s struggling economy and promote national unity.

  Both President Bio and Samura Kamara have significant support throughout Sierra Leone, while other candidates hoped that public dissatisfaction with the economy would turn votes against the two major parties.

  In addition to selecting a president, voters also elected new lawmakers, mayors and councillors.

  What changes have been introduced to the electoral law?

  As a result of a 2022 electoral reform, Sierra Leone now uses a proportional system for allocating parliamentary seats. The president decided to adopt this system to avoid by-elections and increase women’s representation, which can be done through legislative quotas when using party lists. The change was judicially challenged, leading to a landmark Supreme Court ruling that upheld the proportional representation system.

  Some people believe that by adopting party lists and using multi-member districts, the proportional system takes away their right to choose representatives directly and hands that power over to political parties. Chernor Maju Bah, the leader of the parliamentary opposition, expressed concerns regarding the limited timeframe for educating the public about the intricacies of the new system and argued that more time was necessary to ensure a smooth transition.

  Have fundamental civic and democratic freedoms been respected during the election process?

  In recent years Sierra Leone has made progress towards safeguarding and upholding freedoms of expression and association in line with its constitution and international human rights standards. However, the situation has varied over time and challenges have arisen in some instances. For example, ahead of the election the Political Parties Regulation Commission imposed a ban on all street rallies organised by political parties. Many viewed this as an infringement of their right to peaceful assembly. However, political parties were still able to gather peacefully in public spaces such as stadiums, large fields and town halls. The use of social media is also subject to limitations and regulations outlined in the Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act of 2021. Some arrests have been made for violations of this law.

  Sierra Leone has also made significant steps to improve its electoral processes and ensure a transparent, democratic and inclusive political system. Civil society plays a crucial role in ensuring free and fair elections by promoting voter education, monitoring the electoral process and advocating for electoral reforms. Both the government and civil society have made considerable investments to ensure that citizens are well-informed about their rights, the electoral process and the importance of participating in elections, thereby creating a more knowledgeable and engaged electorate.

  Sierra Leone has also welcomed international election observers from various organisations and institutions, who provided an impartial assessment and promoted transparency. Moreover, political parties have collectively agreed to abide by a Code of Conduct setting out guidelines for ethical campaigning and peaceful behaviour during elections, encouraging parties to uphold democratic principles and discouraging any form of violence or intimidation.

  How has civil society, including Fambul Tok, engaged in the election process?

  CSOs have been vigilant and expressed concern over increasing ethnic-based campaigns, hate speech and unrest. These are viewed by civil society as early warning signs of conflict and election-related violence.

  Although Sierra Leone has made progress in holding generally peaceful and credible elections, there have been isolated incidents of violence during this election period, including clashes between supporters of different political parties and between opposition supporters and the police, and instances of property destruction such as arson. The opposition also called for public demonstrations following the resignation of the electoral commissioner.

  As a peacebuilding organisation, Fambul Tok is focused on promoting nonviolence and voter education through our community structures and is advocating for a culture of political tolerance. Fambul Tok facilitates stakeholders’ meetings to promote peace and national cohesion and avoid malice and violence despite political differences. This has promoted peaceful and inclusive political dialogue, raised awareness about electoral misconduct and ensured that appropriate measures are in place to prevent and address electoral violence, intimidation and any other actions that undermine the integrity of the process.

  What international support is Sierra Leone’s civil society receiving, and what other forms of support would you need?

  International support plays a crucial role in assisting Sierra Leone’s civil society in both the pre-election and post-election phases. Even though funding support for civil society has diminished during these elections, CSOs continue to collaborate with international institutions to uphold the values and principles of democracy.

  International organisations, in partnership with the CSO National Elections Watch, have provided capacity-building training and financial resources to strengthen the skills and knowledge of local CSOs in election monitoring, advocacy, voter education and human rights promotion. This support enhances the effectiveness of civil society in promoting free and fair elections and safeguarding human rights. However, there is also a need for technical resources such as communication tools, data analysis software and logistical support to further enhance the capabilities of civil society.

  In 2018 there was post-election violence throughout society. The international community should support CSOs to engage in post-election peace and cohesion campaigns. This involves encouraging communities to accept the outcome of the electoral process and respect the rights of individuals. Diplomatic missions and human rights organisations should remain engaged in the process and keep advocating for a conducive environment for free and fair elections. They can do this by applying diplomatic pressure, issuing public statements and engaging with national authorities to address concerns related to civic space, human rights and electoral integrity.

  It is crucial that international support is tailored to the specific needs and priorities of Sierra Leone’s civil society, in close consultation and collaboration with local groups. This approach ensures that support is context-specific, sustainable and responsive to challenges on the ground.

  ---

  Civic space in Sierra Leone is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Fambul Tok through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@fambultok onTwitter.

• Thailand: Concerns regarding the right to peaceful assembly

  

   

  1 September 2021

  Prime Minister Prayut Chan-O-Cha
  Royal Thai Government
  1 Pitsanulok road
  Dusit, Bangkok 
  Thailand

  Re: Concerns regarding the right to peaceful assembly in Thailand

  Dear Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha,

  We, the 13 undersigned organizations, write to express our concern regarding violence and the excessive use of force by police at recent protests in Bangkok. We are troubled by the disproportionate response of riot police to provocations by protesters. We are also concerned by the arbitrary detention of protest leaders who have recently faced new criminal charges and have been denied bail and detained. Thailand needs to do more to protect protesters from violence and ensure that the public can safely exercise the right to peaceful assembly during the COVID-19 pandemic.

  In recent weeks, both riot police and protesters have contributed to a significant escalation in violence at political protests in Bangkok. In August alone, police have forcibly dispersed at least ten demonstrations using rubber bullets, water cannons, and tear gas. At several protests, demonstrators threw rocks and Molotov cocktails, launched fireworks, and used slingshots to shoot nuts and bolts at riot police. Many of the clashes have occurred near Din Daeng intersection, which is close to the headquarters of the 1^st Infantry Division of the Royal Guard. Youth participation in these protests has been high, with a large proportion of protesters under the age of 18.

  Crowd control measures and other actions taken by law enforcement officers have frequently violated the human rights of protesters and international standards on the policing of protests. Police officers have repeatedly fired rubber bullets at protesters in an indiscriminate fashion. Footage from a recent protest shows riot police firing rubber bullets from a highway overpass at a distance too great to ensure the targeting of violent individuals in a manner consistent with international standards. In other videos, police officers appear to shoot rubber bullets at individuals passing on motorcycles, including at point blank range. Journalists, including those who visibly identified themselves as press, have also reported being hit with rubber bullets at protests.

  Police have reportedly fired tear gas canisters directly at protesters. On 13 August 2021, a protester, Thanat Thanakitamnuay, was hit in the face by an object believed to be a tear gas canister fired by police at Din Daeng intersection and has reportedly lost sight in his right eye.

  The recent use of firearms by unknown assailants at a protest raises further grave concerns. On 18 August 2021, three teenage protesters were shot with live ammunition in front of the Din Daeng Police Station. One of the victims—a 15-year-old boy—was hit by a bullet in the neck and remains in intensive care. According to a hospital report he is suffering from paralysis of both arms and legs and is not responding to stimulus. The other two injured protesters were reportedly 14 and 16 years old. The police have denied using live ammunition during the protest and said they are investigating the shooting.

  In addition to cracking down on street protests, Thai authorities have continued their harassment of protest leaders and participants through legal processes. Since July 2020, more than 700 individuals, including at least 130 children, have been investigated in connection to their protest activities.^[1] Between 7 and 9 August 2021, at least 32 protest leaders and participants were arrested and charged with a variety of offences. Ten were arbitrarily denied bail and subjected to pre-trial detention.

  Two of the protesters who were arrested, Arnon Nampa and Jatupat Boonpattararaksa, are Gwangju Prize for Human Rights laureates. Arnon was charged, inter alia, with lèse-majesté (defaming the monarchy) in relation to a speech he gave on monarchy reform at a protest in Bangkok on 3 August 2021. Jatupat was charged with, inter alia, violating a COVID-19 emergency regulation after he organized a protest in front of Thung Song Hong Police Station on the same day. Seven other protest leaders—Parit Chiwarak, Nutchanon Pairoj, Sirichai Natueng, Phromsorn Weerathamjaree, Panupong Chadnok, Thatchapong Kaedam, and Panadda Sirimatkul—were all charged, inter alia, with violating a COVID-19 emergency regulation as a result of their participation in a peaceful protest in front of the Border Patrol Police Region 1 Headquarters on 2 August 2021. Sam Samart, a 19-year-old, was arrested on 7 August and charged, inter alia, with violating a COVID-19 emergency regulation in relation to the protest in front of the Border Patrol Police Region 1 Headquarters on 2 August 2021.

  Many of these activists have previously been detained, prosecuted, and imprisoned for their protest activities. In 2016, Jatupat was sentenced to two-and-a-half years’ imprisonment after he was convicted of lèse-majesté. Earlier this year, Parit was detained for 91 days on similar charges. Arnon, Panupong, and Phromsorn were also arrested earlier this year and were released from pre-trial detention in June.

  The court determined that the activities of key protest leaders including Arnon, Parit, and Jatupat violated the bail conditions connected to their previous lèse-majesté cases, which prohibited them from participating in political protests or further defaming the monarchy. They could face years of pretrial detention.

  At least eight of the detained protesters have reportedly tested positive for COVID-19 while jailed. On 26 August 2021, the Court of Appeal granted bail to Sirichai Natueng, Panadda Sirimasakul, and Sam Samart, and they were released from custody. Even though prisons are overwhelmed with COVID-19 cases, the other seven protest leaders remain in pre-trial detention, each having been denied bail at least twice.

  Thailand’s obligations under international law and relevant standards

  Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Thailand ratified in 1996, guarantees the right to peaceful assembly. While some restrictions on assembly are permissible under international law, any restriction on this right must be ‘imposed in conformity with the law and . . . necessary in a democratic society.’^[2] ICCPR Article 21 enumerates a list of the permissible justifications for a restriction on assembly: to protect national security, public safety, public order, public health, public morals, or the rights and freedoms of others.^[3] No other governmental interest can justify a restriction on peaceful assembly.

  The Convention on the Rights of the Child, which Thailand ratified in 1992, protects children’s right to freedom of peaceful assembly.^[4]

  In its General Comment No. 37, the UN Human Rights Committee elaborated on the importance of the right to peaceful assembly:

  Together with other related rights, [the right to freedom of peaceful assembly] constitutes the very foundation of a system of participatory governance based on democracy, human rights, the rule of law and pluralism. Peaceful assemblies can play a critical role in allowing participants to advance ideas and aspirational goals in the public domain and to establish the extent of support for or opposition to those ideas and goals. Where they are used to air grievances, peaceful assemblies may create opportunities for the inclusive, participatory and peaceful resolution of differences.^[5]

  The right to peaceful assembly is foundational to many other rights and, in particular, helps to ensure economic, social, and cultural rights are upheld. Moreover, protest is often one of the most effective tools available for marginalized individuals and groups to successfully advocate for change.^[6]

  For these reasons, international law is especially protective of protests with a political nature. According to the Human Rights Committee, ‘assemblies with a political message should enjoy a heightened level of accommodation and protection.’^[7] As such, the creation of perimeters around government buildings or official locations that demarcate where assemblies may not take place ‘should generally be avoided, inter alia, because these are public spaces. Any restrictions on assemblies in and around such places must be specifically justified and narrowly circumscribed.’^[8]

  The threat to public health posed by the COVID-19 pandemic may justify narrow restrictions on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, but such restrictions must meet the requirements of legality, necessity, and proportionality under international human rights law.^[9] In assessing whether a measure is necessary and proportionate to a legitimate aim, consideration should be given to whether the measure in question is the least intrusive means of achieving that aim. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has issued guidance on issues affecting civic space in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, noting that:

  States should ensure that the right to hold assemblies and protests can be realized, and only limit the exercise of that right as strictly required to protect public health. Accordingly, States are encouraged to consider how protests may be held consistent with public health needs, for example by incorporating physical distancing.^[10]

  In April 2020, UN Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups warned against the excessive use of force to enforce COVID-19-related restrictions on protesters, stating, ‘emergency measures can be a more direct threat to their life, livelihood, and dignity than even the virus itself.’^[11] Moreover, aggressive police action against protesters may defeat the purpose of emergency measures. Arrest, detention, the use of force, and dispersal of protests can increase the risk of virus transmission for protesters and law enforcement officials alike.^[12]

  States have an obligation to protect journalists, monitors, and members of the public - as well as public and private property - from harm.^[13] As such, state actors must take steps to ensure that protesters can exercise their rights safely, while exerting the ‘minimum force necessary’ to reduce the likelihood of injuries and property damage.^[14]

  In a joint statement, the UN Special Rapporteurs on the freedoms of association and expression declared that there is ‘no such thing in law as a violent protest’.^[15] Rather, there are only violent protesters who should be dealt with individually. According to the Special Rapporteurs and Human Rights Committee, the right to peaceful assembly is an individual right, not a collective right, and must be treated as such.^[16] Any isolated act of violence by some participants must not be attributed to other participants in the assembly. In addition, so long as organizers take reasonable efforts to encourage peaceful conduct during an assembly, they may not be held responsible for the violent actions of others.^[17] 

  State authorities may only disperse assemblies when ‘strictly unavoidable,’ such as when there is clear evidence of an imminent threat of serious violence that cannot be dealt with by targeted arrests or other less drastic actions.^[18] Before dispersing a crowd, law enforcement officers must take all reasonable measures to enable the assembly by providing a safe environment. Even if some protesters act violently, all those involved retain all their rights under the ICCPR, including, of course, the right to life and protection against arbitrary detention.^[19]

  Law enforcement officers should only resort to force in ‘exceptional’ circumstances.^[20] Any use of force must only be the minimum amount necessary, targeted at specific individuals, and proportionate to the threat posed.^[21] The restrictions on the use of force at assemblies are even more important when police use lethal force, including the use of firearms. When policing an assembly, firearms may only be used when strictly necessary to counter an imminent threat of death or serious injury.^[22]

  Rubber bullets can also be deadly. The OHCHR Guidance on Less Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement states that ‘kinetic impact projectiles should generally be used only with the aim of striking the lower abdomen or legs of a violent individual and only with a view to addressing an imminent threat of injury to either a law enforcement official or a member of the public.’^[23] Rubber bullets should not be used as a general tool to disperse protesters, nor should they be fired indiscriminately into a crowd.^[24]

  Tear gas and other ‘area weapons’ also pose risks to protesters and should only be used in response to widespread violence with the sole purpose of dispersal and as a measure of last resort after giving an audible warning and providing reasonable time for protesters and bystanders to vacate the area.^[25] Tear gas cartridges and canisters may not be aimed at individuals or used in confined spaces.^[26] Their use on a person who is already restrained amounts to a violation of the prohibition against torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment under international law.

  According to the Human Rights Committee, states should ‘consistently promote a culture of accountability for law enforcement officials during assemblies.’^[27] As such, it is essential that police receive adequate training to facilitate assemblies. Law enforcement officers must understand the legal framework governing assemblies, their obligation to enable peaceful assemblies, and the importance of political assemblies in a rights-respecting society. They should receive training on proper techniques to manage crowds and how to avoid escalation while responding to violence by protesters.^[28] Any use of force must be investigated to determine whether the force was necessary and proportionate.^[29] States have ‘an obligation to investigate effectively, impartially and in a timely manner any allegation or reasonable suspicion of unlawful use of force or other violations by law enforcement officials … in the context of assemblies’.^[30]

  In March 2020, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights urged all states to release ‘every person detained without sufficient legal basis, including political prisoners, and those detained for critical, dissenting views’ in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.^[31] By continuing to detain protest leaders despite high infection rates and overcrowding in prisons, the Thai government is unnecessarily putting their lives at grave risk.

  Conclusion

  In order to fulfill its human rights obligations, the Thai government should not only refrain from suppressing protests but also needs to create a safe and enabling environment for members of the public to exercise their rights to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

  We call on the Thai government to ensure that law enforcement officials only resort to the use of force against protesters in full compliance with international human rights law and standards. In particular, authorities must not use greater force than necessary to achieve a legitimate objective and must not cause greater harm than the harm they seek to prevent. Any use of force must be proportionate to a legitimate law enforcement objective, such as meeting any threat of violence. We further call on your government to ensure that all law enforcement personnel present at protests have been properly trained in strategies and tactics that comply with international human rights law and standards. Authorities should promptly, effectively, impartially, and independently investigate any violations of domestic law and international standards and ensure that perpetrators are held accountable.

  We further call on the Thai government to immediately end its harassment of protest leaders and participants. Individuals detained solely because of their exercise of the right to peaceful assembly, including protest leaders recently denied bail, should be immediately and unconditionally released. No one should be detained merely for exercising a human right, such as the rights to peaceful assembly or freedom of expression.

  We urge you to initiate a review of all laws and policies impacting the right to freedom of peaceful assembly in Thailand. Laws and policies that unjustifiably restrict the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and expression should be amended in line with international law and standards.

  Thank you for your attention to the issues and recommendations raised in this letter. We would welcome the opportunity to assist and support the Thai government in meeting its human rights obligations.

  Sincerely,
  Amnesty International
  ARTICLE 19
  ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
  Asia Democracy Network
  Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
  Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL)
  CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
  Civil Rights Defenders
  FIDH – International Federation for Human Rights
  Fortify Rights
  Human Rights Watch
  International Commission of Jurists
  Manushya Foundation

  
  CC:
  Police General Suwat Jangyodsuk,
  Commissioner-General of the Royal Thai Police
  Rama I Rd, Pathum Wan
  Bangkok 10330 

  ---

  Civic space in Thailand is rated Repressed by the CIVICUS Monitor

  ---

  ^[1] Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, ‘สถิติคดี 1 ปี หลังเยาวชนเริ่มปลดแอก: ยุติการใช้ “กฎหมาย เป็นเครื่องมือปราบปรามทางการเมือง’, 18 July 2021, available at: https://tlhr2014.com/archives/32258.  

  ^[2] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 21.

  ^[3] Ibid.

  ^[4] Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 15.

  ^[5] Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 37, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/37, para. 1, (23 July 2020) [hereinafter General Comment No. 37]. Unofficial Thai language translation is available at: https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/1.-ไทย_GC-37.pdf

  ^[6] Id. at para. 2.

  ^[7] Id. at para. 32.

  ^[8] Id. at para. 56.

  ^[9] See Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 37, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/37, para. 45, (23 July 2020) [hereinafter General Comment No. 37].

  ^[10] Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Civic Space and COVID-19: Guidance’, 4 May 2020, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/CivicSpace/CivicSpaceandCovid.pdf.

  ^[11] UN OHCHR, ‘COVID-19 security measures no excuse for excessive use of force, say UN Special Rapporteurs’, 17 April 2020, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25802&LangID=E.

  ^[12] Amnesty International, ‘COVID-19 Crackdowns: Police abuse and the global pandemic’, 2020, p. 25, available at: https://policehumanrightsresources.org/content/uploads/2020/12/ACT3034432020ENGLISH.pdf?x96812. 

  ^[13] Id. at paras. 74, 76.

  ^[14] Id. at paras. 76, 79.

  ^[15] UN OHCHR, ‘UN rights experts urge lawmakers to stop “alarming” trend to curb freedom of assembly in the US’, 30 March 2017, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21464&LangID=E.

  ^[16] Id. See also: General Comment No. 37 at para. 4.

  ^[17] Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, U.N. Doc A/HRC/31/66, 4 February 2016, at para. 26 [hereinafter HRC 31/66].

  ^[18] HRC 31/66 at para 61; General Comment No. 37 at para. 85.

  ^[19] General Comment No. 37 at para. 9.

  ^[20] HRC 31/66 at para. 57.

  ^[21] Id. at paras. 57–58.

  ^[22] General Comment No. 37 at para 88; HRC 31/66 at para. 59. See also: Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, principles 9 and 14; Amnesty International, Dutch Section, ‘Use of Force: Guidelines for the implementation of the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials’, August 2015, section 2, available at: https://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/use_of_force.pdf, [hereinafter Amnesty International, ‘Use of Force’].

  ^[23] United Nations Human Rights Guidance on Less Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement, para. 7.5.8, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/LLW_Guidance.pdf [hereinafter Guidance on Less Lethal Weapons].

  ^[24] Amnesty International, ‘Use of Force’, section 7.4.2.

  ^[25] Id. at para. 87.

  ^[26] Guidance on Less Lethal Weapons, paras. 7.3.6-8.

  ^[27] General Comment No. 37 at para. 89.

  ^[28] HRC 31/66 at para. 42.

  ^[29] General Comment No. 37 at para. 91.

  ^[30] Id. at para. 90.

  ^[31] UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet, ‘Urgent action needed to prevent COVID-19 “rampaging through places of detention”’, 25 March 2020, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25745&LangID=E.

• Thailand: Government must respect and protect the rights of demonstrators

  

  We, the undersigned organizations, condemn the Thai police’s unnecessary and excessive use of force against peaceful protesters marching to the national parliament in Bangkok on November 17, 2020. We are concerned that authorities could employ similar measures when facing protesters who have declared they will march to the Siam Commercial Bank headquarters on November 25.

• There can be no sustainable development without respect for human rights

  FRENCH

  • Global civil society calls on governments to put human rights at centre of development
  • States failing to make connections between sustainable development and human rights to restrict civil society is against the spirit of Agenda 2030
  • Governments need to open channels of communications with civil society groups to make them an equitable partner in the implementation of the sustainable development goals.

  Civil society groups across the globe make significant contributions to development and the Sustainable Development Goals cannot be fully realised if the onslaught on civil society and human rights defenders continues.

  This is the resounding message from representatives of civil society organisations across the world. In May 2019 more than 60 representatives of civil society from 25 countries met in Johannesburg, South Africa to discuss the impact of restrictions on freedom of assembly and association on sustainable development. Reflections from the Johannesburg meeting resonate with those of many others around the world.

  Ahead of the High-Level Political Forum (HLPF) – the United Nations’ central platform for follow-up and review of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals – taking place from July 9-18 in New York, the undersigned civil society representatives call on governments to place human rights at the centre of development.

  The HLPF 2019 takes place at a time when attacks on civil society representatives have reached alarming proportions. Reports reveal that civil society is under serious attack in 111 countries, including those who will present progress made on the SDGs at the HLPF under the associated Voluntary National Review (VNR) framework. The last decade has experienced a spike in the killing of human rights defenders who exercise their right to assemble and associate peacefully. The issue of disruption of protest action and gatherings and the excessive use of force by the police and law enforcement agents is of major concern to many of the groups who endorse this statement.

  

   

  As representatives of civil society, we note with concern that our governments make a distinction between human rights and development – often viewing campaigners and community leaders who engage in human rights activities as unnecessarily disruptive and being far removed from developmental issues. Indeed, authorities have accused them of having anti-development tendencies despite civil society actors having a stake in societal progress and being full-fledged development partners.

  This disconnect often means that governments exercise too much control over the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), collude with non-state actors including private corporations in bringing about their preferred strategy for SDG implementation and often ignore or exclude the voices of civil society when launching development projects. While most human rights defenders are targeted for their campaigning, those advocating for land, environmental and indigenous rights are the most targeted and therefore most likely to be silenced.

  Ahead of the HLPF, two human rights defenders – Ryan Hubilla and Nelly Bagasala from the Filipino human rights advocacy group Karapatan – were brutally killed for their work. Before the murders, Karapatan staff had been surveilled by the military and police operatives.

  The HLPF will review six of the SDGs, including those promoting inequality reduction within and among countries, action on climate change, inclusive and equitable quality education and access to justice for inclusive and accountable institutions. Sadly, the issues that are up for review are at the heart of ongoing restrictions and reprisals by state and non-state actors.

  In 2019 alone, peaceful protests against increases in costs of living and rising inequalities have been violently repressed in Sudan, Zimbabwe, Nicaragua and Venezuela; student protests have been prevented in Liberia; and demonstrations against flawed judicial processes violently repressed in Cameroon have been met with violent repression. In Russia, on 12 June 2019, 530 protesters were arrested and detained after demanding accountability following the arbitrary arrest, detention and release of journalist Ivan Golunov.

  In Latin America and the Caribbean, there has been a spike in attacks, harassment and persecution of environmental rights defenders. In Columbia for example, paramilitary forces continue to target activists working on land, environmental and indigenous rights and have killed some like Robinson López. These are just some of the examples of the real political malaise being seen in many parts of the world, one with very serious consequences for the people involved.

  States often have a narrow view of development when they regard it as the construction of infrastructure and the exploitation of natural resources. So they particularly target those who express concerns over the lack of community consultation on infrastructural projects or over environmental impact when corporations placed profits over the interests of communities when exploiting natural resources. Governments also fail to make connections between sustainable development and the use of restrictive legislation to undermine the work of civil society in various undemocratic ways.

  The HLPF is an opportunity to reverse these trends as it highlights the complementarity of and interconnectedness between development partners. Its 2019 theme “Empowering People and ensuring inclusiveness and equality” reiterates the common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) principle at a time when it is clear governments cannot realise SDGs alone.   Thus, we need to emphasize that there can be no meaningful development without human rights. Civil society groups working on different thematic areas make significant contributions to development and the SDGs cannot be fully realised if the onslaught on civil society and human rights defenders continue with impunity. Lawmakers must realize that human rights defenders are not anti-government but rather support and uphold laws that do not violate human rights.

  Seven human rights defenders working on issues ranging from economic development, community development, anti-corruption initiatives and the rights of women and girls are currently living under strict bail conditions in Zimbabwe, after being arrested on their return from the Maldives for participating in a capacity-building workshop.  

  In light of these restrictions, we call on states to;

  • Amend, repeal and modify restrictive laws and regulations that target civil society and the freedoms of association and assembly and ensure that these laws are in line with international human rights standards;
  • Sign, ratify or adhere to agreements that protect human rights defenders and guarantee an enabling environment for them to carry out their activities.
  • Stop the practice of targeting human rights defenders, community activists and other representatives of civil society, desist from ascribing false labels to them and ensure that like every other citizen, their rights are respected and protected;
  • Establish channels of communication between the state and civil society in relation to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals to ensure that civil society is considered an equal partner in the delivery of the Goals and treated as such;
  • Ensure that at all levels, human rights are at the centre of all development initiatives and guarantee peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice and accountable institutions and reduced inequality.

  Signatories:

  • A Common Future
  • Action Foundation Common Initiative Group
  • Action pour le Developpement
  • AgriBiz Home
  • ASSAUVET/NGO
  • Action for Improvement of Food child and Mother (AFICM)
  • Alliance for Community Action
  • Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
  • AfriYAN
  • Association of citizens PLANT
  • AL-Shafaa Organisation
  • ANSA-EAP
  • Agency for Peoples Empowerment, Sierra Leone, Limited (APEM SL LTD)
  • Act Mara Diocese – Mugumu Safe House
  • Adolescents Initiatives Support Organization (AISO)
  • ADD International
  • Action Aid
  • Action for Rural Aid Empowerment
  • Actions for Democracy and Local Governance (ADLG)
  • Active Women Foundation
  • Agape Aids Control Program
  • Ahadi Forum Tanzania (AFTA)
  • Arusha Non-Governmental Organisation Network (ANGONET)
  • ARUWE
  • Association for Non-Governmental Organisation Zanzibar (ANGOZA)
  • Association of Rare Blood Donor (ARBD)
  • Balkan Civil Society Development Network
  • Business and Human Rights Tanzania (BHRT)
  • Biharamulo Community FM Radio (BCFM)
  • Biharamulo NGOs Network Forum
  • Biharamulo Originating Social Economic Development Association (BOSEDA)
  • Biharamulo Social Economic Development Association (BISEDEA)
  • BINGOS FORUM
  • Civic Initiatives
  • Centre for Peace and Justice
  • Civil Society Development Foundation
  • COSADER- Collectif des ONG pour la Sécurité Alimentaire et le Développent Rural
  • Community Centre for Integrated Development
  • Consortium of Ethiopian Rights Organizations (CERO)
  • CIVICUS, World Alliance for Citizen Participation
  • Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR)
  • Centre for Community Regeneration and Development (CCREAD-Cameroon)
  • Centre for Financial Inclusion and Sustainable Development (CenFISD)
  • Children's Assurance Program Sierra Leone (CAP-SL)
  • Centre for Social Policy Development
  • Caricuao Propone
  • Center for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development
  • Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government, Inc.(CCAGG)
  • CODE-NGO
  • Centre of Youth Dialogue (CYD)
  • Civic and Legal Aid Organization (CILAO)
  • CSYM HUDUMA*the Christian Spiritual Youth Ministry
  • Collaboration for Development and Humanitarian Action Inc
  • CESOPE
  • CHIFU KIMWELI FOOTBALL CLUB
  • Child Watch
  • Children Dignity Forum
  • Christian Education and Development Organisation (CEDO)
  • Civic and Legal Aid Organisations
  • Community Development Initiatives Support Organisation (COSIDO)
  • Community Focus Tanzania
  • Community for Educators and Legal Assistance
  • Community Support Initiatives-Tanzania
  • Crisis Resolving Centre
  • C-SEMA
  • CWCA
  • Discourage Youths from Encourages Poverty
  • Derecho, Ambiente, y Recursos Naturales
  • David Chanyeghea-New Age Foundation
  • Dawning Hope
  • Dignity Kwanza Community Solutions
  • Door of Hope to Women and Youth in Tanzania
  • DUNGONET (NGO’S NETWORK FOR DODOMA)
  • Economic Empowerment and Human Rights Sierra Leone (EEHRSL)
  • Education and English for You
  • Empower Society, Transform Lives (ESTL)
  • Equality for Growth
  • Fundamental human Rights & Rural Development Association FHRRDA
  • Faidika Aidika Wote Pamoja (FAWOPA)
  • FAWETZ
  • FICOFAWE WOMEN EMPOWERMENT
  • FIDELIS Yunde-Youth Movement for Change
  • Free Mind Foundation
  • Fondation Lucienne SALLA
  • Global Vision
  • GEARS Initiative
  • Gidion Kaino Mandesi Dolased
  • Girls Education Support Initiatives
  • GIYEDO
  • Gospel Communication Network of Tanzania
  • Growth Dimensions Africa
  • Global youth clan Sierra Leone chapter
  • GLOBAL MEDIA FOUNDATION
  • Glow Movement, South Africa
  • Global Vision
  • HURISA
  • HuMENA for Human Rights and Sustainable Development
  • Human rights Center Memorial and OVD-Info
  • HakaConnect.org
  • HAKI CATALYST
  • HAKI ELIMU
  • HAKI MADINI
  • HAKI RASILIMALI
  • HAKI ARDHI
  • Happy Children Tanzania Organisation
  • HILDA S. DADU-PHLI
  • HIMS ARUSHA
  • Human Rights National Association of Educators for World Peace
  • Humanity Aid for Development Organisation
  • HURUMA Organisation
  • Initiative for Good Governance and Transparence in Tanzania (IGT)
  • IHAN (International Humanitarian Activists Network) / JAKI (Jaringan Aktivis Kemanusiaan Internasional)
  • Initiative Africaine Pour le Developpement Durable
  • International Center for Environmental Education and Community Development (ICENECDEV)
  • INTRAC
  • ISDO RWANDA
  • ISRAEL ILUNDE –YPC
  • Just Fair
  • JAMII Media Limited
  • John Seka-Seka and Associates Advocates
  • JUKWAA LA KATIBA TANZANIA
  • JUMA KAPIPI
  • Jumuiya Ya Kuelimisha Athari Za Madawa Ya Kulevya Ukimwi Na Mimba Katika Mdogo (JUKAMKUM)
  • JUMUIYA YA KUELIMISHA ATHARI ZA MADAWA YA KULEVYA UKIMWI NA MIMBA KATIKA UMRI MDOGO (JUKAMKUM)
  • JUMUIYA YA KUENDELEZA UFUGAJI NYUKI NA UHIFADHI MAZINGIRA (JUKUNUM)
  • JUMUIYA YA KULINDA NA KUTETEA HAKI ZA WANAWAKE NA WATOTO MKOANI (JUKUWAM)
  • JUMUIYA YA KUTETEA HAKI ZA WANAWAKE NA WATOTO SHRHIYA YA OLE (JUKUHAWA),
  • JUMUIYA YA MAENDELEO YA ELIMU KWA WATOTO PEMBA (JUMAEWAPE)
  • JUMUIYA YA MAENDELEO YA ELIMU KWA WATOTO PEMBA (JUMAEWAPE),
  • JUMUIYA YA MAENDELEO YA WAVUVI WA KOJANI (KOFDO)
  • JUMUIYA YA MAENDELEO ZIWANI (JUMAJZI)
  • JUMUIYA YA OWEDE
  • JUMUIYA YA TUMAINI JIPYA PEMBA(TUJIPE)
  • JUMUIYA YA TUSISHINDWE DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION PEMBA (TUDOPE)
  • JUMUIYA YA WASAIDIZI WA SHERIA PEMBA (JUWASPE)
  • KARAPATAN
  • Kagera Human Rights Defenders and Legal Aid Support Organisation
  • Kabataang Gabay sa Positibong Pamumuhay (KGPP) Inc.,
  • Kadesh International
  • Khpal Kore Organization
  • KUTAFITI-The Social Science Centre for African Development
  • KARENY MASASI
  • Kigoma Paralegal Aid Centre (KIPACE)
  • Kigoma Ujiji Non-Governmental Organisation Network (KIUNGONET)
  • Kigoma Women Development
  • KIKUNDI CHA USHINDI
  • KIWOHEDE
  • KOK Foundation
  • Lawyers for Human Rights
  • LARETOK-LE-SHERIA NA HAKI ZA BINADAMU NGORONGORO (LASHEHABINGO)
  • Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC)
  • Lindi Regional Press Club (LRPC)
  • Lindi Women Paralegal Aid Centre (LIWOPAC)
  • Liwale FARMERS Association (LIFA)
  • Migrant workers Association of Lesotho (MWA-Ls)
  • Monna ka Khomo (Lesotho Herd boys Ass.)
  • My Future Matters
  • Manyara Early Childhood Development Network
  • Mauritius Council of Social Service (MACOSS)
  • Media Education Centre
  • Magata Primary Cooperative Society
  • Manyara Regional Civil Society Network (MACSNET)
  • Mapambano Centre for Children
  • MAWAZO DANIEL-NYDT
  • Mbeya Hope for Orphans
  • Mbeya Paralegal Aid Centre (MBEPACE)
  • MBEYA WOMEN
  • MCHOMORO AIDS COMBAT GROUP
  • Media Association for Indigenous and Pastoralist Communities
  • Media Support Tanzania
  • MICHAEL REUBEN NTIBIKEMA-ELIMU MWANGAZA TANZANIA
  • MICHEWENI ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION AND AIDS CONTROL(MIDECAC)
  • MIKONO YETU CENTRE FOR CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION (MIKONO YETU)
  • Morogoro Paralegal Centre (MPLC)        
  • MSICHANA INITIATIVES
  • Mtwara NGOs Network (MTWANGONET)
  • Mtwara Paralegal Centre
  • MTWARA YOUTH ANTI AIDS GROUP
  • MUKEMBA GROUP MAENDELEO
  • MUSSA JUMA-MISA TANZANIA
  • MWANAMKE NA UONGOZI
  • National Council of NGOS (NACONGO)
  • NNATIONAL Union of Mine and Energy Workers of Tanzania (NUMET)
  • NEEMA KITUNDU-FAWETZ
  • NETWO
  • New Family Organisation
  • New Hope Winners Foundation (NHNWF)                                                       
  • NGUVUMALI Community Development of Environment
  • NICAS NIBENGO- BASE FOR EDUCATION DISSEMINATION
  • NOMADIC PASTORALIST DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION(NOPADEO)
  • NTABYMA
  • NYAKITONTO YOUTH FOR DEVELOPMENT TANZANIA
  • Nelson Nohashi Ministry
  • New Horizon Global
  • NGO World and Danube
  • ONG Les BA TISSEURS
  • Outreach Social Care Project, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
  • Open Mind Tanzania
  • Organisation for Rural Self-Help Initiatives (ORSHI)
  • Plant Protection and Regulatory Services Directorate
  • Population and Development Society
  • PEN Kenya
  • PAMOJA DAIMA (PADA)
  • Paralegal Primary Justice (PPJ)
  • Peace Relief Organisation (PRO)
  • PEMBA Association for Civil Society Organisation (PASCO)
  • PEMBA EAST ZONE ENVIROMENT ASSOCIATION (PEZEA)
  • PEMBA ISLAND RELIEF ORGANIZATION (PIRO)
  • PEMCO
  • Peoples Development Forum (PDF)
  • Peoples Health Movement Tanzania (PHM)
  • PINGOS FORUM
  • Policy Curiosity Society
  • Poverty Alleviation in Tanga (POVATA)
  • Promotion and Women Development Association (POWDA)
  • PROSPERUS HEALTH LIFE INITIATIVES
  • PWAAT
  • RAFIKI Social Development Organisation
  • REHEMA JOSPHEPH-CENTA
  • Resource Advocacy Initiative (RAI)
  • RIEFP
  • ROWODO
  • RUANGWA Organisation for Poverty Alleviation (ROPA)
  • Rural Woman Development Initiative (RUWODI)
  • Rainbow Pride Foundation
  • Recycle Up!
  • RESEAU DES JEUNES POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ET LE LEADERSHIP AU TCHAD, Chad
  • RESPECT CAMEROON
  • Salum Mbaruok
  • Sikhula Sonke Early Childhood Development
  • SPEDYA-Africa
  • Street Youth Connection Sierra Leone (SYC-SL)
  • Sujag sansar orgnaition
  • Sustainable Social Development Organization (SSDO)
  • SADELINE HEALTH CARE TRUST
  • Safe Space for Children and Youth Women Tanzania (SSCYWT)
  • SAHRiNGON
  • SAKALE Development Foundation
  • SAUTI YA HAKI TANZANIA
  • SAUTI YA WANAWAKE UKELEWE
  • Save the Mother and Children of Central Tanzania (SMCCT)
  • SAWABI BIHARAMULO
  • Service Health and Development for People
  • SHALOM OPHARNAGE CARE CENTER
  • SHAMILA MSHANGAMA
  • SHIMAWAMI
  • SHIRIKA LA BINADAMU NANDANGALA
  • SHIVYAWATA
  • SHUKURU PAUL-HRC
  • SOPHIA KOMBA-CAGBV
  • SORF DODOMA
  • Sports Development Aid Lindi
  • Trade Union Congress of Swaziland (TUCOSWA)
  • The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy
  • The Maldivian Democracy Network
  • Tai Tanzania
  • Tanzania Agricultural Modernization Association (TAMA)
  • Tanzania Development Trust
  • TEACH
  • The Need Today
  • The Youth Voice Of SA
  • Tim Africa Aid Ghana
  • Transparence_RD Congo
  • Trio Uganda, United Kingdom
  • TUKELAKANG ENTETE FOUNDATION / YAYASAN TUKELAKANG ENTETE
  • Trag Foundation
  • TAMHA Paralegal Aid
  • TANDAHIMBA Women Association
  • TANGA Paralegal Aid
  • TANGIABLE INITIATIVES FOR LOCAL DEVELOPMENT TANZANIA
  • Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO)
  • Tanzania Centre for Research for Research and Information on Pastoralism (TCRIP)
  • Tanzania Citizen Information Bureau
  • Tanzania Hone Economic Association (TAHEA) BIHARAMULO
  • Tanzania Human Rights Defenders Coalition (THRDC)
  • Tanzania Legal Knowledge and Aid Centre
  • Tanzania media Woman’s Association (TAMWA)
  • Tanzania Media Women’s Association
  • Tanzania Network for Legal Providers (TANLAP)
  • Tanzania Network of Women Living with HIV and AIDS (TNW+)
  • TANZANIA Pastoralist Community Forum (TPCF)
  • Tanzania Peace Legal Aid and Justice
  • Tanzania Tobacco Control Forum
  • Tanzania Widows Association (TAWIA)
  • Tanzania Women Empowerment in Action (TAWEA)
  • Tanzania Women Teachers Association
  • Tanzania Youth Potential Association
  • TAWASANET
  • TAWEDO
  • TAWLA
  • TECDEN
  • TEN/MET
  • TGNP MTANDAO
  • The African for Civil Society (TACS)
  • The African Institute for Comparative and International Law (AICIL)
  • The Development for Accountability in Tanzania
  • The Foundation of Human Health and Social Development (HUHESO)
  • The Life Hood Children and Development Society (LICHIDE)
  • The Organisation of Journalists Against Drug Abuse and Crimes in Tanzania (OJADACT)
  • The Voice of the Marginalised Community
  • TNRF
  • Tree of Hope
  • TUNDURU PARALEGAL CENTRE (TUPACE)
  • TUPACE
  • TUSHIRIKI
  • TUWAANDAE WATOTO
  • TYVA
  • Union for Promotion / Protection, Human Rights Defense and the Environment-UPDDHE/GL Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
  • UNODC, Canada
  • UMMY NDERIANANGAB-SHIVYAWATA
  • UMOJA WA VIKUNDI VYA UZALISHAJI MALI NA UELIMISHAJI RIKA MAGU (UVUUMA)    
  • UMOJA WA WAWEZESHAJI KIOO
  • Under the Same Sun (UTSS)
  • UTPC
  • UTTI MWANGA’MBA-CWCA
  • UVINZA NGOS NETWORK (UNON)
  • Volunteer Activists
  • VIJANA ASSEMBLY
  • Vital Projection Limited
  • Voice of the Voiceless
  • Volunteer for Youth in Health and Development (VOYOHEDE)
  • Victoria Quade, New Zealand
  • Women for Social Progress, Mongolia
  • WAHAMAZA
  • WAJIBU Institute of Accountability
  • WALIO KATIKA MAPAMBANO NA AIDS TANZANIA(WAMATA)
  • WASOMI VOICE FOUNDATION
  • WGNRR AFRICA
  • Widows and Orphaned Development Organisation
  • WILDAF
  • WOFATA
  • WOMEN ACTION TOWARDS ENTRP.DEVELOPMENT
  • WOMEN DIGNITY
  • Women Legal Aid Centre (WLAC)
  • Women Life Foundation
  • Women Wake-Up (WOWAP)                    
  • Women’s Promotion Centre (WPC)
  • Women’s Empowerment in Action
  • WOTE INITIATIVES
  • WOTE SAWA YOUTH DOMESTIC WORKERS
  • WOVUCTA
  • Youth Against Aids Poverty
  • Young League Pakistan, Pakistan
  • Youth Africa and Peace Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
  • YOUTH ASSOCIATION OF SIERRA LEONE, Sierra Leone
  • Youth Harvest Foundation Ghana
  • Youth Partnership for Peace and Development, Sierra Leone
  • YUNA
  • ZAFELA
  • ZAHRA SALEHE-ICCAO
  • ZAITUNI NJIVU- ZAINA FOUNDATION
  • Zanzibar Aids Association and Support for Orphans (ZASO)
  • Zanzibar Association for Children Advancement (ZACA)
  • Zanzibar Children Rights Forum
  • Zanzibar Fighting Against Youth Challenges Organisation (ZAFAYCO)
  • Zanzibar Legal Service Centre 

   

  Find out more about our work at the HLPF here. 

• TURKEY: ‘For the embattled LGBTQI+ movement, simply persisting in taking to the streets is an achievement’

  CIVICUS speaks about 2023 Pride and the civil society response to the Turkish government’s anti-LGBTQI+ campaign with Damla Umut Uzun, international relations and fundraising officer atKaos Gay and Lesbian Cultural Research and Solidarity Association (Kaos GL).

  Founded in 1994, Kaos GL is one of the oldest and largest LGBTQI+ organisations in Turkey, dedicated to creating visibility and understanding and promoting LGBTQI+ human rights.

  How have Turkish authorities reacted to Prideevents?

  Since 2015, Pride events have been increasingly banned by city governors. The first ban was introduced in Istanbul, which in 2014 had the largest Pride gathering, with at least 50,000 participants. But despite the growing number of bans, the number of Pride events across the country has also consistently increased.

  This year in Istanbul, several Pride events were banned by district governor offices, resulting in detentions, police brutality and restrictions on journalists. A Pride movie event organised by the University Feminist Collective in Şişli was banned for ‘potentially causing societal resentment’ and ‘threatening social peace’. The screening of the film ‘Pride’, scheduled by the cinema collective, and a tea gathering event organised by the LambdaIstanbul LGBTQI+ Solidarity Association were banned in Kadıköy district. The police detained and later released at least eight people who came to watch the film, using physical violence. The LGBTQI+ group Queer Baykuş of Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University had their posters violently confiscated by the university’s security units before a planned press release. On 18 June, during the Trans Pride Parade in Beyoğlu district, the police handcuffed and detained 10 people, including a child, and released them later that day after taking police statements. Journalists were prevented from taking pictures during the intervention.

  The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey compiled a detailed report of rights violations in the context of 2023 Pride events between 2 June and 10 July 2023. Various Pride celebrations, including parades, picnics and press statements, were banned by multiple governorships and disrupted due to targeted threats and societal reactions in Adana, Ankara, Antalya, Eskişehir, Izmir, Kocaeli and Muğla. A total of 241 people, including four minors and seven lawyers, were detained on the grounds of Article 2,911 of the law on gatherings and demonstrations. The main reasons cited by authorities were non-compliance with regulations, disruption of public order and violation of ban decisions. Although most detainees were typically released on the same day, they might face prosecution and lawsuits months later.

  Police interventions during Pride events are a reflection of the government’s hostility towards LGBTQI+ people. They are waging a kind of war against us. The recurring violence is fuelled by a sense of impunity: the fact that law enforcement officials face no consequences for harming, insulting or harassing LGBTQI+ people further emboldens them.

  Why is the Turkish government hostile towards LGBTQI+ people?

  Oppression of the LGBTQI+ community in Turkey is not new: the government’s crackdown first intensified following the 2016 attempted coup. But the main reason behind the increasing hatred is the attempt of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to mobilise conservative segments of society. To mask the effects of its corrupt rule and economic mismanagement, the government is employing populist rhetoric and polarisation tactics, seeking to designate an enemy to blame.

  Repression hasn’t been limited to LGBTQI+ people but rather targeted at any opposition or independent views. Dissenting voices, including those of Kurdish people, feminists and human rights defenders, are labelled as ‘terrorists’.

  Among these groups, LGBTQI+ people are a particularly easy target due to societal conservatism and religious tendencies. Censorship and rights violations of LGBTQI+ people affect all aspects of life, including access to goods and services, education, healthcare and housing and media representation. In line with the global anti-gender trend, the government has employed a rhetoric focused on ‘protecting the sacred Turkish family structure against perversion’, using LGBTQI+ people and feminists as scapegoats.

  What role did anti-LGBTQI+ rhetoric play in the2023 presidential elections?

  Anti-LGBTQI+ rhetoric played a significant role in the election campaigns of the AKP government and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, aimed at mobilising conservative voters, including those on the left side of the political spectrum. Former Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu openly mobilised hate speech against LGBTQI+ people at public events. President Erdoğan used similar rhetoric, accusing the opposition of being ‘pro-LGBTQI+’.

  Unfortunately, two radical Islamist parties, Hüdapar and New Welfare, have entered parliament, and their primary election promise was to close down LGBTQI+ organisations. They are now working actively towards this goal, and we anticipate that such rhetoric and efforts will intensify in the run-up to local elections in a few months.

  How are LGBTQI+ organisations, including Kaos GL,responding to these attacks?

  Despite facing oppressive conditions and lack of opportunities, the LGBTQI+ movement in Turkey remains resilient and strong. Alongside feminists, we are the only groups that continue to take to the streets and demonstrate for our rights, showing immense bravery in the face of police violence and detention. Simply persisting in organising demonstrations is an achievement in itself.

  In addition to street activism, Turkish LGBTQI+ organisations are actively engaged in advocacy, the promotion of visibility and capacity building. We recognise that we won’t be able to change policies at the national level due to the AKP’s absolute majority, so we focus our efforts on grassroots societal transformation. We educate professionals who encounter LGBTQI+ people in their daily work, such as doctors, nurses, teachers, lawyers and social and municipal workers, to increase their understanding and capacity to work with LGBTQI+ people and respond to their needs in the respectful manner.

  We document human rights violations and hate crimes, providing a factual basis for our advocacy campaigns. We also report on the situation of LGBTQI+ employees in the public and private sectors. Other organisations focus on reporting the challenges faced by LGBTQI+ students, people living with HIV, elderly people and refugees.

  We also organise cultural events, including queer film festivals such as Pink Life Queer Fest and exhibitions and art programmes like the Ankara Queer Art Programme and the Women-to-Women storytelling contests, aimed at fostering expression and community engagement.

  What obstacles do you encounter in your work, and what supportdo you need?

  Since the attempted coup, the government has intensified its crackdown on civil society organisations (CSOs), subjecting them to frequent state audits to identify alleged mistakes, impose fines or even shut them down. Laws such as the Law on the Prevention of the Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction have made it increasingly difficult for CSOs to receive funds, further hindering their work.

  Turkish LGBTQI+ organisations maintain close contact with European human rights organisations, Council of Europe representatives, the European Union (EU) delegation and United Nations mechanisms. We regularly update them about the developments and shrinking human rights space in Turkey, and in turn, they issue statements expressing deep concern about the government’s actions. However, these efforts have proven ineffective as the AKP government demonstrates a complete lack of regard and even fails to implement decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.

  Turkish LGBTQI+ organisations have generally benefitted from EU funding, but this has started to decrease. It appears that the EU has somewhat given up on Turkey, since the government is making no effort to improve human rights standards. Additionally, the fact that Turkey is keeping millions of refugees out of Europe has limited the EU’s consistency in supporting human rights in Turkey.

  As LGBTQI+ individuals living in Turkey, we are constantly pressured to hide our identities, pushed to the margins of society and silenced. But as LGBTQI+ organisations we continue to fight for our rights and freedoms. To advance our cause, we need more systematic financial resources, increased collaboration with international organisations, more vocal campaigns and international pressure on the Turkish government.

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  Civic space in Turkey is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Kaos GL through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@KaosGL on Twitter.

• UN CYBERCRIME TREATY: ‘This is not about protecting states but about protecting people’

  CIVICUS speaks withStéphane Duguin aboutthe weaponisation of technology and progress being madetowards a United Nations (UN) Cybercrime Treaty.

  Stéphaneis an expert onthe use of disruptive technologies such as cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and online terrorism and theChief Executive Officer of the CyberPeace Institute,a civil society organisation (CSO) founded in 2019 to help humanitarian CSOs and vulnerable communitieslimit the harm of cyberattacks andpromote responsible behaviour in cyberspace. It conducts research and advocacy and provides legal and policy expertise in diplomatic negotiations, including theUN Ad Hoc Committee elaborating the Cybercrime Convention.

  Why is there need for a new UN treaty dealing with cybercrime?

  Several legal instruments dealing with cybercrime already exist, including the 2001 Council of Europe Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, the first international treaty aimed at addressing cybercrimes and harmonising legislations to enhance cooperation in the area of cybersecurity, ratified by 68 states around the world as of April 2023. This was followed by regional tools such as the 2014 African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection, among others.

  But the problem behind these instruments is that they aren’t enforced properly. The Budapest Convention has not even been ratified by most states, although it is open to all. And even when they’ve been signed and ratified, these instruments aren’t operationalised. This means that data is not accessible across borders, international cooperation is complicated to achieve and requests for extradition are not followed up on.

  There is urgent need to reshape cross-border cooperation to prevent and counter crimes, especially from a practical point of view. States with more experience fighting cybercrimes could help less resourced ones by providing technical assistance and helping build capacity.

  This is why the fact that the UN is currently negotiating a major global Cybercrime Convention is so important. In 2019, to coordinate the efforts of member states, CSOs, including CyberPeace Institute, academic institutions and other stakeholders, the UN General Assembly established the Ad Hoc Committee to elaborate a ‘Comprehensive International Convention on Countering the Use of Information and Communication Technologies for Criminal Purpose’ – a Cybercrime Convention in short. This will be the first international legally binding framework for cyberspace.

  The aims of the new treaty are to reduce the likelihood of attacks, and when these happen, to limit the harm and ensure victims have access to justice and redress. This is not about protecting states but about protecting people.

  What were the initial steps in negotiating the treaty?

  The first step was to take stock of what already existed and, most importantly, what was missing in the existing instruments in order to understand what needed to be done. It was also important to measure the efficacy of existing tools and determine whether they weren’t working due to their design or because they weren’t being properly implemented. Measuring the human harm of cybercrime was also key to define a baseline for the problem we’re trying to address with the new treaty.

  Another step, which interestingly has not been part of the discussion, would be an agreement among all state parties to stop engaging in cybercrimes themselves. It’s strange, to say the least, to be sitting at the table discussing definitions of cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crimes with states that are conducting or facilitating cyberattacks. Spyware and targeted surveillance, for instance, are being mostly financed and deployed by states, which are also financing the private sector by buying these technologies with taxpayers’ money.

  What are the main challenges?

  The main challenge has been to define the scope of the new treaty, that is, the list of offences to be criminalised. Crimes committed with the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) generally belong to two distinct categories: cyber-dependent crimes and cyber-enabled crimes. States generally agree that the treaty should include cyber-dependent crimes: offences that can only be committed using computers and ICTs, such as illegally accessing computers, performing denial-of-service attacks and creating and spreading malware. If these crimes weren’t part of the treaty, there wouldn’t be a treaty to speak of.

  The inclusion of cyber-enabled crimes, however, is more controversial. These are offences that are carried out online but could be committed without ICTs, such as banking fraud and data theft. There’s no internationally agreed definition of cyber-enabled crimes. Some states consider offences related to online content, such as disinformation, incitement to extremism and terrorism, as cyber-enabled crimes. These are speech-based offences, the criminalisation of which can lead to the criminalisation of online speech or expression, with negative impacts on human rights and fundamental freedoms.

  Many states that are likely to be future signatories to the treaty use this kind of language to strike down dissent. However, there is general support for the inclusion of limited exceptions on cyber-enabled crimes, such as online child sexual exploitation and abuse, and computer-related fraud.

  There is no way we can reach a wide definition of cyber-enabled crimes unless it’s accompanied with very strict human rights safeguards. In the absence of safeguards, the treaty should encompass a limited scope of crimes. But there’s no agreement on a definition of safeguards and how to put them in place, particularly when it comes to personal data protection.

  For victims as well as perpetrators, there’s absolutely no difference between cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crimes. If you are a victim, you are a victim of both. A lot of criminal groups – and state actors – are using the same tools, infrastructure and processes to perform both types of attacks.

  Even though there’s a need to include more cyber-enabled crimes, the way it’s being done is wrong, as there are no safeguards or clear definitions. Most states that are pushing for this have abundantly demonstrated that they don’t respect or protect human rights, and some – including China, Egypt, India, Iran, Russia and Syria – have even proposed to delete all references to international human rights obligations.

  Another challenge is the lack of agreement on how international cooperation mechanisms should follow up to guarantee the practical implementation of the treaty. The ways in which states are going to cooperate and the types of activities they will perform together to combat these crimes remain unclear.

  To prevent misuse of the treaty by repressive regimes we should focus both on the scope of criminalisation and the conditions for international cooperation. For instance, provisions on extradition should include the principle of dual criminality, which means an act should not be extraditable unless it constitutes a crime in both the countries making and receiving the request. This is crucial to prevent its use by authoritarian states to persecute dissent and commit other human rights violations.

  What is civil society bringing to the negotiations?

  The drafting of the treaty should be a collective effort aimed at preventing and decreasing the amount of cyberattacks. As independent bodies, CSOs are contributing to it by providing knowledge on the human rights impacts and potential threats and advocating for guarantees for fundamental rights.

  For example, the CyberPeace Institute has been analysing disruptive cyberattacks against healthcare institutions amid COVID-19 for two years. We found at least 500 cyberattacks leading to the theft of data of more than 20 million patients. And this is just the tip of the iceberg.

  The CyberPeace Institute also submits recommendations to the Committee based on a victim-centric approach, involving preventive measures, evidence-led accountability for perpetrators, access to justice and redress for victims and prevention of re-victimisation.

  We also advocate for a human-rights-by-design approach, which would ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms through robust protections and safeguards. The language of the Convention should refer to specific human rights frameworks such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is important that the fight against cybercrime should not pit national security against human rights.

  This framing is especially significant because governments have long exploited anti-cybercrime measures to expand state control, broaden surveillance powers, restrict or criminalise freedoms of expression and assembly and target human rights defenders, journalists and political opposition in the name of national security or fighting terrorism.

  In sum, the goal of civil society is to demonstrate the human impact of cybercrimes and make sure states take this into consideration when negotiating the framework and the regulations – which must be created to protect citizens. We bring in the voices of victims, the most vulnerable ones, whose daily cybersecurity is not properly protected by the current international framework. And, as far as the CyberPeace Institute is concerned, we advocate for the inclusion of a limited scope of cybercrimes with clear and narrow definitions to prevent the criminalisation of behaviours that constitute the exercise of fundamental freedoms and human rights.

  At what point in the treaty process are we now?

  A consolidated negotiating document was the basis for the second reading done in the fourth and fifth sessions held in January and April 2023. The next step is to release a zero draft in late June, which will be negotiated in the sixth session that will take place in New York between August and September 2023.

  The process normally culminates with a consolidation by states, which is going to be difficult since there’s a lot of divergence and a tight deadline: the treaty should be taken to a vote at the 78^th UN General Assembly session in September 2024.

  There’s a bloc of states looking for a treaty with the widest possible scope, and another bloc leaning towards a convention with a very limited scope and strong safeguards. But even within this bloc there is still disagreement when it comes to data protection, the approach to security and the ethics of specific technologies such as artificial intelligence.

  What are the chances that the final version of the treaty will meet international human rights standards while fulfilling its purpose?

  Considering how the process has been going so far, I’m not very optimistic, especially on the issue of upholding human rights standards, because of the crucial lack of definition of human rights safeguards. We shouldn’t forget negotiations are happening in a context of tense geopolitical confrontation. The CyberPeace Institute has been tracing the attacks deployed since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. We’ve witnessed over 1,500 campaigns of attacks with close to 100 actors involved, many of them states, and impacts on more than 45 countries. This geopolitical reality further complicates the negotiations.

  By looking at the text that’s on the table right now, it is falling short of its potential to improve the lives of victims in cyberspace. This is why the CyberPeace Institute remains committed to the drafting process – to inform and sensitise the discussions toward a more positive outcome.

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  Get in touch with the CyberPeace Institute through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@CyberpeaceInst and@DuguinStephane on Twitter.

  
  

   

• UN Panel Discussion, Freedom of peaceful assembly and association and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

   

  

  Freedom of peaceful assembly and association and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

  When: 13:15-14:30, Wednesday 17 October 2018

  Where: UNHQ, Conference Room E, New York

  Co-sponsors: Civic Space Initiative, CESR, ISHR, Oxfam, Solidarity Center

  Keynote: Andrew Gilmour, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, delivering opening remarks
   
  Panellists:
  Clément Nyaletsossi Voule, UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association
  Kate Donald, Director, Human Rights in Sustainable Development Program, Center for Economic and Social Rights
  Shayana Kadidal, Attorney, Center for Constitutional Rights

  Moderator: Lyndal Rowlands, CIVICUS

  Panellists will discuss the connections between sustainable development and the the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association drawing on examples from movements related to different aspects of sustainable development from the environment to worker’s rights. The discussion will take place on the occasion of UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of peaceful assembly and of association Clément Nyaletsossi Voule presenting his report (A/73/279) ‘The linkages between the exercise of the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ to the UN General Assembly, on Tuesday 16 October.

  Please register here.

  *Non-UN pass holders must register by noon on Monday 15 October to attend this event*

  For more information please contact: Lyndal Rowlands, CIVICUS, 

  Clément Nyaletsossi Voule - @cvoule

  Clément Nyaletsossi Voule, a national from Togo, has been appointed as United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association in March 2018. Prior to his appointment, he led the International Service for Human Rights (ISHR) work to support human rights defenders from States in transition and coordinated the organization’s work in Africa as the Advocacy Director.

  Andrew Gilmour - @gilmourUN

  Andrew Gilmour of the United Kingdom assumed his functions as Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights on 1 October 2016, heading OHCHR’s Office in New York. In October 2016, Mr. Gilmour was designated by the Secretary-General as senior official to lead the efforts within the UN system to address intimidation and reprisals against those cooperating with the UN on human rights.

  Kate Donald - @Mskaydee

  Kate Donald joined Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) in 2014. She is currently the director of the Human Rights in Development program at the Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) and former Adviser to the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights.

  Shayana Kadidal - @ShayanaKadidal

  Shayana Kadidal is Senior Managing Attorney of the Guantanamo litigation project at the Center for Constitutional Rights. He is counsel in Energy Transfer Equity, et al, v. Greenpeace, a lawsuit brought by the owners of the Dakota Access Pipeline against a number of environmental groups aiming to recast their support of grassroots activism against the pipeline's construction as criminal conspiracy and terrorism.

  Lyndal Rowlands - @lyndalrowlands

  Lyndal works in UN advocacy for CIVICUS the global alliance for citizen participation. She is an award-winning journalist and former UN correspondent and has written or conducted research for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Al Jazeera, the Diplomat, The Saturday Paper and IPS, where she was UN Bureau Chief.

• UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association, Clément Voule meets with civil society to discuss threats to rights

   

  More than 80 representatives of civil society organisations, community leaders and academics met in Johannesburg on 30-31 May and on 3 June with the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Association and Assembly, Clément Voule to discuss the impact of restrictions on freedom of assembly and association on sustainable development. Participants discussed the relationship between human rights and development and how governments perceived the two as separate from each other.  Participants were of the view that the targeting of civil society organisations using a range of restrictions slows down the attainment of development outcomes. That there are existing tensions around the rise of authoritarian models and development and that over the last decade countries like China and Rwanda have experienced some levels of economic growth despite the fact that they are under authoritarian leaders.  Other key insights from participants:

• Worrying legislation to restrict Nigerian civil society sector underway

  CIVICUS, the global civil society alliance and the Nigeria Network of NGOs (NNNGO) are deeply concerned about impending legislation to restrict freedom of association in Nigeria.

  Nigeria’s National Assembly is currently considering a bill to provide for “the establishment of the Non-Governmental Organisations Regulatory Commission for the Supervision, Coordination and Monitoring of Non-Governmental Organisations, Civil Society Organisations etc. in Nigeria and for related matters.” First introduced in July 2016, the bill has since passed through the second reading in the House of Representatives. The bill has now been referred to the Committee on CSOs and Development Partners for further legislative input.

  “The bill is in conflict with Nigeria’s Constitutional and international law obligations,” says Oyebisi Oluseyi, Executive Director of NNNGO. “We must instead strengthen civic space in Nigeria, as our sector’s role in finding solutions to the enormous challenges facing our nation cannot be overemphasized”.

• ZIMBABWE: ‘Election violence is a cover for ideological ambivalence and lack of substantive programmes’

  CIVICUS speaks about the general election in Zimbabwe and the role of civil society with Wellington Mbofana, former director ofthe Civic Education Network Trust (CIVNET), a civil society organisation (CSO) that recently shut down due to lack of funding, and a former board member of several Zimbabwean CSOs.

  What was at stake in this election?

  It’s difficult to pinpoint a single crucial issue that was at stake. Over a considerable period, Zimbabwean elections, much like those in other parts of Africa, have ceased to revolve around substantive issues and have instead become centred on political parties and personalities. This trend is evident in this election, in which major political parties failed to present their manifestos in a timely manner. The main opposition party, Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), unveiled its programme merely two weeks prior to voting, while the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) didn’t even bother.

  Given the crumbling state of the economy, reflected in record-breaking unemployment, pervasive economic informality, escalating poverty, the world’s second-highest inflation rate and a sense of hopelessness, economic strife remained the most prominent concern for voters. Ideally, the competition should have revolved around two or three contrasting strategies for addressing these economic woes. However, what we observed was a cloud of obfuscation. The ruling party advanced a narrative that conditions are improving and investors are flocking to the country, but progress would be even greater if it weren’t for sanctions imposed by Western states. The opposition pledged to outperform ZANU-PF across all fronts. But neither specified how they would fund their proposed initiatives.

  To deal with Zimbabwe’s predicament effectively the government would need to confront a range of issues, including land reform and productivity, water shortages, electricity generation, infrastructure development and urbanisation and, most importantly, guarantee the required funding.

  It should have been important to ensure the meaningfulness of this election because when elections fail, civil unrest and coups ensue, a truth that Africa has repeatedly witnessed.

  Was there any election-related violence?

  The prevalence of violence in all its manifestations – physical, structural and cultural – remains an unfortunate hallmark of Zimbabwean elections. Lives have been lost, injuries endured and property destroyed as a result.

  It is also important to note that because of its fractured politics, the country is in a perpetual election mode. Over the past five years, we have had multiple recalls from parliament and local authorities, leading to by-elections. Instances of intra-party violence have also occurred during parliamentary and primary elections. The culture upholding the idea that wielding the strongest fist is the key to ascending to power must change. Violence is a cover for ideological ambivalence and lack of substantive programmes. Who needs a manifesto when you can use force?

  What tactics did the government use to stifle dissent in the run-up to the election?

  The ruling party stands accused of engaging in lawfare, a tactic that uses laws to constrain the opposition and human rights defenders. These efforts are facilitated by an allegedly captured judiciary. A prominent CCC legislator, Job Sikhala, along with other political activists and human rights defenders, languish in remand prisons on spurious allegations after being denied bail.

  The government introduced controversial laws aimed at silencing dissent. The Private Voluntary Organisations Amendment Bill and the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Amendment Act, commonly called the Patriotic Bill, are clearly designed to deal with critics of the government.

  The Patriotic Bill came into force on 14 July 2023. With this bill, the government created a new crime of ‘wilfully injuring the sovereignty and national interest of Zimbabwe’.  The scope and definition of this offence is vague. There are valid concerns that law enforcement agencies will interpret the law broadly and use it to stifle and penalise the work of independent civil society.

  Citizens and permanent residents of Zimbabwe will be found guilty if they participate in meetings aimed at discussing or plotting armed intervention in Zimbabwe, subverting or overthrowing its government and implementing or extending sanctions or trade boycotts against Zimbabwe. A meeting encompasses any form of communication involving two or more people, regardless of whether it takes place offline or online.

  Participating in discussions about armed intervention can result in life imprisonment or the death penalty if the meeting involves planning such an intervention. Discussing subversion or overthrow of the government is punishable by up to 20 years in prison. Taking part in meetings discussing sanctions or trade boycotts can lead to a fine of up to US$12,000 or up to 10 years in prison, or both. Aggravated offences may lead to consequences such as the termination of citizenship for those who are not citizens by birth or descent, cancellation of residence permits for non-citizens and disqualification from voting or holding public office for five to 15 years.

  In the hands of overzealous and partisan law enforcement agents, this punitive law is very dangerous. It seems to target not only the opposition and civil society but also factions within the fractured ruling party and the military. It likely seeks to prevent a recurrence of a military-assisted transition, which brought the current government to power in 2017. That coup was willingly accepted by powerful global players, including the African Union and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which inadvertently endorsed the idea of military change of power.

  How did Zimbabwean civil society engage with the electoral process?

  Civil society was actively involved in electoral activities throughout the electoral cycle. CSOs play a pivotal role in providing voter education, observing elections, advocating for electoral reforms, safeguarding human rights and offering legal, medical and psycho-social assistance to victims of human rights violations.

  Both local and international observers were generally allowed and accredited. However, there were isolated cases, such as the denial of accreditation to Musa Kika, allegedly due to security risks, while some local citizens encountered intimidation, harassment and threats from unidentified people after engaging with international observers.

  But unfortunately, the last couple of years have been very difficult for Zimbabwean. Several CSOs have shut down. CIVNET, a major organisation providing civic education, closed its doors this year due to lack of funding.

  The Zimbabwean economy is too fragile to support a strong civil society, which heavily relies on international donors and solidarity. Further international support should be rendered to all groups promoting development, good governance, human rights, justice and the rule of law. The international community should also amplify local voices and exert pressure on the Zimbabwean government to act in accordance with international human rights and democratic standards.

  What did CIVNET work on?

  CIVNET operated through three main programmes: the Citizen Participation Programme, including two projects on constitutionalism and voter education, the Leadership Development Programme and the Peace Building Programme.

  The Citizen Participation Programme encouraged citizen engagement in governance and development, fostering collaboration between communities and local authorities through participatory workshops and development projects. The Constitution and Constitutionalism Project aimed to raise awareness about the significance of the new constitution and share information on how to use it to exercise human rights and honour obligations as citizens.

  The Leadership Development Programme enhanced leadership skills of people engaged in community projects. Our graduates now lead various Zimbabwean CSOs and work in local authorities and parliament. CIVNET contributed to the formation and development of CSOs such as the Zimbabwe Election Support Network, the Zimbabwe Peace Project and the Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe. It was also a key member of the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGOs Forum.

  The Peace Building Programme helped people and communities divided by conflict to reach out to each other and mend broken relations. This was done through creatively designed workshops that provided security and safety to both victims and perpetrators of violent conflicts. Mediators were also trained to address local disputes, resulting in transformed relationships and improved dialogue within previously divided communities.

  To what extent could the election be called free and fair?

  The concept of free and fair elections involves political freedoms and fair processes prior to elections, culminating in the casting of votes by well-informed eligible voters able to vote freely for candidates and parties of their choice. A transparent tally of all valid votes, accurate result announcements and universal acceptance of the election outcomes by all parties are integral components of this concept.

  Past elections in Zimbabwe have been contested at courts and other institutions. For Zimbabwe to uphold its position within the international community, this election would have to gain universal recognition as credible, legitimate and conducted in a free and fair manner. It would be key to ensure the acceptance of its outcome and secure peace and stability to attract investors.

  The 2023 election was disputed in the legal arena even before a single ballot was cast. This may be a harbinger of future developments. On 12 July, the Electoral Court disqualified a presidential candidate, Savior Kasukuwere, whose participation had been previously permitted by the Nomination Court. Then the High Court disqualified 12 CCC parliamentary candidates, ostensibly for late filings, although the Nomination Court had accepted their submissions. Both decisions favoured the ruling party. However, following an appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s verdict on the 12 CCC candidates, leading to their reinstatement on the ballot. On 19 July the electoral court ruled in favour of a leader of the opposition United Zimbabwe Alliance party, Elizabeth Valerio, whose candidacy had been initially rejected by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), also for alleged untimely filing.

  Declaring the election to be free and fair would be unreasonable given the political environment characterised by violence, intimidation and voter suppression, non-transparent processes with the electoral roll and ballot paper printing, pre-voting by security personnel, biased media coverage, opposition rallies barred by the police, vote buying through handouts, influence from traditional and religious leaders on voters, misuse of government resources for party campaigns and indications that some parties will reject any outcome other than their own victory, implying that the ruling party wouldn’t have handed over power if it had lost. Indeed, SADC decided to abandon the term ‘free and fair’ regarding Zimbabwean elections, instead referring to them as ‘legitimate’.

  What electoral reforms are needed?

  Adherence to rule of law and impartial management of elections is essential. The ZEC should enforce the Electoral Code of Conduct, safeguarding the right for all to express their political views and campaign freely. It must also ensure fairness by curbing the misuse of state resources, preventing intimidation, harassment and destruction of campaign materials and improving voter education.

  The police should fulfil their constitutional duties impartially, without bias, fear, or favour. Political parties should adhere to the Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Candidates. This entails refraining from violence, misuse of public resources for partisan ends, coercion and intimidation of the electorate and inciting violence through hate speech and derogatory language.

  Were there any issues with people being prevented from voting, and what do you expect to happen next?

  A high turnout was to be expected given the high stakes. The economy has done its own campaign, motivating people to participate. The ruling party also mobilised people, especially in rural areas, by any means necessary.

  However, many voters might not have been able to locate their names on the register. The polling station-based system is such that people living in a specific neighbourhood can only vote at a certain polling station. In the 2018 election, a lot of people found their names had been removed from their usual stations without a change having been requested, while others who requested changes after moving to other districts saw those changes unimplemented. Following the election, many constituencies and councils had elected representatives recalled by political parties in power. Since there are no guarantees that this won’t happen again, some people may have been discouraged from voting.

  Based on experience, disputes around results and their resolution by the courts are to be expected. Given that the judiciary is perceived to be captured and judges were given significant ‘housing loans’ before the election, judgements against the opposition are also rightly likely to be perceived as unfair.

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  Civic space in Zimbabwe is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.