freedom of association

• Alert: Continued deterioration of democratic institutions in Venezuela

  Spanish

  Global civil society alliance, CIVICUS and the International Service for Human Rights (ISHR) are deeply concerned about the continuing deterioration of democratic institutions in Venezuela. On 28 and 29 March 2017, the Constitutional Chamber of Venezuela’s Supreme Court (TSJ) issued rulings No. 155 and 156 by which it declared the National Assembly in contempt of court, stripped legislators of parliamentary immunity, and assumed congressional powers as well as the prerogative to delegate them to whoever it decided, namely the Office of the President.
  
  In practice, many civil society organisations in Venezuela have expressed an opinion that these rulings amounted to an attempted coup against the legislative branch of government, a fundamental pillar of democratic institutions and the embodiment of the people’s right to be represented in the arena where key decisions concerning their lives and rights are made. Similarly, the Venezuelan Attorney General considered these decisions represent a rupture of the Constitutional order.
  
  The latest developments are the culmination of a several years’ long process of erosion of congressional authority which has plunged the country into a deep social crisis. Through the past year and a half, the TSJ issued more than 50 rulings that undermined the functions of the National Assembly and conferred unlimited powers onto the executive branch of the state. This is the reason why the backing down by the TSJ on its latest rulings did not amount to a restoration of the separation of powers and the rule of law. The fact that this reversal was executed at the executive’s request further emphasised the judiciary’s lack of independence and the on-going degradation of Venezuelan republican institutions.
  
  Over the years, the erosion of constitutional checks and balances and the resulting political polarisation have progressed hand in hand with increasing restrictions on civic freedoms, namely the rights to freedom of association, expression and peaceful assembly without which an empowered and enabled civil society cannot exist.
  
  In turn, the increasing concentration of decision-making powers in the executive leadership has led to serious policy-making failures, thereby intensifying rather than resolving the social crisis facing the country, including acute shortages of food and other basic goods, challenges with the public health system and a spike in street violence which disproportionately affects impoverished communities. We are also concerned about state repression against individuals and civil society groups when they speak up, organise and protest about their troubles.
  
  In the face of this multidimensional crisis, we call on Venezuelan Government to:

  • Restore the constitutionally defined functions and resources of the National Assembly as well as the prerogatives of its members, devolve the extraordinary powers conferred onto the executive by subsequent TSJ rulings, and introduce measures to guarantee the independence of the judiciary.
  • Repeal the current state of exception, established through an executive decree, and comply with human rights commitments under international law to guarantee basic enabling conditions for human rights defenders and civil society organisations. 
  • Guarantee the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and of expression. Security forces must refrain from the use of force against, or the arbitrary arrest of peaceful protestors.
  • Engage in dialogue with relevant national actors, including civil society, to resolve the current crisis; and ensure access to food and medicine for the entire population.

  We also urge the international community and in particular, the Organization of American States and its members to assist in resolution of the social and political crisis facing Venezuela.

  Contact:
  Eleanor Openshaw, ISHR NY Office: +1 212 490 2199,
  Inés Pousadela, CIVICUS Policy and Research: +598 2901 1646,

• Amid COVID-19, what is the health of civic freedoms?

  By Marianna Belalba Barreto, Civic Space Research Lead at CIVICUS and Aarti Narsee, Civic Space Research Officer

  More than half a year after the World Health Organization declared the COVID-19 outbreak a pandemic, governments are continuing to waste precious time and energy restricting human rights rather than focusing on fighting the virus. Civic freedoms, including the freedom to associate, express views and peacefully assemble, are under threat, with states using broad and restrictive legislation to snuff out dissent. But people are organising and mobilising to demand rights. In the face of restrictions, civil society continues to fight back, often taking to the streets to do so.

  Read onInter Press Service News Agency

• ANGOLA: ‘The new NGO Law is just a way of legalising the government’s arrogance and excesses’

  PORTUGUESE

  CIVICUS discusses the state of civic space and the new restrictions being imposed on the work of Angolan civil society with Godinho Cristóvão, a jurist, human rights defender and executive director of the association Movimento de Defensores de Direitos Humanos de Angola (Movement of Human Rights Defenders of Angola, KUTAKESA).

  KUTAKESA is a civil society organisation (CSO) working for the rights and protection of human rights defenders (HRDs) in Angola, particularly those active in more vulnerable areas, working on more sensitive issues and from historically excluded groups.

  What are the current conditions for civil society in Angola?

  Angolan CSOs work in a climate of suspicion and uncertainty, despite the fact that the Constitution of the Republic of Angola enshrines a catalogue of citizens’ fundamental rights, freedoms and guarantees.

  The Angolan authorities should have aligned themselves with the democratic rule of law and respected the work of CSOs and HRDs. Instead, there has been an increase in threats, harassment and illegal arrests of HRDs who denounce or hold peaceful demonstrations against acts of bad governance and violations of citizens’ rights and freedoms. There have been clear setbacks with regard to the guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the constitution, as well as the rights set out in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other human rights treaties Angola has ratified.

  How is the government targeting civil society with restrictive legislation?

  The attacks on civil society are totally uncalled for. On 25 May, the Angolan National Assembly passed a draft NGO Statute, despite severe criticism from CSOs, which have stated that it limits freedom of association and gives the state excessive powers to interfere with CSO activities.

  The government targets civil society with legislation that is meant for terrorists and money launderers, though it has never been proven in any court that a CSO has committed an act of terrorism in Angola. On the contrary, the rationale of this legislation constitutes institutional terrorism, the target of which are CSOs.

  In Angola we all know who the corrupt are, and which party feeds corruption and money laundering. And as far as we know, CSOs are not part of that group. Funders of Angolan CSOs are all clearly identified, and the transfer of funds goes through national banking institutions and a rigorous compliance process. It is also worth remembering that many CSO funders are the same ones that fund government projects.

  How does the new restrictive law compare with the 2015 decree that was declared unconstitutional?

  In general, the content and spirit of Presidential Decree 74/15 on the Regulation of NGOs are the same as those of the new NGO Statute Law. By way of example, the rights and duties chapter of the previous regulation, later declared unconstitutional, was retained with only minimal changes in wording that in no way alter its content and its controlling and repressive spirit.

  Additionally, the decree that was found unconstitutional provided for an administrative body under the tutelage of the Angolan executive – called IMPROCAC – with the power to monitor and control CSO actions. The recently approved draft NGO Statute Law provides for a similar body with the same attributions as the old IMPROCAC.

  In other words, this is a new attempt to impose similar restrictions, but it is more serious since its instrument is no longer a presidential decree but a law. This means that it is no longer only the executive that is attacking the principles of autonomy and freedom of association provided for in article 48 of the constitution, but Congress as well, in which the president’s party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), has a majority. It is worth remembering that it was the MPLA majority that approved the 2010 constitution which it is now violating by passing the NGO Statute Law.

  How is civil society, including KUTAKESA, reacting to the proposed law?

  CSOs, at least the most active ones, are not looking favourably on the approval of this law, given the threats it represents in terms of closing off civic space in Angola.

  We are taking joint action to prevent the final approval of this law and its entry into force. From the point of view of legal certainty and security, the courts should be aligned with the principle of jurisprudential precedent. Since they submitted the presidential decree to a review of unconstitutionality and declared it unconstitutional, they should now follow suit, given that the new law contains the same irregularities.

  All national organisations took a joint position to call on parliament to take off the agenda the law now approved. This was done through information exchange meetings with opposition parties represented in parliament. At the same time we made public statements alerting the public about the dangers for freedom of association if the law was approved, and we made urgent appeals to the special rapporteurs of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the United Nations (UN) who have a mandate on freedom of association and HRDs to alert the Angolan government about the consequences the law will have on respect for human rights.

  On KUTAKESA’s part, urgent appeals were made to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in Africa, Remy Ngoy Lumbu, and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, Mary Lawlor.

  Do you see the new law as part of a wider trend to restrict civic space?

  Yes of course, but it is also important to note that the repression of peaceful and legal demonstrations predates the approval of this law. Government mismanagement and endemic corruption have been some of the main causes of the deteriorating social, economic and family conditions for the majority of the population, leading to growing protests and mass demonstrations, which have often been repressed. The approval of this law is just another means of repression and of legalising the arrogance and excesses of the government and its agents, particularly the national police.

  While the law is not necessarily intended as a response to the ongoing protests, given that the attempt to get it passed dates back to 2015, it is likely to be used as another tool to crack down on the protests.

  Now, if the government has good sense and makes a strategic reading of the current political and social context of Angola, it could stop the process of approval of the law or, if it is too late for that, the president could refuse to promulgate it, taking the appeals of civil society into consideration. The law’s approval would certainly increase the number of protests and demonstrations.

  Civic space in Angola is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with KUTAKESA through theirwebsite.

• ANGOLA: ‘The untrue government narrative reveals an aversion to civil society denouncing malpractice’

   PORTUGUESE

  

  CIVICUS discusses the state of civic space and the new restrictions being imposed on civil society in Angola with Emilio José Manuel, focal point for Angola of the Lusophone Platform for Human Rights and founding member of the Working Group for Human Rights Monitoring in Angola (GTMDH).

  The GTMDH is a platform of civil society organisations (CSOs) that works to promote and defend human rights and strives for social justice within the framework of the Angolan constitution and other current laws, as well as international conventions and treaties.

  What are the conditions for civil society in Angola?

  Although there is currently no direct or indirect interference in the work of civil society in Angola, the authorities’ discourse is that, because they receive funding from international institutions, CSOs defend and represent foreign interests.

  Meanwhile there are many joint actions between public institutions and CSOs. For example, once a year the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights organises a forum with CSOs where the GTMDH presents its public position on human rights and provides information on the granting of registration certificates, the legal documents that the Angolan state gives to each CSO attesting that it is legally registered and can operate in the country.

  Why is the government targeting CSOs with legislation aimed at terrorists and money launderers?

  According to the report supporting the draft law, the president considers that he has ‘encountered constraints and difficulties in ensuring compliance with international obligations assumed by the Angolan Government in the area of money laundering and the financing of terrorism’. Hence the need to control the sources and destination of CSO funds.

  This narrative of the Angolan government is untrue and clearly demonstrates its aversion to the role of CSOs in monitoring and denouncing government malpractice. Financial support for the projects of CSOs and human rights defenders comes from well-identified organisations and goes through banking institutions with strict compliance rules – and some of these funders are the same ones that support government projects.

  On 26 May, the draft NGO Statute Law was passed in general by the Angolan National Assembly, ignoring severe criticism from civil society, which has made clear that it limits the right of association and gives the executive excessive powers to interfere in CSO activities.

  The situation is very alarming because the draft law imposes a 120-day period for existing CSOs to make their statutes conform with the law, otherwise they will be outlawed outright without a judicial decision. Article 2 of the draft law requires existing CSOs to conform with the new provisions, under penalty of having their statutes and registrations revoked. This is a violation of the principle of legality and access to justice guaranteed by the Angolan constitution. The principle of legality requires that the law should be clearly articulated and known in advance and should not be applied retroactively.

  How has civil society reacted to the draft law?

  Civil society analysed the draft law and reacted against it. In collaboration with the GTMDH coordinator, my role as legal officer was to prepare petitions, public position papers and communications with the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, and to engage with regional and international partners to amplify the voices of Angolan civil society.

  We requested a technical opinion from UN Special Rapporteur Clément Voule and drafted a public civil society position on the bill explaining why it violates freedoms of association, which we presented publicly at a press conference.

  We advocated with opposition parties represented in parliament and made contacts with the Angolan Bar Association to file, within the scope of our constitutional prerogatives, the appropriate action for an assessment of the unconstitutionality of the draft law. The day before the general approval of the draft law, we sent a public petition to the National Assembly demanding that it not approve it.

  Our next action will be to send a letter to the presidents of some key countries about the closure of civic space in Angola and increasing controls over CSOs, including international CSOs.

  Protests are also taking place against the proposed NGO Statute Law, which have converged with protests against measures that have increased fuel prices and a crackdown on street vendors.

  Do you see this bill as part of a wider trend of restricting civic space?

  The recent repression of demonstrations, arrests of activists and attacks on protesters, including women, is an indicator that civic space is being severely restricted. The use of force by the national police has resulted in deaths without any appropriate process to hold to account and punish police officers involved in cases of violence, torture and killings.

  Our country depends on importing food staples and other goods from abroad. Right now the prices of food, other goods and services have increased. Street vendors are a group that some CSOs work with, particularly those dedicated to empowering women to establish small businesses. Some organisations provide micro credits to street vendors. Although the street vendors’ movement has a life of its own, it is CSOs and their lawyers who have provided them with free legal aid.

  There is a current of national solidarity, taking into account that the law does not explicitly say it will regulate all initiatives by citizens who wish to create an association. My personal opinion is that everyone feels that control will go further. The draft NGO Statute Law lacks a clear definition of what a ‘non-governmental organisation’ is. It also includes vague provisions that need to be better fleshed out to enable the proper interpretation of the law. For example, it is difficult to understand the meaning and normative scope of article 19(1)(d), which imposes a ‘duty on NGOs to refrain from practices and actions that are subversive or liable to be confused with them’. The unanswered question here is how subversive actions are to be defined in the context of the law.

  How does the new draft law compare with the 2015 decree that was deemed unconstitutional?

  According to the analysis we’ve made, the arguments and contents are the same as in Decree 74/15 on the Regulation of NGOs. We have the new role of counselling judges in the Constitutional Court. The situation in the Supreme Court indicates that we have a crisis in the judiciary. So it is uncertain whether this time the judicial decision will be in favour of CSOs. The present draft law establishes rules to control, restrict, approve, authorise and suspend the activities of CSOs, including CSO extinction by an administrative entity to be determined by the president as holder of the executive power, which violates the principle of freedom of association as provided in article 48 of the constitution.

  Do you view the draft NGO Statute Law as part of a regional or global trend?

  After having participated in sessions of the NGO Forum and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, I noted a tendency to restrict civic space throughout Africa. As part of the civil society strategy, we held meetings with activists from Mozambique to share experiences and assemble regional, continental and international strategies. It is worth remembering that various activists, whether linked to CSOs or not, are directly involved in campaigns and waves of protest to try to ensure that the draft law is not given final approval by parliament and promulgated by the president.

  Civic space in Angola is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Contact GTMDH through itswebsite.

• ARGENTINA: ‘Citizens must be able to take part in informed discussions on the issues that affect them’

  CIVICUS speaks with Mariela Belski, Executive Director of Amnesty International Argentina, about the potential human rights effects of changes introduced by Argentina’snew government led by President Javier Milei.

  Founded in 1961, Amnesty International is the world’s largest international human rights organisation.

  What are the main measures taken by Javier Milei’s government, and what are the problems with them?

  As soon as he took office, President Milei issued a decree of necessity and urgency (DNU) to legislate on a large number of issues that will affect people’s lives. Although the National Constitution establishes that the president can only issue decrees when exceptional circumstances prevent the government following ordinary legislative procedures, decrees have been used often for decades. What’s new in this case is the number and magnitude of the changes included in the DNU, in sharp contrast with the executive’s argument that this is an emergency.

  In addition, the government sent to Congress an ‘omnibus law‘ that covers numerous issues not included in the DNU, such as tax reforms. Although it is also justified with arguments related to the context of emergency and economic instability, the bill pushes forward on issues that far exceed the emergency.

  Many changes included in the DNU and the omnibus law raise concerns about their impact on rights in areas such as employment, health, housing and freedoms of assembly and expression. Contrary to international rights standards, through deregulation and the withdrawal of the state, both pieces of legislation will have a negative impact on people’s ability to exercise their rights.

  For instance, medical insurance companies will be able to increase their fees as they like, and are already doing so. If they receive complaints about their service, the state will not impose sanctions. Drug prices will also be deregulated.

  In the area of labour, a series of regressive measures is being introduced regarding severance pay, overtime pay and the extension of probationary periods, among other things. The injunctions that courts have already granted to stop the implementation of these changes have only benefited some specific employment sectors.

  On housing, the DNU repeals the rent law and leaves contractual terms, amounts and the currency rent is paid in up to negotiation between landlords and tenants, allowing the landlord to impose whatever conditions they wish.

  According to the omnibus law, the updating of pensions will no longer be governed by a formula set by law, but left to the discretion of the executive branch.

  The bill also conceives of protest as a crime rather than a right to participation and expression of dissent. It establishes, for instance, notification requirements for any public meeting or demonstration involving three or more people. Although statements have been made that this measure would be reversed, this has not yet happened. In addition, the bill establishes the role of the ‘organiser’ to allow for the identification and eventual sanctioning of protest leaders.

  In the area of security, the bill expands the circumstances in which a police officer can be considered as acting in self-defence, weakening standards of police accountability designed to prevent abuses. Given Argentina’s high rates of police brutality, this goes in the opposite direction to what’s needed.

  The environment will also be affected by the DNU, which amends the forestry law to further enable deforestation, the glaciers law to permit more mining and the fires law to allow more burning. These provisions put natural resources at risk and could aggravate the climate crisis in Argentina.

  In terms of gender policies, both the bill and the DNU remove any reference to diversity and gender. In particular, the omnibus law introduces changes to what’s known as the ‘1,000 days law‘, approved alongside the law on the voluntary interruption of pregnancy to support those who decide to carry a pregnancy to term.

  The instrumentalisation of the economic emergency to subjugate the autonomy of women, who are viewed exclusively as mothers, and the incorporation of figures such as that of the ‘unborn child’ reveal an attempt to bring about a strong regression on sexual and reproductive rights. In a country where every year more than 300 women are murdered, the real emergency should be to design effective policies against gender-based violence.

  How does the new ‘anti-picket’ protocol affect freedom of expression and the right to protest?

  Amnesty International believes that guidelines for police and state action set out in the Protocol for the maintenance of public order in the face of roadblocks violate freedoms of assembly, association and expression. The powers vested in police and security agents to intervene aren’t aligned with international standards on the use of force and risk escalating violence and social conflict, endangering people’s lives and physical integrity.

  The protocol must reconcile the objectives of preserving ‘public order’ and ‘freedom of movement’ with the state’s obligations to respect and protect the physical integrity of individuals and the right to freedoms of assembly and expression, which are protected by the National Constitution and international human rights instruments. Both the protocol and the omnibus law seek to criminalise protesters and impose sanctions, including financial sanctions, that in practice could lead to the disappearance of collectives and organisations.

  Argentina’s regulatory system doesn’t establish an order of priority between rights: neither free transit nor the right to protest take precedence over the other. The banning of demonstrations because of the possible disruption of free movement contradicts domestic norms.

  The Argentine state must comply with its international human rights obligations, particularly regarding the right to protest, freedoms of assembly, association and expression and the use of force by its police and security agents.

  Do you view these measures, and the way they are being taken, as a danger to democracy?

  Amnesty International is concerned that a bill that will impact on numerous key aspects of people’s lives is being pushed through against the clock and during extraordinary congressional sessions.

  In just three weeks the executive has proposed, through the DNU and the omnibus law, massive changes in legislation and regulations that were part of a consensus built over the past 40 years. The essence of democracy lies in citizens’ ability to take part in informed discussions on the issues that affect them. The extremely fast-paced discussion of these policies raises serious doubts about the integrity of the deliberative process.

  Argentina’s context of economic and social crisis does call for profound reforms. Poverty over 40 per cent and exorbitant inflation rates demand a change of course. Reforms, however, must be carried out within the existing institutional and constitutional framework.

  The omnibus law seeks a delegation of powers to the executive on a scale never seen before, in all spheres. Further, it establishes that the regulations issued in the exercise of this delegation will be permanent, except when the nature of the measure determines its transitory character and this is expressly stated.

  Congress should carry out this process in an appropriate manner, following the principles set out in our constitution. Decisions that so significantly affect people’s lives should not be made in haste, but through public debate and following established procedures.

  What initiatives is Amnesty International developing on these issues?

  Regarding the protocol for the maintenance of public order we have presented an analysis with input and comments based on national and international standards. Our aim is to contribute to developing public policies that respect people’s rights.

  Regarding the DNU and the omnibus law, we are organising meetings with officials and colleagues from various areas to jointly analyse the legislation and evaluate next steps.

  Finally, we are preparing a document analysing the first 100 days of Milei’s government from a human rights perspective. In the same vein, we will be monitoring Congress closely.

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  Civic space in Argentina is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Amnesty International Argentina through itswebsite or itsFacebook, Instagram, TikTok orTwitter accounts, and contact Mariela Belski through herInstagram orLinkedIn accounts.

• BAHRAIN: ‘Had there been civic freedoms, the authorities would have known of the deep suffering at Jau Prison’

  CIVICUS speaks about the situation of political prisoners on hunger strike in Bahrain withJawad Fairooz, founder and director of Salam for Democracy and Human Rights (Salam DHR).

  Founded in 2012, Salam DHR is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) registered in France, Switzerland and the UK. It undertakes research and advocacy for the advancement of democracy and human rights, mainly in relation to Bahrain, but also in the wider Gulf and Middle East and North Africa regions.

  Maryam al-Khawaja, daughter of imprisoned human rights defender Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, intends to return to Bahrain imminently to ensure her father gets medical treatment and press for his immediate and unconditional release. Yet she, too, faces possible arrest. What’s your assessment of the situation?

  Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, 62, a dual Danish-Bahraini citizen, is the co-founder of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights and has a long history of activism. He was arrested by the government of Bahrain in 2004, 2007 and again amid mass unrest in April 2011. After this he faced a grossly unfair trial before a military court, including on charges of ‘seeking to overthrow the government’. He was tortured in pretrial custody and since his arbitrary imprisonment he has been repeatedly denied access to adequate healthcare.

  On 9 August he joined some 800 other hunger strikers. They called for an end to lockdown policies that require them to spend up to 23 hours of the day in their cells, the suspension of solitary confinement, the opportunity for collective or congregational prayer in Jau Prison’s mosque, face-to-face meeting rights with family members without a glass screen and access to healthcare commensurate with that available to the public, among other improvements in prison conditions.

  On 13 September the mass hunger strike ended with the authorities reportedly meeting many of these demands. This came as Bahrain’s Crown Prince visited Washington, DC, where he met with senior members of the Biden administration: the problem had to go away.

  Maryam nevertheless intends to travel and she has our full support. We continue to call for Abdulhadi’s immediate and unconditional release. The Danish and European Union (EU) authorities must do more.

  What is at the core of this problem is the absence of civic space in Bahrain. If there was space for independent civil society, then CSOs would have effectively alerted the authorities to prison conditions and they could have addressed the situation. An independent civic space makes it possible to find a balance in government conduct.

  What does this mean for Maryam al-Khawaja and our courageous colleagues travelling with her? It means they should be allowed to enter Bahrain and make their demands. The government should engage with them in a spirit of transparency. The absolute worst that could happen is for dissent to be tolerated just a little bit more. While this seems unlikely to happen, it is what the government should do. We wish them all Godspeed.

  How is it possible to conduct human rights activism in such a closed environment? How does Salam DHR do it?

  Bahrain has closed civic space. Government officials decide which CSOs can be registered and who can stand for their boards. They prevent people from engaging in public life who have no criminal records or public complaints but rather perhaps a past association with a political movement or party that was unfairly banned years ago.

  The Bahraini constitution provides for freedoms and safeguards similar to many other states, but the reality is that the government continues to carry out arbitrary arrests and stage unfair trials for acts that are not internationally recognised as crimes. The authorities torture detainees and use the death penalty, despite domestic opposition and international condemnation. They have stripped hundreds, including myself, of citizenship, depriving us of even the right to have rights in our homeland. They use the digital space to monitor and punish dissent and to foment religious and sectarian strife.

  Activists linked with Salam DHR cannot, in effect, exercise their right to peaceful assembly, let alone openly campaign for freedoms of association and expression, the release of prisoners unfairly tried and imprisoned or a moratorium on the death penalty. They would risk arrest if they did that.

  Yet engaging in civic activism is not totally impossible, only very challenging. Alongside CIVICUS and other partners, Salam DHR engages with allies and like-minded activists as well as the few CSOs that openly but cautiously raise human rights concerns so that the wider Bahraini society hears our message. We echo and amplify their appeals.

  We are a catalyst: we help Bahraini activists access platforms to reach domestic and international audiences and provide training and development opportunities such as internships. Alone and in partnership with others, we research, document and publicise developments, grounding our message in article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states that every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity to take part in the conduct of public affairs.

  How useful for advocacy purposes was theglobal event held by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in Bahrain’s capital, Manama, in March 2023?

  It was mixed: Danish parliamentarians and those from other countries addressed human rights issues and the absence of an independent civic space. The IPU’s human rights team raised concerns about freedom of expression and violations against Bahraini parliamentarians. But despite the IPU’s affiliated status with the United Nations (UN), the government still denied access to independent observers and human rights organisations, denying them either visas or access and turning at least one around at the airport. This was the authorities once again restricting civic space.

  A few days before the IPU meeting officially began, Bahraini lawyer and activist Ebrahim Al-Mannai called for parliamentary reforms on social media. He and three others who shared his post were arrested for publishing material that could ‘disturb public order’.

  At the event itself, the government appeared uninterested in seriously engaging with visiting parliamentarians on human rights issues, despite attempts from the Danish delegation and representatives from Finland, Iceland and Ireland. Our message is clear: open up civic space, free up CSOs and political parties and liberate discourse, otherwise the cycle of political unrest will continue.

  Reports indicate that the mass hunger strike in Jau Prison has ended. What’s your assessment of this episode?

  The painful August 2023 mass hunger strike was wholly avoidable. It happened mainly due to the government’s stubborn and short-sighted refusal to allow civic space to exist even to a minimum degree. Had there been freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, they would have known of the deep suffering at Jau Prison. If you don’t let people say what they think, then public life can only lurch from crisis to crisis.

  The hunger strike was the expression of the accumulation of a number of factors that have been present in Bahraini prisons for years and it was based on grievances that have been repeatedly expressed: prison conditions and ill treatment of prisoners amounting to torture. The abuses worsened and conditions deteriorated during the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, medical neglect resulted in the deaths of two prisoners, Hussein Barakat and Abbas Mallalah.

  We appeal once more to the authorities to allow for the opening of civic space and provide a social vent to end the cycle of human rights crises we face.

  Is the international community doing all it can to support the struggle for democracy and human rights in Bahrain?

  International human rights organisations, UN treaty bodies and Special Procedures and partner states, for instance in the context of the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review process of Bahrain, have all joined us in calling on the government of Bahrain to abide by its international human rights obligations, starting with the basic step of letting people have a voice in public life.

  Today, 15 September, is International Day of Democracy, and we are joining the UN in calling on the government of Bahrain to empower the next generation by ensuring that their voices are included in the decisions that will have a profound impact on their world. In his address, UN Secretary-General António Guterres has warned that ‘walls are closing in on civic spaces’. Those walls are also the walls of Jau Prison, where it took 800 detainees’ unjust suffering for the government to even take notice.

  But the UN has also let neighbouring United Arab Emirates, which is as closed as Bahrain, host the forthcoming COP28 climate change summit. Lack of civic space means there can be no activism for climate justice in Bahrain – for instance, no public demands for accountability can be expressed over costly and environmentally damaging land reclamation in Bahrain’s northeast, which has already eroded the livelihood of fishing communities. We need to be able to address these challenges openly, with a rights-based approach, to avoid a future calamity.

  And powerful states that could be putting some pressure for change are avoiding the issue. Right now, Bahrain’s Crown Prince is wrapping up meetings with senior Biden administration officials, none of whom appear to have raised civic space concerns or addressed the needless suffering of 800 Bahraini prisoners. The UK has removed Bahrain from its list of ‘countries of concern’ at the same time as it trumpeted a billion-dollar Bahraini investment in the UK. In October the EU will recommence its cycle of so-called human rights dialogues.

  The international community’s inexplicable complacency over the festering human rights quagmire in Bahrain will further embolden the government in crushing civic space. Many leaders miss the point when it comes to Bahrain and its Gulf neighbours: they appear to accept the facade of what is presented as pragmatic autocracy and appear to accept regional rulers’ colonial-mindset contention that democracy will destabilise the region.

  Democracies have in fact produced the most stable, enduring and dynamic systems in the world. Human rights and democracy are essential for Bahrain and its neighbours because their deficits continue to be the primary cause of resentment and unrest. A security-based approach does not remedy these problems. Bahrain’s history has shown these methods to be a failure, as it has endured continuous waves of mass unrest followed by violent crackdowns.

  Authoritarianism and the forms of violence it fosters are the real destabilising forces, a cycle that can only be broken through the recognition and enactment of democratic rights. The first step towards this goal is simply letting civic space exist.

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  Civic space in Bahrain is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Salam for Democracy and Human Rights through itswebsite and follow @SALAM_DHR and@JawadFairooz on Twitter.

• BAHRAIN: ‘The government uses public relations to mask human rights violations’

  CIVICUS speaks withDrewery Dyke of Salam for Democracy and Human Rights (Salam DHR) about closed civic and democratic space in Bahrain as the state prepares to host the Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). The IPU Assembly takes place in the capital, Manama,from 11 to 15 March 2023.

  Salam DHR is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) founded in 2012 to undertake research and advocacy for the advancement of democracy and human rights, mainly in relation to Bahrain, and also in the wider Gulf and Middle East and North Africa regions.

  We last spoke on the eve of the parliamentary election held in November 2022. How has civic space in Bahrain evolved since?

  The government of Bahrain held the November 2022 parliamentary election under the same, highly restrictive, 2018 Political Rights Law used in the 2018 elections. It banned scores of people from being able to vote or stand for election on spurious grounds such as affiliation to a banned political party or having a criminal record.

  Bahrain’s international partners, United Nations (UN) human rights bodies and civil society all decried the banning of political parties, as it flew in the face of international standards and simply deprived many people of having a voice. The court cases, too, dating from the 2011 unrest, were grossly unfair. In November 2018, the UN Human Rights Committee denounced both the Political Isolation Law and the Law on Associations

  And yet there seems to be a small opening for civil society and greater freedoms. The regional mood music appears to be changing, with the governments of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates normalising relations with Qatar, and the Bahraini government having set out a 2022-2026 National Human Rights Plan.

  Bahrain’s government appears to have signalled that it is minded to undertake some reform but civil society remains highly sceptical. Many of us are concerned that the government is once again using public relations initiatives to project an image of the country that masks longstanding, unresolved human rights violations for which there has been no accountability.

  Is change possible? Yes, to some degree, it appears so. But civil society needs to remain vigilant and sceptical. Action will speak louder than words. An amendment of existing laws on political and civil society organisations is now a must.

  How does Salam DHR manage to work in such a restrictive environment?

  Current legislation makes it impossible for our organisation to register and openly carry out any research or advocacy in Bahrain. That has been the case since 2013. And yet at least one woman human rights defender who is linked to Salam DHR and other human rights CSOs has remained active inside Bahrain. She walks a tightrope on a daily basis, taking action to support individuals, notably prisoners of conscience. Lawyers, political and civil society activists and others from all walks of life continue to contact us but we cannot discuss their identities to protect their safety. It is a challenge.

  In November 2022, however, the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights obtained accreditation to the UN’s Economic and Social Council, which means it can now formally participate in UN meetings and events. This important step could help prise open the space for civil society just that little bit more. We will see.

  Why do you think the Bahraini government offered to host the IPU Assembly?

  The Bahraini government invited the IPU to hold its 146th Assembly in order to project an image of a democratic country and boost its international standing. The IPU’s catchphrase on its website is ‘For democracy. For everyone’. The government seeks to own this message in a situation where democracy does not exist.

  The theme of the 146th Assembly is ‘Promoting peaceful coexistence and inclusive societies: Fighting intolerance’. Yet by limiting freedoms of association and assembly and the right to peaceful religious expression, Bahrain’s government promotes exclusion and intolerance.

  Possibly to foster its mission, the IPU accepted the Bahraini government’s offer to hold its meeting in Manama. Is that problematic? In some ways, yes. But it is upon us to promote – peacefully – democratic change that advances adherence to international human rights standards. And parliamentarians from around the world attending the IPU Assembly could help chip away at deeply rooted discrimination and the fact that so many in civil society are deprived of having a voice or are afraid to use it.

  Links between Bahraini parliamentarians and civil society are uneven. Some have few if any links while others have better connections and communication with their electorate, including civil society. Some seek to hold government action to account, albeit timidly.

  The IPU Assembly may be an opportunity for Bahraini members of parliament to learn how their counterparts in other parts of the world engage with their electors and effectively represent their concerns. Parliamentarians are a building block of a free civil society. We need them to step up during the Assembly to make that a reality in Bahrain.

  How could this whitewashing attempt become an advocacy opportunity?

  The IPU Assembly will be a pivotal opportunity for advocacy. Visiting parliamentarians must make it so. They must reject baseless hype and propaganda depicting Bahrain as a land of freedom and democracy.

  In a recently published brief, Salam DHR is urging attending parliamentarians to join with other parliamentarians from across the globe to call on the government of Bahrain to rescind all provisions that restrict parliamentary life and freedom of expression and association of Bahraini members of parliament. We want them to call for the government to resolve two outstanding cases the IPU’s Committee on the Human Rights of Parliamentarianshas lodged with the government of Bahrain, and examine the cases of 15 former parliamentarians targeted with arbitrary arrest and detention, unfair trial and imprisonment and arbitrary stripping of citizenship. We’re also asking parliamentarians to urge the government to implement all recommendations arising from human rights treaty obligations and as many as possible of those made by UN Special Procedures and arising from Bahrain’s 2022 UN Universal Periodic Review.

  We urge visiting parliamentarians to inform themselves of other widely shared human rights concerns in relation to Bahrain, including the denial of political rights and women’s rights, the use of the death penalty and the tactic of revoking citizenship as punishment, and to meet with human rights activists and others in civil society while in Bahrain.

  How can the international community better support Bahraini civil society and activism for democracy?

  Civil society in and engaged with Bahrain needs the international community to listen and speak with us, to hear our experiences and work with us. There is a narrative and experience that differs from the public relations whitewashing by the government.

  We are saying that there are longstanding problems that need to be addressed, in terms of law, practice and accountability. But we are also saying that we believe that Bahrain’s international partners – from varying states, including European Union member states, the UK and USA, and the UN and its human rights bodies – and now parliamentarians can all work together, in unison, to erode the climate of repression that denies respect for human dignity, in order to empower Bahraini civil society and gradually build a more open and rights-respecting country.

  Civic space in Bahrain is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Salam DHR through itswebsite and follow @SALAM_DHR and@drewerydyke on Twitter.

• BAHRAIN: ‘This election is make-believe: its only role is to provide a veneer of democracy’

  CIVICUS speaks about the election being held today in Bahrain withJawad Fairooz, founder and director of Salam for Democracy and Human Rights (Salam DHR).

  Salam DHR is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) founded in 2012 to undertake research and advocacy for the advancement of democracy and human rights, mainly in relation to Bahrain, but also in the wider Gulf and Middle East and North Africa regions.

  Jawad Fairooz is a former Bahraini parliamentarian. In the 2010 election his political group, al-Wefaq, won 18 out of 40 seats, becoming the largest group in the Council of Representatives. They all resigned in repudiation of the repression of protests in 2011, and Jawad and another parliamentarian were arrested, tortured and ill-treated in detention. In November 2012, while he was visiting the UK, the government withdrew his citizenship, making him stateless. He became a campaigner against statelessness and for the rights of the stateless and founded Salam DHR in 2013.

  What is the significance of today’s election?

  Elections matter, or at least they should. In Bahrain, elections for municipal councils and the 40-seat parliament, the Council of Representatives, are held every four years, with possible runoffs where no candidate obtains a majority.

  Between 2002 and 2010, these elections were carried out in a context where civil society had become relatively more vibrant. They continued – even if only just – to carry the promise that parliament would take an increasingly larger and more responsible role in deepening democracy and freedoms and ensuring the continuing existence of civil society.

  Far more than now, they showed elections are a pivotal moment for social and political renewal – for those who will shape society to engage with civil society and to accommodate differing social and political views. Elections can create a sense of shared ownership, and in a context of tolerance and acceptance they can foster a vibrant and responsible civil society. They can help build a culture of human rights.

  But that is not the case with today’s election.

  This one reflects an ever-shrinking civic space. Parliamentarians’ institutional power has weakened, as they too operate under limited civic space. The government is inclined to seek less qualified parliamentarians whose conduct it will be able to control. To further weaken and subordinate parliament to the government’s will, the King recently issued a decree giving more power to parliament’s chair, a government loyalist, to determine the body’s workings. This will further extend government writ and further chill civic space.

  This election, like those of 2014 and 2018, is controlled or stage managed in a way that makes it clear that its only role is to provide a veneer of democracy. It’s make-believe.

  But let’s be clear: it is also an opportunity for us to get back to work on our own renewal, to locate openings and fissures and pry them open, and to chip away at walls enclosing us, in Bahrain, in the Gulf and across the region. An opportunity to look forward.

  Flaws notwithstanding, we need to engage with the new parliamentarians. Will the government let them engage with independent civil society? It looks unlikely, but we will try, both through bilateral parliamentary visits and in the context of the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s General Assembly, which will be held in Bahrain’s capital, Manama, in March 2023. We need to start organising now so that global parliamentarians can help carry our voices and those of international civil society to the heart of Manama.

  We also need to plant the seeds for civil society activism around COP28, which will take place a year from now in neighbouring United Arab Emirates, where civic space is non-existent. We just can’t stop now, however bleak the situation of Bahrain or the Gulf may seem. This cycle of unfair elections is done, but our task to continue to look for avenues of engagement and activism continues apace. We are looking forward.

  Have further restrictions been imposed on civic space in the run-up to the election?

  Not really, as most of the damage was already done.

  In December 2014, the authorities imprisoned Ali Salman, the leader of al-Wefaq, the largest political association. He was arrested for protesting against the parliamentary elections, which al-Wefaq boycotted because promised reforms had not been implemented. In 2015 he was sentenced to four years in prison on charges such as inciting hatred, disturbing the peace and insulting public institutions, but he was acquitted of the most serious charge, of inciting political change, which could carry a life sentence.

  He appealed, but so did the prosecutor, who demanded a stricter sentence, and in 2016 his prison sentence was increased to nine years. Further charges were subsequently added and in 2017 he was accused and tried for the crime of ‘spying for Qatar’. For having tried to mediate in Bahrain’s conflict with Qatar, the authorities handed him a life sentence.

  In July 2016, a court in Bahrain dissolved and banned Al-Wefaq after accusing it of fostering violence and ‘terrorism’. In May 2017, the main non-sectarian political association, Wa’d, was shut down as well, also under accusations of advocating violence, supporting terrorism and inciting crimes.

  In advance of the 2018 parliamentary election, the government amended the NGO law, extending restrictions on who could establish or be on a CSO board, irrespective of the organisation’s nature – this applies even to organisations working on sports, working with the community or providing charitable services. It also forbade all those linked to banned political parties from engaging with CSOs.

  In addition, anyone sentenced to more than six months’ imprisonment, even if subsequently pardoned by the King, convicted in error or provided with a ‘no objection certificate’, is now deprived for life of voting rights and the right to stand for election. Likewise, all those who for whatever reason did not take part in the previous election have been banned from taking part in the next.

  Having crushed civic space for years, in the run-up to the 2022 election the authorities only needed to ensure that calm persisted. To that effect, in September the Ministry of Municipalities Affairs issued vaguely worded regulations that appeared to link electioneering and religion. Among other things, these regulations banned the holding of meetings in public religious centres and other public places such as educational facilities. They appeared aimed at the majority Shi’a community for whom such centres have often become the only places where they – we – are allowed to gather.

  What are the conditions for civil society like in Bahrain?

  In Bahrain, the very existence of a civil society – let alone an independent one – depends on the political will and whim of the government: the Ministry of Labour and Social Development controls the licensing of all CSOs.

  The newly amended NGO Law redefined who could establish and run a CSO and prohibited members of banned political bodies from setting up a CSO. These new rules were applied in January 2022 to forbid two peaceful women activists, Zainab al-Durazi and Safia al-Hasan, taking up the board positions to which they had been freely elected in a women-focused CSO. The two women had been linked to the banned group Wa’d.

  Do some of the activities of CSOs whose directors are demonstrably loyal to the state help and support society’s needs? Of course they do. We need them and we commend such organisations. But they are not independent.

  Those perceived as not personally loyal to the government and its leaders do not get licences to operate any CSO and are not allowed to be on supervisory boards, in any sector, in total contravention to international law and practice, and completely against the wishes of Bahraini people. A thorough vetting process ensures this remains the case.

  All CSOs must obtain permission to engage in any way with non-Bahraini bodies such as foreign or international human rights groups or to meet with foreign Bahrain-based diplomats. If they get permission and the meeting takes place, the government requires the participation of a Foreign Ministry representative and the preparation of notes for the meeting, subject to approval. If this is not done, the representative of the CSO risks criminal charges or the closure of the organisation.

  The absence of an independent civil society means that any consultation that does take place is performative – just for show. The authorities don’t typically take the limited civil society that is loyal to the government into account, so independent voices are simply not even in the picture.

  If the government only consults those of whom they approve, and even then, only barely, how will that shape government policy? How can it capture the concerns and wishes of the wider population? How is this sustainable? Well, it isn’t. It is unwise and risks creating conditions similar to those that resulted in a national crisis in 2011.

  What would it take to build democratic institutions in Bahrain?

  Recent history has shown that democratic institutions are difficult to build and easy to lose. In Bahrain and the Gulf, the human rights movement does not call for removal of X so that they be replaced by Y. Instead, we build case studies from each country to show the inequities of laws and practices, and we campaign on that. The reform of specific practices, in certain areas – the administration of justice, the freedom of assembly – is achievable if the authorities in Bahrain and across the Gulf actually engage with human rights groups and United Nations human rights bodies.

  We need the Bahraini authorities to provide some genuine representation of the people by the people. We are ready to have a real, genuine dialogue with the authorities, but there needs to be a level playing field. If, despite the restrictions placed on them, the parliamentarians elected in this election step up, then we will have a chance to make a difference going forward. But just as we dare to dream and act, they need to do so too.

  What kind of support does Bahraini civil society need from the international community?

  We need more engagement. We need states and friends in international civil society to step up and explain the character and vision of the democratic society that the majority of Bahrainis seek; to explain that it does not represent a threat but rather an unlocking of potential.

  We need international civil society counterparts to engage in international fora, not only to reflect and project our voice but also to emphasise the role and inherent legitimacy of Bahraini civil society to the Bahraini authorities.

  We need our international partners to put pressure on the government’s human rights oversight bodies – the Ombudsman’s office, the Special Investigative Unit and the National Institution for Human Rights – to provide real rather than cosmetic redress, accountability and reform. Some of these oversight bodies have helped migrant workers facing abuse, but even then, their scope has been limited as they have failed to address underlying unjust laws or practices.

  We need help and expertise to collate evidence to mount realistic claims for accountability in jurisdictions that have provisions for sanctioning, such as the Global Magnitsky Act that the US government uses to sanction foreign government officials deemed to be human rights offenders,

  We need international civil society to press the government of Bahrain to explain why it has failed to adhere to the international conventions to which it has acceded, or why it has not acceded to additional standards such as optional protocols, or been clearer about imposing a moratorium on the death penalty.

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  Civic space in Bahrain is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Salam for Democracy and Human Rights through their website and follow @SALAM_DHR and@JawadFairooz on Twitter.

• Bangladesh: Odhikar faces another blow as government upholds de-registration decision

  The decision by the Prime Minister’s Office of Bangladesh to uphold the de-registration of prominent human rights organisation Odhikar is appalling and demonstrates the government’s ongoing efforts to crush the organisation and stifle human rights work in the country, CIVICUS, the global civil society alliance said today.

• BELARUS: ‘Despite the repression, we haven’t halted our work for a single day’

  

  CIVICUS speaks with Marina Kostylianchenko of Viasna about the closure of civic space and criminalisation of activism in Belarus.

  Viasna (‘Spring’) is a Belarusian human rights civil society organisation (CSO) that provides assistance to political prisoners and their families. It was founded in 1996 in response to large-scale repression of protests by the regime of President Alexander Lukashenko. In 2003 it was shut down by the government and subsequently persecuted for operating as anunregistered organisation. Repression increased in reaction to 2020 protests that followed a presidential electionwidely seen as stolen. Viasna founder Ales Bialiatski was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2022. In 2023 he wassentenced to 10 years in prison and Viasna was declared an ‘extremist group’.

   

  What tactics of repression have the authorities used against Viasna?

  Ever since it was established in 1996, Viasna has been under scrutiny. It was able to operate officially for only a very short period, as the Supreme Court dissolved it as early as 2003. Successive attempts to secure legal status have been unsuccessful so we have continued working without official approval. Just like other people in Belarus, we have faced repression, including detentions, fines and imprisonment for our human rights activism.

  A big shock came in 2011 when Viasna founder and leader Ales Bialiatski was arrested and sentenced to four years in prison on fabricated charges of tax evasion. He was unexpectedly released under an amnesty nearly three years later.

  An unprecedented peak in repression followed the 2020 mass protests. This had a profound impact on the operation of human rights organisations. For example, Viasna expanded its scope to include a hotline for people to seek advice and report detentions and other human rights violations. We also started collecting information about politically motivated criminal prosecutions and recognising detainees as political prisoners, documenting instances of torture and other forms of ill-treatment, and ultimately launching the #FreeViasna campaign for the release of imprisoned human rights defenders.

  In 2021 the government focused on dismantling civil society. Security forces conducted home and office searches and issued arrest orders targeting Viasna staff and staff of other CSOs and independent media. On 14 July, 15 Viasna members and volunteers were detained nationwide, including Ales Bialiatski, his deputy Valentin Stefanovich and lawyer Vladimir Labkovich, who are still in custody. In 2023 they were sentenced to 10, nine and seven years in jail respectively, along with substantial fines, for allegedly smuggling money and financing protests. The coordinator of the Viasna volunteer service, Marfa Rabkova, and volunteer Andrei Chepyuk, also remain in prison, with sentences of almost 15 and six years respectively.

  In August 2023, Viasna was declared an extremist organisation, which in line with recent amendments to the Criminal Code means that any staff member could be criminally prosecuted and sentenced in absentia. Anyone might also face criminal liability for providing information or contributing to Viasna’s work in any way.

  The authorities are trying to erect a barrier between us and the people we help. But despite the repression, we haven’t halted our work for a single day.

  In what conditions does Viasna currently work?

  We operate in exile. Most members of Viasna had to leave Belarus in 2021 to avoid prison and be able to continue their human rights work.

  Forced relocation has implications, as over time a gap inevitably emerges between those who left and those who remain in Belarus.

  Moreover, new challenges and areas of work have arisen. For instance, an increasing number of people are being released after completing their sentences and require medical care, rehabilitation and help with adjusting back into society. Those who left Belarus face difficulties in adapting to a new environment and struggle with getting legal status, employment, housing and everyday matters.

  Even though the coordinator of the Viasna volunteer service has been imprisoned for over three years, our work with volunteers both inside Belarus and among the diaspora has never ceased. Volunteers are mainly engaged in research and data collection, translation of texts into multiple languages and the creation of illustrations and designs. They also assist at events we organise or participate in.

   

  Do imprisoned activists face further pressure while in jail?

  In 2023, all our colleagues were transferred to reformation colonies to serve their sentences. The conditions there are particularly harsh, primarily due to severe restriction of communication with the outside world. Unlike in pretrial detention facilities, where human rights activists could receive letters, parcels and money transfers from sympathisers, now only close relatives, usually only one or two people, are allowed to call or send mail and parcels. Even then, calls are limited to a maximum of 10 minutes a week and parcels to one or two per season.

  Another form of pressure exerted on political prisoners is confinement for 10 or more consecutive days in cold punishment cells where they are not allowed to have warm clothes or other belongings, including books and pens. Inmates are punished for any reason, such as not adhering to the prescribed greeting procedure, failing to fasten a button or neglecting to shave. If a political prisoner commits several such violations, they are classed as a ‘persistent violator of internal regulations’, which justifies further pressure.

  All prisoners, except older ones and those with disabilities, are required to work, usually in hazardous industries or cold rooms for eight or more hours a day. Wages are symbolic: after subtracting various payments for their maintenance in prison, only tiny amounts are transferred to prisoners’ personal accounts, which are then used to pay off fines.

  We practically have no information about our imprisoned colleagues’ health conditions, but we know barely any medical care is provided in prison facilities.

   

  How have you organised to support your imprisoned colleagues?

  In 2021, in collaboration with Amnesty International, Front Line Defenders, Human Rights Watch, the International Federation for Human Rights, Libereco, Ostgruppen and other partners, we initiated a solidarity campaign to advocate for the immediate release of our imprisoned colleagues.

  We’re continually exploring new modes of engagement with Belarusian civil society and other communities to advance our cause. For instance, on 8 December 2023 we unveiled an art installation, ‘Unbreakable’, in the heart of Vilnius, depicting the faces of five Viasna political prisoners and featuring descriptions in three languages – Belarusian, Lithuanian and English. We participate in any event available to speak about the plight of our colleagues criminalised for their commitment to human rights.

  Several international awards have significantly bolstered attention for our cause. In 2022 Viasna was honoured with the Tulip of Human Rights award from the Dutch government, and Ales Bialiatski became a Nobel Peace Prize laureate alongside the Ukrainian Center for Civil Liberties and the Russian organisation Memorial. As a result of the Nobel Prize people in other countries found out who Ales is and why he is in prison, and expressions of support and solidarity increased.

  What support do you receive from the international community, and what further support do you need?

  A coalition of international human rights organisations has repeatedly issued joint statements urging the immediate release of Viasna’s political prisoners. Representatives of the United Nations, the European Parliament and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe have also been vocal about the more than 1,500 political prisoners in Belarus.

  Unfortunately, we haven’t yet identified the leverage that would foster the immediate release of Viasna activists. At the same time, the authorities are doing everything to isolate our colleagues and make them believe they’ve been forgotten. That’s why it’s so important to show support by sending them letters and postcards, helping their families and friends, signing petitions and holding solidarity actions around the world. For example, Libereco activists stage monthly rallies in Berlin and Zurich and organise solidarity races to raise awareness.

  Every show of support matters. We urge people to join our initiatives, spread information as widely as possible and come up with new forms of solidarity actions. To this end, we have created free-of-charge designs for printing on T-shirts, posters, leaflets, stickers and postcards. We would also appreciate support for our activities and our incarcerated colleagues through a subscription on Patreon or a one-time donation via Stripe.

   

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  Civic space in Belarus is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Viasna through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@Viasna onTwitter. Contact the#FreeViasna campaign through itswebsite and follow@FreeViasna onTwitter.

  The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

• Belarusian authorities must end suppression of citizens, says CIVICUS
  Johannesburg. 19 May 2011. The recent detention of 14 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) activists in Minsk is just one more incident in an on-going crackdown on civil society in Belarus, said CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation today. The arrests came as local LGBT groups were gathering in Minsk to commemorate the International Day of Anti-Homophobia on 17 May.

  According to one organiser, Sergei Androsenko, head of the organisation Gay Belarus, the protestors were planning to gather peacefully with the goal of spreading tolerance and understanding, but were detained pre-emptively by police before they could assemble. The fourteen detainees, including Androsenko, were taken to a local police precinct, where they were finger-printed, harassed with slurs and had some of their personal effects confiscated, including a thousand flyers advertising the campaign to ‘legalise love’, before being released.

• BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: ‘Civil society has failed to spark people’s activist side’

  
  CIVICUS speaks about deteriorating civic space in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) withAida Daguda and Dajana Cvjetkovic, director and programme manager atthe Centre for Civil Society Promotion (CPCD).

  Founded in 1996, CPCD is a civil society organisation (CSO) working to strengthen civil society and citizen participation in BiH and the Western Balkans through capacity development, advocacy and campaigning.

  What are civic space conditions like in BiH?

  In our nearly three decades working in civil society in BiH and the Western Balkans, we have never witnessed such a rapid deterioration of civic space. Our organisation, along with other CSOs, is deeply concerned about two new pieces of legislation introduced in Republika Srpska (RS), one of the two entities that make up BiH.

  The first bill, already adopted, reintroduced criminal defamation into the legal system. The second, currently under parliamentary debate, is a ‘foreign agents’ bill that would criminalise CSOs that receive foreign funding or assistance for ‘political activities’ and give state institutions the power to shut them down. This would be just another tool to further restrict civil society in the hands of government authorities, who already use the mechanisms in place to oversee the work of CSOs and exert pressure and threaten us. Over the past year there have been more inspections of CSOs than ever before, specifically targeting smaller and more vocal organisations.

  By silencing independent media and civil society, RS President Milorad Dodik seeks to eliminate public scrutiny and criticism in an entity marred by criminal activities and corruption and undergoing a difficult economic situation. The government is resisting democratic oversight and trying to eliminate all forms of critical thought among the public.

  Moreover, in April 2023 the Sarajevo local government proposed amendments to local public order laws that would penalise the spread of ‘fake news’ and criticism of state authorities. Although the draft bill was withdrawn in June due to the public outcry it caused, the authorities have expressed their commitment to reintroducing a modified version of the bill.

  These are all signals that the situation for civil society is rapidly worsening in RS and in BiH as a whole, with severe limitations being introduced on freedoms of association and expression.

  How has Bosnian civil society organised against the restrictive bills?

  A part of RS’s civil society is well organised and experienced in advocacy and campaigning. But overall, there are fewer than 10 CSOs that are strongly committed to their human rights mission and vision, while the rest maintain links with the government that make them less vocal against repressive laws. We provide support with expertise and funding to independent CSOs in RS, but we must be discreet because we are based in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the other entity that composes BiH, and our help tends to be misunderstood by both politicians and the public in the RS.

  Unfortunately, many Bosnian CSOs remain silent due to fear. In RS in particular, people are afraid for their safety and that of their families. Unlike in Georgia, where people took to the streets to defend freedom of association, people in Bosnia aren’t motivated, partly due to media narratives portraying civil society as being paid by the international community to act against the government.

  We are using all available tools to raise awareness about repressive legislation within the country, at the European Union (EU) level and through communication with various civil society networks, including CIVICUS. The government argues that these laws are necessary to prevent the financing of terrorism and money laundering, but we view these as excuses.

  We have informed opposition members of parliament about the potential negative consequences of the ‘foreign agents’ law but have made no impact. Our outreach to the public has been hindered by lack of media support.

  However, we remain hopeful that this crisis may turn into an opportunity for Bosnian civil society to revive the sense of solidarity that we’ve lost over the past decade. These days, we constantly think in terms of projects and donors and tend to see each other as competitors when we most desperately need to be united.

  How would you describe the current political climate in BiH?

  Our region has historically bordered with empires, and this location has come at a price. The threat of RS’s secession has risen in recent years, posing a security problem for the entire region. Due to BiH’s location and rich natural resources and potential for energy production, many fear that its fate depends on the outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the interests of major powers such as China, the EU, Russia, Turkey and the USA. The people of BiH are the ones with the least influence on the decisions that will affect them.

  While secession may not be imminent, the threat of it significantly impacts on people’s wellbeing. We experience a pervasive feeling of insecurity that contributes to an anxious atmosphere. This makes people easier to manipulate. Many people are considering leaving, mostly because of their sense of insecurity and the widespread corruption.

  Fear is our main currency. Past experiences of police surveillance leading to arrests of protesters have deterred people from participating in demonstrations. People are losing hope that things will improve. During the war we experienced between 1992 and 1995, we had a very strong feeling of hope that when the war ended we would recover a normal life and rebuild our country. Now we have peace but we don’t have hope anymore.

  How do you work to strengthen civil society in BiH, and what obstacles do you face?

  Our organisation was established right after the war, so it has existed for 27 years. We were the first ones to connect CSOs from different parts of the country and our network currently includes over 350 organisations.

  In 2004, we launched the first initiative of institutional cooperation between government and civil society. At that time, civil society was thriving. But over the past decade or so, the situation has steadily worsened. Civil society faces a shortage of human resources, and people hold rather negative views about civil society. We seek to change such perceptions by consistently communicating the purpose and results of our work to the public and beneficiaries of our services and activities.

  We also lack strong connections with the media, which should serve as a channel between us, the government, the international community and, most importantly, our society. To show what we’re doing and what we are trying to achieve, instead of just following donors’ visibility guidelines we have established our own portal in which we collect inspiring stories of civil society’s impact in improving people’s lives.

  But our biggest problem is lack of local ownership. For many years the international community did things for us, so we aren’t used to solving problems by ourselves. People aren’t used to activism; they complain and wait for others to resolve their problems. That’s one of the failures of civil society: we have implemented many projects, but never managed to spark people’s activist side.

  What challenges do you face in cooperating with international partners?

  International agencies implement large projects in BiH and many funds come from the international community, but we don’t see results. One of the reasons is that local civil society is pushed aside. When we inquire with donors about supporting local organisations or networks, they argue that small organisations lack the capacity to successfully implement large grants. It has become their mantra.

  This hampers the development of civil society as the true democratic force our country urgently needs. We must engage in dialogue with the government to devise solutions for the numerous problems we face. We need to move past the ‘projectisation’ of civil society and focus on the long term.

  This also applies to the government, which is also forced to work within the project framework, executing short-term tasks requested by the EU or other international institutions. For instance, the government, jointly with the European Commission, invested around €1 million (approx. US$1.06 million) to fulfil a request to establish a register for CSOs, but once international partners left the country, the register ceased to function. There was a failure to recognise that civil society could have created, managed and overseen the register, which could have been instrumental in developing a common civil society strategy.

  This year we established an informal group of donors who support local civil society in Bosnia. We hope the international community will consistently convey the message that they must prioritise local ownership and sustainability. We don’t want to see civil society becoming a mere service provider for larger international agencies. We need to organise around genuine shared interests rather than form networks to satisfy the criteria of calls for proposals. It is time for us to think strategically about who we are and what our role is.

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  Civic space in Bosnia and Herzegovina is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor. Bosnia and Herzegovina is currently on theCIVICUS Monitor Watchlist, which draws attention to countries where there is a serious and rapid decline in respect for civic space.

  Get in touch with CPCD through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@cpcdba on Twitter.

• BURUNDI: ‘Human rights activism can hardly be carried out openly anymore’

  CIVICUS speaksabout the repression of civil society and human rights defenders and LGBTQI+ rights in Burundi with Carina Tertsakian, co-founder of the Burundi Human Rights Initiative (BHRI).

  Active from mid-2019 until December 2023, the BHRI was an independent initiative that worked in cooperation with a range of people inside and outside Burundi todocument the human rights situation and advocate for human rights.

  Has there been any improvement in the human rights situation in Burundi?

  Burundi’s overall human rights record has remained largely unchanged since President Évariste Ndayishimiye took office in 2020. Back then people had high hopes because the new president had a less bloody past than his predecessor. But there’s been little progress in the protection of civil and political rights. The authorities have continued to arrest, prosecute, ill-treat and sometimes torture people for political reasons. Those arrested have included activists, journalists and opposition members.

  Even though the most serious forms of rights violations such as political killings and enforced disappearances have decreased, human rights defenders (HRDs) and journalists have been arbitrarily arrested simply due to their involvement in human rights activities or their affiliation with independent civil society organisations (CSOs). They are typically accused of undermining internal state security or territorial integrity, among other baseless charges.

  What are the conditions for LGBTQI+ people in Burundi?

  In August 2023, 24 people were arrested for their alleged involvement in organisations that help LGBTQI+ people. While some were acquitted or released, others faced sentencing. One activist who was acquitted passed away before being released. The case is ongoing, drawing attention to the larger underlying issue that homosexuality is still criminalised in Burundi.

  It’s nearly impossible to identify openly as an LGBTQI+ activist in Burundi. While some organisations engage in activities to support LGBTQI+ people, they avoid explicitly identifying as LGBTQI+ organisations. The 24 people who were arrested, for instance, had participated in training on awareness and prevention of HIV/AIDS.

  In his recent year-end speech, President Ndayishimiye vilified LGBTQI+ people, labelling homosexuality as a sin and encouraging public stoning of those perceived as ‘homosexuals’. This horrifying statement has further fuelled hateful rhetoric online. On a positive note, a Burundian CSO and several prominent activists in exile strongly criticised Ndayishimiye’s statement, something that is extremely difficult to do inside Burundi.

  To what extent is it possible for human rights organisations to work in Burundi?

  In 2015, a significant political and human rights crisis unfolded in Burundi, marked by a violent crackdown on civil society, particularly on critics and those suspected of opposing the government. As a result, leaders of major human rights organisations fled the country and remain in exile. Some faced charges and were convicted in absentia, including to life imprisonment.

  Human rights activism can hardly be carried out openly in Burundi anymore. Ever since 2015, activists addressing politically sensitive issues face direct threats and can’t work freely inside the country. Even those previously affiliated with human rights organisations that no longer operate in Burundi continue to face arrests.

  Activists advocating for economic and social rights experience comparatively less pressure. Some CSOs working on anti-corruption and good governance issues have been more or less allowed to function, although the government has occasionally impeded their activities, for example, by disrupting or prohibiting press conferences.

  Have Burundian activists found safety in exile?

  Exiled activists based in Europe or Canada are relatively safe, whereas those in Rwanda may encounter additional pressure. In 2015, as many HRDs and journalists fled, the government in Burundi banned or suspended their organisations and shut down several independent radio stations. Some exiled journalists established radio stations abroad, mainly in Rwanda.

  The Burundian government has taken advantage of recently improved relations with Rwanda and pressured the host country to silence these journalists or hand them over. The Rwandan government gave some of these journalists an ultimatum to either remain silent or leave, forcing some to halt operations from Rwanda and relocate again. Some of these journalists were among a broader group, including other HRDs, who were tried and sentenced in absentia.

  What are your key demands for the Burundian government?

  Burundi’s civil society demands that the government lift civic space restrictions, enabling HRDs, journalists and other independent voices to express themselves freely without harassment. We support these demands.

  First of all, the government must release Floriane Irangabiye, a journalist sentenced to 10 years in jail in May 2023. Five other HRDs were charged and tried earlier, in April. The government targeted them because of their association with an international organisation the regime dislikes and accused them of illegally receiving funds. Although released after two months thanks to international pressure, some have been given a suspended sentence, so we call for all charges against them to be dropped.

  The safety of exiled activists must also be ensured before they can return, which requires the lifting of their sentences. As long as HRDs continue to face convictions in absentia, there will be significant impediments to any form of human rights activism in Burundi. We further urge the government to revoke the bans and suspensions imposed on CSOs since 2015.

  Despite the government’s claim that Burundi is a democracy, it is certainly not. If it were, it would allow people to voice criticism and the activities of HRDs wouldn’t be criminalised.

  What support do Burundian human rights activists receive from international allies, and what further do they need?

  When European Union countries, the USA and other governments raise concerns about blatant human rights violations in Burundi, particularly through their embassies in the country, it really makes a difference. Although it may take years to secure the release of an HRD, intensified international pressure has proven effective.

  There are too few independent human rights groups left in Burundi, and it’s difficult to provide international support to virtually non-existent entities. Those still active are mostly individual activists, so it is challenging for donors to support them. One notable exception is the independent newspaper Iwacu, which, despite facing constraints, continues its work. We encourage donors to sustain their support of the media outlet, which represents one of the few remaining independent voices in Burundi.

  Human rights organisations operating from exile need ongoing support, and could expand their work if they had more sustainable funding. It’s hard to work from abroad. After several years in exile, activists begin to feel disconnected and demotivated as they don’t see things change.

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  Civic space in Burundi is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

• CIVICUS calls on Nicaraguan authorities to withdraw new bill threatening freedom of association

  A new bill introduced in Congress by lawmakers from Nicaragua’s governing party would severely restrict freedoms of association and expression if passed into law, global civil society alliance CIVICUS said today. Introduced on 22 September, The Foreign Agents Law (“Ley de Regulación de Agentes Extranjeros”) would require individuals and organisations that receive overseas funding  to register as “foreign agents”. Those registered as such would be banned from participating in activities relating to domestic politics.

  This legislation would give government ample discretionary powers to control and muzzle civil society, including the power to freeze assets of organisations and people classified as “foreign agents” who fail to register within 60 days. It would also ban anonymous donations, require individuals and organisations to submit detailed monthly reports on funding and use of resources, and allow the government to cancel the registration of organisations not meeting requirements.

  Similar legislation implemented in other countries, including Russia, has had a chilling effect on civic space, leading to the closure of many organisations and the discrediting of civil society activists. CIVICUS calls on the Nicaraguan Congress to reject the proposed bill and guarantee an enabling environment for civil society organisations and human rights defenders.

  “This law would significantly obstruct the operation of civil society organisations in Nicaragua and contribute to the stigmatisation of activists and human rights defenders. Nicaraguan authorities have repressed peaceful protests, sought to silence critical voices and are now attempting to take away people’s right to freely associate,” said Natalia Gomez, CIVICUS Advocacy and Campaigns Officer.

  
  Background

  In April 2018, widespread protests for social rights set off a crisis in Nicaragua which persists to date. Violations during this crisis have left over 300 protesters dead and more than 100,000 people forcibly displaced. While mass mobilisations have abated, the persecution and criminalisation of political dissidence has continued. Opposition politicians, independent journalists and human rights defenders have faced systematic harassment from security agents and from civilian pro-regime groups. 

  For more information on civic space violations, visit the Nicaragua country page on theCIVICUS Monitor 

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  ABOUT CIVICUS

  CIVICUS is a global alliance of civil society organisations dedicated to strengthening citizen action and civil society around the world. CIVICUS has more than 10,000 members worldwide.

  The CIVICUS Monitor is an online participatory platform that monitors civic freedoms, including the freedoms of expression, association and assembly, in 196 countries across the world.

• CIVICUS condemns crackdown on Civil Society in Bahrain
  Johannesburg. 10 December 2010. CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation is deeply concerned about the deteriorating operating environment for civil society in the Kingdom of Bahrain. The past few months have been marred by growing intolerance towards dissenters, which began in the run up to the October elections and continues in the post election phase.

  Authorities in Bahrain are waging a relentless campaign against activists whose views are not in line with the official position. Currently, 24 prominent human rights defenders are facing trial under Bahrain's anti-terrorism laws. They have been charged with collaborating with foreign organisations and circulating false information. They have also been accused of forming terrorist networks, destruction of public and private property and defaming the authorities.

  The arrested activists have complained about torture and abuse meted out to them by the National Security Agency. They have so far appeared in court on four occasions and the next hearing has been scheduled for 23 December. During their first appearance in court on 27 October, detainees informed the court that while in detention they were beaten, electrocuted, verbally and physically assaulted and denied adequate sleep. Those detained were not allowed access to legal representation during interrogation and some family members did not know where they were being detained for two weeks after their arrest. It has also been reported that prior to, during and after the elections about 350 other activists have been arrested.

  "In a worrying trend, it has become commonplace in Bahrain to arrest activists for writing articles and delivering speeches which are critical of the government's discriminatory policies and official corruption,"  said Netsanet Belay, CIVICUS' Director of Policy and Research. "Persecution and torture of public-spirited individuals offering legitimate criticism against official policies and the clampdown on their organisations amounts to a repudiation of Bahrain's accession to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention Against Torture."

  The Bahrain Human Rights Society (BHRS), a CIVICUS partner for the Civil Society Index and one of the few remaining independent groups striving for the protection of civil and political freedoms in the country, has been targeted in the recent crackdown. On 6 September, the Ministry of Social Development issued an order to dissolve the Board of the BHRS and went ahead to appoint an administrator 'an employee from the Ministry' to lead the BHRS. The BHRS has had to go to court in response to these arbitrary actions and its fate currently depends on the court's response. The first hearing of the case scheduled for 26 October has been postponed to 4 January 2011.

  According to Abdullah Aldorazi of BHRS, "The unfair order issued by the Ministry of Social Development to dissolve the Board of the BHRS is a security strategy aimed at preventing the documentation of atrocities carried out by the authorities during the crackdown and preventing families of the detainees from using the society as a safe haven."

  CIVICUS urges the authorities of the Kingdom of Bahrain to live up to their commitments under international law and guarantee civil society the space to freely express, associate and assemble.

  CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation is a global movement of civil society with members and partners in over a hundred countries. The Civil Society Watch (CSW) Project of CIVICUS tracks threats to civil society freedoms of expression, association and assembly across the world.

  ---

  For more information please contact CIVICUS:

  
  Jessica Hume ( , +27 82 768 0250), Communications Manager

  or

  David Kode ( , +27 73 775 8649), Policy Officer
  Office Tel: +27 11 833 5959

  CIVICUS House, 24 Gwigwi Mrwebi Street, Newtown 2001, Johannesburg, South Africa
  PO Box 933, Southdale 2135, Johannesburg, South Africa
  tel: +27-11-833-5959 | fax: +27-11-833-7997 | email:
  web: www.civicus.org

• CIVICUS expresses solidarity with embattled Swazi Civil Society

  Johannesburg. 17 November 2010.The Swazi Trade Union Movement is undertaking Global Days of Action on 16 and 17 November to raise awareness and demand for human rights and justice for the people of Swaziland. CIVICUS extends its whole-hearted support to Swazi civil society in this endeavour and remains deeply concerned about the freedom of civil society in the country.

  “Swaziland is Africa’s last absolute monarchy and the government’s tight control and frequent crackdowns on opposition parties and pro-democracy movements are unacceptable in today’s world,” said Ingrid Srinath, Secretary General of CIVICUS. “It is high time the government accepts the legitimate aspirations of the people of Swaziland to enjoy democratic rights.”

  The space for civil society to freely express, associate and assemble remains constrained in Swaziland.  Statements in the press on 19 October by Swazi Prime MinisterBarnabas Sibusiso Dlamini outlined his intentions to propose legislation to force columnists to request prior permission before publishing comments that criticise the government. The Prime Minister stated that columnists write pieces that are harmful to the image of the country and that they receive compensation from foreign sources with interests in Swaziland. The Prime Minister’s statement insinuates that newspaper pieces which are critical of the government will be censored before they are published.

  Enactment of such a law will breach freedom of expression guarantees in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the country’s own Constitution. Moreover, it would repudiate the aims and objectives of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Commonwealth, of which Swaziland is a member.

  “CIVICUS remains deeply concerned about the censorship of the press in Swaziland and the frequent government crackdowns on pro-democracy demonstrations organised by civil society groups,” says David Kode, Policy Officer at CIVICUS. “The Swazi security forces have used the Suppression of Terrorism Act, enacted in November 2008, to justify the use of force and intimidation in suppressing dissent, including demonstrations.”

  In September 2010, security forces disrupted pro-democracy demonstrations, detaining and releasing some activists without charge and deporting foreign human rights activists and trade unionists in the country to show solidarity with Swazi civil society. The government approved these actions, claiming that intimidation and torture are tools for government use to suppress opposition to the state and those acting on behalf of foreign forces.

  CIVICUS urges the Swazi government to respect the rights of the people of Swaziland to express democratic dissent and demand the reform of authoritarian institutions.

  CIVICUS:  World Alliance for Citizen Participation is a global movement of civil society with members and partners in over a hundred countries.  The Civil Society Watch (CSW) Project of CIVICUS tracks threats to civil society freedoms of expression, association and assembly across the world.  In 2009, CSW tracked threats to civil society in over 75 countries around the globe.

  ---

  For more information please contact CIVICUS:
  
  Jessica Hume ( , +27 82 768 0250), Communications Manager

  or

  David Kode (david.kode@civicus,org, +27 73 775 8649), Policy Officer
  Office Tel: +27 11 833 5959

• CIVICUS Monitor: a new effort to study civic space

  After two years of deep thinking and hard work, the global civil society alliance CIVICUS has launched the beta version of the CIVICUS Monitor – the first ever online tool specifically designed to track and rate respect for civic space, in as close to real-time as possible.

• CIVICUS urges Iran to stop persecuting human rights defenders and implement Universal Periodic Review recommendations

  Johannesburg. 22 June 2010. Earlier this month, CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation and a number of civil society groups censured Iran at the UN Human Rights Council for outright refusal to accept key recommendations made during its Universal Periodic Review (UPR). 
  
  Iran rejected 45 of the 188 recommendations made to it by diplomatic delegations of different states and took back 20 recommendations to Tehran for further review. Notably, the rejected recommendations included "end to severe restrictions on the rights to free expression, association and assembly" (United States) and the "end to the detention and trials of writers solely for the practice of their right to freedom of expression" (Slovenia).

• Civil society in Latin America and the Caribbean under threat

  Restrictions on civic space rising despite prevalence of democracy

  Click hereto read a Spanish language version of this release

  Civil society in Latin America and the Caribbean is coming under increasing pressure despite the prevalence of electoral democracy in the region, says a new reportreleased today by CIVICUS, the global civil society alliance.

  While the core civil society freedoms of association, assembly and expression are constitutionally recognised in most countries, legal, administrative and de facto barriers to the exercise of these freedoms have risen throughout the continent. These restrictions are appearing after an upsurge of citizens’ protests over entrenched issues of inequality, corruption and abuses of political power.

• CROATIA: ‘The longer this government remains in power, the weaker democracy and the rule of law become’

  CIVICUS speaks about ongoing anti-government protests in Croatia with Oriana Ivković Novokmet, Executive Director of Gong.

  Gong is a think-do tank whose work focuses on promoting democratic processes and institutions and developing a democratic political culture in Croatia.

  What triggered recent protests?

  On 17 February, thousands of people took the streets of the capital, Zagreb, todemand early parliamentary elections. Organised by 11 left and liberal opposition parties, this massive anti-government demonstration was triggered by the appointment of former judge Ivan Turudić as the new state attorney amid media reports linking him to corruption. The opposition fears this appointment will further deteriorate the already compromised reputation of the Croatian judiciary.

  According to a report by one of the most influential Croatian newspapers, Jutarnji list, between 2016 and 2020,Turudić, then the president of the Zagreb County Court, exchanged messages with the then state secretary of the ministry of justice, accused in another corruption case. The messages clearly showed they had a romantic relationship. Opposition members argue that Turudić lied to the Parliamentary Committee for the Judiciary when questioned about the meetings they had, claiming their relationship was superficial.

  Additionally, President Zoran Milanović accused Turudić of meeting as president of the Zagreb County Court with Zdravko Mamić, a football manager sentenced for tax evasion and embezzlement who is currently a fugitive in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mamić allegedly met with Turudić while a suspect and later when he was under investigation, as noted by the Security Intelligence Agency.

  In a context of increasing frustration with the government of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) party, which is plagued with corruption accusations, the February protests helped the opposition gain momentum. It subsequently announced plans to stage further protests in several major cities on 23 March.

  What’s the state of democracy and civic freedoms in Croatia?

  Turudić’s appointment was yet another example of Prime Minister Andrej Plenković’s habit of capturing independent institutions, which he’s done since reaching office. The longer the HDZ and Plenković remain in power, the weaker the rule of law and liberal democracy become. Plenković vowed to reform the HDZ but he has failed to change his party and also reversed progress made in upholding the rule of law in Croatia.

  Under Plenković, Croatia is drifting away from the principles it adopted on joining the European Union. During his two terms, institutions such as the Commission for the Prevention of Conflicts of Interest have been significantly weakened. The Commissioner for Information was appointed as a fig leaf so the justice minister could hide the real authors of theLaw on Constituencies, which redrew the boundaries of electoral districts to suit the ruling party. This key electoral law was crafted by the HDZ without involving experts, civil society or the opposition. Arbitrary district boundaries were traced on the basis of an unreliable voter registry. This move has undermined public trust in elections and could also result in an even lower voter turnout.

  Are protesters able to voice their demands freely?

  The government has imposed restrictions on protest rights, including by closing St Mark’s Square, home to key government institutions. Full access to the square is now restricted to government and parliamentary staff, and the area where people are allowed to protest is demarcated with fences. Recent demonstrations like the one on 17 February, however, have​​seen an expansion of the available space for protesters.

  Plenković reacted to these protests by accusing the opposition of being pro-Russian, despite the fact that its only reference to Russia was to mourn Alexei Navalny’s death. On its official Facebook page, the HDZ insulted the opposition and people who supported the protest by labelling them ‘backward leftists’, ‘rampant angry revolutionaries’, ‘Russophiles’, ‘Putinophiles’ and ‘destructive and anti-patriots’. Many members of the government also endorsed this hostile narrative. In this crucial electoral year, Gong’sanalysis revealed the use of numerous bots – automated programs that mimic human activity – supporting insults against the opposition on Facebook and attempting to manipulate citizens.

  Plenković has tried to silence the media and their sources by adding provisions to the Criminal Code to criminalise leaking of information during the non-public phase of criminal proceedings. The bill however triggered protests by journalists and in response the government amended it to clarify that leaks deemed to be ‘in the public interest’ wouldn’t be criminalised. What is or is not in the public interest will however be determined by judges and Turudić.

  What’s at stake in the 2024 elections?

  President Milanović shocked Croatia when he announced he would run in parliamentary elections, scheduled for 17 April, as the Social Democratic Party’s (SDP) prime ministerial candidate, entering the ring against Plenković. The Constitutional Court says Milanović can only run for prime minister if he resigns as head of state first. Milanović called them gangsters and continued the campaign with the slogan ‘The rivers of justice are coming’. The SDP’s support grew strongly in the polls, but it now has a furious rhetorical populist at its head, openly saying he will not respect the Constitutional Court.

  Campaigns will likely be plagued by offensive speech, contributing to the erosion of democratic values and the integrity of the electoral process. The HDZ is still by far the strongest party, but people are increasingly dissatisfied with the direction of the government and the constant corruption scandals. With Milanović’s entry into the race, the election result has become uncertain.

  What are the main challenges for civil society?

  Croatian civil society organisations (CSOs) operate in a context marked by a backsliding in liberal democracy, with attacks on activists, the media and independent experts, and challenges to the rule of law. Civic space has significantly contracted, and CSOs face administrative burdens, financial constraints, overwork and underpayment. As a result, many organisations are retreating from the public sphere, decreasing their engagement and doubting if they should continue to question thosein power.

  Moreover, changes in 2020 to theCouncil for Civil Society Development reduced the participation of CSOs in decision-making processes, undermining the legitimacy of the body and leading to the government outvoting CSOs and completely dominating law-drafting working groups. We have warned the public and the European Commission (EC) about token CSOs being used to shape anti-corruption laws. Instead of consulting widely with civil society, the government includes these CSOs that have been established to support its agenda rather than promote the public interest. 

  In this challenging environment, Gong is set on remaining an active democratic watchdog,using a range of strategies to achieve social impact and foster positive change. These include analysis, research, proposing democratic innovations, advocacy, education, networking and collaboration with diverse stakeholders, including the academic community, civil society, media, politicians, government institutions and society in general.

  A recent successful advocacy effort involved the EC unveiling new guidelines for the participation of its members in elections. This initiative was prompted by Gong’sreport on EC President Ursula Von Der Leyen’s involvement in a pre-election campaign video for the HDZ. Gong raised this issue with both the EC and the European Ombudsman during Croatia’s 2020 parliamentary election.

  For doing this work, we are constantly targeted with defamation campaigns by politicians, particularly those in power. This raises concerns for our safety and must immediately stop.

  Civic space in Croatia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Gong through itswebsite orInstagram page, and followGong andOriana Ivković Novokmet on Facebook, and@GONG_hr and@OrianaIN on Twitter.