human rights council

Sudan: The UN Human Rights Council should act urgently and hold a special session
Following the 25 October 2021 military coup in Sudan, CIVICUS and partners have released a call on the UN Human Rights Council to convene a special session to address the crisis in the country.

To Permanent Representatives of Member and Observer States of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council (Geneva, Switzerland)

Excellencies,

As violence is increasing in Sudan following the military coup of 25 October 2021 and decisive action is needed to protect the transition, Sudan’s constitutional order, and the human rights of people in Sudan, the UN Human Rights Council has a responsibility to act urgently.

The Council should fulfil its mandate to prevent violations and respond promptly to human rights emergencies by convening a special session and adopting a resolution requesting the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to set up a fact-finding mission to monitor, verify and report on the situation in Sudan with a view to preventing further human rights violations and abuses, identifying perpetrators, and ensuring accountability for these violations and abuses.

Ahead of the 48^thsession of the Human Rights Council (13 September-11 October 2021), 37 civil society organisations (CSOs) highlighted[1] the need for the Council to extend its support to, and scrutiny of, Sudan. The CSOs highlighted that Sudan’s political transition remained incomplete, mentioned ongoing challenges and risks, and urged States to maintain the monitoring and public reporting capacity of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). They wrote: “[T]he Human Rights Council has a responsibility to keep Sudan high on its list of priorities and to contribute to meaningful progress in the country.”

Their call remained unanswered as the Council failed to adopt any Sudan-focused resolution.

Two weeks after the session ended, on 25 October 2021, Sudan’s military forces arrested Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and several civilian figures, including members of the Transitional Government and Transitional Sovereign Council (SC), who were placed under house arrest or taken to unknown locations. At the time of writing, several of them remain held incommunicado or under house arrest. Military elements took control of the national television and key centres of information. They imposed a partial internet shutdown in the country and closed roads, bridges, and the airport in Khartoum.

This military coup occurred one month before the head of the former Transitional Military Council (TMC), General Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan, who had since August 2019 been heading the SC, was due to hand over the presidency of the SC to civilian representatives, as per the power-sharing agreement and Constitutional Document of 2019.[2]

General al-Burhan announced a nation-wide state of emergency and the dissolution of the SC and the civilian-led Transitional Government.

He unilaterally announced the suspension of Articles 11, 12, 15, 16, 24-3, 71, and 72 of the Constitutional Document. These articles pertain to the SC, the Transitional Council of Ministers and Cabinet, the Transitional Legislative Council (which was to be constituted), and the TMC. The latter’s dissolution seems to have been annulled, paving the way for military rule.[3]

The coup and military takeover also threaten the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement for Sudan, which was signed on 3 October 2020 between the Transitional Government and parties to the peace process, including armed groups that were involved in the conflicts that have affected several of Sudan’s regional States in the last three decades.

General al-Burhan sought to justify the illegal takeover by blaming “political infighting” within civilian bodies and groups, including the Transitional Government and the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), the coalition that brings together the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), civic groups, and political parties that signed the Declaration on Freedom and Change of January 2019 and led the peaceful popular revolution of 2018-2019 that led to the ouster of former President Omar al-Bashir, in April 2019, and the political transition. General al-Burhan even asserted that the army had ousted the government to avoid a “civil war.”[4]

* * * * * * * * *

Immediately after the coup was reported, and despite restrictions on communications, protesters peacefully took to the streets to denounce the military’s illegal actions and demand the reinstatement of the government and a transition to civilian rule. The SPA called for strikes and civil disobedience. Protesters erected barricades in the streets. Soldiers opened fire on crowds and reportedly killed at least ten people and injured dozens. Arrests have been reported.[5]

These acts demonstrate the armed and security forces’ lack of commitment to a democratic transition to civilian rule and their determination to consolidate control, including by using violence. The 25 October 2021 military coup followed a reported coup attempt on 21 September 2021, which “the military blamed on a cadre of Bashir-allied Islamists but which several diplomats described […] as a trial balloon,” as tensions were growing within the SC.[6]

Fears of a full-fledged, bloody crackdown are mounting. These fears are made credible by the illegal actions of the reconstituted TMC, the history of violence and abuse that characterises Sudan’s armed and security forces, including the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and the current context, including restrictions on communications, which are reminiscent of the shutdown that was imposed following the atrocities committed on 3 June 2019 (known as the “Khartoum massacre”[7]).

While the total number of arrests made is unknown, it is likely to increase after the release of the present letter. Human rights defenders (HRDs), protest organisers, journalists, and independent voices, in particular women human rights defenders (WHRDs), women journalists, and women and girls protesting the coup, are at a heightened risk of being subjected to violations and abuses. These include arbitrary arrests, the use of unwarranted and lethal force, beatings, ill-treatment and torture, and sexual and gender-based violence, as was the case during the Khartoum massacre.[8]

* * * * * * * * *

The coup has drawn condemnation. States, including partners of Sudan, condemned it as a betrayal of the transition, demanded the release of political leaders, and urged full observance for the Constitutional Document and the reinstatement of transitional institutions.[9]

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), of which Sudan is a Member, issued a statement in which its Executive Secretary, Dr. Workneh Gebeyehu, said he was “alarmed by the current political developments.” He “strongly condemn[ed] any attempt to undermine the transitional government” and called for the “immediate release” of all arrested political leaders.[10]

The Arab League expressed “deep concern” about the military coup. The organisation’s Secretary-General urged all parties to “fully abide” by the Constitutional Declaration signed in August 2019.[11]

The Chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, who learned “with deep dismay of the serious development of the current situation in Sudan,” called “for the immediate resumption of consultations between civilians and military” and reaffirmed that “dialogue and consensus is the only relevant path to save the country and its democratic transition.” He further called “for the release of all arrested political leaders and the necessary strict respect of human rights.”[12] However, despite the Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government,[13] he did not convey a “clear and unequivocal warning to the perpetrators of the unconstitutional change that, under no circumstances, will their illegal action be tolerated or recognized by the [AU].”

The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) met on 26 October 2021. The following day, it released a communiqué[14] in which it “strongly condemn[ed] the seizure of power by the Sudanese military on 25 October 2021 and the dissolution of the Transitional Government, and totally reject[ed] the unconstitutional change of government, as unacceptable and an affront to the shared values and democratic norms of the AU.” It decided to “suspend, with immediate effect, the participation of the Republic of Sudan in all AU activities until the effective restoration of the civilian-led Transitional Authority.”

While this is a positive step, more needs to be done to stop military rule and protect the transition, Sudan’s constitutional order, and the human rights of people in Sudan. As repression increases, AU mediation efforts and Human Rights Council action are not mutually exclusive but complementary.

The UN Secretary-General, Mr. António Guterres, “strongly condemn[ed] the ongoing military coup d’état in Khartoum and all actions that could jeopardize Sudan’s political transition and stability.” He called for the immediate reconstitution of the governing arrangements provided for under the Constitutional Document.” He referred to the “unlawful detention” of the Prime Minister, government officials and politicians as “unacceptable” and called for the immediate release of those detained arbitrarily. He added: “Any attempts to undermine this transition process puts at risk Sudan’s security, stability and development.”[15]

The Special Representative for Sudan and Head of the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), Mr. Volker Perthes, said he was “deeply concerned about reports of an ongoing coup and attempts to undermine Sudan’s political transition.” He “called on the security forces to immediately release those who have been unlawfully detained or placed under house arrest” and urged an “[immediate] return to dialogue and [engagement] in good faith to restore the constitutional order.”[16]

For her part, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ms. Michelle Bachelet, “strongly condemn[ed] [the] military coup in Sudan and the declaration of a nationwide state of emergency, the suspension of key articles of the Constitutional Document and the governing bodies.” She reminded “military and security forces to refrain from unnecessary and disproportionate use of force, to respect people’s freedom of expression, as well as the right of peaceful assembly.” She added: “It would be disastrous if Sudan goes backwards after finally bringing an end to decades of repressive dictatorship.”[17]

On 26 October, the UN Security Council met behind closed doors to discuss the crisis. It failed to adopt a resolution to unequivocally condemn the military coup, or even to release a statement.

* * * * * * * * *

In this context, the Human Rights Council cannot afford to stay silent or wait for its next regular session, which is due to open on 25 February 2022, to act.

It should make clear that the TMC cannot be considered a legitimate partner; strongly condemn the military coup; urge full respect for the Constitutional Document and the reinstatement of transitional institutions; call for an immediate stop to the violence against protesters; demand a release of all political prisoners; and demand accountability for the human rights violations and abuses committed.

The Human Rights Council should fulfil its mandate to prevent violations and respond promptly to human rights emergencies, convene a special session, and request the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to set up a fact-finding mission to monitor, verify and report on the situation in Sudan with a view to preventing further human rights violations and abuses, identifying perpetrators, and ensuring accountability for these violations and abuses.

The report of the fact-finding mission should be shared with the UN Security Council. The Human Rights Council should further ensure that the High Commissioner publicly and regularly reports on the human rights situation in Sudan, relying on both in-house expertise and the work of the OHCHR country office in Sudan, and it should hold interactive dialogues on the human rights situation in Sudan twice a year.

We thank you for your attention to these pressing issues and stand ready to provide your delegation with further information as required.

Sincerely,
1. African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS)
2. AfricanDefenders (Pan-African Human Rights Defenders Network)
3. African Initiative for Peacebuilding, Advocacy and Advancement (AfriPeace)
4. Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS)
5. Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR)
6. CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
7. CSW (Christian Solidarity Worldwide)
8. Darfur and Beyond
9. DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project)
10. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
11. Global Rights
12. Human Rights and Peace Centre (HURIPEC)
13. International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
14. International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI)
15. International Service for Human Rights (ISHR)
16. Justice Center for Advocacy and Legal Consultations
17. Kamma Organization for Development Initiatives (KODI)
18. Kenya Human Rights Commission
19. Kongamano La Mapinduzi
20. Lawyers for Justice Sudan
21. Mouvement Inamahoro
22. Never Again Coalition
23. PAX
24. Physicians for Human Rights
25. REDRESS
26. Regional Centre for Training and Development of Civil Society (RCDCS)
27. The Sentry
28. Skills for Nuba Mountains
29. Sudan Archives
30. Sudan Human Rights Hub
31. Sudan Unlimited
32. Victims Advocates International
33. Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights
[1] DefendDefenders et al., “The Human Rights Council should extend its support to, and scrutiny of, Sudan,” 10 September 2021 (accessed on 26 October 2021).

[2] For background, see DefendDefenders et al., “Sudan: ensuring a credible response by the UN Human Rights Council,” 3 September 2019, (and Annex) (accessed on 26 October 2021).

[3] Al Jazeera, “Sudan coup: Which constitutional articles have been suspended?” 26 October 2021, (accessed on 26 October 2021).

[4] France 24, “Sudan’s Burhan says army ousted government to avoid civil war,” 26 October 2021, (accessed on 27 October 2021).

[5] Al Jazeera, “‘No to army rule’: Pro-democracy protesters take to Sudan streets,” 27 October 2021; BBC News, “Sudan coup: Why the army is gambling with the future,” 27 October 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59050473 (both accessed on 27 October 2021).

[6] International Crisis Group, “Reversing Sudan’s Dangerous Coup,” 26 October 2021. See also BBC News, “Killings of Peaceful Sudanese Democracy Protesters Demand Accountability: Urgent International Action Needed to Prevent Further Violence,” 21 September 2021, (both accessed on 27 October 2021).

[7] See previous civil society letters on Sudan, in particular International Refugee Rights Initiative et al., “Killings of Peaceful Sudanese Democracy Protesters Demand Accountability: Urgent International Action Needed to Prevent Further Violence ,” 6 June 2019, ; DefendDefenders et al., “Sudan: ensuring a credible response by the UN Human Rights Council,” 3 September 2019, (and Annex); DefendDefenders et al., “The Human Rights Council should support human rights reforms in Sudan,” 9 September 2020, (all accessed on 26 October 2021).

[8] Human Rights Watch, “‘They Were Shouting ‘Kill Them’: Sudan’s Violent Crackdown on Protesters in Khartoum,” 17 November 2019, (accessed on 26 October 2021).

[9] For a comprehensive list of responses by Governments and intergovernmental organizations to the military coup, see Sudan Unlimited, “World Unites with the People of Sudan and Against #SudanCoup,” (accessed on 26 October 2021).

[10] “IGAD Statement On The Current Political Development In Sudan,” 25 October 2021, (accessed on 26 October 2021).

[11] Asharq al-Awsat, “Arab League Expresses ‘Deep Concern’ over Sudan,” 25 October 2021, (accessed on 26 October 2021).

[12] “Statement of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the situation in Sudan,” 25 October 2021, (accessed on 26 October 2021).

[13] AU PSC, “Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government” (AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI)), 10-12 July 2000, (accessed on 25 October 2021).

[14] “Communiqué of the 1041^st meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union held on 26 October 2021 on the Situation in Sudan,” 27 October 2021, (accessed on 27 October 2021).

[15] “Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General - on Sudan,” 25 October 2021, (accessed on 26 October 2021).

[16] “SRSG Statement about Reports of an Ongoing Coup and Attempts to Undermine Sudan’s Political Transition,” 25 October 2021, (accessed on 26 October 2021).

[17] “Statement by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet on the coup d’état in Sudan,” 25 October 2021, (accessed on 26 October 2021).

Civic space in Sudan is rated as repressed by the CIVICUS Monitor.
Sudan: Urgently convene a special session and establish an investigative mechanism
TO PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF MEMBER AND OBSERVER STATES OF THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (GENEVA, SWITZERLAND)

Excellencies, In light of the unfolding human rights crisis in Sudan, and notwithstanding efforts to stop the fighting by the African Union (AU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and other regional and international actors, we, the undersigned non-governmental organisations, are writing to urge your delegation to address the human rights dimensions of the crisis by supporting the convening of a special session of the UN Human Rights Council.

In line with the Council’s mandate to prevent violations and to respond promptly to human rights emergencies, States have a responsibility to act by convening a special session and establishing an investigative and accountability mechanism addressing all alleged human rights violations and abuses in Sudan.

We urge your delegation to support the adoption of a resolution that requests the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to urgently organize an independent mechanism to investigate human rights violations and advance accountability in Sudan, whose work would complement the work of the designated Expert on Sudan.

* * *

On 15 April 2023, explosions and gunfire were heard as violence erupted in Khartoum and other Sudanese cities between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by Sudan’s current head of state as Chairperson of the Sovereign Council (SC), General Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan, and a paramilitary group, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as “Hemedti”).

As of 25 April 2023, at midnight, a 72-hour ceasefire has been announced. The death toll, however, is estimated at over 400 civilians, with thousands injured. Actual figures are likely to be much higher as most of Khartoum’s hospitals have been forced to close and civilians injured during the crossfire cannot be rescued. Millions of residents are trapped in their homes, running out of water, food and medical supplies as electricity is cut and violence is raging in the streets of Khartoum. Banks have been closed and mobile money services severely restricted, which limits access to cash, including salary and remittances. Diplomats and humanitarians have been attacked. The fighting has spread to other cities and regions, including Darfur, threatening to escalate into full-blown conflict.

In a Communiqué, the AU Peace and Security Council noted “with grave concern and alarm the deadly clashes […], which have reached a dangerous level and could escalate into a full-blown conflict,” “strongly condemned the ongoing armed confrontation” and called for “an immediate ceasefire by the two parties without conditions, in the supreme interest of Sudan and its people in order to avoid further bloodshed and harm to […] civilians.”

* * *

In light of these developments, we urge your delegation to support the adoption, during a special session on the unfolding human rights crisis in Sudan, of a resolution that, among other actions:
- - - Requests the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to urgently organize on the most expeditious basis possible an independent investigative mechanism, comprising three existing international and regional human rights experts, for a period of one year, renewable as necessary, and complementing, consolidating and building upon the work of the designated Expert on Human Rights in the Sudan and the country office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, with the following mandate:
      
      To undertake a thorough investigation into alleged violations and abuses of international human rights law and violations of international humanitarian law and related crimes committed by all parties in Sudan since 25 October 2021, including on their possible gender dimensions, their extent, and whether they may constitute international crimes, with a view to preventing a further deterioration of the human rights situation;
      
      To establish the facts, circumstances and root causes of any such violations and abuses, to collect, consolidate, analyze and preserve documentation and evidence, and to identify, where possible, those individuals and entities responsible;
      
      To make such information accessible and usable in support of ongoing and future accountability efforts, and to formulate recommendations on steps to be taken to guarantee that the authors of these violations and abuses are held accountable for their acts and to end the cycle of impunity in Sudan;
      
      To provide guidance on justice, including criminal accountability, reparations, and guarantees of non-recurrence;
      
      To integrate a gender perspective and a survivor-centred approach throughout its work;
      
      To engage with Sudanese parties and all other stakeholders, in particular United Nations agencies, civil society, refugees, the designated Expert on Human Rights in the Sudan, the field presence of the Office of the High Commissioner in Sudan, African Union bodies and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, in order to provide the support and expertise for the immediate improvement of the situation of human rights and the fight against impunity; and
      
      To ensure the complementarity and coordination of this effort with other efforts of the United Nations, the African Union and other appropriate regional and international entities, drawing on the expertise of, inter alia, the African Union and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to the extent practicable;
    - Decides to enhance the interactive dialogue on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, called for by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 50/1, at its 53rd session so as to include the participation of other stakeholders, in particular representatives of the African Union, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and civil society;
    - Requests the independent investigative mechanism to present an oral briefing to the Human Rights Council at its 54th and 55th sessions, and a comprehensive written report at its 56th session, and to present its report to the General Assembly and other relevant international bodies; and
    - Requests the Secretary-General to provide all the resources and expertise necessary to enable the Office of the High Commissioner to provide such administrative, technical and logistical support as is required to implement the provisions of the present resolution, in particular in the areas of fact-finding, legal analysis and evidence-collection, including regarding sexual and gender-based violence and specialized ballistic and forensic expertise.
We thank you for your attention to these pressing issues and stand ready to provide your delegation with further information as required.

Sincerely,

First signatories (as of 26 April 2023):
1. Act for Sudan
2. Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture in the Central African Republic (ACAT-RCA)
3. African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies (ACDHRS)
4. African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS)
5. AfricanDefenders (Pan-African Human Rights Defenders Network)
6. Algerian Human Rights Network (Réseau Algérien des Droits de l’Homme)
7. Amnesty International
8. Angolan Human Rights Defenders Coalition
9. Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
10. Atrocities Watch Africa (AWA)
11. Beam Reports – Sudan
12. Belarusian Helsinki Committee
13. Burkinabè Human Rights Defenders Coalition (CBDDH)
14. Burundian Coalition of Human Rights Defenders (CBDDH)
15. Cabo Verdean Network of Human Rights Defenders (RECADDH)
16. Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS)
17. Cameroon Women’s Peace Movement (CAWOPEM)
18. Central African Network of Human Rights Defenders (REDHAC)
19. Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) – Mozambique
20. Centre de Formation et de Documentation sur les Droits de l’Homme (CDFDH) – Togo
21. CIVICUS
22. Coalition of Human Rights Defenders-Benin (CDDH-Bénin)
23. Collectif Urgence Darfour
24. CSW (Christian Solidarity Worldwide)
25. DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project)
26. EEPA – Europe External Programme with Africa
27. Ethiopian Human Rights Defenders Center (EHRDC)
28. FIDH (International Federation for Human Rights)
29. Forum pour le Renforcement de la Société Civile (FORSC) – Burundi
30. Gender Centre for Empowering Development (GenCED) – Ghana
31. Gisa Group – Sudan
32. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
33. Horn of Africa Civil Society Forum (HoA Forum)
34. Human Rights Defenders Coalition Malawi
35. Human Rights Defenders Network – Sierra Leone
36. Human Rights House Foundation
37. Institut des Médias pour la Démocratie et les Droits de l’Homme (IM2DH) – Togo
38. International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI)
39. International Commission of Jurists
40. International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI)
41. International Service for Human Rights
42. Ivorian Human Rights Defenders Coalition (CIDDH)
43. Jews Against Genocide
44. Journalists for Human Rights (JHR) – Sudan
45. Justice Africa Sudan
46. Justice Center for Advocacy and Legal Consultations – Sudan
47. Libyan Human Rights Clinic (LHRC)
48. Malian Coalition of Human Rights Defenders (COMADDH)
49. MENA Rights Group
50. Mozambique Human Rights Defenders Network (MozambiqueDefenders – RMDDH)
51. NANHRI – Network of African National Human Rights Institutions
52. National Coalition of Human Rights Defenders – Kenya
53. National Coalition of Human Rights Defenders – Somalia
54. National Coalition of Human Rights Defenders-Uganda (NCHRD-U)
55. Network of Human Rights Journalists (NHRJ) – The Gambia
56. Network of the Independent Commission for Human Rights in North Africa (CIDH Africa)
57. Never Again Coalition
58. Nigerien Human Rights Defenders Network (RNDDH)
59. Pathways for Women’s Empowerment and Development (PaWED) – Cameroon
60. PAX Netherlands
61. PEN Belarus
62. Physicians for Human Rights
63. POS Foundation – Ghana
64. Project Expedite Justice
65. Protection International Africa
66. REDRESS
67. Regional Centre for Training and Development of Civil Society (RCDCS) – Sudan
68. Réseau des Citoyens Probes (RCP) – Burundi
69. Rights Georgia
70. Rights for Peace
71. Rights Realization Centre (RRC) – United Kingdom
72. Salam for Democracy and Human Rights
73. Society for Threatened Peoples
74. Southern Africa Human Rights Defenders Network (Southern Defenders)
75. South Sudan Human Rights Defenders Network (SSHRDN)
76. Sudanese American Medical Association (SAMA)
77. Sudanese American Public Affairs Association (SAPAA)
78. Sudanese Women Rights Action
79. Sudan Human Rights Hub
80. Sudan NextGen Organization (SNG)
81. Sudan Social Development Organisation
82. Sudan Unlimited
83. SUDO UK
84. Tanzania Human Rights Defenders Coalition (THRDC)
85. The Institute for Social Accountability (TISA)
86. Togolese Human Rights Defenders Coalition (CTDDH)
87. Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH)
88. Waging Peace
89. World Council of Churches
90. World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT)
91. Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights
ANNEX: KEY HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN SUDAN, PRE-15 APRIL 2023

Sudan’s human rights situation has been of utmost concern for decades. In successive letters to Permanent Missions to the UN Human Rights Council, Sudanese and international civil society groups highlighted outstanding human rights concerns dating back to the pre-2019 era, including near-complete impunity for grave human rights violations and abuses, some of which amounting to crimes under international law.

Civil society organisations also attempted to draw attention to post-2019 human rights issues, including the brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters during and after the 2018-2019 popular protests and after the military coup of 25 October 2021. They repeatedly called for ongoing multilateral action, stressing that as the UN’s top human rights body, the Council had a responsibility to ensure scrutiny of Sudan’s human rights situation and to support the Sudanese people’s demands for freedom, justice, and peace.

During a special session held on 5 November 2021, the Council adopted a resolution requesting the High Commissioner to designate an Expert on Human Rights in the Sudan. As per resolution S-32/1, which was adopted by consensus, the Expert’s mandate will be ongoing “until the restoration of [Sudan’s] civilian-led Government.” As per Council resolution 50/1, also adopted by consensus, in July 2022, the Council requested the presentation of written reports and the holding of additional debates on Sudan’s human rights situation.

The violence that erupted on 15 April 2023, which resulted from persisting disagreements regarding security and military reforms and unaddressed issues of accountability of security forces and lack of security sector reform, came against a backdrop of severe restrictions on human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Observers’ and civil society actors’ fears of a deterioration of the situation, immediately prior to 15 April 2023, including in the form of an intensified crackdown on peaceful protesters in Khartoum and violence in the capital and in the conflict areas of Darfur, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan, as well as in Eastern Sudan, were well founded. These fears were made credible by the history of violence and abuse that characterises Sudan’s armed and security forces, including the SAF, the RSF, and the General Intelligence Service (GIS) (the new name of the infamous National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS)).

Since the 25 October 2021 coup, de facto authorities systematically used excessive and sometimes lethal force, as well as arbitrary detention to crack down on public assemblies. The situation was particularly dire for women and girls, who face discriminatory laws, policies, and practices, as well as sexual and gender-based violence, including rape and the threat of rape in relation to protests and conflict-related sexual violence in Sudan’s conflict areas.

National investigative bodies, such as the committee set up to investigate the 3 June 2019 massacre in Khartoum, had failed to publish any findings or identify any perpetrators.

The situation in Darfur, 20 years after armed conflict broke out between the Sudanese government and rebel groups, remained particularly concerning. Intercommunal and localised violence in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile had escalated since October 2021, resulting in civilian casualties, destruction of property and human rights violations. Emergency laws and regulations remained in place, stifling the work of independent actors. In Blue Nile State, fighting had increased in scope and expanded to new areas.

Cruel, inhuman and degrading punishments that were common in the Al-Bashir regime were still being handed out by the courts of laws. Throughout the country, the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) continued to unduly restrict the operations of civil society organisations, including through burdensome registration and re-registration requirements, restrictions to movement, and surveillance.

These added to long-standing, unaddressed human rights issues UN actors, experts, and independent human rights organisations identified during the three decades of the Al-Bashir regime. Among these issues, impunity for grave human rights violations and abuses remains near-complete.

As of early April 2023, the country was in a phase of political dialogue. On 5 December 2022, the Sudanese military and civilian representatives, including the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), which played a key role in the 2018-2019 revolution, signed a preliminary agreement, known as the Political Framework Agreement. The agreement was supposed to be a first step in paving the way for a comprehensive agreement on the transition, which was supposed to be led by civilians and lead to the holding of elections at the end of a two-year period. The agreement, however, excluded key issues such as justice and accountability. Strong disagreements persisted regarding key security and military reforms. Influential actors, including major political parties and the resistance committees, rejected the deal altogether.

The political stalemate and mounting tensions also threatened the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement, signed on 3 October 2020 between the then Transitional Government and parties to the peace process, including armed groups that were involved in the conflicts that have affected several of Sudan’s regional States in the last three decades.
Tanzania: 38 NGOs call on states to express concern over human rights
#Tanzania: Activists & journalists are experiencing a rapid decline in #civicspace. 38 rights groups call on #UN Member States to take action at the Human Rights Council (#HRC). Joint letter: https://t.co/M9JM5MxQ99 pic.twitter.com/7XOOGugyeP
— CIVICUS (@CIVICUSalliance) May 13, 2019

Today, CIVICUS and 37 Tanzanian, African and international human rights organisations publish a letter calling on states to use the next session of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) to raise concern over Tanzania’s situation in order to prevent a further deterioration.

Since a group of 30 NGOs first wrote a letter on Tanzania, in August 2018, the space for human rights defenders (HRDs), civil society, journalists, bloggers, the media, LGBTI persons, and opposition and dissenting voices has continued to shrink. The situation in Tanzania, which ranks 118th in Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index this year, calls for a response at the United Nations. This can be in the form of individual (national) or joint statements by state delegations.

In the letter, the group of NGOs say: “While we do not believe that at this point, the situation calls for a [HRC] resolution, warning signs of a mounting human rights crisis exist.” We echo the statements delivered in recent months by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and call for preventative engagement with the Tanzanian government.

To Permanent Representatives of Member and Observer States of the United Nations Human Rights Council

Open letter to States on preventative engagement with, and action on, Tanzania at the Human Rights Council’s 41st session

Excellency,

Ahead of the 41st regular session of the UN Human Rights Council (“the Council”), which will take place from 24 June-12 July 2019, we write to call on your delegation to deliver statements, both jointly and individually, and to engage in bilateral démarches to address the ongoing deterioration of the human rights situation in the United Republic of Tanzania.

Since a group of 30 civil society organisations (CSOs) first addressed a letter on Tanzania to Council Members and Observers, in August 2018 references [1], the space for human rights defenders (HRDs), civil society, journalists, bloggers, the media, LGBTI persons, and opposition and dissenting voices has continued to shrink. While we do not believe that at this point, the situation calls for a resolution, warning signs of a mounting human rights crisis exist.

In recent months, draconian legislation enacted since 2015 and legal and extra-judicial methods used to harass HRDs, threaten independent journalism, and restrict freedom of opinion and expression, peaceful assembly and association have been supplemented with measures that result in further closing the civic and democratic space in the country. [2]

Recent legislative, policy and practical developments have led to increased international and regional attention on Tanzania. The surge in the number, and strengthening of the wording, of statements delivered by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights indicate that global concern is growing over the situation in the country, which for decades demonstrated a commitment to improving the human rights of all people, both nationally and within East Africa.

On 2 November 2018, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet raised the alarm on the fact that “[l]esbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people [have] been subjected to growing violence, harassment and discrimination over the past two years.” She expressed concern over these steps, warning that they “could turn into a witch-hunt and could be interpreted as a licence to carry out violence, intimidation, bullying, harassment and discrimination against those perceived to be LGBT.”[3]

On 4 February 2019, during an informal conversation Ms. Bachelet held with the Council President and Members, Ms. Bachelet raised concern about amendments to the Political Parties Act, stating: “Legislation passed by Tanzania’s Parliament last month sets up significant obstacles to the registration of political parties, and restricts them from carrying out basic activities like holding rallies and taking public stands on issues. This will clearly hamper prospects for free and fair elections in 2020.”[4]

Ms. Bachelet asked Council Members to “engage Tanzania bilaterally on its rights situation” and urged the country to “accept visits of the Special Rapporteurs to advise on measures to protect public freedoms and other human rights concerns,” citing legislative curbs on freedom of opinion and expression, attacks on several prominent civil society members and opposition figures, restrictions on women’s access to health, and an overall “climate [that] denies Tanzanians their rights.”

Since then, despite assurances provided by then Tanzanian Minister for Constitutional and Legal Affairs (now Foreign Minister), H.E. Mr. Palamagamba Kabudi, during the Council’s High-Level Segment [5], the situation has continued to deteriorate. Further signs of serious backsliding include the NGOs Coordination Board’s decision, on 17 April 2019, to de-register six CSOs. As reported by Watetezi TV, the revocation is based on the claims that the organisations had purportedly violated national values, principles and regulations of NGOs and operated against their own constitutions. They include the Community Health Education Services and Advocacy (CHESA), Kazi Busara na Hekima (KBH Sisters), AHA Development Organization Tanzania, Pathfinder Green City, Hope and Others, and HAMASA Poverty Reduction (HAPORE).

On 25 April 2019, Dr. Wairagala Wakabi, the Executive Director of the Uganda-based Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), was detained, upon arrival, at Dar es Salaam Julius Nyerere International Airport. After hours of interrogation, Dr. Wakabi was deported back to Uganda as a “prohibited immigrant”. Lawyers reported that the authorities denied him entry into Tanzania on vague grounds of “national interest.”[6] CIPESA’s work in Tanzania and across Africa, advocates for human rights online.

Earlier, on 27 February 2019, the Information Services Department, which oversees newspaper licenses, temporarily suspended the publication license of The Citizen newspaper, on accusations that it had published reports that were “false,” “misleading,” and “seditious.” The suspension order cited, inter alia, a 22 July 2018 article on a statement by US Senator Bob Menendez, which pointed to the erosion of democracy in Tanzania. Tanzanian authorities alleged the article contained “falsehoods” and had “seditious intent” as defined in Article 52 of Tanzania's Media Services Act. [7]

Meanwhile, the fate or whereabouts of journalist Azory Gwanda, who disappeared in November 2017, remain unknown, which further highlights the need for the establishment of protection mechanisms for journalists and HRDs in Tanzania.

The only recent, noticeable positive development is the 28 March 2019 judgment by the East African Court, which ruled that Sections 7(3)(a), (b), (f), (g), (h), (i) and (j); 19, 20 and 21; 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40; and 58 and 59 of the abovementioned Media Services Act violate the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community. The Court directed the Tanzanian Government to take such measures as necessary to bring the Media Services Act into compliance with the Treaty [8]. This judgment offers a ray of hope in regional and international mechanisms as avenues for ensuring respect for human rights in Tanzania.

Building on these steps, we call on your delegation to make use, at the Council’s 41st session, of the following agenda items to raise concern over Tanzania, both jointly and in your national capacity:
Specifically, your delegation could encourage the Tanzanian Government to set a date for special procedure visits, starting with the visit of the Special Rapporteur on peaceful assembly and association, whose visit request has been agreed in principle in 2018 and in line with the statements delivered by the Tanzanian delegation at the Council’s 39th session [11].

Additionally, bilateral engagement in multilateral fora such as the Council and at the embassy level, in Tanzania, should be used to raise relevant issues with the Government.

The options outlined in the present letter fit in a form of preventative engagement the Council has been seeking to promote as it works towards operationalizing its “prevention mandate.” The 41st session should be leveraged to help prevent a further deterioration of the human rights situation in Tanzania.

We thank you for your attention to these pressing issues and stand ready to provide your delegation with further information.

Sincerely,

African Defenders (the Pan-African Human Rights Defenders Network)
African Freedom of Expression Exchange (AFEX)
Amnesty International
ARTICLE 19
Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
Association for Human Rights in Ethiopia (AHRE) – Ethiopia
Association for Progressive Communications (APC)
Center for Civil Liberties – Ukraine
Central Africa Human Rights Defenders Network (Réseau des Défenseurs des Droits Humains en Afrique Centrale – REDHAC)
The Centre for Peace and Advocacy (CPA) – South Sudan
CIVICUS
Civil Rights Defenders
Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA)
Committee to Protect Journalists
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative
DefendDefenders (the East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project)
Geneva for Human Rights / Genève pour les Droits de l'Homme
Human Rights Defenders Network – Sierra Leone
Human Rights Watch
International Commission of Jurists
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA)
International Service for Human Rights
The International Youth for Africa (IYA) – South Sudan
JASS (Just Associates)
Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC)
Ligue burundaise des droits de l’homme ITEKA – Burundi
MARUAH – Singapore
The Network of South Sudan Civil Society Organizations in Uganda (NoSSCOU)
The Nile Centre for Human Rights (NCHR – South Sudan)
Odhikar – Bangladesh
The ONE Campaign
Southern Africa Human Rights Defenders Network (SAHRDN)
Reporters Without Borders
Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights
Tanzania Human Rights Defenders Coalition (THRDC)
West Africa Human Rights Defenders Network (ROADDH/WAHRDN)
World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT)

[1] DefendDefenders et al., “Tanzania: Open letter to States for joint action to address crackdown on civic space and prevent a further deterioration of the situation,” 16 August 2018, https://www.defenddefenders.org/press_release/hrc39-address-crackdown-on-civic-space-in-tanzania/(accessed 25 April 2019).

[2] Ibid., and see below for recent developments. Relevant laws include the Electronic and Postal Communications Act (2010) and Online Content Regulations (2018), the Statistics Act (2015), the Cybercrimes Act (2015), the Media Services Act (2016), and the Access to Information Act (2016). See full analysis in DefendDefenders, “Spreading Fear, Asserting Control: Tanzania’s assault on civic space,” 26 June 2018, https://www.defenddefenders.org/publication/spreading-fear-asserting-control-tanzanias-assault-on-civic-space/, accessed 25 April 2018.

[3] Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Bachelet: Tanzania has duty to protect – not further endanger – LGBT people,” 2 November 2018, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23817&LangID=E (accessed 25 April 2019).

[4] See also Reuters, “Tanzania MPs grant government sweeping powers over political parties,” 30 January 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tanzania-politics/tanzania-mps-grant-government-sweeping-powers-over-political-parties-idUSKCN1PO0IA (accessed 25 April 2019).

[5] Statement available on the HRC webcast, http://webtv.un.org/search/tanzania-high-level-segment-5th-meeting-40th-regular-session-human-rights-council/6007149576001/?term=kabudi&sort=date (accessed 25 April 2019).

[8] CIPESA, “CIPESA Executive Director Detained At Tanzania Airport – UPDATE,” 25 April 2019, https://cipesa.org/2019/04/cipesa-executive-director-detained-at-tanzania-airport/ (accessed on 1st May 2019).

[7] Committee to Protect Journalists, “Tanzania imposes 7-day publication ban on The Citizen,” 1st March 2019, https://cpj.org/2019/03/tanzania-citizen-7-day-publication-ban.php (accessed on 1st May 2019).

[9] East African Court of Justice, First Instance Division, Reference No.2 of 2017, Media Council of Tanzania, Legal and Human Rights Centre Tanzania Human Rights, and Defenders Coalition vs. The Attorney General of the United Republic of Tanzania, 28 March 2019, available at: http://eacj.eac.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Referene-No.2-of-2017.pdf(accessed 24 April 2019).

[10] Although we do not believe that, at this point, Tanzania deserves to be considered under the same item as countries with some of the gravest human rights records, a diplomatically-worded statement under item 4, which would refer to the need for Tanzania to engage in dialogue and cooperation and to take corrective action before the situation calls for a more robust multilateral response, could make a useful contribution to sending the Government the right message.

[11] Tanzania should be encouraged to accept advisory services to review and amend its legislation in order to bring it in line with its constitutional and international obligations, as well as to review and amend policies and practices, in particular those of law enforcement officials and regulatory authorities working with civil society and the media.

[12] In a statement delivered under item 3 (GD), on 14 September 2018, Tanzania stated: “The United Republic of Tanzania remains fully committed to the promotion and protection of human rights in the country and globally. We call upon the International Community to continue supporting us in this endeavour.” In a right of reply the Tanzanian delegation exercised on 11 September 2018, under item 2, Tanzania addressed a series of concerns that had been expressed over its domestic situation and pledged to “continue working diligently to improve its human rights situation” (full statements available on the HRC extranet).
The Human Rights Council should listen to the voices of those affected

Statement at the 49th Session of the UN Human Rights Council

Item 2 General Debate

Delivered byLisa Majumdar

Thank you, Mr. President, and thank you to the High Commissioner for her update.

There is so much the Council can and should do during this session to address the grave situations you reported. The successes and failures of this Council have a tangible impact for those at the forefront of defending human rights.

Last week the Council acted strongly on the conflict in Ukraine to take a step towards accountability for Russian aggression. This session, we expect the Council to take its opportunity to strengthen human rights and protect civic space elsewhere. To build on accountability efforts in Myanmar. To take robust action on Nicaragua’s worsening human rights crisis, and to address the civic space backsliding in Cambodia. And to strengthen protection for those standing up for human rights in conflict zones.

The success and credibility of the Council relies on the engagement and participation of those on the frontline of human rights – the activists, journalists, environmentalists, colleagues – who risk their lives and freedom to stand up for human rights. The Council is stronger when it has the full participation of civil society, and can hear the voices of those affected. It can protect and support those trying to effect positive change in extraordinarily difficult circumstances. It can create a route to justice for victims of violations and accountability for perpetrators.

But it can only do so if its members, as set out in GA Resolution 60/251 ‘uphold the highest standards in the promotion and protection of human rights.’ Their failure to do so weakens the Council, and undermines its outcomes. We call on the Council to seek the reform needed to address this.

We thank you.
The climate emergency is a threat to human rights and human life
Statement at the 43rd Session of the UN Human Rights Council
Watch statement delivered by youth climate activist, Paloma Costa:

My name is Paloma Costa and I am from a region where the Amazon is threatened and human rights seem to mean nothing. I am the outcome of this dominant paradigm of development, an economic model that we insist that "sustains" our nations but is not sustainable at all. Where mining and large enterprises are destroying our land and our people.

So, I want to state something today: Our lives are not for sale. Our lands are not for sale. We are facing a systemic crisis and we cannot come with market solutions to human problems.

While we are here convened and discussing human rights, there are still people being killed, arrested and oppressed, just for being social-environmentalists, forest protectors or activists. There are still negotiations of climate change lead by deniers of science and deniers of the climate crisis. The climate emergency is a threat to human rights and human life. And we are drowning in your lack of action in order to make deep structural changes in our society.

And we have the solutions! We can defeat local struggles if it becomes a global fight! What more do we need to see to start turning all those resolutions and recommendations available into commitments and policies? To adopt mechanisms where people have responsibility for their actions and recommendations given really guide the parties, in an inclusive, deliberative and binding way?

That’s why I stand here, to amplify those unheard voices of young people whose human rights are being violated, especially in the global south. But what I really wanted to see is all of these voices here with me, because we are the conscience in the work you do, and we are ready to be part of the solution andtake climate action NOW! We just need to be heard and that our calls turn into concrete action.So I still have hope. Because, your pencils have both the power to heal or to kill. So what will you choose?

We all have a dream of a beautiful world, and we should honour that dream by doing the necessary work to make it happen. I want to be a co-creator of the world I dream of. The indigenous united themselves in Raoni’s land to protect their territories and as Célia Xakriabá, said: the limits of these lands are in our conscience. So, are you conscious to unite and protect our planet?
The Council must address arbitrary detention of human rights defenders
Statement at the 48th Session of the UN Human Rights Council

Delivered by Lisa Majumdar

Thank you, Madame President.

No one should be arbitrarily detained simply for peacefully protecting equality, freedom and justice for all. But worldwide, people are in prison for standing up for their rights and for the rights of their communities.

Teresita Naul is a human rights defender who dedicated her life to protecting the poorest and the most marginalised. She is detained in the Philippines under spurious charges. Teresita’s case is illustrative of how the Philippines has repeatedly criminalised the work of human rights defenders.

Sudha Bharadwaj is a human rights lawyer, and one of many human rights defenders charged and detained in India under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act. This is a clear example of a case in which the use of vague and overly broad national security and anti-terrorism provisions has given authorities wide discretion to criminalise peaceful activities, a tactic highlighted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.

María Esperanza Sánchez García is human rights defender detained in Nicaragua, where false charges have been used as a strategy to criminalise activists and defenders to deny them status of political prisoner, and arbitrary detention used as a tactic to dismantle the political opposition.

Abdulhadi Al-Khawaja, Co-Founder of the Gulf Centre for Human Rights, has spent a decade arbitrarily detained in Bahrain. This year he turned 60 in prison, separated from family and friends.

Human rights defenders are critical to the functioning of the Council’s mandate. We call on the Council to ensure that States who routinely practice arbitrary detention of human rights defenders are held to account and to ensure that human rights defenders are protected and can continue their vital work.

We thank you.

Civic space in the Philippines, India and Nicaragua is repressed and closed in Bahrain as rated by the CIVICUS Monitor
The crisis of accountability persists in the Philippines
Statement at 48th Session of the UN Human Rights Council

Delivered by Roneo Clamor, Karapatan

CIVICUS and Karapatan welcome the High Commissioner’s update.

In June 2020, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights said that violations of human rights, including the widespread and systematic killing of thousands of alleged drug suspects, attacks on human rights activists and the vilification of dissent, were pervasive in the country, and accountability for these actions are virtually non-existent. We have seen no human rights progress on the ground, and the crisis of accountability persists.

The UN national joint programme for human rights adopted in July 2021 has minimal prospects to improve the situation on the ground, particularly given the obvious lack of political will to do so.

Those who protect human rights and call for justice continue to be targeted and attacked. Activists have been killed over the year both by the security forces and unknown individuals. In many instances this occurred following reports of them being red-tagged. In virtually none of the cases has anyone been held accountable.

Others, like 64-year-old human rights worker Teresita Naul, have been arrested on trumped up criminal charges without due process. Senator Leila de Lima remains in prison for politically motivated charges because of her actions to investigate killings in the drug war.

The draconian Anti-Terror Act, adopted in 2020, appears to be aimed at further criminalising dissent.

Justice is about holding perpetrators of human rights violations accountable, reparations for the victims, and the non-repetition of the crimes and atrocities committed. None of these will be forthcoming under the current administration, or the current resolution. We urgently call on the Human Rights Council to establish an overdue independent investigation in the Philippines.

Thank you.

Civic space in the Philippine is rated as repressed by the CIVICUS Monitor
The deterioration of civic space in Colombia, Guatemala and Honduras
37th Session of the UN Human Rights Council
Statement during the High Commissioner's country briefings

CIVICUS is extremely concerned about the spate of attacks against HRDs journalists and peaceful protestors that has taken place across Colombia, Guatemala and Honduras.

We remain gravely alarmed by the striking inattention given to the disturbing increase of killings of HRDs since the signing of the Peace Agreement by the Colombian government and the FARC guerrilla group. Local partners report that 106 defenders were killed and 310 attacks on media workers and journalists took place during 2017. In addition, arbitrary detentions, attacks and judicial harassment are also on the rise.

Moreover, CIVICUS is concerned about the situation in Honduras. Honduras has been placed on the CIVICUS Monitor Watch List because of the violence surrounding the November 2017 contested presidential elections. Protests were met with excessive police force and more than 20 protesters were killed, with many others injured or detained. Additionally, reports show increasing attacks against HRDs who denounce the repression of protests. There has also been an increase in violations of the right to freedom of expression, including smear campaigns, threats, harassment and physical attacks against media workers and activists expressing dissent on the media.

Finally, Mr President, CIVICUS is extremely concerned by the continuing violence against local communities involved in land rights struggles in Guatemala. These violations are perpetrated by state security forces or by private security working under the orders of private corporations. The authorities have not taken any action to protect these communities. During one such event in late November 2017, a Maya community that had been evicted from their land and were camping on the side of a road was attacked by security guards that opened fire, killing one community member and injuring another.

In all three cases, CIVICUS calls on the authorities to stop the use of violence against activists, media workers and peaceful demonstrators, to conduct investigations on threats and attacks, and ensure perpetrators of unlawful killings are brought to justice without further delays.
The SDGs will not be achieved unless civic space is protected
Statement at the 43rd Session of the UN Human Rights Council
Watch us deliver our statement below:

The report on intersessional meetings on the 2030 Agenda concluded that the Sustainable Development Goals cannot be attained without stronger, inclusive and meaningful public participation in the development and monitoring of policies.

Civil society plays a critical role in ensuring inclusive policy making by shining a spotlight on the needs of the most vulnerable, by propelling innovation, by identifying solutions to complex development challenges, and by taking responsibility for delivery of services on the ground. Civil society, including human rights defenders, also perform an imperative watchdog role. Without information from the frontlines it is all but impossible to hold states accountable to their commitments under the SDGs.

When civic space is restricted, these vital roles are compromised.

Achieving the SDGs requires an expanded and safeguarded civic space, with the assured protection of human rights defenders. However, commitments made to protect and promote civic space have not been fully realised. Much more needs to be done to ensure that civil society can actively engage in implementation and monitoring of the SDGs.

To this end, we urge the Council to support the following measures:
- Adoption of the more robust and relevant indicators on SDGs 16.7, 16.10 and 17.17.
- Issue public pronouncements on the importance of civic space from political leaders, diplomats and representatives of intergovernmental institutions.
- Enhance the space for civil society groups in Voluntary National Reviews drawing on experiences from the UPRs.
The SDGs will not be achieved unless civic space is protected and the full participation of civil society is guaranteed, and we call on this Council to hold to account states which do not do so.

See our wider advocacy priorities and programme of activities at the 43rd Session of the UN Human Rights Council
The UN must address the government of the Philippines pattern of reprisals
Joint statement at the 45th Session of the UN Human Rights Council -- CIVICUS and Karapatan, delivered by Roneo Clamor

CIVICUS and its member organisation Karapatan welcome the Secretary General’s report and recommendations on reprisals. It reflects the systemic patterns of reprisals which we see in the Philippines against human rights defenders engaging with the UN.

Karapatan paralegal Zara Alvarez was killed last month. This year alone, human rights defenders Teresita Naul and Alexander Philip Abinguna were arrested and are still detained, while Karapatan colleagues Jay Apiag, Clarizza Singson, Julius Dagatan, Reylan Vergara, Petty Serrano, and myself, routinely receive online and offline attacks on a daily basis, including judicial harassment. Our Secretary-General Christina Palabay has suffered rape and death threats following advocacy at the Council, including to support the adoption of resolution 41/2 on the Philippines last year. The same patterns of reprisals are reported against other NGOs as well.

Karapatan was accused by the Philippines government of being a terrorist organization, prompting an independent audit into longstanding funding from Belgium. The audit found no irregularities. But such baseless allegations before the Council impedes our access to resources for human rights advocacy in the Philippines and within UN institutions.

The Philippines is a member of this Council. That reprisals continue unabated, without accountability, has a direct impact on the worth of the UN as a whole. We urge the Council to address the Philippine government’s patterns of reprisals against human rights defenders. We appeal to the Council to work towards an independent investigation on the human rights situation in the Philippines.

Civic space in Philippines rated as Obstructed by the CIVICUS Monitor
The work of human rights defenders is crucial to the work of this Council
Statement at the 49th Session of the UN Human Rights Council

Item 3 General Debate

Delivered byLisa Majumdar

Thank you, Mr President.

The work of human rights defenders is crucial to the work of this council. It takes a lot of courage to stand up to power, at great personal risk. The report by the Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders shows all too clearly what this risk entails.

In Belarus, seven members of the Human Rights Centre Viasna have been jailed for their human rights work – which is evidence of a larger repression. In Nicaragua, human rights defender María Esperanza Sánchez García has been arbitrarily detained for over two years under false charges. Nicaragua has systematically sought to silence the voices of human rights defenders.

The Special Rapporteur reiterated again that States must ensure an enabling environment to protect human rights defenders. Spurious legal proceedings brought against defenders not only act as a chilling effect but are also a serious drain of the human and financial resources of defenders and NGOs, compounding other serious challenges in access to resources which prevent defenders and NGOs from carrying out their work. We call on States to ensure access to resources for human rights defenders and other civil society.

The Council is currently negotiating a resolution which will highlight the work of human rights defenders in conflict and post-conflict situations which resonates all too well in the world today.

Human rights defenders play a crucial role in conflict prevention and in post-conflict reconstruction, and it is vital to ensure their safety and ability to operate. We call on all states to support and implement the resolution, and we call on the Council to hold states accountable for their treatment of human rights defenders.
Timor-Leste: Civil society has played a critical role in strengthening democracy, but civic space shortfalls remain
Statement at the 50th Session of the UN Human Rights Council

Adoption of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) report of Timor-Leste

Delivered by Marta da Silva, La'o Hamutuk

Thank you, Mr President.

La'o Hamutuk, JSMP, HAK, Forum Asia and CIVICUS welcome the government of Timor-Leste’s engagement with the UPR process.

Civil society played a critical role in achieving Timor-Leste’s sovereignty and strengthening democracy, and human rights defenders, journalists and other civil society members are largely able to work without fear of reprisals.

However, there is still more to be done to strengthen the right to freedom of expression. Some journalists have faced threats, and some practise self-censorship to deal with such intimidation. We welcome that Timor-Leste accepted a recommendation to revise the Media Law, which contains provisions that can undermine freedom of expression and media freedom. During the review, states also made recommendations in relation to attempts by the government to introduce draft laws that could further stifle freedom of expression, including the proposed Criminal Defamation Law and Cyber Crime Law. We are further alarmed by restrictions on the right to peaceful assembly and the arbitrary arrests of protesters.

We call on Timor-Leste to address these concerns and ensure a safe, secure and enabling environment for human rights defenders and journalists to carry out their work. Specifically, the government should implement recommendations relating to civic space and:
- Revise the Media Law to ensure it is in line with international standards and refrain from introducing new laws or provisions limiting either offline or online expression.
- Ensure that journalists and civil society organisations can work freely and without fear of retribution for expressing critical opinions or covering topics that the government may deem sensitive.
- Ensure that human rights defenders are able to carry out their legitimate activities without fear or undue hindrance, obstruction or harassment and adopt a specific law to ensure the protection of human rights defenders.
- Amend the Law on Freedom of Assembly and Demonstration to guarantee fully the right to the freedom of peaceful assembly in line with international law and standards.
- Improve avenues for transparency and public participation in policy-development to ensure that all citizens’ needs and wishes are heard.
We thank you.

Civic space in Timor Leste is rated as "Obstructed" by the CIVICUS Monitor
Timor-Leste: States must call on the government to protect civic freedoms
International human rights groups raise the alarm about the state of civic rights in Timor-Leste ahead of the country's review at the United Nations Human Rights Council on 27 January 2022.
To achieve the SDGs, civil society must be supported and protected
Statement at the 46th Session of the UN Human Rights Council

Thank you, Madame President.

CIVICUS welcomes the report on the intersessional meeting for dialogue and cooperation on human rights and the 2030 Agenda. We strongly concur with the report’s consensual conclusions that inclusive collaborative recovery strategies require effective involvement of civil society, and that access to information, transparent communication, solidarity, shared responsibility and mutual accountability are crucial.

While this was true before the COVID 19 Pandemic; it is now even more critical that these laudable aims are met. We welcome continued commitment of States to the realisation of Agenda 2030. However, none of the SDGs can be realized while civic space is restricted and human rights defenders are attacked.

The CIVICUS Monitor continues to track restrictions in civic space across the globe and shows that only 3% of the world’s population is able to effectively speak out, assemble and take action. How can civil society partner with government to implement sustainable development? How can communities engage and implement these goals at a local level when they are being stifled and their very existence threatened? Misuse of increasing anti-terrorism laws, health emergency laws and cyber-security laws continue to stifle the freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly. For us to achieve the sustainable development goals in their entirety, civil society must be supported, promoted and protected. Communities must be empowered and those standing up for their rights must be protected.
Triggers for urgent action by the United Nations Human Rights Council
This report is a written output of a nine-month long applied research project in association with The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies and CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation. The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) is the foremost body when it comes to human rights. One of its mandates is to address human rights emergencies, which it does through special sessions and urgent debates. This ‘urgent action’ mechanism allows the Council to address emerging human rights crises rather than merely dealing with their aftermath. Yet, the UNHRC addresses human rights emergencies unevenly, giving some regions and situations much more attention than others. In order to understand why, this research seeks to identify “unofficial” triggers that lead to urgent action.

The identification of triggers influencing urgent action at the Council was pursued through the investigation of two cases, namely human rights violations in Myanmar and Ethiopia. Throughout this research, seven triggers were identified:
1. Intra-council Procedures
2. Issue Emergence
3. Transnational Advocacy Networks
4. Regional Blocs
5. Geopolitics
6. Regional and Parallel Human Rights Mechanisms
7. Communication and Media
Donwload the report
Tunisia: Adoption of UPR Outcome in the context of increased civic space restrictions
Statement at the 52nd Session of the UN Human Rights Council

Adoption of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) report of Tunisia

Delivered by Nicola Paccamiccio

Thank you, Mr President.

CIVICUS and Arab NGO Network for Development welcome the government of Tunisia’s engagement with the UPR process.

Since its last review, Tunisia failed to implement any of the recommendations relating to civic space. We regret that Tunisia accepted just 13 of the 22 civic space recommendations it received during this cycle.

In the context of a deep political and economic crisis, President Saïed has issued a number of decrees to consolidate power and weaken the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law. Amidst this, space for civil society is increasingly being restricted in Tunisia, leading to a rating downgraded by the CIVICUS Monitor from obstructed to repressed, the second-worst category, in its annual report. Tunisia’s downgrade comes after its addition to the CIVICUS Monitor Watchlist in March 2022 following a rapid decline in civic space.

Since July 2021, authorities have investigated or prosecuted over 30 people for their criticism of the government, including activists, journalists, lawyers and members of Tunisia’s dissolved parliament. In addition, the government has issued or initiated decrees that restrict fundamental freedoms. In particular, Decree-law 2022-54, issued in 2022, that criminalises ‘fake news’ and rumours, poses a threat to independent journalism. We regret the government lack of commitment to accept recommendations to repeal the Decree.

Security forces have also raided the offices and confiscated the equipment of many private media outlets, shut down news outlets, evicted their staff and closed down the offices of Al Jazeera, under allegations of not having the proper broadcasting license.

Mr President, we call on the government of Tunisia to take concrete steps to address these concerns, including by withdrawing restrictive legislation that restricts freedom of expression and association.

We thank you.

Civic space in Tunisia is rated as "Repressed" by the CIVICUS Monitor.
Turkmenistan at UN Human Rights Council: Adoption of Universal Periodic Review Report
CIVICUS welcomes the government of Turkmenistan's engagement with the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process. We welcome the release of journalist Saparmamed Nepeskuliev but note with concern that his health deteriorated while serving a three-year prison term on spurious drug-charges that the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found to be arbitrary.

In our UPR Submission, we documented that since its last review, Turkmenistan has not implemented any of the 27 recommendations made relating to civic space, including the 24 recommendations that were accepted.

Furthermore, there are 112 individuals forcibly disappeared, who have been targeted for political opposition or their work in civil society. We echo the recommendation made in the 3rd Cycle Review that Turkmenistan welcome a visit by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the Working Group on Enforced Disappearances.

We are further concerned by state interference in the media. In April 2018, the President dismissed Kaybov Myratdurdy, the editor of Edebiýat we Sungat newspaper and replaced him with his own candidate. The state has also forcibly dismantled private satellite dishes which allow citizens to access foreign TV and radio stations.

Mr. President, we are deeply concerned by ongoing violations of freedom of assembly. The government of Turkmenistan regularly and coercively mobilises residents for public events and frequently implements subbotnik (or forced labour) days. Mr. President, this practice runs contrary to the right to freedom of assembly, a basic element of which is voluntary participation in assemblies.

Due to numerous obstacles in the 2014 Law on Public Associations, no independent human rights organisations exist in Turkmenistan. We urge the government to implement the recommendations made during the 3rd Cycle Review to simplify the legal and procedural requirements for the registration of civil society.

Mr. President, CIVICUS calls on the Government of Turkmenistan to take proactive measures to address these concerns and implement recommendations to create and maintain, in law and in practice, an enabling environment for civil society.
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