impunity

• ECUADOR: ‘The election provided a temporary escape valve, but instability is not over’

  CIVICUS discusses the results of the 15 October runoff vote in Ecuador’s presidential election with Humberto Salazar, executive director of Fundación Esquel.

  Esquel is a civil society organisation that seeks to contribute to sustainable human development, the improvement of the quality of life of the most excluded parts of the population and the construction of a democratic, responsible and supportive society in Ecuador.

  How did violence as a result of organised crime affect the election?

  The electoral process was deeply affected by violence. This was not limited to the death of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio. In the context of these and the previous local elections, elected representatives to local governments were also assassinated. The most notorious case was that of Agustín Intriago, mayor of the city of Manta. A candidate for the National Assembly was also assassinated, and many other candidates for different positions received threats. The list of fatal victims of violence expands if we include the seven suspects captured for the Villavicencio assassination who were killed in the prisons where they were being held.

  In this context, voting preferences were surely affected. From the shadows, groups representing local and transnational mafias sent intimidating messages through violent acts that influenced people’s votes. This was very evident in the first round, when following Villavicencio’s assassination, most voters opted for candidates who until then had had no chance of reaching the runoff. This was the case with Jan Topic and Daniel Noboa, the president-elect. Both saw their numbers rebound after the assassination.

  Was violence a campaign issue in the runoff?

  The influence of violence on the elections went beyond being a campaign issue strategically chosen by the candidates. For voters, security became a central issue on the agenda, even surpassing in priority other key issues such as unemployment and poverty.

  It is not that unemployment and poverty lost relevance, but rather that the three issues became an integrated trio of aspirations that is at the basis of current demands. The electorate is looking for quick and effective, but not isolated, answers. Security, unemployment and poverty are all elements of the same equation that citizens demand from the political system.

  Although the candidates’ proposals on the issue were very general, there is a consensus in political circles that security is a key issue in Ecuador’s current situation. Consequently, in the coming days the president-elect will have to develop his security proposals in greater detail. At the polls, voters didn’t evaluate whether the proposals of either candidate on the issue were the best, nor did they have the tools to do so, but now they hope that, regardless of the policies chosen, the result of their implementation will be greater peace.

  Do you see the result as indicating a rightward turn by the electorate, or do you think the vote wasn’t ideologically motivated?

  The analysis of electoral preferences is not a game of addition and subtraction in which one side, in this case the right, wins, while the other side loses. Nor are we dealing with a naïve or uninformed electorate that has been tricked by a renewed right-wing alternative and has leaned towards right-wing values, principles and narratives as a result.

  In the current circumstances, the vote is far from ideological. Other considerations weigh in the assessment of available options. In this case, the search for novelty prevailed, allowing for the victory of an ‘outsider’. In Ecuador, outsiders have a long track record of success.

  While the winning candidate represents the right in terms of his values and models, discursively he presents himself as a renovator, much more pragmatic than ideological. This blurring of ideological content is not a unique feature of this particular candidate, but expresses a deeper process of transformation of representation in a context in which rhetoric has been emptied of content as a result of practices blatantly contradicting discourse.

  People voted overwhelmingly for a candidate who managed to inspire their trust, whose traits set him apart from the polarised competition proposed by more ideological candidates. They looked for someone who offered alternatives not only to address security issues but also to tackle issues of economic recovery and welfare.

  The result was also influenced by the expectations of specific audiences such as young people, who make up a major part of the electoral roll. This part of the electorate sought options for the future detached from the conflicts between those who are ultimately responsible for the crisis in which we are now immersed. In this sense, right-wing and left-wing ideological narratives were equally punished, as evidenced by the fact that all traditional parties lagged behind in the election results.

  Why did defeated candidate Luisa González lose, despite having a stronger party structure?

  A key factor in Luisa González’s defeat in the runoff was the weight of the figure of former president Rafael Correa as the symbol and leader of the Citizen Revolution movement. This leadership, which offers the movement a captive electorate of around 25 per cent, also creates a ceiling that, in a polarised competition between Correism and anti-Correism, does not allow the candidate to surpass the 50 per cent required to win in the runoff. The same polarisation strategy that gave Correa’s government the strength to push its agendas has reduced her chances of attracting an electorate that is not part of the party’s hardcore vote.

  The revanchist narratives of Correism, expressed in the motto ‘neither forgive nor forget’, also undermined González’s support. The appeal to a return to the past reaffirmed the party’s base, but prevented it winning the votes of a broader electorate that distrusts the authoritarian tendencies of Correism and feared that the triumph of his candidate would translate into restrictions on civic space, particularly on freedom of association.

  What are civil society’s expectations of the new administration?

  While the president-elect does not have a history of resistance to civil society participation, during the campaign he was not particularly open to receiving proposals from and meeting with civil society groups. This creates uncertainty about how broad and effective spaces for civil society participation in public policy design and implementation will be. In principle, there are no clear threats to civic space, but there is uncertainty regarding the new government’s position on the promotion and strengthening of civil society.

  It is worth noting that the two second-round competitors had a conservative bias beyond their ideological leanings to the right or left. Hence the uncertainty as to how the new president will respond to social demands from the gender equality agendas of feminist groups and the LGBTQI+ community, the demands of the Indigenous movement regarding plurinationality and interculturality, and the concerns of the human rights movement regarding the search for policies to tackle crime that do not sacrifice rights.

  What is certain is that there is a huge number of problems that the new government will have to address. To sustain its initiatives beyond the one and a half years of his term in office, the new president will need to make a broad call for action and produce a basic agenda endorsed by national multi-stakeholder agreements. Policies on security, labour – with an emphasis on youth employment under a model of intergenerational inclusion – and combating chronic child malnutrition will be indispensable. The so-called Democracy Code, the 2009 law that establishes the electoral system, the management of elections and the requirements for the functioning and financing of political parties and movements, must also be reformed.

  Do you think this election put an end to political instability?

  The instability is not over, but the election provided a temporary and short-lived escape valve for the tensions of the multi-dimensional crisis affecting Ecuador. The government’s grace period, however, will be very limited: it will have to produce measures in the short term that show it’s on the way to resolving major problems.

  Two things could work against it: the slowness of the bureaucratic apparatus to develop transformative projects and the power struggle that could block its initiatives in the National Assembly. The relationship between the executive and legislative branches will be key. If the executive once again finds itself blocked by a multitude of special interests demanding perks to enable the approval of its initiatives, the crisis will again deepen.

  Civic space in Ecuador is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Fundación Esquel through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow @FundacionEsquel onInstagram andTwitter.

• ECUADOR: ‘The new government must dialogue and seek political agreements that are public, not under the table’

  CIVICUS discusses the results of the 15 October runoff vote in Ecuador’s presidential election with Ruth Hidalgo, executive director of Participación Ciudadana (Citizen Participation).

  Participación Ciudadana is a non-partisan and pluralist civil society organisation (CSO) that works to strengthen democracy in Ecuador.

  How did organised crime violence affect the electoral process?

  The electoral process that just ended has been marked by political violence: a presidential candidate, a mayor and a prefect were assassinated. There has also been a climate of violence on the streets due to the actions of drug gangs, who extort protection money known as ‘vaccines’ from the public and uses it to finance organised crime groups.

  This made the issue of security one of the central topics in the debate between the second round candidates, and one that has generated the highest expectations.

  The two candidates’ proposals, however, were broadly similar, although with some differences in tone and characteristics of their own. Both aimed to strengthen the presence of the armed forces as co-executors alongside the police of anti-crime policies.

  How do you interpret the triumph of a centre-right alternative?

  This was not necessarily an ideological vote. The weakness of political parties in Ecuador means that ideology is losing strength. For some time now, the country has been debating not between right and left but between Correism and anti-Correism: it is the controversial legacy of former president Rafael Correa, in power for a decade between 2007 and 2017, which continues to polarise Ecuadorian society.

  The winning candidate, business leader Daniel Noboa, represents at least by his origins a centre-right option. But if he has won, it is because he has managed to capture the votes of a young electorate that is not on either side of the polarisation and has rather opted for a new vision, a young candidate with no political baggage who offers a form of politics that, unlike that of his predecessors, is not confrontational.

  What factors worked against the candidacy of Luisa González?

  Correa’s candidate, Luisa González, was hurt by the constant presence of Correa during most of the campaign, which ended up overshadowing her candidacy. Although in the end she tried to distance herself from that influence, she did not manage to position herself as a renewed Correist option, which is what she should have conveyed in order to have a chance of winning. She remained stuck to the worn-out and questioned political image of the former president.

  I believe that the element of Correa’s legacy that leads to the greatest rejection is his confrontational and threatening way of dealing with those he views as political enemies. This seems to be eliciting more and more discontent and disapproval. While the amount of support González received was not small, this set a ceiling for her that she was unable to break through. This was precisely the reason her opponent was able to prevail.

  How has the space for civil society evolved in recent years, and what can be expected under the new government?

  Civil society, in my opinion, has recovered its presence and freedom of action after Correa’s time in power, during which it was restricted and in some cases persecuted. Let’s not forget that an important environmental CSO, which confronted the government because of its extractivist policies, was arbitrarily shut down and then legislation was passed to regulate the registration, operations and closure of CSOs at the government’s discretion, with the aim of removing those that bothered the government. Many civil society activists and journalists were criminalised for their work.

  The expectation of civil society under the new government is the same as always: to have an enabling environment that allows it to carry out its activities freely. We expect a government that protects and promotes freedom of association.

  What should be the priorities of the new president?

  It’s worth remembering that these were early elections called to elect President Guillermo Lasso’s successor after he used the ‘cross-death’ mechanism, dissolving congress to prevent it impeaching him, but simultaneously cutting his mandate short. This means Noboa will only serve as president for the rest of Lasso’s term: a mere 18 months, too little time for the many challenges he will face.

  The new president takes over a country plagued by insecurity and violence, with a high fiscal deficit, almost zero growth, very high unemployment rates and on top of that, one that is once again experiencing the El Niño climate phenomenon, with warming water currents that produce extreme weather events and record temperatures. These are all issues he will have to prioritise, with public policies aimed at mitigating the most important problems in the areas of the economy, climate change and public security. To do so, he will need to build a strong team and create spaces for dialogue and reconciliation. He will need to demonstrate openness to civil society and seek political agreements that are public, not under the table.

  Every election presents an opportunity. As always in a country with so many needs, expectations are high. The main task ahead for the new government is to strengthen Ecuador’s democracy, which will demand an enormous amount of work.

  Civic space in Ecuador is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Participación Ciudadana through itswebsite orFacebook account, subscribe to itsYouTube channel and follow@participacionpc on Instagram and@ParticipacionPC and@RhidalgoPC on Twitter.

• Eritrea: Council resolution should outline human rights situation & extend the Special Rapporteur’s mandate

  To Permanent Representatives of Member and Observer States of the United Nations Human Rights Council (Geneva, Switzerland)

  Excellencies,

  Ahead of the UN Human Rights Council’s 53^rd session (19 June-14 July 2023), we, the undersigned non-governmental organisations, are writing to urge your delegation to support the development and adoption of a resolution that extends the mandate of the Special Rap­por­teur on the situation of hu­man rights in Eritrea for one year.

  Additionally, we highlight the need for the Council to put forward a strong resolution that clearly spells out and condemns the ongoing human rights viola­tions committed by Eri­trean authorities at home and abroad and the context of complete impunity that prevails.

  *    *     *

  We believe that the Council cannot fol­low a “business as usual” approach and that it is time for it to move be­yond merely procedural reso­lutions that extend the Special Rappor­teur’s mandate. The Council should produce a substantive assess­ment of Eritrea’s hu­man rights situation, adopting strong, meaningful reso­lu­tions on the country. These resolutions should include references to the Special Rapporteur’s “bench­marks for progress”[1] and recommendations by other UN and African bodies and me­cha­nisms, as well as substantive paragraphs ad­dres­sing violations committed by the country’s autho­rities inside and outside the country.[2]

  In this regard, this year’s resolution should at a minimum mention the following key human rights issues in Eritrea[3]:

  • Arbi­trary arrests and detentions, including in­com­mu­ni­cado de­ten­­tion of journalists and other dis­senting voices, as well as prolonged detention of Djiboutian pri­soners of war;[4]
  • Vio­lations of the rights to a fair trial, access to jus­tice, and due process;
  • Enforced disappearances;[5]
  • Conscription into the country’s abusive na­tional ser­vi­ce system,[6] including conscription for in­de­finite periods of national ser­­vi­ce, involving torture, sexual vio­len­ce against women and girls, and forced labour. Since Council resolution 50/2[7] was adopted, in July 2022, the Eritrean Govern­ment led an inten­sive forced conscription campaign during which it conducted waves of roundups to identify peo­ple it considers draft evaders or deserters, punishing family members of those seek­ing to avoid cons­cription or recall. Such punishment has included arbitrary detentions and home expulsions[8];
  • Restrictions on the media and media workers, severe res­tric­tions on civic space, inc­lu­ding the rights to freedoms of opinion and expression, peaceful assembly, association, move­ment, and non-discrimination,[9] as well as severe restrictions to freedom of religion or belief[10];
  • Widespread impunity for past and on­going human rights vio­la­tions; and
  • The Government of Eritrea’s refusal to engage in a serious dialogue with the inter­national com­mu­­ni­ty, including by cooperating with the Council, despite its election for a second term as a Coun­cil Member (2022-2024). For decades, Eritrean authorities have blatantly denied commit­ting serious human rights violations, including in relation to the presence of Eritrean for­ces in Ethiopia’s Tigray region.[11]

  Eri­trean forces have been credibly accused of grave violations of international law in Tig­ray, some of which may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, since the conflict started in November 2020. These violations, and the associated complete lack of accountability, deserve the Coun­cil’s atten­tion.

  *     *     *

  In July 2022, the Council took a modest step toward addressing substantive human rights issues in Eritrea. For the first time since 2018, it went beyond a one-page resolution extending the Special Rap­por­teur’s mandate. It did so by referring to the benchmarks for pro­gress Special Rap­porteurs identified, thereby outlining a path for human rights reforms. These benchmarks include streng­then­ing the rule of law, refor­ming the national military service, protecting fundamental freedoms, addressing pervasive sexual and gender-based violence, and strengthening cooperation with international and Afri­can human rights bo­dies.

  Resolution 50/2 also extended the Special Rapporteur’s mandate for a year, which was the main purpose of Eritrea-focused resolutions adopted in 2019, 2020, and 2021.

  Although it went further than these three resolutions, which were merely procedural and contained no sub­stantive assessment of Eritrea’s situation, resolution 50/2 failed to clearly describe and condemn hu­man rights violations Eritrean au­thorities are responsible for. It failed to reflect the situation in the coun­try in the way Council resolutions did prior to 2019, as well as the atrocities Eritrean forces have committed in Ethiopia’s Tigray region since armed conflict broke out, in November 2020. Yet violations Eritrean authorities commit at home and abroad are two sides of the same coin, and the total closure of the civic space enables these violations to continue with impunity.

  Ahead of the Council’s 50^th session, over 40 civil society organisations urged the Council to maintain its scrutiny of Eritrea’s human rights situation and to strengthen its annual resolution with a view to bringing it in line with pre-2019 resolutions.[12] We welcome the inclusion, in resolution 50/2, of a call on the Gov­ern­ment of Eritrea to “[commit] to making progress on the recom­mendations included in [the Special Rapporteur’s] reports and on the benchmarks and asso­cia­ted indi­ca­tors proposed in 2019.” We stress, however, that resolutions on Eritrea should fully reflect the country’s human rights situation.

  In 2016, the Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea[13] found that there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that crimes against humanity have been committed in the country since 1991 and that Eritrean officials have committed and continue to commit the crimes of enslavement, imprisonment, enforced disappearance, tor­­ture, other inhumane acts, persecution, rape, and murder. The international com­munity and the African Union have failed to ensure adequate follow-up for these findings. Since 2019, the Human Rights Council has conveyed the impression to victims, survivors, and their families that it has given up on the account­a­bility agenda.

  Yet no Eritrean official has been held criminally accountable, and Eritrea’s human rights situation has not fundamentally changed. All the key issues identified in pre-2019 Council resolutions on the country and by independent experts and organisations remain valid. For ins­tance, in his 2022 report, the Special Rapporteur, Dr. Mohamed Abdelsalam Babiker, noted that “the vast majority of the recommendations made by human rights mechanisms […], as well as the recom­mendations from the country’s universal pe­riodic review in 2019, remain unimplemented.” He added that “the persistent human rights crisis in Eritrea deepened during the reporting period” and iden­tified several worrying trends.[14]

  Similarly, in the statement delivered during the enhanced interactive dialogue on Eritrea held on 6 March 2023, the Deputy UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ms. Nada Al-Nashif, highlighted that “[t]he human rights situation in Eritrea remains dire and shows no sign of improvement. It continues to be cha­racterised by serious hu­man rights violations.”[15] She added: “It is alarming that all these human rights violations are committed in the context of complete impunity. Eritrea has not taken any de­mons­trable steps to ensure accountability for past and ongoing human rights violations.”

  *     *     *

  The Human Rights Council should allow the Special Rapporteur to pursue his work and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to deepen its engagement with Eritrea.

  At its 53^rd session, the Council should adopt a resolution:

  • Extending the mandate of the Spe­cial Rap­porteur on Eritrea for a period of one year;
  • Urging Eritrea to cooperate fully with the Spe­cial Rap­por­teur by granting him access to the country, in accordance with its obligations as a Council Member;
  • Condemning the ongoing human rights viola­tions committed by Eri­trean authorities at home and abroad and the context of complete impunity that prevails;
  • Welcoming the benchmarks for progress in improving the situ­a­tion of hu­man rights and associated indicators and recommendations, as well as recommendations formulated by other UN and African human rights bodies and mechanisms, and calling on Eri­trea to deve­lop an implementation plan to meet the benchmarks for pro­gress, in con­sul­tation with the Special Rapporteur and OHCHR; and
  • Requestingthe High Commissionerand the Special Rappor­teur to present updates on human rights concerns in Eritrea and on accountability options for serious violations at the Coun­cil’s 55^th session in an enhanced interactive dia­lo­gue that also includes the participation of civil so­ciety and requesting the Special Rap­porteur to present a comprehensive written report at the Council’s 56^th ses­sion and to the General Assembly at its 78^th

   

  We thank you for your attention to these pressing issues and stand ready to provide your delegation with further information.

  Sincerely,

  1. Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture in the Central African Republic (ACAT-RCA)
  2. AfricanDefenders (Pan-African Human Rights Defenders Network)
  3. The America Team for Displaced Eritreans
  4. Amnesty International
  5. Burkinabè Human Rights Defenders Coalition (CBDDH)
  6. Burundian Human Rights Defenders Coalition (CBDDH)
  7. Cabo Verdean Network of Human Rights Defenders (RECADDH)
  8. CIVICUS
  9. Coalition of Human Rights Defenders-Benin (CDDH-Bénin)
  10. Coordination of Human Rights Organizations (CODDH) – Guinea
  11. CSW (Christian Solidarity Worldwide)
  12. DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project)
  13. Eritrean Afar National Congress
  14. Eritrea Focus
  15. Eritrean Coordination for Human Rights
  16. Eritrean Law Society
  17. Geneva for Human Rights – Global Training (GHR)
  18. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P)
  19. Global Initiative to Empower Eritrea Grassroot Movement
  20. The Horn of Africa Civil Society Forum (HoACSF)
  21. Hawai’i Institute for Human Rights
  22. Human Rights Concern - Eritrea (HRCE)
  23. Human Rights Defenders Network – Sierra Leone
  24. Human Rights Watch
  25. Institut des Médias pour la Démocratie et les Droits de l’Homme (IM2DH) – Togo
  26. International Service for Human Rights (ISHR)
  27. Ivorian Human Rights Defenders Coalition (CIDDH)
  28. Lawyers’ Rights Watch Canada
  29. Libyan Human Rights Clinic (LHRC)
  30. Network of NGOs for the Promotion and Defence of Human Rights (RONGDH) – Central African Republic
  31. Nigerien Human Rights Defenders Network (RNDDH/NHRDN)
  32. One Day Seyoum
  33. Togolese Human Rights Defenders Coalition (CTDDH)
  34. Vision Ethiopian Congress for Democracy (VECOD)
  35. World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT)

   

  [1] See Council resolution 38/15, available at: https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/RES/38/15. See also reports of the Special Rapporteur to the Council, UN Docs. A/HRC/41/53, A/HRC/44/23, and A/HRC/47/21.

  [2] See Annex for a review of elements contained in successive Council resolutions on Eritrea (2012-2022).

  [3] See DefendDefenders et al., “The Human Rights Council should strengthen its action on Eritrea,” 20 May 2022, https://defenddefenders.org/the-human-rights-council-should-strengthen-its-action-on-eritrea/ (accessed on 12 April 2023), as well as previous civil society letters, namely DefendDefenders et al., “Eritrea: maintain Human Rights Council scrutiny and engagement,” 5 May 2020, https://defenddefenders.org/eritrea-maintain-human-rights-council-scrutiny-and-engagement/; DefendDefenders et al., “Eritrea: renew vital mandate of UN Special Rapporteur,” 10 May 2021, https://defenddefenders.org/eritrea-renew-vital-mandate-of-un-special-rapporteur/. See also CSW, “Eritrea: General Briefing,” 22 March 2022, https://www.csw.org.uk/2022/03/22/report/5629/article.htm (accessed on 11 April 2023).

  [4] See for instance One Day Seyoum, “About Eritrea,” https://onedayseyoum.org/about-eritrea (accessed on 12 April 2023).

  [5] See, among others, Amnesty International, “Eritrea: Ten years on, Ciham Ali’s ongoing enforced disappearance ‘a disgrace’,” 7 December 2022, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/12/eritrea-ten-years-on-ciham-alis-ongoing-enforced-disappearance-a-disgrace/ (accessed on 11 April 2023).

  [6] Human Rights Concern - Eritrea, “Eritrea Hunts Down its Young People for Enforced Military Service,” 6 September 2022, https://hrc-eritrea.org/eritrea-hunts-down-its-young-people-for-enforced-military-service/ (accessed on 11 April 2023). See also Human Rights Watch, “Eritrea: Crackdown on Draft Evaders’ Families,” 9 February 2023, https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/09/eritrea-crackdown-draft-evaders-families (accessed on 12 April 2023).

  [7] Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session50/res-dec-stat

  [8] Human Rights Watch, “Eritrea: Crackdown on Draft Evaders’ Families,” op. cit.

  [9] CIVICUS, Civic Space Monitor, “Eritrea,” https://monitor.civicus.org/country/eritrea/

  [10] CSW – FoRB in Full blog, “Let Us Honour The Memory of Patriarch Antonios By Bringing an End to the Violations of the Eritrean Regime,” 9 February 2023, https://forbinfull.org/category/sub-saharan-africa/eritrea/; CSW, “Eritrean Church Leader Denied Burial Site in His Hometown,” 21 April 2023, https://www.csw.org.uk/2023/04/21/press/5988/article.htm; “HRC52: Oral statement on the situation of human rights in Eritrea,” 6 March 2023, https://www.csw.org.uk/2023/03/06/report/5948/article.htm (all accessed on 24 April 2023).

  [11] Despite its obli­ga­tions as a Council Member to “uphold the highest standards in the promotion and pro­tection of human rights” and to “fully cooperate with the Council,” the Government refuses to co­ope­rate with the Special Rapporteur or other special procedure mandate holders. As of 2023, Eritrea remains among the very few countries that have never received any visit by a special procedure (see https://spinternet.ohchr.org/ViewCountryVisits.aspx?visitType=all&Lang=en).

  On 9 February 2023, President Afwerki said that his country’s forces “never committed any human rights violations or interfered in the war” in Tigray and referred to allegations of crimes under international law, which have been credibly documented, as a “disinformation campaign” (Anadolu, “Eritrean leader denies rights violations by his forces in Ethiopian war,” 10 February 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/eritrean-leader-denies-rights-violations-by-his-forces-in-ethiopian-war/2814756 (accessed on 27 April 2023)).

  [12] See footnote 3 above.

  [13] See https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/co-i-eritrea/commissioninquiryonhrin-eritrea (accessed on 12 April 2023).

  [14] A/HRC/50/20, available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session50/list-reports. See in particular paras. 75-76. These trends include the increased militarization of the country and the continued inde­finite conscription; the country’s continued involvement in human rights and humanitarian law violations in the context of the conflict in Ethiopia, as well as the increase in round-ups (giffas), recruitment of child soldiers, and kidnapping and forced conscription of Eritrean refugees to fight in the conflict; the continued closure of civic space, which remains “hermetically shut,” with no possibility for Eritreans to express dis­sent or participate in decision-making, the prolonged and arbitrary detention of hundreds of Eritreans for their real or perceived opposition to the Government; the increased pressure being placed on religious groups and on diaspora communities; and an increase in ethnic and political tensions in the diaspora as a result of the rifts opened by the war in Tigray.

  [15] She further highlighted: “Our Office continues to receive credible reports of torture; arbitrary detention; in­hu­mane conditions of detention; enforced disappearances; restrictions of the rights to freedoms of ex­pres­sion, of association, and of peaceful assembly. Thousands of political prisoners and prisoners of con­s­cience have, reportedly, been behind bars for decades. Furthermore, the harassment and arbitrary deten­tion of people because of their faith continues unabated with estimated hundreds of religious leaders and followers affected.”

• Eritrea: Extend UN Special Rapporteur mandate, help end generalized impunity

  To Permanent Representatives of Member and Observer States of the United Nations Human Rights Council, Geneva, Switzerland

  Excellencies,

  Ahead of the 38^th session of the UN Human Rights Council (“HRC” or “the Coun­cil”), we write to you as a cross-re­gional group of non-governmental organizations to share our serious concerns over the sys­te­ma­tic, wide­spread and gross human rights violations that continue to be committed with impu­nity in Eritrea.

  We urge your Govern­ment to support and co-sponsor at the upcoming session a streamlined reso­lution that accurately reflects the gravity of the situation on the ground, renews the man­date of the Special Rapporteur under the Council’s agenda item 4, and sets out a framework for need­ed reforms to improve the human rights situation in the country and advance ac­count­ability.

  At the Council’s last regular session, during an enhanced interactive dialogue on Eri­trea held in March 2018, Deputy UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Kate Gilmore noted:

  “In 2016, the Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea found reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity, namely, enslavement, imprisonment, enforced disappearance, torture, other inhumane acts, per­secution, rape and murder, had been committed since 1991. The Commission noted that despite the State’s increased engagement with the international community, there was no evidence of progress in the field of hu­man rights. I regret to report that this state of affairs remains unchanged.”[1]

  In her most recent statement to the Council, the UN Special Rapporteur on Eritrea, Sheila B. Keet­ha­ruth, similarly detailed violations per­tain­ing to the right to life, including deaths in custody for which responsibility “falls squarely on Gov­ernment authorities,” the right to liberty and security of the person, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, freedoms of expression, assembly and as­so­ciation, and freedom of religion or belief, inc­lu­­ding the harass­ment, mis­treatment, torture and detention of members of unrecognized religions.[2] These continuing violations present a systematic character, meaning, in the words of the Special Rap­porteur, that “they cannot be the result of ran­dom or isolated acts by the autho­rities” and that they occur in a country ruled “not by law, but by fear.”[3]

  Since Eritrea was first considered by the Council, the Government has refused to cooperate with the mechanisms the Council set up, including the Special Rapporteur and the Commis­sion of In­quiry (CoI). At the March 2018 enhanced interactive dialogue, Eritrea was not present to take the floor as the con­cer­ned country.

  Eritrea’s cooperation with other international bodies, mechanisms or agencies has been extremely selec­tive. While the Government recently invited the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Hu­man Rights (OHCHR) for a short-term technical assistance mission, the Deputy High Commissio­ner under­lined that “the test of the merits of our engagement with Eritrea – like Eritrea’s commitments at the international level – lies in whether or not they produce concrete human rights improvements for the people of Eritrea.” She concluded that there had been no measurable progress to date.

  Eritrea has consistently denied UN Special Procedures, including the country-specific Special Rap­por­teur, access to the country. At the time of writing, pen­ding visit requests by Special Procedures included requests from the Spe­cial Rapporteurs on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (request in 2005; reminders in 2007 and 2010); freedom of religion or belief (request in 2004; reminders in 2005 and 2006); extrajudicial, sum­mary or arbitrary exe­cu­tions (request in 2010); the right to food (request in 2003); and freedom of opi­nion and expression (request in 2003; reminders in 2005 and 2015).

  Eritrea has also attacked, intimidated and threatened human rights defenders and independent UN ex­perts, including the Special Rapporteur and members of the CoI. When the latter presented their report in 2015, they noted that “[they] were followed in the streets and in [their] hotels and vilified in blogs on line where the words of [their] report have been twisted and misquoted.” The Com­mission’s Chair added: “Of course this is trivial compared to the day to day experience of people in Eritrea itself, but it is indicative of a determination on the part of the authorities to control anyone they perceive as a critic.”[4]

  The gravity, scale and nature of the continuing violations call for justice. Victims, including those who live inside the country and those who have fled it, deserve redress. As domestic avenues for such red­ress are non-existent, the international community must continue to act with a view to en­ding the gene­ra­lized impu­nity that prevails in the coun­try. The Deputy High Commissioner remin­ded the Coun­cil that, as advi­sed by the Special Rapporteur, there could be “no sustain­able solution to the refugee out­flows until the Government complied with its human rights obligations.”[5]

  In view of the ongoing crimes under international law and violations of human rights and fun­da­mental freedoms committed in Eritrea, the Special Rapporteur’s mandate remains an indispensable mechanism to advance the protection and promotion of human rights in the country. The mandate holder continues to fulfil an invaluable role by monitoring the dire situation in the country, shining a light on violations, providing a crucial platform to help amplify the voices of victims, and offering Eritreans an opportunity to find long-lasting solutions for the respect of their human rights.

  Consistent with its mandate to address situations of violations of human rights, including gross and systematic violations, the Human Rights Council should continue to address the situ­ation in Eritrea. We urge your dele­gation to actively support and co-sponsor a resolution that:

  • Recalls the reports of the Commission of Inquiry and the Special Rapporteur and continues to ex­press its deep concern over the findings contained therein;
  • Condemns the reported systematic, widespread and gross human rights viola­tions and abuses that have been and are being committed by the Government of Eritrea in a climate of genera­li­zed im­punity;
  • Reiterates that all perpetrators of such violations and abuses should be held ac­countable;
  • Extends the mandate of the Special Rap­porteur and invites the mandate holder to continue to fol­low up on the findings of HRC mechanisms, including on accountability;
  • Invites the Special Rapporteur to assess and report on the Eritrean Government’s degree of enga­ge­ment and cooperation with the Council and its mechanisms, as well as with OHCHR, and whe­re feasible to develop benchmarks for progress on human rights and a time-bound action plan for the imple­mentation of these benchmarks;
  • Calls on all states to urge the Government of Eritrea to co-operate with the Special Rappor­teur and other UN bodies and mechanisms, including Special Procedures, implement the recommen­da­­tions these bodies and mechanisms made over the years, and allow unfettered ac­cess to the coun­try, including detention centers and training facilities.

  We thank you for your attention to these pressing issues and are available to provide your delegation with further information as required.

  Sincerely,

  Africa Monitors

  Amnesty International

  ARTICLE 19

  Asian Legal Resource Centre

  Central Africa Human Rights Defenders Network (REDHAC)

  Christian Solidarity Worldwide

  Citizens for Democratic Rights in Eritrea (CDRiE)

  CIVICUS

  DefendDefenders (the East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project)

  Eritrean Diaspora in East Africa

  Eritrean Lowland League

  Eritrean Law Society

  Eritrean Movement for Democracy and Human Rights

  FIDH (International Federation for Human Rights)

  FORUM-Asia

  Human Rights Concern – Eritrea

  Human Rights Institute of South Africa (HURISA)

  Human Rights Watch

  International Fellowship of Reconciliation

  International Service for Human Rights                        

  PEN Eritrea

  Release Eritrea

  Reporters Without Borders

  Southern Africa Human Rights Defenders Network (SAHRDN)

  West Africa Human Rights Defenders Network (WAHRDN/ROADDH)

  ---

  [1] The meeting summary can be found at: www.bit.ly/2Fc69BX

  [2] www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22821&LangID=E

  [3] www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16055&LangID=E

  [4] www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16731&LangID=E The Special Rapporteur herself has faced personal attacks during an interactive dialogue that was held in June 2017, when she was referred to as a “naked Empress with no clothes” and was accused of carrying out a witch-hunt against Eritrea. See www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ior40/8032/2018/en/

  [5] See footnote 1 above.

• GUATEMALA: ‘Criminal law is being used as a weapon of political persecution’

  CIVICUS discusses corruption in Guatemala and the criminalisation of anti-corruption activism with Claudia González, former member of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) and Virginia Laparra’s defence attorney.

  Virginia Laparra is a former prosecutor of the Special Prosecutor’s Office against Impunity (FECI) who has recently been unjustly sentenced to four years in prison. The #LibertadParaVirginia (#FreedomForVirginia) campaign is mobilising in response.

• Killing of another human rights activist highlights climate of impunity in the Philippines

  🇵🇭#Philippines: The cold-blooded murder of Zara Alvarez is a travesty and yet another addition to the growing list of activists who have been attacked and killed in the country with impunity.
  
  Statement: https://t.co/xrE3QXDRcR pic.twitter.com/TmLkWIqGAv

  — CIVICUS (@CIVICUSalliance) August 19, 2020

  CIVICUS, the global civil society alliance, denounces the tragic killing of human rights activist Zara Alvarez. Her murder highlights a wider pattern of attacks against human rights defenders, journalists and critics that has increased under the Duterte administration, and the need for an international investigation into the crimes.

• MALAWI: ‘The tactics used by the current administration are the same used by its predecessors’

  CIVICUS speaks about recent protests in Malawi with Michael Kaiyatsa, Executive Director of the Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation (CHRR).

  CHRR is civil society organisation (CSO) aimed at supporting and promoting democracy and human rights in Malawi. Its mission is to contribute towards the protection, promotion and consolidation of good governance by empowering rural and urban communities to exercise their rights. Founded in 1995 by former student exiles who returned home to the promise of a new democracy, it operates through two core programmes: Community Mobilisation and Empowerment and Human Rights Monitoring and Training.

  How has the situation in Malawi evolved since the 2020 elections?

  Malawi held a presidential election in June 2020 because the 2019 election was annulled on the basis that there were massive irregularities and the court ordered a rerun. The 2020 election was won by the opposition candidate, Lazarus Chakwera.

  During the campaign, Chakwera said that if elected, he would address some key issues, including corruption in the public sector. It was the perception of public opinion that corruption was on the rise and the previous administration had not done much to tackle the problem. Chakwera promised to introduce reforms to seal all loopholes allowing for corruption and to improve the judicial system so corruption cases would not be ignored.

  However, once in power it didn’t look like these changes were effectively being implemented. As usual, the first year people gave the new administration some time. The president kept on making the same promises but made very little actual progress. 

  The second year continued in the same way and Malawians started to lose patience. People started to take their discontent out to the streets. The economic situation in Malawi also kept getting worse, with costs of living skyrocketing every day and a rise in unemployment. People looked back at campaign promises and compared them to their reality, and frustration arose.

  I wouldn’t say all campaign commitments were just empty promises and lies, because there were issues the government attempted to address, but progress has been slow. For instance, they promised to increase funding for the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) and ensure its independence. Funding for the ACB increased significantly, and a new law was eventually passed to amend the Corrupt Practices Act, removing the requirement of the ACB director to seek consent to prosecute corruption cases. They promised to set up special courts to prosecute corruption cases, and finally submitted a bill to amend the Court’s Act and make a provision for special courts.

  But they also promised to work to recover stolen assets and are moving at an extremely slow pace in this regard. And they also said they would create a million jobs for young people, which has never happened.

  What’s behind recent protests against the judiciary?

  Last year we started seeing lots of protests against corruption and impunity. There have been numerous cases involving government officials – including from the current administration – that have not been prosecuted. Investigations take years, and those involving senior government officials take the longest and rarely end in conviction. Recent ACB reports show that only 30 per cent of such cases have been concluded, and most of these date back to 2015.

  In sum, the wheels of justice are barely moving, and people have concluded that the government is pursuing selective justice. In a recent case, for instance, an 18-year-old man arrested for cannabis possession was prosecuted and given a sentence of eight years in prison, while people accused of serious crimes involving corruption are given three and four-year sentences, if anything at all. Ironically, before this case, a powerful business leader was accused of the same crime, marijuana possession, and was just asked to pay a fine. Such arbitrariness is pushing people to the streets.

  While selective justice is nothing new, this time around people want to hold the government accountable for the promises made on the campaign trail. As a result, pressure is also coming from the opposition to hold the government to account. When the current ruling party was in the opposition, they were the ones raising these issues. Now people are realising it is not any different from its predecessors.

  How have the authorities responded to the protests?

  The government has often tried to stop protests with the use of excessive force. Just recently, over 80 activists were detained and arrested. They were charged with holding an illegal assembly, although the constitution guarantees the freedom of assembly. Hours before these demonstrations started, some Malawians claiming to be from the business community requested the court issue an injunction to stop them. The injunction was granted late in the afternoon, so people gathered the next morning without knowing about it, and the police came in and started firing teargas, beating up people and arresting everyone they could.

  The tactics used by the current administration are the same ones used by its predecessors. The habit of getting last-minute injunctions isn’t new at all: this is what happened in July 2011, when the government got a last-minute injunction, people assembled without any knowledge of it and over 20 were killed by the police in the ensuing repression.

  What shocks me the most is the court’s interpretation of the meaning of the right to the freedom of assembly. The Police Act is very clear about what needs to be done if people stage a protest. It all starts with a notification to the authorities, but this is usually interpreted as people needing to obtain permission from the police, which is against what the law actually says.

  In the recent protest against the judiciary, we were told the demonstration would not proceed until the organisers provided a list with the protesters’ names, to be held liable if the demonstration resulted in damage to property. This is strange, as you cannot be sure who is going to attend a protest and how they will conduct themselves. It is not just the police but also the courts that are now asking for a registry of attendees, something that cannot be found anywhere in the law.

  How could the international community support Malawian civil society?

  Over the past two or three years, new civil society groups have emerged to defend human rights and economic justice, and are mobilising mostly through social media platforms and community radio, particularly in rural areas, issuing statements and calling people to the streets.

  Malawian civil society needs international protection. We need to be able to express ourselves and feel safe while doing it, so we need our international partners to send a message to the president, reminding him of his commitments and his obligations under the constitution. 

  We continue to experience the same challenges as in the past, despite the administration being a beneficiary of civil society mobilisation. In 2019 and 2020, when organisations like ours were protesting against electoral irregularities, the current authorities were by our side and supported our protest for democracy. But they are now doing exactly what they criticised when they were in the opposition, including by passing laws that restrict civil society, such as the recent NGO Amendment Act.

  Civil society also needs resources, including for legal representation. There are currently over 80 civil society activists under arrest, most of whom don’t have legal representation. As a result, they remain in custody awaiting trial. There’s no fair access to justice and they could be held indefinitely.

  Civic space in Malawi is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with the Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@CHRRMalawi on Twitter.

• Palestine: Israel must end impunity and indiscriminate attacks on protestors

  One month after a horrific massacre of protesters in the occupied Palestinian territory, global civil society alliance, CIVICUS is urging accountability for the unacceptably high levels of lethal violence employed by Israeli security forces against demonstrations.  

  Since 30 March 2018, when Palestinians launched a protest campaign against forced evictions, the denial of their right to return to their occupied territories and the relocation of the US embassy to Jerusalem, more than 120 protestors have been killed including children, journalists and health personnel. In addition, more than 12 000 Palestinians have been wounded.  On May 14, the deadliest day of the protests, more than 61 Palestinians including 8 children were shot and killed by Israeli forces and nearly 3 000 were wounded in Gaza. 

  Despite the decision by the UN Human Rights Council on 18 May 2018 to dispatch an independent commission of inquiry to investigate violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, Israeli forces are continuing to use unnecessary, indiscriminate and disproportionate force against protesters. This includes exploding bullets, which are designed to inflict maximum damage, in a calculated attempt to kill, maim and inflict serious bodily harm on Palestinian protesters. Palestinian civil society representatives are being prevented from travelling abroad including to UN bodies to expose the atrocities being committed by Israeli forces.

  Said Mandeep Tiwana, CIVICUS’ Chief Programmes Officer: “We all bear responsibility for not doing enough to demand an end to the atrocities committed by Israeli security forces.”

  “Silence from some states and overt support for Israeli forces’ actions by others is emboldening them to act with impunity and cause massive suffering to the Palestinian community,” said Tiwana.

  As Israeli authorities wilfully ignore calls from the international community to exercise restraint against Palestinian protestors, CIVICUS urges civil society around the world to urge their governments to speak out against continuing attacks on Palestinian protesters, demand an end to impunity by Israeli forces and support the commission of inquiry mandated by the UN Human Rights Council to investigate violations in the context of the large scale civilian protests in the occupied Palestinian territory.

  ENDS.

  For more information, contact:

  Grant Clark
  
  

• TURKEY: ‘For the embattled LGBTQI+ movement, simply persisting in taking to the streets is an achievement’

  CIVICUS speaks about 2023 Pride and the civil society response to the Turkish government’s anti-LGBTQI+ campaign with Damla Umut Uzun, international relations and fundraising officer atKaos Gay and Lesbian Cultural Research and Solidarity Association (Kaos GL).

  Founded in 1994, Kaos GL is one of the oldest and largest LGBTQI+ organisations in Turkey, dedicated to creating visibility and understanding and promoting LGBTQI+ human rights.

  How have Turkish authorities reacted to Prideevents?

  Since 2015, Pride events have been increasingly banned by city governors. The first ban was introduced in Istanbul, which in 2014 had the largest Pride gathering, with at least 50,000 participants. But despite the growing number of bans, the number of Pride events across the country has also consistently increased.

  This year in Istanbul, several Pride events were banned by district governor offices, resulting in detentions, police brutality and restrictions on journalists. A Pride movie event organised by the University Feminist Collective in Şişli was banned for ‘potentially causing societal resentment’ and ‘threatening social peace’. The screening of the film ‘Pride’, scheduled by the cinema collective, and a tea gathering event organised by the LambdaIstanbul LGBTQI+ Solidarity Association were banned in Kadıköy district. The police detained and later released at least eight people who came to watch the film, using physical violence. The LGBTQI+ group Queer Baykuş of Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University had their posters violently confiscated by the university’s security units before a planned press release. On 18 June, during the Trans Pride Parade in Beyoğlu district, the police handcuffed and detained 10 people, including a child, and released them later that day after taking police statements. Journalists were prevented from taking pictures during the intervention.

  The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey compiled a detailed report of rights violations in the context of 2023 Pride events between 2 June and 10 July 2023. Various Pride celebrations, including parades, picnics and press statements, were banned by multiple governorships and disrupted due to targeted threats and societal reactions in Adana, Ankara, Antalya, Eskişehir, Izmir, Kocaeli and Muğla. A total of 241 people, including four minors and seven lawyers, were detained on the grounds of Article 2,911 of the law on gatherings and demonstrations. The main reasons cited by authorities were non-compliance with regulations, disruption of public order and violation of ban decisions. Although most detainees were typically released on the same day, they might face prosecution and lawsuits months later.

  Police interventions during Pride events are a reflection of the government’s hostility towards LGBTQI+ people. They are waging a kind of war against us. The recurring violence is fuelled by a sense of impunity: the fact that law enforcement officials face no consequences for harming, insulting or harassing LGBTQI+ people further emboldens them.

  Why is the Turkish government hostile towards LGBTQI+ people?

  Oppression of the LGBTQI+ community in Turkey is not new: the government’s crackdown first intensified following the 2016 attempted coup. But the main reason behind the increasing hatred is the attempt of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to mobilise conservative segments of society. To mask the effects of its corrupt rule and economic mismanagement, the government is employing populist rhetoric and polarisation tactics, seeking to designate an enemy to blame.

  Repression hasn’t been limited to LGBTQI+ people but rather targeted at any opposition or independent views. Dissenting voices, including those of Kurdish people, feminists and human rights defenders, are labelled as ‘terrorists’.

  Among these groups, LGBTQI+ people are a particularly easy target due to societal conservatism and religious tendencies. Censorship and rights violations of LGBTQI+ people affect all aspects of life, including access to goods and services, education, healthcare and housing and media representation. In line with the global anti-gender trend, the government has employed a rhetoric focused on ‘protecting the sacred Turkish family structure against perversion’, using LGBTQI+ people and feminists as scapegoats.

  What role did anti-LGBTQI+ rhetoric play in the2023 presidential elections?

  Anti-LGBTQI+ rhetoric played a significant role in the election campaigns of the AKP government and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, aimed at mobilising conservative voters, including those on the left side of the political spectrum. Former Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu openly mobilised hate speech against LGBTQI+ people at public events. President Erdoğan used similar rhetoric, accusing the opposition of being ‘pro-LGBTQI+’.

  Unfortunately, two radical Islamist parties, Hüdapar and New Welfare, have entered parliament, and their primary election promise was to close down LGBTQI+ organisations. They are now working actively towards this goal, and we anticipate that such rhetoric and efforts will intensify in the run-up to local elections in a few months.

  How are LGBTQI+ organisations, including Kaos GL,responding to these attacks?

  Despite facing oppressive conditions and lack of opportunities, the LGBTQI+ movement in Turkey remains resilient and strong. Alongside feminists, we are the only groups that continue to take to the streets and demonstrate for our rights, showing immense bravery in the face of police violence and detention. Simply persisting in organising demonstrations is an achievement in itself.

  In addition to street activism, Turkish LGBTQI+ organisations are actively engaged in advocacy, the promotion of visibility and capacity building. We recognise that we won’t be able to change policies at the national level due to the AKP’s absolute majority, so we focus our efforts on grassroots societal transformation. We educate professionals who encounter LGBTQI+ people in their daily work, such as doctors, nurses, teachers, lawyers and social and municipal workers, to increase their understanding and capacity to work with LGBTQI+ people and respond to their needs in the respectful manner.

  We document human rights violations and hate crimes, providing a factual basis for our advocacy campaigns. We also report on the situation of LGBTQI+ employees in the public and private sectors. Other organisations focus on reporting the challenges faced by LGBTQI+ students, people living with HIV, elderly people and refugees.

  We also organise cultural events, including queer film festivals such as Pink Life Queer Fest and exhibitions and art programmes like the Ankara Queer Art Programme and the Women-to-Women storytelling contests, aimed at fostering expression and community engagement.

  What obstacles do you encounter in your work, and what supportdo you need?

  Since the attempted coup, the government has intensified its crackdown on civil society organisations (CSOs), subjecting them to frequent state audits to identify alleged mistakes, impose fines or even shut them down. Laws such as the Law on the Prevention of the Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction have made it increasingly difficult for CSOs to receive funds, further hindering their work.

  Turkish LGBTQI+ organisations maintain close contact with European human rights organisations, Council of Europe representatives, the European Union (EU) delegation and United Nations mechanisms. We regularly update them about the developments and shrinking human rights space in Turkey, and in turn, they issue statements expressing deep concern about the government’s actions. However, these efforts have proven ineffective as the AKP government demonstrates a complete lack of regard and even fails to implement decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.

  Turkish LGBTQI+ organisations have generally benefitted from EU funding, but this has started to decrease. It appears that the EU has somewhat given up on Turkey, since the government is making no effort to improve human rights standards. Additionally, the fact that Turkey is keeping millions of refugees out of Europe has limited the EU’s consistency in supporting human rights in Turkey.

  As LGBTQI+ individuals living in Turkey, we are constantly pressured to hide our identities, pushed to the margins of society and silenced. But as LGBTQI+ organisations we continue to fight for our rights and freedoms. To advance our cause, we need more systematic financial resources, increased collaboration with international organisations, more vocal campaigns and international pressure on the Turkish government.

  ---

  Civic space in Turkey is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Kaos GL through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@KaosGL on Twitter.