United Nations
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Myanmar: Independent investigation needs access and international community must ensure accountability
Statement at the 45th Session of the UN Human Rights Council
Interactive Dialogue with the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar
Thank you, Madame President,
We thank the Independent Investigative Mechanism for its second report.
We particularly welcome efforts articulated towards outreach and engagement with local and regional civil society.
We are alarmed by the continuing lack of access granted to Myanmar to the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), which has been exacerbated owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. For the mechanism to fulfil its mandate, it is crucial that it has access to information including to relevant evidence of serious international crimes and witnesses. Ongoing failure to ensure unfettered access to journalists, humanitarian actors and human rights monitors to Rakhine state also puts this in jeopardy. We call on the government to grant access to the Mechanism and other actors as a matter of urgency. We further call on Facebook to uphold its commitment to cooperate by providing all relevant evidence it holds, noting that to date it has only partially complied with such requests.
Myanmar’s future depends on a clear demonstration from the international community that any international crimes will not be tolerated. It also depends on those in Myanmar who speak out on violations and advocate for positive change being listened to, rather than persecuted. We call on the Myanmar government to do so.
Pursuing criminal accountability is a long process and requires long-term sustainability. We call on the Council to ensure that the Mechanism can enjoy such sustainability by ensuring it adequate resources. We further call on the international community to recognize that the vital work of the Mechanism is only one stage of this process, and to take steps to ensure progress towards accountability is made: including by referring Myanmar to the International Criminal Court or an independent tribunal, and exercising universal jurisdiction to hold the perpetrators accountable.
Failing to do so would be a grave abdication of responsibility to the victims of grave human rights violations, their families and communities, who have deserved accountability and justice for so long.
We ask the Mechanism what steps it is taking to systematize engagement with civil society, and what steps it is taking to ensure sustainability in the event of budget restrictions?
Thank you.
Civic space in Myanmar is rated as Repressed by the CIVICUS Monitor.
Current council members:
Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Eritrea, Fiji, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Libya, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Slovakia, Somalia, Sudan, Spain, Togo, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela
Civic space ratings from the CIVICUS Monitor
OPEN NARROWED OBSTRUCTED REPRESSED CLOSED -
Myanmar: Restrictions on civil society hamper humanitarian action
Statement at the 53rd Session of the UN Human Rights Council
Interactive Dialogue on written update of the High Commissioner on Myanmar
Delivered by Kyaw Win
Thank you Mr. President,
CIVICUS and the Burma Human Rights Network thank the High Commissioner for his report on the human rights impact of the denial of humanitarian access in Myanmar.
Since the coup, more than a million people, especially from ethnic and religious minority communities, have been displaced by the military junta’s indiscriminate airstrikes and systematic atrocities. During the past two years when humanitarian needs have been acute, the junta has routinely and deliberately blocked, confiscated, and destroyed lifesaving aid to prevent it from reaching people in need. Further, the junta’s amendments to the 2014 NGO registration law formalised further restrictions on civil society and humanitarian actions including banking, procurement of aid items and movement of aid workers.
Compounding these issues, on 14 May, Cyclone Mocha devastated communities in Chin, Rakhine, Kachin states and Magway and Sagaing Regions, impacting over 1.6 million people. The most severely hit areas were Rathedaung and Sittwe townships in Rakhine State. In the wake of the cyclone, the junta issued a notice blocking humanitarian organisations from delivering deliver life-saving aid to impacted communities in Rakhine State where 130,000 Rohingya remain trapped under apartheid like conditions. The cyclone has provided the junta with an opportunity to continue its genocidal campaign against the Rohingya.
Despite these restrictions, civil society groups, diaspora communities, Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations and the National Unity Government have been at the forefront to effectively provide emergency aid risking death, arrest, torture, and harassment. They must be supported to continue to do so.
BHRN and CIVICUS call on the Council and the UN to take steps to protect humanitarian groups and provide flexible direct funding to them to support their ability to assist the population-in-need.
We thank you.
Civic space in Myanmar is rated as "closed" by the CIVICUS Monitor
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New paper on the restrictions facing climate change activists
- Environmental activism is dangerous and too often deadly, and may worsen as the growing climate crisis fuels divides over access to natural resources
- Millions of people have marched this year calling for an end to climate injustice yet around the world just 4 percent of the world’s population live in countries where governments are properly respecting the freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression according to the CIVICUS Monitor.
- The annual United Nations climate change negotiations (COP), to be held in Madrid from 2 to 13 December was meant to be the ‘People’s COP’ but was unable to find a home in Latin America, which remains the most dangerous region in the world to be an environmental defender
Millions of people have taken to the streets in 2019 calling for an end to climate injustice but on the frontlines of the crisis and at the United Nations brave activists continue to be deliberately silenced.
This new position paper ‘We will not be silenced: Climate activism from the frontlines to the UN’ details how people who speak out for climate justice are threatened and intimidated with violence, repressive laws, frivolous lawsuits and disinformation campaigns. Instead of responding to the demands of the climate movement for a more ambitious and just response to the climate crisis, governments are choosing to smother their voices.
In October, when Chilean civil society called for the government to withdraw the military from the streets before hosting COP 25 the Piñera government instead responded by withdrawing overnight from hosting the pivotal meeting. Chile’s withdrawal reflects a worrying trend after Brazil earlier pulled out from hosting COP 25 and Poland, the host of COP 24, imposed restrictions on public mobilisations and limited the participation of accredited civil society.
Civil society scrutiny and contributions to UN climate talks are vital in a year when millions of people have marched in the streets demanding an end to climate inaction. Recent developments in UN climate talks - including the erasure of the landmark IPCC 1.5 degree report from negotiations - under pressure from states including Saudi Arabia - show the vital need for the COP 25 to be the first true ‘People’s COP’ - reversing the trends in closing space for civil society from the local to the global level.
For more information and interview requests please contact:
Lyndal Rowlands (English)
Natalia Gomez Peña (English, Spanish) -
New UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of assembly and association
The Civic Space Initiative welcomes Mr. Nyaletsossi Clément Voule as the new UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of assembly and association, and congratulates him on his appointment. The Civic Space Initiative (CSI) is a collaborative project of ARTICLE 19, CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, the European Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ECNL), the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), and the World Movement for Democracy.
Since its creation in September 2010, the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur has been critical in providing practical guidance to States on how they should implement their human rights obligations as they relate to association and assembly, and has consistently stood up for those whose rights were violated. The CSI expresses its appreciation to the two previous mandate holders, Mr. Maina Kiai and Dr. Annalisa Ciampi.
Mr. Voule takes on this mandate at a time where the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association are under increasing pressure globally and the gap between states’ international commitments and national realities is growing ever wider. The Civic Space Initiative regards the mandate of UN Special Rapporteur as critical in bridging that gap. Mr. Voule will build on 20 years of experience in addressing this challenge, including coordinating the recent African Commission on Human and People's Rights Study Group on the laws governing freedom of association and assembly in the region, which produced guidelines to assist states in the implementation of these rights.
Having supported similar initiatives on a global, regional and country level since 2012, the Civic Space Initiative aims to influence policy actors to protect civic space; empower civil society actors to advance civic space freedoms; and increase the awareness and engagement of the public in supporting civic space. The CSI stands ready to support Mr. Voule in his capacity as Special Rapporteur, and urges all States to respect the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association and be responsive to the mandate.
For more information, please contact:
Andrew Smith, ARTICLE 19 (andrewATarticle19.org)
Susan Wilding, CIVICUS (susan.wildingATcivicus.org)
Vanja Skoric, ECNL (vanjaATecnl.org)
Nicholas Miller, ICNL (nmillerATicnl.org)
Troy Johnson, World Movement for Democracy (troyJATned.org) -
Nicaragua: Carta a los gobiernos solicitando una mayor vigilancia de los derechos humanos
El Consejo de Derechos Humanos de la ONU debe garantizar la continuidad y el fortalecimiento del monitoreo de la situación de los derechos humanos en Nicaragua
Nosotras, las organizaciones de derechos humanos abajo firmantes, pedimos al Consejo de Derechos Humanos (CDH) que durante el 43º periodo de sesiones adopte una resolución por la que renueve y refuerce el mandato de la Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos (OACNUDH) para hacer un seguimiento de la situación de los derechos humanos en Nicaragua e informar al respecto, tal como solicitó específicamente la alta comisionada de las Naciones Unidas para los derechos humanos. Instamos a su delegación a apoyar activamente la adopción de dicha resolución.
A pesar de los esfuerzos regionales y de la ONU por abordar la crisis, la situación sobre el terreno en Nicaragua sigue siendo crítica. Desde que, a finales de 2018, expulsó al personal de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos y de la OACNUDH, el gobierno se ha negado a permitir que observadores internacionales de derechos humanos accedan al país. La represión ejercida por el gobierno contra las organizaciones de derechos humanos, las organizaciones de mujeres y feministas, los líderes y lideresas comunitarios y los periodistas que documentan abusos desde las protestas de 2018 continúa limitando el espacio de la sociedad civil de forma dramática. El gobierno sigue inmerso en lo que la OACNUDH describe como “la prohibición sistemática de las manifestaciones”, por medios que incluyen el acoso y la intimidación, en noviembre de 2019, contra personas que habían iniciado una huelga de hambre para pedir la liberación de sus familiares. Según los grupos de derechos humanos locales, 61 personas críticas con el gobierno se encuentran encarceladas arbitrariamente, mientras que la impunidad por crímenes de derecho internacional y violaciones graves de derechos humanos cometidas por la policía y por grupos parapoliciales sigue siendo la norma.
La presentación continua de informes por parte de la OACNUDH sigue siendo fundamental para garantizar que los graves abusos y violaciones de derechos humanos cometidos durante las protestas de 2018 —que incluyeron asesinato, tortura, violación y otros actos de violencia sexual—, y otros cometidos desde entonces, no quedan impunes. Al mismo tiempo, el monitoreo por parte de la OACNUDH es crucial para frenar posibles violaciones de derechos humanos, incluidas las que se puedan cometer en relación con las elecciones presidenciales de 2021.
Habida cuenta de las graves violaciones de derechos humanos y la falta de disposición de las autoridades a cooperar y trabajar con los mecanismos regionales e internacionales, la situación sigue cumpliendo los “criterios objetivos para la acción del Consejo” (véase en el anexo nuestra perspectiva general a este respecto) elaborados en una declaración conjunta encabezada por Irlanda en el 32º periodo de sesiones para ayudar a identificar situaciones que requieren la atención del CDH, y reafirmados por declaraciones conjuntas encabezadas por Países Bajos en el 35º periodo de sesiones, Australia en el 37º periodo de sesiones, Fiyi en el 40º periodo de sesiones, y las Islas Marshall durante la sesión actual del Consejo.
En este contexto, es fundamental que el CDH adopte una resolución para responder con firmeza a las conclusiones del informe presentado por la alta comisionada en septiembre de 2019 (A/HRC/42/18) y siga su recomendación de que el CDH pida a la OACNUDH que “fortalezca el monitoreo, la documentación, el análisis y los informes públicos sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en Nicaragua”. Confiamos en que su delegación apoyará activamente una iniciativa como ésta.
Sírvase aceptar, Excelencia, nuestra consideración más distinguida.
Amnistía Internacional
Articulación de Movimientos Sociales y OSC de Nicaragua (AMS)
Asociadas por lo Justo (JASS)
Centro Nicaragüense de Derechos Humanos (CENIDH)
Centro por la Justicia y el Derecho Internacional (CEJIL)
CIVICUS: Alianza Mundial por la Participación Ciudadana
Federación Internacional de los Derechos Humanos (FIDH)
FAN - Feministas Autoconvocadas de Nicaragua
Fondo de Acción Urgente de América Latina y el Caribe (FAU-AL)
Front Line Defenders
Fundación Popol Na
Fundación del Río
Human Rights Watch
Iniciativa Mesoamericana de Mujeres Defensoras de los Derechos Humanos (IM-Defensoras)
Iniciativa Nicaragüense de Defensoras de Derechos Humanos (INDDH)
Instituto sobre Raza, Igualdad y Derechos Humanos (Raza e Igualdad)
Movimiento Autónomo de Mujeres (MAM)
Oficina en Washington para Asuntos Latinoamericanos (WOLA)
Oxfam
Plataforma Internacional Contra la Impunidad
Punto Focal de la Campaña 28 de Setiembre por la Despenalización del Aborto en América Latina y el Caribe
Red de Salud de las Mujeres Latinoamericanas y del Caribe - Enlace Nacional Nicaragua
Red Local
Servicio Internacional para los Derechos Humanos (ISHR)
Unión de Presas y Presos Políticos Nicaragüenses (UPPN)
Anexo: Evaluación de la situación en Nicaragua frente a los criterios objetivos para la acción del Consejo de Derechos Humanos
Durante el 32º periodo de sesiones (CDH32) del Consejo de Derechos Humanos de la ONU, celebrado en junio de 2016, Irlanda pronunció una declaración en nombre de un grupo interregional de Estados (basándose en una declaración conjunta previa pronunciada por Maldivas) que proponía unos criterios objetivos (o “principios rectores”) para “ayudar [al Consejo de Derechos Humanos] a decidir, de forma objetiva y no selectiva, cuándo debe trabajar de forma útil con un Estado concreto para prevenir, responder o abordar violaciones de derechos humanos y ayudar a reducir una situación preocupante”. La aplicación de estos criterios objetivos se ha reafirmado desde entonces en declaraciones conjuntas interregionales pronunciadas por Países Bajos en el 35º periodo de sesiones del Consejo en nombre de 49 Estados, en una declaración conjunta pronunciada por Australia en nombre de 11 miembros entrantes del Consejo de todos los grupos regionales en el 37º periodo de sesiones y en declaraciones similares presentadas por Fiyi en nombre de 10 miembros entrantes en el 40º periodo de sesiones, y por las Islas Marshall en nombre de nueve miembros entrantes en el 43º período de sesiones.
El análisis llevado a cabo por nuestras organizaciones, detallado más abajo, muestra que todos los criterios identificados en la declaración conjunta se han cumplido parcial o totalmente en el caso de Nicaragua.
¿Llamamiento a la acción por parte del secretario general de la ONU, el Alto Comisionado u otro órgano, organismo o agencia pertinente de la ONU?
En el informe presentado al Consejo de Derechos Humanos en septiembre de 2019, la alta comisionada de las Naciones Unidas para los derechos humanos expresó motivos de honda preocupación y pidió explícitamente al CDH que renovara y reforzara el mandato de seguimiento y presentación de informes de su oficina.¿Recomendaciones para la acción por parte de un grupo de procedimientos especiales?
Desde que comenzó la crisis, los procedimientos especiales han planteado pública y reiteradamente sus motivos de preocupación mediante declaraciones conjuntas y acciones urgentes, entre ellas:- Declaración conjunta: Nicaragua: debe poner fin a las represalias contra los periodistas, dicen expertos en derechos humanos, 26 de agosto de 2019.
- Declaración conjunta: Nicaragua debe poner fin a la represión de los derechos humanos - Expertos de la ONU, 22 de noviembre de 2018.
- Declaración conjunta: Nicaragua debe poner fin a la “caza de brujas” contra las voces disidentes, dicen expertos de la ONU, 9 de agosto de 2018.
- Declaración conjunta: Nicaragua: Government must end violence and reinstate political dialogue, say UN, 14 de junio de 2018.
- Declaración conjunta: Nicaragua: Experts say appalled by Government’s violent response to peaceful protests, 27 April 2018.
¿Tiene el Estado en cuestión una INDH de “clase A”? De ser así, ¿ha llamado esa institución la atención de la comunidad internacional hacia una situación emergente y ha pedido que se emprendan acciones?
La INDH de Nicaragua fue degradada a clase B tras una recomendación del el Subcomité de Acreditación de la Alianza Global de las Instituciones Nacionales de Derechos Humanos (GANHRI), por no estar “preparada para pronunciarse con la contundencia adecuada […] en respuesta a denuncias creíbles de graves violaciones de los derechos humanos”.¿Se ha mostrado el Estado en cuestión dispuesto a reconocer que se enfrenta a desafíos especiales en materia de derechos humanos y ha tomado un conjunto de medidas creíbles, incluidos un calendario y unos parámetros de referencia, para responder a la situación? ¿Está el Estado en cuestión colaborando de manera significativa y constructiva con el Consejo sobre la situación?
El informe presentado por la OACNUDH al CDH en septiembre de 2019 señalaba la constante negación por parte de las autoridades de la responsabilidad de los graves abusos y violaciones de derechos humanos, y decía que las autoridades “han culpado a los líderes sociales y de la oposición, a los defensores de los derechos humanos y a los manifestantes de lo que llaman la ‘violencia golpista’ y su repercusión negativa en la economía del país”.La constante negativa del gobierno aceptar la crisis de derechos humanos o a dialogar y cooperar para abordarla quedó claramente en evidencia cuando las autoridades declararon que las conclusiones y recomendaciones del informe de la OACNUDH tenían como intención continuar una campaña difamatoria contra el gobierno y facilitar “condenas políticas y medidas contra el pueblo nicaragüense”.
¿Está el Estado en cuestión cooperando de forma efectiva con los procedimientos especiales del CDH, lo que incluye dar permiso para visitar el país?
Nicaragua no ha permitido el acceso al país a los procedimientos especiales desde una visita realizada por el relator especial sobre el derecho a la alimentación en 2009. Seis procedimientos especiales han solicitado acceso desde 2016, entre ellos el Grupo de Trabajo sobre la Detención Arbitraria y el relator especial sobre el derecho a la libertad de reunión pacífica, pero no han podido llevar a cabo visitas. Nicaragua tampoco ha respondido a la gran mayoría de las comunicaciones enviadas por los procedimientos especiales.¿Colabora el Estado en cuestión con la OACNUDH, incluso en el área de la asistencia técnica, y colabora de forma efectiva con los órganos de tratados de derechos humanos de la ONU?
En agosto de 2018, el equipo de la OACNUDH sobre el terreno fue expulsado de Nicaragua, al día siguiente de publicar un informe sobre los patrones de abusos y violaciones de derechos humanos cometidos en el país. En 2020, a la OACNUDH seguía prohibiéndosele hacer un seguimiento de la situación de los derechos humanos sobre el terreno. Por tanto, la Oficina Regional de la OACNUDH para Centroamérica tuvo que continuar realizando a distancia su seguimiento de la situación de los derechos humanos.Nicaragua aún no ha cumplido con su obligación de presentar informes a la mayoría de los órganos de tratados (Comité de Derechos Humanos, 6 años de retraso, Comité contra la Tortura, 5 años, Comité para la Eliminación de la Discriminación contra la Mujer, 8 años, Comité para la Eliminación de la Discriminación Racial, 7 años, Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, 5 años, Comité de los Derechos del Niño, 3 años).
¿Algún mecanismo o institución regional pertinente ha identificado que la situación requiere la atención de la comunidad internacional? ¿Está el Estado en cuestión cooperando con las organizaciones regionales pertinentes?
En 2018, la CIDH, en acuerdo con el gobierno nicaragüense, estableció formalmente dos mecanismos para monitorear e investigar la situación de los derechos humanos: el Mecanismo Especial de Seguimiento para Nicaragua (MESENI) y el GIEI. En diciembre de 2018, Nicaragua expulsó del país tanto al MESENI como al GIEI, un día antes de la fecha prevista para la publicación del informe del GIEI. Tras su expulsión del país, el GIEI publicó su informe, en el que concluía que los abusos cometidos en el país, que incluían asesinato, detenciones arbitrarias y persecución, constituían crímenes de lesa humanidad. Tras una resolución adoptada en junio de 2019 por la Asamblea General de la Organización de los Estados Americanos (OEA), el Consejo Permanente nombró, en agosto de 2019, una comisión para abordar la crisis política y social en Nicaragua. En septiembre de 2019, el gobierno negó a la Comisión sobre Nicaragua el acceso al país. A pesar de la negativa del gobierno nicaragüense a reunirse con la Comisión, ésta pudo emitir su informe, en cumplimiento de su mandato. Tras recibir numerosos testimonios que informaban de acoso e intimidación constantes sufridos por las personas a las que se consideraba contrarias al gobierno, e informaban también de detenciones arbitrarias, trato inhumano y restricciones al ejercicio de los derechos políticos y la libertad de expresión, la Comisión concluyó que “Nicaragua vive una crítica situación en materia de derechos humanos que requiere la urgente atención de la comunidad interamericana e internacional en su conjunto”.¿Está el Estado en cuestión facilitando u obstaculizando el acceso y el trabajo por parte de actores humanitarios, defensores y defensoras de los derechos humanos, y medios de comunicación?
Nuestras organizaciones han documentado los reiterados actos de censura, ataques y amenazas contra los medios de comunicación, periodistas y defensores y defensoras de los derechos humanos y sus familias por parte de la policía y grupos armados parapoliciales durante las protestas. El gobierno ha hecho redadas en las oficinas de medios de comunicación independientes, ha presentado cargos penales contra periodistas, ha cancelado la inscripción legal en registro de nueve organizaciones de la sociedad civil, y ha expulsado del país a periodistas extranjeros y a observadores internacionales de derechos humanos.Estas preocupaciones han sido expresadas por los mecanismos regionales e internacionales. El 26 de agosto de 2019, un grupo de procedimientos especiales emitió una declaración en la que pedía a Nicaragua que cesara las represalias contra periodistas, como seguimiento de una declaración anterior emitida en noviembre de 2018 en la que instaba “al gobierno de Nicaragua que ponga fin de inmediato a la represión y las represalias contra quienes se muestran en contra de las acciones del Gobierno y cooperan con la ONU, incluidos los defensores y defensoras de derechos humanos, periodistas y manifestantes pacíficos”. En noviembre de 2019, en una declaración de prensa, la OACNUDH pidió al gobierno que pusiera fin “a la represión persistente de la disidencia y al actual patrón de detenciones arbitrarias, y se abstenga de criminalizar y atacar a los defensores y defensoras de los derechos humanos, los opositores políticos y otras voces disidentes”.
La Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) ha expresado su preocupación por la “nueva etapa de la represión en Nicaragua tendiente a silenciar, intimidar y criminalizar a las voces opositoras al Gobierno, a los organismos de derechos humanos y a los medios de comunicación independientes en el país”. En diciembre de 2019, la CIDH dictó medidas cautelares en favor de 17 defensoras de los derechos humanos que habían sufrido acoso, intimidación, amenazas de muerte y ataques en este contexto. La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos también ha tenido que dictar medidas provisionales para proteger a miembros de dos ONG locales, a causa de los graves riesgos para sus vidas y su integridad física.
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Nicaragua: Letter to UN Member States calling for increased human rights monitoring
Joint Letter at the 43rd Session of the UN Human Rights Council: UN Human Rights Council should ensure enhanced monitoring of the human rights situation in Nicaragua
We, the undersigned human rights organizations, call on the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) to adopt a resolution during the 43rd session, renewing and further strengthening the mandate of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to monitor and report on the human rights situation in Nicaragua, as specifically requested by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. We urge your delegation to actively support the adoption of such a resolution.
Despite UN and regional efforts to address the crisis, the situation in Nicaragua remains dire. The government has refused to allow international human rights monitors to access the country since it expelled staff members of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and OHCHR in late 2018. The government’s crackdown against human rights organizations, women's organizations and feminist organizations, community leaders, and journalists documenting abuses since the 2018 protests continues to dramatically limit space for civil society internally. The government continues to engage in what the OHCHR described as a “systematic prohibition of protests” – including by harassing and intimidating, in November 2019, people who had begun a hunger striking to demand the release of their relatives. Sixty-one government critics are arbitrarily imprisoned, according to local human rights groups, while impunity for crimes under international law and serious human rights violations by police and pro-government groups is still the rule.
Continued reporting by the OHCHR remains critical to ensure that grave violations committed during the 2018 protests – including murder, torture, rape and other acts of sexual violence – as well as others committed since then do not go unpunished. At the same time, OHCHR monitoring is crucial to curb potential rights violations, including in connection to the 2021 presidential elections.
Given the continued serious violations and the unwillingness of the authorities to cooperate and engage with regional and international mechanisms, the situation continues to meet the “objective criteria for HRC action” (see our overview in this regard in annex), elaborated to help identify situations requiring the HRC’s attention in a joint statement led by Ireland at the 32nd session, and further reaffirmed by joint statements led by the Netherlands at the 35th session, Australia at the 37th session, Fiji at the 40th session of the Council, and the Marshall Islands during the current session of the Council.
In this context, it is essential that the HRC adopts a resolution that responds robustly to the findings of the report presented by the High Commissioner in September 2019 (A/HRC/42/18) and follows her recommendation that the HRC request the OHCHR to “enhance its monitoring, documentation, analysis, and public reporting on the human rights situation in Nicaragua.” We urge your delegation to actively support this initiative.
Please accept, Excellency, the assurance of our highest consideration,
Amnesty International
Articulación de Movimientos Sociales y OSC de Nicaragua (AMS)
Centro por la Justicia y el Derecho Internacional (CEJIL)
Centro Nicaragüense de Derechos Humanos (CENIDH)
CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
Fédération Internationale pour les Droits Humains (FIDH)
FAN - Feministas Autoconvocadas de Nicaragua
Fondo de Acción Urgente de América Latina y el Caribe (FAU-AL)
Front Line Defenders
Fundación Popol Na
Fundación del Río
Human Rights Watch
Iniciativa Mesoamericana de Mujeres Defensoras de Derechos Humanos (IM Defensoras)
Iniciativa Nicaragüense de Defensoras de Derechos Humanos (INDDH)
International Service for Human Rights (ISHR)
Just Associates (JASS)
Movimiento Autónomo de Mujeres (MAM)
Oxfam
Plataforma Internacional Contra la Impunidad
Punto Focal de la Campaña 28 de Setiembre por la Despenalización del Aborto en América Latina y el Caribe
Red de Salud de las Mujeres Latinoamericanas y del Caribe - Enlace Nacional Nicaragua
Red Local
The International Institute on Race, Equality and Human Rights
Unión de Presas y Presos Políticos Nicaragüenses (UPPN)
Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)
Annex: Assessment of nicaragua agaisnt the Objective criteria for HRC action
During the thirty-second session (HRC32) of the UN Human Rights Council in June 2016, Ireland delivered a statement on behalf of a cross-regional group of States (building upon a previous joint statement by the Maldives) proposing objective criteria – or “guiding principles” – to “help [the Human Rights Council] decide, in an objective and non-selective manner, when the Council should usefully engage with a concerned State, to prevent, respond to, or address violations and to assist in de-escalation of a situation of concern.” Application of these objective criteria has been further reaffirmed in cross-regional joint statements delivered by the Netherlands at the 35th session of the Council on behalf of 49 States, a joint statement delivered by Australia on behalf of 11 incoming members of the Council from all regional groups at the 37th session, and similar joint statements delivered by Fiji on behalf of 10 incoming members at the 40th session; and by the Marshall Islands on behalf of nine incoming members at the 43rd session.
Analysis by our organisations, set out below, shows that all of the criteria identified in the joint statement have been partially or fully met in the case of Nicaragua.
Call for action by the UN SG, HC or another relevant UN organ, body or agency?
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed deep concerns and explicitly called on the HRC to renew and strengthen her Office’s monitoring and reporting mandate in the report presented to the HRC in September 2019.Recommendation for action by a group of Special Procedures?
Since the beginning of the crisis Special Procedures have consistently raised their concerns publicly through joint statements, as well as Urgent Actions, including:- Joint statement: Nicaragua must stop reprisals against journalists, say human rights experts, 26 August 2019.
- Joint statement: Nicaragua must stop repression of human rights – UN experts, 22 November 2018.
- Joint statement: Nicaragua must end "witch-hunt" against dissenting voices, say UN experts, 9 August 2018.
- Joint statement: Nicaragua: Government must end violence and reinstate political dialogue, say UN, 14 June 2018.
- Joint statement: Nicaragua: Experts say appalled by Government’s violent response to peaceful protests, 27 April 2018.
Does the State concerned have an “A status” NHRI? If so, has that institution drawn the attention of the international community to an emerging situation and called for action?
Nicaragua’s NHRI has been downgraded to B status following a recommendation by the Sub-Committee on Accreditation of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI), based on its failure “to adequately speak out […] in response to credible allegations of serious human rights violations.”Has the State concerned been willing to recognise that it faces particular human rights challenges and laid down a set of credible actions, including a time-table and benchmarks to measure progress, to respond to the situation? Is the State concerned engaging in a meaningful, constructive way with the Council on the situation?
The OHCHR report to the HRC in September 2019 noted the authorities’ continued denial of responsibility for the serious violations and abuses, reporting that they “have instead blamed social and opposition leaders, human rights defenders and demonstrators for what they call the ‘coup-related violence’ and the negative impact on the country’s economy.”The government’s continued refusal to accept, or engage in dialogue and cooperation to address, the human rights crisis was clearly evidenced in their claims that the report, conclusions and recommendations of the OHCHR were intended to continue a smear campaign against the government and to facilitate “political convictions and action against the Nicaraguan people.”
Is the State concerned effectively cooperating with HRC Special Procedures, including by allowing country visits?
Nicaragua has not allowed access to the Special Procedures since a visit by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food in 2009. Six Special Procedure mandates have requested access since 2016, including the Working Group on arbitrary detention and the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly, but have been unable to carry out visits. Nicaragua has also failed to respond to the vast majority of communications sent by the Special Procedures.Is the State concerned engaging with OHCHR, including in the field of technical assistance and effective engagement with the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies?
In August 2018, the OHCHR team on the ground was expelled from Nicaragua the day after they published a report on the patterns of human rights violations and abuses committed in the country. In 2020, the OHCHR continues to be barred from monitoring the human rights situation from the ground. The OHCHR Regional Office for Central America has therefore had to continue their monitoring of the human rights situation remotely.
Nicaragua is overdue with its reporting obligations to the majority of the treaty bodies (CCPR 6 years, CAT 5 years, CEDAW 8 years, CERD 7 years, CESCR 5 years, CRC 3 years).Has a relevant regional mechanism or institution identified the situation as requiring the attention of the international community? Is the State concerned cooperating with relevant regional organisations?
In 2018, the IACHR formally established two mechanisms to monitor and investigate the human rights situation in agreement with the Nicaraguan government: The Special Monitoring Mechanism for Nicaragua (MESENI) and the GIEI. In December 2018, Nicaragua expelled both the MESENI and GIEI from Nicaragua, a day before GIEI´s report was due to be released. Following their expulsion from the country GIEI released their report concluding that abuses in the country, including murder, arbitrary detentions, and persecution, amounted to crimes against humanity. Following a resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) in June 2019, the Permanent Council appointed, in August 2019, a Commission to address the political and social crisis in Nicaragua. In September 2019, the government denied the Commission on Nicaragua access to the country. Despite the refusal of the government of Nicaragua to meet the Commission, the Commission was able to submit a report as mandated. After receiving numerous testimonies that reported ongoing harassment and intimidation suffered by those perceived as government opponents, arbitrary detentions, inhuman treatment and restrictions to the exercise of political rights and freedom of expression; the Commission concluded that “Nicaragua is experiencing a critical human rights situation that urgently demands the attention of the Inter-American community and the world at large.”Is the State concerned facilitating or obstructing access and work on the part of humanitarian actors, human rights defenders and the media?
Our organisations have documented the repeated censorship, attacks and threats against the media, journalists, and human rights defenders and their families by police and pro-government armed groups during the protests. The government has raided the offices of independent media outlets, filed criminal charges against journalists, cancelled the legal registration of nine civil society organizations, and expelled foreign journalists and international human rights monitors from the country.These concerns have been expressed by the regional and international mechanisms. On 26 August 2019, a group of Special Procedures issued a statement calling on Nicaragua to stop reprisals against journalists, in follow up to an earlier statement issued in November 2018 “urging the Government of Nicaragua to immediately put an end to the repression and reprisals against those who speak out against the Government and cooperate with the UN, including human rights defenders, journalists and peaceful protesters.” In November 2019, in a press statement, OHCHR called on the government to “end the persistent repression of dissent and the ongoing pattern of arbitrary arrests and refrain from criminalizing and attacking human rights defenders, political opponents and any other dissenting voices.”
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has expressed concern over the “new stage of repression in Nicaragua aimed at silencing, intimidating and criminalizing those opposed to the Government, human rights organizations and the independent media in the country.” In December 2019, the IACHR granted precautionary measures to 17 women human rights defenders who had been subjected to harassment, intimidation, death threats and attacks in this context. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has also had to grant provisional measures to protect members of two local NGOs, because of the serious risks to their lives and physical integrity.
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Nicaragua: Over 100 political prisoners remain detained
41st Session of the UN Human Rights Council
-Interactive dialogue on the report from the High Commissioner on Nicaragua
-Joint statement from CIVICUS & Red LocalWe note that the government of Nicaragua has yet to comply with some of the agreements reached with the Civic Alliance for Justice and Democracy during negotiations earlier this year. While we welcome the release of 56 political prisoners by the Nicaraguan government, 104 political prisoners are still arbitrarily detained, and over one hundred are missing. We reiterate calls for the immediate release of those unjustly incarcerated and urge the government to take urgent steps to investigate the whereabouts of those who have been disappeared.
The government furthermore agreed to put in place a security protocol for political prisoners and those forced into exile. This has not been done. . We call for its immediate implementation to ensure the full enforcement of their rights, and the return of assets. We also call on the government to put in place measures to guarantee the safe return of those in exile.
The Nicaraguan government’s severe repression of anyone standing up for their rights has continued, reflected in the High Commissioners’ oral update. Free expression and assembly is severely restricted. Local civil society organisations have been stripped of their legal status and of their assets, and human rights defenders and journalists are harassed.
Given the grievous human rights violations, we are particularly concerned that the Amnesty Law recently established by the Nicaraguan government will subsume the essential truth and reparations process needed to address the severe human rights violations prevalent in the country, and hinder any opportunity for full accountability. The law on comprehensive care for victims was pushed though in a process which saw civil society and victims themselves completely side-lined.
We are further deeply concerned that the government of Nicaragua continues to block the return of international human rights bodies to the country, including the special mechanism of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and OHCHR. Such bodies shine a crucial light on human rights violations and are critical for ensuring accountability of perpetrators. Victims of human rights violations have the right to truth, justice and reparation. The government of Nicaragua should guarantee those rights and put a complete stop to their strategy of repression.
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Nicaragua: Resolution adopted at Human Rights Council
Resolution on Nicaragua adopted at the 46th Session of the UN Human Rights Council
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Niger : Recommandations sur l'espace civique pour l'Examen Périodique Universel des Droits de l'Homme
CIVICUS présente des contributions conjointes à l'Examen Périodique Universel (EPU) des Nations Unies sur l'espace de la société civile au Niger
L'Examen Périodique Universel du Conseil des Droits de l'Homme des Nations unies est un processus unique qui consiste à examiner le bilan des 193 États membres des Nations unies en matière de droits de l'homme tous les quatre ans et demi.
CIVICUS, le Réseau ouest-africain des défenseurs des droits humains et le Réseau nigérien des défenseurs des droits humains mettent en évidence le niveau de mise en œuvre des recommandations reçues par le Niger lors de son précédent examen en 2016. Malgré les garanties constitutionnelles sur la liberté de réunion pacifique, d'expression et d'association, le gouvernement nigérien a pris pour cible les défenseurs des droits humains et les a soumis à des arrestations arbitraires et à des persécutions judiciaires. Les rassemblements pacifiques sont réprimés et les manifestations prévues sont interdites, tandis que des journalistes sont détenus pour avoir fait des reportages sur des questions touchant l'État. Des lois restrictives comme la loi de 2019 sur les cybercrimes sont utilisées pour poursuivre les représentants de la société civile.
Lire l'intégralité des recommandations
https://www.civicus.org/documents/NigerUPRSubmission.FR.2020.pdf -
Nigeria: Adoption of Universal Periodic Review Report
UN Human Rights Council – 40th Session
15 March 2019
Oral StatementThe Nigeria Network of NGOs and CIVICUS welcome the Government of Nigeria’s engagement in the 3rd cycle of the UPR process, including accepting a range of recommendations presented by the UPR Working Group in November 2018.
We note that since the 2nd UPR review, the government has worked towards strengthening security operations through retraining law enforcement personnel in interrogation. However, we urge Nigeria to put effective measures in place to curb police brutality through a comprehensive reform of the police force.
It is disappointing to note that despite the continued harassment of the press and of civil society organisations, the national report of Nigeria barely addressed the issue of restrictions on civic space. Arrests, detentions and harassment of human rights defenders continues. Maryam Awaisu, one of the leaders of the #ArewaMeToo movement, was arrested in her office in February 2019. In January, the Abuja and regional offices of the Media Trust Limited, publishers of the Daily Trust newspapers, were raided by soldiers. The paper’s regional editor and a reporter were arrested and later released.
Although the Non-Governmental Organisations Regulatory Bill was rejected, we note with concern a new bill that is before the Senate, the Establishment of the Federal Charities Commission of Nigeria, which seeks to regulate the activities of NGOs. We urge Nigeria not to adopt laws that would further undermine civic space.
We call on the Nigerian government to consider the 12 recommendations made by delegates relating to civic space and the operations of security personnel whilst fully implementing the eight accepted recommendations from the previous review relating to the protection of journalists, human rights defenders and civil society activists.
Civic space in Nigeria is rated as Obstructed by the CIVICUS Monitor
See our joint submission on Nigeria for the UN Universal Periodic Review
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No country is above scrutiny -- resolution needed for human rights emergency in USA
Statement at the 43rd Session of the UN Human Rights Council
Like so many, we have watched with horror as protesters seeking justice and equality in the US have been met with state-sanctioned violence and their attackers with impunity. Journalists, protest monitors and medical teams alike have been deliberately targeted by law enforcement officials.
We are inspired by worldwide solidarity with the Black Lives Matter protests to end systemic racism, and by the changes that the protests have already brought about. Laws have been introduced at the local level. Overdue conversations have begun. But piecemeal modifications are no substitute for systemic change.
Protests worldwide are routinely brutally suppressed, and accountability for violence by law enforcement is rare. This is not unique to the US; nor is systemic racism. But racism and white supremacy are entrenched in the country. Similarly entrenched issues of police violence, impunity and militarization impact harmfully and disproportionately the Black community in the US.
The Human Rights Council has a role to play in addressing both the systemic racism that plagues our institutions, as well as its implications – from over-policed communities, to violence meted out on peaceful protesters, to murder with impunity.
The credibility of the council is at stake. It must show that human rights are universal and no country is above scrutiny for grave human rights violations.
CIVICUS supports a resolution mandating an independent investigation into systemic racism in the US, and into excessive use of force against peaceful protests in US cities since the murder of George Floyd. These measures would bring accountability, justice and equality one small but necessary step closer. As we heard with such power yesterday, individuals, their loved ones, and whole communities have been failed by the national institutions that are supposed to protect them. The international community must step up.
Civic space in the United States is currently rated as Narrowed by the CIVICUS Monitor
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NORTH KOREA: ‘It is time for the international community to adopt a ‘human rights up front’ approach’
CIVICUS speaksabout the activism of North Korean escapees with Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK).Founded in 2001 and based in the USA, HRNK is a human rights organisationwith the principal objective of raising international awareness of North Korea's human rights situation.
Is it possible to carry out any form of activism in North Korea?
No form of activism is possible in North Korea. There is no civil society due to an overwhelming and unprecedented level of coercion, control, surveillance and punishment. The markets that emerged following the famine of the 1990s and the newly created domestic mobile phone network allow North Koreans to engage in limited forms of market activity, but even this is subject to state surveillance and control. Every North Korean, regardless of whether they are a member of the ruling party or a government official, belongs to a party-controlled organisation, such as the Youth League or the Women’s Union. Anecdotal information from sources inside the country suggests that there is sporadic opposition and resistance to state agents at the local level, but the regime has gone to extreme lengths to prevent the emergence of any organised opposition.
Have there been any recent changes in how the North Korean regime responds to dissent?
Under the pretext of COVID-19 prevention, the North Korean regime has intensified its crackdown on those attempting to smuggle in information from the outside world or attempting to access such information. In December 2020 the Supreme People’s Assembly, North Korea’s highest legislative body, passed the ‘Anti-Reactionary Ideology and Culture Law’. This law imposes severe criminal penalties on those who access or disseminate foreign content, including movies, dramas, music and books. The penalties are especially severe, up to a life sentence of hard labour, for those who smuggle in or disseminate South Korean media.
How do people manage to escape North Korea?
Leaving the country without official authorisation is regarded as treason in North Korea. To escape, North Koreans need the assistance of religious networks, international civil society organisations (CSOs) and brokers who operate in the China-North Korea border region. The author and journalist Melanie Kirkpatrick has called this escape route ‘Asia’s underground railroad’. In some cases, family members or relatives who have already escaped pay brokers to arrange the escape. The most common route is through China and Southeast Asia. Upon arrival in Thailand, the escapees either choose to go to South Korea or apply for asylum in other countries.
However, since Kim Jong-un came to power in late 2011, the North Korean regime has intensified border security. The Chinese government has also taken steps that make it more difficult for the escapees to move inside China. In addition, the Chinese government has a longstanding policy of forced returns, whereby it repatriates any North Korean refugees arrested in its territory. This violates China’s obligations as a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, since North Korean refugees face a credible fear of persecution upon return.
This, combined with the COVID-19 border lockdown, means the number of escapees reaching South Korea has plummeted. The highest annual recorded number of arrivals to South Korea was 2,914 in 2009, but this fell to only 67 in 2022. The easing of COVID-related measures is likely to result in a greater number of attempts to flee.
What kind of help do escapees receive?
Most escapees choose to go to South Korea, as they are granted citizenship upon arrival under South Korea’s constitution. The South Korean government provides various forms of economic, educational and job training assistance to North Korean refugees. International and local CSOs also help them adjust to life in South Korea.
The situation is still difficult for many escapees, given how different the two societies have become in over seven decades of division. According to the latest available data from South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, a total of 34,000 escapees have resettled in South Korea to date. Refugees who choose to go to other countries, including the UK and the USA, primarily receive help from CSOs and other escapees who have already relocated there.
How do escapees work to document and denounce human rights violations in North Korea?
North Korean escapees play a critical role, given their first-hand experience of life under the regime. Many refugees, including those who are survivors of North Korea’s detention facilities, provide vital testimony to CSOs that seek to document and raise awareness of human rights violations in North Korea. Escapee testimony has also played a critical role in the work of the United Nations (UN) Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea, whose 2014 report concluded that the North Korean regime has committed crimes against humanity pursuant to policies determined at the highest levels of the state. Both the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea and the Seoul office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights continue to work closely with North Korean escapees.
Some refugees operate their own organisations. In addition to documenting and raising global awareness of the human rights situation in North Korea, they are often involved in sending outside information to North Korean people. Methods they use include radio broadcasts, leaflet balloons flown across the Korean demilitarised zone and rice and micro-SD cards in plastic bottles that are floated across the maritime border between the two Koreas. It is also common for individual escapees to send money to family members in North Korea with the help of brokers.
How does HRNK support escapees?
HRNK works closely with North Korean escapees to document and raise awareness of the human rights situation in North Korea. Given the lack of on-the-ground access inside North Korea, we employ a methodology that combines satellite imagery analysis, witness testimony and open-source investigation.
Testimonies are often given by escapees who have already resettled in South Korea, although HRNK has sometimes obtained information through refugees with contacts inside North Korea. HRNK has held consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council since April 2018 and reports to various UN bodies and hosts side events in Geneva and New York. We have facilitated the participation of North Korean escapees at these events to amplify their voices on the international stage.
What further international support do diaspora activists need?
North Korean activists need support from both private and public sources of funding. In general, North Korean human rights activists are overworked and underfunded. ‘Like-minded’ governments such as those of Japan, South Korea, the USA and others display interest in the issue but have often sidelined human rights concerns to focus solely on negotiating military, political and security matters. It is time for the international community to adopt a ‘human rights up front’ approach to North Korea, ensuring that human rights concerns are integrated into every aspect of its interactions with North Korea. Escapee activists will play a critical role in this effort.
Civic space in North Korea is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with HRNK through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@committeehrnk onTwitter.
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NORTH KOREA: ‘Since Kim Jong-un came to power, the surveillance and security system has increased dramatically’
CIVICUS speaks about activism in the closed civic space of North Korea with Bada Nam, Secretary General of People for Successful Corean Reunification (PSCORE).
Founded in 2006 and based in South Korea, PSCORE is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) that works to improve human rights in North Korea, assist North Korean escapees settling in South Korea and address barriers to reunification of the two Koreas.
Is there anything resembling civil society in North Korea?
North Korea values organisational activities, requiring every citizen to participate simultaneously in several groups such as the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea, North Korea’s Socialist Women’s Union and the Socialist Patriotic Youth League. All of them are government-organised and exert control over people rather than encourage critical thinking. Mentioning civic organisations from the outside world is strictly forbidden.
Congregating and engaging in activism in any way critical to the regime is a serious criminal offence, with punishments that can extend to the death penalty. As a result, any such activity must be covert, and it’s difficult to obtain accurate information on the existence of an underground civil society.
North Korea is a surveillance state, where people are always cautious about what they say, even to close friends and family members. It’s impossible to gather colleagues and engage in civic activities because everyone is made to monitor each other and failure to report treasonous crimes to the authorities would also result in severe punishment. Public criticism sessions and public executions are also examples of how the regime strikes fear into the population.
People are deterred from opposing the government not only because of the extreme punishment they would face but also due to North Korea’s policy of guilt by association, which puts their close relatives at risk. The ‘Songbun’ class system classifies people according to their political loyalties, as ‘loyal’, ‘wavering’ or ‘hostile’, and family members may be demoted in this classification system, affecting their life opportunities, including career options and access to food rations. In serious cases, entire families may be sent to political camps and die from forced labour or starvation. Therefore, North Koreans don’t dare imagine opposing the government.
Have there been any recent changes in the ways the North Korean regime responds to dissent?
The North Korean government has always responded to dissent in an extreme manner. However, since Kim Jong-un came to power in 2011, the surveillance and security system has increased dramatically, making it nearly impossible to escape from North Korea. Extra security measures are in place along the borders and a shoot-to-kill policy is enforced against those trying to escape. The situation was exacerbated further during the COVID-19 pandemic when the China-North Korea border was closed, both halting trade and also impeding the flow of defectors.
Information poses the greatest threat to the North Korean regime, especially due to the influence of the recent ‘Korean wave’ that has made South Korean popular culture increasingly prevalent. Most people in North Korea have been exposed to South Korean dramas and music, leading some to adopt South Korean manner of speech and fashion style. In response, the government has intensified monitoring, enacted strict laws and imposed severe punishments for consuming or distributing foreign media. The Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act, enacted in January 2023, explicitly prohibits the use of foreign languages and specifically bans South Korean terms such as ‘oppa’, which translates as ‘older brother’ and is used as a form of endearment for a boyfriend.
How do people manage to escape North Korea?
Most North Koreans escape across the border with China, often with the help of a broker. Brokers reach out to wealthy families in North Korea or help those who have escaped to China get to South Korea. Defectors in South Korea sometimes contact a broker to help other family members flee.
China has a policy of forced repatriation for North Korean refugees, and its advanced surveillance system makes it extremely difficult to travel in China undetected. If apprehended and returned to North Korea, defectors and their families face severe punishment.
Most North Korean refugees must travel through several countries before reaching safety. From China, they might flee to Mongolia and Southeast Asian countries such as Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. Many North Koreans end up seeking asylum in Thailand, where the government assists them and helps organise their journey to South Korea.
What help do escapees receive?
The assistance available to North Korean refugees depends on the laws and diplomatic relations of countries with North and South Korea. Civil society, including PSCORE, helps North Korean defectors settle in South Korea by teaching essential life skills. Thanks to our volunteer teachers, we focus on providing educational support, including English lessons and vocational workshops. In the past, we also assisted escapees in reaching South Korea but, unfortunately, this became impossible due to China’s growing securitisation and the impact of COVID-19.
Once in South Korea, North Koreans must undergo a 12-week training programme at the Hanawon rehabilitation centre, where they learn various skills to adapt to the South Korean lifestyle and have access to medical treatment and mental health services. While the South Korean government has implemented programmes to assist refugees, the process of fully integrating into South Korean society is still difficult for people who have previously lived under the totalitarian regime. Psychological trauma from refugees’ journey to freedom may have lasting effects on their lives.
How do escapees work to raise awareness and advocate for change in North Korea?
There are many CSOs, mainly based in South Korea, that support North Koreans inside the country and abroad. Some organisations send messages, information, K-dramas and K-pop to North Korea using USB sticks. South Korean news outlets, such as Daily NK and NK News, have sources in North Korea that provide insights into the current situation. PSCORE and other North Korean human rights groups conduct interviews with defectors and publish reports based on their testimonies.
Our primary activities involve organising public awareness campaigns through seminars and events. We also share short catchy videos on various North Korea-related topics via our social media channels. Our large international team of interns plays a crucial role in advocacy by translating our social media content into various languages. This makes our mission and content visible to the rest of the world.
PSCORE was granted special consultative status with the United Nations (UN) Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 2012, facilitating our engagement with the international community. We hold an annual side event at the UN Human Rights Council to share the latest information on North Korea’s human rights situation. We leverage international pressure to try to bring about change.
What further international support do diaspora activists need?
The topic of North Korean human rights is seen as a very political issue in South Korea. This means that CSOs are affected by each change of government, as policies toward North Korea shift with every administration. While PSCORE’s objective is centred on achieving peace and improving human rights in North Korea, we receive limited support compared to other CSOs due to the interpretation of our activities as politically charged, even though PSCORE is a non-partisan and non-religious CSO. Increased media exposure could help us secure more funding.
Insufficient funding is a common challenge for North Korean human rights organisations. It hinders the potential to raise awareness and support refugees in South Korea. North Korean activists need more platforms to amplify their voices and continue advocating for change. Still, we hope that more donations will come as the international community becomes more interested in the cause of human rights in North Korea.
Civic space in North Korea is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with PSCORE through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@PSCORE911 on Twitter.
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NORTHERN CYPRUS: ‘Civil society is not involved in decision-making and is considered a nuisance’
CIVICUS speaks with DeryaBeyatlı, Director of the Human Rights Platform,about the space for civil society in Northern Cyprus and the prospects for reunification in the context of the 2023 Cyprus and Turkish presidential elections.
Established in 2021, theHuman Rights Platform isa Turkish-Cypriot civil society umbrella organisation bringing together seven human rights organisations guided by the vision of an egalitarian, democratic and inclusive society where human rights and fundamental freedoms are protected and accessible for everyone.
What do you make of the results of the Cyprus presidential election?
In the latest presidential election, held in February 2023, we saw a rise of nationalist and racist rhetoric. In response to losing ground, the left-wing Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) supported a candidate who was more nationalistic than the party itself, but was still defeated in the runoff by Nicos Christodoulides, who was backed by centrists and right-wing parties.
It is clear to me that over the past few years Cyprus has been affected by the same shift towards radical right-wing politics that we’ve seen elsewhere in Europe.
What does the Human Rights Platform work on?
One of the main objectives of the Human Rights Platform is to document human rights violations committed by the government of Northern Cyprus, which is largely controlled by the Turkish authorities. I have observed that both society and the local authorities are becoming more racist, largely in reaction to the inflow of Black students who are lured with the promise of a job in Europe and trafficked into the northern part of Cyprus. Only in 2020 was human trafficking recognised as a crime in Northern Cyprus, and yet more than two years later, there has been only one court verdict in a case involving this crime. The authorities are unwilling to deal with human trafficking crimes and other human rights violations and keep blaming the victims instead.
What is the current state of reunification talks?
Ever since 1974, Cyprus has been split along ethnic lines, with Greek and Turkish Cypriots living on either side of the Green Line, a buffer zone under United Nations (UN) control. Christodoulides assumed that reunification talks might resume due to Turkey’s rapprochement with the west in search of relief to address damage caused by recent earthquakes and right after being elected said that the reunification of Cyprus is his priority. However, I think neither him nor Ersin Tatar, the current president of Northern Cyprus, who has strongly advocated for a two-state solution for many years, nor the Turkish and Greek guarantors are actually interested in the reunification of Cyprus.
The two-state formula currently advocated by Tatar was put on the table back in 2002 by Rauf Denktash, the founding president of Northern Cyprus, and was widely rejected by UN member states, with the exception of Turkey. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly expressed his support for the two-state solution, so I don´t think his re-election changes anything.
Reunification talks are currently on hold and I’m afraid we’re headed towards permanent division. Neither Turkey nor the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) are eager to give up the power they exercise and share it with Turkish Cypriots. We are in a sandwich position, where Turkey interferes with the local matters of Northern Cyprus and the RoC discriminates against Turkish-speaking citizens of the island.
One of the numerous human rights implications of the division of Cyprus is that there are around 30,000 children of mixed marriages who cannot get RoC citizenship and hence become European Union (EU) citizens. Despite Turkish language being an official language of the RoC, official documents and legislation are all in the Greek language, leaving Turkish Cypriots out. Turkish Cypriots cannot open a bank account or establish an association unless they live in government-controlled areas. And the list goes on.
What obstacles does civil society face in Northern Cyprus?
The division of the island creates challenging civic space conditions in Northern Cyprus, where the Human Rights Platform is registered. We face many obstacles due to the fact that we work in areas not under the effective control of the government of RoC. It’s very difficult to make our voices heard and get access to funding available to EU member states because we are not legally registered in a member state. Yet we cannot do so, since we do not reside in the government-controlled areas. Our only funding opportunity is the Financial Aid instrument of the European Commission (EC), which is highly competitive and offers limited funds to civil society.
The local authorities of Northern Cyprus prefer directing EU funds towards infrastructure and economic development, and regard supporting civil society as unnecessary and therefore a complete waste of funds. Turkish Cypriot civil society organisations (CSOs) aren’t involved in decision-making mechanisms and are considered a nuisance. Meanwhile, local public funds are only available to government-sponsored non-governmental organisations, also known as GONGOs, that are under the effective control of the Turkish Embassy and the Turkish Cypriot political leadership.
Perceived by local authorities as a threat, Turkish Cypriot civil society is silenced and sometimes attacked on mainstream media. Public TV, radio and news agencies are almost inaccessible for us. CSOs working to protect human rights and safeguard democracy in Northern Cyprus are systematically marginalised. Since we maintain relationships with the EC, EU member states and the USA, we are often regarded as ‘foreign agents’ and threatened and blackmailed, sometimes openly but mostly discreetly. A widely used tactic is the use of fake social media accounts promoting extremely nationalistic content and blaming Turkish Cypriot civil society activists for trading the country to the Greeks or to imperialistic powers.
What international support do Turkish Cypriot human rights CSOs need?
Most international intergovernmental organisations and their agencies prefer to ignore our presence. Since we are in a place the existence of which they don’t recognise, they refuse to even meet with us, let alone hear us out. We need both political and financial support in order to get stronger and become more effective in our struggle to uphold democracy and human rights in Northern Cyprus.
Civic space in Cyprus is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with the Human Rights Platform through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@ihp_hrp and@DBeyatli on Twitter.
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Nuevo documento sobre las restricciones que sufren los activistas que luchan contra el cambio climático
- El activismo ambiental es peligroso y, con demasiada frecuencia, mortal. Esto puede empeorar a medida que la creciente crisis climática agrava el acceso a los recursos naturales.
- Millones de personas han marchado este año pidiendo el fin de la injusticia climática, pero en todo el mundo solo el 4 por ciento de la población mundial vive en países donde los gobiernos respetan adecuadamente las libertades de asociación, reunión pacífica y expresión, según el Monitor CIVICUS.
- Aunque la COP 25, que se celebrará en Madrid del 2 al 13 de diciembre, debía ser la "COP de la gente", no pudo encontrar un hogar en América Latina, que sigue siendo la región más peligrosa del mundo para defender el medioambiente
Millones de personas salieron a las calles en 2019 pidiendo el fin de la injusticia climática, pero en la primera línea de la crisis y en las Naciones Unidas, valientes activistas continúan siendo silenciados deliberadamente. Este nuevo documento de posición "Silenciando a los Testigos: activismo climático desde la primera línea hasta la ONU" detalla cómo las personas que hablan por la justicia climática son amenazadas e intimidadas con violencia, leyes represivas, juicios frívolos y campañas de desinformación. En lugar de responder a las demandas del movimiento climático por una respuesta más ambiciosa y justa a la crisis climática, los gobiernos eligen sofocar sus voces.
En octubre, cuando la sociedad civil chilena pidió al gobierno que retirara a los militares de las calles antes de la COP 25, el gobierno de Piñera respondió cancelando de la noche a la mañana esta reunión central. El retiro de Chile como anfitrión de la COP refleja una tendencia preocupante, después de que Brasil decidió no alojar la COP 25 y Polonia, la anfitriona de la COP 24, impuso restricciones a las movilizaciones públicas y limitó la participación de la sociedad civil acreditada.
El escrutinio por parte de la sociedad civil y las contribuciones a las conversaciones sobre el clima de la ONU son vitales en un año en que millones de personas marcharon por las calles exigiendo el fin de la inacción climática. Los recientes desarrollos en las negociaciones climáticas de la ONU, incluida la eliminación del histórico informe de 1.5 grados del IPCC de las negociaciones, bajo la presión de estados como Arabia Saudita, muestran la necesidad vital de que la COP 25 sea la primera 'COP de la gente', y que se reviertan las tendencias del cierre del espacio cívico para la sociedad civil desde el nivel local hasta el global.
Para obtener más información y solicitudes de entrevistas, comuníquese con:
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One Year of Arbitrary Detention: Human Rights Organisations Call for Release of Kashmiri Human Rights Defender Khurram Parvez
The undersigned organisations call for the immediate and unconditional release of Kashmiri human rights defender Khurram Parvez, who was arrested one year ago on November 22, 2021 on politically motivated terrorism and other charges.
Parvez, the Coordinator of the Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS) and Chairperson of the Asian Federation Against Involuntary Disappearances (AFAD), has been a champion of human rights advocacy, documentation, and investigations including in the Jammu and Kashmir region, for over 20 years.
On November 22, 2021, India’s counterterrorism body, the National Investigation Agency (NIA), raided Parvez’s home and office for approximately 14 hours, seizing his and his family members’ laptop, mobile phone, and books. He was then called in for questioning at the NIA office where he was arrested on the basis of a First Information Report lodged by the NIA on November 6, 2021. The arrest memo stated that Parvez was being charged under the Indian Penal Code and the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), India’s abusive counterterrorism law, which makes release on bail difficult. Specifically, he was charged with “criminal conspiracy,” “waging, or attempting to wage war, or abetting waging of war, against the Government of India,” “punishment for conspiracy to wage war against the Government of India,” “raising funds for terror activities,” “punishment for conspiracy,” “recruiting any person or persons for commission of a terrorist act,” “offence relating to membership of a terrorist organisation,” and “offence of raising funds for terrorist organisations.” In May 2020, United Nations (UN) experts raised concerns about various provisions in the UAPA that are inconsistent with international human rights law and standards.
Indian authorities have repeatedly targeted Khurram Parvez for his human rights work in an attempt to silence him and intimidate others. Over the years, the NIA and other law enforcement agencies have accused him of “carrying out secessionist and separatist activities” in the region and have conducted raids at his home and offices. In 2016, authorities barred him from travelling to Switzerland to attend the UN Human Rights Council session, and then jailed him for 76 days under the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act (PSA). In December 2021, UN experts urged the Indian authorities to stop targeting Parvez.
On May 13, 2022, after 173 days of detention, the NIA filed a preliminary charge sheet before the NIA Special Court in New Delhi against Parvez and stated that they will continue investigating this case. The NIA accused Parvez of “running a network of over ground workers of the [Pakistan-based armed militant organisation] Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) for furthering activities of LeT and to commit terrorist attacks in India”, according to the press release published by the NIA on May 13, 2022. His detention has since then been extended at least five times by the NIA Special Court in New Delhi under Section 43D(2)(b) of the UAPA, which allows for the extension of the detention period for up to 180 days if the investigating agency is unable to complete the investigation of a case within a 90-day period.
Parvez has now been in detention for one year. His arbitrary detention is part of a longstanding list of human rights violations committed by Indian authorities against human rights defenders, civil society organisations, journalists, and activists in Jammu and Kashmir. Rather than working towards accountability for these violations, authorities have targeted and arrested those who have exposed and sought justice for such violations. Indian authorities have also clamped down on media freedom and shut down the internet to quash peaceful protests and restrict access to information. This has caused a chilling effect, further shrinking civic space in a region that is already facing an increasing clampdown on dissent since the Indian Parliament revoked Jammu and Kashmir’s special autonomous status in August 2019.
The Indian authorities must release Parvez immediately and unconditionally, and all charges against him must be dropped, as they are a reprisal for his peaceful human rights work. Human rights defenders should be protected, not persecuted. The Indian authorities must stop criminalising the work of human rights defenders and end all attempts to silence and intimidate human rights defenders and others critical voices of the government. Instead, Indian authorities should prioritise ending impunity for the human rights violations that human rights defenders have bravely documented and exposed, especially in Jammu and Kashmir, and ensure human rights defenders can work in a safe and enabling environment without fear of reprisals.
Signed:
Amnesty International
Asian Federation Against Involuntary Disappearances (AFAD)
CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
FORUM-ASIA
Front Line Defenders (FLD)
Human Rights Watch
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), in the framework of the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders
International Service for Human Rights (ISHR)
Minority Rights Group International
Stichting The London Story
World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), in the framework of the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders
Press Contacts
For FIDH:
For Stichting the London Story:
Civic space in India is rated as "Repressed" by the CIVICUS Monitor
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Open Letter on Myanmar: the UN must hold the military junta accountable
To: Member States of the United Nations General Assembly
CC: The United Nations Secretary-General
Open Letter: The UN General Assembly must take decisive action to hold the military junta accountable for atrocities in Myanmar
Your Excellencies,
We – 440 Myanmar, regional, and international civil society organizations – call on Member States of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to take immediate and decisive action to hold the Myanmar military accountable under international law through all possible avenues.
We welcome the report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights which provided corroborated evidence of the military junta’s intensifying brutality – particularly airstrikes, the burning of villages, and mass killings. In addressing the worsening crisis in Myanmar, High Commissioner Volker Türk described the junta’s actions as “inhumanity in its vilest form,” emphasizing that there is “no reason to believe that the military will…break the cycle of impunity that has characterized its operations for decades.” It is clear that the military has continued and will continue to commit genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes against the people of Myanmar unless it is held accountable under international law. We thus express our strongest support for the High Commissioner’s call for the UN Security Council (UNSC) to refer “the full scope of the current situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court (ICC).”
Nearly one year after its adoption in December 2022, we remain extremely disappointed by the insubstantial Security Council resolution 2669 on Myanmar. With this resolution, the Council has utterly failed to uphold its responsibilities under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and to ensure justice and accountability by failing to refer the current crisis in Myanmar to the ICC.
Despite the resolution’s demand of “an immediate end to all forms of violence throughout the country,” since its adoption, the junta has launched at least 965 airstrikes. This amounts to a 150% increase in airstrikes following the resolution. These aerial bombardments, often combined with attacks by ground troops, are one reason why at least 4,149 people have been killed, as of 17 October 2023, and over 1.7 million have been internally displaced since the coup attempt. One of the latest attacks is as recent as 9 October 2023, when the junta once again launched an artillery bombardment on an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp: this time in Munglai Hkyet Village in Kachin State. The attack killed at least 29 people, including 13 children, and injured at least 57 people. Among the displaced, elderly women, pregnant women, and children have the most vulnerabilities, which are severely exacerbated by the lack of sufficient food, water, shelter, and other necessities. Moreover, the military – which has long used rape as a weapon of war – continues, with blanket impunity, its widespread sexual and gender-based violence, particularly against women and girls, in detention and in areas of its scorched-earth campaigns.
Further, in flagrant disregard of the resolution’s call for “full, safe and unimpeded humanitarian access to all people in need,” the junta continues to weaponize humanitarian aid by blocking, seizing, and destroying lifesaving supplies from displaced communities that have suffered from its heinous crimes. Even in natural disasters, such as the devastating Cyclone Mocha, the junta has proven its total disregard for human lives by blocking humanitarian access to affected communities across western Myanmar.
As the Myanmar human rights and humanitarian crisis further escalates, we express our greatest disappointment in the UN’s deferral of its responsibilities to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its futile Five-Point Consensus (5PC) over the past 29 months. The regional bloc and its current approach have utterly failed to take concrete measures to end the crisis, serving only to deter tangible action by the international community. In fact, ASEAN itself has explicitly requested UN support in addressing the crisis. To address Myanmar’s multi-faceted crisis, the UN must stop hiding behind the failed 5PC and take concrete actions to assume its responsibility to protect the people of Myanmar.
Excellencies, the loss of lives of the people of Myanmar at the hands of this ruthless military must not continue, and justice for the victims and survivors cannot wait. The Myanmar military’s decades-long impunity, and thus its systematic and widespread violence, will continue to prevail – and thousands of lives will continue to be lost – unless and until the military faces prosecution and is held to account for its genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Thus, it is with great urgency that we once again call on the UNGA and its individual Member States to strongly recommend the UNSC utilize all political and technical instruments at its disposal, namely a resolution on Myanmar under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Such a resolution must necessitate the referral of the crisis in Myanmar to the ICC or the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal; robust, coordinated, and targeted economic sanctions on the Myanmar military and linked entities; and a comprehensive arms embargo to end the flow of weapons, jet fuel, and dual-use technology to the junta. Equally, we urge the UNGA to further recommend its Member States, agencies, and mechanisms to stop lending legitimacy to the junta; impose new and further coordinated, targeted economic sanctions; cut the flow of arms; and provide financial, political, and technical support for accountability efforts under universal jurisdiction, including in Argentina, Germany, and Turkey.
With Myanmar’s crisis reaching the point of unfathomable devastation, we look to the leadership of UN Member States to immediately actualize a UNSC resolution. If the resolution is vetoed by China or Russia, the people of Myanmar fully anticipate the UNGA’s adoption of the resolution, following in the footsteps of the decisive resolution on Ukraine promptly adopted by the same body in 2022.
Alongside a united call for a resolution, UN Member States must act immediately to ensure the response to the worsening humanitarian catastrophe across Myanmar is sufficient, effective, and harmless for affected populations. Member States must cease any partnership with the junta for the provision of aid, while increasing political and financial support through cross-border channels for locally led, frontline humanitarian responders – many of whom are women who serve and lead their communities in these roles in spite of great personal risks.
Now is the time for the UNGA and its Member States to fulfill their responsibility to the people of Myanmar. The UNGA and its Member States must ensure justice and accountability through all possible avenues, strengthen locally led humanitarian assistance, and unequivocally support the Myanmar people’s will for federal democracy.
Signed by 440 civil society organizations, including 71 who have chosen not to disclose their name:
- 5/ of Zaya State Strike
- 8888 Generation (New Zealand)
- Action Against Myanmar Military Coup (AAMMC) Sydney
- Action Committee for Democracy Development (Coalition of 14 grassroots networks)
- Action Committee of Basic Education Students (ACBES)
- Active Youths Kalaymyo
- Ah Nah Podcast – Conversations with Myanmar
- All Arakan Students’ & Youth’ Congress
- All Arakan Youth Organization Network
- All Aung Myay Thar San Schools Strike Force
- All Burma Democratic Front in New Zealand
- All Burma Federation of Student Unions (Monywa District)
- All Burma Indigenous People Alliance
- All Burma Student Democratic Front – Australia Branch
- All Young Burmese League (AYBL)
- Alliance of Students’ Union – Yangon (ASU-Yangon)
- ALTSEAN-Burma
- Anti Dictatorship in Burma – DC Metropolitan Area.
- Anti-coup Forces Coordination Committee (ACFCC – Mandalay)
- Anti-Junta Alliance Yangon-AJAY
- Anti-Myanmar Dictatorship Movement
- Anti-Myanmar Military Dictatorship Network (AMMDN)
- Arakan CSO Network
- ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR)
- Asia Justice and Rights (AJAR)
- Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
- ASORCOM – Alternative Solutions for Rural Communities
- Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
- Association of Human Rights Defenders and Promoters
- Athan – Freedom of Expression Activist Organization
- Auckland Kachin Community NZ
- Auckland Zomi Community
- Aung San Su Kyi Park, Norway
- Australia Burma Friendship Association, Northern Territory
- Australia Karen Organization WA Inc.
- Australia Myanmar Doctors, Nurses and Friends
- Australia Myanmar Youth Alliance (AMYA)
- Australian Burmese Muslim Organisation
- Australian Chin Community (Eastern Melbourne Inc)
- Australian Karen Organisation (AKO)
- AWDO (Nagphe)
- A-Yar-Taw People Strike
- Ayeyarwaddy West Development Organisation (AWDO)
- Bamar Community Tasmania
- Basic Education General Strike Committee (BEGSC)
- Basic Education Worker Unions – Steering Committee (BEWU-SC)
- Blood Money Campaign
- BMT counselling
- Boat People SOS
- Burma Academy
- Burma Action Ireland
- Burma Campaign UK
- Burma Canadian Network, Peace for Burma (Vancouver-Canada)
- Burma Civil War Museum
- Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN)
- Burma Lawyers’ Council (BLC)
- Burma Support
- Burmese Community – South Australia
- Burmese Community Development Collaboration (BCDC)
- Burmese Community Group (Manawatu, NZ)
- Burmese Community Support Group (BCSG)
- Burmese Friendship Association
- Burmese Medical Association Australia (BMAA)
- Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK
- Burmese Rohingya Welfare Organisation New Zealand
- Burmese Women’s Union (BWU)
- Campaign for a New Myanmar
- Canberra Karen Association
- CAN-Myanmar
- CDM Medical Network (CDMMN)
- Chanmyatharzi Township People’s Strike
- Chaung Oo Township Youth Strike Committee
- Chin Community – South Australia
- Chin Community in Norway
- Chin Community of Auckland
- Chin Community of Western Australia Inc.
- Chin Community Tasmania
- Chin Human Rights Organization
- Chin Youth Organization
- Chindwin (West) Villages Women Strike
- CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
- Civil Information Network (CIN)
- Civil Rights Defenders
- Civil Society Organizations Coordination Committee (Monywa)
- Coalition Strike Committee – Dawei
- Co-operative University Mandalay Students’ Strike
- CRPH & NUG Supporters Ireland
- CRPH Funding Ireland
- CRPH Support Group, Norway and members organizations
- CRPH, NUG Support Team Germany – Deutschland
- CRPH/NUG support group Australia
- CSOs Nexus Consortium – Tanintharyi
- Daung Sitthe Strike
- Dawei (Ashaetaw) Women Strike
- Dawei Youths Revolutionary Movement Strike Committee
- Democracy for Burma
- Democracy, Peace and Women’s Organization
- Democratic Party for a New Society, Norway
- Democratic Youth Council
- Depayin Township Revolution Steering Committee
- Depayin Women Strike
- Dhobama (2021 Generation)
- Doh Atu – Ensemble pour le Myanmar
- East Bago – Former Political Prisoners Network
- Educational Initiatives Prague
- Equality Myanmar
- Ethnic Youth General Strike Committee (Mandalay)
- Falam Community – South Australia
- Families and Friends of LGBTIQA+ in Myanmar
- Federal Corner
- Federal Myanmar Benevolence Group (NZ)
- Federation of General Workers Myanmar (FGWM)
- Former Political Prisoners and New Generation Group – Monywa
- FORUMCIV – Sweden
- Free Burma Campaign (South Africa)
- Free Rohingya Coalition
- Future Light Center
- Future Thanlwin
- Gangaw Women Strike
- Gender Equality Network
- General Strike Collaboration Committee (GSCC)
- General Strike Committee of Basic and Higher Education (GSCBHE)
- General Strike Committee of Nationalities (GSCN)
- Generation Wave
- Global Myanmar Spring Revolution
- Grass-root People
- Human Rights Educators Network
- Human Rights Foundation of Monland
- Incorporated Organization Shilcheon Bulgyo
- Industrial Training Centre (ITC) Family Sydney
- Industries Strike
- Info Birmanie
- Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID)
- Inle Federal Democracy Moment (IFDM)
- Inle Woman Union (IWU)
- Inlihtan Peninsula Tenasserim
- Institute for Asian Democracy
- Integria, z.u. Prague
- Inter Pares
- International Association, Myanmar-Switzerland (IAMS)
- International Campaign for the Rohingya
- JASS (Just Associates)
- JMC Inn Lay
- Joint Action Committee for Democracy in Burma (JACDB)
- Justice 4 Myanmar – Hope & Development
- Justice For Myanmar
- Kachin Association Australia
- Kachin Association Norway
- Kachin Association of Australia WA Inc.
- Kachin Student Union
- Kachin Women Association Thailand
- Kachin Women Network
- Kalay Township Strike Committee
- Kalay Women Strike
- Karen Community – South Australia
- Karen Human Rights Group
- Karen Peace Support Network
- Karen Swedish Community (KSC)
- Karenni Association – Norway
- Karenni Civil Society Network
- Karenni Community of Western Australia Inc.
- Karenni Federation of Australia
- Karenni Human Rights Group
- Karenni National Women’s Organization
- Karenni Society New Zealand
- Kayah State Students Union
- Kayan New Generation Youth
- Kayin Community Tasmania
- K’cho Ethnic Association
- Keng Tung Youth
- Korean Civil Society in Support of Democracy in Myanmar (106 organizations nationwide)
- Kyae Lak Myay
- Kyain Seikgyi Spring Revolution Leading Committee
- Kyauktada Strike Committee
- La Communauté Birmane de France
- Latpadaung Region Strike Committee
- Legal Aid for Human Rights
- LGBT Alliance
- LGBT Alliance Myanmar (Kalay Region)
- LGBT Alliance Myanmar (Kyaukse Region)
- LGBT Community Yangon
- LGBT Union – Mandalay
- MAGGA Initiative
- Magway People’s Revolution Committee
- Maharaungmyay Township People’s Strike
- Mandalar University Students’ Strike
- Mandalay Alliance Coalition Strike
- Mandalay Medical Family (MFM)
- Mandalay Regional Youth Association Revolution Core Group
- Mandalay Strike Force (MSF)
- Mandalay Women Strike
- Mandalay Youth Strike
- Mandalay-based People’s Strike
- Mandalay-Based University Students’ Unions (MDY_SUs)
- Matu Burma Foundation
- Matu Chin Community – South Australia
- MayMyo Strike Force
- Metta Campaign
- Milk Tea Alliance – Friends of Myanmar
- Min Hla Farmers Group
- Minbu Farmers Group
- Mindat Chin Community NSW
- Mindat Community – South Australia
- Mizo Community – South Australia
- Mon Association – Norway
- Mon Families Group
- Mon National Council (MNC)
- Monywa – Amyint Road Strike Leading Committee
- Monywa LGBT Strike
- Monywa People’s Strike Steering Committee
- Monywa Women Strike
- Monywa-Amyint Road Women Strike
- Multi-Religions Strike
- Muslim Youth Network
- Mya Taung Strike
- Myanmar Accountability Project
- Myanmar Anti-Military Coup Movement in New Zealand
- Myanmar Baptist Churches in Norway
- Myanmar Buddhist Community of South Australia
- Myanmar Campaign Network
- Myanmar Catholic Community In Norway
- Myanmar Community Coffs Harbour (MCC)
- Myanmar Community Group Christchurch New Zealand
- Myanmar Community Group Dunedin New Zealand
- Myanmar Community in Norway
- Myanmar Cultural Research Society – MCRS
- Myanmar Democracy and Peace Committee (Australia)
- Myanmar Democratic Movement (MDM)
- Myanmar Diaspora Group Finland
- Myanmar Engineering Association of Australia (MEAA)
- Myanmar Engineers – New Zealand
- Myanmar Gonye (New Zealand)
- Myanmar Hindu Community – Norway
- Myanmar Institute of Information Technology Students’ Strike
- Myanmar Labor Alliance (MLA)
- Myanmar Muslim Organization – Norway
- Myanmar People Alliance (Shan State)
- Myanmar People Residing in Canberra
- Myanmar Refugee Policy Group
- Myanmar Students’ Association Australia (MSAA)
- Myanmar Students’ Union in New Zealand
- Myanmar Teachers’ Federation
- Myaung Youth Network
- Myingyan Civilian Movement Committee
- Nelson Myanmar Community Group New Zealand
- Netherlands Myanmar Solidarity Platform
- Network for Human Rights Documentation – Burma (ND-Burma)
- Network of University Student Unions – Monywa
- New Zealand Doctors for NUG
- New Zealand Karen Association
- New Zealand Zo Community Inc.
- NLD Organization Committee (International) Norway
- NLD Solidarity Association (Australia)
- No Business With Genocide
- No.12 Basic Education Branch High School (Maharaungmyay) Students’ Union
- Norway Falam Community
- Norway Matu Community
- Norway Rawang Community
- NRFF – New Rehmonnya Federated Force
- NSW Karenni (Kayah) Communities
- Nyan Lynn Thit Analytica
- OCTOPUS (ရေဘဝဲ)
- Overseas Mon Association. New Zealand
- Padauk Finland – Myanmar Association
- Pale Township People’s Strike Steering Committee
- Parents, Families and Friends of LGBTIQA+ in Myanmar (PFLAG – Myanmar)
- Patriotic War Vetrans of Burma (PWVB)
- Perth Myanmar Youth Network
- Political Prisoners Network – Myanmar
- Progressive Karenni People Force (PKPF)
- Progressive Voice
- Pwintphyu Development Organisation
- Pyi Gyi Tagon Strike Force
- Pyit Taing Htaung Social Club
- Pyithu Gonye (New Zealand)
- Queensland Kachin Community (QKC)
- Queensland Myanmar Youth Collective (QMYC)
- Queensland Rohingya Community
- Rangoon Scout Network – RSN
- Red Campaign Nirvana Exhortation Group
- Remonya Association of WA (Mon Community)
- Representative Committee of University Teacher Associations (RC of UTAs)
- Rohingya Community in Norway
- Rural Community Development Society
- Rvwang Community Association New Zealand
- Samgha Sammaga-Mandalay
- Save and Care Organization for Ethnic Women at Border Areas
- Save Myanmar – USA
- Save Myanmar Fundraising Group (New Zealand)
- Save Myanmar San Francisco
- Seinpann Strike
- Shan Community (New Zealand)
- Shan MATA
- Shwe Pan Kone People`s Strike Steering Committee
- Shwe Youth Democratic Alliance (SYDA)
- Sitt Nyein Pann Foundation
- Social Garden
- Southcare Medical Centre
- Southern Youth Development Organization (SYDO)
- Spring Friends
- Spring Sprouts
- Spring Traveller
- Student Voice
- Sujata Sisters Group (NZ)
- Support for Myanmar
- Support Group for Democracy in Myanmar (Netherlands)
- Swedish Burma Committee
- Swedish Foundation for Human Rights
- Swiss Burma Association (ASB)
- Sydney Friends for Myanmar Unity
- Synergy – Social Harmony Organization
- Ta Mar Institute of Development
- Ta’ang Women’s Organization
- Tamar Institute of Development
- Tanintharyi MATA
- Tanintharyi Nationalities Congress
- Taze Strike Committee
- Taze Women Strike
- Tenasserim Student Unions’ Network
- Thakhin Kodaw Mhine Peace Network (Monywa)
- Thayat Chaung Women Strike
- The 88 Generation Peace and Open Society (Monywa)
- The Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KontraS)
- The Helpers for Perfect Democracy (HPD)
- The Institution of Professional Engineers Myanmar (IPEM)
- The Ladies
- The Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute Foundation, Inc. (MPI)
- Twitter Team for Revolution (TTFR)
- U.S. Campaign for Burma
- Union of Karenni State Youth (UKSY)
- United Myanmar Community of South Australia
- University Students’ Unions Alumni Force
- Victorian Burmese Care Community (VBCC)
- Victorian Myanmar Youth (VMY)
- Volunteers in Myanmar
- We Pledge CDM (Australia)
- Western Australia Myanmar Community (WAMC)
- Western Australia Myanmar Democratic Network (WAMDN)
- Wetlet Revolution Leading Committee
- Wetlet Township Women Strike
- White Coat Society Yangon (WCSY)
- Women Activists Myanmar (WAM)
- Women Advocacy Coalition – Myanmar
- Women Alliance Burma (WAB)
- Women’s League of Burma
- Women’s Peace Network
- Yadanabon University Students’ Union (YDNBUSU)
- Yadanar Foundation
- Yangon Women Strike
- Yasakyo Township People`s Strike Steering Committee
- Yinmarpin and Salingyi All Villages Strike Committee
- Youth for Democratization of Myanmar (UDM)
- Youth Heart Beams
- Zo Community – South Australia
- Zomi Association Australia Inc.
- Zomi Christian Fellowship of Norway
- Zomi Community – South Australia
- Zomi Community Queensland
- ကန့်ဘလူမြို့နယ်အထွေထွေသပိတ်
- ကရင်နီပြည်စစ်ဘေးရှောင်ကူညီစောင့်ရှောက်ရေးကွန်ယက်
- ခုနစ်စဥ်ကြယ်အဖွဲ့
- ဒို့မြေကွန်ရက် – LIOH
- နားဆင်သူများအဖွဲ့
- ပဉ္စမမဏ္ဏိုင်
- ပွင့်ဖြူလယ်ယာမြေကွန်ရက်
- မျက်မှောက်ခေတ်
- မျိုးဆက်-Generations
- ယောဒေသစစ်ဘေးရှောင်ကူညီရေးအဖွဲ့
- ရပ်ဝန်းသစ် (Yat Wun Thit)
Civic space in Myanmar is rated 'Closed' by the CIVICUS Monitor.
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Open Letter to ECOSOC regarding upcoming elections to the Committee on NGOs
We write to you regarding the upcoming elections to the ECOSOC Committee on NGOs for the 2019-2022 term, which will take place on April 16.
NGOs are an essential partner of the UN, as recognized by article 71 of the UN Charter as well as ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, which acknowledges “the breadth of non-governmental organizations' expertise” and their capacity “to support the work of the United Nations.” The Committee on NGOs plays a necessary role in facilitating this partnership by considering NGO applications for consultative status with the UN and assessing the contributions of accredited NGOs to ECOSOC. The Committee makes recommendations about which NGOs will enjoy access and participation rights and which will not. Given the importance of the tasks of the Committee, it is essential that members uphold the highest standards in regard to fulfilling the Committee’s mandate in a fair, apolitical manner.
The practice of the Committee has been the object of much criticism for failing to treat applicant and accredited NGOs objectively. Some members of the Committee use membership as a means to keep some NGOs – particularly human rights NGOs – out of the UN. Recent, positive developments – the webcasting of all open sessions of the Committee and the invitation to accredited NGOs to meet with the Committee – have all come about due to ECOSOC interventions, not as a result of initiatives taken by the Committee itself.
Membership of the Committee on NGOs matters. The upcoming elections to the NGO Committee in April, for the 2019-2022 term provide States with a commitment to ensuring civil society access and participation with the opportunity to put themselves forward as candidates. ECOSOC members will also be able to show they are committed to fair practice for civil society through who they elect.
In addition, membership of the Committee on NGOs is currently not subject to term limits. The organizations joining this letter believe the introduction of term limits would allow for greater diversity within the Committee over time. States should be required to leave the Committee for a specific period after serving the maximum agreed terms.
We urge all ECOSOC Member States to commit to electing to the Committee on NGOs States that have a positive record in regard to ensuring a safe and enabling environment for civil society to operate in and addressing cases of intimidation and reprisals swiftly and effectively, as encouraged in Human Rights
Council consensus resolutions on civil society space.1 Similarly, we urge all candidates for membership on the Committee on NGOs to commit publicly to ensuring a safe, enabling environment for civil society to operate in, including at the United Nations.The upcoming elections for the Committee on NGOs are an opportunity for States to put into practice a genuine commitment to promoting civil society access and participation at the UN either as candidates or electors. We hope that they will lead to much needed transformation in the membership, as well as the practice, of the Committee on NGOs.
Amnesty International
Civicus: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
Conectas Direitos Humanos
Freedom Now
Human Rights Watch
Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights
International Service for Human Rights
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Open Letter to UN member states: Urgent action needed on Myanmar
To:Member and Observer states of the UN Human Rights Council
Subject:Urgent action needed on MyanmarDear Excellencies
We write to you regarding the deeply concerning situation in Myanmar, particularly in Rakhine State. Reports estimate that more than 270,000 Rohingyas have fled to Bangladesh following the outbreak of violence two weeks ago, and this figure is expected to significantly increase. Thousands of non-Muslim residents have also been internally displaced. Reports have also emerged of entire villages being burnt and hundreds killed. On 31 August, three UN Special Rapporteurs expressed concern citing credible reports of death to villagers resulting from security force attacks, and the use of helicopters and rocket propelled grenades on the population. On 5 September, speaking to reporters, the UN Secretary General warned of a risk of ethnic cleansing. Access to northern Rakhine State has been denied to independent observers and humanitarian aid agencies while media has been tightly controlled – leaving the territory under a virtual information blackout and exacerbating a humanitarian catastrophe. We call on the UN Human Rights Council to urgently act – by passing a resolution on Myanmar calling for an end to abuses against the population and ensuring immediate humanitarian access.
The UN Human Rights Council established a Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (FFM) at its 34th session in March this year, following reports of alarming human rights violations in Rakhine State beginning in October last year. In February 2017, a report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and statements by the UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar referred to reports of egregious violations targeting the Rohingya minority at the end of 2016 and the beginning of 2017 – including the deliberate killing of children, the burning of homes with people inside them, rape, and sexual violence. The OHCHR report concluded that reports indicate the very likely commission of crimes against humanity. Military operations conducted during this period bear a close semblance to current operations which involve mass exodus of Rohingya fleeing violence, multiple reports of civilian deaths, and egregious violations under an information blackout, without independent access to observers or journalists.
The current bout of violence began following reports of coordinated attacks on police posts by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), an armed militant organisation, on 25 August – after which the Myanmar military launched a massive response. Weeks before the current outbreak of violence, on 11 August, the UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar expressed concern on increasing military build-up in Rakhine State. The violence broke out immediately following the release of a report by an international commission headed by the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, which called for reforms to address wide-ranging forms of discrimination faced by the Rohingya community. On 29 August, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights cautioned all sides on fuelling further violence and called on the government leadership to condemn the inflammatory rhetoric and incitement to hatred that is proliferating. He further expressed concerns on unsupported government allegations that international aid organizations were complicit in or supporting attacks, as this places aid workers in danger and may make it impossible for them to deliver essential aid.
Myanmar has so far failed to restore full humanitarian access following the preceding period of violence that began in October 2016. The Myanmar government has hitherto been reluctant to cooperate with the FFM and has denied allegations relating to violations of international human rights law and humanitarian law. The government has also refused to reform discriminatory laws that affect the Rohingya community and deny them full citizenship rights, leaving the community in a vulnerable situation.
It is imperative for the UN Human Rights Council to urgently address the escalating situation in Myanmar through a resolution at the upcoming 36th session of the UN Human Rights Council. The establishment of the FFM was considerably delayed for technical reasons. The lack of access to the country by independent investigators as well as the current outbreak of violence have further increased the magnitude of the body's work ahead of its March 2018 reporting deadline. In this context, the Council should pass a resolution on Myanmar which:
- Extends the time available for the FFM beyond March;
- Makes provision for the FFM to provide a preliminary report to the UN General Assembly in September 2017 and a final report to the UN Human Rights Council and the General Assembly in 2018;
- Calls on Myanmar to urgently grant full access to the FFM;
- Emphasises the responsibility of Myanmar to prevent and seek accountability for any retaliation or reprisal against individuals for engaging with the FFM;
- Expresses grave concern over recent allegations of violations and calls for an immediate end to attacks on the civilian population; and
- Urges full access for humanitarian aid and independent observers.
Please accept the assurance of our highest consideration.
- ALTSEAN-Burma (Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma)
- ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR)
- Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
- Asian Legal Resource Center (ALRC)
- Awaz Foundation Pakistan - Centre for Development Services (AwazCDS-Pakistan)
- Burma Campaign UK
- Bytes for All, Pakistan (B4A)
- Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies
- Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria
- Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW)
- CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
- Civil Rights Defenders
- Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (kontraS)
- Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative
- Conectas Direitos Humanos
- Defend Defenders (the East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project)
- Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights
- FIDH - International Federation for Human Rights
- Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
- Human Rights Watch
- Human Rights Working Group (HRWG)
- INFORM Human Rights Documentation Centre
- Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC)
- International Service for Human Rights (ISHR)
- Judicial System Monitoring Program (JSMP)
- Korean House for International Solidarity (KHIS)
- Madaripur Legal Aid Association
- National Commission for Justice and Peace, Pakistan
- Odhikar
- Partnership for Justice
- People's Empowerment Foundation, Thailand
- People's Vigilance Committee on Human Rights (PVCHR)
- PILIPINA Legal Resources Center (PLRC)
- Pusat KOMAS
- Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit
- Safeguard Defenders
- South India Cell for Human Rights Education and Monitoring (SICHREM)
- Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM)
- Think Centre
- Unitarian Universalist Service Committee
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Open Letter urging UN Human Rights Council members to discuss the report on human rights situation in Xinjiang
Re: Proposed Human Rights Council Decision on Xinjiang
Dear Minister,
We, the undersigned human rights organizations, are writing to urge you to support a decision at the current session of the United Nations Human Rights Council enabling the Council to discuss the recent report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China.
Meticulous and detailed, the High Commissioner’s report lays bare a systematic campaign by the Chinese government to target Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim minorities for the peaceful exercise of their rights to freedom of religion and expression and to enjoy their own culture. Strikingly, in addition to other sources, the report relies extensively upon the Chinese government’s own policy documents to demonstrate that the authorities’ sweeping crackdown on Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities is discriminatory in both purpose and effect.
Notably, the High Commissioner’s report concludes that the extent of these violations may constitute international crimes, “in particular crimes against humanity,” requiring “urgent attention by the United Nations intergovernmental bodies and human rights system.” Dozens of UN Special Procedure mandates issued a joint statement reinforcing these concerns and calling on the Human Rights Council to urgently address the human rights situation in China.
High Commissioner’s Findings
The report details Chinese authorities’ religious profiling of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang as “extremists,” based on indicia such as “wearing hijabs and ‘abnormal’ beards,” “closing restaurants during Ramadan,” “giving one’s child a Muslim name,” and other conduct that the High Commissioner described as “nothing more or less than personal choice in the practice of Islamic religious beliefs and/or legitimate expression of opinion.”
The report sets out how those deemed “at risk of extremism” are subject to serious violations by the authorities, including arbitrary detention, torture, involuntary medical treatment, forced labor, family separation, interference with reproductive rights, as well as intimidation, threats and reprisals.
The authorities have transferred large numbers of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities to detention centers for indefinite periods without charge and without any effective means to challenge their detention. The authorities euphemistically refer to these as “vocational education and training centres,” but refused to provide the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights with any curriculum for this so-called “education.” Detainees were prohibited from practicing their religion, praying, or speaking their language. Instead, there was a strong emphasis on “political teachings” and rehabilitation through self-criticism. As one former detainee said, “we were forced to sing patriotic song after patriotic song every day, as loud as possible and until it hurts, until our faces became red and our veins appeared on our face.”
Detainees also reported being subject to torture and other ill-treatment, including “being beaten with batons, including electric batons while strapped in a so-called ‘tiger chair’; being subjected to interrogation with water being poured in their faces; prolonged solitary confinement; and being forced to sit motionless on stools for prolonged periods of time.” Many reported being shackled, constant hunger and weight loss, and being forced to take white pills, which made them drowsy.
Ahead of visits by foreign delegations, former detainees indicated they were “explicitly told by guards to be positive about their experience,” fearing that their detention would be further prolonged or that family members would face reprisals if they failed to comply.
The report also details a broader program to suppress Uyghur language, culture, religion and identity outside of detention centers, noting that “alongside the increasing restrictions on expressions of Muslim religious practice are recurring reports of the destruction of Islamic religious sites, such as mosques, shrines and cemeteries.” “Homestay” programs, involuntary in nature, placed government officials in many Uyghur homes, where families reported being under constant surveillance and “not allowed to pray or speak their own language.” Even children are not safe: Chinese authorities have reportedly placed the children of those detained in state-run child welfare institutions and boarding schools without parental consent, and with similar restrictions on their ability to practice their religion or speak their language.
Proposed UN Human Rights Council Resolution
The proposed resolution is very modest in scope, merely calling for the High Commissioner’s report to be discussed at the Human Rights Council. It takes no position on the issues addressed, takes no position with respect to China, and does not prejudge the outcome of such a discussion. As a human rights organization, we would have preferred that a resolution go much further, heeding the call by some 50 UN Special Procedures and hundreds of nongovernmental organizations from more than 60 countries for an international mechanism to monitor and report on the situation on an ongoing basis. A resolution to discuss the report is the bare minimum response that can be credibly expected from the Human Rights Council when faced with a report of this magnitude.
Despite China’s stated commitment to “dialogue,” it has made every effort to suppress the report and prevent discussion of its contents. Such an approach, if it prevailed, would undermine the institutional integrity of the Human Rights Council by placing the human rights situation in one country alone uniquely beyond international scrutiny. This would only empower China to pursue its campaign of repression against Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim minorities with impunity.
We trust we can count on your government’s support for the proposed resolution.
Sincerely,
ACAT Belgium
ACAT Germany
ACAT UK
Access Now
Alliance des Avocats pour les Droits de l'Homme
Amnesty International
Article 19
Centro de Documentación en Derechos Humanos "Segundo Montes Mozo SJ" (SMM)
Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights
CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
Coalition for Genocide Response
Comité pour la Liberté à Hong-Kong
Coordination des Associations et des Particuliers pour la Liberté de Conscience
DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project)
Defense Forum Foundation
East Turkistan Australian Association
European Union of Jewish Students
EXCUBITUS Derechos Humanos
Families of the Disappeared
Federal Association of Vietnamese Refugees in the Federal Republic of Germany
Frankfurt Stands with Hong Kong
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Human Asia
Human Rights Defenders Network-SL
Human Rights Watch
Humanists International
Humanitarian China
Institute for Asian Democracy
International Christian Concern
International Coalition to End Transplant Abuse in China (ETAC)
International Commission of Jurists
International Service for Human Rights
Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights
Judicial Reform Foundation
Justice For North Korea
Lesbian and Gay Association of Liberia (LEGAL)
LGBT+ initiative group "Revers"
Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies
Network of the independent Commission for Human rights in North Africa CIDH AFRICA
NK Watch
Northern California Hong Kong Club
People for Successful Corean Reunification- PSCORE
Persatuan Sahabat Wanita Selangor
Planet Ally
René Cassin, the Jewish voice for human rights
Reporters Without Borders (RSF)
Réseau Ouest Africain des Défenseurs des Droits Humains/West African Human Rights Defenders' Network
Safeguard Defenders
Scholars at Risk
The Rights Practice
Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG)
Uyghur Association of Victoria, Australia
Viet Tan
Vietnam Human Rights Network
Women's Action Network
World Uyghur Congress
YUHU Indonesia
Civic space in the China is rated as "Closed" by the CIVICUS Monitor