CIVICUS speaks with Rafael Uzcátegui, general coordinator of the Venezuelan Programme for Human Rights Education Action (Provea), about the results of recent opposition primaries ahead of the 2024 elections.
Provea is a Venezuelan civil society organisation dedicated to raising awareness among the most vulnerable groups in society about their rights and providing legal support to victims of human rights violations.
What is the opposition’s strategy for the 2024 elections?
The opposition’s strategy is to promote a joint candidacy, supported by the majority of the opposition, to face President Nicolás Maduro in the upcoming elections. This is an easy thing to say, but in the current conditions it is a big challenge. After the defeat of the strategy of exerting as much pressure as possible, which climaxed with protests in 2017 and Juan Guaidó’s so-called interim presidency in early 2019, tensions and misgivings ensued and the opposition fragmented. People lost confidence in its leadership. According to opinion polls conducted towards the end of the pandemic, Guaidó was rejected as much as was Maduro. More than 80 per cent of people did not want either of them.
In other words, there has been a crisis of representation affecting both the government and the opposition. A new strategy had to be adopted, but this was not sufficiently explained to the public. Nor was there a public assessment of the mistakes made by the traditional opposition leadership, so that distrust and resignation increased among the public. The feeling that there was nothing that could be done was so great that analysts and political leaders alike stated that hopes should be placed not on the 2024 elections but on those to be held in 2030.
But in the space of a year things have changed. The opposition primary elections have served to legitimise a joint candidacy through popular consultation. At first they seemed like a mere bureaucratic formality, but as the date approached, the primaries became a political event that exceeded the expectations of the organisers. Despite being held under conditions of absolute censorship, with physical attacks on candidates at their campaign events, with limited resources and under veiled or explicit threats from the authorities to dissuade people from participating, more than two million people voted.
This showed that there is a great need for change and restored democratic society’s confidence that change is possible. It confirmed that the strategy should be focused on elections and created a bottom-up consensus not only on a potential unitary candidacy but also on a new opposition leadership.
The return to democracy requires two key elements: the construction of agreements among the opposition and the recovery of citizens’ confidence in democratic leadership. The opposition primaries were an important first step. If it can take further steps in the same direction, the opposition could once again become a credible threat to the authoritarian regime.
How has the government reacted to the opposition primaries?
The government underestimated the effects of the primaries: it thought that censorship, disinformation and harassment would dissuade people from participating, so the high turnout was the first big surprise. It was clear that many people still thought of voting as a safe mechanism for expressing their opinions. The second surprise was the overwhelming support received by candidate María Corina Machado across all geographies and among all social groups that voted.
Machado had been criticised on the grounds that her discourse only resonated with middle class and affluent groups, but the support she received reflects a widespread aspiration for a better life. Machado even won support from the ruling party’s most loyal constituencies, which partly explained its desperate response, which has been to try to annul the primaries through the courts.
The Supreme Court of Justice – characterised by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, a mechanism set up by the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, as part of a machinery for persecuting dissent – has ruled to ‘suspend’ the effects of the primaries on the grounds that fraud was committed.
At the same time, in an attempt to recover the initiative, the government has tried to exacerbate nationalist sentiment by activating its dispute over the territory of Essequiba Guiana, claimed by Venezuela but under Guyanese control, and has called for a consultative referendum on the issue on 3 December.
Will Machado be able to run in 2024, or will the government seek to disqualify her candidacy?
It will be a major challenge to ensure that Machado’s candidacy is enabled and the other recommendations of the European Union (EU) Election Observation Mission for elections with democratic guarantees are complied with. This is the time to fight against the authorities’ tactic of disqualifying any political leader popular enough to win key positions through elections.
The existence of conditions for the exercise of the rights of assembly and participation will depend on several factors operating simultaneously: the strengthening of the democratic camp, government-opposition dialogue, the recovery of citizen confidence and pressure from the international community.
The road towards 2024 will be long. If Machado ends up being disqualified, the opposition should establish a consensus mechanism, in which she should play an important role. It must be clear at all times that the strategy for a democratic transition necessarily involves elections.
What are the chances of achieving a democratic transfer of power?
The principle of democratic alternation is completely alien to Chavismo, the ruling movement founded by Hugo Chávez. It came to power to stay in power forever and views its ‘revolutionary’ conception of the world to be the only truth and an inescapable way to improve people’s living conditions. As in Cuba and Nicaragua, the government is forced to hold elections, even if these are no more than a simulation, for a number of reasons, not least of which is the need to gain a certain degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. There is only a fine line between simulation and farce, so elections must be organised in such a way that makes them appear genuine.
One positive factor is that Venezuela is currently under investigation by the International Criminal Court and under the scrutiny of mechanisms such as the Independent International Mission. This scrutiny is a deterrent to open and widespread repression. These are cracks that the democratic camp can exploit to ensure greater democratic guarantees in the upcoming elections.
In the coming months we will witness a tug of war between government and opposition. One negative message we are receiving from various international voices is that the 2024 elections, regardless of how they are organised, will be a milestone for normalising relations with Venezuela. I think Maduro is unwilling to organise an election that he might lose, so he will go to great lengths to divide and discourage the opposition vote.
Overcoming these hurdles will require that synergy is maintained between a cohesive political leadership, a citizenry highly motivated to participate and pressure from the international community, especially from progressive forces in the region, to prevent the more radical sectors of Chavismo and the armed forces hindering a potential transition. It is important to ensure that the more democratic sectors of Chavismo are given guarantees so that they can find a place for themselves in the transition. Ultimately, it is a question of establishing the right incentives so the costs of leaving are lower than those of remaining in power by any means.
How is civil society working to ensure the transparency and competitiveness of the electoral process?
Human rights organisations have endorsed the seven key recommendations of the EU Election Observation Mission report: strengthening the separation of powers, abolishing disqualifications, conducting a public education campaign on voting, imposing sanctions for electoral misconduct, enabling balanced media coverage, repealing the so-called ‘hate law’ to prevent self-censorship and allow for freedom of expression, and introducing a combination of incentives and sanctions to have trained and accredited polling station authorities on election day.
Civil society organisations specialising in electoral rights are leading all advocacy actions in this regard, with other organisations supporting them. On 17 October, the government and the opposition signed the ‘Partial Agreement on the Promotion of Political Rights and Electoral Guarantees for All’, known as the Barbados Agreement.
The government is supposed to honour this agreement. However, it has already shown it has no intention to do so. By initiating legal proceedings against the primaries, it has breached the first point of the agreement, which states that each political sector is free to select its candidate for the elections.
What should the international community do to help Venezuela have free and competitive elections in 2024?
There is no way to achieve a transition to democracy in Venezuela without the accompaniment and pressure of the international community. For now, the USA has taken the lead by encouraging the Barbados Agreement and establishing a mechanism for lifting economic sanctions.
However, sanctions against human rights violators and the embargo on arms sales should be retained. International initiatives to monitor and protect human rights in Venezuela must also remain active. The government is operating to prevent the extension of the mandate of the Independent International Mission, which is due to be decided by the UN Human Rights Council in 2024. This is the most important available mechanism for uncovering the facts, and its work complements that of the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
Finally, it is key for progressive governments in Latin America, such as those of Brazil, Chile and Colombia, to issue public and private messages to the Venezuelan authorities so that they agree to hold elections with democratic guarantees.
Civic space in Venezuela is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Provea through its website or Facebook account, subscribe to its YouTube channel and follow @proveaong on Instagram and @_Provea and @fanzinero on Twitter.
