CIVICUS speaks with Gürkan Özturan, media freedom monitoring officer with the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF), about the concerning implications of a proposed law on foreign agents in Turkey.
ECPMF is a civil society organisation (CSO) based in Leipzig, Germany, dedicated to promoting, preserving and defending media freedom in Europe.
What’s Turkey’s Foreign Influence Agents bill, about and why is it concerning?
The Foreign Influence Agents bill began as a rumour circulating in pro-government media. We haven’t seen an official draft yet. The rumour seems to have originated in the Ministry of Justice, which has since confirmed it is working on a draft bill.
The bill appears to be aimed at combating foreign influence in Turkey. In recent years, whenever independent media broke sensational news or civil society published reports exposing scandals, the government labelled these the work of foreign agents. It claimed these organisations — mainly civil society groups and independent media outlets that rely heavily on international development or human rights funding from abroad — published these stories and reports because foreign entities paid them to do so.
In my experience, such claims are unfounded. During my time managing various funding mechanisms for an independent news agency in Turkey, which also relied on international funding for its survival, I never met a donor who requested specific stories or angles of coverage. Donors simply supported our work, which contributed to the development of rights and freedoms. As long as the funds were used according to the proposed project plan and everything was financially accounted for, that was it.
Now I work for an organisation that relies on international funding, mainly from the European Commission, the free state of Saxony, the city of Leipzig, the German Foreign Ministry and the National Endowment for Democracy, a private US foundation, as well as Adessium, a charitable foundation based in the Netherlands. These funders don’t require us to take a particular stance or avoid specific issues. They support the work of independent civil society, which is common practice worldwide. Yet the fiction that foreign donors are dictating the work of local civil society and media seems to be the entire justification for the law being drafted in Turkey.
Do you see the developments in Turkey as part of a wider regional or global trend?
The ideas behind the bill being drafted in Turkey appear to be the same as those behind Russia’s law on foreign agents, which has been copied in several countries. The most recent is Georgia, where the ruling party passed a law on foreign agents that sparked significant protests. Similar laws have been passed in countries such as Hungary and Nicaragua. The origins of these laws can be traced to Russia’s 2012 law, which initially aimed to label internationally supported organisations. Over time, this evolved into a criminal offence, allowing for severe restrictions on independent media and civil society.
Here’s the pattern: the bill’s proponents initially claim the law will merely profile CSOs, although statements by some governing alliance representatives in Turkey suggest what will happen next – those profiled as receiving foreign funding will be identified as criminals and punished. This is the sinister intention behind these laws.
Interestingly, independent journalists in exile recently published articles about high-profile figures such as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s son, Bilal Erdoğan, state bodies and pro-government organisations receiving substantial international funding. If the bill’s proponents believe that receiving international funding is criminal, this hypocrisy should be highlighted.
Moreover, Turkey itself provides international funding to other developing countries. Supporting human rights and freedoms through international funding shouldn’t be perceived as a criminal activity. However, in Georgia, Russia and Turkey such support is politicised, often to advance the agenda of the ruling party or to stifle the opposition.
A pertinent example is the treatment of LGBTQI+ issues in Georgia, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Turkey. Governments have politicised these issues and adopted polarising agendas that target women and LGBTQI+ people. LGBTQI+ organisations that receive international funding are particularly vulnerable. Russia has already outlawed such support, leading to violent attacks, and Georgia has seen similar incidents. Turkey has also hardened its stance, particularly after withdrawing from the Istanbul Convention, the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence.
This trend extends beyond LGBTQI+ groups to other activists, such as those campaigning for animal rights or environmental causes. In essence, anyone who receives international support could be labelled a foreign agent and treated as a criminal. In an extreme scenario, people could be targeted for having international connections, foreign business partners or international investors. This is paving the way for growing xenophobia.
The Turkish government and judiciary have tended to use criminal labels to target government opponents, often imprisoning them before finding or fabricating evidence against them. In this context, the Foreign Influence Agent Law poses significant further risks.
How has Turkish civil society responded?
Civil society is beginning to hold internal discussions and plan its response. However, there is some reluctance to react publicly as the bill has not yet been officially presented. Nevertheless, we have encouraged civil society groups to discuss its implications, drawing on the experiences of other countries and highlighting the potential risks for Turkey.
Some organisations are concerned that discussing a draft bill that has not yet been formally introduced could undermine their credibility. The problem is that the Turkish government often starts the policymaking process with rumours, then adjusts the proposal based on initial reactions, pushes it through parliament without proper public consultation and passes it quickly, often in the middle of the night, to catch the opposition off guard.
If public opinion, civil society and political parties don’t react fast, the government can pass any law it wants simply because the governing alliance has a majority in parliament. It is crucial that legal associations, CSOs and independent media speak out about how such a law would affect their work and the broader civil society and media landscape in Turkey.
There is a possibility that civil society can still defeat this bill if it plans and acts strategically. However, if it waits until the last minute to oppose it, success is unlikely. Similar situations have occurred repeatedly over the past decade, when the ruling alliance passed laws on the judiciary, withdrew from the Istanbul Convention, enacted the Disinformation Law and implemented social media and press laws.
What are the conditions for civil society in Turkey, and how will they change if this bill is passed?
Civil society in Turkey faces extremely harsh working conditions. Over the last decade, hundreds of CSOs have been closed down and thousands of people have been arrested or imprisoned. The 2020 law meant to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has become a tool for the government to closely monitor and control CSOs. This law requires extensive audits and allows the government to appoint trustees to organisations, which can disrupt their operations.
The proposed Foreign Influence Agents bill would exacerbate these conditions by criminalising civil society activities. Labelling organisations as part of foreign criminal networks would discourage young people from getting involved, particularly given the biased education system that emphasises nationalist goals and government policies.
If the bill is passed as proposed, anyone receiving international funding could be imprisoned. This poses a significant risk, potentially leading to the imprisonment of thousands of people. The case of Osman Kavala, wrongfully imprisoned for years, illustrates the potential impact this law could have on civil society.
How can the international community support Turkish civil society in this context?
Frankly, the options are limited. International CSOs like ECPMF issue statements, engage in advocacy, provide practical and legal support and take people into protection programmes when necessary. We monitor the situation closely and publish reports. But it’s not clear what more can be done from the outside, as the largest part of the work needs to take place locally.
Governments, particularly in the west, have been largely inactive. The refugee deal between Europe and Turkey has backfired, reducing Europe’s influence on Turkey’s democratisation. In addition, Turkey’s involvement in the Ukraine conflict has made the west more dependent on Erdoğan’s cooperation, further reducing its willingness to challenge Turkey on human rights and civil society issues.
In the past, international bodies such as the European Union have remained silent when repressive laws have been passed in Turkey, leaving European CSOs to raise these issues.
But this bill poses a risk not only to Turkey but to other countries as well. As the world becomes more polarised, more countries are likely to adopt similar laws, leading to greater mistrust and less cross-border cooperation. It is vital that the international community responds now to prevent the spread of such laws. CSOs, governments and international bodies must work together to provide support, apply diplomatic pressure and raise awareness of the potential dangers.
Civic space in Turkey is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with The European Centre for Press and Media Freedom through its website or Facebook page, and follow @ECPMF and @obefintlig on Twitter.
