CIVICUS discusses Iran’s presidential election with Sina Entesari, an Iranian journalist and human rights defender currently living in exile. In 2018, Sina was sentenced to seven years in prison for reporting on human rights violations against religious and ethnic minorities. He was released in 2020 under a COVID-19 order and exiled to France, where he serves on the board of the International Community of Iranian Academics.
On 5 July, Iranians voted in a run-off presidential election to replace President Ebrahim Raisi, who died in a helicopter crash. Reformist ex-health minister Masoud Pezeshkian defeated ultra-conservative former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili by 53.6 to 44.3 per cent. Although ultimate power in Iran lies with the Supreme Leader, the outcome of the presidential election could influence Iran’s foreign and nuclear policies and its international relations.
What was at stake in the presidential election?
There were three sides to this election: Masoud Pezeshkian from the reformist camp, Mohammad Jalili from the conservative or revolutionary wing and people who reject the Islamic Republic regime and boycotted the election. What was at stake wasn’t just the victory of one candidate or the other, but the wider implications of public participation for the legitimacy of the regime.
The outcome of the election won’t significantly change the situation for Iranian people. While Pezeshkian and Jalili represent reformist and conservative factions respectively, no significant difference can be expected in their response to civil society demands. In Iran, ultimate authority rests with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. The president has no real decision-making power – he’s merely the executor of the supreme leader’s policies.
Pezeshkian’s victory will help the Iranian regime present a more moderate face to the west. He’s exactly the person the regime needs to stabilise the country’s position in terms of foreign policy. Interestingly, his candidacy wasn’t approved for the parliamentary election, but suddenly the same authority that had rejected him approved him for the presidential election. This is because he now fits the regime’s needs. This election was designed to make the regime’s needs look like public demands, but they are not. Pezeshkian’s election won’t lead to any meaningful change at home.
What do you make of the first-round results?
The official turnout of 40 per cent in the first round, which was questionable, was remarkably low compared to previous elections. It indicated widespread lack of faith in the electoral process and disillusionment based on the belief that there’s no real difference between the candidates.
Since 1997, Iranians have been forced to choose between bad and worse. They’ve voted not based on the merits of the candidates but out of fear that someone worse might come to power, so votes cast for Pezeshkian weren’t really for him, but against Jalili. This has led many in civil society to conclude abstention is the best course of action. As a result, voter turnout has fallen steadily since 2008, when it was 85 per cent. Every year, more and more people decide not to take part in this process.
What challenges does Iranian civil society face, and what was its position towards the election?
Iranian civil society faces severe restrictions, including internet filtering, media censorship, imprisonment of political activists and limited freedom of expression. These challenges are compounded by the lack of genuine political representation and the overarching control of the Supreme Leader, which stifles any meaningful reform efforts.
For civil society, it was clear a victory for the reformist candidate was unlikely to lead to significant improvements in civic space and human rights. Even if reformists have what they present as a slightly more progressive agenda, they lack real power to enact meaningful change. And people are already disappointed with reformists, having realised they are much more loyal to the regime’s structure than to people’s demands.
As a result, many in civil society advocated boycotting the elections as a form of protest against a regime that lacks legitimacy and genuine popular support. They saw participation as legitimising a system that doesn’t truly represent public will or address people’s demands.
How can the international community best support Iranian civil society?
International civil society and policymakers should understand that the regime will continue to pursue its overarching plans to destabilise the region in the long term. The change of administrations and their negotiating tones are merely tactics to manage crises and advance their extreme policies. Above all, the holding of elections in Iran should not be misinterpreted as a sign of democracy.
The international community can best support Iranian civil society by first acknowledging the significant level of disillusionment among Iranian people. This recognition should guide diplomatic and political efforts to address the root causes of disillusionment, such as the lack of genuine political representation and the regime’s authoritarian control.
Support for initiatives that promote human rights, freedom of expression and the empowerment of civil society can help strengthen the voices of Iranians. In addition, pressure on the Iranian regime to respect international human rights norms and encourage open dialogue between the regime and civil society can help create an environment conducive to meaningful political and social change.
Civic space in Iran is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor
Follow @ma_mooli on Twitter.