CIVICUS discusses the French election with Paymon Azmoudeh, a France-based political and geopolitical risk analyst. After several years working to strengthen civil society and human rights in the Middle East, Paymon is now a member of the France-based Queer & Feminist Collective, which was launched after the start of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement in Iran. The group campaigns for the abolition of systems of gender apartheid and for the rights of the LGBTQIA community in countries where sexual and gender minorities face institutionalised repression.
President Emmanuel Macron dissolved parliament and called a snap election in response to the results of the 9 June European Parliament election, which saw the far-right National Rally (RN) take first place on almost 34 per cent of the vote. The RN also led in the first round of National Assembly elections, but a left-wing coalition, the New Popular Front, quicky formed ahead of runoff votes to try to stop it taking seats. The Front then won the most seats but fell short of a majority, with Macron's Ensemble alliance second and the RN third. There appears to be no clear path to forming a government.
How unexpected were recent election results in France?
The fact the National Assembly election was called in the first place was more surprising than the results. The dissolution caught nearly everyone off guard, including most government officials. Even the Prime Minister, Gabriel Attal, was unaware of the decision to dissolve the assembly, which was made by Macron and a small circle of advisors without the cabinet’s participation.
Coming just after European Parliament election results were announced, the entire country was scrambling to understand what this sudden move meant and what Macron’s motivations were. From my perspective, it appears Macron was looking to regain the upper hand after the European election results. He saw the far right gaining significant traction, with 40 per cent of the vote between Marine Le Pen’s RN and Eric Zemmour’s Reconquête, and decided to use one of the most powerful constitutional tools available to try to break that fever.
Of course, the European election was as much a referendum on the current leadership as anything else, and the result reflected the government’s relative unpopularity. Many French people have perceived the government’s tone and messaging over the past several years as arrogant, while stagnating economic fortunes and a feeling of abandonment among rural and working-class communities outside the major cities have contributed to support for the far right.
The dissolution did prove to be a major success in one way: this election saw excellent turnout in comparison with past National Assembly elections, partly because it is rare to have these elections in isolation, rather than at the same time as presidential elections. There’s no question that the assembly members elected this time have a popular mandate. Given the nature of the results, however, no one really knows what exactly that mandate is.
What were Macron's motives for dissolving the National Assembly and calling early elections? To what extent did his strategy succeed or backfire?
The decision seemed like a gamble to test whether the public genuinely desired a far-right government or not. Macron and his Ensemble coalition, who had struggled to enact their policies under a minority government, hoped to frame the election as a binary choice between the centrists and the far right, as Macron successfully did in the 2017 and 2022 presidential elections. However, the left coalesced more effectively than Macron and the parties that make up Ensemble expected, forming a robust alternative that ended up taking a large number of the seats the outgoing government was hoping to pick up.
In moving forward with the dissolution, Macron appears to have underestimated both the unpopularity of his brand and the left’s ability to unite, at least temporarily. The ‘republican front’, a time-honoured French approach to blocking far-right candidates based on withdrawing in favour of the strongest alternative candidate, proved to still be at least somewhat effective. Instead of the anticipated binary choice, however, many electoral districts saw three-way races where runner-up candidates refused to withdraw, which often resulted in victories for left-wing candidates.
Despite the conventional wisdom being that the far right has fully ‘detoxified’ itself and the republican front would no longer work, the results showed that the majority of French voters still reject the far right’s platform and its vision for French society. Even so, while it may not be reflected in its share of National Assembly seats, the RN got the largest percentage of voters of any party in both electoral rounds. If it weren’t for the fact that the French electoral system was essentially designed to keep non-mainstream parties out of the halls of power, it would have won many more seats than the 55 it picked up this time around. The RN’s seat tally of 143 has already made it the largest single party in the Assembly.
How much influence do you think far-right parties will have in the new European Parliament? What policy implications will this have?
The trend of resurgent nationalism and scepticism towards the European project is evident. Far-right parties across Europe share a rejection of the post-war centre-left/centre-right political consensus and an antipathy towards the cultural and demographic changes of recent decades. The far right is also very effective when it comes to exploiting economic instability, concerns over immigration and most recently the impact of Russian’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Despite setbacks for the far right like those in France in 2022 and Poland in 2023, its momentum across Europe is very much an ongoing concern, particularly when it’s driven by media ecosystems favourable to its rhetoric. We have seen this trend in France, with a number of more overtly politicised media outlets gaining a wide audience and helping the RN make further inroads.
As they win more and more seats at the European and national levels, these parties will inevitably shift the policies being put in place by European governments, particularly on issues like immigration, national sovereignty and economic integration. This poses an ongoing challenge for the European Union (EU), as these parties tend to prioritise national sovereignty over collective European solutions. The push for a ‘Europe of nations’ reflects a fundamentally different vision of the EU’s future, and if these parties succeed, they will ultimately leave Europe weaker and more divided in a multipolar world – which is why hostile powers like Russia are so keen to back them.
How has the French political landscape changed as a result of the legislative election? What kind of government can be expected as a result?
As opposed to before, where centrists had a relative majority that allowed them to govern, France’s political landscape is now roughly evenly split between the left, the centre and the far right. None of these groups can govern independently, and all have claimed they cannot or will not govern in coalition with the others.
The left has emerged from these elections claiming victory and asserting that it is its prerogative to govern. While it secured the most seats, it did not win a majority, and President Macron has instead argued that no one actually ‘won’ the election. Even so, the left-wing coalition’s electoral success is an important milestone, and the hope coming out of the elections was that left-wing parties wouldn’t squander this moment in their debates over who they should now propose as prime minister.
Unfortunately, that appears to be what’s happening, with one part of the New Popular Front – La France insoumise, France Unbowed – at loggerheads with its coalition partners over who would be an acceptable choice for the premiership. These parties have started publicly airing their disagreements over their prospective choices, and if this goes on for much longer, they will sacrifice the opportunity to set the tempo for the new National Assembly.
For his part, Macron’s strategy will involve attempting to coax away members from the left-wing coalition, particularly targeting the Socialists, to form a broader coalition similar to Germany’s various grand coalitions under Angela Merkel. However, the Socialists have made clear up to this point that it intends to stay loyal to its coalition partners. Even if the grand coalition approach were to succeed in the short term, any government it produced would be vulnerable to no-confidence votes.
Instead, given this fragmented landscape, it is quite possible we will instead see a technocratic government formed, led by a mutually acceptable elder statesperson until the next opportunity for an election arises. This could be as soon as a year from now, when Macron is permitted to call an election again. Other countries in Europe have experienced this type of scenario, but this is new for France.
Do you think democracy was at stake? What role has civil society played and what more could it do to defend and deepen democracy?
Ultimately, I do think democracy was and still is at stake. Even if a far-right government were to win an absolute majority and form a government, it would struggle to enact much of its programme without running foul of the constitution. For example, measures that discriminate between French citizens based on their place of birth would necessitate constitutional changes.
We’ve seen the long-term impact of far-right governments even after they’ve left power, such as with the Trump administration in the USA. If the far right ever leads a government in France, it could have a profound and potentially harmful effect on democracy. The RN’s core platform is based on an idea of ‘national preference’ that flies in the face of the race-blind, colour-blind, egalitarian ideals of the French Republic, and its attitudes and discourse suggest it would govern in an illiberal manner, much like the current government in Hungary and until recently the government of Poland.
French civil society played a crucial role in the republican front, which once again kept the far right out of power. Labour unions, civic groups and community organisations mobilised effectively to support the left-wing coalition in particular. The quick unification of normally fractious political parties into an effective electoral coalition also facilitated this mobilisation.
However, the long-term influence of labour unions has waned, and there’s a broader atomisation of French society, like many other societies. Fortunately, young French people remain politically active and engaged, and they are ready and willing to demonstrate and organise for their beliefs. This energy is a good sign for the future of French civil society, although there is also no denying that the far right and its ideas are making inroads among the youngest generation of French voters as well.
One interesting development is the left-wing coalition’s professed openness to having a non-politician, such as a union leader or civil society figure, lead the next government. It does not appear that coalition members are close to agreeing on a candidate amongst themselves, but if they were to pursue this idea, it would signal an interesting shift towards greater inclusion of civil society in governance.
Overall, civil society here, as everywhere, must continue to be vigilant and active in defending democratic norms and the ideals upon which French democracy has been built.
Civic space in France is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
