advocacy

• ANGOLA: ‘Much effort was put into excluding people from the electoral process’

  PORTUGUESE

  CIVICUS speaks about the recent Angolan election and its aftermath with Catarina Antunes Gomes and Cesaltina Abreu from the Social Sciences and Humanities Laboratory of the Catholic University of Angola (LAB). LAB works closely with Civic Movement Mudei (‘I changed’ in Portuguese), a movement of multiple civil society organisations (CSOs) that advocate for democratic change in Angola. It campaigns for voting rights and fair conditions of electoral competition, including transparent funding, equitable media coverage and citizen monitoring of election processes.

  

   What kinds of civic space restrictions did Angolan civil society encounter during the election?

  Civil society has faced many constraints before, during and after the election. Prior to the election, there was a partial review of the constitution that was done without any consultation and did not follow the recommendations of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. The organic law on general elections was also amended without the participation of civil society or the political opposition, and it resulted in reduced electoral transparency. Key stakeholders were denied a platform to be part of the process.

  A few months before the election, the government also decided to change Angola’s political and administrative division, with potential impact on the drawing of electoral districts. Although it did not follow through with this reform, this caused great confusion and gave rise to suspicions about the intentions of the ruling party, the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the credibility of the election.

  In 2021 President João Lourenço appointed Laurinda Cardoso, a member of the MPLA’s political bureau, as chief judge of the Constitutional Court. Civil society also raised concerns about the appointment and swearing in of Manuel Pereira da Silva as the new president of the National Electoral Commission. But our voices have been overlooked during the whole process.

  The media situation has also been very precarious. Since the start of the electoral process, state intervention has increased, even in private media. Mudei monitored the media coverage of various parties and candidates from May until July and found that both public and private media had become instruments of propaganda, undermining the right to freedom of information and free choice.

  On 6 July, just as the electoral campaign was about to begin, a new law was proposed to prohibit surveys and posts revealing voting choices. Instead of ensuring people were fully included in the electoral process, much effort was put into excluding them.

  As a result, the level of transparency and fairness of the 24 August election has been dubious to say the least. It has been questioned by civil society through many public statements. The organisations we work with, Mudei and LAB, have produced a statementindicating they do not consider the elections to have been transparent, fair and free.

  What do you think contributed to low voter turnout?

  There were probably many reasons why fewer than half of registered voters went to the polls, but we believe major ones were disorganisation, fear and lack of trust.

  The whole process was badly organised. In September 2021 there was an ‘unofficial electoral registration’ period, which is really a process of connecting databases to determine who is eligible to vote, but it was not made clear to people what this was about. Most people were confused about what the law said on residency and voting. The process was marked by lack of clarity and irregularities. Everything seemed too complicated so many lost interest. Many people were excluded as a result.

  People were also afraid. The electoral campaign should be a time when candidates share their ideas with us, debate their parties’ proposals and tell us their thoughts about Angola’s future. But this was not what happened. The ruling party had a strong negative discourse, treating the other parties as enemies rather than adversaries. They didn’t present any ideas on how to make the country progress and what they published as their political programme was of very low quality.

  Staying away from the polls can also be interpreted as a form of protest. We have done a lot of comparative electoral analysis and found that protest voting has increased in Angola through the years. This is the result of people’s complete lack of faith in political institutions, given their limited democratic character and lack of transparency. This year the protest vote rose even further.

  How has the Angolan government reacted to civil society’s criticisms of electoral irregularities?

  The government has responded with repression. There are two situations that we would like to share with CIVICUS and other international allies so they can help us by providing visibility, pressuring human rights international bodies and offering support in the form of capacity-building and funding for human rights activists and social movements in Angola.

  The first situation concerns Pascoal Baptistiny, executive director of MBAKITA, a CSO that promotes the rights of Indigenous peoples and traditional communities in the province of Cuando Cubango in southern Angola. Pascoal has expressed concerns about the election, including in an interview with CIVICUS last year. This made him a target. He was put under surveillance and has recently requested our help to evacuate his family to Luanda, Angola’s capital, because he has been threatened and is afraid for their safety.

  The second situation concerns several members of Mudei, including its coordinator, who has been threatened repeatedly. Another of our colleagues, who was an independent candidate, has been mentioned in aggressive articles and social media posts along with an official from the European Union delegation in Luanda. They are attacked as part of a supposed subversive conspiracy involving powerful international interests aiming at destabilising Angola.

  The feeling of oppression has been increasing. The Angolan army has been put on high alert, allegedly to prevent attacks. But how would unarmed civilians be able to attack them? That is clearly an excuse; their presence is threatening and intimidating. We urge the international community to publicly denounce what our government is doing to people and act to protect civil society activists who continue to work regardless and face threats and violence as a result.

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  Civic space in Angola is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Mudei through itsFacebook page,and follow@MovCivicoMudei on Twitter.

• ANGOLA: ‘The new NGO Law is just a way of legalising the government’s arrogance and excesses’

  PORTUGUESE

  CIVICUS discusses the state of civic space and the new restrictions being imposed on the work of Angolan civil society with Godinho Cristóvão, a jurist, human rights defender and executive director of the association Movimento de Defensores de Direitos Humanos de Angola (Movement of Human Rights Defenders of Angola, KUTAKESA).

  KUTAKESA is a civil society organisation (CSO) working for the rights and protection of human rights defenders (HRDs) in Angola, particularly those active in more vulnerable areas, working on more sensitive issues and from historically excluded groups.

  What are the current conditions for civil society in Angola?

  Angolan CSOs work in a climate of suspicion and uncertainty, despite the fact that the Constitution of the Republic of Angola enshrines a catalogue of citizens’ fundamental rights, freedoms and guarantees.

  The Angolan authorities should have aligned themselves with the democratic rule of law and respected the work of CSOs and HRDs. Instead, there has been an increase in threats, harassment and illegal arrests of HRDs who denounce or hold peaceful demonstrations against acts of bad governance and violations of citizens’ rights and freedoms. There have been clear setbacks with regard to the guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the constitution, as well as the rights set out in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other human rights treaties Angola has ratified.

  How is the government targeting civil society with restrictive legislation?

  The attacks on civil society are totally uncalled for. On 25 May, the Angolan National Assembly passed a draft NGO Statute, despite severe criticism from CSOs, which have stated that it limits freedom of association and gives the state excessive powers to interfere with CSO activities.

  The government targets civil society with legislation that is meant for terrorists and money launderers, though it has never been proven in any court that a CSO has committed an act of terrorism in Angola. On the contrary, the rationale of this legislation constitutes institutional terrorism, the target of which are CSOs.

  In Angola we all know who the corrupt are, and which party feeds corruption and money laundering. And as far as we know, CSOs are not part of that group. Funders of Angolan CSOs are all clearly identified, and the transfer of funds goes through national banking institutions and a rigorous compliance process. It is also worth remembering that many CSO funders are the same ones that fund government projects.

  How does the new restrictive law compare with the 2015 decree that was declared unconstitutional?

  In general, the content and spirit of Presidential Decree 74/15 on the Regulation of NGOs are the same as those of the new NGO Statute Law. By way of example, the rights and duties chapter of the previous regulation, later declared unconstitutional, was retained with only minimal changes in wording that in no way alter its content and its controlling and repressive spirit.

  Additionally, the decree that was found unconstitutional provided for an administrative body under the tutelage of the Angolan executive – called IMPROCAC – with the power to monitor and control CSO actions. The recently approved draft NGO Statute Law provides for a similar body with the same attributions as the old IMPROCAC.

  In other words, this is a new attempt to impose similar restrictions, but it is more serious since its instrument is no longer a presidential decree but a law. This means that it is no longer only the executive that is attacking the principles of autonomy and freedom of association provided for in article 48 of the constitution, but Congress as well, in which the president’s party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), has a majority. It is worth remembering that it was the MPLA majority that approved the 2010 constitution which it is now violating by passing the NGO Statute Law.

  How is civil society, including KUTAKESA, reacting to the proposed law?

  CSOs, at least the most active ones, are not looking favourably on the approval of this law, given the threats it represents in terms of closing off civic space in Angola.

  We are taking joint action to prevent the final approval of this law and its entry into force. From the point of view of legal certainty and security, the courts should be aligned with the principle of jurisprudential precedent. Since they submitted the presidential decree to a review of unconstitutionality and declared it unconstitutional, they should now follow suit, given that the new law contains the same irregularities.

  All national organisations took a joint position to call on parliament to take off the agenda the law now approved. This was done through information exchange meetings with opposition parties represented in parliament. At the same time we made public statements alerting the public about the dangers for freedom of association if the law was approved, and we made urgent appeals to the special rapporteurs of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the United Nations (UN) who have a mandate on freedom of association and HRDs to alert the Angolan government about the consequences the law will have on respect for human rights.

  On KUTAKESA’s part, urgent appeals were made to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in Africa, Remy Ngoy Lumbu, and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, Mary Lawlor.

  Do you see the new law as part of a wider trend to restrict civic space?

  Yes of course, but it is also important to note that the repression of peaceful and legal demonstrations predates the approval of this law. Government mismanagement and endemic corruption have been some of the main causes of the deteriorating social, economic and family conditions for the majority of the population, leading to growing protests and mass demonstrations, which have often been repressed. The approval of this law is just another means of repression and of legalising the arrogance and excesses of the government and its agents, particularly the national police.

  While the law is not necessarily intended as a response to the ongoing protests, given that the attempt to get it passed dates back to 2015, it is likely to be used as another tool to crack down on the protests.

  Now, if the government has good sense and makes a strategic reading of the current political and social context of Angola, it could stop the process of approval of the law or, if it is too late for that, the president could refuse to promulgate it, taking the appeals of civil society into consideration. The law’s approval would certainly increase the number of protests and demonstrations.

  Civic space in Angola is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with KUTAKESA through theirwebsite.

• ANGOLA: ‘The untrue government narrative reveals an aversion to civil society denouncing malpractice’

   PORTUGUESE

  

  CIVICUS discusses the state of civic space and the new restrictions being imposed on civil society in Angola with Emilio José Manuel, focal point for Angola of the Lusophone Platform for Human Rights and founding member of the Working Group for Human Rights Monitoring in Angola (GTMDH).

  The GTMDH is a platform of civil society organisations (CSOs) that works to promote and defend human rights and strives for social justice within the framework of the Angolan constitution and other current laws, as well as international conventions and treaties.

  What are the conditions for civil society in Angola?

  Although there is currently no direct or indirect interference in the work of civil society in Angola, the authorities’ discourse is that, because they receive funding from international institutions, CSOs defend and represent foreign interests.

  Meanwhile there are many joint actions between public institutions and CSOs. For example, once a year the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights organises a forum with CSOs where the GTMDH presents its public position on human rights and provides information on the granting of registration certificates, the legal documents that the Angolan state gives to each CSO attesting that it is legally registered and can operate in the country.

  Why is the government targeting CSOs with legislation aimed at terrorists and money launderers?

  According to the report supporting the draft law, the president considers that he has ‘encountered constraints and difficulties in ensuring compliance with international obligations assumed by the Angolan Government in the area of money laundering and the financing of terrorism’. Hence the need to control the sources and destination of CSO funds.

  This narrative of the Angolan government is untrue and clearly demonstrates its aversion to the role of CSOs in monitoring and denouncing government malpractice. Financial support for the projects of CSOs and human rights defenders comes from well-identified organisations and goes through banking institutions with strict compliance rules – and some of these funders are the same ones that support government projects.

  On 26 May, the draft NGO Statute Law was passed in general by the Angolan National Assembly, ignoring severe criticism from civil society, which has made clear that it limits the right of association and gives the executive excessive powers to interfere in CSO activities.

  The situation is very alarming because the draft law imposes a 120-day period for existing CSOs to make their statutes conform with the law, otherwise they will be outlawed outright without a judicial decision. Article 2 of the draft law requires existing CSOs to conform with the new provisions, under penalty of having their statutes and registrations revoked. This is a violation of the principle of legality and access to justice guaranteed by the Angolan constitution. The principle of legality requires that the law should be clearly articulated and known in advance and should not be applied retroactively.

  How has civil society reacted to the draft law?

  Civil society analysed the draft law and reacted against it. In collaboration with the GTMDH coordinator, my role as legal officer was to prepare petitions, public position papers and communications with the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, and to engage with regional and international partners to amplify the voices of Angolan civil society.

  We requested a technical opinion from UN Special Rapporteur Clément Voule and drafted a public civil society position on the bill explaining why it violates freedoms of association, which we presented publicly at a press conference.

  We advocated with opposition parties represented in parliament and made contacts with the Angolan Bar Association to file, within the scope of our constitutional prerogatives, the appropriate action for an assessment of the unconstitutionality of the draft law. The day before the general approval of the draft law, we sent a public petition to the National Assembly demanding that it not approve it.

  Our next action will be to send a letter to the presidents of some key countries about the closure of civic space in Angola and increasing controls over CSOs, including international CSOs.

  Protests are also taking place against the proposed NGO Statute Law, which have converged with protests against measures that have increased fuel prices and a crackdown on street vendors.

  Do you see this bill as part of a wider trend of restricting civic space?

  The recent repression of demonstrations, arrests of activists and attacks on protesters, including women, is an indicator that civic space is being severely restricted. The use of force by the national police has resulted in deaths without any appropriate process to hold to account and punish police officers involved in cases of violence, torture and killings.

  Our country depends on importing food staples and other goods from abroad. Right now the prices of food, other goods and services have increased. Street vendors are a group that some CSOs work with, particularly those dedicated to empowering women to establish small businesses. Some organisations provide micro credits to street vendors. Although the street vendors’ movement has a life of its own, it is CSOs and their lawyers who have provided them with free legal aid.

  There is a current of national solidarity, taking into account that the law does not explicitly say it will regulate all initiatives by citizens who wish to create an association. My personal opinion is that everyone feels that control will go further. The draft NGO Statute Law lacks a clear definition of what a ‘non-governmental organisation’ is. It also includes vague provisions that need to be better fleshed out to enable the proper interpretation of the law. For example, it is difficult to understand the meaning and normative scope of article 19(1)(d), which imposes a ‘duty on NGOs to refrain from practices and actions that are subversive or liable to be confused with them’. The unanswered question here is how subversive actions are to be defined in the context of the law.

  How does the new draft law compare with the 2015 decree that was deemed unconstitutional?

  According to the analysis we’ve made, the arguments and contents are the same as in Decree 74/15 on the Regulation of NGOs. We have the new role of counselling judges in the Constitutional Court. The situation in the Supreme Court indicates that we have a crisis in the judiciary. So it is uncertain whether this time the judicial decision will be in favour of CSOs. The present draft law establishes rules to control, restrict, approve, authorise and suspend the activities of CSOs, including CSO extinction by an administrative entity to be determined by the president as holder of the executive power, which violates the principle of freedom of association as provided in article 48 of the constitution.

  Do you view the draft NGO Statute Law as part of a regional or global trend?

  After having participated in sessions of the NGO Forum and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, I noted a tendency to restrict civic space throughout Africa. As part of the civil society strategy, we held meetings with activists from Mozambique to share experiences and assemble regional, continental and international strategies. It is worth remembering that various activists, whether linked to CSOs or not, are directly involved in campaigns and waves of protest to try to ensure that the draft law is not given final approval by parliament and promulgated by the president.

  Civic space in Angola is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Contact GTMDH through itswebsite.

• ASEAN: ‘Laos’s leadership raises serious human rights concerns’

  CIVICUS speaks about the implications of Laos chairing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with Mary Aileen Diaz Bacalso, Executive Director of the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA).

  Founded in 1991, FORUM-ASIA is a network of 85 organisations across 23 countries, mainly in Asia. It works to strengthen movements for human rights and sustainable development through research, advocacy, capacity development and solidarity actions in Asia and beyond. It has consultative status with the United Nations and maintains a consultative relationship with the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights.

  What are the main challenges ASEAN will likely face in 2024?

  ASEAN is a regional alliance comprising of 10 Southeast Asian countries, plus Timor-Leste, which is on track to join. It was established in 1967 to preserve peace and stability in the Cold War era. Nowadays it oversees collaborative efforts on its three pillars of economic, socio-cultural and political and security matters. It is also meant to promote and safeguard human rights through a regional mechanism within the political-security pillar.

  With Laos as chair, ASEAN will face three significant challenges in 2024. The first is related to its reliance on consensus politics and non-interference, which means that progress depends on each member state’s unique circumstances. Political events such as elections in Indonesia, attempted coups in Myanmar and regressions in human rights and democracy in countries across the region, including in Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, obstruct advances in the protection and promotion of human rights and put the ability to achieve consensus to the test.

  The second challenge is the result of a notable lack of optimism and growing scepticism by human rights organisations about Laos’s role as chair. Laos’s reputation for human rights abuses and violations of fundamental freedoms raises doubts about its ability to lead ASEAN effectively in improving human rights protections.

  The third challenge is linked to external factors, particularly geopolitical tensions between China and the west, which will influence the regional bloc. These pressures may impact on economic, socio-cultural and political-security cooperation within ASEAN, adding another layer of complexity to the challenges the organisation will face in 2024.

  What does the fact that Laos is chairing ASEAN in 2024 mean for China’s standing and role in the region and globally?

  Laos continues to have the same voting power as other ASEAN members, but as chair, it has greater influence in shaping the organisation’s agenda. For instance, it has chosen ‘Enhancing Connectivity and Resilience’ as the theme for 2024 and has shown commitment to fostering connections with the East Asia bloc, including China. An official statement issued by the 2024 ASEAN Foreign Ministers Retreat emphasised the importance of enhancing ties between ASEAN and East Asian countries. It highlighted mechanisms such as the East Asia-ASEAN Summit, which includes the 10 ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea.

  Two key concerns arise under Laos’s leadership, particularly regarding human rights. First, it’s uncertain how it will approach the Myanmar crisis, particularly due to the continued reliance on ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus as the primary reference, despite calls from civil society to move beyond this plan.

  Laos has designated a seasoned diplomat as the ASEAN Special Envoy, tasked with meeting junta leader Min Aung Hlaing in Myanmar. However, the lack of a clear agenda for engaging with supporters of democracy such as the National Unity Government, the National Unity Consultative Council and the Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations raises doubts that ASEAN is playing a progressive role. Given historical and political ties between the military junta and the government of Laos, concerns linger about ASEAN’s alignment with the interests of people in Myanmar.

  Second, the future of the human rights agenda is uncertain given Laos’s dubious human rights track record, which includes cases like the 2012 enforced disappearance of a prominent member of Laotian civil society, Sombath Somphone, and the deportation of the Chinese human rights lawyer Lu Siwei in October 2023. Plans have already been outlined for the 2024 ASEAN Human Rights Dialogue, but it is unclear whether civil society will be included or whether Laos will ensure a secure environment for it to take part.

  Another pending topic on the human rights agenda is the revision of the terms of reference of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, which are supposed to be revised every five years but haven’t experienced any improvement in one and a half decades.

  Does Laos’s role as chair create any significant opportunity for Laotian civil society?

  We are quite sceptical about the potential impact of these changes in regional institutions on the domestic civil society landscape of a country with closed civic space.

  Laos systematically represses civil society activists and dissenters through a variety of legal and extra-legal measures, including surveillance, threats and violence. The decision to choose Timor-Leste over Laos as the host for the ASEAN Civil Society Conference/ASEAN Peoples’ Forum despite Laos holding the ASEAN chair underscores the apprehensions of civil society regarding safety within Laos.

  Given the principle of non-interference on which ASEAN is based, it remains an unresolved question whether other ASEAN countries will scrutinise Laos’s human rights track record.

  Nonetheless, from a civil society standpoint, this situation presents an opportunity to amplify efforts in advocating for justice and accountability for victims of human rights violations in Laos.

  FORUM-ASIA is steadfast in its commitment to monitor the human rights situation, document violations and hold the Laotian government, as well as all ASEAN governments, accountable for upholding their commitment to protect and promote human rights in accordance with international human rights standards.

  It is key to strengthen solidarity with Laos and leverage the momentum of Laos’s chairing of ASEAN. We urge the international community to participate in campaigns and advocacy initiatives. We must join forces to amplify the voices of the oppressed, shine the spotlight on Laos and the region and undertake collective action to address human rights concerns.

• AUSTRALIA: ‘Indigenous Australians must be represented at the heart of policy-making’

  CIVICUS speaks about Indigenous peoples’ rights in Australia with Paul Wright, National Director of Australians for Native Title and Reconciliation (ANTaR), a civil society organisation (CSO) that works in solidarity with and advocates for the rights of Indigenous peoples in Australia, including by aiming to change the attitudes and behaviours of non-Indigenous Australians.

  What is the current situation of Indigenous peoples in Australia?

  As soon as colonisation began in 1788, Australia’s First Nations peoples, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, were systematically persecuted and marginalised. They were dispossessed of their lands and denied the rights afforded to settlers or colonisers.

  In 2022, more than 230 years since colonisation began and 120 years after the former colonies federated into the Commonwealth of Australia, Indigenous Australians continue fighting for their rights and to have their sovereignty recognised.

  Through the years, there have been big wins, frustrating disappointments and broken promises from governments. Human rights have been consistently denied or violated. Australia was one of the last nations to ratify the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), and following ratification it has done very little to honour or domesticate the articles of the declaration.

  More positively, the Australian Human Rights Commission includes an Indigenous Social Justice Commissioner whose role is to advocate for the rights of Indigenous peoples and keep Indigenous issues on the agenda of the Australian federal government. The position is currently filled by a Bunuba woman, Dr June Oscar, who is a great source of information on the human rights situation of Indigenous Australians.

  While things are slowly improving, Indigenous Australians continue to have a lower life expectancy, live in poorer health and have worse employment and education outcomes than non-Indigenous Australians.

  The wide health gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities was highlighted by the Close the Gap Campaign, co-chaired by the Indigenous Social Justice Commissioner and the CEO of the National Association of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Workers and Practitioners. In response, the Australian government entered into the National Agreement on Closing the Gap with the Coalition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peak Organisations, committing to implementing tangible policy reforms. In July 2020 it issued its second Annual Data Compilation Report that tracks the implementation of the agreement.

  Do you think Australian Indigenous peoples are well represented in policy-making processes?

  They are not, so the current political battle in Australia is to make sure Indigenous Australians are represented at the heart of the policy-making that affects them. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have issued the Uluru Statement from the Heart, an invitation to ‘walk with us in a movement of the Australian people for a better future’. It calls for structural reforms, including constitutional change, to establish a First Nations’ ‘Voice to Parliament’ and kick off a national process of truth-telling and reconciliation. The current federal Labor government has committed to holding a referendum to decide this question. This is a major moment for Australia.

  Since the 1992 Mabo High Court decision, which recognised that a group of Torres Strait Islanders, led by Eddie Mabo, held ownership of Mer (Murray Island), native title has been recognised for all Indigenous people in Australia. In response to that seminal High Court ruling, the government introduced the Native Title Act, and over the next 30 years, 40 per cent of the Australian landmass has been returned to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples that have made claims. Not all claims have been successful, however: native title rights are limited and do not entail self-determination at the level outlined in the UNDRIP and other international standards.

  How is ANTaR working to advance the rights of Indigenous Australians?

  ANTaR is a national advocacy organisation that promotes the rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people that was founded 25 years ago. We began as a grassroots protest movement to resist government attempts to water down legislation on native title rights. We have subsequently worked alongside many Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander leaders, organisations and communities to advocate for rights and justice. Our priorities have included health equality, justice, anti-racism, advocacy for a treaty, reconciliation and much more.

  As an ally organisation, we operate under the principle of not speaking for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and instead look to their leadership and direction to channel our resources and support. There are a growing number of solid connections between Indigenous peoples globally, which is encouraging. Australia has learned many lessons from Indigenous affairs in Canada, Norway, New Zealand and elsewhere.

  Civic space in Australia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with ANTaR through itswebsite orFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@ANTaR_National on Twitter. 

• AUSTRALIA: ‘There will be little change on First Nations people’s recognition, representation and rights’

  CIVICUS speaks with Peter Lewis, president of Australians for Native Title and Reconciliation (ANTaR), about the recent defeat in areferendum of a proposal to recognise Indigenous Australians in the constitution and create a permanent institution so they can speak directly to government and parliament on matters relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.

  ANTaR is a civil society organisation (CSO) that works in solidarity with and advocates for the rights of Indigenous peoples in Australia,conducting independent research and analysis and providing Australians with quality information on priorities concerning First Nations rights.

  What was the process leading to the referendum?

  In December 2010, an Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous Australians was established and started discussing how to constitutionally recognise First Nations peoples. In January 2012, the panel suggested a new section be added to the Constitution – ‘Section 51A’ – to recognise First Peoples as the original inhabitants of the nation now known as Australia. The federal government later announced that a referendum on the matter would be delayed by two to three years due to an absence of widespread public support.

  In December 2015, a Referendum Council was established and began consultations on how best to establish constitutional recognition of First Nations peoples. A discussion paper was released in October 2016 and articulated the central suggestions for constitutional reform to include a declaration of recognition, a ban on racial discrimination and a First Nations Voice to Parliament, with the right to be consulted on legislation relevant to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.

  In May 2017, a convention at Uluru heard the outcomes from the First Nations Dialogues, with 250 First Nations leaders and representatives in attendance. Despite the generosity of spirit embodied by the Uluru statement, in October 2017 the government of then Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull outrightly rejected its proposals, breaking is promise of ‘doing things with’ Aboriginal people instead of to them. Turnbull made this decision unilaterally, without any consultation with or regard for the National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples, a national representative body, or members of the Referendum Council.

  In March 2018 the government established another Joint Select Committee that was tasked to again inquire into and report on constitutional change. Its final report endorsed a constitutionally enshrined Voice to Parliament. By the end of 2018, the Labor opposition had promised to establish a Voice for First Nations people and vowed to take the issue of constitutional recognition to referendum if elected to government in 2019.

  On 29 September 2022, the inaugural meeting of the Referendum Working Group and the Referendum Engagement Group discussed the steps to a 2023 referendum on a First Nations Voice to Parliament. The Constitutional Alteration (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Voice) 2023 Bill was introduced to parliament on 30 March 2023. On the same day, a Joint Select Committee was formed to analyse and report on the bill.

  The committee heard from witnesses and published submissions, and recommended that parliament pass the bill without amendment. The House of Representatives passed it on 31 May and the Senate did so on 19 June. This meant a referendum would be called within the next six months.

  A constitutionally enshrined First Nations Voice to Parliament would offer a first step toward structural and symbolic reform, ensuring that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders peoples can have a say about the laws and policies that impact on their lives and communities.

  Who sided for and against?

  The federal leadership of conservative parties – the Liberal and National parties – did not support the referendum. However, there was some support for the Voice within the conservative parties federally and in some states and territories.

  There was also some opposition by a minority of First Nations leaders on the basis that the Voice did not represent an adequate transfer of power and that a treaty should come before any changes to the constitution. But a vast majority of First Nations leaders and organisations supported recognition and voice, as did most civil society organisations and some business organisations.

  ANTaR was active in the Yes campaign and worked with others to establish Allies for Uluru. In October 2022 we initiated a Yes to Voice, Truth and Treaty Campaign.

  The Yes campaign also received support from international CSOs such as Amnesty International and Oxfam, and its measures were supported by United Nations (UN) experts, and specifically by successive Special Rapporteurs on the rights of Indigenous Peoples.

  But the referendum was used by neo-Nazi and QAnon adherents to stoke fear about First Nations peoples’ aspirations.

  What kind of disinformation was circulated?

  The No side of the debate made a number of false claims ranging from the misleading to clear lies. There were claims that the Voice would be a third chamber of parliament and that it would delay all decision making. There were claims that Australians would lose their homes as a result, and that it would enable First Nations people to establish their own military, and even that it would allow the UN to take over Australia. There were claims that the move was legally risky and that it would divide the nation – although currently the federal government can legislate for First Nations people through the ‘race powers’, a constitutional clause that says the government can make special laws for people of any particular race. So the nation is clearly already divided.

  Why do you think the initiative failed, and what will the consequences be?

  In Australia referendums rarely succeed, and in fact have never succeeded without support from all major parties.

  The No case included much disinformation and fearmongering and a majority of the electorate responded negatively. It should however be noted that many inner-city and inner suburban areas, as well as First Nations-dominated remote areas, voted yes.

  Because of this result, there will be little change and First Nations people’s recognition, representation and rights will depend on whoever is in government at the time. First Nations organisations will renew their calls for justice and recognition of their sovereignty and press on issues such as treaty-making, truth-telling and reducing disadvantage by providing greater agency for First Nations communities.

  Civic space in Australia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with ANTaR through itswebsite orFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@ANTaR_National on Twitter.

• AUSTRIA: ‘A new civil society coalition is emerging to defend democracy against extremism’

  CIVICUS speaks about the growth of the far right in Austria withGabriela Greilinger, PhD Student at the University of Georgia, USA and co-founder and director Quo Vademus,a grassroots think tank publishing analysis by young writers and encouraging young people to engage with politics and current affairs.

  What are the main far-right groups in Austria, and how concerning is their recent growth?

  The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) is the main far-right political party, but there are other groups outside the party system that are also ideologically far right and are considered very close to the FPÖ, such as Identitarian Movement Austria. Freiheitliche Jugend (Freedom Party Youth of Austria), the youth wing of the FPÖ, also maintains close links to the Identitarian Movement. There are also right-wing extremist fraternities, such as Olympia, which are similarly closely connected to the FPÖ.

  The FPÖ’s recent rise in the polls is not really a novelty but rather a recurrence. Since its founding after the Second World War, it has been included as a coalition partner in government several times and has risen and fallen in popularity over the years. It plummeted in the polls following the 2019 Ibiza scandal – in which FPÖ politicians were filmed appearing to offer business contracts in return for support – and other corruption allegations, and the breakup of the far-right coalition government led by Sebastian Kurz, which included the right-wing conservative, Christian-democratic Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) along with the FPÖ. After that, the Austrian Freedom Party went through several leadership changes.

  Several factors jointly account for the FPÖ’s most recent surge in the polls. First came the COVID-19 pandemic, during which it positioned itself as a strong opposition to the public health measures put in place by the ÖVP-Greens coalition government, including mandatory testing and vaccinations. It openly supported anti-lockdown demonstrations, bringing together people from both right and left.

  Then, in 2021, corruption allegations around then-ÖVP chancellor Kurz emerged, which played into the hands of the FPÖ, helping it regain its popularity. This was followed by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which led to an energy crisis and soaring prices in Austria, a country traditionally highly dependent on Russian gas.

  As a result, inflation surged further and exacerbated economic anxieties, which have remained largely unaddressed by the current government. All of this has helped the FPÖ regain its popularity, so much so that in November 2022 it surpassed the Social Democrats in the polls and has polled around 30 per cent since. Forecasts predict that it will come in first in this year’s elections and, if so, it would for the first time in history be able to appoint the chancellor.

  What public concerns is the FPÖ tapping into?

  Immigration is certainly one of the main issues the FPÖ keeps coming back to, but not the only one.  The FPÖ also engages in ‘culture war’ politics, taking on issues such as gender-inclusive language and LGBTQI+ rights.

  Over the past couple of years, in the context of rising inflation following the pandemic and during the war in Ukraine, it has also increasingly tapped into people’s financial anxieties.

  Overall, though, it doesn’t present any viable solutions to people’s concerns but rather attacks and smears political opponents, trying to present itself as the clean alternative to what it calls the ‘system parties’ – a term formerly used by Nazis. Social media, specifically Facebook, is one of the main platforms it uses to spread their messages.

  How have Austrian civil society and public opinion reacted to this rise of the far right?

  The far right has long been mainstreamed and normalised in Austria, among other reasons because of its repeated inclusion in government. That means its rise, while concerning, is not necessarily surprising or shocking to most people. We’ve seen it happen before. Still, time and again there have been protests against the far right – in 2017, for instance, people mobilised against the inclusion of the FPÖ in the right-wing Kurz government.

  However, civil society and its leaders have again become more outspoken in recent weeks, after the German investigative outlet Correctiv reported on a secretive meeting known as the Lehnitzsee Conference that took place last November in Germany, in which right-wing extremists, businesspeople and even some members of the mainstream conservative Christian Democratic Union discussed plans to expel millions of people deemed not sufficiently ‘assimilated’ to the majority society. A notorious Austrian extremist, Martin Sellner, took part in the event, implicating the Austrian extreme-right scene.

  This far-right meeting triggered large-scale anti-far-right demonstrations in Germany, which inspired Austrians to organise protests in Vienna and other cities across the country. Although the protests were fewer and smaller in size than Germany’s, many people mobilised.

  We have also seen the emergence of a new civil society coalition to defend democracy against extremism. In response to the revelations about the Lehnitzsee Conference, several civil society organisations formed the Coalition for Human Rights and Democracy (Bündnis für Menschenrechte und Demokratie) to ‘create a firewall’ against right-wing extremism. It then also organised a demonstration in defence of democracy in the city of Graz.

  How has the government reacted to the rise of the far right?

  As of today, we’ve seen little reaction or attempts by the government to curtail the far right. It’s been rather the opposite: the ÖVP has long adopted the messages of the far right on immigration and largely appropriated the FPÖ’s depiction of immigrants. And although the current chancellor, Karl Nehammer, had said he would not enter a coalition that includes FPÖ leader Herbert Kickl, a hardliner, he has not completely ruled it out after this year’s election.

  As it stands, the FPÖ is set to win the election and a relaunch of another ÖVP-FPÖ coalition seems to be the most likely option. All in all, I see the government making very little effort to avert the far-right danger. If anything, the ÖVP is trying to take the wind out of the FPÖ’s sails by co-opting its agenda and programme. This is not weakening the far right but rather mainstreaming its policy points and making it part of the ‘normal’ public debate – which it shouldn’t be.

  What forms of international support does Austrian civil society need to sustain its efforts?

  I believe that there could and should be more international cooperation between civil society organisations that are addressing right-wing extremism and racism. Further, more positive media coverage is needed of civil society efforts to mobilise in defence of democracy to divert the focus from the far right. While it is true that the far right has once again made significant advances, the media continues to focus disproportionately on far-right successes, potential future successes, positions and discourse, simply giving it too much airtime. In contrast, there is much less focus on the forces standing up for democracy and civil society’s efforts to respond to extremism.

  At the end of the day, as the slogan used in the German protests goes, ‘Wir sind mehr’ (We are more). We are the majority, even if at times a silent one – and not the far-right supporters and sympathisers.

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  Civic space in Austria is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Quo Vademus through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow @ggreilinger @quovademusorg on Twitter.

• AZERBAIJAN: ‘Operating on the ground has become increasingly difficult due to security concerns’

  CIVICUS speaks about the links between the exploitation of fossil fuels and human rights violations in Azerbaijan with Kate Watters, Executive Director of Crude Accountability.

  Founded in 2003, Crude Accountability is a civil society organisation that works to protect the environmental and human rights of people in the Caspian and Black Sea regions and in areas of Eurasia affected by oil and gas development.

  How do extractive industries fuel human rights violations in Azerbaijan?

  The key problem is corruption, which results from the close relationship between the executive branch of government and the oil industry. The use of the state oil company by the regime led by president Ilham Aliyev is a key feature of Azerbaijan’s kleptocracy.

  Corporations operating in Azerbaijan handle vast sums of money and oversee massive projects. For example, British Petroleum (BP), the largest foreign investor, is involved in many of the key fossil fuel projects and is the majority shareholder and operator of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, through which around 80 per cent of Azerbaijan’s oil is exported. BP has a monopoly in the industry that dominates the national economy, with oil and gas accounting for 95 per cent of all exports, 75 per cent of government revenue and 42 per cent of national GDP.

  Those in charge of the oil and gas sector control the financial and economic dynamics of the whole country. The vast revenues generated by the hydrocarbon industry make it difficult for smaller environmentally sustainable alternatives to gain traction and create fertile ground for corruption and secrecy. International mechanisms that promote transparency in the industry rely on a level of adherence to the rule of law that Azerbaijan lacks.

  That’s why Crude Accountability’s advocacy efforts focus on advancing transparency and accountability. We aim for the adoption of cleaner technologies that ensure the wellbeing of local communities and call for international financial institutions to cease financing fossil fuels and redirect their investments toward sustainable green energy projects. We urge companies to be transparent about the social and environmental impacts of their operations and strive for continuous improvement.

  What work do you do in Azerbaijan?

  Crude Accountability’s involvement in Azerbaijan dates back to the early 2000s. We work with communities, organisations and people affected by oil and gas developments. Our efforts encompass extensive research, educational and advocacy activities that address the specific impacts of the hydrocarbon industry, such as gas flaring from the BP’s Sangachal Terminal, which is causing villagers health problems and sleep disruption, along with  the broader impacts of onshore and offshore oil and gas development in Azerbaijan.

  As an organisation, we’ve shed light on previously undisclosed areas. One of our achievements is the collaborative report ‘Flames of Toxicity‘, produced in partnership with Omanos Analytics. Using satellite imagery and other technologies, we proved that oil spills and flaring were happening during extraction and refining processes in several locations. By doing this we reminded industry stakeholders that, even when it’s unsafe for activists to conduct extensive on-site verification, there are technologies we can use to gain insight into environmental and human rights violations.

  For the past few years, operating on the ground in Azerbaijan has become increasingly difficult due to security concerns for our partners. Since mid-2023, our primary focus in Azerbaijan has shifted to advocating for the release of Gubad Ibadoghlu, a prominent economist and anti-corruption activist. He was arbitrarily detained in July 2023 and is currently held in miserable conditions in a pretrial detention centre outside the capital, Baku, facing mistreatment and denial of medical attention. During his arrest, both he and his wife were severely beaten after the car they were driving was surrounded and forced to stop. The physical violence perpetrated against Ibadoghlu and his wife during arrest is extremely concerning.

  We are part of an international coalition of activists, academics, policymakers and journalists that works for the release of Gubad Ibadoghlu and other Azerbaijani political prisoners, including independent journalists affected by the recent crackdown on civil society.

  Is the level of repression in Azerbaijan increasing?

  Repression has intensified over the last five years, and particularly in the past couple of years, as President Ilham Aliyev and the presidential apparatus have sought to solidify their position and power. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, authoritarianism and the repression of civil society have escalated across Eurasia. This is certainly the case in Azerbaijan.

  Azerbaijani people are afraid to speak out about the Azerbaijani offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh. Even those who refrain from criticising the offensive and work to address other related issues risk being labelled as ‘pro-Armenian’, a smear used by authorities against activists and dissenters.

  The snap presidential election scheduled for 7 February will serve to further consolidate Aliyev’s rule amidst regional turmoil. In this context, independent journalists face a heightened risk of repression. In June 2023, protests erupted in the village of Soyudlu, already threatened by environmental degradation, against the construction of an artificial lake to contain waste from the nearby Gadabay goldmine. Police severely beat community activists and journalists who came to cover the story. The village remains under lockdown, and although it appears that the goldmine’s activity has been limited or halted, it remains a challenge to obtain verified information. The community has been under stress since the incident.

  Environmental activists are also at risk. People with information about issues such as flaring or emissions are often afraid to speak out. Sometimes they have family members employed by the oil company or refinery and fear that they may lose their jobs, jeopardising the family’s livelihood. Fear of repercussions silences environmental activists and others who are aware of environmental violations. Still, some environmental and human rights defenders continue to operate discreetly in Azerbaijan.

  What forms of international support does Azerbaijani civil society currently need?

  Azerbaijan’s selection as the host for this year’s United Nations climate change conference, COP29, poses significant challenges from both a human rights and an environmental perspective. Azerbaijan has fallen short of its climate commitments. It hasn’t signed the Global Methane Pledge, a step taken even by countries like Turkmenistan. There are also serious concerns about civil society’s ability to participate in COP29 due to ongoing repression and severe human rights violations taking place in the host country. The imprisonment of a prominent Azerbaijani economist investigating corruption in the oil and gas sector raises further concerns.

  The international community should demand transparency and accountability from the Azerbaijani authorities in the run-up to COP29 and throughout the conference. A legitimate discussion on climate change in the framework of sustainability and human rights can only occur with the active participation of civil society.

  It is also very important to building international coalitions to confront authoritarianism, repression and closed civic space. Autocratic governance seeks to make people feel isolated and disunited, so collaborative efforts are vital. By working together, sharing resources and leveraging each organisation’s expertise for knowledge exchange, we can enhance our impact.

  Azerbaijani civil society requires financial resources, solidarity and support from the international community. The more we can offer to activists on the ground, the more successful our collective efforts will be.

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  Civic space in Azerbaijan is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Crude Accountability through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow it onLinkedIn andTwitter.

• BAHRAIN: ‘Had there been civic freedoms, the authorities would have known of the deep suffering at Jau Prison’

  CIVICUS speaks about the situation of political prisoners on hunger strike in Bahrain withJawad Fairooz, founder and director of Salam for Democracy and Human Rights (Salam DHR).

  Founded in 2012, Salam DHR is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) registered in France, Switzerland and the UK. It undertakes research and advocacy for the advancement of democracy and human rights, mainly in relation to Bahrain, but also in the wider Gulf and Middle East and North Africa regions.

  Maryam al-Khawaja, daughter of imprisoned human rights defender Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, intends to return to Bahrain imminently to ensure her father gets medical treatment and press for his immediate and unconditional release. Yet she, too, faces possible arrest. What’s your assessment of the situation?

  Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, 62, a dual Danish-Bahraini citizen, is the co-founder of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights and has a long history of activism. He was arrested by the government of Bahrain in 2004, 2007 and again amid mass unrest in April 2011. After this he faced a grossly unfair trial before a military court, including on charges of ‘seeking to overthrow the government’. He was tortured in pretrial custody and since his arbitrary imprisonment he has been repeatedly denied access to adequate healthcare.

  On 9 August he joined some 800 other hunger strikers. They called for an end to lockdown policies that require them to spend up to 23 hours of the day in their cells, the suspension of solitary confinement, the opportunity for collective or congregational prayer in Jau Prison’s mosque, face-to-face meeting rights with family members without a glass screen and access to healthcare commensurate with that available to the public, among other improvements in prison conditions.

  On 13 September the mass hunger strike ended with the authorities reportedly meeting many of these demands. This came as Bahrain’s Crown Prince visited Washington, DC, where he met with senior members of the Biden administration: the problem had to go away.

  Maryam nevertheless intends to travel and she has our full support. We continue to call for Abdulhadi’s immediate and unconditional release. The Danish and European Union (EU) authorities must do more.

  What is at the core of this problem is the absence of civic space in Bahrain. If there was space for independent civil society, then CSOs would have effectively alerted the authorities to prison conditions and they could have addressed the situation. An independent civic space makes it possible to find a balance in government conduct.

  What does this mean for Maryam al-Khawaja and our courageous colleagues travelling with her? It means they should be allowed to enter Bahrain and make their demands. The government should engage with them in a spirit of transparency. The absolute worst that could happen is for dissent to be tolerated just a little bit more. While this seems unlikely to happen, it is what the government should do. We wish them all Godspeed.

  How is it possible to conduct human rights activism in such a closed environment? How does Salam DHR do it?

  Bahrain has closed civic space. Government officials decide which CSOs can be registered and who can stand for their boards. They prevent people from engaging in public life who have no criminal records or public complaints but rather perhaps a past association with a political movement or party that was unfairly banned years ago.

  The Bahraini constitution provides for freedoms and safeguards similar to many other states, but the reality is that the government continues to carry out arbitrary arrests and stage unfair trials for acts that are not internationally recognised as crimes. The authorities torture detainees and use the death penalty, despite domestic opposition and international condemnation. They have stripped hundreds, including myself, of citizenship, depriving us of even the right to have rights in our homeland. They use the digital space to monitor and punish dissent and to foment religious and sectarian strife.

  Activists linked with Salam DHR cannot, in effect, exercise their right to peaceful assembly, let alone openly campaign for freedoms of association and expression, the release of prisoners unfairly tried and imprisoned or a moratorium on the death penalty. They would risk arrest if they did that.

  Yet engaging in civic activism is not totally impossible, only very challenging. Alongside CIVICUS and other partners, Salam DHR engages with allies and like-minded activists as well as the few CSOs that openly but cautiously raise human rights concerns so that the wider Bahraini society hears our message. We echo and amplify their appeals.

  We are a catalyst: we help Bahraini activists access platforms to reach domestic and international audiences and provide training and development opportunities such as internships. Alone and in partnership with others, we research, document and publicise developments, grounding our message in article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states that every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity to take part in the conduct of public affairs.

  How useful for advocacy purposes was theglobal event held by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in Bahrain’s capital, Manama, in March 2023?

  It was mixed: Danish parliamentarians and those from other countries addressed human rights issues and the absence of an independent civic space. The IPU’s human rights team raised concerns about freedom of expression and violations against Bahraini parliamentarians. But despite the IPU’s affiliated status with the United Nations (UN), the government still denied access to independent observers and human rights organisations, denying them either visas or access and turning at least one around at the airport. This was the authorities once again restricting civic space.

  A few days before the IPU meeting officially began, Bahraini lawyer and activist Ebrahim Al-Mannai called for parliamentary reforms on social media. He and three others who shared his post were arrested for publishing material that could ‘disturb public order’.

  At the event itself, the government appeared uninterested in seriously engaging with visiting parliamentarians on human rights issues, despite attempts from the Danish delegation and representatives from Finland, Iceland and Ireland. Our message is clear: open up civic space, free up CSOs and political parties and liberate discourse, otherwise the cycle of political unrest will continue.

  Reports indicate that the mass hunger strike in Jau Prison has ended. What’s your assessment of this episode?

  The painful August 2023 mass hunger strike was wholly avoidable. It happened mainly due to the government’s stubborn and short-sighted refusal to allow civic space to exist even to a minimum degree. Had there been freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, they would have known of the deep suffering at Jau Prison. If you don’t let people say what they think, then public life can only lurch from crisis to crisis.

  The hunger strike was the expression of the accumulation of a number of factors that have been present in Bahraini prisons for years and it was based on grievances that have been repeatedly expressed: prison conditions and ill treatment of prisoners amounting to torture. The abuses worsened and conditions deteriorated during the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, medical neglect resulted in the deaths of two prisoners, Hussein Barakat and Abbas Mallalah.

  We appeal once more to the authorities to allow for the opening of civic space and provide a social vent to end the cycle of human rights crises we face.

  Is the international community doing all it can to support the struggle for democracy and human rights in Bahrain?

  International human rights organisations, UN treaty bodies and Special Procedures and partner states, for instance in the context of the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review process of Bahrain, have all joined us in calling on the government of Bahrain to abide by its international human rights obligations, starting with the basic step of letting people have a voice in public life.

  Today, 15 September, is International Day of Democracy, and we are joining the UN in calling on the government of Bahrain to empower the next generation by ensuring that their voices are included in the decisions that will have a profound impact on their world. In his address, UN Secretary-General António Guterres has warned that ‘walls are closing in on civic spaces’. Those walls are also the walls of Jau Prison, where it took 800 detainees’ unjust suffering for the government to even take notice.

  But the UN has also let neighbouring United Arab Emirates, which is as closed as Bahrain, host the forthcoming COP28 climate change summit. Lack of civic space means there can be no activism for climate justice in Bahrain – for instance, no public demands for accountability can be expressed over costly and environmentally damaging land reclamation in Bahrain’s northeast, which has already eroded the livelihood of fishing communities. We need to be able to address these challenges openly, with a rights-based approach, to avoid a future calamity.

  And powerful states that could be putting some pressure for change are avoiding the issue. Right now, Bahrain’s Crown Prince is wrapping up meetings with senior Biden administration officials, none of whom appear to have raised civic space concerns or addressed the needless suffering of 800 Bahraini prisoners. The UK has removed Bahrain from its list of ‘countries of concern’ at the same time as it trumpeted a billion-dollar Bahraini investment in the UK. In October the EU will recommence its cycle of so-called human rights dialogues.

  The international community’s inexplicable complacency over the festering human rights quagmire in Bahrain will further embolden the government in crushing civic space. Many leaders miss the point when it comes to Bahrain and its Gulf neighbours: they appear to accept the facade of what is presented as pragmatic autocracy and appear to accept regional rulers’ colonial-mindset contention that democracy will destabilise the region.

  Democracies have in fact produced the most stable, enduring and dynamic systems in the world. Human rights and democracy are essential for Bahrain and its neighbours because their deficits continue to be the primary cause of resentment and unrest. A security-based approach does not remedy these problems. Bahrain’s history has shown these methods to be a failure, as it has endured continuous waves of mass unrest followed by violent crackdowns.

  Authoritarianism and the forms of violence it fosters are the real destabilising forces, a cycle that can only be broken through the recognition and enactment of democratic rights. The first step towards this goal is simply letting civic space exist.

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  Civic space in Bahrain is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Salam for Democracy and Human Rights through itswebsite and follow @SALAM_DHR and@JawadFairooz on Twitter.

• BANGLADESH: ‘Civil society made a lot of efforts to stop Japan financing the Matarbari project’

  CIVICUS speaks about the cancellation of the Matarbari 2 coal-fired power plant project in Bangladesh with Sharif Jamil, General Secretary of Bangladesh Paribesh Andolon (BAPA), a platform that organises civil society movements against environmental degradation. Since 2009 Sharif has been involved with the Waterkeeper Alliance, a global network aimed at ensuring every community’s right to clean water. He is currently the Coordinator of Waterkeepers Bangladesh and Council Member of Waterkeeper Alliance.

  What is the significance of the cancellation of the Matarbari 2 project in Bangladesh?

  The cancellation of the Matarbari 2 coal plant project is very significant because it shows global leaders living up to their commitment to fight climate change. Last year G7 countries reached an agreement to stop building coal plants and funding coal-related projects. If Japan continued to support this coal project, it would have undermined the global effort being made to tackle climate change.

  We were happy to see a few contractors also pulling out of the project. Sumitomo Corporation, one of the biggest ones, decided to back out of the project on the basis that it contradicts their new climate policy. The Japanese-owned company decided to stop building and supporting coal plants. We believe this was a major step towards the cancellation of the project.

  People living in the area where Matarbari 1 and 2 were implemented were affected by pollution caused by the projects. If it continued, people living near the coal plant would have been affected by air pollution. The coal plant also threatened to pollute water in surrounding areas, which would have also put people in danger.

  How has civil society been involved?

  Civil society made a lot of efforts to stop Japan financing the Matarbari coal project, and hard advocacy work finally paid off. We made sure to talk to community members in surrounding areas to get their views on the project. Because we listened to their concerns about the health issues the project might cause it was easier to carry out advocacy work in the communities. Environmental civil society organisations (CSOs) were able to put pressure on key stakeholders with the help of research institutions that studied and tracked global finance and investments.

  It is encouraging to see G7 countries living up to their commitments. Japan taking a position against coal financing is a huge step towards protecting the environment in Bangladesh and the rest of world. Coal-fired power plants are the biggest contributors of carbon emissions and therefore one of the biggest obstacles to climate change mitigation efforts. As civil society we are happy to see that it is possible to hold governments and multinational corporations accountable.

  However, while it is good news to see Japan backing away from coal plant projects in Bangladesh, it is also quite frustrating to see it headed towards liquefied natural gas, which is also a fossil fuel. It would be good if Japan could help Bangladesh move towards clean and renewable energies. They have the necessary technology to do so and sharing it with us would help us overcome the climate crisis we are all going through.

  What role did your organisation play?

  As an organisation we found it important to talk to scientists to understand the scientific impacts this project would have had on our environment. We also analysed the environmental impact assessment study provided by organisations that were monitoring the project. We communicated with the plant company and the government to understand their position on the fight against climate change and environmental issues in Bangladesh. Fortunately, they were willing to listen to our concerns and even invited us to their stakeholder meetings.

  The problem we noticed with this project is that the parties involved did not consider the data provided by environmental organisations. It was understood that power plants would boost industrial activity, but our argument was that these projects had to be sustainable. Doing an environmental impact assessment was therefore key. Any project that is implemented should be carried out comprehensively, inclusively and on the basis of science so that it does not harm our environment. It was frustrating that the environmental impact assessment of Matarbari 1 did not do any modelling for harmful pollutants such as fine particles (PM 2.5) or mercury, letting the plant continue functioning subjecting it to scientific scrutiny.

  In advocating against the Matarbari project we tried to let people be part of the development activities happening around them. It was important to make them understand that every development project happening in their communities had to be sustainable and promote their wellbeing, which was not the case with Matarbari 1 and 2.

  What other actions are needed to combat climate change and environmental degradation?

  Japan is a trusted partner of Bangladesh. Bangladesh has long received Japanese investment and development collaboration. We have worked for a long time with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency, which has done a lot of good. We would like to see collaboration for development continue, but it should be of the sustainable and green kind.

  The Matarbari plant project was detrimental to our environment and its activities would have polluted both our water and air. This caused unrest and protests. We want multinational corporations and governments to consider the environmental impacts of any project they intend to introduce. They should consider the long-term effects of every project as well as the country’s energy security.

  Did you receive any support from international CSOs and activists?

  Several environmental organisations in Japan and other countries helped us raise awareness about the negative impacts of the Matarbari project. Some of these organisations conducted studies and came up with recommendations on how projects could be made green and sustainable.

  But we still need support to ensure that upcoming projects aim to promote the use of clean energy and live up to environmental standards. Our country also needs resources to help it transition to clean energies. Therefore, there is further need for collaboration with governments that can help us move in that direction.

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  Civic space in Bangladesh is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Bangladesh Paribesh Andolon through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and reach out to Sharif throughFacebook.

• BANGLADESH: ‘The government is banishing the opposition in the run-up to the election’

  CIVICUS speaks with Zaman Ashraf about the current pre-election crackdown in Bangladesh.

  Zaman is a Bangladeshi human rights defender who advocates for the rights of survivors of torture and victims of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and seeks stronger legal protections for human rights in compliance with international law. He currently lives in exile in Hong Kong, since human rights activism has become increasingly risky in Bangladesh.

• BANGLADESH: ‘The legal vulnerability of LGBTQI+ people leads to harassment and discrimination’

  CIVICUS speaks about the state of civic space and the rights of excluded groups in Bangladesh with Shahanur Islam, founder secretary general of JusticeMakers Bangladesh (JMBD) and founder president of JMBD in France.

  JMBD isa human rights organisation working against all forms of discrimination and impunity for violence against ethnic, religious, social and sexual minorities and victims of torture, extrajudicial killings, forced disappearance and organised violence, including women and children. It provides legal support to victims and advocates for justice and human rights through research, awareness-raising campaigns and collaboration with various stakeholders,including other civil society groups, government agencies and international organisations.

• BANGLADESH: ‘This is a one-sided election in which we already know who the winner will be’

  

  CIVICUS speaks with Dr Mubashar Hasan about the ongoing crackdown on dissent in Bangladesh ahead of 7 January general elections.

  Mubashar is a Bangladesh-born academic and social justice activist. He is a post-doctoral researcher at the Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages, University of Oslo, Norway.

   

  What’s the current political climate in Bangladesh?

  The political climate in Bangladesh is tense. The election is being organised under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, the world’s longest-serving female head of government. The main opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), has said it’s not going to participate in an election held under this administration, arguing that there isn’t a level playing field for parties to compete freely and fairly.

  Judicial harassment is rife. In September, the New York Times reported that 2.5 million opposition activists faced judicial cases, with each facing multiple cases and some up to 400. Journalists have found that many cases against the opposition were fabricated. The police have even reportedly filed cases against BNP activists who were long dead or living abroad.

  On 28 October 2023, the opposition organised a massive rally. To stop this becoming a full-blown people-led movement, the government aggressively repressed it. A few opposition activists retaliated and then the government blamed the violence on the opposition. At least 15 people were killed, including two police officers. More than 20,000 opposition activists have been incarcerated since late October.

  This election-related violence is largely the result of state violence. Human Rights Watch recently described the ongoing developments as an autocratic crackdown. Freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly are being restricted and forcefully violated, affecting the legitimacy of the election process. Extremely politicised state institutions are being used as an extension of the ruling party, a trend many argue could lead to the materialisation of a totalitarian state.

  Is there any space for civil society to operate in Bangladesh?

  The space for civil society in Bangladesh is closed. Civil society organisations are free to operate only as long as they don’t challenge the ruling system.

  Just as in any autocratic country, there is an increasing activism going on in the diaspora. There are many Bangladeshi activists living in Australia, as well as in Malaysia, Sweden, the USA and elsewhere. BNP leader Tarique Rahman lives in exile in London.

  People in the diaspora are using the leverage that comes with living under democratic governments to spread information about what happens in Bangladesh. Those diaspora activists argue that it is their duty to expose what is going on back home.

  There are also key investigative journalists working from exile. A site called Netra News runs out of Malmö in Sweden, and it is still quite influential in exposing serious illegal acts by the government. There are several emerging YouTube commentators and analysts who have been very courageous. They have millions of followers.

  How big a problem is disinformation in Bangladeshi politics?

  Disinformation has always been a problem. Authoritarian governments don’t like the free flow of information. They want to control information and seek to discredit independent voices, just as Trump did in the USA, trashing fact as fiction and making fiction fact. And he was the authoritarian leader of a democratic country, which Bangladesh is not.

  Partisan elements within the government of Bangladesh and ruling party members treat those who dare challenge the official narrative as enemies. As I mentioned in one of my recent articles for the Diplomat Magazine, the government is the dominant force promoting political disinformation. The main opposition party has also promoted disinformation in some instances but independent factcheckers have concluded that the volume of political disinformation promoted by the opposition is miniscule compared to the government.

  There has been recent reporting by the Financial Times focused on how the Bangladeshi ruling party is using AI-driven disinformation to disrupt the upcoming election. But this is a one-sided election in which we already know who the winner will be. In this election voters do not have real choice. Why the ruling party is promoting AI-driven disinformation is therefore a mystery.

  What are your expectations for election day and its aftermath?

  Many things will unfold in the coming days. Voter turnout will most likely be low. The government will deploy military forces nationwide, perhaps even putting them in charge of distributing ballot boxes and election materials.

  There will be some violence, probably by the opposition, followed by arrests. The opposition will persist in demanding a free and fair election and the resignation of the government. Some loss of life is sadly to be expected.

  This election is also taking place within a wider geopolitical context. China, India and Russia are strongly supportive of the Bangladeshi government, whereas the USA keeps talking about free and fair elections, which puts it on the side of Bangladeshi people.

  At this point, not much is in the hands of Bangladeshi people. Without effective external pressure towards democracy, change is unlikely. Civil society’s work will only become more challenging in Bangladesh as the government steps up its repression. 

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  Civic space in Bangladesh is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Mubashar through hiswebpage and follow@mh23rights on Twitter.

• BELARUS: ‘Despite the repression, we haven’t halted our work for a single day’

  

  CIVICUS speaks with Marina Kostylianchenko of Viasna about the closure of civic space and criminalisation of activism in Belarus.

  Viasna (‘Spring’) is a Belarusian human rights civil society organisation (CSO) that provides assistance to political prisoners and their families. It was founded in 1996 in response to large-scale repression of protests by the regime of President Alexander Lukashenko. In 2003 it was shut down by the government and subsequently persecuted for operating as anunregistered organisation. Repression increased in reaction to 2020 protests that followed a presidential electionwidely seen as stolen. Viasna founder Ales Bialiatski was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2022. In 2023 he wassentenced to 10 years in prison and Viasna was declared an ‘extremist group’.

   

  What tactics of repression have the authorities used against Viasna?

  Ever since it was established in 1996, Viasna has been under scrutiny. It was able to operate officially for only a very short period, as the Supreme Court dissolved it as early as 2003. Successive attempts to secure legal status have been unsuccessful so we have continued working without official approval. Just like other people in Belarus, we have faced repression, including detentions, fines and imprisonment for our human rights activism.

  A big shock came in 2011 when Viasna founder and leader Ales Bialiatski was arrested and sentenced to four years in prison on fabricated charges of tax evasion. He was unexpectedly released under an amnesty nearly three years later.

  An unprecedented peak in repression followed the 2020 mass protests. This had a profound impact on the operation of human rights organisations. For example, Viasna expanded its scope to include a hotline for people to seek advice and report detentions and other human rights violations. We also started collecting information about politically motivated criminal prosecutions and recognising detainees as political prisoners, documenting instances of torture and other forms of ill-treatment, and ultimately launching the #FreeViasna campaign for the release of imprisoned human rights defenders.

  In 2021 the government focused on dismantling civil society. Security forces conducted home and office searches and issued arrest orders targeting Viasna staff and staff of other CSOs and independent media. On 14 July, 15 Viasna members and volunteers were detained nationwide, including Ales Bialiatski, his deputy Valentin Stefanovich and lawyer Vladimir Labkovich, who are still in custody. In 2023 they were sentenced to 10, nine and seven years in jail respectively, along with substantial fines, for allegedly smuggling money and financing protests. The coordinator of the Viasna volunteer service, Marfa Rabkova, and volunteer Andrei Chepyuk, also remain in prison, with sentences of almost 15 and six years respectively.

  In August 2023, Viasna was declared an extremist organisation, which in line with recent amendments to the Criminal Code means that any staff member could be criminally prosecuted and sentenced in absentia. Anyone might also face criminal liability for providing information or contributing to Viasna’s work in any way.

  The authorities are trying to erect a barrier between us and the people we help. But despite the repression, we haven’t halted our work for a single day.

  In what conditions does Viasna currently work?

  We operate in exile. Most members of Viasna had to leave Belarus in 2021 to avoid prison and be able to continue their human rights work.

  Forced relocation has implications, as over time a gap inevitably emerges between those who left and those who remain in Belarus.

  Moreover, new challenges and areas of work have arisen. For instance, an increasing number of people are being released after completing their sentences and require medical care, rehabilitation and help with adjusting back into society. Those who left Belarus face difficulties in adapting to a new environment and struggle with getting legal status, employment, housing and everyday matters.

  Even though the coordinator of the Viasna volunteer service has been imprisoned for over three years, our work with volunteers both inside Belarus and among the diaspora has never ceased. Volunteers are mainly engaged in research and data collection, translation of texts into multiple languages and the creation of illustrations and designs. They also assist at events we organise or participate in.

   

  Do imprisoned activists face further pressure while in jail?

  In 2023, all our colleagues were transferred to reformation colonies to serve their sentences. The conditions there are particularly harsh, primarily due to severe restriction of communication with the outside world. Unlike in pretrial detention facilities, where human rights activists could receive letters, parcels and money transfers from sympathisers, now only close relatives, usually only one or two people, are allowed to call or send mail and parcels. Even then, calls are limited to a maximum of 10 minutes a week and parcels to one or two per season.

  Another form of pressure exerted on political prisoners is confinement for 10 or more consecutive days in cold punishment cells where they are not allowed to have warm clothes or other belongings, including books and pens. Inmates are punished for any reason, such as not adhering to the prescribed greeting procedure, failing to fasten a button or neglecting to shave. If a political prisoner commits several such violations, they are classed as a ‘persistent violator of internal regulations’, which justifies further pressure.

  All prisoners, except older ones and those with disabilities, are required to work, usually in hazardous industries or cold rooms for eight or more hours a day. Wages are symbolic: after subtracting various payments for their maintenance in prison, only tiny amounts are transferred to prisoners’ personal accounts, which are then used to pay off fines.

  We practically have no information about our imprisoned colleagues’ health conditions, but we know barely any medical care is provided in prison facilities.

   

  How have you organised to support your imprisoned colleagues?

  In 2021, in collaboration with Amnesty International, Front Line Defenders, Human Rights Watch, the International Federation for Human Rights, Libereco, Ostgruppen and other partners, we initiated a solidarity campaign to advocate for the immediate release of our imprisoned colleagues.

  We’re continually exploring new modes of engagement with Belarusian civil society and other communities to advance our cause. For instance, on 8 December 2023 we unveiled an art installation, ‘Unbreakable’, in the heart of Vilnius, depicting the faces of five Viasna political prisoners and featuring descriptions in three languages – Belarusian, Lithuanian and English. We participate in any event available to speak about the plight of our colleagues criminalised for their commitment to human rights.

  Several international awards have significantly bolstered attention for our cause. In 2022 Viasna was honoured with the Tulip of Human Rights award from the Dutch government, and Ales Bialiatski became a Nobel Peace Prize laureate alongside the Ukrainian Center for Civil Liberties and the Russian organisation Memorial. As a result of the Nobel Prize people in other countries found out who Ales is and why he is in prison, and expressions of support and solidarity increased.

  What support do you receive from the international community, and what further support do you need?

  A coalition of international human rights organisations has repeatedly issued joint statements urging the immediate release of Viasna’s political prisoners. Representatives of the United Nations, the European Parliament and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe have also been vocal about the more than 1,500 political prisoners in Belarus.

  Unfortunately, we haven’t yet identified the leverage that would foster the immediate release of Viasna activists. At the same time, the authorities are doing everything to isolate our colleagues and make them believe they’ve been forgotten. That’s why it’s so important to show support by sending them letters and postcards, helping their families and friends, signing petitions and holding solidarity actions around the world. For example, Libereco activists stage monthly rallies in Berlin and Zurich and organise solidarity races to raise awareness.

  Every show of support matters. We urge people to join our initiatives, spread information as widely as possible and come up with new forms of solidarity actions. To this end, we have created free-of-charge designs for printing on T-shirts, posters, leaflets, stickers and postcards. We would also appreciate support for our activities and our incarcerated colleagues through a subscription on Patreon or a one-time donation via Stripe.

   

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  Civic space in Belarus is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Viasna through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@Viasna onTwitter. Contact the#FreeViasna campaign through itswebsite and follow@FreeViasna onTwitter.

  The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

• BELIZE: ‘Many laws remain that keep LGBTQI+ people as second-class citizens’

  CIVICUS speaks about the situation of LGBTQI+ rights in Belize and the ongoing impacts of the British colonial legacy with Caleb Orozco, the chief litigant in a case successfully challenging Belize’s discriminatory laws and co-founder of the United Belize Advocacy Movement (UNIBAM).

  Founded in 2006, UNIBAM was the first LGBTQI+-led policy and advocacy civil rights organisation in Belize. Focused on dismantling systemic and structural violence that impacts on human rights, it uses rights-based approaches to reduce stigma and discrimination.

  What was the process leading to the overturn of Belize’s so-called anti-gay laws?

  The process of overturning the sodomy laws contained in Section 53 of the Criminal Code started with a preliminary assessment that guided the development of the University of the West Indies’ Rights Advocacy Project (URAP) led by Tracy Robinson, whose group initiated my case in 2010. In 2011 we worked with Human Dignity Trust, which joined as interested party, to engage on international treaty obligations.

  In 2007, a conversation started at a meeting in Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic, organised by the Caribbean Vulnerable Communities Coalition. URAP engaged by email and Viper Messenger, with additional regional conferences to flesh out legal arguments. The process identified Lisa Shoman as local Senior Counsel and Chris Hamel Smith, who argued the case in 2013.

  Meanwhile, we submitted reports for Belize’s Universal Periodic Review at the United Nations Human Rights Council to test the government’s response to the challenge to the sodomy laws. We also resorted to thematic hearings at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The response of the government was that it needed a ‘political mandate’. We worked with the subcommittee for policy and legislation of the National AIDS Commission to monitor legislative opportunities and gauge the position of the government and the prime minister. We knew the government would not significantly fight the process.

  In late 2010 we filed a challenge to Section 53 and a fight with the group of churches ensued. UNIBAM’s role was eventually reduced to that of an interested party, with the churches relegated to the same role, and I remained as the sole claimant.

  We did not have a communications strategy, so we developed one. Nor did we have a security strategy, but we got help from the Human Dignity Trust. We participated in around 300 media interviews, collectively, over the years. The process included the derailment of the government’s revised national gender policy of 2013, with hundreds protesting across the country. Also, in Jamaica, 25,000 people protested to demand the removal of Professor Brendon Bain, an expert witness in my case in support of the churches, from his job at the University of the West Indies. 

  The case was heard by the Supreme Court in May 2013. We submitted personal experiences of discrimination and tried to strike out the churches, but we failed. Three years later, on 10 August 2016, the judge ruled in our favour, establishing that Section 53 was unconstitutional, which effectively decriminalised consensual same-sex activity held in private by consenting adults.

  The Attorney General launched a partial appeal focused on the freedom of expression and non-discrimination on the grounds of ‘sex’, but the Court of Appeal’s judgment was reaffirmed in December 2019, with the expectation that the sodomy law had to be modified by parliament after the Court reaffirmed its unconstitutionality. Over time, the political tone changed: from claiming a political mandate was needed to change our sodomy law, to supporting 15 out of 17 Universal Periodic Review recommendations on LGBTQI+ rights in 2018. We are now waiting for parliament to modify the law as per the instruction of the Court of Appeal.

  Did you experience backlash?

  I experienced a lot of backlash throughout the process. This included character assassination and death threats, to the point that a personal security plan had to be put in place for me to go to court in 2013 and for my daily movement. Christian TV stations pushed negative propaganda and social media platforms buzzed with homophobia and threats. 

  How much progress has the LGBTQI+ rights movement achieved so far? 

  The LGBTQI+ rights movement became part of a National Working Group, in which I helped draft a cabinet note to advance the Equal Opportunities Bill and Hate Crime Legislation, with support from the Human Dignity Trust. Even though the Equal Opportunities Bill was endorsed by the cabinet, it didn’t reach parliament before the 2020 general election, because the evangelical ‘Kill the Bill’ campaign succeeded in derailing it just in time. We are not giving up in 2022!

  I run the only LGBTQI+-led observatory of human rights in Belize, which provides litigation support to clients. We produce knowledge products on systemic and structural violence that feeds into a national and transnational advocacy framework that includes LGBTQI+ economic inclusion and livelihoods. 

  The process influenced and inspired the development of several niche organisations focused on LGBTQI+ families, health, trans issues and lesbian and bisexual women. It helped launch the global mandate of the Human Dignity Trust’s campaign on decriminalisation. Ours was in fact their first case back in 2011.

  What challenges do LGBTQI+ people continue to face in Belize? How can challenges be addressed?

  There is the denial of gender markers for trans people. Violence against us can take place in the family and the workplace. Kids experience discrimination in schools. In addition, family insecurity for LGBTQI+ parents is a huge deal. We endure economic rights violations and economic exclusion, as well as unequal access to economic benefits such as social security and government pensions. 

  LGBTQI+ Belizeans experience daily deficits in the police’s work that deals with us as victims of violence and detainees. If you’re of African descent and gay, expect police harassment.

  We need resources to advance 20 amendments to laws that exclude LGBTQI+ Belizeans as citizens, which attack our dignity and rights and keep us as second-class citizens. The functions of the Human Rights Observatory, which provides redress to LGBTQI+ Belizeans and marginalised women, should be strengthened.

  What kind of international support does Belizean LGBTQI+ civil society need? 

  International allies can support us with donations through our GoFundMe page. We also really value offers of pro-bono legal support for the work of our Human Rights Observatory, including legal research, legal defence,  protection work, bill drafting, litigation support, and branding strategies, as well as offers of pro bono support to produce investigative or victim advocacy training.

  Civic space in Belize is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with UNIBAMthrough itswebsite and follow@UNIBAMSupport on Twitter.

• BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: ‘Civil society has failed to spark people’s activist side’

  
  CIVICUS speaks about deteriorating civic space in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) withAida Daguda and Dajana Cvjetkovic, director and programme manager atthe Centre for Civil Society Promotion (CPCD).

  Founded in 1996, CPCD is a civil society organisation (CSO) working to strengthen civil society and citizen participation in BiH and the Western Balkans through capacity development, advocacy and campaigning.

  What are civic space conditions like in BiH?

  In our nearly three decades working in civil society in BiH and the Western Balkans, we have never witnessed such a rapid deterioration of civic space. Our organisation, along with other CSOs, is deeply concerned about two new pieces of legislation introduced in Republika Srpska (RS), one of the two entities that make up BiH.

  The first bill, already adopted, reintroduced criminal defamation into the legal system. The second, currently under parliamentary debate, is a ‘foreign agents’ bill that would criminalise CSOs that receive foreign funding or assistance for ‘political activities’ and give state institutions the power to shut them down. This would be just another tool to further restrict civil society in the hands of government authorities, who already use the mechanisms in place to oversee the work of CSOs and exert pressure and threaten us. Over the past year there have been more inspections of CSOs than ever before, specifically targeting smaller and more vocal organisations.

  By silencing independent media and civil society, RS President Milorad Dodik seeks to eliminate public scrutiny and criticism in an entity marred by criminal activities and corruption and undergoing a difficult economic situation. The government is resisting democratic oversight and trying to eliminate all forms of critical thought among the public.

  Moreover, in April 2023 the Sarajevo local government proposed amendments to local public order laws that would penalise the spread of ‘fake news’ and criticism of state authorities. Although the draft bill was withdrawn in June due to the public outcry it caused, the authorities have expressed their commitment to reintroducing a modified version of the bill.

  These are all signals that the situation for civil society is rapidly worsening in RS and in BiH as a whole, with severe limitations being introduced on freedoms of association and expression.

  How has Bosnian civil society organised against the restrictive bills?

  A part of RS’s civil society is well organised and experienced in advocacy and campaigning. But overall, there are fewer than 10 CSOs that are strongly committed to their human rights mission and vision, while the rest maintain links with the government that make them less vocal against repressive laws. We provide support with expertise and funding to independent CSOs in RS, but we must be discreet because we are based in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the other entity that composes BiH, and our help tends to be misunderstood by both politicians and the public in the RS.

  Unfortunately, many Bosnian CSOs remain silent due to fear. In RS in particular, people are afraid for their safety and that of their families. Unlike in Georgia, where people took to the streets to defend freedom of association, people in Bosnia aren’t motivated, partly due to media narratives portraying civil society as being paid by the international community to act against the government.

  We are using all available tools to raise awareness about repressive legislation within the country, at the European Union (EU) level and through communication with various civil society networks, including CIVICUS. The government argues that these laws are necessary to prevent the financing of terrorism and money laundering, but we view these as excuses.

  We have informed opposition members of parliament about the potential negative consequences of the ‘foreign agents’ law but have made no impact. Our outreach to the public has been hindered by lack of media support.

  However, we remain hopeful that this crisis may turn into an opportunity for Bosnian civil society to revive the sense of solidarity that we’ve lost over the past decade. These days, we constantly think in terms of projects and donors and tend to see each other as competitors when we most desperately need to be united.

  How would you describe the current political climate in BiH?

  Our region has historically bordered with empires, and this location has come at a price. The threat of RS’s secession has risen in recent years, posing a security problem for the entire region. Due to BiH’s location and rich natural resources and potential for energy production, many fear that its fate depends on the outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the interests of major powers such as China, the EU, Russia, Turkey and the USA. The people of BiH are the ones with the least influence on the decisions that will affect them.

  While secession may not be imminent, the threat of it significantly impacts on people’s wellbeing. We experience a pervasive feeling of insecurity that contributes to an anxious atmosphere. This makes people easier to manipulate. Many people are considering leaving, mostly because of their sense of insecurity and the widespread corruption.

  Fear is our main currency. Past experiences of police surveillance leading to arrests of protesters have deterred people from participating in demonstrations. People are losing hope that things will improve. During the war we experienced between 1992 and 1995, we had a very strong feeling of hope that when the war ended we would recover a normal life and rebuild our country. Now we have peace but we don’t have hope anymore.

  How do you work to strengthen civil society in BiH, and what obstacles do you face?

  Our organisation was established right after the war, so it has existed for 27 years. We were the first ones to connect CSOs from different parts of the country and our network currently includes over 350 organisations.

  In 2004, we launched the first initiative of institutional cooperation between government and civil society. At that time, civil society was thriving. But over the past decade or so, the situation has steadily worsened. Civil society faces a shortage of human resources, and people hold rather negative views about civil society. We seek to change such perceptions by consistently communicating the purpose and results of our work to the public and beneficiaries of our services and activities.

  We also lack strong connections with the media, which should serve as a channel between us, the government, the international community and, most importantly, our society. To show what we’re doing and what we are trying to achieve, instead of just following donors’ visibility guidelines we have established our own portal in which we collect inspiring stories of civil society’s impact in improving people’s lives.

  But our biggest problem is lack of local ownership. For many years the international community did things for us, so we aren’t used to solving problems by ourselves. People aren’t used to activism; they complain and wait for others to resolve their problems. That’s one of the failures of civil society: we have implemented many projects, but never managed to spark people’s activist side.

  What challenges do you face in cooperating with international partners?

  International agencies implement large projects in BiH and many funds come from the international community, but we don’t see results. One of the reasons is that local civil society is pushed aside. When we inquire with donors about supporting local organisations or networks, they argue that small organisations lack the capacity to successfully implement large grants. It has become their mantra.

  This hampers the development of civil society as the true democratic force our country urgently needs. We must engage in dialogue with the government to devise solutions for the numerous problems we face. We need to move past the ‘projectisation’ of civil society and focus on the long term.

  This also applies to the government, which is also forced to work within the project framework, executing short-term tasks requested by the EU or other international institutions. For instance, the government, jointly with the European Commission, invested around €1 million (approx. US$1.06 million) to fulfil a request to establish a register for CSOs, but once international partners left the country, the register ceased to function. There was a failure to recognise that civil society could have created, managed and overseen the register, which could have been instrumental in developing a common civil society strategy.

  This year we established an informal group of donors who support local civil society in Bosnia. We hope the international community will consistently convey the message that they must prioritise local ownership and sustainability. We don’t want to see civil society becoming a mere service provider for larger international agencies. We need to organise around genuine shared interests rather than form networks to satisfy the criteria of calls for proposals. It is time for us to think strategically about who we are and what our role is.

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  Civic space in Bosnia and Herzegovina is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor. Bosnia and Herzegovina is currently on theCIVICUS Monitor Watchlist, which draws attention to countries where there is a serious and rapid decline in respect for civic space.

  Get in touch with CPCD through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@cpcdba on Twitter.

• BOTSWANA: ‘We must strategise so that we don’t merely react to crises and anti-rights action’

  CIVICUS speaks about the struggle for LGBTQI+ rights in Botswana with Dumiso Gatsha, an LGBTQI+ activist and founder of Success Capital.

  Success Capital is a youth and feminist-led organisation working to strengthen youth agency and autonomy in human rights and sustainable development while challenging power, privilege and patriarchy through intersectionality. Its approaches include participatory research, peer-to-peer knowledge sharing and advocacy.

  Has the 2019 High Courtruling that decriminalised same-sex relations led to improvements?

  The 2019 ruling had structural effects: by declaring the criminalisation of same-sex intimacy unconstitutional, it eliminated not only the possibility of prosecution but also the excuse that was often used to exclude LGBTQI+ people from service delivery. It affirmed our existence as Batswana, Africans and people and heralded a new field of untapped opportunities for improving the lives of all people in Botswana, not only LGBTQI+ people.

  Documented instances of violence against queer people in social settings, hate speech and intolerance online have increased. This doesn’t mean violence itself has increased – only that it is now more visible. Decriminalisation has improved the environment to report on and seek redress for human rights violations, injustices and inequities.

  However, there has also been backlash, and violence may be on the rise as a result of the higher visibility, agency and advocacy by LGBTQI+ people.

  It’s true that in Botswana there weren’t any immediate negative reactions to the High Court ruling, unlike in countries such as Kenya or Namibia, where progressive judgements elicited immediate protest action. But, reflective of wider and broader anti-gender ideology influences, earlier this year there have been protest marches led by churches, a whole four years after the High Court ruling. This means that for those opposed to LGBTQI+ rights, the matter is far from settled.

  The anti-rights reaction was triggered by a member of parliament’s request to consult with churches on the procedural steps parliament needed to take to amend the Penal Code in line with the 2021 ruling by the Court of Appeal that upheld the High Court’s decision. From what we understand, this ruling was needed to finally put the matter of decriminalisation to rest, having ensured that all processes had been exhausted within Botswana’s jurisdiction.

  Representatives of churches and members of parliament questioned the very essence of our democracy. They publicly threatened politicians in a pre-election year, bringing confusion about the democratic process and denouncing our existence as citizens who have rights.

  The strength of the backlash despite the time that has passed shows that decriminalisation is only the beginning. It is not the solution or end point in fulfilling human rights, but it serves as a basis for much-needed interventions in social, cultural, institutional and public participation spaces.

  How has civil society, and your organisation in particular, responded?

  Fighting back has been a slow and protracted process because of limited resources. Botswana’s higher middle income country status and narrow avenues for civil society engagement have meant that the gains made from decriminalisation could not be strategically amplified across the human rights, sexual and reproductive rights and democratic landscape.

  Success Capital has less than five per cent of the resources that more prominent civil society organisations have. This means grassroots, hidden and hard-to-reach communities and constituents are left behind – notably in more rural, climate-affected and impoverished areas, where queerness, migrant status, disability, sex work status and being an ethnic minority are all second to socioeconomic status and the need to secure a livelihood.

  Our constituents didn’t feel threatened by the anti-LGBTQI+ protests, which is reflective of their resilience and agency. But this was a moment to gauge how unprepared philanthropy is to respond to backlash and regressive attempts. I was shocked when a funder asked me what I was doing about it while knowing full well that they had delayed disbursing funds aimed at removing human rights barriers for LGBTQI+ people.

  Still, we commemorated Pride and helped host the Changing Faces Changing Spaces conference organised by the East African Sexual Health and Rights Initiative, for which we helped secure visas and provided advice to LGBTQI+ people and sex workers from across Africa. We worked in solidarity with East African groups in the context of increasing anti-LGBTQI+ sentiments, engaged in strategic policy-oriented dialogue with other civil society leaders, made a solidarity visit to Namibia and networked to ensure that we would be prepared for whatever came next. None of this was externally funded – it was pure feminist decolonial action underpinning our belief in our own freedom, with or without decriminalisation.

  Has there been any change in the state of public opinion in Botswana on LGBTQI+ rights?

  The Afrobarometer survey has noted some improvements in public opinion, but intolerance and hate speech remain prevalent. National-level data is not always reflective of the situation in local and grassroots communities. Language, socioeconomic status and the availability of services all contribute to how people in Botswana participate and perceive different issues.

  For example, in our own community engagements in rural locations we have noted that abortion is mostly accepted on the basis of an understanding of the challenges experienced by many who end up pregnant. However, more than one abortion is frowned upon. And we see similar nuances across sexual orientation, sex characteristics and gender identity issues. For instance, feminine queer men tend to be tolerated more than trans women, as are masculine lesbian women giving birth, while bisexual men are emasculated online. Social parameters are too wide to be readily captured without meaningful resources and political will to ensure all LGBTQI+ people are included in state policy and programming.

  Have you experienced any negative repercussions from your work?

  Yes. Invitations have been rescinded and scrutiny increased. We are policed on who can be invited to take part in social participation mechanisms that include government officials. We are denied an audience despite fulfilling all the necessary steps in writing invitations, submitting proposals and following up through the hierarchy. For instance, we applied for approval for civil society participation in the 2023 World Bank-International Monetary Fund Spring meetings, and despite receiving permission from parliamentary caucuses, a ministry interrogated us on what we wanted to do and why we wanted to attend.

  We had our email address blocked to prevent us submitting future statements to the United Nations. We have been denied funding for being too radical, and calling out funders has not really worked for us.

  I’ve had several encounters with law enforcement. The first happened when a fellow volunteer was strangled and I recorded audio of the incident before police confiscated my phone. We are exploring a case on this at the moment. The second happened when a trans colleague was questioned because how she presented was not the same as the gender stated on her identity card. And more recently, we were told of plainclothes police in non-branded cars patrolling and possibly shooting people who don’t stop on highways when instructed to in the middle of nowhere. This kind of policing is harmful, unlawful and abusive, and is being used to target LGBTQI+ people without any accountability.

  Where do these restrictions come from?

  Some restrictions we’ve faced reflect a regional landscape in which LGBTQI+ networks have shut down, limiting representation, and a global trend in which eligibility, visa and logistical support have only worsened, limiting civil society participation in advocacy and governance mechanisms.

  Civil society in Botswana is not immune from these trends. Even within the Global Fund mechanism, the most prominent enabler of those fighting for sexual health rights, delays have taken up most of the current financial year, compromising eight months of service provision.

  I think we are underestimating the reach of anti-rights groups. Although global anti-rights influences have existed for decades, domestic counterparts have recently grown emboldened and are increasingly well resourced. Botswana’s higher middle income country status reflects a skewed and unequal income distribution and hides the fact that the few with capital and wealth side with the conservative, morally driven powerholders and are not afraid to deploy their influence against human rights activists. Criminalisation is good business for the politicians that also run corporations. Inequality is good news for those with means and power to subjugate those left behind.

  How do you connect with LGBTQI+ rights movements abroad and internationally? What international support do you receive, and what further support do you need?

  LGBTQI+ activists are dynamic and diverse. Success Capital has always engaged in collaborative knowledge sharing, linking with other initiatives and sharing the space in advocacy sessions, side events and mobilising actions. We take pride in unearthing young, emergent and nascent activists and movements that operate in the margins and sharing our platform with them. This helps us continue and challenge conversations in rooms we can’t access or engage in.

  Since decriminalisation, international support has been quite high. It has, however, been skewed. It has followed a hierarchy that’s reflective of wider trends, with more institutionalised groups having easier access to funding and benefitting from the development industrial complex the most. Grassroots organisations continue to be left behind, lacking institutional or long-term funding.

  Solidarity is like sunshine – everyone deserves some. That’s why the ecosystem needs to be steered towards collaboration. And it must focus on strategising so that we don’t merely react to crises and anti-rights action, but we take the initiative in the struggle for our rights.

  Civic space in Botswana is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Success Capital through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@ProSuccessBW on Twitter.

• BULGARIA: ‘Our society has finally become sensitised to domestic and gender-based violence’

  CIVICUS speaks with Victoria Petrova, Communications and Development Director at the Bulgarian Fund for Women (BFW), about civil society’s struggles to end domestic and gender-based violence in Bulgaria.

  Established in 2004, the BFW is the only Bulgarian feminist civil society organisation (CSO) supporting organisations, collectives and activists that challenge the status quo and work towards systemic change for women, girls and all marginalised communities.

  What does BFW do?

  The BFW has played a pivotal role in advancing women’s rights across Bulgaria for two decades. Our focus has recently extended. As well as funding projects, in 2020 we started providing core funding to help organisations meet essential needs such as administrative costs, office space, equipment and staff salaries, which often remain uncovered by project funding.

  Core funding is of paramount importance to ensure the sustainability of CSOs. Financial stability empowers organisations to be strategic, proactive and resilient in the face of challenges. As of today, providing core funding objective has become our biggest focus.

  We also have other funding mechanisms such as project funding and the Open Opportunity programme, which provides rapid funding of up to 10,000 BGN (approx. US$5,500). This has proven invaluable in times of crisis or in the face of unforeseen challenges, such as last year’s attack on the Rainbow Hub, an LGBTQI+ space in the capital, Sofia. A far-right former presidential candidate attacked the hub during an event and injured a participant, an activist and Rainbow Hub team member. The premises were destroyed. Through the Open Opportunity programme BFW gave them a grant so they could get it fixed.

  Overall, BFW distributed a total of over US$700,000 in direct grants to CSOs in 2022 alone.

  We’ve also taken proactive steps to contribute to building capacity in the organisations we support, recognising the significance of robust women’s rights organisations in a context where great gender inequalities persist.

  It is estimated that one in three women, or approximately one million, suffer from domestic and gender-based violence in Bulgaria and at least 15 women have been killed by former or current intimate partners, husbands or other relatives since the beginning of 2023. Women do a disproportionate share of household chores and care work. There aren’t enough support services, such as public kindergartens. There is a significant pay gap and women are grossly underrepresented in politics – only about 25 per cent of members of parliament are women. Life is even harder in small towns, where gender stereotypes are much more deeply rooted.

  Have you faced backlash for the work you do?

  Women’s rights organisations as well as the entire civil society sector in Bulgaria have encountered significant challenges since 2018. These started alongside attacks on the Istanbul Convention – the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence.

  Attacks were sparked by a far-right party, VMRO, and also by the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) after it shifted its stance in relation to the Convention. The party with the biggest parliamentary representation, GERB (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria), sort of washed its hands at the time and left the matter with the Constitutional Court. And the Court ruled that ratifying the Istanbul Convention would be unconstitutional. This made Bulgaria one of the few European states that haven’t ratified the Convention.

  These days, attacks focus on the changes recently made to the Protection Against Domestic Violence Act. Regressive and pro-Russian groups such as Revival (Vazrazhdane) and BSP claim that this law seeks to impose the Istanbul Convention and implement what they call ‘gender ideology’. A few months ago, the BSP even started collecting signatures to enable a referendum against ‘gender ideology’. The party has recently announced it has collected the required number of signatures.

  What recent changes were made to the Protection Against Domestic Violence Act, and why?

  Changes to this law had been pursued for years but faced rejection by some political parties, including Revival, the BSP and some GERB members. They were finally introduced in July and they represented progress, even though they did not include the definition of ‘intimate relationship’ proposed by women’s advocates, as a result of which they did not extend protection to people who are in relationships but are unmarried and not in a domestic partnership.

  Regrettably, this omission meant that the shocking Stara Zagora case, in which an 18-year-old woman was beaten and disfigured by her boyfriend, did not fall within the law’s purview. This attack happened in late June but only became public in late July, as a result of the victim’s family’s engagement with the media out of frustration with the slow pace of the investigation.

  In response, around 10,000 people protested in Sofia and tens of thousands demonstrated in other regions, demanding justice for victims and action against domestic and gender-based violence. This groundswell of public engagement was unprecedented, shaking the normalised apathy or victim-blaming that had often been the response to similar cases in the past.

  This forced parliament to reconsider the bill, and on 7 August it reconvened to widen its scope to cover ‘intimate relationships’. This was a step in the right direction, although some concerning elements remain.

  First, criteria for people to be considered as intimate partners include having been in a relationship for at least 60 days, without any clarity as to what counts as the start of those 60 days and, more concerningly, what happens if violence occurs within the first 60 days. Second, at the last minute, members of parliament inserted the words ‘man’ and ‘woman’ in the definition, therefore limiting its scope to heterosexual couples. Same-sex couples were completely excluded from seeking protection under this law.

  Bulgarian politicians should do much better. During that same debate a GERB member of parliament, former Minister of Culture and former Chairman of the Parliament, Vezhdi Rashidov, made extremely offensive comments. It was during the break, when he thought his microphone was off and basically called raped women ‘whores’. Our organisation wrote an open letter asking for his resignation, and just a few days later he announced he was resigning.

  Unfortunately, his comments reflect widespread attitudes among many of our politicians towards women’s rights and domestic and gender-based violence. We are fed up with their sexist jokes, homophobic expressions, lack of understanding and deliberate disinformation regarding gender issues and women’s rights.

  What do you think made the Stara Zagora case so impactful?

  The impact of the Stara Zagora case can be attributed to several factors, primarily stemming from systemic failures that occurred across various institutional levels. The perpetrator’s swift release within 72 hours of the attack, despite being on probation for prior offences, set the tone for public outrage.

  Public indignation also resulted from the discrepancy between the severity of the attack, which involved the use of a knife and resulted in 400 stitches, a broken nose and a shaved head, and its categorisation as a mere ‘soft bodily injury’.

  There was a shift in public sentiment that revealed heightened awareness and empathy for victims. The usual response in these cases is often victim-blaming. This time, however, many more people sided with the victim. Although some anti-rights voices questioning the victim’s innocence emerged, particularly on social media, most public figures refrained from such insensitivity.

  As a result, over the past few weeks, we have started to see more and more domestic violence cases being reported on the media. So I’d say the Stara Zagora case sensitised society and accelerated change. I hope people will now be more willing to seek protection and justice, and institutions and the media will be more willing to empathise with the victims.

  What else should be done to combat gender-based violence more effectively?

  While there are organisations like BFW that have worked against gender-based violence for decades, it’s evident that a comprehensive national campaign led by the state is needed to catalyse broader change. Such a campaign should aim to reach people across all socio-economic strata, fostering a shared understanding of gender equality and the unacceptability of violence.

  Education and prevention are paramount, and they must begin at an early age. Teaching children about gender equality and the importance of rejecting violence from the outset can contribute to lasting change.

  The establishment of more crisis centres across the country to provide immediate support and safety for victims is also crucial. Only 15 out of 28 regional cities have crisis centres so far. Perhaps positive change will now take place as four ministries have got involved in solving the issue.

  Finally, ratification of the Istanbul Convention remains a pivotal goal. Its comprehensive framework can guide Bulgaria in its efforts to counter gender-based violence. We will continue advocating for these changes and support other organisations that work for women’s rights.

  How do you connect with the global women’s movement and what additional support do you need?

  We participate in networks like Prospera and On the Right Track. These connections expose us to diverse perspectives and experiences and enrich our understanding of the broader movement.

  Collaboration among organisations and international assistance are essential to counter anti-rights narratives, fend off far-right movements that are unfortunately increasingly organised and determined and promote positive change. When helping people and organisations, we sometimes tend to be reactive to attacks. We need to support each other to be more proactive.

  As I already mentioned, core funding is of huge importance to our grantees, but it is for us as well. I am happy to see that more of our donors started providing this type of long-term support, and I am hopeful that even more will recognise the need for it in the future.

  To end on a more positive note, I am thankful that Bulgarian society has finally become sensitised to the topic of domestic and gender-based violence. This isn’t a private issue but an issue that affects the whole of society. We are all responsible for educating ourselves on the topic, learning about its different forms, stepping up when we see something unacceptable and supporting people who are brave enough to report violence.

  We look forward to a collective push toward lasting change, supported by all of you.

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  Civic space in Bulgaria is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the BFW through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@bgfundforwomen on Twitter.

  The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

• BURUNDI: ‘Human rights activism can hardly be carried out openly anymore’

  CIVICUS speaksabout the repression of civil society and human rights defenders and LGBTQI+ rights in Burundi with Carina Tertsakian, co-founder of the Burundi Human Rights Initiative (BHRI).

  Active from mid-2019 until December 2023, the BHRI was an independent initiative that worked in cooperation with a range of people inside and outside Burundi todocument the human rights situation and advocate for human rights.

  Has there been any improvement in the human rights situation in Burundi?

  Burundi’s overall human rights record has remained largely unchanged since President Évariste Ndayishimiye took office in 2020. Back then people had high hopes because the new president had a less bloody past than his predecessor. But there’s been little progress in the protection of civil and political rights. The authorities have continued to arrest, prosecute, ill-treat and sometimes torture people for political reasons. Those arrested have included activists, journalists and opposition members.

  Even though the most serious forms of rights violations such as political killings and enforced disappearances have decreased, human rights defenders (HRDs) and journalists have been arbitrarily arrested simply due to their involvement in human rights activities or their affiliation with independent civil society organisations (CSOs). They are typically accused of undermining internal state security or territorial integrity, among other baseless charges.

  What are the conditions for LGBTQI+ people in Burundi?

  In August 2023, 24 people were arrested for their alleged involvement in organisations that help LGBTQI+ people. While some were acquitted or released, others faced sentencing. One activist who was acquitted passed away before being released. The case is ongoing, drawing attention to the larger underlying issue that homosexuality is still criminalised in Burundi.

  It’s nearly impossible to identify openly as an LGBTQI+ activist in Burundi. While some organisations engage in activities to support LGBTQI+ people, they avoid explicitly identifying as LGBTQI+ organisations. The 24 people who were arrested, for instance, had participated in training on awareness and prevention of HIV/AIDS.

  In his recent year-end speech, President Ndayishimiye vilified LGBTQI+ people, labelling homosexuality as a sin and encouraging public stoning of those perceived as ‘homosexuals’. This horrifying statement has further fuelled hateful rhetoric online. On a positive note, a Burundian CSO and several prominent activists in exile strongly criticised Ndayishimiye’s statement, something that is extremely difficult to do inside Burundi.

  To what extent is it possible for human rights organisations to work in Burundi?

  In 2015, a significant political and human rights crisis unfolded in Burundi, marked by a violent crackdown on civil society, particularly on critics and those suspected of opposing the government. As a result, leaders of major human rights organisations fled the country and remain in exile. Some faced charges and were convicted in absentia, including to life imprisonment.

  Human rights activism can hardly be carried out openly in Burundi anymore. Ever since 2015, activists addressing politically sensitive issues face direct threats and can’t work freely inside the country. Even those previously affiliated with human rights organisations that no longer operate in Burundi continue to face arrests.

  Activists advocating for economic and social rights experience comparatively less pressure. Some CSOs working on anti-corruption and good governance issues have been more or less allowed to function, although the government has occasionally impeded their activities, for example, by disrupting or prohibiting press conferences.

  Have Burundian activists found safety in exile?

  Exiled activists based in Europe or Canada are relatively safe, whereas those in Rwanda may encounter additional pressure. In 2015, as many HRDs and journalists fled, the government in Burundi banned or suspended their organisations and shut down several independent radio stations. Some exiled journalists established radio stations abroad, mainly in Rwanda.

  The Burundian government has taken advantage of recently improved relations with Rwanda and pressured the host country to silence these journalists or hand them over. The Rwandan government gave some of these journalists an ultimatum to either remain silent or leave, forcing some to halt operations from Rwanda and relocate again. Some of these journalists were among a broader group, including other HRDs, who were tried and sentenced in absentia.

  What are your key demands for the Burundian government?

  Burundi’s civil society demands that the government lift civic space restrictions, enabling HRDs, journalists and other independent voices to express themselves freely without harassment. We support these demands.

  First of all, the government must release Floriane Irangabiye, a journalist sentenced to 10 years in jail in May 2023. Five other HRDs were charged and tried earlier, in April. The government targeted them because of their association with an international organisation the regime dislikes and accused them of illegally receiving funds. Although released after two months thanks to international pressure, some have been given a suspended sentence, so we call for all charges against them to be dropped.

  The safety of exiled activists must also be ensured before they can return, which requires the lifting of their sentences. As long as HRDs continue to face convictions in absentia, there will be significant impediments to any form of human rights activism in Burundi. We further urge the government to revoke the bans and suspensions imposed on CSOs since 2015.

  Despite the government’s claim that Burundi is a democracy, it is certainly not. If it were, it would allow people to voice criticism and the activities of HRDs wouldn’t be criminalised.

  What support do Burundian human rights activists receive from international allies, and what further do they need?

  When European Union countries, the USA and other governments raise concerns about blatant human rights violations in Burundi, particularly through their embassies in the country, it really makes a difference. Although it may take years to secure the release of an HRD, intensified international pressure has proven effective.

  There are too few independent human rights groups left in Burundi, and it’s difficult to provide international support to virtually non-existent entities. Those still active are mostly individual activists, so it is challenging for donors to support them. One notable exception is the independent newspaper Iwacu, which, despite facing constraints, continues its work. We encourage donors to sustain their support of the media outlet, which represents one of the few remaining independent voices in Burundi.

  Human rights organisations operating from exile need ongoing support, and could expand their work if they had more sustainable funding. It’s hard to work from abroad. After several years in exile, activists begin to feel disconnected and demotivated as they don’t see things change.

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  Civic space in Burundi is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

• BURUNDI: ‘Our right to be recognised and represented as an Indigenous community is being violated’

  CIVICUS speaks about Indigenous peoples’ rights in Burundi with Severin Sindizera, Global Coordinator of the Indigenous Peoples Global Forum for Sustainable Development (IPGFforSD).

  IPGFforSD is a civil society organisation (CSO) that advocates for the rights of Indigenous peoples in Burundi and monitors the implementation of the Sustainable Development Gaols (SDGs) in relation to Indigenous peoples at the national and international levels.

  What is the situation of Indigenous people in Burundi?

  The Batwa Indigenous people represent approximately two per cent of Burundi’s population. The context is disheartening because most of our rights are not recognised. Most Batwa people live in extreme poverty and are marginalised and discriminated against. They are often excluded from access to basic resources such as public services, education, land and healthcare. One common issue affecting Indigenous people across the globe is lack of access to land and decision-making bodies. 

  The Batwa people are not exempt from this, as our land rights are not recognised in Burundi. We need land to survive – to build our houses, grow our crops, graze our animals and preserve our culture.

  Batwa people are not well represented in decision-making processes, which explains why development strategies rarely cater to us and our needs. We have been excluded from the economic, social, political and cultural development of our country. It is quite unfair to have people make decisions on our behalf without consulting with our community. When projects are implemented, we are often sidelined. It would seem the government is trying to make people think it is helping Indigenous people while we are not really receiving the help we need.

  The SDGs aim to eradicate many problems affecting societies globally, but their implementation in Burundi has not been inclusive of Indigenous people. The government must understand that our place in society is already under threat, so it needs to approach the SDGs in an intersectional manner to serve all people of Burundi equally.

  The international community has also shown a lack of a solid plan to address the rights of Indigenous peoples during implementation of the SDGs. We want to know how international organisations aim to promote Indigenous peoples’ development through the SDGs. I had the privilege of attending the Forum on Financing for Development (FfD) in New York, but was disappointed I was the only member representing Indigenous peoples.

  What are the main rights violations experienced by Batwa people in Burundi?

  Batwa people in Burundi do not have access to education, healthcare and proper legal services. Many people have suffered and died due to being denied access to healthcare facilities in their communities. When we try to get legal help to hold accountable those responsible for negligence in healthcare centres, we do not qualify to receive it. We hope this will change one day and the Batwa people of Burundi will be inclusively integrated in their communities.

  But Batwa people currently face serious discrimination. We are often called names such as witches and made feel unwanted by the wider society. Our dignity is looked down upon and we are forced to take a lesser place in society. Without access to good jobs, Batwa people have a high prevalence of poverty.

  Batwa people are disproportionately affected by arbitrary arrests and rights violations, as well as by land grabbing from the government and international stakeholders. People take advantage of us because they know that the majority of us do not have identity cards, making it difficult for us to access justice. Whatever laws have been put in place to protect us are not really working.

  Our right to be recognised and represented as a community is being violated. We need members of our community to advocate for our rights independently, without being associated with any political party. The history of this country should inform policymakers about the importance of cultural recognition. No one should be left behind because of their identity. We have a right to participate fully in public life without facing rights violations.

  Has any progress been made in terms of representation in policymaking processes?

  The Burundian government has launched an initiative to include Indigenous people in some governmental positions. There are now a few Batwa people in parliament. However, the fact that participation in public affairs requires association with a political party makes us uncomfortable. This restricts many Indigenous people from speaking out about their rights because they are controlled by their political parties.

  Political representation is an opportunity for our needs to be heard but our people who are actively participating in public affairs do not necessarily speak on our behalf. Participation of ethnic minorities in Burundi still has a long way to go despite the efforts of the government. Batwa women are inadequately represented in political positions.

  Our government focuses on development but fails to promote it in an inclusive manner. It recently setup a national strategy for Indigenous people, highlighting issues we are dealing with and stating its plan to advance Indigenous people’s rights. We hope that they will consult with members of our community and Indigenous leaders about our needs so the strategy actually benefits us.

  How can Indigenous groups across the world work together to promote Indigenous people’s rights?

  Indigenous groups must have regional and international forums to collaborate towards the achievement of our human rights, economic and social development, as well as civil and political rights. We must partner with international organisations that have experience with working on Indigenous people’s rights so that they can help us with our advocacy work and share strategies to make our work more effective.

  Our organisation, IPGFforSD, works for Indigenous rights through international advocacy and innovative initiatives. We work in collaboration with Indigenous groups an encourage them to create and enhance their platforms in their respective countries from across the globe who face similar issues. We focus on monitoring SDG implementation because the rights and needs of Indigenous people are currently not well represented when SDGs are implemented. We have worked with the United Nations (UN) mechanisms, including the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), to raise awareness of the plight of Indigenous people and the need to recognise them in both national and international policies. We advocate for national governments and international organisations to implement the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

  We also work to sensitise our leaders about Indigenous rights through workshops and seminars. Our aim is for them to be well informed so they can, we hope, help us in the battle of getting our rights recognised in Burundi.

  Civic space in Burundi is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with IPGFforSD through itsFacebook page and follow@IIpgfforsd on Twitter.