politics
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AUSTRIA: ‘A new civil society coalition is emerging to defend democracy against extremism’
CIVICUS speaks about the growth of the far right in Austria withGabriela Greilinger, PhD Student at the University of Georgia, USA and co-founder and director Quo Vademus,a grassroots think tank publishing analysis by young writers and encouraging young people to engage with politics and current affairs.
What are the main far-right groups in Austria, and how concerning is their recent growth?
The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) is the main far-right political party, but there are other groups outside the party system that are also ideologically far right and are considered very close to the FPÖ, such as Identitarian Movement Austria. Freiheitliche Jugend (Freedom Party Youth of Austria), the youth wing of the FPÖ, also maintains close links to the Identitarian Movement. There are also right-wing extremist fraternities, such as Olympia, which are similarly closely connected to the FPÖ.
The FPÖ’s recent rise in the polls is not really a novelty but rather a recurrence. Since its founding after the Second World War, it has been included as a coalition partner in government several times and has risen and fallen in popularity over the years. It plummeted in the polls following the 2019 Ibiza scandal – in which FPÖ politicians were filmed appearing to offer business contracts in return for support – and other corruption allegations, and the breakup of the far-right coalition government led by Sebastian Kurz, which included the right-wing conservative, Christian-democratic Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) along with the FPÖ. After that, the Austrian Freedom Party went through several leadership changes.
Several factors jointly account for the FPÖ’s most recent surge in the polls. First came the COVID-19 pandemic, during which it positioned itself as a strong opposition to the public health measures put in place by the ÖVP-Greens coalition government, including mandatory testing and vaccinations. It openly supported anti-lockdown demonstrations, bringing together people from both right and left.
Then, in 2021, corruption allegations around then-ÖVP chancellor Kurz emerged, which played into the hands of the FPÖ, helping it regain its popularity. This was followed by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which led to an energy crisis and soaring prices in Austria, a country traditionally highly dependent on Russian gas.
As a result, inflation surged further and exacerbated economic anxieties, which have remained largely unaddressed by the current government. All of this has helped the FPÖ regain its popularity, so much so that in November 2022 it surpassed the Social Democrats in the polls and has polled around 30 per cent since. Forecasts predict that it will come in first in this year’s elections and, if so, it would for the first time in history be able to appoint the chancellor.
What public concerns is the FPÖ tapping into?
Immigration is certainly one of the main issues the FPÖ keeps coming back to, but not the only one. The FPÖ also engages in ‘culture war’ politics, taking on issues such as gender-inclusive language and LGBTQI+ rights.
Over the past couple of years, in the context of rising inflation following the pandemic and during the war in Ukraine, it has also increasingly tapped into people’s financial anxieties.
Overall, though, it doesn’t present any viable solutions to people’s concerns but rather attacks and smears political opponents, trying to present itself as the clean alternative to what it calls the ‘system parties’ – a term formerly used by Nazis. Social media, specifically Facebook, is one of the main platforms it uses to spread their messages.
How have Austrian civil society and public opinion reacted to this rise of the far right?
The far right has long been mainstreamed and normalised in Austria, among other reasons because of its repeated inclusion in government. That means its rise, while concerning, is not necessarily surprising or shocking to most people. We’ve seen it happen before. Still, time and again there have been protests against the far right – in 2017, for instance, people mobilised against the inclusion of the FPÖ in the right-wing Kurz government.
However, civil society and its leaders have again become more outspoken in recent weeks, after the German investigative outlet Correctiv reported on a secretive meeting known as the Lehnitzsee Conference that took place last November in Germany, in which right-wing extremists, businesspeople and even some members of the mainstream conservative Christian Democratic Union discussed plans to expel millions of people deemed not sufficiently ‘assimilated’ to the majority society. A notorious Austrian extremist, Martin Sellner, took part in the event, implicating the Austrian extreme-right scene.
This far-right meeting triggered large-scale anti-far-right demonstrations in Germany, which inspired Austrians to organise protests in Vienna and other cities across the country. Although the protests were fewer and smaller in size than Germany’s, many people mobilised.
We have also seen the emergence of a new civil society coalition to defend democracy against extremism. In response to the revelations about the Lehnitzsee Conference, several civil society organisations formed the Coalition for Human Rights and Democracy (Bündnis für Menschenrechte und Demokratie) to ‘create a firewall’ against right-wing extremism. It then also organised a demonstration in defence of democracy in the city of Graz.
How has the government reacted to the rise of the far right?
As of today, we’ve seen little reaction or attempts by the government to curtail the far right. It’s been rather the opposite: the ÖVP has long adopted the messages of the far right on immigration and largely appropriated the FPÖ’s depiction of immigrants. And although the current chancellor, Karl Nehammer, had said he would not enter a coalition that includes FPÖ leader Herbert Kickl, a hardliner, he has not completely ruled it out after this year’s election.
As it stands, the FPÖ is set to win the election and a relaunch of another ÖVP-FPÖ coalition seems to be the most likely option. All in all, I see the government making very little effort to avert the far-right danger. If anything, the ÖVP is trying to take the wind out of the FPÖ’s sails by co-opting its agenda and programme. This is not weakening the far right but rather mainstreaming its policy points and making it part of the ‘normal’ public debate – which it shouldn’t be.
What forms of international support does Austrian civil society need to sustain its efforts?
I believe that there could and should be more international cooperation between civil society organisations that are addressing right-wing extremism and racism. Further, more positive media coverage is needed of civil society efforts to mobilise in defence of democracy to divert the focus from the far right. While it is true that the far right has once again made significant advances, the media continues to focus disproportionately on far-right successes, potential future successes, positions and discourse, simply giving it too much airtime. In contrast, there is much less focus on the forces standing up for democracy and civil society’s efforts to respond to extremism.
At the end of the day, as the slogan used in the German protests goes, ‘Wir sind mehr’ (We are more). We are the majority, even if at times a silent one – and not the far-right supporters and sympathisers.
Civic space in Austria is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Quo Vademus through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow @ggreilinger @quovademusorg on Twitter.
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BULGARIA: ‘Our society has finally become sensitised to domestic and gender-based violence’
CIVICUS speaks with Victoria Petrova, Communications and Development Director at the Bulgarian Fund for Women (BFW), about civil society’s struggles to end domestic and gender-based violence in Bulgaria.
Established in 2004, the BFW is the only Bulgarian feminist civil society organisation (CSO) supporting organisations, collectives and activists that challenge the status quo and work towards systemic change for women, girls and all marginalised communities.
What does BFW do?
The BFW has played a pivotal role in advancing women’s rights across Bulgaria for two decades. Our focus has recently extended. As well as funding projects, in 2020 we started providing core funding to help organisations meet essential needs such as administrative costs, office space, equipment and staff salaries, which often remain uncovered by project funding.
Core funding is of paramount importance to ensure the sustainability of CSOs. Financial stability empowers organisations to be strategic, proactive and resilient in the face of challenges. As of today, providing core funding objective has become our biggest focus.
We also have other funding mechanisms such as project funding and the Open Opportunity programme, which provides rapid funding of up to 10,000 BGN (approx. US$5,500). This has proven invaluable in times of crisis or in the face of unforeseen challenges, such as last year’s attack on the Rainbow Hub, an LGBTQI+ space in the capital, Sofia. A far-right former presidential candidate attacked the hub during an event and injured a participant, an activist and Rainbow Hub team member. The premises were destroyed. Through the Open Opportunity programme BFW gave them a grant so they could get it fixed.
Overall, BFW distributed a total of over US$700,000 in direct grants to CSOs in 2022 alone.
We’ve also taken proactive steps to contribute to building capacity in the organisations we support, recognising the significance of robust women’s rights organisations in a context where great gender inequalities persist.
It is estimated that one in three women, or approximately one million, suffer from domestic and gender-based violence in Bulgaria and at least 15 women have been killed by former or current intimate partners, husbands or other relatives since the beginning of 2023. Women do a disproportionate share of household chores and care work. There aren’t enough support services, such as public kindergartens. There is a significant pay gap and women are grossly underrepresented in politics – only about 25 per cent of members of parliament are women. Life is even harder in small towns, where gender stereotypes are much more deeply rooted.
Have you faced backlash for the work you do?
Women’s rights organisations as well as the entire civil society sector in Bulgaria have encountered significant challenges since 2018. These started alongside attacks on the Istanbul Convention – the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence.
Attacks were sparked by a far-right party, VMRO, and also by the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) after it shifted its stance in relation to the Convention. The party with the biggest parliamentary representation, GERB (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria), sort of washed its hands at the time and left the matter with the Constitutional Court. And the Court ruled that ratifying the Istanbul Convention would be unconstitutional. This made Bulgaria one of the few European states that haven’t ratified the Convention.
These days, attacks focus on the changes recently made to the Protection Against Domestic Violence Act. Regressive and pro-Russian groups such as Revival (Vazrazhdane) and BSP claim that this law seeks to impose the Istanbul Convention and implement what they call ‘gender ideology’. A few months ago, the BSP even started collecting signatures to enable a referendum against ‘gender ideology’. The party has recently announced it has collected the required number of signatures.
What recent changes were made to the Protection Against Domestic Violence Act, and why?
Changes to this law had been pursued for years but faced rejection by some political parties, including Revival, the BSP and some GERB members. They were finally introduced in July and they represented progress, even though they did not include the definition of ‘intimate relationship’ proposed by women’s advocates, as a result of which they did not extend protection to people who are in relationships but are unmarried and not in a domestic partnership.
Regrettably, this omission meant that the shocking Stara Zagora case, in which an 18-year-old woman was beaten and disfigured by her boyfriend, did not fall within the law’s purview. This attack happened in late June but only became public in late July, as a result of the victim’s family’s engagement with the media out of frustration with the slow pace of the investigation.
In response, around 10,000 people protested in Sofia and tens of thousands demonstrated in other regions, demanding justice for victims and action against domestic and gender-based violence. This groundswell of public engagement was unprecedented, shaking the normalised apathy or victim-blaming that had often been the response to similar cases in the past.
This forced parliament to reconsider the bill, and on 7 August it reconvened to widen its scope to cover ‘intimate relationships’. This was a step in the right direction, although some concerning elements remain.
First, criteria for people to be considered as intimate partners include having been in a relationship for at least 60 days, without any clarity as to what counts as the start of those 60 days and, more concerningly, what happens if violence occurs within the first 60 days. Second, at the last minute, members of parliament inserted the words ‘man’ and ‘woman’ in the definition, therefore limiting its scope to heterosexual couples. Same-sex couples were completely excluded from seeking protection under this law.
Bulgarian politicians should do much better. During that same debate a GERB member of parliament, former Minister of Culture and former Chairman of the Parliament, Vezhdi Rashidov, made extremely offensive comments. It was during the break, when he thought his microphone was off and basically called raped women ‘whores’. Our organisation wrote an open letter asking for his resignation, and just a few days later he announced he was resigning.
Unfortunately, his comments reflect widespread attitudes among many of our politicians towards women’s rights and domestic and gender-based violence. We are fed up with their sexist jokes, homophobic expressions, lack of understanding and deliberate disinformation regarding gender issues and women’s rights.
What do you think made the Stara Zagora case so impactful?
The impact of the Stara Zagora case can be attributed to several factors, primarily stemming from systemic failures that occurred across various institutional levels. The perpetrator’s swift release within 72 hours of the attack, despite being on probation for prior offences, set the tone for public outrage.
Public indignation also resulted from the discrepancy between the severity of the attack, which involved the use of a knife and resulted in 400 stitches, a broken nose and a shaved head, and its categorisation as a mere ‘soft bodily injury’.
There was a shift in public sentiment that revealed heightened awareness and empathy for victims. The usual response in these cases is often victim-blaming. This time, however, many more people sided with the victim. Although some anti-rights voices questioning the victim’s innocence emerged, particularly on social media, most public figures refrained from such insensitivity.
As a result, over the past few weeks, we have started to see more and more domestic violence cases being reported on the media. So I’d say the Stara Zagora case sensitised society and accelerated change. I hope people will now be more willing to seek protection and justice, and institutions and the media will be more willing to empathise with the victims.
What else should be done to combat gender-based violence more effectively?
While there are organisations like BFW that have worked against gender-based violence for decades, it’s evident that a comprehensive national campaign led by the state is needed to catalyse broader change. Such a campaign should aim to reach people across all socio-economic strata, fostering a shared understanding of gender equality and the unacceptability of violence.
Education and prevention are paramount, and they must begin at an early age. Teaching children about gender equality and the importance of rejecting violence from the outset can contribute to lasting change.
The establishment of more crisis centres across the country to provide immediate support and safety for victims is also crucial. Only 15 out of 28 regional cities have crisis centres so far. Perhaps positive change will now take place as four ministries have got involved in solving the issue.
Finally, ratification of the Istanbul Convention remains a pivotal goal. Its comprehensive framework can guide Bulgaria in its efforts to counter gender-based violence. We will continue advocating for these changes and support other organisations that work for women’s rights.
How do you connect with the global women’s movement and what additional support do you need?
We participate in networks like Prospera and On the Right Track. These connections expose us to diverse perspectives and experiences and enrich our understanding of the broader movement.
Collaboration among organisations and international assistance are essential to counter anti-rights narratives, fend off far-right movements that are unfortunately increasingly organised and determined and promote positive change. When helping people and organisations, we sometimes tend to be reactive to attacks. We need to support each other to be more proactive.
As I already mentioned, core funding is of huge importance to our grantees, but it is for us as well. I am happy to see that more of our donors started providing this type of long-term support, and I am hopeful that even more will recognise the need for it in the future.
To end on a more positive note, I am thankful that Bulgarian society has finally become sensitised to the topic of domestic and gender-based violence. This isn’t a private issue but an issue that affects the whole of society. We are all responsible for educating ourselves on the topic, learning about its different forms, stepping up when we see something unacceptable and supporting people who are brave enough to report violence.
We look forward to a collective push toward lasting change, supported by all of you.
Civic space in Bulgaria is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with the BFW through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@bgfundforwomen on Twitter.
The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.
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Chad elections: President Déby seeks a sixth term in a region for old men
By David Kode, Advocacy & Campaigns Lead at CIVICUS
In a familiar pattern than continues to be repeated, President Idriss Déby looks set to be elected for yet another term in Chad following this Sunday’s presidential elections. In power since 1990, this will be the 68-year-old incumbent’s sixth term.
President Déby’s victory at the ballot box may be all but assured, but that’s not to say he doesn’t face significant opposition. When he was nominated to be the ruling Patriotic Salvation Movement’s flagbearer this February, the announcement sparked widespread demonstrations. In the capital N’Djamena and other major cities, protesters took to the streets chanting “no to a sixth term!” and “Leave, Déby!”.
Read on African Arguments
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Closure of Himal magazine part of ongoing onslaught on free expression in the South Asia region
CIVICUS speaks to Aunohita Mojumdar the editor of Himal Southasian, a review magazine of politics and culture based in Nepal and run by the not-for-profit Southasia Trust. Aunohita Mojumdar speaks on the suspension of the magazine from publishing and freedom of expression in the region. She has spent 25 years reporting from parts of South Asia. Before arriving in Kathmandu in 2012, Mojumdar was based in Kabul, Afghanistan for eight years as a freelancer. She is currently working for the re-launch of the suspended magazine
1. Please tell us about Himal Southasian and what makes it unique?
Himal is unique in a number of ways. It has a regional outlook, covering the whole of Southasia; it functions as a bridge between academia and journalism by making in-depth reporting and research accessible to a wider audience; and it challenges the jingoism and ultra-nationalism that obstructs a clear-eyed view of the region and its challenges.Though the South Asian region has strong independent media outlets, reportage and analysis are invariably dominated by the national perspective, whether it is in the selection of issues the media covers or the manner in which issues are reported. The hostile rhetoric strengthens the confrontational postures based on jingoism rather than fact-based discourse and debate. As evident in the coverage of Indo-Pak issues. Reporting is also overwhelmingly event-based reporting and Himal has been unique in the kind of context it provides, thus answering the critical question of journalism that is often ignored – the why.
Though significant path-breaking scholarship exists in the region, much of this remains confined to academic texts which remain inaccessible to a wider audience because of stilted jargon or language. Himal seeks to bring this scholarship into the public domain on the premise that informed debate and discourse is a necessary element of democracy.
Despite the rise of ultra-nationalism, most media are unwilling to undertake critical reporting on this issue for fear of being branded as being anti-national. Himal’s contribution in this of expanding the scope for debate and discourse on this is well-established, a recent example being the controversy over Himal’s signature map. (See map is pictured above. Readers note, the map is rotated intentionally by the editors of Himal to reconceptualise regionalism and put a focus on people and not nation-states).
2. Himal Southasian has been forced to cease its operations due to bureaucratic reasons. Could you shed some light as to what happened?
Small organisations are sometimes challenged by the lack of money, staff, professionalism or administrative weaknesses. It is worth mentioning that Himal has met all these challenges and risen above them. The magazine’s suspension in November 2016 was caused by a new but growing expression of intolerance which uses bureaucracy to silence individuals and organisations which are troublesome to regimes, governments and states.Often this tactic is through investigations, never-ending and ambiguous, and it is the process rather than the outcome which kills. In the case of Himal the method was even simpler. Himal was never investigated nor even questioned. The simple expedient of withholding permission for us to use our grants and to secure work visas for our staff as well as a slow-down of other regulatory processes paralysed our functioning.
These methods clearly work much better than direct censorship or attacks, both because there is no obvious attack and it is long drawn and because it is nearly impossible to mobilise public opinion on it. The low-level but high-value attrition of these methods is making them an increasingly popular form of clamping down on civil society.3. How would you characterise the environment for civil society in Nepal? Is freedom of expression respected?
As a non-Nepali I cannot hope to speak to the entirety of the situation in Nepal but our experience suggests that there is a high degree of self-censorship. Very few civil society groups spoke out on our behalf after the suspension and even some media organisations whose mandate is the protection of journalists have been reluctant to speak out, let alone other media outlets.4. Are you hopeful about the future of freedom of expression in South Asia? Is it being respected at present?
Freedom of expression throughout Southasia is facing a major challenge and in fact our last issue published out of Nepal documents the shrinking space in almost the entire region with a few exceptions. There are multiple challenges to freedom of expression. We have increasingly intolerant governments, which are using direct or indirect means to curb media and civil society. We have vigilante groups who are carrying out violent attacks on writers and journalists who are either being actively encouraged by the governments or are encouraged by the impunity the government inaction offers.Governments are also using more sophisticated methods of control detailed earlier. In fact the challenge to Himal has made us aware of the extent of control exercised on routine functions. There is nothing, for example, in the rules and procedures which force the Nepal government to either give permission or show cause why the permission is being withheld. We see similar actions against NGOs in India where a large number of organisations critical of the government are losing the permission to operate or losing the ability to accept grants. Many non-commercial organisations rely on grants for their function and the reasons to deny them the permission appears arbitrary, linked not to their performance but to their perceived opposition to the government.
Even where media are not directly attacked, the corporatisation of media has led to media reporting more and more on selective subjects catering to audiences with purchasing power. As media emerge more as carriers for advertising they are required to create a feel-good audience for their readers, leaving out the vast majority of the citizens who do not have the purchasing power to drive advertising spend.
Self-censorship is being exercised by the media to avoid any confrontation that could damage the corporate interests while the profit motive of media companies has taken away resources from the actual task of journalism.While the trends in Southasia are not very different from global trends, the weak rule of law and poor governance in Southasian countries poses additional challenges and is a threat to the small number of independent outlets that exist.
5. How can international and regional civil society support you in carrying out your mandate?
With increasingly complex and sophisticated threats emerging to the survival of independent media, the support structures and strategies also need to evolve. While there are robust processes in place to provide safe havens to activists who are threatened, to relocate them in exile, there are few processes in place for supporting activists and organisations who wish to remain in situ and work. There are few processes to support organisations who may not be physically at risk but whose work is being threatened or compromised. There are absolutely no initiatives which are examining and questioning the new methodologies of attack where organisations and individuals are being targeted by financial investigations even though there is, by now, a pattern of such victimisation.In our case for example it would have helped if there had been questions asked of the government on the refusal to process permissions. Indeed given the suspension of Himal and the closure of its offices in Nepal after nearly 30 years of public service journalism such questions could still be asked so that governments know they will be held accountable.
While Himal remains ready to resume its editorial work as soon as it is able, it is currently seeking to establish the administrative and financial structures that will allow it to function. Support that would enable this would be welcome.
About Himal: Himal Southasian, a review magazine of politics and culture, is the only regional magazine of its kind. Stretching from Afghanistan to Burma, from Tibet to the Maldives, this region of more than 1.4 billion people shares great swathes of interlocking geography, culture and history. Yet today neighbouring countries can barely talk to one another, much less speak in a common voice. For over three decades, Himal Southasian has strived to define, nurture, and amplify that voice.
Civic space in Nepal is rated as obstructed by the CIVICUS Monitor.
Follow Himal on twitter at @Himalistan. Visit the website of Himal at http://himalmag.com -
GABON: ‘Civic space and the conditions for the exercise of human rights were difficult under the former regime’
CIVICUS discusses the military coup in Gabon with Georges Mpaga, National Executive President of the Network of Free Civil Society Organisations of Gabon (ROLBG).
Over the past decade, ROLBG has focused on enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, torture and arbitrary detention. It advocates to improve civic space in Gabon and Central Africa and campaigns on inhumane detention conditions.
What’s your opinion on Gabon’s recent elections and subsequent military coup?
The 26 August elections were undoubtedly fraudulent, as were the previous ones. The regime led by predatory dictator Ali Bongo had banned international and domestic observer missions and international media. ROLBG was the only organisation that carried out citizen observation through the parallel vote tabulation system. Because of Bongo’s despotic will, the election was held under totally irregular conditions, in flagrant violation of international norms and standards. The vote count was held behind closed doors, in an opaque context that allowed for large-scale electoral fraud and falsified results.
On 30 August 2023, the salutary intervention of the defence and security forces put an end to this aberration. For me, as someone from civil society, what has just happened in Gabon is by no means a military coup; it is quite simply a military intervention led by patriots within the army, under the leadership of General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, that put an end to a 56-year imposture, a predatory system and an infernal cycle of rigged elections often punctuated by massive human rights violations. This is our reading of the situation, and it is the general opinion of the Gabonese people, who have just been freed from a criminal dictatorship and oligarchy.
Why has military intervention taken place now, after so many years of Bongo family rule?
The military intervention on 30 August was justified as a response to the desire shown by the Bongo clan and its Gabonese Democratic Party to remain in power by will or by force, through fraudulent elections and police repression orchestrated by the defence and security forces, which were instrumentalised and took orders from the former president.
The Gabonese armed forces intervened to avert a bloodbath and replace the Bongo regime: an unrelenting regime that was ruthless towards the Gabonese people, tainted by clientelist relationships, shady business deals, predatory corruption and widespread violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, all sanctioned by fraudulent elections.
In this sense, the coup in Gabon is not part of a regional trend, but the result of a purely internal process resulting from 56 years of dictatorship and its corollary of human rights violations and the destruction of the country’s economic and social fabric. However, the events underway in Gabon obviously have repercussions in the Central African region, home to some of the worst of Africa’s dictatorships.
What’s your perspective on international criticism of the coup?
Civil society welcomed the military intervention because it sounded the death knell for more than half a century of deceit and predation at the top of the state. Without this intervention, we would have witnessed an unprecedented tragedy.
The Gabonese army, under the leadership of the Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions (CTRI), the military junta in power, allowed the country to escape a tragedy with incalculable consequences. Seen in this light, the military should be celebrated as heroes. As soon as he took power, General Oligui set about uniting a country that had been deeply divided and traumatised by such a long time of calamitous management by the Bongo family and the mafia interests around them.
The attitude of the international community is unacceptable to civil society, human rights defenders and the people of Gabon, who have long paid a heavy price. In 2016, when Bongo planned and carried out an electoral coup followed by atrocities against civilians who opposed the electoral masquerade, the international community remained silent, leaving Gabon’s civilians to face their executioner. In view of this, we categorically reject the declarations of the international community, in particular the Economic Community of Central African States and the African Union, two institutions that have encouraged the manipulation of constitutions and presidencies for life in Central Africa.
What were conditions like for civil society under Bongo family rule? Do you think there is any chance that the situation will now improve?
Civic space and the conditions for exercising democratic freedoms and human rights were difficult under the former regime. The rights of association, peaceful assembly and expression were flouted. Many civil society activists and human rights defenders, including myself, spent time in prison or were deprived of their fundamental rights.
With the establishment of the transitional regime, we are now seeing fundamental change towards an approach that is generally favourable to civil society. The new authorities are working in concert with all the nation’s driving forces, including civil society, which was received on 1 September by General Oligui and his CTRI peers, and I was the facilitator of that meeting. The transitional president, who was sworn in on 4 September, took to work to restore state institutions, human rights and democratic freedoms, and to respect Gabon’s national and international commitments. A strong signal was given on 5 September, with the gradual release of prisoners of conscience, including the leader of Gabon’s largest civil service union confederation, Jean Remi Yama, after 18 months of arbitrary detention.
Civic space in Gabon is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Georgesthrough hisFacebook page and follow@gmpaga on Twitter.
The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.
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GABON: ‘Under the old regime civil society was not taken into account’
CIVICUS discusses the military coup in Gabon with Pepecy Ogouliguende, expert in human rights, governance, gender and peace mediation and founder and president of Malachie.
Malachie is a Gabonese civil society organisation that combats poverty and promotes sustainable development and gender equality. It is active in a areas that include biodiversity protection, aid in the event of natural disasters, medical support, particularly for people living with HIV/AIDS, and human rights education, especially for the most vulnerable groups in society.
What’s your opinion on Gabon’s recent general election and subsequent military coup?
At around 3am on 30 August 2023, the Gabonese Electoral Commission announced the results of the presidential election, with incumbent Ali Bongo as the winner. A few minutes later, the military announced they had seized power. It is important to stress that this was not a coup d’état, but a seizure of power by the military. This distinction is justified by the fact that it took place without bloodshed.
The election was marred by irregularities and the announcement of the results would have led to protests, albeit legitimate, but which would have ended in violence. I would therefore like to salute the bravery of the defence and security forces.
The military then dissolved all governing institutions and set up a Transition Committee for the Restoration of Institutions (CTRI).
Was your organisation able to observe the election?
No, my organisation was unable to observe the election for the simple reason that no international or national observers were admitted. The election was conducted in total secrecy. Like all Gabonese people, I saw that the announced results did not correspond with the results at the ballot box.
The seizure of power by the defence and security forces in this particular context of public distrust of the authorities and deep suspicion of the election results is rather akin to a patriotic act.
Why has military intervention taken place now, after so many years of Bongo family rule?
Our defence and security forces, along with the public, have observed numerous irregularities and dysfunctions in the state apparatus in recent years. They therefore decided to put an end to this regime, which no longer corresponded to the aspirations of the Gabonese people.
The military saw an opportunity in the 26 August election to end the current system by assuming their responsibilities to save the nation and the rule of law. The aim of this seizure of power is to ‘restore the dignity of the Gabonese people’. As the CTRI spokesperson put it, ‘we are finally on the road to happiness’.
What’s your perspective on international criticism of the coup?
The international community simply acted by the book without first analysing the context. Gabon’s is a very special case.
Celebrations on the streets of Gabon’s main cities showed the extent to which the old regime was no longer wanted, just tolerated. These scenes of popular jubilation, which contrast with the international community’s condemnation, should be a wake-up call to the international community, inviting it to review its approach, which is more focused on safeguarding stability at all costs, often to the detriment of real social progress, development or economic growth – in short, at the expense of the wellbeing of the majority.
All those in the international community who spoke up condemned the ‘coup d’état’ and assured us that they were following developments in Gabon with interest, while reiterating their attachment to respect for institutions. Reactions from international organisations were very strong: the United Nations condemned the coup and the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) suspended Gabon because they directly associated this ‘coup d’état’ with those that had previously taken place elsewhere in the region.
The USA has distanced itself somewhat by stating that it will work with its partners and the people to support the democratic process underway. This is where we look to the rest of the international community to help us work towards building strong institutions.
We salute those states that have clearly understood the need for this change. We condemn AU and ECCAS sanctions. The international community should support states in respecting their laws and constitutions and ensuring that democracy and human rights are respected.
Do you think this coup is part of a regional trend?
First and foremost, it should be reminded that in the case of Gabon, this was a military takeover and not a coup d’état in the strict sense of the term. It was in fact the result of bad governance and failure to take account of the needs of the population, particularly social needs, but also of the thirst for change. It can have regional impacts in the sense that most African populations are experiencing the same difficulties – youth unemployment, poverty, lack of access to healthcare – and aspire to major change. When people don’t feel taken into account by policymakers, they become frustrated.
We don’t rule out the possibility that this will have an impact on our neighbours. It is not too late for the regimes in power in Central Africa to seize this opportunity to rethink the way they serve their people.
What were conditions like for civil society under Bongo family rule? Do you think there is any chance the situation will now improve?
In Gabon, the operation of organisations and associations is governed by law 35/62, which guarantees freedom of association. That said, under the old regime civil society was not taken into account. It was only partly involved in the management of public affairs.
Some leaders, particularly trade union leaders, could be arrested or intimidated if the regime felt they were being overzealous. Several Gabonese civil society leaders denounced arbitrary arrests linked to their opinions and positions.
Like the Gabonese people, civil society is delighted at the change. Civil society as a whole is committed to taking an active part in the actions and reforms carried out by the authorities during the transition, to promote respect for human rights, equity and social justice, the preservation of peace and good governance.
The CTRI has just authorised the release of some of Gabon’s leading trade unionists and prisoners of conscience. In view of the first decisions taken by the CTRI, the best is yet to come. I can safely say that the Gabon of tomorrow will be better. Today there is a glimmer of hope.
Civic space in Gabon is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Malachie through itswebsite or itsFacebook page.
The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.
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HORN OF AFRICA: ‘De-escalation must be the primary objective’
CIVICUS speaks with Mengistu Assefa, Program Manager at the Center for the Advancement of Rights and Democracy (CARD), about a port deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland and the possibility of it escalating into an armed conflict with Somalia.
CARD is an Ethiopian civil society organisation that advocates for democracy and human rights through citizen empowerment.
What’s the relevance of the recent port deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland?
Following Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia became a landlocked nation, placed in a challenging position for international trade. Since then, Djibouti has emerged as its primary access point to the sea, handling over 95 per cent of its trade volume. This dependence comes at a cost, with Ethiopia paying more than US$1 billion annually in fees to Djibouti’s ports and infrastructure. With its estimated population of 126 million, the second largest in Africa, Ethiopia views sea access as critical for its economic, political and demographic future.
To achieve this, on 1 January 2024 the Ethiopian federal government signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on commercial port access with Somaliland, a self-proclaimed autonomous territory that is internationally recognised as part of Somalia.
While this MoU is not a legally binding agreement, it carries significant implications for the region because it walks a tightrope between cooperation and recognition. For Somaliland, the MoU represents a potential step towards international recognition of its de facto autonomy. Although the agreement’s full details remain undisclosed, it also reportedly grants Ethiopia access to Somaliland’s Red Sea coast, potentially including a military base. Ethiopian authorities have not been explicit about Somaliland’s recognition, saying the MoU allows for an ‘in-depth assessment’ of Somaliland’s quest for recognition.
Somalia vehemently rejects the MoU, viewing it as a violation of its territorial integrity and political sovereignty. It is actively mobilising diplomatic pressure against the deal. Somali president Hassan Sheik Mohamed has visited Egypt and Eritrea, Ethiopia’s long-standing competitors, seeking support. Additionally, the Arab League, of which Somalia is a member, has denounced the MoU. Egypt’s leader, already locked in negotiations with Ethiopia over a Nile dam project, has assured Somalia of potential support if requested, further escalating regional tensions.
What’s the political status of Somaliland?
Somaliland, with an estimated population of five million, broke away from Somalia and declared its independence in 1991 after 30 years of civil war. It fought for its independence based on the argument that it had a distinct historical heritage. Somaliland was a UK protectorate, while Somalia was under Italian control. For Somalilanders, this is enough argument to prove they are different territories. Moreover, in June 1960 Somaliland was briefly recognised as an independent state by around 35 nations for a span of five days, before it relinquished its sovereignty to reunite with the Somali Republic.
Somaliland declared its independence more than three decades ago but Somalia has never recognised it. Neither has any international organisation. Even so, Somaliland has managed to become a stable, functional state. It established its own army and democratic institutions and has held six elections with peaceful transitions of power.
In late 2022 and early 2023, a local armed movement, the Dhulbahante militias, rose against Somaliland’s government, declaring its intention to rejoin Somalia. This uprising posed significant political and security challenges to the Somaliland government, partly contributing to the postponement of 2023 elections. It cast a shadow of instability over Somaliland’s bid for international recognition, which hinges on its ability to demonstrate long-term stability and democratic institutions.
Could the port deal lead to international recognition of Somaliland’s independence?
Somaliland has made clear that a binding legal agreement could only be signed once it is officially recognised as an independent nation state. But the Ethiopian side of the story is quite different. Ethiopia hasn’t ruled out the possibility of that happening but hasn’t explicitly said it would take a stance on the recognition of Somaliland. The signing of a binding legal international agreement with Somaliland would however result in Ethiopia’s de facto recognition of its independence.
Looking at the bigger picture, this deal could affect the regional security architecture, particularly when it comes to fighting Al-Shabaab, an Islamist terrorist group based in Somalia and allied with Al-Qaeda. Al-Shabaab is perceived as a global security threat and has explicitly targeted Ethiopia. Consequently, Ethiopia is engaged in fighting Al-Shabaab in Somalia alongside the Somali army. If Ethiopia recognises Somaliland, Somalia will likely force Ethiopia to pull out its troops. However, as Somalia cannot take charge of its security on its own, Ethiopia could use it as leverage to force Somalia to back down from a strong reaction.
Ethiopia’s potential recognition of Somaliland carries significant implications. Located in a strategically crucial area along the Gulf of Eden, where Houthis and pirates constantly attack international ships, Somaliland’s 850-kilometre coastline attracts interest from various countries seeking a potential military base. Ethiopia’s explicit recognition of Somaliland could trigger a domino effect, with other countries following suit, although recognition would likely face significant hurdles at the African Union (AU).
The AU adheres to the principle of respecting colonial borders and has expressed concerns about setting a precedent for secessionist movements in other African states, including Morocco and Nigeria. Ethiopia will likely weigh this carefully before explicitly recognising Somaliland’s independence. However, the rapidly shifting landscape of international interests suggests that it’s not an impossibility. This possibility is further amplified by the growing involvement of great and emerging powers in the Red Sea region, driven by economic and security interests.
Could tensions escalate into a conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia?
Ethiopia and Somalia have had difficult relations in the past. In 1964, they clashed in a three-month border conflict. This initial skirmish foreshadowed a larger and bloodier conflict that erupted between 1977 and 1978. During this period, Somalia invaded Ethiopia with the intent of annexing the Ogaden region, inhabited by ethnic Somalis. The conflict quickly became a proxy war for the contenders of the Cold War, with the western bloc supporting Somalia and the Soviet Union backing Ethiopia. Ultimately, Ethiopia repelled the Somali army.
In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a group aiming to unite all Somalis across Ethiopia, Somalia and Somaliland under Islamic rule, gained control of Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital. This development raised concerns in Ethiopia, which perceived it as a threat to its national security and regional stability. Supported by the USA in the context of the ‘war on terror’, Ethiopia militarily intervened in Somalia and removed the ICU from power.
Several years later, Ethiopia and Somalia signed a bilateral agreement aimed at stabilising the region. This agreement facilitated the deployment of Ethiopian security forces to assist the Somali National Army in its fight against Al-Shabaab and support the ongoing Somali transition process. It’s important to note that these Ethiopian troops are currently integrated into the AU Transition Mission in Somalia, a peacekeeping mission.
Since October 2023, Ethiopia has declared its intention to gain access to the sea by peaceful means. In exchange for access Ethiopia has offered Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia land-swaps and stakes in a successful state-owned business such as Ethiopian Airlines, Africa’s biggest and most successful airline, and even in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. But none of these countries accepted Ethiopia’s offer, leaving Somaliland as a seemingly more amenable option.
Somalia viewed Ethiopia’s signing of the port deal with Somaliland as betrayal. It reacted strongly and aggressively because it considers it an encroachment on its territory and an act against its sovereignty.
Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence could open a Pandora’s box. In fear that it could lead to regional and global recognition, Somalia said that if Ethiopia moved forward in implementing the agreement, consequences would follow.
This all brings us to the final and crucial point: where will this take the region? While the possibility of conflict cannot be entirely dismissed, it’s important to consider various factors and perspectives to assess its likelihood.
First, military capabilities and intentions play a role. While Somalia’s military power is not comparable to Ethiopia’s, the potential for escalation and regional instability cannot be ignored. Additionally, Ethiopia’s stated commitment to peaceful resolutions needs to be weighed against its historical engagements and potential strategic calculations.
Second, the international community’s role matters. The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region are already grappling with complex conflicts and any further instability would have significant repercussions. International pressure and diplomatic efforts to de-escalate tensions and promote dialogue will be crucial in preventing conflict.
Further, Somalia’s response to the MoU adds another layer of complexity. Its seeking of support from Ethiopia’s historical competitors, such as Egypt and Eritrea, as well as regional entities such as the Arab League, could potentially lead to increased diplomatic pressure against Ethiopia. This, in turn, could further strain relations between the two countries for the foreseeable future.
Finally, the MoU is likely to ignite discussions about the status of Somaliland, both within the AU and at the United Nations Security Council.
What should the international community do to address this potential crisis?
The international community plays a crucial role in navigating the complex situation surrounding Ethiopia’s pursuit of sea access and its MoU with Somaliland. It is essential to engage with all stakeholders, particularly the Somali government and Somaliland’s authorities. It should be a top priority to facilitate negotiations to find a lasting solution that ensures both peaceful coexistence and normalised relations, as people in the Horn of Africa are ultimately bearing the brunt of this disagreement.
Regardless of the outcome, be it Somaliland’s reunification with Somalia or its international recognition as a separate state, the two countries must establish a mutually agreeable arrangement for peaceful coexistence. The international community can play the role of facilitating a genuine conversation between the two. This is of course easier said than done, given the historical complexities of their relationship and the vested interests of various states and organisations, including western nations and other international players, who prioritise their security and economic interests in the region.
International involvement should also aim to support Ethiopia and Somalia in reaching a mutually agreeable solution. This requires careful diplomacy to avoid exacerbating existing tensions or creating new problems. It’s also essential to urge those with vested interests in the region to avoid exploiting this situation for their agendas. De-escalation must be the primary objective.
Civic space in bothEthiopia andSomalia is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with CARD through itswebsite or itsFacebook orInstagram pages, and follow@CARDEthiopia and@mengistu_dadi on Twitter.
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INDIA: ‘Civil society efforts will be crucial to the quality of the elections’
CIVICUS speaks with Anjali Bhardwaj, founding member of the Society for Citizen Vigilance Initiatives (Satark Nagrik Sangathan, SNS), about recent electoral reforms and civil society efforts to ensure the quality of India’s upcoming election.
Established in 2003, SNS is a civil society organisation (CSO) working to promote government transparency and accountability and foster active citizen participation.
What recent changes have been made to rules on campaign financing?
On 15 February, the Supreme Court ruled the electoral bond system currently used to finance election campaigns unconstitutional. This is a positive change, with a potential to bring transparency to campaign financing.
Introduced in 2018, the electoral bond scheme allowed people and organisations to buy designated bank bonds ranging from 1,000 to 10 million rupees (approx. US$12 to US$120,000) to donate to political campaigns in a completely anonymous way. When it introduced this system, the ruling Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) presented it as a measure to combat corruption and increase transparency in political financing.
Before the bond system was introduced, political parties could receive funds in cash or through the banking system, but large corporate donations were often made in cash. All cash donations below 20,000 rupees (approx. US$240) were anonymous under the Income Tax Act. So to hoodwink the system, parties often reported large cash donations as multiple donations of amounts smaller than 20,000 rupees.
The electoral bond scheme was presented as a measure to increase transparency but the anonymity it ensured had the opposite effects. The opacity it enabled allowed single donors to provide unlimited funding. It hasn’t allowed people, CSOs, opposition political parties or even the Election Commission of India to track the flow of money in politics. It has compromised the public’s right to information, as voters are unable to discern the extent or sources of funding political parties receive. This limited people’s democratic right to make informed voting decisions.
What was the reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s decision?
The Supreme Court first addressed this issue as early as 2019, acknowledging the bond system’s potential harm to democracy but allowing it to continue while it analysed the substance of the case. But even back then, it emphasised the deepened information imbalance created by a system that allowed the ruling party to access information about donors and donations through the government-controlled bank while leaving opposition parties and the public in the dark.
In its recent ruling, the Supreme Court stressed that electoral bonds infringe article 19 of the constitution because without the right to information in electoral matters, the rights to free speech and expression guaranteed by article 19 cannot be fully realised.
Voters in India predominantly support parties, rather than individual candidates. When large corporations contribute generous funds to political parties, there is the presumption that they do so in the expectation of receiving favours in return once parties become part of governments. When favours are returned, policy is guided not by promises made to voters or by people’s needs but by the interests of funders. This is why funding transparency is crucial for informed voting. Without this information, voters cannot know what to expect when parties access government.
Electoral bonds exacerbated corruption through anonymous funding that gave free rein to large corporations to influence policy. They also made the playing field even more uneven, as the BJP consistently received a substantial share of electoral bonds.
The Supreme Court judgment declared the scheme and associated amendments unconstitutional, emphasising the importance of the right to information. The court prohibited further transactions and mandated disclosure of past transactions, marking a significant move towards restoring transparency and fairness in India’s electoral process.
How has civic space evolved under Prime Minister Narendra Modi?
Regrettably, since the beginning of the Modi government in 2014 we have seen a significant contraction of civic space, due to systematic attacks on the crucial right to dissent, a cornerstone of any democracy.
The essence of democracy lies in people’s right to question those in power. But in India, this right has been under attack in three primary ways.
First, those who express dissent, criticise government policies or challenge legislation are labelled as anti-national. The governments files legal cases against them, leveraging draconian laws, terror-related legislation and money laundering statutes to silence them.
Second, the government has deliberately weakened the laws that empower citizens. The Indian Right to Information Act, lauded as one of the world’s most progressive, has been amended twice in the last five years. Regressive amendments have severely affected people’s right to access information and question the authorities. Similarly regressive amendments to other laws, such as the Representation of People Act and the Income Tax Act, along with the electoral bonds, have further curtailed people’s right to access vital information to hold the authorities to account.
The government has also undermined the independence of institutions responsible for upholding fundamental rights, including the right to free expression and protest. This has eroded the constitutional protection people should enjoy when expressing dissent. Protesting and questioning the government have therefore become increasingly difficult.
The cumulative effect of these developments has dealt a severe blow to civic space in India.
Are there enough guarantees for a free and fair election?
India has needed electoral reform long before the current administration. For decades civil society has advocated for changes to strengthen the electoral process. While India takes pride in conducting relatively free and fair elections, concerns over the quality of elections have increased over time.
Civil society has repeatedly expressed alarm over issues including the influence of money over elections, the security and reliability of electronic voting machines and manipulation of the voter roll.
Regarding the undue influence of money over elections and consequently over policymaking, electoral bonds have long been a matter of major concern. Civil society has also expressed apprehension about glitches in and tampering with electronic voting systems, prompting debate and ongoing legal challenges in the Supreme Court. Alarms were also sounded by recent elections that saw arbitrary deletions and additions to voter lists.
Civil society continues to bring attention to these issues, urging authorities to find solutions. The resolution of these challenges is essential for India to genuinely claim it conducts free and fair elections.
Who are the major contenders in the 2024 election, and what are the main issues the winner will need to tackle?
India has numerous political parties that actively participate in elections. The BJP and its allies have successfully formed a government twice and are currently strong contenders to secure a third term in office. The opposition landscape includes the Indian National Congress, historically prevalent prior to the BJP’s rise. But there are many other national and regional parties that contribute to the diversity of the political spectrum.
As a developing country, India, faces multifaceted challenges. Among the most significant are deep-seated socio-economic inequality and high incidence of poverty, with a small number of families holding a substantial portion of the country’s wealth and a substantial percentage of the population living below the poverty line. There is much need for policies to uplift those on the margins of society and reforms to the structures that perpetuate inequality.
Equally crucial is the protection of civic freedoms, particularly for those who criticise the government, including through peaceful protests. Those who express dissent and demand accountability must be protected rather than criminalised.
The next government should prioritise these issues, addressing inequalities and working to create an environment where citizens can freely express themselves and participate fully in the democratic process.
Civic space in Indonesia is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with the SCVI through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow @sns_india on Twitter.
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INDONESIA: ‘We must become an example of successful societal resistance against the threat of autocratic rule’
CIVICUS speaks about the upcoming general election in Indonesia with Muhammad Isnur, chairperson of the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) and Secretary of the Board of theHuman Rights Working Group.
Founded in 1970, YLBHI is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) that provides legal aid to excluded communities throughout Indonesia and engages in research, advocacy and empowerment initiatives. Every year the organisation receives at least 3,500 legal complaints and requests for assistance.
What is at stake in the upcoming general election?
The upcoming election will define Indonesia’s trajectory amidst a trend of growing authoritarianism. The incumbent government led by President Joko Widodo, known as Jokowi, is responsible for numerous human rights violations. It has targeted poor people through evictions and arrests, weakened anti-corruption efforts and criminalised civil society.
Jokowi has expressed support for the presidential candidacy of Prabowo Subianto, who faces allegations of crimes against humanity, including abductions and enforced disappearances of activists during mass protests in 1998 that led to the downfall of the Suharto dictatorship. He was dismissed from the military but hasn’t faced accountability and his victims haven’t received reparations, and some remain missing. His victory would be the worst possible scenario for civil society.
Jokowi has also undermined the rule of law to pave the way for his 36-year-old son, Gibran Rakabuming, to become a vice-presidential candidate. The controversial Constitutional Court ruling issued in October 2023 to grant him an exception to the legal minimum age of 40 to run for president or vice-president was delivered by Chief Justice Anwar Usman, who happens to be Jokowi’s brother-in-law. Gibran represents the interests of the Jokowi government and corrupt and authoritarian economic elites.
If the ruling elite succeeds in arbitrarily extending its power, there is risk of a resurgence of the kind of authoritarian and oligarchical rule we saw during dictatorship from 1966 to 1998.
Who are the other contenders, and what are their human rights records?
The other candidates are Ganjar Pranowo and Mahfud MD of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, which has a long history of wielding power and currently holds the highest number of ministers in the government. Mahfud has defended the Jokowi government for many years and denied the gross human rights violations committed by Indonesian security forces against Indigenous Papuans.
We’ve also documented numerous human rights violations in Central Java during Ganjar’s tenure as governor. In Kendeng, despite a court decision favourable to the local community opposed to the construction of a cement factory, Ganjar reissued an environmental permit for the construction to proceed. In Wadas, he facilitated the implementation of a mining project aligned with Jokowi’s agenda, disregarding opposition from the local community, which also faced extraordinary repression, including arrests and beatings by the police and disruptions of internet and electricity services.
The third pair of candidates, Anies Baswedan and Muhaimin Iskandar, in contrast, position themselves as advocates for change. Anies has a social agenda focused on protecting poor people. But they receive support from parties that are integral to the existing power structure and have also backed laws that weakened labour rights and undermined the Corruption Eradication Commission.
What are the prospects of the election being free and fair?
The public is concerned about Jokowi’s numerous efforts to make the election unfree and unfair. First, although he later denied it, under the pretext of COVID-19 he planned to amend the constitution to stay for a third term. He then focused on building a political dynasty. He supported his son-in-law and his son to be elected as mayors in Medan and Surakarta. Civil society reports suggest the police and army played an influential role in their victories. Concern persists as Jokowi has signalled support for the Prabowo-Gibran pair and ordered his officials to back his son’s campaign, even though they are required to remain neutral.
There are also significant concerns about potential fraud, which have prompted civil society to intensify efforts to establish an election monitoring system and set up monitoring mechanisms at polling stations. Civil society remains vigilant, scrutinising any statements, policies or threats that could undermine the integrity of the election.
Civil society is joining forces to prevent the election of Prabowo. Online activists have created the Four Fingers Movement to urge voters to choose a different pair than Prabowo-Gibran.
Surveys currently indicate that Prabowo could receive about 40 per cent of the vote. To force a runoff, it’s essential to prevent fraud and secure turnout. If nobody takes over half of the vote on 14 February, civil society and the public may unite around an alternative candidate to counter Prabowo in the runoff. But there are concerns about a potentially low turnout. The number of people choosing not to vote was already high in the previous election.
What should be done to counter democratic decline in Indonesia?
Democracy in Indonesia is being eroded by a government that disregards constitutional principles and the rule of law and instead uses laws as tools of power to suit its interests. Jokowi has reinstated the army and police in various public roles and issued presidential decrees and enacted policies to undermine other political parties and eliminate the opposition.
A key symptom of democratic decline is repression of government critics, including journalists, activists, academics and others advocating for human rights. A revealing example is the case against activists Haris Azhar and Fatia Maulidiyanti, who faced criminal defamation charges for exposing state corruption and human rights violations in the Papua region. Human rights are being violated across Indonesia as communities are evicted under the pretext of investment or national development projects, and people who denounce this are systematically criminalised.
But there are other issues that should be tackled to foster democracy in Indonesia. Indonesian political parties lack a clear ideological orientation and don’t represent public interests. Their position depends on their leadership and decisions are often made by a few. There is no internal democracy in political parties. The high costs of campaigning lead parties to rely on support from wealthy investors and businesspeople, undermining transparency and enabling corruption.
To foster change, we should work toward democratising parties, making them more transparent and accountable. Efforts should be made to involve the public in the legislative process. Laws are sometimes passed within a week without any consultation with civil society. Referendums and other mechanisms should be explored to enhance public participation.
The upcoming election has additional significance in the face of a global surge in authoritarianism. We must avoid following the path of the Philippines, where the son and daughter of two authoritarian dynasties succeeded in getting elected. We must unite in the face of authoritarianism and become an example of successful societal resistance against the threat of autocratic rule.
Civic space inIndonesiais rated ‘obstructed’by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with YLBHI through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@YLBHI on Twitter.
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NIGER: ‘France and the USA have displayed imperial attitudes towards poor countries in Africa’
CIVICUS speaks about Niger’s recent decision to suspend military cooperation with the USA with Dr Boubacar N’Diaye, Emeritus Professor of Pan-African Studies and Political Science at the College of Wooster, international consultant on security sector governance and former chair of the African Security Sector Network, a pan-African think tank focused on security governance issues in the continent, and particularly in West Africa.
How would you describe Niger’s security situation?
Niger is located in a very strategic position in the continent – it’s at the heart of West Africa and the Sahel, and shares borders with Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali and Nigeria. This makes it an ideal location for geopolitical powers to have a presence.
Until recently, Niger was a key security partner of France and the USA. There were French troops in the country, and in 2012, the government signed an agreement with the USA to establish a drone base to conduct surveillance and military operations against terrorism. Between 1,000 to 1,500 US soldiers were deployed under this agreement.
But despite promises to assist Niger in fighting terrorism, little was done in this regard. Instead, the USA utilised this alliance to carry out surveillance operations in the region in support of its global geopolitical strategy.
On 26 July 2023, Niger experienced a military coup against President Mohamed Bazoum, with the junta claiming the president’s response to the dire security situation was inadequate. The country has confronted terrorist attacks on military and civilians for quite some time. Yet the crisis extends beyond security to encompass political and social dimensions.
Following the coup, the junta demanded France and its soldiers leave the country. France and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposed sanctions on Niger, resulting in power cuts and border closures. No goods or medical supplies were allowed in or out across ECOWAS borders, while terrorist attacks persisted, claiming the lives of Nigerien military personnel. Sanctions were subsequently lifted, but the crisis persisted.
Why did Niger suspend military cooperation with the USA?
While France maintained a firm stance against military coups in the region, the USA took a more conciliatory approach. For that, one would have expected General Abdourahamane Tchiani, the junta’s leader, to be more accommodating with the USA.
While the military leaders were quite grateful for this, they were also irked by the arrival of a US delegation of high-ranking State Department officials who, with a typical imperial attitude, lectured them on democracy and demanded they cut all links with the Russian government. They also accused them of having secret deals with Iran to sell uranium.
The fact that the USA belittled and showed no respect to Niger led the military junta to revoke the 2012 agreement, which it highlighted was a secret document not endorsed by the public that granted the USA carte blanche to operate in Niger as they pleased.
In requesting the USA lo leave the country, Niger asserted its rights as a free and sovereign nation. As such, Niger is free to make deals with whichever country it chooses, with neither the USA nor France having the authority to dictate any decision.
This decision significantly affects the USA’s geostrategic position, as Niger is the only country in West Africa where it has a military presence. If compelled to withdraw entirely, the USA would lose its surveillance capabilities and ability to project power. If the USA wants to stay and seek a new agreement with the junta, it will need to tone down its demands. But if it keeps pressing Niger to cut ties with Russia, it is unlikely to be able to reach a deal.
Do you see Niger’s decision as part of a broader regional trend?
Over the past few years, people in other countries in the region, including Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal, have shown a desire to reaffirm sovereignty and reject the influence of imperial powers.
France, as the former colonial power and on behalf of the European Union (EU) and the west, has particularly had a lot of influence in the region. It has conducted military operations, done business and even imposed the CFA franc, the regional currency and a relic of French colonialism in Africa.
France, and to a lesser extent the USA, have displayed imperial attitudes towards poor countries in Africa. They have completely disregarded their national sovereignty and ignored their need for dignity. They aim to dictate to their people the type of government they should have, the decisions they should make and who they should partner with. This imperial mentality must stop.
The public, guided by a very active civil society, is happy to see France and the USA being told to leave. They are happy to see Niger behave as a sovereign country that rejects foreign influence, particularly when both countries have done little to nothing to help resolve the insecurity dilemma Niger has faced for a decade.
How do you understand the growing power of Russia in this context?
Russia, and to a lesser extent China, are the default partners in the region. Despite their substantial presence and technological capabilities, France, the USA and even the United Nations have not achieved the same level of success as Russia in nations such as the Central African Republic (CAR) or Mali. Russia has been able to stabilise the security situation in the CAR, at least to some extent, and recapture major strategic cities in Mali that have been under rebel control for the last 10 years.
Countries in the region see an alternative in Russia. This is not rooted in a Cold War mentality but rather in Russia’s longstanding presence in the region, its support for many nations during the early years of independence and its demonstrated effectiveness in combating terrorism.
What international support does Niger’s civil society need?
Nigerien civil society needs the solidarity of civil society across the world. Civil society organisations have suffered a lot. Niger is one of the poorest countries in the world and has faced months of a severe embargo, sanctions, electricity cuts and medicine shortages. While these measures have been lifted, so has financial assistance from the EU and France, which has exacerbated socioeconomic hardships and security issues.
The country hasn’t collapsed – as some had hoped – but is undergoing serious socioeconomic hardship and security challenges. The military coup is not to be applauded – it’s a clear sign of political failure. But considering the context, it can be understood. People have accepted that the military are in charge, and now they need all the help and solidarity they can receive.
The international community should adopt a more empathetic stance towards Niger, supporting the country and its authorities. They should avoid punitive measures such as sanctions, which only harm the public, and refrain from imposing decisions and norms upon the nation.
Instead, the international community should find a formula to help Nigerien authorities navigate through this complicated context and transition back to a constitutional order, with the active involvement of local civil society.
Civic space in Niger is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with the African Security Sector Network through itswebsite orFacebook andLinkedIn pages, and follow@ASSN_Africa on Twitter.
The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.
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PAKISTAN: ‘It doesn’t matter who casts the vote as much as who counts the vote’
CIVICUS speaks about Pakistan’s upcoming election with Muhammad Mudassar, Chief Executive Officer at the Society for Human Rights and Prisoners’ Aid (SHARP-Pakistan).
Founded in 1999, SHARP is a human rights civil society organisation working for the rights and wellbeing of vulnerable groups, including refugees and internally displaced people, and working on issues related to people trafficking and smuggling of migrants, including through advocacy at the national and international levels, capacity development, community services and emergency response.
What’s the political climate in Pakistan ahead of the election?
Post-COVID-19, like many global south countries Pakistan grapples with security concerns, political instability and economic challenges that affect both its citizens and government. This means that uncertainty loomed over the upcoming election, but the situation is much clearer now and the country is all set to vote for the new parliament. It would be unconstitutional to extend the mandate of the existing caretaker government. The Chief Justice of Pakistan has confirmed that it is set in stone that the general election should be held on time.
To what extent are conditions conducive to a free and fair election?
As had always been the case, there’s controversy around the election, which many observers feel lacks conditions for fair competition. While some political parties are free to conduct their activities, others claim to face restrictions in submitting nomination papers and campaigning, and their members are subjected to arrests.
Over the past 75 years, no prime minister of Pakistan has completed a full five-year term, and they have often ended up in jail. This trend started with Zulficar Ali Bhutto, deposed during martial law in 1977, followed by his daughter Benazir Bhutto, who was dismissed twice. A similar fate befell recent former prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan.
Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) has had ample space for campaigning, even though Sharif, a three-time former prime minister, was ousted for alleged corruption in 2017 and sentenced to 10 years in prison. In October 2023, he returned to Pakistan from exile in the UK, where he had travelled on bail for medical treatment in 2018. Sharif’s corruption conviction and his lifetime ban from politics were overturned by the Supreme Court in early January. Now most political commentators are predicting that the PML-N will win the election.
In comparison, Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party is complaining that it has been all but barred from participating in the election. The Electoral Commission of Pakistan disqualified Khan due to one conviction out of around 200 cases against him and barred the party from using its famous cricket bat symbol on ballot papers. Khan has also recently received 10 and 14-year sentences on charges of leaking state secrets and corruption. Nomination papers of most national and provincial PTI leaders were rejected by District Returning Officers but appellate tribunals of higher judiciary subsequently accepted most and allowed them to context elections.
Further, there’s no democracy within political parties due to nepotism and dynastic leadership. Most political parties function as family dynasties, which drives independent leaders away. It has rarely been about people’s choices. It doesn’t matter who casts the vote as much as who counts the vote.
How have civic space conditions changed over the past years?
The media and civil society are divided and, human rights activists comment, there is an atmosphere of discontent that somewhat hinders the freedom of speech. Further, unemployment and other pressing issues continue to prompt many people to leave Pakistan.
Still, at SHARP-Pakistan we remain hopeful and keep analysing problems to try to offer solutions. As part of Pakistani civil society, we aspire to forge connections, work alongside and learn from international partners to be able to better promote human rights and democracy at home. We need free and fair elections so that results truly reflect the will of the people.
How are you and other civil society groups engaging with the election?
The role of civil society in the election takes the form of support for the institutional processes of a democratic vote well as the more substantive development of a democratic electorate. Civil society is also playing its due role in reducing election-related conflict dynamics and promoting a peaceful electoral environment.
Civic space in Pakistan is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
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SENEGAL: ‘The situation is becoming more tense as we approach the 2024 elections’
CIVICUS speaks about the deterioration of civic space in the run-up to next year’s elections in Senegal with Sadikh Niass, Secretary General of the African Meeting for the Defence of Human Rights (Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme,RADDHO), andIba Sarr, Director of Programmes at RADDHO.
RADDHO is a national civil society organisation (CSO) based in Dakar, Senegal. It works for the protection and promotion of human rights at the national, regional and international levels through research, analysis and advocacy aimed at providing early warning and preventing conflict.
What are the conditions for civil society in Senegal?
Senegalese civil society remains very active but faces a number of difficulties linked to the restriction of civic space. It is subjected to many verbal attacks by lobbies close to the government, which consider them to be opponents or promoters of ‘counter-values’ such as homosexuality. It is also confronted with restrictions on freedom of assembly. Civil society works in difficult conditions with few financial and material resources. Human rights organisations receive no financial support from the state.
The situation is becoming more tense as we approach the February 2024 elections. Since March 2021, the most radical opposition and the government have opted for confrontation. The government is trying to weaken the opposition by reducing it to a minimum. It is particularly targeting the most dynamic opposition group, the Yewi Askan Wi (‘Liberate the People’) coalition, whose main leader, Ousmane Sonko, is currently in detention.
All opposition demonstrations are systematically banned. Spontaneous demonstrations are violently repressed and result in arrests. The judiciary was instrumentalised to prevent the candidacy of the main opponent to the regime, Sonko, and the main leaders of his party have been arrested.
In recent years, we have also seen an upsurge in verbal, physical and legal threats against journalists, which is a real setback for the right to freedom of information.
What will be at stake in the 2024 presidential election?
With the discovery of oil and gas, Senegal is becoming an attractive destination for investors. Transparent management of these resources remains a challenge in a context marked by an upsurge in terrorist acts. Poverty-stricken populations see this discovery as a means of improving their standard of living. With the breakthrough of the opposition in the 2022 local and legislative elections, we sense that the electorate is increasingly expressing its desire for transparency, justice and improved socio-economic conditions.
On 3 July 2023, the incumbent president declared that he would not compete in the next elections. This declaration could offer a glimmer of hope for a free and transparent election. But the fact that the state is being tempted to prevent leading opposition figures from running poses a major risk of the country descending into turbulence.
Civil society remains alert and is working to ensure that the 2024 elections are inclusive, free and transparent. To this end, it has stepped up its efforts to promote dialogue among political players. CSOs are also working through several platforms to support the authorities in organising peaceful elections by monitoring the process before, during and after the poll.
What triggered the recent demonstrations? What are the protesters’ demands and how has the government responded?
The recent protests were triggered by Sonko’s sentencing to two years in prison on 1 June 2023. On that day, a court ruled on the so-called ‘Sweet Beauty’ case, in which a young woman working in a massage parlour accused Sonko of raping her and making death threats against her. Sonko was acquitted of the death threats, but the rape charges were reclassified as ‘corruption of youth’.
This conviction was compounded by Sonko’s arrest on 31 July 2023 and the dissolution of his political party, PASTEF – short for ‘Senegalese African patriots for work, ethics and fraternity’ in French.
Protesters are driven by the feeling that their leader is being persecuted and that the cases for which he has been convicted only serve to prevent him taking part in the forthcoming elections. Their main demand is the release of their leader and those illegally detained.
Faced with these demonstrations, the government has opted for repression. The authorities consider that they are facing acts of defiance towards the state and have called on the security forces to use force.
Repression has resulted in the deaths of more than 30 people and more than 600 injured since March 2021, when the repression first began. In addition to the loss of life and injuries, more than 700 people have been arrested and are languishing in Senegal’s prisons. We have also noted the arrest of journalists, as well as the interruption of television signals and the restriction of some internet services.
How is Senegalese civil society, including RADDHO, working to defend human rights?
RADDHO works at the national level to help victims of human rights violations and carries out awareness-raising, human rights education and capacity-building activities.
RADDHO collaborates with regional and international mechanisms, notably the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Council. To this end, we carry out a number of activities to raise awareness of legal instruments for the protection and promotion of human rights. As an observer member of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, we regularly participate in civil society forums during the Commission’s sessions. RADDHO also coordinates the CSO coalition for the follow-up and implementation of the recommendations of the United Nations Universal Periodic Review for Senegal.
What international support is Senegalese civil society receiving and what additional support would it need?
To fulfil their missions, Senegalese CSOs receive support from international institutions such as the European Union, the bilateral cooperation agencies of the USA and Sweden, USAID and SIDA, and organisations and foundations such as Oxfam NOVIB in the Netherlands, NED in the United States, NID in India and the Ford Foundation, among others. However, because Senegal has long been considered a stable country, support remains insufficient.
Given the growing restrictions on civic space of recent years and the political crisis, civil society needs support to better assist victims of human rights violations, to contribute to the emergence of a genuine human rights culture and to work towards widening civic space and strengthening the rule of law, democracy and good governance.
Civic space in Senegal is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with RADDHOthrough itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@Raddho_Africa on Twitter.
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TAIWAN: ‘China has tried to intimidate voters and pressure Taiwanese civil society organisations’
CIVICUS discusses Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election with Brian Hioe, one of the founders of New Bloom Magazine.
New Bloom is an online magazine that covers activism and youth politics in Taiwan and Asia and the Pacific. A former fellow at the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, Brian is currently a non-resident fellow at the University of Nottingham’s Taiwan Research Hub.
What’s at stake in the 2024 election?
Taiwan’s elections consistently capture global attention due to the anticipation surrounding China’s response. Typically, elections feature two candidates representing the two major parties. One of them, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), is historically pro-independence and the other, Kuomintang (KMT), is historically pro-unification. This pattern persists in the current election, although there are other parties in the race.
Traditionally, Taiwanese voters opt for what they perceive as the safest choice in terms of safeguarding their hard-earned democratic freedoms. The overarching concern is to avoid actions that might trigger backlash from China.
Now it looks like the centre-left candidate of the ruling DPP is going to win because the pro-unification camp is very divided. But with multiple candidates running, fragmentation is to be expected, potentially affecting the outcome.
What are the most relevant domestic campaign issues?
There is a lot of dissatisfaction with the current government’s inability to address pressing economic issues. Young people’s salaries are very low, working hours are among the world’s longest and most people cannot afford to buy a house. We also have a declining birthrate and a growing older population.
Dissatisfaction has translated into some support for the pro-China party. The KMT is the historic Chinese nationalist party and was the ruling party during Taiwan’s authoritarian era, from 1949 to 1987. Its campaign centres on deepening economic relations with China, promising to bring back the good old days of economic success.
Environmental issues, and particularly air pollution, also weigh heavily on voters. The question of Taiwan’s future energy needs is key, as a balance is sought between maintaining a stable energy supply and minimising pollution. There is heated debate around nuclear energy. Taiwan’s environmental movement is anti-nuclear, as is the DPP, unlike the KMT. There are concerns about what to do with nuclear waste. People are worried that the frequent earthquakes that hit Taiwan could cause a potential catastrophe, as happened in Fukushima, Japan in 2011.
Past elections also featured debate on culture-war issues such as same-sex marriage, which the DPP pushed for but the KMT opposed. But these have now taken a back seat to economic and environmental issues.
However, the defining matter remains the cross-strait issue – the question of what kind of relations Taiwan will maintain with China.
What are the positions of the main candidates?
DPP candidate Lai Ching-te, the current vice president and expected winner, previously served as mayor of Taiwan’s historical capital Tainan and Taiwan’s premier. He is perceived as more conservative than the incumbent and is strongly pro-independence, although as he has climbed in the polls he has tempered his position in fear that strong rhetoric could provoke a reaction from the military or China. Despite his comparatively conservative background, he has signalled openness to progressive ideas, notably by becoming the first presidential candidate to participate in the Pride parade this October.
KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih is the current mayor of New Taipei and a former police chief with a record of involvement in the arrest of political dissidents during the authoritarian period. He is more moderate than other KMT candidates on unification issues, which is perceived to improve the KMT’s chances. However, his choice of running mate signalled a potential shift towards a more dogmatic position on unification.
The third candidate is former Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je, the leader of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), a new party leaning towards unification. He has gained some support from young people, who tend not to support the KMT. He has a populist style, often making gaffes or misspeaking. He has faced criticism for making misogynistic and homophobic comments, but this hasn’t affected his popularity.
How do young people feel about this election?
There seems to be a notable decrease in enthusiasm and engagement with the election process. The 2020 election came around the same time of the protest wave in Hong Kong, which gave many young people a glimpse of what the future could look like for Taiwan if it were to become part of China.
Now the context is different and what prevails among people is dissatisfaction with the DPP due to challenging circumstances, which has resulted in the rise of the third-party anti-establishment candidate. Ko Wen-je is, ironically, a candidate opposed to progressive causes such as LGBTQI+ rights, but many young people are still attracted by his anti-establishment message.
In contrast, the DPP is perceived as the status quo and despite its recent progressivism under the Tsai administration has not managed to win over young people. Broadly, while millennials may still support it, Gen Z does not.
What role are foreign powers playing in the election process?
China’s persistent efforts to interfere in Taiwan’s political processes have resulted in recent arrests of people accused of operating in favour of China to influence the election, with efforts made to stiffen sentences for espionage. Ten military officials have, for example, been arrested in connection with these interference attempts.
A tactic employed to influence the election is paint the DPP as overly provocative towards China or overly reliant on the USA, suggesting that this may lead to adverse consequences. The DPP has indeed strengthened relations with the USA, while the KMT, once the US-backed authoritarian ruling party, has shifted its position. The KMT now argues that growing too close to the USA might provoke China, questions arms sales and civic exchanges and disseminates conspiracy theories regarding fictional US plans to destroy Taiwan in the event of a war.
The other side of the political aisle attacks the KMT for being too close to China and criticises its attempts to revive trade agreements such as the Cross Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA), opposition to which led to the 2014 Sunflower Movement.
Have there been any concerns about the integrity of civic space?
Taiwan is the only country in Asia rated by the CIVICUS Monitor as having open civic space. There are questions about how civil society engages with both major political parties and concerns about potential co-optation. Civil society faces the challenge of balancing relations with political parties and maintaining a critical position without being perceived as partisan. Civil society is often closer to the DPP, because it is more centre-left and suspicious of China.
But there haven’t been government attempts to restrict civic space. The government does take actions to curb Chinese influence but to date has not infringed on civil society rights.
China in contrast has tried to pressure Taiwanese civil society organisations (CSOs), particularly those focusing on cross-strait issues. Five years ago, a Taiwanese CSO worker was arrested in China on vague national security charges, in what seemed aimed at sending a warning to Taiwanese civil society not to meddle with China.
China has also tried to intimidate voters. In a recent example, a person who purchased a book on the possibility of a Chinese invasion received a suspicious phone call from someone impersonating a customer service representative asking them about it.
What are your expectations for the post-election period?
Unless something unexpected happens, a DPP victory is the likeliest outcome. China is unlikely to take any drastic actions before the election, as such moves might inadvertently strengthen support for the DPP.
Following the election, however, China is expected to respond with intimidation tactics, possibly through military exercises, to signal its opposition to a new DPP administration. The intensity of these exercises may be influenced by China’s relations with the USA at the time.
In terms of civic space, should the DPP continue in power, civil society may need to broaden its outreach, both regionally and internationally, to build resilience and avoiding being sucked in by the two-party dynamics.
However, were the KMT to win, civil society would likely refocus on domestic concerns. It may regroup to resist, particularly in the face of potential attempts to reintroduce trade agreements such as the CSSTA.
If the status quo is maintained, Taiwan will continue strengthening ties with the USA and the west while actively reaching out to southeast Asian countries, a strategy aimed at reducing economic reliance on China and diversifying political ties.
The geopolitical landscape will play a crucial role in shaping Taiwan’s future, and the actions and reactions of both China and Taiwan will be closely watched on the international stage.
Civic space in Taiwan is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with New Bloom Magazine through itswebsite, contact Brian Hioe through hisFacebook page and follow @brianhioe onTwitter orInstagram.
The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.
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UGANDA: ‘We’ll participate in COP28 to pressure world leaders to divert funding away from oil and gas’
CIVICUS speaks about recent developments involving the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) project and civil society’s efforts to stop it with Zaki Mamdoo, Campaign Coordinator of Stop EACOP.Established in 2020, Stop EACOP is a coalition of Ugandan environmental and climate justice organisations that oppose the pipeline project due to the significant threats it poses to protected ecosystems, water resources and community lands across Tanzania and Uganda.
What are your coalition’s aims?
Our aim is to halt the construction of EACOP to avert the catastrophic environmental and climate consequences associated with the pipeline and safeguard human rights and communal territories.
To achieve this, we employ a multifaceted strategy: heightening public awareness, exerting pressure on financial institutions and raising their reputational costs so they distance themselves from the project, mobilising impacted communities and rallying to force governments and oil corporations to suspend the project.
A cornerstone of our approach is engaging with young people. Our partner programmes in both Tanzania and Uganda are focused on youth. We proactively seek out young people in various initiatives, including security training sessions. Recently, we’ve identified student leaders from various universities who had organised to spread awareness about the project’s impacts among their peers. We are actively pursuing funding and other opportunities to bolster their efforts.
Internally, we give space to youth representatives to contribute their perspectives. We’re committed to amplifying young voices and offering avenues for their growth and development as activists. A reflection of this is that I am 26 years old and trusted with the leadership as campaign coordinator.
How has the situation evolved since welast spoke over a year ago?
There have been significant changes over the past year. Drilling has started in one of the most important biodiversity hotspots. One of the companies leading the project, French energy conglomerate Total Energies, has launched oil drilling in Uganda’s Murchison Falls National Park, home to diverse animal and bird species, including elephants, giraffes and lions. Its ecological significance is heightened by the presence of the Murchison Falls-Albert Delta Wetland System, essential for Lake Albert fisheries.
The pipeline threatens the park’s biodiversity and tourism appeal. It will also have economic impacts, as the park is a major contributor to Uganda’s economy, accounting for 59 per cent of exports and having generated over US$1 billion in revenue in 2022.
Negative consequences are already evident, with displaced elephants damaging crops and posing threats to human lives in nearby communities. Tragic incidents involving elephants have already occurred in Buliisa district, where the park is located.
This is clearly just another a case in which profit is prioritised over environmental and socioeconomic considerations.
Our demands, however, remain unaltered: we adamantly call for the project’s complete cancellation due to its intolerable environmental and human risks. And while governmental authorities have largely remained unresponsive, we’ve achieved progress with financial institutions. Remarkably, 27 banks have already denied funding for EACOP, and an additional 23 major insurers and reinsurers have declined to support the pipeline.
What restrictions do Stop EACOP activists face?
We operate in fairly restrictive environments in which the freedom to protest is often violated. Recently, for instance, four of our activists were forcibly arrested on charges of ‘inciting violence’, transported in police vehicles and kept in jail overnight for protesting against the pipeline in Kampala, Uganda’s capital.
The activists, three women and one man, were protesting peacefully, but their arrests were unnecessarily violent. It must be emphasised that only four protesters were involved, so the degree of force applied was clearly excessive, yet not entirely unexpected. Historically, Ugandan authorities have responded aggressively to any demonstrations perceived as anti-government, in line with a dictatorial regime indifferent to public sentiments or alternate viewpoints. This reaction is not unprecedented, although it’s intriguing that the government seems threatened by even small-scale protests like this four-person event.
But this won’t stop us: we will continue to demonstrate peacefully. Several of our members maintain a fund to secure bail or engage lawyers whenever activists are arrested. We arrange legal representation and explore the possibility of anticipatory bail when possible. However, given the sporadic nature of these protests, support is often provided post-arrest. We’ve also partnered with organisations that specialise in security training so that we can provide tools for advocates to voice their concerns without jeopardising their personal safety.
How do you connect with the global climate movement?
We connect with climate activists worldwide by sharing experiences and strategies and providing each other with support across borders. Global solidarity strengthens our efforts, so we appreciate any form of international backing for our cause.
What lies ahead remains uncertain, but as demonstrated in numerous instances globally, when we come together to back local communities as they advocate for their rights and a more promising tomorrow, there is a potential to counter even the largest of corporate giants effectively.
More than a million people have already raised their voices against EACOP. We believe that together we can stop it.
Are you planning to engage with the upcoming COP28 climate summit?
We’re deliberating on the optimal way to participate in COP28 to pressure world leaders to address the pipeline project directly and divert funding away from new oil and gas developments. I will be there to represent the campaign.
Despite controversies surrounding the summit’s leadership and lack of an enabling civic space in the host country, the United Arab Emirates, we are hopeful that substantive progress will be made. But we recognise that lasting change will require continued people-powered mobilisation. We’re committed to sustaining our fight for climate justice and environmental preservation in East Africa.
Civic space in Uganda is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Stop EACOP through itswebsite and follow@stopEACOP on Twitter.
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ZIMBABWE: ‘Election violence is a cover for ideological ambivalence and lack of substantive programmes’
CIVICUS speaks about the general election in Zimbabwe and the role of civil society with Wellington Mbofana, former director ofthe Civic Education Network Trust (CIVNET), a civil society organisation (CSO) that recently shut down due to lack of funding, and a former board member of several Zimbabwean CSOs.
What was at stake in this election?
It’s difficult to pinpoint a single crucial issue that was at stake. Over a considerable period, Zimbabwean elections, much like those in other parts of Africa, have ceased to revolve around substantive issues and have instead become centred on political parties and personalities. This trend is evident in this election, in which major political parties failed to present their manifestos in a timely manner. The main opposition party, Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), unveiled its programme merely two weeks prior to voting, while the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) didn’t even bother.
Given the crumbling state of the economy, reflected in record-breaking unemployment, pervasive economic informality, escalating poverty, the world’s second-highest inflation rate and a sense of hopelessness, economic strife remained the most prominent concern for voters. Ideally, the competition should have revolved around two or three contrasting strategies for addressing these economic woes. However, what we observed was a cloud of obfuscation. The ruling party advanced a narrative that conditions are improving and investors are flocking to the country, but progress would be even greater if it weren’t for sanctions imposed by Western states. The opposition pledged to outperform ZANU-PF across all fronts. But neither specified how they would fund their proposed initiatives.
To deal with Zimbabwe’s predicament effectively the government would need to confront a range of issues, including land reform and productivity, water shortages, electricity generation, infrastructure development and urbanisation and, most importantly, guarantee the required funding.
It should have been important to ensure the meaningfulness of this election because when elections fail, civil unrest and coups ensue, a truth that Africa has repeatedly witnessed.
Was there any election-related violence?
The prevalence of violence in all its manifestations – physical, structural and cultural – remains an unfortunate hallmark of Zimbabwean elections. Lives have been lost, injuries endured and property destroyed as a result.
It is also important to note that because of its fractured politics, the country is in a perpetual election mode. Over the past five years, we have had multiple recalls from parliament and local authorities, leading to by-elections. Instances of intra-party violence have also occurred during parliamentary and primary elections. The culture upholding the idea that wielding the strongest fist is the key to ascending to power must change. Violence is a cover for ideological ambivalence and lack of substantive programmes. Who needs a manifesto when you can use force?
What tactics did the government use to stifle dissent in the run-up to the election?
The ruling party stands accused of engaging in lawfare, a tactic that uses laws to constrain the opposition and human rights defenders. These efforts are facilitated by an allegedly captured judiciary. A prominent CCC legislator, Job Sikhala, along with other political activists and human rights defenders, languish in remand prisons on spurious allegations after being denied bail.
The government introduced controversial laws aimed at silencing dissent. The Private Voluntary Organisations Amendment Bill and the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Amendment Act, commonly called the Patriotic Bill, are clearly designed to deal with critics of the government.
The Patriotic Bill came into force on 14 July 2023. With this bill, the government created a new crime of ‘wilfully injuring the sovereignty and national interest of Zimbabwe’. The scope and definition of this offence is vague. There are valid concerns that law enforcement agencies will interpret the law broadly and use it to stifle and penalise the work of independent civil society.
Citizens and permanent residents of Zimbabwe will be found guilty if they participate in meetings aimed at discussing or plotting armed intervention in Zimbabwe, subverting or overthrowing its government and implementing or extending sanctions or trade boycotts against Zimbabwe. A meeting encompasses any form of communication involving two or more people, regardless of whether it takes place offline or online.
Participating in discussions about armed intervention can result in life imprisonment or the death penalty if the meeting involves planning such an intervention. Discussing subversion or overthrow of the government is punishable by up to 20 years in prison. Taking part in meetings discussing sanctions or trade boycotts can lead to a fine of up to US$12,000 or up to 10 years in prison, or both. Aggravated offences may lead to consequences such as the termination of citizenship for those who are not citizens by birth or descent, cancellation of residence permits for non-citizens and disqualification from voting or holding public office for five to 15 years.
In the hands of overzealous and partisan law enforcement agents, this punitive law is very dangerous. It seems to target not only the opposition and civil society but also factions within the fractured ruling party and the military. It likely seeks to prevent a recurrence of a military-assisted transition, which brought the current government to power in 2017. That coup was willingly accepted by powerful global players, including the African Union and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which inadvertently endorsed the idea of military change of power.
How did Zimbabwean civil society engage with the electoral process?
Civil society was actively involved in electoral activities throughout the electoral cycle. CSOs play a pivotal role in providing voter education, observing elections, advocating for electoral reforms, safeguarding human rights and offering legal, medical and psycho-social assistance to victims of human rights violations.
Both local and international observers were generally allowed and accredited. However, there were isolated cases, such as the denial of accreditation to Musa Kika, allegedly due to security risks, while some local citizens encountered intimidation, harassment and threats from unidentified people after engaging with international observers.
But unfortunately, the last couple of years have been very difficult for Zimbabwean. Several CSOs have shut down. CIVNET, a major organisation providing civic education, closed its doors this year due to lack of funding.
The Zimbabwean economy is too fragile to support a strong civil society, which heavily relies on international donors and solidarity. Further international support should be rendered to all groups promoting development, good governance, human rights, justice and the rule of law. The international community should also amplify local voices and exert pressure on the Zimbabwean government to act in accordance with international human rights and democratic standards.
What did CIVNET work on?
CIVNET operated through three main programmes: the Citizen Participation Programme, including two projects on constitutionalism and voter education, the Leadership Development Programme and the Peace Building Programme.
The Citizen Participation Programme encouraged citizen engagement in governance and development, fostering collaboration between communities and local authorities through participatory workshops and development projects. The Constitution and Constitutionalism Project aimed to raise awareness about the significance of the new constitution and share information on how to use it to exercise human rights and honour obligations as citizens.
The Leadership Development Programme enhanced leadership skills of people engaged in community projects. Our graduates now lead various Zimbabwean CSOs and work in local authorities and parliament. CIVNET contributed to the formation and development of CSOs such as the Zimbabwe Election Support Network, the Zimbabwe Peace Project and the Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe. It was also a key member of the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGOs Forum.
The Peace Building Programme helped people and communities divided by conflict to reach out to each other and mend broken relations. This was done through creatively designed workshops that provided security and safety to both victims and perpetrators of violent conflicts. Mediators were also trained to address local disputes, resulting in transformed relationships and improved dialogue within previously divided communities.
To what extent could the election be called free and fair?
The concept of free and fair elections involves political freedoms and fair processes prior to elections, culminating in the casting of votes by well-informed eligible voters able to vote freely for candidates and parties of their choice. A transparent tally of all valid votes, accurate result announcements and universal acceptance of the election outcomes by all parties are integral components of this concept.
Past elections in Zimbabwe have been contested at courts and other institutions. For Zimbabwe to uphold its position within the international community, this election would have to gain universal recognition as credible, legitimate and conducted in a free and fair manner. It would be key to ensure the acceptance of its outcome and secure peace and stability to attract investors.
The 2023 election was disputed in the legal arena even before a single ballot was cast. This may be a harbinger of future developments. On 12 July, the Electoral Court disqualified a presidential candidate, Savior Kasukuwere, whose participation had been previously permitted by the Nomination Court. Then the High Court disqualified 12 CCC parliamentary candidates, ostensibly for late filings, although the Nomination Court had accepted their submissions. Both decisions favoured the ruling party. However, following an appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s verdict on the 12 CCC candidates, leading to their reinstatement on the ballot. On 19 July the electoral court ruled in favour of a leader of the opposition United Zimbabwe Alliance party, Elizabeth Valerio, whose candidacy had been initially rejected by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), also for alleged untimely filing.
Declaring the election to be free and fair would be unreasonable given the political environment characterised by violence, intimidation and voter suppression, non-transparent processes with the electoral roll and ballot paper printing, pre-voting by security personnel, biased media coverage, opposition rallies barred by the police, vote buying through handouts, influence from traditional and religious leaders on voters, misuse of government resources for party campaigns and indications that some parties will reject any outcome other than their own victory, implying that the ruling party wouldn’t have handed over power if it had lost. Indeed, SADC decided to abandon the term ‘free and fair’ regarding Zimbabwean elections, instead referring to them as ‘legitimate’.
What electoral reforms are needed?
Adherence to rule of law and impartial management of elections is essential. The ZEC should enforce the Electoral Code of Conduct, safeguarding the right for all to express their political views and campaign freely. It must also ensure fairness by curbing the misuse of state resources, preventing intimidation, harassment and destruction of campaign materials and improving voter education.
The police should fulfil their constitutional duties impartially, without bias, fear, or favour. Political parties should adhere to the Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Candidates. This entails refraining from violence, misuse of public resources for partisan ends, coercion and intimidation of the electorate and inciting violence through hate speech and derogatory language.
Were there any issues with people being prevented from voting, and what do you expect to happen next?
A high turnout was to be expected given the high stakes. The economy has done its own campaign, motivating people to participate. The ruling party also mobilised people, especially in rural areas, by any means necessary.
However, many voters might not have been able to locate their names on the register. The polling station-based system is such that people living in a specific neighbourhood can only vote at a certain polling station. In the 2018 election, a lot of people found their names had been removed from their usual stations without a change having been requested, while others who requested changes after moving to other districts saw those changes unimplemented. Following the election, many constituencies and councils had elected representatives recalled by political parties in power. Since there are no guarantees that this won’t happen again, some people may have been discouraged from voting.
Based on experience, disputes around results and their resolution by the courts are to be expected. Given that the judiciary is perceived to be captured and judges were given significant ‘housing loans’ before the election, judgements against the opposition are also rightly likely to be perceived as unfair.
Civic space in Zimbabwe is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
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ZIMBABWE: ‘This so-called election was a circus and a waste of resources’
CIVICUS speaks about Zimbabwe’sAugust general election and its aftermath with Obert Masaraure, national president of Amalgamated Rural Teachers Union of Zimbabwe and spokesperson of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, which brings together 84 Zimbabwean civil society organisations (CSOs).
What was at stake in this election?
This was an important election. We were expecting both a democratic and an economic breakthrough after years of dictatorship and economic stagnation. Millions of young people are dropping out of school, thousands are dying after failing to secure healthcare and millions are unemployed. We expected change to happen.
But we were disappointed. Civil society tried to engage with the electoral process and play a monitoring role but was criminalised. Those who were doing voter tabulation were arrested. After the Election Management Board barred civil society groups we had to monitor the electoral process clandestinely. In the run-up to the election we also did a lot of voter education. We managed to generate excitement among voters, but on voting day they were frustrated.
What’s your assessment of the credibility of the results?
According to the results announced by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) on 26 August, President Emmerson Mnangagwa of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) received 52.6 per cent of the vote, while the leading opposition candidate, Nelson Chamisa of Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), received 44 per cent. But these results are not credible because the polls were held on a flawed electoral field and the ZEC failed to discharge its duty to run a reasonably free and fair election, as evidenced by multiple acts and omissions.
First, the ZEC didn’t supply ballot papers or the voter roll in time to many polling stations in the provinces of Bulawayo, Harare and Manicaland, which are traditional opposition strongholds. This was a clear attempt to suppress voters and help the incumbent stay in power.
The Electoral Act mandates ZEC to display the voter roll at all polling stations 48 hours before the polls open, but most polling stations only received it on election day. This had consequences for the opposition, because in urban areas, where the opposition is stronger, at least 180,000 voters couldn’t find their names at the designated polling stations on election day. Their names had been moved after a shambolic delimitation process but as voter rolls had been unavailable until the last minute, these voters were unable to locate their new polling stations.
According to a ZEC statement, only 23 per cent of polling stations opened on time in Harare, with 75 per cent doing so in Bulawayo and 85 per cent in Manicaland. Some polling stations in Harare were still waiting for ballot papers as late as 6pm, one hour before closing. In contrast, in the majority of the ruling party’s strongholds, typically in harder-to-reach areas, election materials were received early and all polling places were open at the scheduled time.
In urban areas there were waiting times of up to 12 hours. Many people were unable to vote within that period and voting had to be extended to 48 hours. In rural areas, where the ruling party is strongest, the maximum waiting period was 30 minutes. Additionally, an estimated 42,000 civil servants who were working as polling officials could not vote after the ZEC refused to facilitate their voting.
The overall impact of this was to disenfranchise millions of voters and suppress opposition voters while encouraging those of the ruling party.
There were also lots of fraudulent and deceptive practices. There were cases where local candidates were taken off the ballot, as happened to CCC’s Shepherd Sithole in ward 1 of Bulawayo. A shocking incident was also recorded in which party symbols for ZANU-PF and the CCC were switched, confusing voters and making it impossible to record their actual choice.
There were reports from at least 50 polling stations in rural areas that the supposedly indelible ink used could easily be washed away. This was suspected to be a deliberate attempt to allow rural voters to vote multiple times to inflate the results for ZANU-PF. The postal ballot mechanism also appeared to be abused for ballot stuffing, as at least 35 polling stations reported receiving more postal ballots than they had voters registered.
There were numerous instances of intimidation at polling stations. A ZANU-PF affiliate, Forever Associates Zimbabwe (FAZ), set up ‘exit survey tables’ in at least 1,340 polling stations. Individual voters were asked to declare who they had voted for and provide their personal details. FAZ also recorded the serial numbers of voters’ ballot papers and told voters they would be able to tell who they voted for. Needless to say, this intimidated voters who have experienced a long history of serious political violence.
This was a sham, not an election. It was a circus and a waste of resources that subverted the will of the people and illegally kept the incumbent in power.
What needs to happen next to bring about democracy in Zimbabwe?
The Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition has demanded the immediate announcement of a date for a fresh free, fair and credible election. We must put an end to the long history of disputed elections in Zimbabwe and usher in a legitimate government that can lift Zimbabwe up from the category of a pariah state, rebuild its economy and improve the lives of its people.
Zimbabwe needs an inclusive national dialogue to broker a political settlement leading to credible elections supervised by the Southern African Development Community and the African Union. Zimbabweans should play their role in exerting pressure on the government to force it to agree to dialogue.
Zimbabwean pro-democracy organisations must be strengthened through international support so that they can play their proper role in a transition to democracy. The international community is also invited to exert pressure so that the government agrees to engage in an inclusive national dialogue. And while it does not, the international community must isolate the country from the family of nations. A dictatorship does not deserve a seat on any international platform.
Civic space in Zimbabwe is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
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