AI

  • EUROPEAN MEDIA FREEDOM ACT: ‘It will be crucial for EU member states to take this legal framework seriously’

    Renate_Schroeder.jpgCIVICUS speaks with Renate Schroeder, Director of the European Federation of Journalists (EFJ), about theEuropean Media Freedom Act, the first integrated legislation that protects freedom of expression and media independence and pluralism in the European Union.

    The EFJ is the largest organisation of journalists in Europe, fighting for decent working conditions and defending the right to freedom of expression.

    Why was the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) needed?

    The European Commission (EC) produced the draft EMFA in September 2022, in a context of growing disinformation and threats to media independence and journalists’ safety across Europe. The Vice President of the European Commission for Values and Transparency, Věra Jourová, understood the dangers of media capture and political manipulation. With her help and a lot of research by European institutions, we were able to show media freedom was declining in the European Union (EU), despite the bloc’s historical commitment to this principle.

    That’s why the EC came up with a proposal to ensure the right of all citizens to receive plural and editorially independent information. This had never been formally addressed before. The EMFA is rooted in the need to create clear rules to level the playing field across the EU, addressing issues such as media capture, the independence of public service media, editorial independence, transparency in media ownership and state advertisement.

    What regulations does the EMFA introduce?

    The EMFA seeks to safeguard media freedom and integrity. It includes provisions to protect journalistic sources, ensuring confidentiality. This is particularly crucial for investigative journalism given the growing use of spyware to target journalists’ sources, as seen in countries such as Greece and Hungary.

    The Act also addresses state control over public service media. Rather than state broadcasters, what the ecosystem needs is independent, strong, public service media systems free of state influence or control over funding.

    In addition, the EMFA recognises readers’ right to know who’s behind what they read, so it includes an article on transparency in media ownership and another on editorial independence to prevent journalism being used for political or economic interests or propaganda. This is based on the acknowledgment there are people such as politicians or foreign business leaders who own media outlets and use them for their agendas. They don’t view journalism as a public good but as a tool for propaganda.

    Another issue the Act deals with is content moderation. Journalists are no longer the gatekeepers of information – platforms are. Recognising this, the EMFA requires platforms to consult media service providers and journalists before removing content.

    Finally, the Act establishes a board composed of independent regulatory authorities tasked with overseeing compliance with the EMFA and other related legislation such as the Audiovisual Media Service Directive.

    What were the main points of contention during the process?

    At the beginning, several stakeholders were against the EMFA. Germany raised one significant point of contention. It has a federal system where states have their own independent regulatory media systems, and they were concerned about potential interference from Brussels.

    Publishers also presented a challenge. They showed little interest in any transparency or editorial regulation and had concerns about a European board having a say on that.

    However, with the support of a group of media freedom organisations, digital rights advocates and other civil society groups, we overcame most of these obstacles. While the initial draft was not as good as we would have liked, the European Parliament emerged as our ally and helped strengthen transparency rules and reinforce provisions related to public media service and source protection.

    One particularly contentious issue during negotiations with both the European Parliament and European Council was the protection of sources and safeguards against spyware. Some states, such as France, argued for exemptions based on national security considerations. These risked compromising the protection of journalists’ sources and transforming the EMFA into a surveillance tool. Thanks to efforts of supportive countries such as Spain, these proposals were rejected, preserving the EMFA’s integrity.

    Does the final draft fully address civil society concerns?

    While the final draft addresses some concerns raised by civil society, there are areas where our partners feel it could have gone further.

    For instance, on the issue of transparency of media ownership, civil society groups wanted to establish a European database, but this provision didn’t go through. We also wanted to include a stronger article addressing concentration of media ownership and requiring a public interest test for mergers. The language in the final agreement is often too principled, which may cause problems when implemented at the national level.

    Even so, we understand that drafting regulations at the European level, where you deal with multiple and diverse states, is not easy. The current rise of right-wing governments is only making it harder. Even traditionally supportive states such as Denmark, Finland and Sweden have been cautious in their approaches.

    We knew it was now or never, so we are very happy the EMFA got adopted, even if some articles are not worded as strongly as we would have liked. With right-wing movements on the rise, there was a lot of pressure to agree a final text and have it passed right away, even if it wasn’t perfect, because the June European Parliament elections will likely result in a more right-wing Parliament.

    What happens next?

    The next step is for the European Parliament’s Plenary session in Strasbourg on 11 March to formally vote on the provision agreement, which the Council of the EU under the current Belgian presidency will officially adopt. The Act needs a three-fourths majority, and only Hungary is certain to vote against. It will enter into force a year afterwards, with some articles taking effect earlier, at six months, and others later, at 15 months. And then it will get implemented and have direct effects at the national level.

    There will likely be a testing period in which civil society and journalists’ organisations will play a vital role in ensuring effective implementation and taking legal action if necessary. For instance, if media providers fail to comply with transparency rules, civil society may need to challenge them in court.

    However, it is still unclear how this process will work. For instance, if a civil society organisation in Hungary believes there’s a lack of plural access to media and decides to take legal action, it may face challenges in Hungary’s judicial system and may need to escalate the issue to the Court of Justice in Luxembourg, a process that could take several years.

    I am also worried about how the article on the protection of sources will be implemented. Even though safeguards are in place, this article may be misinterpreted. At the end of the day, national security issues are always defined at the national level. That’s a limitation of all EU treaties and some states may end up finding clever ways to circumvent these protections.

    Having this legal framework in place is a big step forward, but it will also be crucial for states to take it seriously.

    Over the last five years, the EC has made significant progress in regulating the information ecosystem, with initiatives such as the Digital Service Act, Digital Markets Act, Artificial Intelligence Act and now the EMFA. The main challenge will be the effective implementation of all these measures. We hope the EC will prioritise implementation and sanction states that fail to comply. We also hope the EMFA will receive sufficient funding for the board to deal with monitoring and implementing it. Without proper enforcement, no regulation will be of any help.

    What further reforms are needed?

    We are worried about the use of generative AI to promote disinformation and deep fakes. Voluntary guidelines are not enough. We need stronger measures that balance freedom of expression with human control over AI systems. While AI can be a great tool for journalists it can also be misused.

    The EU is at a crossroads. The European Parliament has always been on the side of media freedom, and for the first time we risk losing this support. Young voters will play a vital role in the upcoming elections. Their engagement, informed vote and understanding of the role of the EU and what is at stake may change the course of the elections. And for that facts are needed, and a healthy information ecosystem with limited disinformation circulating in social media.


    Get in touch with the European Federation of Journalists through itswebsite orInstagram andFacebook pages, and follow@EFJEUROPE and@renatemargot on Twitter.

  • GLOBAL SECURITY: ‘NATO remains as relevant today as it was when it was established in 1949’

    JamieSheaCIVICUS discusses the recent North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) summit with Jamie Shea, former NATO official and current Professor of Strategy and Security at the University of Exeter, UK and Senior Fellow for Peace, Security and Defence at the think tank Friends of Europe.

    NATO held its annual summit from 9 to 11 July. On the military alliance’s 75th anniversary, the leaders of its 32 member states gathered in Washington DC, where the treaty was first signed. Amid concerns about a possible second presidency for Donald Trump, who has suggested he won’t honour NATO’s cornerstone Article 5 on mutual defence, the agenda focused on maintaining unity, strengthening NATO’s European pillar and planning Ukraine’s integration.

    How relevant is NATO today?

    NATO is as relevant today as it was when it was founded in April 1949. It continues to play a vital role in ensuring the security of its members. Its ability to unite the USA and Canada with Europe around shared values and interests is vital.

    Europe continues to face significant threats from an expansionist and aggressive Russia, as evidenced by the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. NATO provides essential deterrence and defence, particularly for those Central and Eastern European member states that have a history of subjugation under Czarist and Soviet regimes and are most directly threatened by Russia’s actions.

    NATO provides a standard of collective defence that individual member states could not achieve on their own. Smaller allies particularly value its consensus-based decision-making process and its political and military consultation mechanisms, which ensure that every member has a seat at the table and a voice in decisions. This inclusive approach to security represents a significant advance over Europe’s past security dynamics.

    How has NATO evolved over time?

    NATO started with 12 member states and has grown to 32, with Finland and Sweden joining in the last two years following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

    After the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO shifted its focus to peacekeeping, with stabilisation missions in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, Kosovo and Libya. It invoked Article 5 of its Charter – the collective defence clause – for the first time after the terrorist attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001.

    It has also addressed new security challenges, including counterterrorism, cyber defence, energy supply and the protection of critical infrastructure and space assets. It has recognised climate change as a security issue and established global partnerships that extend beyond Europe to regions such as Asia-Pacific, the Gulf, Latin America and North Africa.

    More recently, however, deteriorating relations with Russia have led NATO to refocus on its core mission of collective defence. Supporting Ukraine in its resistance to Russian aggression has become a key priority. Given Russia’s continued aggression and its perception of NATO as an enemy, this focus is likely to dominate the alliance’s agenda for the next decade.

    How much space for civil society participation does NATO offer in its structures and processes?

    Addressing global challenges often requires the expertise of civil society organisations and think tanks that provide valuable scientific and technical analysis, insights and solutions.

    For example, in preparing for NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, we consulted civil society experts to help us understand Afghan history, culture and traditions. This aimed to ensure that NATO forces would engage effectively with Afghan society, working with rather than against it, and emphasise the protection of women and children.

    NATO has also worked with civil society to assess the impact of climate change and develop strategies for military responses to natural disasters and extreme weather events, and has established centres of excellence involving civil society to improve its understanding of issues such as cyberspace, disinformation, hybrid warfare and terrorism.

    What were the key issues on the agenda at this year’s summit?

    Assistance to Ukraine was the number one issue. NATO seeks to ensure a more consistent flow of advanced weapons and funding to help Ukraine counter the Russian offensive in the Donbass and near Kharkiv. Many allies announced further packages of assistance, including F16 aircraft, pilot training, Patriot anti-missile batteries, Leopard 2 tanks and 155mm artillery rounds. NATO will coordinate military supplies and train the Ukrainian army through a new Special Command based in Wiesbaden, Germany. This is expected to be operational by September. Additionally, NATO also announced that allies will maintain their current level of financial support by providing US$43 billion to Ukraine in 2025.

    The other major focus was the Asia-Pacific region. NATO leaders met with their counterparts from Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea to discuss increased cooperation on Ukraine, artificial intelligence, climate change, critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity and proliferation. China was criticised for its role as a ‘decisive enabler’ of Russia’s war effort in Ukraine and for its rapid, non-transparent conventional and nuclear modernisation programme.

    What are the prospects of Ukraine joining NATO ?

    NATO has a vital interest in Ukraine’s membership, which would strengthen the defence of Eastern Europe, but there are no immediate prospects for accession. The allies have said that Ukraine still has work to do to meet NATO standards, particularly in areas such as anti-corruption and judicial reform. It won’t be easy for Ukraine to do this while it’s still at war with Russia.

    NATO is also unlikely to accept Ukraine as long as the war continues, as this would automatically draw member states into the conflict with Russia without the possibility of prior deterrence. But it’s gradually and progressively integrating it into its structures before taking a final decision on full membership, including the Article 5 security guarantee.

    Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky attended the summit and Ukraine was declared to be on an ‘irreversible’ path to NATO membership, with 23 allies and partners signing bilateral security agreements with Ukraine. NATO is also working to modernise Ukraine’s military structures and equipment to make its armed forces fully interoperable with NATO.

    How are relations between Europe and NATO?

    Relations between NATO and the European Union (EU) are now much smoother, especially as both are focusing on challenges on their immediate borders rather than on global issues. The EU has used the war in Ukraine to push ahead with its own defence cooperation, particularly in setting up the European Peace Facility to collectively buy ammunition and fund national arms transfers to Ukraine. It has also agreed a defence production strategy and a plan to boost industrial production of weapons, bringing critical defence supply chains and raw materials back to Europe.

    NATO and the EU are cooperating more closely on critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, military mobility and space, agreeing on a rational division of labour to avoid costly duplication.

    How would be the impact if Donald Trump’s returned to the US presidency?

    Trump’s re-election could pose significant challenges for NATO allies because of his unpredictability. One day he could propose cutting off aid to Ukraine and the next he could reject Putin’s peace proposals. Similarly, his views on NATO have fluctuated from being critical to claiming credit for ‘saving NATO’ by pushing Europeans to increase their defence spending.

    Trump has accused Europe of free riding on US power and financial generosity, which isn’t true. Europeans helped the USA after 9/11 by sending thousands of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq, and without Europe’s solidarity it would be much harder for the USA to put serious pressure on China. And while the USA is helping to defend Europe, it is also serving its own strategic interests. An isolated USA, with Russia dominating Europe and China dominating Asia, would no longer be a global power.

    European contributions to NATO and global security are now the highest in 30 years, with 23 out of 32 NATO allies meeting the two per cent of GDP defence spending target, up from five during the Trump administration. Any sensible US president would recognise that NATO is a good deal for the USA. When all budgets are counted, Europe has spent twice as much as the USA on aid to Ukraine and pays more to the United Nations and its agencies for international development and humanitarian aid.

    Dealing with Trump if he returns to the White House will require constant and careful diplomacy. But Republicans in Congress who remain pro-NATO, along with the US defence industry and military establishment, can play a crucial role in helping Europe persuade Trump that weakening European security or undermining NATO would ultimately damage the USA’s status and hand China and Russia a significant geopolitical victory.

    Get in touch with Friends of Europe through itswebsite orLinkedIn page, and follow@FriendsofEurope on Twitter. Get in touch with Jamie Shea throughLinkedIn.

    The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

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