exile
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BANGLADESH: ‘This is a one-sided election in which we already know who the winner will be’
CIVICUS speaks with Dr Mubashar Hasan about the ongoing crackdown on dissent in Bangladesh ahead of 7 January general elections.
Mubashar is a Bangladesh-born academic and social justice activist. He is a post-doctoral researcher at the Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages, University of Oslo, Norway.
What’s the current political climate in Bangladesh?
The political climate in Bangladesh is tense. The election is being organised under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, the world’s longest-serving female head of government. The main opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), has said it’s not going to participate in an election held under this administration, arguing that there isn’t a level playing field for parties to compete freely and fairly.
Judicial harassment is rife. In September, the New York Times reported that 2.5 million opposition activists faced judicial cases, with each facing multiple cases and some up to 400. Journalists have found that many cases against the opposition were fabricated. The police have even reportedly filed cases against BNP activists who were long dead or living abroad.
On 28 October 2023, the opposition organised a massive rally. To stop this becoming a full-blown people-led movement, the government aggressively repressed it. A few opposition activists retaliated and then the government blamed the violence on the opposition. At least 15 people were killed, including two police officers. More than 20,000 opposition activists have been incarcerated since late October.
This election-related violence is largely the result of state violence. Human Rights Watch recently described the ongoing developments as an autocratic crackdown. Freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly are being restricted and forcefully violated, affecting the legitimacy of the election process. Extremely politicised state institutions are being used as an extension of the ruling party, a trend many argue could lead to the materialisation of a totalitarian state.
Is there any space for civil society to operate in Bangladesh?
The space for civil society in Bangladesh is closed. Civil society organisations are free to operate only as long as they don’t challenge the ruling system.
Just as in any autocratic country, there is an increasing activism going on in the diaspora. There are many Bangladeshi activists living in Australia, as well as in Malaysia, Sweden, the USA and elsewhere. BNP leader Tarique Rahman lives in exile in London.
People in the diaspora are using the leverage that comes with living under democratic governments to spread information about what happens in Bangladesh. Those diaspora activists argue that it is their duty to expose what is going on back home.
There are also key investigative journalists working from exile. A site called Netra News runs out of Malmö in Sweden, and it is still quite influential in exposing serious illegal acts by the government. There are several emerging YouTube commentators and analysts who have been very courageous. They have millions of followers.
How big a problem is disinformation in Bangladeshi politics?
Disinformation has always been a problem. Authoritarian governments don’t like the free flow of information. They want to control information and seek to discredit independent voices, just as Trump did in the USA, trashing fact as fiction and making fiction fact. And he was the authoritarian leader of a democratic country, which Bangladesh is not.
Partisan elements within the government of Bangladesh and ruling party members treat those who dare challenge the official narrative as enemies. As I mentioned in one of my recent articles for the Diplomat Magazine, the government is the dominant force promoting political disinformation. The main opposition party has also promoted disinformation in some instances but independent factcheckers have concluded that the volume of political disinformation promoted by the opposition is miniscule compared to the government.
There has been recent reporting by the Financial Times focused on how the Bangladeshi ruling party is using AI-driven disinformation to disrupt the upcoming election. But this is a one-sided election in which we already know who the winner will be. In this election voters do not have real choice. Why the ruling party is promoting AI-driven disinformation is therefore a mystery.
What are your expectations for election day and its aftermath?
Many things will unfold in the coming days. Voter turnout will most likely be low. The government will deploy military forces nationwide, perhaps even putting them in charge of distributing ballot boxes and election materials.
There will be some violence, probably by the opposition, followed by arrests. The opposition will persist in demanding a free and fair election and the resignation of the government. Some loss of life is sadly to be expected.
This election is also taking place within a wider geopolitical context. China, India and Russia are strongly supportive of the Bangladeshi government, whereas the USA keeps talking about free and fair elections, which puts it on the side of Bangladeshi people.
At this point, not much is in the hands of Bangladeshi people. Without effective external pressure towards democracy, change is unlikely. Civil society’s work will only become more challenging in Bangladesh as the government steps up its repression.
Civic space in Bangladesh is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Mubashar through hiswebpage and follow@mh23rights on Twitter.
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CHINA: ‘Feminism remains resilient because it addresses issues central to everyday life’
CIVICUS discusses women’s rights and a crackdown on feminist activists in China with Jing Guo, founder of the Legal Aid Hotline for Women’s Right to Work, which provides legal and psychological support to women facing gender-based discrimination and violence.The Chinese government, which sees any form of independent activism as a threat to its power, is targeting the women’s rights movement. It recently sentenced two women’s rights activists, Sophia Huang Xueqin and Wang Jianbing, to five and three and a half years in prison respectively for ‘inciting subversion of state power’. Huang is a prominent #MeToo activist, while Wang advocates for labour rights and support for women who report workplace sexual harassment. Arrested in 2021, they had already spent three years in prison when they were sentenced.
What’s the status of women’s rights in China?
Women in China face several pressing issues that have a significant impact on their daily lives. Gender discrimination is pervasive, affecting women in education, the workplace and within their families. Women often face higher barriers to education, stricter admission standards, job discrimination, lower wages and unfair treatment, especially during pregnancy. The lack of adequate public childcare services also places a heavy burden on women, often forcing them to sacrifice career opportunities to care for their families.
Violence against women is alarmingly widespread, occurring in homes, schools and workplaces, but legal protection is limited and poorly enforced. Many officials lack awareness of gender issues and the profound impacts of domestic violence and sexual harassment.
In addition, social norms continue to favour sons over daughters, perpetuating gender inequality. Women are often pressured to conform to traditional roles and relationships, but increasing awareness is leading many to resist these expectations.
Gender inequality is prevalent, but the government is reluctant to mobilise efforts to improve women’s status and civil society organisations have limited resources. For instance, there is a lack of comprehensive and reliable national statistics on women’s status. Surveys conducted by governmental organisations such as the Women’s Federation are not convincing, and civil society doesn’t have the capacity to conduct widespread surveys.
What happens to activists who publicly raise these issues?
Prominent feminist activists face severe repression. For example, Sophia Huang Xueqin, a feminist journalist and #MeToo activist, was arrested in 2021 while on her way to the UK to study. Last month she was sentenced to five years in prison for ‘subversion of state power’. Huang has been a prominent voice in China’s #MeToo movement, reporting on victims of sexual abuse and speaking out against misogyny and sexism in Chinese newsrooms.
According to the verdict, the authorities considered her regular meetings and forums to discuss social issues to be subversion. Huang’s activism began in 2018, when she supported the first #MeToo case in China by helping survivors share their experiences. After personally experiencing sexual harassment, she began investigating in journalism circles and covered protests in Hong Kong in 2019. The government accused her of promoting non-violent protest strategies, demonstrating the absurdity of the charges against her. Her story and others like it reveal what women face when they campaign for their rights in China.
Why is the Chinese government targeting feminist activists?
The Chinese government targets not only feminist activists, but any form of dissent, resulting in widespread harassment and repression. There was also a significant setback in 2015, when five feminists were arrested while planning an anti-sexual harassment campaign.
The deteriorating political environment has made activism increasingly difficult, but feminism remains resilient because it addresses issues central to everyday life. The fact that feminist ideas are deeply embedded in everyday life makes it difficult for the government to completely suppress activism.
Despite limited resources and ongoing security concerns, feminist activism continues. The movement is largely driven by volunteers who support victims and promote public education. Women continue to build connections and organise small-scale activities, both inside China and in exile. Online groups and social media serve as important platforms for expressing feminist ideas and sharing experiences.
What has been the impact of the Chinese #MeToo movement?
The #MeToo movement triggered a powerful shift in public awareness of sexual harassment in China, transforming what was once a taboo subject into an issue we could finally talk about. Just a decade ago, discussion of sexual harassment was virtually unheard of, and it was the persistence of activism that changed this.
#MeToo spawned informal volunteer groups dedicated to supporting survivors and educating the public, inspiring changes in men’s attitudes. Volunteers from diverse professional backgrounds have come together in a vast advocacy network that empowers those affected by sexual harassment. This collective effort isn’t just about dealing with individual cases; it’s about fostering a cultural shift that promotes equality and respect for all.
As a result, a 2022 law provided a clearer definition of sexual harassment, allowing some cases to reach the courts and resulting in significant victories for survivors.
Despite ongoing challenges, the #MeToo movement continues to reshape gender dynamics, particularly in academia and civil society, where young, educated women are taking action to change the ingrained patriarchal ideas in these areas.
How do Chinese women’s rights activists organise and mobilise, and what kind of international support do they need?
Feminist activism in China is resilient, as activists continue to develop innovative strategies to organise and mobilise women. Activities such as hiking serve as informal gatherings where participants can network and discuss pressing issues. Outside China, activists face fewer security concerns, but are still cautious. They organise events such as stand-up shows in cities such as London, New York and Vancouver to raise awareness and build a community.
Despite limited resources, activists are making the most of what they have and stressing the importance of creating supportive and courageous spaces to share experiences and ideas. In recent years, more feminists have created platforms for political expression, providing opportunities for open discussion of political issues. Events held abroad encourage Chinese feminists to share their stories bravely, often without photographs to protect their identities, reflecting ongoing security concerns even in exile.
International support is crucial to sustaining feminist activism. Financial assistance, intellectual exchange and the creation of supportive networks are essential for the growth of the movement. For example, Chinese activists and organised groups have launched a transnational campaign to demand Huang’s release, but we need broader support from more people and organisations to build a stronger network to prevent these injustices happening again.
Civic space in China is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Jing Guo through herFacebook page.
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CUBA: ‘The only options available are prison, exile, or submission’
CIVICUS speaks with Cuban activist Carolina Barrero, who has been in exile in Spain since February 2022, about the circumstances driving increasing numbers of Cubans out of the country.
Carolina is an art historian and a member of the 27N movement, formed out of the protests held on 27 November 2020 outside the Ministry of Culture in Havana to denounce lack of freedoms, the repression of dissent and harassment against the San Isidro Movement, a protest group started by artists. She was forced to leave Cuba in reprisal for her activism in support of relatives of political prisoners held since the protests of 11 July 2021, known as 11J.
Why did you leave Cuba?
My story as an activist forced into exile follows the pattern typically used by the state security apparatus to neutralise dissidents. I was told many times that I had to leave or else I would suffer legal consequences and eventually go to jail. I never gave in. I currently have four open cases, for instigation to commit a crime, conspiracy against state security, contempt and clandestine printing. Every single time I was threatened with prosecution and imprisonment if I did not stop my activism. I was urged to ‘stay quiet’, a classic euphemism for subdued.
On 31 January 2022, I was arrested at aprotest outside the 10 de Octubre Municipal Court in Havana. It was the first day of thetrial of a group of 11J protesters. I was with other activists including Alexander Hall, Leonardo Romero Negrín, Daniela Rojo and Tata Poet, accompanying political prisoners’ mothers who were waiting to see their children from a distance when they were brought to court. When that happened, we all applauded and shouted ‘freedom’ and ‘they are heroes’. State security offices violently arrested us, beat us and put us in a cage truck to take us to different police stations.
As happened before, state security told me that I had 48 hours to leave Cuba. But this time I was told that if I didn’t, 12 mothers of political prisoners would be prosecuted for public disorder. At first I thought it was just an empty threat, but they told me, ‘for 20 years we have been doing this to the Ladies in White’, a group who have been mobilising for their detained relatives since 2003. In other words, they were prepared to go all the way.
The Cuban dictatorship knows very well how to put pressure on us using our families and our private lives, because they have us under surveillance and they know everything about us. For instance, they know if your mother has a heart condition so they pay her a visit to force you to stay quiet and not give her a heart attack. If you have committed an infidelity, they threaten to show photos to your partner. If you are at university, they threaten you with expulsion. If you live in rented housing, they pressure your landlords to throw you out. Their tactic is to detect your weakness and blackmail you into submission. At some point you get tired of this life and choose to self-censor.
These threats were not working with me, so they threatened me with infringing on the freedom of third parties. They knew of my close ties with the mothers of imprisoned protesters and particularly with Yudinela Castro and Bárbara Farrat. Most of these mothers live in very precarious situations and cannot denounce the arbitrariness they suffer. Many have more than one child in prison, sometimes also their husbands, so they are quite alone. When they threatened me with criminalising and imprisoning them, I decided this time I had to leave.
How different is the situation of political exiles from that of those emigrating for economic reasons?
In principle, there would seem to be a big difference between exile resulting from the use of systematic repression to punish or neutralise political dissent and emigration motivated by social and economic asphyxiation. However, this classification obscures the ultimate causes of the factors that lead people to leave Cuba.
Under a dictatorship such as Cuba’s, the root reasons why people leave the country are always political. All waves of exile from Cuba, from the 1960s to the present day, have had a political background: repression by the ruling regime. Not only are political freedoms missing, but all the freedoms necessary for people to be able to manage their own destiny. In Cuba people have no agency over any aspect of their public or private lives; all aspects of life are controlled by the Cuban state, which is not merely authoritarian, but totalitarian.
No one flees paradise. No one decides to leave their life, work, career and affections to pursue the ‘American dream’. Although in some cases the forced character of exile seems clearer than in others, at the end of the day every exile from Cuba is a forced exile. We flee to survive and to have the opportunity to just be.
Many Cubans risk their lives at sea or cross jungles with their babies to get to a place where they don’t know the language or the culture, just to be a little freer. In Cuba, if you don’t fit the mould set by the Communist Party, the only authorised party, in power since 1965, you are treated as a potential criminal. Everything is politically determined, from access to education and healthcare to the possibility of earning a living. Economic suffocation also has political causes. So it is misleading to distinguish sharply between political exile and economic migration.
Following the protests of 11 July 2021 and their repression, it became clearer than ever that the only three options available to Cubans are prison, exile, or submission.
Like other Cuban activists in exile, you have conducted international advocacy ever since you left Cuba. Do you think this could prompt the Cuban state to rethink its tactic of offering exit instead of prison?
At the moment, the Cuban state is more concerned about us being inside, lighting the fire of protest, than outside, denouncing repression in international forums. But I think the regime’s calculations are wrong, because those of us who have gone into exile have not forgotten Cuba and are not going to abandon the cause of democracy. And international advocacy plays an important role in our struggle.
This, which may seem innocuous to the regime, is a fundamental part of activism to end the dictatorship because it attacks one of the fundamental pillars that have sustained the regime: the effectiveness of international propaganda. The Cuban state has allocated enormous resources to diplomacy so that every embassy is a propaganda centre that promotes the narrative, the epic and the myth of the Cuban Revolution.
To counter the effect of propaganda on international opinion, now Cuba also has a growing army of ambassadors who have witnessed and been part of the latest cycle of protests and can speak in international forums of what is really happening in Cuba. I firmly believe that, to a large extent, the fall of the dictatorship depends on the fall of the myth. This is an important task for us in exile.
What are the chances of a political transition in Cuba?
I do not dare to make predictions on such a delicate issue, and one so longed for by Cubans for decades. But I am able to highlight one fact: the Cuban regime has never been as weak as it is now. After the mass protests, the regime can no longer hide the extent of the discontent, which it has historically blamed on a few opponents who, according to its narrative, are funded by ‘the empire’. Social discontent is now evident and massive, reaching all corners of the island and all social groups. The dictatorship no longer has the support of the poorest or of those it claims to defend, but only of the military and bureaucratic leadership.
It also has a serious succession problem. Since Miguel Díaz-Canel assumed power after being appointed by Raúl Castro, he has not made a single administrative decision that has earned him praise. Everything has been a disaster and he will be remembered as an incompetent dictator with very little charisma. I think the regime spends 24 hours a day thinking of how to fill this power vacuum, since Díaz-Canel has no credibility whatsoever, even among officials, and even demoralises the repressive apparatus. The problem is that they have no one to replace him with, nor do they know how. They could stage a vote, but the situation is so delicate that they know it could easily get out of hand. They could even stage a self-coup, but this is also a very delicate path that could end up being lethal.
At the current international juncture, Cuba’s position on the Russian invasion of Ukraine makes the Cuban dictatorship, the oldest in the western hemisphere, even more difficult to justify in the eyes of international opinion. Justifying Cuba has become a challenge even for those with a marked ideological bias. Added to these factors are the economic, social and humanitarian crises, all of which threaten the regime and its continuity. Faced with the energy crisis and shortages of basic goods, the Cuban foreign minister himself has requested support from the Biden administration, something totally unheard of. The irony is complete: in Cuba there are people in prison accused of ‘mercenaryism’ for having received US support, and now it turns out that the Cuban government itself has become a mercenary by its own definition.
What will happen or not, I dare not predict. I believe that the protests will not be silenced and our voices will continue to be heard. I only hope that the democratic transition will come about through a peaceful process rather than violence.
Beyond overthrowing the dictatorship, the goal – and the challenge – is to build a democracy. For this we will need the support of civil society organisations such as CIVICUS. After six decades of civic and political anaesthesia, in recent years Cuban civil society has awoken and showed that it has the capacity, the will and the determination to move towards democracy. We have an open window of opportunity and, as the Cuban writer José Lezama Lima would say, we have the power for change.
Civic space in Cuba is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Contact Carolina Barrero through herInstagram page and follow@carolinabferrer on Twitter.
Photo credit: Fernando Fraguela
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EGYPT: ‘Activists who work from abroad are being targeted through their families’
CIVICUS speaksabout the ongoing repression of dissent in EgyptwithAhmed Attalla, Executive Director of the Egyptian Front for Human Rights (EFHR).
Founded in 2017 and registered in the Czech Republic, EFHR is a civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes human rights in Egypt, with a specific focus on criminal justice, through advocacy, research and legal support.
What are the conditions for civil society in Egypt?
Civic space in Egypt has remained highly restricted for the past decade, with the authorities consistently targeting civil society activists, journalists, political dissidents and human rights advocates.
The 2019 NGO law restricts the rights of CSOs. It mandates their registration and enables the government and security forces to interfere in their operations and order the cessation of activities deemed sensitive by the government, such as monitoring human rights conditions and denouncing violations. Organisations registered under this law may also face funding restrictions.
Some CSOs had to shut down because the authorities targeted them with counter-terrorist measures or prosecuted their directors in Case no. 173 of 2011, commonly known as the ‘Foreign Funding Case’. In some instances, the directors of these organisations were prohibited from leaving the country and their assets were frozen. Some courageous organisations have persisted in their work even in the face of attacks against their directors and staff.
In September 2021, the government launched the National Human Rights Strategy, a propaganda tool aimed at concealing the human rights crisis ahead of hosting the COP27 climate summit in 2022. As part of this initiative, it took steps to release some political prisoners and engaged in a national dialogue that contained a broader spectrum of political actors, including civil society representatives.
How has Egyptian civil society organised in the face of repression?
Civil society has adapted to the ongoing repression in various ways. Many CSOs have decided to limit their public engagement and abstain from taking to the streets or limit their work to the provision of legal aid while refraining from undertaking research and international advocacy, especially with international human rights mechanisms. Other organisations have been forced to relocate their operations abroad to safeguard their staff and ensure the continuity and integrity of their work, which has had the opposite effect of facilitating their advocacy efforts with international mechanisms and among European Union (EU) member states.
In response to the continuous pressure, many organisations have started collaborating more closely. In 2019, EFHR coauthored a joint report with eight other CSOs for the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council and participated in the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) session in which Egypt’s human rights record was examined. In 2023, we jointly submitted another report for Egypt’s UPR. We have also engaged in joint campaigns and participated in the formation of coalitions aimed at addressing specific challenges. Egyptian CSOs are increasingly recognising the importance of working together to amplify their impact and advocate for change.
How does EFHR work in such a repressive context?
When it was founded in 2017, EFHR was officially registered in the Czech Republic with affiliates in Egypt, where our team of researchers and lawyers provides crucial legal support by attending daily court hearings and working directly with victims of prosecution. We have successfully coordinated work between our overseas office and our colleagues based in Egypt. Our work focuses on issues that are ignored by the Egyptian authorities, including issues concerning criminal justice, detention conditions and gender-based violence.
We take various security measures to protect the identities of our staff. For instance, our research publications don’t include author names or contact details, and we maintain the anonymity of our legal team. These precautions give us some space to work and leverage our findings and expertise with international mechanisms, by engaging with UN Special Rapporteurs and working groups and collaborating with EU diplomats.
However, we have also faced some challenges. Three of our lawyers have been implicated in state security cases, facing accusations of affiliating with terrorist groups and potentially engaging in the use of force. We have managed to relocate other at-risk colleagues to ensure their safety. The same is happening to other Egyptian human rights organisations, whose members either managed to flee the country or were arrested and remained in prison for least two years.
How do you support Egyptian activists under threat?
We provide legal assistance to those who have been arrested or targeted by the authorities and take measures to ensure activists’ digital security and protect their anonymity, enabling them to continue their work. We collaborate with partners and foreign embassies to put pressure on the Egyptian government, but sometimes this doesn’t work.
Within Egypt, there are a few tools available to protect our colleagues at risk. Even political parties cannot protect their members in Egypt, so they also face regular detentions. Parties often attempt to exert pressure on the authorities to release arrested politicians but after releasing them the government arrests other members of the same organisations.
Are Egyptian activists safe in exile?
Activists who work from abroad are being targeted through their families. For example, the Egyptian-American human rights advocate Mohamed Soltan, who filed a case against former prime minister Hazem el-Beblawi, saw his five family members harassed and arrested as a result of his activism. A German resident, Alaa Eladly, was arrested upon landing in Cairo just because his daughter, Egyptian activist Fagr Eladly, criticised President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi president over human rights abuses at a 2015 press conference between the president and then German chancellor Angela Merkel . The father of Belgium-based journalist and human rights advocate Ahmed Gamal Ziada has recently been detained and accused of misuse of communication, spreading false news and joining a banned group. This strategy aims to silence activists and impose an even higher personal cost for doing their work.
What can the international community do to support Egyptian civil society?
To gain a comprehensive understanding of the situation in Egypt it is important to listen to the perspectives of local human rights defenders. Our international allies and partners must exert pressure on the Egyptian government to open civic space, stop targeting journalists, civil society activists and political figures and filing trumped up charges against them, and release all political prisoners detained for defending the fundamental rights to freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression.
EU member states must revise their terms of cooperation with Egypt to prioritise human rights. For instance, they should include human rights considerations as a conditionality for providing financial aid. It is imperative to strike a balance between the interests of governments and the demands of Egyptian civil society. It is also essential to sustain financial support for Egyptian CSOs, especially now that the economic crisis has also hit civil society.
Civic space in Egypt is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with EFHR through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@egyptian_front onTwitter.
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GUATEMALA: ‘Corrupt elites see defenders of justice as a threat to their interests and try to silence them’
CIVICUS discusses the state of civic space and justice in Guatemala with former anti-corruption prosecutor Virginia Laparra.Virginia recently went into exile after spending two years in prison for a case brought against her in retaliation for her work. She received a five-year sentence, which she condemned as arbitrary. As a prosecutor, she led important investigations into corruption cases. This put her in the crosshairs of a judicial system that had become a guarantor of impunity. While in prison, she suffered violations of her fundamental rights and medical negligence. Her case is part of a pattern of repression that has forced over 50 human rights defenders and members of the Guatemalan judiciary into exile.
What circumstances forced you to leave Guatemala?
For 16 years I worked in the Guatemalan Public Prosecutor’s Office as a prosecutor for crimes against life, property crimes, violence against women, crimes against minors, drug trafficking, financial and tax crimes and customs smuggling. This experience helped me to train in different areas and this is how my career as a prosecutor took shape.
As time went on, I took on more and more responsibility, becoming head of various units and offices, including the Permanent Attention Office, which deals with complaints and classifies information received by the Public Prosecutor’s Office. I was also in charge of the regional headquarters of the Office of the Special Prosecutor against Impunity, which worked hand in hand with the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala on cases of organised crime and corruption.
My work didn’t go unnoticed. Starting in 2017, I received threats and was subjected to smear campaigns in the government-controlled media. Persecution included arbitrary judicial proceedings and an attempt to put my case in the hands of judges known for their ties to corruption. Finally, I was arrested in an illegal and arbitrary procedure and sent to prison, where I suffered torture, human rights violations and prolonged solitary confinement.
I received the support of the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, which issued several resolutions in my favour, and I was declared a prisoner of conscience by Amnesty International. But the Guatemalan state ignored these demands. I spent two years in prison, and when I was released in January, threats intensified. In the absence of guarantees for my safety, I took the difficult decision to leave my country to preserve my life and freedom.
Fortunately, in exile I have found new ways to contribute to the promotion of justice and human rights in Latin America by working with international and local organisations. Above all, I’m satisfied with the work I did in Guatemala and proud to have contributed to justice.
What are the challenges facing human rights defenders and the judicial officials in Guatemala?
Civic space in Guatemala is in crisis. There were hopes that the government of Bernardo Arévalo, which took office in January this year, would reform the judicial system and create a more favourable environment for the administration of justice. It’s true that little time has passed, but it seems unlikely this will be achieved. The powerful interests that perpetuate corruption and impunity remain intact, and the new administration has faced strong pressures that limit its ability to implement substantial change.
Human rights defenders, members of the judiciary and politicians who support the Arévalo government face intimidation, threats, attacks and arbitrary detention. Impunity only exacerbates the risks.
Corrupt elites who have stayed in power by plundering public resources see defenders of justice as a threat to their interests and try to silence them through smear campaigns, persecution and physical violence. The exile of Thelma Aldana, Juan Francisco Sandoval and many other former members of the judiciary, human rights defenders and journalists is a stark reminder of the hostility faced by those who work for justice, transparency and accountability.
How can the international community support the fight against impunity in Guatemala?
The international community can and must play a crucial role in this fight. International platforms should highlight and condemn human rights violations. Diplomatic voices must urge the Guatemalan government to guarantee respect for human rights. It is also essential that they provide financial and technical support to local civil society organisations.
The international community should support the fight against corruption and impunity in Guatemala and coordinate its efforts to ensure it has deep and lasting impact. They must help protect human rights defenders and ensure the justice system is not used as a weapon to stifle dissent.
Civic space in Guatemala is rated as ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
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HONG KONG: ‘Any activism that the government dislikes can be deemed a national security violation’
CIVICUS speaks about the persecution faced by Hong Kong activists in exile with Anouk Wear, research and policy adviser at Hong Kong Watch.Founded in 2017, Hong Kong Watch is a civil society organisation (CSO) based in the UK thatproduces research and monitors threats to Hong Kong’s autonomy, basic freedoms and the rule of law. Itworks at the intersection between politics, academia and the media to help shape the international debate about Hong Kong.
What challenges do Hong Kong activists in exile face?
Hong Kong activists in exile face the challenge of continuing our activism without being in the place where we want and need to be to make a direct impact. We put continuous effort into community-building, preserving our culture and staying relevant to the people and situation in Hong Kong today.
When we do this, we face threats from the Chinese government that have drastically escalated since the National Security Law (NSL) was imposed in 2020.
This draconian law was enacted in response to the mass protests triggered by the proposed Extradition Bill between Hong Kong and mainland China in 2019.
The NSL broadly defines and criminalises secession, subversion, terrorist activities and collusion with a foreign country or with external elements. The maximum penalty is life imprisonment. In 2022, the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee concluded that the NSL is ‘vague and ambiguous’.
In practical terms, any activism the Hong Kong government dislikes, including meeting a foreign politician, organising an event and publishing an article, can be deemed a violation of the NSL, according to the government’s interpretation. This means we don’t know what is legal and what is not, and many people end up self-censoring to protect themselves.
On 3 July 2023, the government issued new arrest warrants for eight activists in exile, including three in the UK – Nathan Law, Finn Lau and Mung Siu-tat – and offered bounties of around £100,000 (approx. US$130,000) each for anyone providing information leading to their arrest. All of them are accused of breaching the NSL. Despite having no legal basis for applying the NSL in the UK, the Hong Kong government continues to threaten and intimidate activists abroad.
To what extent are civil society and independent media in exile able to continue doing their work?
Since the imposition of the NSL, over 60 CSOs, including political parties, trade unions and media groups, have disbanded. Many have relocated abroad, including over 50 CSOs that signed a joint statement urging government action following the Hong Kong National Security arrest warrants and bounties this month.
There is a strong network of Hong Kong activists in exile, and activists in exile are still able to do their work. However, we have great difficulty collaborating with activists still in Hong Kong because of the risks they face. For example, last week, five people in Hong Kong were arrested for alleged links to activists in exile who are on the wanted list. Collaborations must now be even more careful and discreet than they already were.
What kind of support do Hong Kong activists and journalists in exile receive, and what further international support do you need?
In November 2022, Hong Kong journalists who relocated to the UK collaborated with the National Union of Journalists of the UK and Ireland to launch the Association of Overseas Hong Kong Media Professionals. They pledged to focus on freedom of the press in Hong Kong and provide mutual assistance for professionals who have relocated overseas.
There is also extensive support among Hong Kong activists and CSOs in exile, from civil society of host countries and from the international community, as can be seen in the joint response to the arrest warrants and bounties issued on 3 July.
However, more coordinated action is needed to respond to Beijing’s threats, particularly from the governments of host countries. There needs to be more assurance and action to reiterate that Beijing and Hong Kong do not have jurisdiction abroad and there will be serious consequences to their threats.
Hong Kong activists in exile are now making submissions to the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review process, which will review China’s human rights record since 2018.
We urge UN member states, CSOs and journalists to use this opportunity to highlight the drastic changes that have taken place in Hong Kong and to continue supporting our fight for democracy, rights and freedom.
Civic space in Hong Kong is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Hong Kong Watch through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@hk_watch and@anoukwear onTwitter.
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HONG KONG: ‘We urge governments to protect exiled human rights defenders within their jurisdictions’
CIVICUS speakswith Anouk Wear, research and policy adviser at Hong Kong Watch, about recent district council elections held in Hong Kong amid an ongoing crackdown on dissent.
Founded in 2017, Hong Kong Watch is a civil society organisation (CSO) based in the UK thatproduces research and monitors threats to Hong Kong’s autonomy, basic freedoms and rule of law. Itworks at the intersection between politics, academia and the media to shape the international debate about Hong Kong.
What was the significance of Hong Kong’s 2023 district council elections?
On 11 December 2023, Hong Kong held elections spanning 18 district councils with a total of 479 seats. District councillors advise the Hong Kong government on local issues within their districts and have funding to promote recreational, cultural and community activities.
These elections were especially significant because following the previous round, held in 2019 and won by pro-democracy candidates by a landslide, the Hong Kong government introduced several changes to ensure that the pro-China camp would maintain the majority in future elections.
The 2023 election was marked by a record-low voter turnout of just 27.5 per cent. Many people abstained because they felt a sense of despair given that all candidates had to be vetted and approved by the Chinese state. This left no opposition voices to vote for, diminishing the significance of the election.
We want genuine universal suffrage, not a ‘democracy with Chinese characteristics’, as the founding chairman of Hong Kong’s Democratic Party, Martin Lee, aptly warned in 2014. Unfortunately, the situation has only worsened since then.
What tactics did the government use to control the election?
As analysed in a briefing we published recently, the election fit into a broader trend of democratic erosion in Hong Kong.
In 2021, changes to Legislative Councils were introduced under the slogan ‘Patriots Governing Hong Kong’, aimed at screening out democrats and ensuring that only pro-establishment candidates aligned with Beijing could run for seats. To that effect, candidates are now required to pass two major political barriers before participating in the election.
First, they must secure nominations from all five sectors of the Election Committee, a 1,500-member electoral college made up of representatives of various constituencies, including industry, professions, grassroots organisations, the government and Hong Kong representation in Chinese bodies. Second, they are screened by the Candidate Eligibility Review Committee, mainly composed of government officials. Candidates who don’t have a strong pro-China agenda can be disqualified on grounds of not being ‘patriotic’ enough.
A similar approach was applied to district council candidates. In April 2023, Chief Executive John Lee announced that upcoming district council elections would be open exclusively to patriots, with only a certain number of ‘depoliticised’ seats focused on administrative tasks elected by the public. He added that people who love the country and are willing to serve can participate in district councils through ‘various other ways’. In line with these reforms, only 88 seats were directly elected by the public, compared to 452 in the previous election, with 179 to be appointed by the chief executive.
Moreover, in the lead-up to the elections, three members of the League of Social Democrats were followed and arrested for planning a protest against the election, which they called a ‘birdcage’, stating that ‘Hong Kong people’s right to vote and to be elected seems to be absent’.
What should be done to restore democratic freedoms in Hong Kong?
Civil space has drastically shrunk since the 2019 district council elections. Following the imposition of the National Security Law in 2020, over 60 organisations have been disbanded, including CSOs, political parties, trade unions and media outlets. Many organisations have relocated abroad, while others have adjusted the scope of their work to protect their members who remain in Hong Kong.
It’s crucial that discussions are continued, the human rights situation is monitored and detailed reports are provided as steps towards restoring democratic freedoms in Hong Kong. We shouldn’t accept new repressive laws as the norm but instead stay vocal about any regressive legislation and rights violation.
It’s important to keep speaking up for people in Hong Kong and human rights defenders in exile. For example, recently the Hong Kong national security police issued five arrest warrants offering HK$1 million (approx. US$ 128,000) bounties for exiled pro-democracy Hong Kong activists based in the UK and USA. We strongly condemn this illegal attack against our friends and colleagues. We urge governments to take a stand and protect Hong Kong human rights defenders within their jurisdictions.
How is Hong Kong Watch working towards this end, and what international support do you need?
We work to inform and educate legislators, policymakers and the media, as well as raise awareness among the wider public about violations of human rights, basic freedoms and the rule of law in Hong Kong. We advocate for actions to assist victims of rights violations through a combination of in-depth research reports, opinion editorials, monthly media briefings, interviews and advocacy campaigns.
It’s crucial to hold Hong Kong and China accountable for their violations of international human rights law and urge them to fulfil their obligations. For instance, the 2022 review of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee, tasked with monitoring compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), found that Hong Kong violated its international legal obligations and recommended that the authorities take tangible steps, with a clear timeline, to introduce universal suffrage and reform the electoral system in compliance with the ICCPR.
We’re engaging in this effort through submissions to the Human Rights Committee and other treaty bodies, including the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as to the upcoming Universal Periodic Review at the UN Human Rights Council.
We deeply appreciate the support we receive from governments, legislators, civil society and people worldwide. But we need more international solidarity, particularly at the governmental level, to pressure Hong Kong authorities to comply with their obligations under international law and ensure that other states refrain from conducting business as usual with Hong Kong, in view of the grave and systematic nature of human rights violations the current regime commits.
Civic space in Hong Kong is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Hong Kong Watch through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@hk_watch and@anoukwear onTwitter.
The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.
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IRAN: ‘Women and queer people are at the forefront of the struggle against religious despotism’
CIVICUS speaks with Asal Abasian about their experiences as a queer and feminist activist in Iran and in exile.
Asal is an Iranian journalist and queer feminist activist. After receiving threats, they fled Iran in 2021. They first stayed in Turkey, where they freelanced with various foreign-based Persian language media outlets and Turkish media. They’re currently based in Paris, France. In Iran, same-sex relations are illegal and LGBTQI+ people can face the death penalty.
What was your life like in Iran and why did you leave?
My experience in Iran was challenging, uncomfortable and at times traumatic. However, my work as a cultural journalist focused on creativity, opening up new spaces that could escape the overt repression of traditional religious anti-queer social norms, showcasing diversity and expressions of transgression.
Navigating this was challenging because the editorial world was a closed, misogynistic, male-dominated work environment, and because the state constantly monitored our actions. Despite these obstacles, the medium of culture, which I mainly covered, allowed for a certain degree of freedom.
On a personal level, I embodied this challenge by pushing against the norms and visibly wearing my queer identity even in uncomfortable situations. Living in Iran as a queer person is difficult. If a same-sex relationship is exposed, it is punishable by death. Same-sex marriage is a distant dream. There’s a long way to go for the realisation of freedom for the queer community in Iran. Even if a queer person has a progressive and supportive family, the laws are against them and society is strongly queerphobic.
Have you found safety in exile?
Unfortunately, misogyny and homophobia exist everywhere. However, at least in a western country I have no fear of being arrested and imprisoned for my journalism or queer identity.
But discrimination is a universal problem. In France, of course, homophobia is not as intense as in Iran and the Middle East because of protective laws, but it still exists. There are reactionary and dogmatic people everywhere, and I believe this oppression, with varying degrees of intensity, is universal.
Living as an immigrant in the west, you can experience the intersection of oppression. Sometimes the treatment of immigrants, especially queer immigrants, is filled with violence and devoid of empathy and kindness. It seems the system is set up in such a way that immigrants are constantly discouraged from their journey and pushed back.
Has the situation in Iran changed since you left?
Sadly, the situation has not improved. But after the Woman, Life, Freedom movement triggered by the murder of Mahsa Jina Amini by the morality police in September 2022, women and the queer community have found more courage to fight against patriarchy and religious despotism.
Women and queer people are at the forefront of this struggle. Change hasn’t come from the regime, but from people’s resistance against its oppression and tyranny. The fact that women are now at the forefront of civil struggles in Iran is very encouraging because no oppressive force can deter or push them back from their goal of freedom.
However, the situation could be improved by spreading the ideas of inclusivity, equality and dignity through public education and cultural development. Much education takes place in schools, and much is also the responsibility of the media and the free flow of information. This is something we aspire to realise in countries like Afghanistan and Iran.
What does Pride Month mean to you? Do you see a future where it could happen in Iran?
Pride Month reminds me of the long and arduous journey of the queer movement up to this day. The fight against discrimination and oppression is a legacy we, the queer community, are proud of.
As a member of the queer community in Iran, I hope for a day when Pride marches take place in the cities of Iran, and queer people can express their identities with pride, freely and without fear.
But we are still a long way from that day. The problem is that the Islamic regime represents a segment of Iranian society. Part of society is very conservative and reactionary, making the possibility of change towards freedom and a safe space for queer people almost impossible. However, we remain hopeful and continue to fight for that day to come.
Civic space in Iran is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
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NORTH KOREA: ‘It is time for the international community to adopt a ‘human rights up front’ approach’
CIVICUS speaksabout the activism of North Korean escapees with Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK).Founded in 2001 and based in the USA, HRNK is a human rights organisationwith the principal objective of raising international awareness of North Korea's human rights situation.Is it possible to carry out any form of activism in North Korea?
No form of activism is possible in North Korea. There is no civil society due to an overwhelming and unprecedented level of coercion, control, surveillance and punishment. The markets that emerged following the famine of the 1990s and the newly created domestic mobile phone network allow North Koreans to engage in limited forms of market activity, but even this is subject to state surveillance and control. Every North Korean, regardless of whether they are a member of the ruling party or a government official, belongs to a party-controlled organisation, such as the Youth League or the Women’s Union. Anecdotal information from sources inside the country suggests that there is sporadic opposition and resistance to state agents at the local level, but the regime has gone to extreme lengths to prevent the emergence of any organised opposition.
Have there been any recent changes in how the North Korean regime responds to dissent?
Under the pretext of COVID-19 prevention, the North Korean regime has intensified its crackdown on those attempting to smuggle in information from the outside world or attempting to access such information. In December 2020 the Supreme People’s Assembly, North Korea’s highest legislative body, passed the ‘Anti-Reactionary Ideology and Culture Law’. This law imposes severe criminal penalties on those who access or disseminate foreign content, including movies, dramas, music and books. The penalties are especially severe, up to a life sentence of hard labour, for those who smuggle in or disseminate South Korean media.
How do people manage to escape North Korea?
Leaving the country without official authorisation is regarded as treason in North Korea. To escape, North Koreans need the assistance of religious networks, international civil society organisations (CSOs) and brokers who operate in the China-North Korea border region. The author and journalist Melanie Kirkpatrick has called this escape route ‘Asia’s underground railroad’. In some cases, family members or relatives who have already escaped pay brokers to arrange the escape. The most common route is through China and Southeast Asia. Upon arrival in Thailand, the escapees either choose to go to South Korea or apply for asylum in other countries.
However, since Kim Jong-un came to power in late 2011, the North Korean regime has intensified border security. The Chinese government has also taken steps that make it more difficult for the escapees to move inside China. In addition, the Chinese government has a longstanding policy of forced returns, whereby it repatriates any North Korean refugees arrested in its territory. This violates China’s obligations as a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, since North Korean refugees face a credible fear of persecution upon return.
This, combined with the COVID-19 border lockdown, means the number of escapees reaching South Korea has plummeted. The highest annual recorded number of arrivals to South Korea was 2,914 in 2009, but this fell to only 67 in 2022. The easing of COVID-related measures is likely to result in a greater number of attempts to flee.
What kind of help do escapees receive?
Most escapees choose to go to South Korea, as they are granted citizenship upon arrival under South Korea’s constitution. The South Korean government provides various forms of economic, educational and job training assistance to North Korean refugees. International and local CSOs also help them adjust to life in South Korea.
The situation is still difficult for many escapees, given how different the two societies have become in over seven decades of division. According to the latest available data from South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, a total of 34,000 escapees have resettled in South Korea to date. Refugees who choose to go to other countries, including the UK and the USA, primarily receive help from CSOs and other escapees who have already relocated there.
How do escapees work to document and denounce human rights violations in North Korea?
North Korean escapees play a critical role, given their first-hand experience of life under the regime. Many refugees, including those who are survivors of North Korea’s detention facilities, provide vital testimony to CSOs that seek to document and raise awareness of human rights violations in North Korea. Escapee testimony has also played a critical role in the work of the United Nations (UN) Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea, whose 2014 report concluded that the North Korean regime has committed crimes against humanity pursuant to policies determined at the highest levels of the state. Both the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea and the Seoul office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights continue to work closely with North Korean escapees.
Some refugees operate their own organisations. In addition to documenting and raising global awareness of the human rights situation in North Korea, they are often involved in sending outside information to North Korean people. Methods they use include radio broadcasts, leaflet balloons flown across the Korean demilitarised zone and rice and micro-SD cards in plastic bottles that are floated across the maritime border between the two Koreas. It is also common for individual escapees to send money to family members in North Korea with the help of brokers.
How does HRNK support escapees?
HRNK works closely with North Korean escapees to document and raise awareness of the human rights situation in North Korea. Given the lack of on-the-ground access inside North Korea, we employ a methodology that combines satellite imagery analysis, witness testimony and open-source investigation.
Testimonies are often given by escapees who have already resettled in South Korea, although HRNK has sometimes obtained information through refugees with contacts inside North Korea. HRNK has held consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council since April 2018 and reports to various UN bodies and hosts side events in Geneva and New York. We have facilitated the participation of North Korean escapees at these events to amplify their voices on the international stage.
What further international support do diaspora activists need?
North Korean activists need support from both private and public sources of funding. In general, North Korean human rights activists are overworked and underfunded. ‘Like-minded’ governments such as those of Japan, South Korea, the USA and others display interest in the issue but have often sidelined human rights concerns to focus solely on negotiating military, political and security matters. It is time for the international community to adopt a ‘human rights up front’ approach to North Korea, ensuring that human rights concerns are integrated into every aspect of its interactions with North Korea. Escapee activists will play a critical role in this effort.
Civic space in North Korea is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with HRNK through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@committeehrnk onTwitter.
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NORTH KOREA: ‘Since Kim Jong-un came to power, the surveillance and security system has increased dramatically’
CIVICUS speaks about activism in the closed civic space of North Korea with Bada Nam, Secretary General of People for Successful Corean Reunification (PSCORE).Founded in 2006 and based in South Korea, PSCORE is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) that works to improve human rights in North Korea, assist North Korean escapees settling in South Korea and address barriers to reunification of the two Koreas.
Is there anything resembling civil society in North Korea?
North Korea values organisational activities, requiring every citizen to participate simultaneously in several groups such as the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea, North Korea’s Socialist Women’s Union and the Socialist Patriotic Youth League. All of them are government-organised and exert control over people rather than encourage critical thinking. Mentioning civic organisations from the outside world is strictly forbidden.
Congregating and engaging in activism in any way critical to the regime is a serious criminal offence, with punishments that can extend to the death penalty. As a result, any such activity must be covert, and it’s difficult to obtain accurate information on the existence of an underground civil society.
North Korea is a surveillance state, where people are always cautious about what they say, even to close friends and family members. It’s impossible to gather colleagues and engage in civic activities because everyone is made to monitor each other and failure to report treasonous crimes to the authorities would also result in severe punishment. Public criticism sessions and public executions are also examples of how the regime strikes fear into the population.
People are deterred from opposing the government not only because of the extreme punishment they would face but also due to North Korea’s policy of guilt by association, which puts their close relatives at risk. The ‘Songbun’ class system classifies people according to their political loyalties, as ‘loyal’, ‘wavering’ or ‘hostile’, and family members may be demoted in this classification system, affecting their life opportunities, including career options and access to food rations. In serious cases, entire families may be sent to political camps and die from forced labour or starvation. Therefore, North Koreans don’t dare imagine opposing the government.
Have there been any recent changes in the ways the North Korean regime responds to dissent?
The North Korean government has always responded to dissent in an extreme manner. However, since Kim Jong-un came to power in 2011, the surveillance and security system has increased dramatically, making it nearly impossible to escape from North Korea. Extra security measures are in place along the borders and a shoot-to-kill policy is enforced against those trying to escape. The situation was exacerbated further during the COVID-19 pandemic when the China-North Korea border was closed, both halting trade and also impeding the flow of defectors.
Information poses the greatest threat to the North Korean regime, especially due to the influence of the recent ‘Korean wave’ that has made South Korean popular culture increasingly prevalent. Most people in North Korea have been exposed to South Korean dramas and music, leading some to adopt South Korean manner of speech and fashion style. In response, the government has intensified monitoring, enacted strict laws and imposed severe punishments for consuming or distributing foreign media. The Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act, enacted in January 2023, explicitly prohibits the use of foreign languages and specifically bans South Korean terms such as ‘oppa’, which translates as ‘older brother’ and is used as a form of endearment for a boyfriend.
How do people manage to escape North Korea?
Most North Koreans escape across the border with China, often with the help of a broker. Brokers reach out to wealthy families in North Korea or help those who have escaped to China get to South Korea. Defectors in South Korea sometimes contact a broker to help other family members flee.
China has a policy of forced repatriation for North Korean refugees, and its advanced surveillance system makes it extremely difficult to travel in China undetected. If apprehended and returned to North Korea, defectors and their families face severe punishment.
Most North Korean refugees must travel through several countries before reaching safety. From China, they might flee to Mongolia and Southeast Asian countries such as Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. Many North Koreans end up seeking asylum in Thailand, where the government assists them and helps organise their journey to South Korea.
What help do escapees receive?
The assistance available to North Korean refugees depends on the laws and diplomatic relations of countries with North and South Korea. Civil society, including PSCORE, helps North Korean defectors settle in South Korea by teaching essential life skills. Thanks to our volunteer teachers, we focus on providing educational support, including English lessons and vocational workshops. In the past, we also assisted escapees in reaching South Korea but, unfortunately, this became impossible due to China’s growing securitisation and the impact of COVID-19.
Once in South Korea, North Koreans must undergo a 12-week training programme at the Hanawon rehabilitation centre, where they learn various skills to adapt to the South Korean lifestyle and have access to medical treatment and mental health services. While the South Korean government has implemented programmes to assist refugees, the process of fully integrating into South Korean society is still difficult for people who have previously lived under the totalitarian regime. Psychological trauma from refugees’ journey to freedom may have lasting effects on their lives.
How do escapees work to raise awareness and advocate for change in North Korea?
There are many CSOs, mainly based in South Korea, that support North Koreans inside the country and abroad. Some organisations send messages, information, K-dramas and K-pop to North Korea using USB sticks. South Korean news outlets, such as Daily NK and NK News, have sources in North Korea that provide insights into the current situation. PSCORE and other North Korean human rights groups conduct interviews with defectors and publish reports based on their testimonies.
Our primary activities involve organising public awareness campaigns through seminars and events. We also share short catchy videos on various North Korea-related topics via our social media channels. Our large international team of interns plays a crucial role in advocacy by translating our social media content into various languages. This makes our mission and content visible to the rest of the world.
PSCORE was granted special consultative status with the United Nations (UN) Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 2012, facilitating our engagement with the international community. We hold an annual side event at the UN Human Rights Council to share the latest information on North Korea’s human rights situation. We leverage international pressure to try to bring about change.
What further international support do diaspora activists need?
The topic of North Korean human rights is seen as a very political issue in South Korea. This means that CSOs are affected by each change of government, as policies toward North Korea shift with every administration. While PSCORE’s objective is centred on achieving peace and improving human rights in North Korea, we receive limited support compared to other CSOs due to the interpretation of our activities as politically charged, even though PSCORE is a non-partisan and non-religious CSO. Increased media exposure could help us secure more funding.
Insufficient funding is a common challenge for North Korean human rights organisations. It hinders the potential to raise awareness and support refugees in South Korea. North Korean activists need more platforms to amplify their voices and continue advocating for change. Still, we hope that more donations will come as the international community becomes more interested in the cause of human rights in North Korea.
Civic space in North Korea is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with PSCORE through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@PSCORE911 on Twitter.