opposition

  • BAHRAIN: ‘Had there been civic freedoms, the authorities would have known of the deep suffering at Jau Prison’

    JawadFairoozCIVICUS speaks about the situation of political prisoners on hunger strike in Bahrain withJawad Fairooz, founder and director of Salam for Democracy and Human Rights (Salam DHR).

    Founded in 2012, Salam DHR is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) registered in France, Switzerland and the UK. It undertakes research and advocacy for the advancement of democracy and human rights, mainly in relation to Bahrain, but also in the wider Gulf and Middle East and North Africa regions.

    Maryam al-Khawaja, daughter of imprisoned human rights defender Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, intends to return to Bahrain imminently to ensure her father gets medical treatment and press for his immediate and unconditional release. Yet she, too, faces possible arrest. What’s your assessment of the situation?

    Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, 62, a dual Danish-Bahraini citizen, is the co-founder of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights and has a long history of activism. He was arrested by the government of Bahrain in 2004, 2007 and again amid mass unrest in April 2011. After this he faced a grossly unfair trial before a military court, including on charges of ‘seeking to overthrow the government’. He was tortured in pretrial custody and since his arbitrary imprisonment he has been repeatedly denied access to adequate healthcare.

    On 9 August he joined some 800 other hunger strikers. They called for an end to lockdown policies that require them to spend up to 23 hours of the day in their cells, the suspension of solitary confinement, the opportunity for collective or congregational prayer in Jau Prison’s mosque, face-to-face meeting rights with family members without a glass screen and access to healthcare commensurate with that available to the public, among other improvements in prison conditions.

    On 13 September the mass hunger strike ended with the authorities reportedly meeting many of these demands. This came as Bahrain’s Crown Prince visited Washington, DC, where he met with senior members of the Biden administration: the problem had to go away.

    Maryam nevertheless intends to travel and she has our full support. We continue to call for Abdulhadi’s immediate and unconditional release. The Danish and European Union (EU) authorities must do more.

    What is at the core of this problem is the absence of civic space in Bahrain. If there was space for independent civil society, then CSOs would have effectively alerted the authorities to prison conditions and they could have addressed the situation. An independent civic space makes it possible to find a balance in government conduct.

    What does this mean for Maryam al-Khawaja and our courageous colleagues travelling with her? It means they should be allowed to enter Bahrain and make their demands. The government should engage with them in a spirit of transparency. The absolute worst that could happen is for dissent to be tolerated just a little bit more. While this seems unlikely to happen, it is what the government should do. We wish them all Godspeed.

    How is it possible to conduct human rights activism in such a closed environment? How does Salam DHR do it?

    Bahrain has closed civic space. Government officials decide which CSOs can be registered and who can stand for their boards. They prevent people from engaging in public life who have no criminal records or public complaints but rather perhaps a past association with a political movement or party that was unfairly banned years ago.

    The Bahraini constitution provides for freedoms and safeguards similar to many other states, but the reality is that the government continues to carry out arbitrary arrests and stage unfair trials for acts that are not internationally recognised as crimes. The authorities torture detainees and use the death penalty, despite domestic opposition and international condemnation. They have stripped hundreds, including myself, of citizenship, depriving us of even the right to have rights in our homeland. They use the digital space to monitor and punish dissent and to foment religious and sectarian strife.

    Activists linked with Salam DHR cannot, in effect, exercise their right to peaceful assembly, let alone openly campaign for freedoms of association and expression, the release of prisoners unfairly tried and imprisoned or a moratorium on the death penalty. They would risk arrest if they did that.

    Yet engaging in civic activism is not totally impossible, only very challenging. Alongside CIVICUS and other partners, Salam DHR engages with allies and like-minded activists as well as the few CSOs that openly but cautiously raise human rights concerns so that the wider Bahraini society hears our message. We echo and amplify their appeals.

    We are a catalyst: we help Bahraini activists access platforms to reach domestic and international audiences and provide training and development opportunities such as internships. Alone and in partnership with others, we research, document and publicise developments, grounding our message in article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states that every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity to take part in the conduct of public affairs.

    How useful for advocacy purposes was theglobal event held by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in Bahrain’s capital, Manama, in March 2023?

    It was mixed: Danish parliamentarians and those from other countries addressed human rights issues and the absence of an independent civic space. The IPU’s human rights team raised concerns about freedom of expression and violations against Bahraini parliamentarians. But despite the IPU’s affiliated status with the United Nations (UN), the government still denied access to independent observers and human rights organisations, denying them either visas or access and turning at least one around at the airport. This was the authorities once again restricting civic space.

    A few days before the IPU meeting officially began, Bahraini lawyer and activist Ebrahim Al-Mannai called for parliamentary reforms on social media. He and three others who shared his post were arrested for publishing material that could ‘disturb public order’.

    At the event itself, the government appeared uninterested in seriously engaging with visiting parliamentarians on human rights issues, despite attempts from the Danish delegation and representatives from Finland, Iceland and Ireland. Our message is clear: open up civic space, free up CSOs and political parties and liberate discourse, otherwise the cycle of political unrest will continue.

    Reports indicate that the mass hunger strike in Jau Prison has ended. What’s your assessment of this episode?

    The painful August 2023 mass hunger strike was wholly avoidable. It happened mainly due to the government’s stubborn and short-sighted refusal to allow civic space to exist even to a minimum degree. Had there been freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, they would have known of the deep suffering at Jau Prison. If you don’t let people say what they think, then public life can only lurch from crisis to crisis.

    The hunger strike was the expression of the accumulation of a number of factors that have been present in Bahraini prisons for years and it was based on grievances that have been repeatedly expressed: prison conditions and ill treatment of prisoners amounting to torture. The abuses worsened and conditions deteriorated during the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, medical neglect resulted in the deaths of two prisoners, Hussein Barakat and Abbas Mallalah.

    We appeal once more to the authorities to allow for the opening of civic space and provide a social vent to end the cycle of human rights crises we face.

    Is the international community doing all it can to support the struggle for democracy and human rights in Bahrain?

    International human rights organisations, UN treaty bodies and Special Procedures and partner states, for instance in the context of the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review process of Bahrain, have all joined us in calling on the government of Bahrain to abide by its international human rights obligations, starting with the basic step of letting people have a voice in public life.

    Today, 15 September, is International Day of Democracy, and we are joining the UN in calling on the government of Bahrain to empower the next generation by ensuring that their voices are included in the decisions that will have a profound impact on their world. In his address, UN Secretary-General António Guterres has warned that ‘walls are closing in on civic spaces’. Those walls are also the walls of Jau Prison, where it took 800 detainees’ unjust suffering for the government to even take notice.

    But the UN has also let neighbouring United Arab Emirates, which is as closed as Bahrain, host the forthcoming COP28 climate change summit. Lack of civic space means there can be no activism for climate justice in Bahrain – for instance, no public demands for accountability can be expressed over costly and environmentally damaging land reclamation in Bahrain’s northeast, which has already eroded the livelihood of fishing communities. We need to be able to address these challenges openly, with a rights-based approach, to avoid a future calamity.

    And powerful states that could be putting some pressure for change are avoiding the issue. Right now, Bahrain’s Crown Prince is wrapping up meetings with senior Biden administration officials, none of whom appear to have raised civic space concerns or addressed the needless suffering of 800 Bahraini prisoners. The UK has removed Bahrain from its list of ‘countries of concern’ at the same time as it trumpeted a billion-dollar Bahraini investment in the UK. In October the EU will recommence its cycle of so-called human rights dialogues.

    The international community’s inexplicable complacency over the festering human rights quagmire in Bahrain will further embolden the government in crushing civic space. Many leaders miss the point when it comes to Bahrain and its Gulf neighbours: they appear to accept the facade of what is presented as pragmatic autocracy and appear to accept regional rulers’ colonial-mindset contention that democracy will destabilise the region.

    Democracies have in fact produced the most stable, enduring and dynamic systems in the world. Human rights and democracy are essential for Bahrain and its neighbours because their deficits continue to be the primary cause of resentment and unrest. A security-based approach does not remedy these problems. Bahrain’s history has shown these methods to be a failure, as it has endured continuous waves of mass unrest followed by violent crackdowns.

    Authoritarianism and the forms of violence it fosters are the real destabilising forces, a cycle that can only be broken through the recognition and enactment of democratic rights. The first step towards this goal is simply letting civic space exist.


    Civic space in Bahrain is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with Salam for Democracy and Human Rights through itswebsite and follow @SALAM_DHR and@JawadFairooz on Twitter.

  • BAHRAIN: ‘This election is make-believe: its only role is to provide a veneer of democracy’

    JawadFairoozCIVICUS speaks about the election being held today in Bahrain withJawad Fairooz, founder and director of Salam for Democracy and Human Rights (Salam DHR).

    Salam DHR is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) founded in 2012 to undertake research and advocacy for the advancement of democracy and human rights, mainly in relation to Bahrain, but also in the wider Gulf and Middle East and North Africa regions.

    Jawad Fairooz is a former Bahraini parliamentarian. In the 2010 election his political group, al-Wefaq, won 18 out of 40 seats, becoming the largest group in the Council of Representatives. They all resigned in repudiation of the repression of protests in 2011, and Jawad and another parliamentarian were arrested, tortured and ill-treated in detention. In November 2012, while he was visiting the UK, the government withdrew his citizenship, making him stateless. He became a campaigner against statelessness and for the rights of the stateless and founded Salam DHR in 2013.

    What is the significance of today’s election?

    Elections matter, or at least they should. In Bahrain, elections for municipal councils and the 40-seat parliament, the Council of Representatives, are held every four years, with possible runoffs where no candidate obtains a majority.

    Between 2002 and 2010, these elections were carried out in a context where civil society had become relatively more vibrant. They continued – even if only just – to carry the promise that parliament would take an increasingly larger and more responsible role in deepening democracy and freedoms and ensuring the continuing existence of civil society.

    Far more than now, they showed elections are a pivotal moment for social and political renewal – for those who will shape society to engage with civil society and to accommodate differing social and political views. Elections can create a sense of shared ownership, and in a context of tolerance and acceptance they can foster a vibrant and responsible civil society. They can help build a culture of human rights.

    But that is not the case with today’s election.

    This one reflects an ever-shrinking civic space. Parliamentarians’ institutional power has weakened, as they too operate under limited civic space. The government is inclined to seek less qualified parliamentarians whose conduct it will be able to control. To further weaken and subordinate parliament to the government’s will, the King recently issued a decree giving more power to parliament’s chair, a government loyalist, to determine the body’s workings. This will further extend government writ and further chill civic space.

    This election, like those of 2014 and 2018, is controlled or stage managed in a way that makes it clear that its only role is to provide a veneer of democracy. It’s make-believe.

    But let’s be clear: it is also an opportunity for us to get back to work on our own renewal, to locate openings and fissures and pry them open, and to chip away at walls enclosing us, in Bahrain, in the Gulf and across the region. An opportunity to look forward.

    Flaws notwithstanding, we need to engage with the new parliamentarians. Will the government let them engage with independent civil society? It looks unlikely, but we will try, both through bilateral parliamentary visits and in the context of the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s General Assembly, which will be held in Bahrain’s capital, Manama, in March 2023. We need to start organising now so that global parliamentarians can help carry our voices and those of international civil society to the heart of Manama.

    We also need to plant the seeds for civil society activism around COP28, which will take place a year from now in neighbouring United Arab Emirates, where civic space is non-existent. We just can’t stop now, however bleak the situation of Bahrain or the Gulf may seem. This cycle of unfair elections is done, but our task to continue to look for avenues of engagement and activism continues apace. We are looking forward.

    Have further restrictions been imposed on civic space in the run-up to the election?

    Not really, as most of the damage was already done.

    In December 2014, the authorities imprisoned Ali Salman, the leader of al-Wefaq, the largest political association. He was arrested for protesting against the parliamentary elections, which al-Wefaq boycotted because promised reforms had not been implemented. In 2015 he was sentenced to four years in prison on charges such as inciting hatred, disturbing the peace and insulting public institutions, but he was acquitted of the most serious charge, of inciting political change, which could carry a life sentence.

    He appealed, but so did the prosecutor, who demanded a stricter sentence, and in 2016 his prison sentence was increased to nine years. Further charges were subsequently added and in 2017 he was accused and tried for the crime of ‘spying for Qatar’. For having tried to mediate in Bahrain’s conflict with Qatar, the authorities handed him a life sentence.

    In July 2016, a court in Bahrain dissolved and banned Al-Wefaq after accusing it of fostering violence and ‘terrorism’. In May 2017, the main non-sectarian political association, Wa’d, was shut down as well, also under accusations of advocating violence, supporting terrorism and inciting crimes.

    In advance of the 2018 parliamentary election, the government amended the NGO law, extending restrictions on who could establish or be on a CSO board, irrespective of the organisation’s nature – this applies even to organisations working on sports, working with the community or providing charitable services. It also forbade all those linked to banned political parties from engaging with CSOs.

    In addition, anyone sentenced to more than six months’ imprisonment, even if subsequently pardoned by the King, convicted in error or provided with a ‘no objection certificate’, is now deprived for life of voting rights and the right to stand for election. Likewise, all those who for whatever reason did not take part in the previous election have been banned from taking part in the next.

    Having crushed civic space for years, in the run-up to the 2022 election the authorities only needed to ensure that calm persisted. To that effect, in September the Ministry of Municipalities Affairs issued vaguely worded regulations that appeared to link electioneering and religion. Among other things, these regulations banned the holding of meetings in public religious centres and other public places such as educational facilities. They appeared aimed at the majority Shi’a community for whom such centres have often become the only places where they – we – are allowed to gather.

    What are the conditions for civil society like in Bahrain?

    In Bahrain, the very existence of a civil society – let alone an independent one – depends on the political will and whim of the government: the Ministry of Labour and Social Development controls the licensing of all CSOs.

    The newly amended NGO Law redefined who could establish and run a CSO and prohibited members of banned political bodies from setting up a CSO. These new rules were applied in January 2022 to forbid two peaceful women activists, Zainab al-Durazi and Safia al-Hasan, taking up the board positions to which they had been freely elected in a women-focused CSO. The two women had been linked to the banned group Wa’d.

    Do some of the activities of CSOs whose directors are demonstrably loyal to the state help and support society’s needs? Of course they do. We need them and we commend such organisations. But they are not independent.

    Those perceived as not personally loyal to the government and its leaders do not get licences to operate any CSO and are not allowed to be on supervisory boards, in any sector, in total contravention to international law and practice, and completely against the wishes of Bahraini people. A thorough vetting process ensures this remains the case.

    All CSOs must obtain permission to engage in any way with non-Bahraini bodies such as foreign or international human rights groups or to meet with foreign Bahrain-based diplomats. If they get permission and the meeting takes place, the government requires the participation of a Foreign Ministry representative and the preparation of notes for the meeting, subject to approval. If this is not done, the representative of the CSO risks criminal charges or the closure of the organisation.

    The absence of an independent civil society means that any consultation that does take place is performative – just for show. The authorities don’t typically take the limited civil society that is loyal to the government into account, so independent voices are simply not even in the picture.

    If the government only consults those of whom they approve, and even then, only barely, how will that shape government policy? How can it capture the concerns and wishes of the wider population? How is this sustainable? Well, it isn’t. It is unwise and risks creating conditions similar to those that resulted in a national crisis in 2011.

    What would it take to build democratic institutions in Bahrain?

    Recent history has shown that democratic institutions are difficult to build and easy to lose. In Bahrain and the Gulf, the human rights movement does not call for removal of X so that they be replaced by Y. Instead, we build case studies from each country to show the inequities of laws and practices, and we campaign on that. The reform of specific practices, in certain areas – the administration of justice, the freedom of assembly – is achievable if the authorities in Bahrain and across the Gulf actually engage with human rights groups and United Nations human rights bodies.

    We need the Bahraini authorities to provide some genuine representation of the people by the people. We are ready to have a real, genuine dialogue with the authorities, but there needs to be a level playing field. If, despite the restrictions placed on them, the parliamentarians elected in this election step up, then we will have a chance to make a difference going forward. But just as we dare to dream and act, they need to do so too.

    What kind of support does Bahraini civil society need from the international community?

    We need more engagement. We need states and friends in international civil society to step up and explain the character and vision of the democratic society that the majority of Bahrainis seek; to explain that it does not represent a threat but rather an unlocking of potential.

    We need international civil society counterparts to engage in international fora, not only to reflect and project our voice but also to emphasise the role and inherent legitimacy of Bahraini civil society to the Bahraini authorities.

    We need our international partners to put pressure on the government’s human rights oversight bodies – the Ombudsman’s office, the Special Investigative Unit and the National Institution for Human Rights – to provide real rather than cosmetic redress, accountability and reform. Some of these oversight bodies have helped migrant workers facing abuse, but even then, their scope has been limited as they have failed to address underlying unjust laws or practices.

    We need help and expertise to collate evidence to mount realistic claims for accountability in jurisdictions that have provisions for sanctioning, such as the Global Magnitsky Act that the US government uses to sanction foreign government officials deemed to be human rights offenders,

    We need international civil society to press the government of Bahrain to explain why it has failed to adhere to the international conventions to which it has acceded, or why it has not acceded to additional standards such as optional protocols, or been clearer about imposing a moratorium on the death penalty.


    Civic space in Bahrain is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with Salam for Democracy and Human Rights through their website and follow @SALAM_DHR and@JawadFairooz on Twitter.

  • BANGLADESH: ‘This is a one-sided election in which we already know who the winner will be’

    mubashar-hasan.png

    CIVICUS speaks with Dr Mubashar Hasan about the ongoing crackdown on dissent in Bangladesh ahead of 7 January general elections.

    Mubashar is a Bangladesh-born academic and social justice activist. He is a post-doctoral researcher at the Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages, University of Oslo, Norway.

     

    What’s the current political climate in Bangladesh?

    The political climate in Bangladesh is tense. The election is being organised under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, the world’s longest-serving female head of government. The main opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), has said it’s not going to participate in an election held under this administration, arguing that there isn’t a level playing field for parties to compete freely and fairly.

    Judicial harassment is rife. In September, the New York Times reported that 2.5 million opposition activists faced judicial cases, with each facing multiple cases and some up to 400. Journalists have found that many cases against the opposition were fabricated. The police have even reportedly filed cases against BNP activists who were long dead or living abroad.

    On 28 October 2023, the opposition organised a massive rally. To stop this becoming a full-blown people-led movement, the government aggressively repressed it. A few opposition activists retaliated and then the government blamed the violence on the opposition. At least 15 people were killed, including two police officers. More than 20,000 opposition activists have been incarcerated since late October.

    This election-related violence is largely the result of state violence. Human Rights Watch recently described the ongoing developments as an autocratic crackdown. Freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly are being restricted and forcefully violated, affecting the legitimacy of the election process. Extremely politicised state institutions are being used as an extension of the ruling party, a trend many argue could lead to the materialisation of a totalitarian state.

    Is there any space for civil society to operate in Bangladesh?

    The space for civil society in Bangladesh is closed. Civil society organisations are free to operate only as long as they don’t challenge the ruling system.

    Just as in any autocratic country, there is an increasing activism going on in the diaspora. There are many Bangladeshi activists living in Australia, as well as in Malaysia, Sweden, the USA and elsewhere. BNP leader Tarique Rahman lives in exile in London.

    People in the diaspora are using the leverage that comes with living under democratic governments to spread information about what happens in Bangladesh. Those diaspora activists argue that it is their duty to expose what is going on back home.

    There are also key investigative journalists working from exile. A site called Netra News runs out of Malmö in Sweden, and it is still quite influential in exposing serious illegal acts by the government. There are several emerging YouTube commentators and analysts who have been very courageous. They have millions of followers.

    How big a problem is disinformation in Bangladeshi politics?

    Disinformation has always been a problem. Authoritarian governments don’t like the free flow of information. They want to control information and seek to discredit independent voices, just as Trump did in the USA, trashing fact as fiction and making fiction fact. And he was the authoritarian leader of a democratic country, which Bangladesh is not.

    Partisan elements within the government of Bangladesh and ruling party members treat those who dare challenge the official narrative as enemies. As I mentioned in one of my recent articles for the Diplomat Magazine, the government is the dominant force promoting political disinformation. The main opposition party has also promoted disinformation in some instances but independent factcheckers have concluded that the volume of political disinformation promoted by the opposition is miniscule compared to the government.

    There has been recent reporting by the Financial Times focused on how the Bangladeshi ruling party is using AI-driven disinformation to disrupt the upcoming election. But this is a one-sided election in which we already know who the winner will be. In this election voters do not have real choice. Why the ruling party is promoting AI-driven disinformation is therefore a mystery.

    What are your expectations for election day and its aftermath?

    Many things will unfold in the coming days. Voter turnout will most likely be low. The government will deploy military forces nationwide, perhaps even putting them in charge of distributing ballot boxes and election materials.

    There will be some violence, probably by the opposition, followed by arrests. The opposition will persist in demanding a free and fair election and the resignation of the government. Some loss of life is sadly to be expected.

    This election is also taking place within a wider geopolitical context. China, India and Russia are strongly supportive of the Bangladeshi government, whereas the USA keeps talking about free and fair elections, which puts it on the side of Bangladeshi people.

    At this point, not much is in the hands of Bangladeshi people. Without effective external pressure towards democracy, change is unlikely. Civil society’s work will only become more challenging in Bangladesh as the government steps up its repression. 


    Civic space in Bangladesh is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with Mubashar through hiswebpage and follow@mh23rights on Twitter.

  • EL SALVADOR: ‘The election is only a formality to give the green light to a dictatorship’

    Carolina_Amaya.pngCIVICUS speaks about El Salvador’s general election with Carolina Amaya, a Salvadoran freelance journalist specialising in climate crises and socio-environmental conflicts.

    What’s at stake in this election?

    Eighty years after the end of the Maximiliano Martínez dictatorship, El Salvador is approaching a new dictatorship. On 4 February, once President Nayib Bukele is unconstitutionally re-elected, Salvadorans will lose guarantees for our basic human rights.

    Bukele's first administration was characterised by widespread human rights violations: excessive militarisation, a prolonged state of emergency, stigmatisation and criminalisation of poverty as synonymous with involvement in gangs, attacks on independent press, land dispossession, environmental destruction, persecution of environmental defenders – the list goes on. This reality is disguised by propaganda disseminated by media and content creators aligned with the government. Their narrative is that gangs will be back on the streets if Bukele or his party, Nuevas Ideas, lose power.

    Bukele is seeking re-election after ignoring the Salvadoran constitution, which does not allow it. Therefore, his new administration will be unconstitutional, as will all the decisions he makes. It is to be feared that all the rights enshrined in that same constitution will be violated. And we will no longer know how long Bukele and his circle will remain in power.

    In short, what is at stake in the election is our dying democracy. Salvadoran citizens will get to have their say at the ballot box now, but it is uncertain whether they will be able to do so freely again in the future.

    What are the chances of this election being truly free and fair?

    The election will be free, but completely irregular given that the front-runner’s candidacy is unconstitutional. The process has been flawed from the moment the Supreme Electoral Tribunal allowed the registration of Bukele’s candidacy, despite him being ineligible for re-election.

    As for fairness, there are other parties running on different platforms, but competition is unequal. The ruling party has made use of official funds for its electoral campaign, while the rest had to use their own funds to compete against a lavishly funded apparatus with a strong presence on both social and traditional media. This annihilates any alternative, so the election is only a formality to give the green light to a dictatorship.

    The democracy that was born in 1992 has been eroded over the years. Every political party that has held power has been embroiled in corruption scandals. Corruption, the arrogance of elites, the inefficiency of the state and the lack of transparency have resulted in widespread distrust. Impoverished communities have become strongholds of Bukelism because they depend on government welfare to satisfy immediate needs; it is clear to them that they cannot expect long-term solutions.

    The government has campaigned intensely by handing out food boxes and cutting the ribbon on construction projects, all of which is prohibited by the Electoral Code. But there is no authority that can put a stop to these illegal acts because the entire state structure is co-opted by Bukelism, including the judiciary and watchdog bodies.

    What has the climate of opinion been ahead of the election?

    Social media such as YouTube and TikTok are dominated by disinformation and the manipulation of information, while a campaign of fear has taken hold on television. This is nothing new in El Salvador: political parties have long campaigned on the fear that El Salvador could become another Cuba or Venezuela. Now the threat is focused on insecurity and the preservation of life.

    It is very concerning that this messaging has permeated Salvadoran society to the point of not only normalising Bukele's unconstitutional candidacy but also giving him the certainty of a comfortable win.

    What’s the position of civil society, the political opposition and public opinion regarding the government's security policy?

    Bukele’s government has been authoritarian throughout all these years and in many ways, not just in the area of security. During the pandemic it locked up thousands of people who did not comply with isolation directions. When the quarantine was over, it established the state of emergency that continues to allow it to spy on us, persecute us and lock us up. Bukele has militarised the streets, and this has intensified in January 2024, on the eve of the election. The military has been patrolling every neighbourhood of San Salvador, the capital, to demonstrate its presence and power.

    The public is grateful that the gangs lost much of their grip over the country. That is the main achievement of the Bukele administration. The problem is that most people are unaware of the reality of Bukele’s negotiations with gangs, so they think that he managed to clear the streets of gang members just by subjecting them to his state of emergency.

    The media’s handling of images of imprisoned gang members has been very effective, to the point that it has had international repercussions. In several Latin American countries experiencing the scourge of organised crime, people are calling for an authoritarian figure just like Bukele to put an end to it. Even the president of Honduras, ideologically far removed from Bukele, has opted for militarisation and the use of repression to deal with gangs.

    How has civic space been restricted under Bukele?

    As a journalist, I can attest to the fact that many people shy away from the cameras because they dare not make public statements. Sources that spoke to me for years have increasingly stopped responding to my calls, starting from 2019, when Bukele came to power. The situation has worsened as this administration has progressed. Freedom of expression is increasingly limited, as is freedom of assembly. For example, when marches are called in the capital, police blockades are set up to hold back buses coming from the interior.

    Harassment of dissenting voices is also apparent on social media. Day after day, journalists and human rights defenders are denigrated by armies of trolls. I am among the 10 female journalists most attacked on Twitter. Attacks against us women are often misogynistic in nature.

    Some organisations, such as Acción Ciudadana, the Association of Journalists of El Salvador and Cristosal, continue to denounce the lack of a free environment for the expression of opinions, but their complaints have had little effect. Freedom of expression has continued to erode. And a country without freedom of expression, where human rights are violated and human rights defenders are persecuted, is nothing short of a dictatorship.


    Civic space in El Salvador is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Follow@sharkgirl_sv on Twitter.

  • GABON : « L’espace civique et les conditions des droits humains étaient difficiles sous l’ancien régime »

    GeorgesMpagaCIVICUS échange sur le coup d’État militaire au Gabon avec Georges Mpaga, président exécutif national du Réseau des organisations libres de la société civile du Gabon (ROLBG).

    Au cours des dix dernières années, le ROLBG s’est concentré sur les disparitions forcées, les exécutions extrajudiciaires, la torture et les détentions arbitraires. Il plaide en faveur de l’espace civique au Gabon e l’Afrique centrale et mène des campagnes sur les conditions de détention inhumaines.

    Que pensez-vous des récentes élections au Gabon et du coup d’État militaire qui s’en est suivi ?

    Les élections du 26 août ont été indubitablement frauduleuses, comme l’étaient les précédentes. Le régime du dictateur prédateur Ali Bongo avait interdit les missions d’observation internationales et domestiques ainsi que la présence de la presse internationale. Le ROLBG a été la seule organisation à mettre en œuvre une observation citoyenne à travers le système de tabulation parallèle des votes. Par la volonté despotique de Bongo, l’élection s’est tenue dans des conditions totalement irrégulières, en violation flagrante des normes et standards internationaux en la matière. Les scrutins s’étaient déroulés à huis clos, dans une opacité qui a généré une fraude électorale à grande échelle et des résultats tronqués.

    Le 30 août 2023, l’intervention salutaire des forces de défense et de sécurité a mis un terme à cette forfaiture. Pour moi en tant qu’acteur de la société civile, ce qui vient de se passer au Gabon n’est nullement un coup d’Etat, c’est tout simplement une intervention militaire menée par des patriotes au sein de l’armée, sous le leadership du Général Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, qui a mis fin à une imposture de 56 ans, un système prédateur et un cycle infernal d’élections truquées souvent jalonnées de violations massives des droits humains. C’est notre lecture de la situation et c’est l’avis général de la population gabonaise qui vient d’être libérée d’une dictature et d’une oligarchie criminelle.

    Pour quoi l’intervention militaire s’est-elle produite maintenant, après tant d’années de règne de la famille Bongo ?

    L’intervention militaire du 30 août se justifie comme une réponse à la volonté du clan Bongo et son Parti démocratique gabonais de se maintenir au pouvoir de gré ou de force à travers des élections frauduleuses et la répression policière orchestrée par des forces de défense et de sécurité instrumentalisées et aux ordres de l’ancien président.

    Les forces armées gabonaises sont intervenu pour éviter un bain de sang et remplacer le régime incarné par Bongo : un régime inamovible qui s’est montré impitoyable envers le peuple gabonais, entaché de relations clientélistes, d’affaires louches, de corruption prédatrice et de violations généralisées des droits humains et des libertés fondamentales, le tout sanctionné par des élections frauduleuses.

    En résumé, le coup au Gabon ne s’inscrit pas dans une tendance régionale, mais est le résultat d’un processus purement interne résultant des 56 ans de dictature et son corollaire de violations des droits humains et de destruction du tissu économique et social du pays. Les évènements en cours au Gabon ont évidemment des répercussions dans la région d’Afrique centrale, foyer des plus grandes dictatures d’Afrique.

    Quel est votre point de vue sur les critiques internationales concernant le coup d’État ?

    La société civile a favorablement accueilli l’intervention militaire qui a sonné le glas de plus d’un demi-siècle de forfaiture et de prédation au sommet de l’Etat. Sans cette intervention, nous aurons assisté à une tragédie sans précédent.

    L’armée gabonaise, sous la houlette du Comité pour la transition et la restauration des institutions (CTRI), la junte militaire au pouvoir, a permis au pays d’échapper à un drame aux conséquences incalculables. Vu sous cet angle, les militaires sont des héros à célébrer. Dès sa prise de pouvoir, le Général Oligui s’est employé à fédérer un pays qui était profondément divisé et traumatisé par si longtemps de gestion calamiteuse par la famille Bongo et les intérêts mafieux qui les entouraient.

    L’attitude de la communauté internationale est inacceptable pour la société civile, les défenseurs des droits humains et la population gabonaise, qui ont longtemps payé un lourd tribut. Quand en 2016 Bongo a planifié et exécuté un coup d’état électoral suivi d’atrocités contre les populations civiles qui s’étaient opposées à la mascarade électorale, la communauté internationale s’était tue laissant les populations civiles gabonaises face à leur bourreau. Au regard de ce qui précède, nous rejetons catégoriquement les déclarations de la communauté internationale, singulièrement la Communauté Économique des États de l’Afrique centrale et l’Union Africaine, deux institutions qui encouragent les tripatouillages de constitutions et les présidences à vie en Afrique centrale.

    Quelles étaient les conditions de la société civile sous le régime de la famille Bongo ? Pensez-vous qu’il y ait une chance que la situation s’améliore ?

    L’espace civique et les conditions d’exercice des libertés démocratiques et les droits humains étaient difficiles sous l’ancien régime. Les droits de d’association, de réunion pacifique d’expression étaient bafoués. De nombreux militants de la société civile et défenseurs des droits humains dont moi-même, ont séjourné en prison ou furent privés de leurs droits fondamentaux.

    Maintenant, avec l’arrivée du régime de transition, nous notons un changement fondamental, une approche globalement favorable à la société civile. Les nouvelles autorités travaillent désormais de concert avec toutes les forces vives de la nation y compris la société civile qui a été reçue le 1er septembre par le Général Oligui et ses pairs du CTRI, et votre humble serviteur était le facilitateur de cette rencontre. Le président de transition, qui a prêté serment le 4 septembre, s’est engagé à travailler pour restaurer les institutions de l’Etat et les droits humains et démocratiques et respecter les engagements nationaux et internationaux du Gabon. Le signal fort a été donné le 5 septembre par la libération progressive des prisonniers d’opinion dont le leader de la plus grande confédération syndicale de la fonction publique gabonaise, Jean Remi Yama, après 18 mois de détention arbitraire.


    L’espace civique au Gabon est classé « réprimé » par leCIVICUS Monitor.

    Contactez Georgessur sa pageFacebook et suivez@gmpaga sur Twitter.

    Les opinions exprimées dans cette interview sont celles de la personne interviewée et ne reflètent pas nécessairement celles de CIVICUS.


     

  • GABON : « Sous l’ancien régime la société civile n’était pas prise en compte »

    PepecyOgouliguendeCIVICUS échange sur le coup d’État militaire au Gabon avec Pepecy Ogouliguende, experte en droits humains, gouvernance, genre et médiation de paix et fondatrice et présidente de Malachie.

    Malachie est une organisation de la société civile gabonaise qui lutte contre la pauvreté et promeut le développement durable et l’égalité des sexes. Elle est active dans plusieurs domaines, notamment la protection de la biodiversité, l’aide en cas de catastrophes naturelles, le soutien médical, notamment auprès des personnes vivantes avec le VIH/SIDA, et l’éducation aux droits humains, particulièrement auprès des couches sociales les plus vulnérables.

    Que pensez-vous des récentes élections au Gabon et du coup d’État militaire qui s’en est suivi ?

    Le 30 août 2023 aux environs de 3h du matin la Commission Gabonaise Électorale a annoncé les résultats de l’élection présidentielle qui donnaient le président, Ali Bongo, gagnant. Quelques minutes plus tard, les militaires annonçaient avoir pris le pouvoir. Il est important de souligner qu’il ne s’agit pas d’un coup d’État, mais d’une prise de pouvoir par les militaires. Cela trouve sa justification dans le fait que cela s’est déroulé sans effusion de sang.

    Cette élection était entachée d’irrégularités et l’annonce de ses résultats allaient conduire à des contestations bien que légitimes mais qui se seraient soldées par des violences. Je tiens donc ici à saluer l’acte de bravoure des forces de défense et de sécurité.

    Les militaires ont ensuite dissous l’ensemble des institutions du gouvernement et ont mis en place un Comité de Transition pour la Restauration des Institutions (CTRI).

    Votre organisation a-t-elle pu observer les élections ?

    Non, mon organisation n’a pas pu observer les élections pour la simple raison qu’aucun observateurs internationaux et nationaux n’étaient admis. Cette élection s’est déroulée dans une opacité totale. Comme tous les Gabonais, j’ai effectivement constaté que les déclarations ne correspondaient pas aux résultats des urnes.

    La prise du pouvoir par les forces de défense et de sécurité dans cette circonstance particulière de défiance des populations envers les autorités et de suspicion profonde quant à la vérité des urnes s’apparente plutôt à un sursaut patriotique.

    Pour quoi l’intervention militaire s’est-elle produite maintenant, après tant d’années de règne de la famille Bongo ?

    Nos forces de défense et de sécurité ont au même titre que la population, constaté de nombreuses irrégularités et plusieurs dysfonctionnements de l’appareil étatique ces dernières années. Ils ont donc décidé de mettre fin à ce régime qui ne correspondait plus aux aspirations des Gabonais.

    Les militaires ont profité des élections du 26 août dernier pour mettre fin au système en place en prenant leurs responsabilités pour sauver la nation et l’État de droit. Aussi, le but de cette prise de pouvoir est de « redonner aux gabonais leur dignité ». Comme l’a dit le porte-parole du CTRI, « c’est enfin notre essor vers la félicité ».

    Quel est votre point de vue sur les critiques internationales concernant le coup d’État ?

    La communauté internationale a simplement appliqué les textes sans au préalable analyser le contexte. Le contexte du Gabon est bien particulier.

    La célébration dans les rues des principales villes du pays montre à quel point le régime en place n’était plus désiré, mais seulement toléré. Ces scènes de liesse populaire observées qui contrastent avec la condamnation de la communauté internationale devraient interpeller celle-ci, l’inviter à revoir son approche davantage tournée vers la sauvegarde à tout prix de la stabilité souvent au détriment d’un réel progrès social, du développement ou encore de la croissance économique... bref, du bien-être du plus grand nombre.

    Tous les membres de la communauté internationale qui se sont exprimés ont condamné le « coup d’État » et assuré qu’ils suivaient avec intérêt l’évolution de la situation au Gabon tout en rappelant leur attachement au respect des institutions. Les réactions des organisations internationales ont été très fortes : les Nations unies ont condamné et l’Union Africaine (UA) et la Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique centrale (CEEAC) ont suspendu le Gabon car ce « coup d’État » a été directement assimilé à ceux qui ont précédemment eu lieu dans la région. Les États-Unis se sont quelques peu démarqués en affirmant qu’ils travailleraient avec leurs partenaires et les populations pour soutenir le processus démocratique en cours. C’est en cela que nous attendons le reste de la communauté internationale pour nous aider à œuvrer à la construction d’institutions fortes.

    Nous saluons les États qui ont bien compris la nécessité de ce changement. Nous condamnons les sanctions de l’UA et celles de la CEEAC. La communauté internationale devrait accompagner les États dans le respect des lois et constitutions et veiller au respect de la démocratie et des droits humains.

    Pensez-vous que ce coup d’État s’inscrit dans une tendance régionale ?

    Il faut avant tout rappeler que pour le cas du Gabon, il s’agit d’une prise de pouvoir des militaires et non d’un coup d’État au sens strict du terme. Il est effectivement le résultat d’une mauvaise gouvernance, de la non prise en compte des besoins des populations notamment les besoins sociaux mais aussi d’une soif de changement. Elle peut avoir une connotation régionale en ce sens que la plupart des populations africaines vivent les mêmes difficultés - chômage des jeunes, pauvreté, manque d’accès aux soins de santé - et aspirent à de grands changements. Lorsque la population ne se sent pas prise en compte dans les politiques mises en place elle est frustrée.

    Nous n’excluons pas la possibilité que cela ait un impact chez nos voisins. Il n’est pas trop tard pour que les régimes en place en Afrique centrale saisissent cette occasion pour repenser la manière de servir le peuple.

    Quelles étaient les conditions de la société civile sous le régime de la famille Bongo ? Pensez-vous qu’il y ait une chance que la situation s’améliore ?

    Au Gabon, le fonctionnement des organisations et associations est régie par la loi 35/62 qui garantit la liberté d’association. Cela dit, sous l’ancien régime la société civile n’était pas prise en compte. Elle ne participait que partiellement à gestion de la chose publique.

    Certains leaders notamment syndicaux pouvaient être victimes d’arrestations ou d’intimidations si le régime estimait qu’ils faisaient trop de zèle. Plusieurs leaders dans la société civile gabonaise se levaient pour dénoncer des arrestations arbitraires liées aux opinions et positionnements.

    Au même titre que les Gabonais, la société civile s’est réjouie du changement. La société civile dans son ensemble s’est engagée à prendre activement part aux actions et reformes menées par les autorités au cours de la transition qui iront dans le sens du respect des droits humains, l’équité et la justice sociale, la préservation de la paix ainsi que la promotion de la bonne gouvernance.

    Le CTRI vient d’autoriser la libération de quelques figures de la lutte syndicale au Gabon et de prisonniers d’opinion. Aux vues des premières décisions prises par le CTRI, le meilleur est à venir. Je peux, sans risques de me tromper, dire que le Gabon de demain sera meilleur. Aujourd’hui on perçoit une lueur d’espoir.


    L’espace civique au Gabon est classé « réprimé » par leCIVICUS Monitor.

    Contactez Malachie via sonsite web ou sa pageFacebook.

    Les opinions exprimées dans cette interview sont celles de la personne interviewée et ne reflètent pas nécessairement celles de CIVICUS.

  • GABON: ‘Civic space and the conditions for the exercise of human rights were difficult under the former regime’

    GeorgesMpagaCIVICUS discusses the military coup in Gabon with Georges Mpaga, National Executive President of the Network of Free Civil Society Organisations of Gabon (ROLBG).

    Over the past decade, ROLBG has focused on enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, torture and arbitrary detention. It advocates to improve civic space in Gabon and Central Africa and campaigns on inhumane detention conditions.

    What’s your opinion on Gabon’s recent elections and subsequent military coup?

    The 26 August elections were undoubtedly fraudulent, as were the previous ones. The regime led by predatory dictator Ali Bongo had banned international and domestic observer missions and international media. ROLBG was the only organisation that carried out citizen observation through the parallel vote tabulation system. Because of Bongo’s despotic will, the election was held under totally irregular conditions, in flagrant violation of international norms and standards. The vote count was held behind closed doors, in an opaque context that allowed for large-scale electoral fraud and falsified results.

    On 30 August 2023, the salutary intervention of the defence and security forces put an end to this aberration. For me, as someone from civil society, what has just happened in Gabon is by no means a military coup; it is quite simply a military intervention led by patriots within the army, under the leadership of General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, that put an end to a 56-year imposture, a predatory system and an infernal cycle of rigged elections often punctuated by massive human rights violations. This is our reading of the situation, and it is the general opinion of the Gabonese people, who have just been freed from a criminal dictatorship and oligarchy.

    Why has military intervention taken place now, after so many years of Bongo family rule?

    The military intervention on 30 August was justified as a response to the desire shown by the Bongo clan and its Gabonese Democratic Party to remain in power by will or by force, through fraudulent elections and police repression orchestrated by the defence and security forces, which were instrumentalised and took orders from the former president.

    The Gabonese armed forces intervened to avert a bloodbath and replace the Bongo regime: an unrelenting regime that was ruthless towards the Gabonese people, tainted by clientelist relationships, shady business deals, predatory corruption and widespread violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, all sanctioned by fraudulent elections.

    In this sense, the coup in Gabon is not part of a regional trend, but the result of a purely internal process resulting from 56 years of dictatorship and its corollary of human rights violations and the destruction of the country’s economic and social fabric. However, the events underway in Gabon obviously have repercussions in the Central African region, home to some of the worst of Africa’s dictatorships.

    What’s your perspective on international criticism of the coup?

    Civil society welcomed the military intervention because it sounded the death knell for more than half a century of deceit and predation at the top of the state. Without this intervention, we would have witnessed an unprecedented tragedy.

    The Gabonese army, under the leadership of the Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions (CTRI), the military junta in power, allowed the country to escape a tragedy with incalculable consequences. Seen in this light, the military should be celebrated as heroes. As soon as he took power, General Oligui set about uniting a country that had been deeply divided and traumatised by such a long time of calamitous management by the Bongo family and the mafia interests around them.

    The attitude of the international community is unacceptable to civil society, human rights defenders and the people of Gabon, who have long paid a heavy price. In 2016, when Bongo planned and carried out an electoral coup followed by atrocities against civilians who opposed the electoral masquerade, the international community remained silent, leaving Gabon’s civilians to face their executioner. In view of this, we categorically reject the declarations of the international community, in particular the Economic Community of Central African States and the African Union, two institutions that have encouraged the manipulation of constitutions and presidencies for life in Central Africa.

    What were conditions like for civil society under Bongo family rule? Do you think there is any chance that the situation will now improve?

    Civic space and the conditions for exercising democratic freedoms and human rights were difficult under the former regime. The rights of association, peaceful assembly and expression were flouted. Many civil society activists and human rights defenders, including myself, spent time in prison or were deprived of their fundamental rights.

    With the establishment of the transitional regime, we are now seeing fundamental change towards an approach that is generally favourable to civil society. The new authorities are working in concert with all the nation’s driving forces, including civil society, which was received on 1 September by General Oligui and his CTRI peers, and I was the facilitator of that meeting. The transitional president, who was sworn in on 4 September, took to work to restore state institutions, human rights and democratic freedoms, and to respect Gabon’s national and international commitments. A strong signal was given on 5 September, with the gradual release of prisoners of conscience, including the leader of Gabon’s largest civil service union confederation, Jean Remi Yama, after 18 months of arbitrary detention.


    Civic space in Gabon is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with Georgesthrough hisFacebook page and follow@gmpaga on Twitter.

    The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

  • GABON: ‘Under the old regime civil society was not taken into account’

    PepecyOgouliguendeCIVICUS discusses the military coup in Gabon with Pepecy Ogouliguende, expert in human rights, governance, gender and peace mediation and founder and president of Malachie.

    Malachie is a Gabonese civil society organisation that combats poverty and promotes sustainable development and gender equality. It is active in a areas that include biodiversity protection, aid in the event of natural disasters, medical support, particularly for people living with HIV/AIDS, and human rights education, especially for the most vulnerable groups in society.

    What’s your opinion on Gabon’s recent general election and subsequent military coup?

    At around 3am on 30 August 2023, the Gabonese Electoral Commission announced the results of the presidential election, with incumbent Ali Bongo as the winner. A few minutes later, the military announced they had seized power. It is important to stress that this was not a coup d’état, but a seizure of power by the military. This distinction is justified by the fact that it took place without bloodshed.

    The election was marred by irregularities and the announcement of the results would have led to protests, albeit legitimate, but which would have ended in violence. I would therefore like to salute the bravery of the defence and security forces.

    The military then dissolved all governing institutions and set up a Transition Committee for the Restoration of Institutions (CTRI).

    Was your organisation able to observe the election?

    No, my organisation was unable to observe the election for the simple reason that no international or national observers were admitted. The election was conducted in total secrecy. Like all Gabonese people, I saw that the announced results did not correspond with the results at the ballot box.

    The seizure of power by the defence and security forces in this particular context of public distrust of the authorities and deep suspicion of the election results is rather akin to a patriotic act.

    Why has military intervention taken place now, after so many years of Bongo family rule?

    Our defence and security forces, along with the public, have observed numerous irregularities and dysfunctions in the state apparatus in recent years. They therefore decided to put an end to this regime, which no longer corresponded to the aspirations of the Gabonese people.

    The military saw an opportunity in the 26 August election to end the current system by assuming their responsibilities to save the nation and the rule of law. The aim of this seizure of power is to ‘restore the dignity of the Gabonese people’. As the CTRI spokesperson put it, ‘we are finally on the road to happiness’.

    What’s your perspective on international criticism of the coup?

    The international community simply acted by the book without first analysing the context. Gabon’s is a very special case.

    Celebrations on the streets of Gabon’s main cities showed the extent to which the old regime was no longer wanted, just tolerated. These scenes of popular jubilation, which contrast with the international community’s condemnation, should be a wake-up call to the international community, inviting it to review its approach, which is more focused on safeguarding stability at all costs, often to the detriment of real social progress, development or economic growth – in short, at the expense of the wellbeing of the majority.

    All those in the international community who spoke up condemned the ‘coup d’état’ and assured us that they were following developments in Gabon with interest, while reiterating their attachment to respect for institutions. Reactions from international organisations were very strong: the United Nations condemned the coup and the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) suspended Gabon because they directly associated this ‘coup d’état’ with those that had previously taken place elsewhere in the region.

    The USA has distanced itself somewhat by stating that it will work with its partners and the people to support the democratic process underway. This is where we look to the rest of the international community to help us work towards building strong institutions.

    We salute those states that have clearly understood the need for this change. We condemn AU and ECCAS sanctions. The international community should support states in respecting their laws and constitutions and ensuring that democracy and human rights are respected.

    Do you think this coup is part of a regional trend?

    First and foremost, it should be reminded that in the case of Gabon, this was a military takeover and not a coup d’état in the strict sense of the term. It was in fact the result of bad governance and failure to take account of the needs of the population, particularly social needs, but also of the thirst for change. It can have regional impacts in the sense that most African populations are experiencing the same difficulties – youth unemployment, poverty, lack of access to healthcare – and aspire to major change. When people don’t feel taken into account by policymakers, they become frustrated.

    We don’t rule out the possibility that this will have an impact on our neighbours. It is not too late for the regimes in power in Central Africa to seize this opportunity to rethink the way they serve their people.

    What were conditions like for civil society under Bongo family rule? Do you think there is any chance the situation will now improve?

    In Gabon, the operation of organisations and associations is governed by law 35/62, which guarantees freedom of association. That said, under the old regime civil society was not taken into account. It was only partly involved in the management of public affairs.

    Some leaders, particularly trade union leaders, could be arrested or intimidated if the regime felt they were being overzealous. Several Gabonese civil society leaders denounced arbitrary arrests linked to their opinions and positions.

    Like the Gabonese people, civil society is delighted at the change. Civil society as a whole is committed to taking an active part in the actions and reforms carried out by the authorities during the transition, to promote respect for human rights, equity and social justice, the preservation of peace and good governance.

    The CTRI has just authorised the release of some of Gabon’s leading trade unionists and prisoners of conscience. In view of the first decisions taken by the CTRI, the best is yet to come. I can safely say that the Gabon of tomorrow will be better. Today there is a glimmer of hope.

    Civic space in Gabon is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with Malachie through itswebsite or itsFacebook page.

    The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

  • PANAMA: ‘We’ll have to stay vigilant and resist any attempt to curtail rights and freedoms’

    a-olga_panama.png

    CIVICUS discusses the results of Panama’srecent presidential election with Olga de Obaldía, executive director of the Foundation for the Development of Civic Freedom.

    The Foundation for the Development of Civic Freedom is a civil society organisation working to defend fundamental freedoms, empower citizens for democratic participation and strengthen democracy by promoting transparency and the struggle against corruption.

    Who is José Raúl Mulino, and why did he win the election?

    Mulino won the election in large part due to the popularity and charisma of former President Ricardo Martinelli, and also in part due to the peculiarities of the Panamanian electoral system.

    Martinelli campaigned despite being disqualified from running for or holding public office after being convicted of money laundering in a major corruption scheme involving overpriced road construction. He initially tried to register his wife as his running mate, presumably in order to give her his place if his legal troubles made it impossible for him to run. But he abandoned the plan because the constitution forbids the president appointing close relatives.

    Instead of his wife, he appointed Mulino, his security minister between 2009 and 2014. Martinelli’s conviction became final in February: he was sentenced to more than 10 years in prison and, in order to avoid prison, he sought asylum in the Nicaraguan embassy. The Electoral Court allowed Mulino to take Martinelli’s place. This decision was appealed on the grounds of unconstitutionality, but two days before the election the Supreme Court upheld the Electoral Court’s decision.

    Convicted or not, Martinelli maintained his enormous popularity and, from his embassy confinement, launched a media campaign based on the slogan ‘Mulino is me’, an attempt to transfer his core electoral support, estimated at between 30 and 35 per cent, to Mulino.

    Since Panama elects its president by a simple majority of votes, without a runoff, and there were eight candidates, Mulino won with 34 per cent of the vote.

    This electoral system should be revised to ensure the popular will is respected. However, it’s worth noting that Panamanians were civic-minded and accepted the result peacefully even though most had voted against the president-elect.

    What were Mulino’s campaign promises?

    Among other things, Mulino promised to ‘put money in people’s pockets’ and build infrastructure, notably a train linking the city of David, in the far east of the country, with Panama City. This was justified on the grounds that it would improve transport between the interior and capital and stimulate economic development in remote and neglected regions.

    Another recurring theme in Mulino’s campaign was the need to put an end to what was characterised as ‘judicial persecution’. Martinelli’s party contains many people indicted for corruption during his administration. Several of them have been elected to the Central American Parliament, which grants them immunity from prosecution under a treaty that equates their privileges with those of national deputies.

    During the election campaign, the possibility of ‘closing’ the Darién Gap, the border with Colombia, was also mentioned as a way of stemming the flow of migrants through the jungle. However, the feasibility and impact of this measure are unclear. Previous bans aimed at stopping migration have only encouraged clandestine approaches and exacerbated humanitarian problems. The situation in the Darién is complex and need far-reaching solutions.

    These promises were clearly popular with some parts of the public, but their feasibility and potential consequences should be carefully considered.

    Finally, another promise was to ‘help’ former President Martinelli. It is not yet clear what form this help will take. The president-elect has said his government will follow the rule of law, and his first major test will be to resolve the ex-president’s impasse in the Nicaraguan embassy, from where he continues to try to influence national politics.

    What should the new government do to address the country’s key social and economic challenges?

    The new government will have to make critical decisions in a context of deep economic crisis. One of them is to save the social security system.

    Panama is one of the most unequal countries in the world. Informal labour has reached 55 per cent, with 20,000 jobs not recovered since the pandemic. The social security system is on the verge of bankruptcy: it covers 80 per cent of people, but only 30 per cent pay contributions. The pension system now lacks the funds to meet its future obligations and could collapse.

    Economic problems are compounded by falling investment. Public debt has risen to US$49 billion, with no clear investment in infrastructure or job creation. The state is due to make its first major debt payment in three months, but does not appear to have sufficient funds to meet it.

    The president-elect has announced he will seek to form a government of national unity. It is unclear what form this will take, but it’s clear that given the scale of the problems, a coalition government or some form of cross-sectoral cooperation is the only way forward. According to the president-elect’s statements, business would be his natural ally in finding solutions.

    Under what conditions does civil society operate in Panama, and can changes be expected under the new government?

    As elections approached, our small civil society faced a recurring phenomenon: an exodus towards partisan political activity. While some civil society organisations like ours are professionalised – with a board, administrative staff, a budget and defined structures – most rely on volunteers. Traditionally, a reverse exodus from non-winning political parties towards civil society organisations happens after elections.

    In addition, few organisations focus their work on advocacy for civil and political rights and freedoms and democratic governance. Most focus on poverty alleviation or the provision of social services such as health and education. In these roles, they tend to be partners with the state in the implementation of official programmes. In recent years, however, we have witnessed an increase in activism and the formation of new identity-based groups demanding equal rights, while new youth groups have arisen at the national level as a political and social force largely responsible for the success of national mobilisations against open-pit mining in October and November 2023.

    In the 2024 electoral campaign, while civil society participation remained limited, since there are few organisations dedicated to promoting civic values or fundamental freedoms, we saw several non-partisan initiatives to enable informed voting, and several organisations, including us, joined together in this effort.

    We don’t know what will happen under the new government, but we are concerned about the Martinelli administration’s record of restricting civic space through intimidation of critical organisations and the judicial harassment of activists and journalists. It is unclear what trajectory the Mulino government will follow, but we’ll have to stay vigilant and resist any attempt to curtail fundamental rights and freedoms or restrict civic space.


    Civic space in Panama is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with the Foundation for the Development of Civic Freedom through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow @libertciudadana onInstagram andTwitter.

  • SÉNÉGAL : « La restriction de l’espace civique demeure la plus grande préoccupation de la société civile »

    MalickNdomeCIVICUS échange avec Malick Ndome, conseiller sénior en politique et membre du conseil d’administration au Conseil des organisations non gouvernementales d’appui au développement (CONGAD), sur les récentes élections au Sénégal.

    La CONGAD a été fondée en 1982 par des organisations de la société civile (OSC) travaillant au Sénégal pour coordonner les relations avec l’État et d’autres partenaires. La CONGAD offre des formations pour les OSC, les autorités locales et les médias. Il plaide également en faveur d’une société civile plus forte, capable d’influencer les politiques publiques.

    Quelle est l’importance de la victoire du candidat de l’opposition Bassirou Diomaye Faye lors de la récente élection présidentielle ?

    La victoire de M. Faye au premier tour était difficile à prévoir. Cependant, il est important de reconnaître l’impact de sa sortie de prison, ainsi que celle d’Ousmane Sonko, leader de son parti, les Patriotes du Sénégal (PASTEF), à peine dix jours avant l’élection.

    M. Sonko avait été empêché de se présenter à la suite d’une condamnation controversée pour corruption de la jeunesse et diffamation en 2023. M. Faye a été désigné comme candidat à sa place, mais il a également été envoyé en prison pour avoir critiqué la décision du tribunal dans l’affaire Sonko. Leur libération a notablement galvanisé le soutien des sympathisants et des militants de PASTEF, et plus généralement des jeunes, qui ont apprécié leur message de changement et leur aura anti-corruption. En revanche, il semble que la coalition gouvernementale ait suscité un manque d’enthousiasme notable.

  • SÉNÉGAL : « La situation devient plus tendue au fur et mesure qu’on s’approche des élections de 2024 »

    SadikhNiass IbaSarrCIVICUS échange sur la dégradation de l’espace civique à l’approche des élections sénégalaises de l'année prochaine avec Sadikh Niass, Secrétaire Général de laRencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme(RADDHO), etIba Sarr, Directeur des Programmes de la RADDHO.

    La RADDHO est une organisation de la société civile (OSC) nationale basée à Dakar, Sénégal. Elle travaille pour la protection et la promotion des droits humains au niveau national, régional et international par le biais de la recherche, de l’analyse et du plaidoyer afin de fournir des alertes d’urgence et de prévenir les conflits.

    Quelles sont les conditions pour la société civile au Sénégal ?

    La société civile sénégalaise reste très active mais est confrontée à plusieurs difficultés liées à la restriction de l’espace civique. Elle subit beaucoup d’attaques verbales de la part de certaines lobbies proches du pouvoir qui les considèrent comme des opposants ou faisant la promotion de « contre valeurs » comme l’homosexualité. Elle est aussi confrontée aux restrictions de libertés de manifestations. La société civile travaille dans des conditions difficiles avec peu de moyens financiers et matériels. En effet les organisations de défense des droits humains ne reçoivent aucun soutien financier de l’Etat.

    La situation devient plus tendue au fur et mesure qu’on s’approche des élections de février 2024. Depuis mars 2021, l’opposition la plus radicale et le gouvernement ont tous opté pour la confrontation. Le gouvernement tente d’affaiblir l’opposition en la réduisant au minimum. Il s’attaque particulièrement à l’opposition la plus dynamique, la coalition Yewi Askan Wi (« Libérer le peuple »), dont le principal leader, Ousmane Sonko, est aujourd’hui en détention.

    Toutes les manifestations de l’opposition sont systématiquement interdites. Les manifestations spontanées sont violemment réprimées et se soldent par des arrestations. Le judiciaire est instrumentalisé pour empêcher la candidature du principal opposant au régime, Sonko, et les principaux dirigeants de son parti sont arrêtés.

    Nous avons également assisté ces dernières années à une recrudescence des menaces verbales, physiques et judiciaires envers les journalistes, ce qui constitue un vrai recul du droit à l’information.

    Quels seront les enjeux de l’élection présidentielle de 2024 ?

    Avec la découverte du pétrole et du gaz, le Sénégal devient une destination attrayante pour les investisseurs. La gestion transparente de ces ressources reste un défi dans un contexte marqué par la recrudescence des actes terroristes. Les populations confrontées à la pauvreté voient en cette découverte un moyen d’améliorer leur niveau de vie. Avec la percée de l’opposition lors des élections locales et législatives de 2022 on sent que l’électorat exprime de plus en plus fortement son désir de transparence, de justice et d’amélioration des conditions socio-économiques.

    Le 3 juillet 2023 le président sortant a déclaré qu’il ne participera pas aux prochaines élections. Cette déclaration pourrait constituer une lueur d’espoir d’une élection libre et transparente. Mais le fait que l’État soit tenté d’empêcher certains ténors de l’opposition d’y prendre part constitue un grand risque de voir le pays sombrer dans des turbulences.

    La société civile reste alerte et veille à ce que l’élection de 2024 soit une élection inclusive, libre et transparente. A cet effet elle a beaucoup multiplié des actions en faveur du dialogue entre les acteurs politiques. Également les OSC s’activent à travers plusieurs plateformes pour accompagner les autorités dans l’organisation des élections apaisées par la supervision du processus avant, pendant et après le scrutin.

    Qu’est-ce qui a déclenché les récentes manifestations ? Quelles sont les revendications des manifestants et comment le gouvernement a-t-il réagi ?

    Les récentes manifestations ont été déclenchées par la condamnation de Sonko à deux ans de prison le 1er juin 2023. Ce jour-là, un tribunal s’est prononcé sur l’affaire dite « Sweet Beauty », dans laquelle une jeune femme employée dans un salon de massage accusait Sonko de l’avoir violée et d’avoir proféré des menaces de mort à son encontre. Sonko a été acquitté des menaces de mort, mais les accusations de viol ont été requalifiées en accusations de « corruption de la jeunesse ».

    Est venu se greffer à cette condamnation l’arrestation de Sonko le 31 juillet 2023 et la dissolution de son parti politique, le PASTEF (Patriotes africains du Sénégal pour le travail, l’éthique et la fraternité).

    Les manifestations sont animées par le sentiment que leur leader fait l’objet de persécutions et que les affaires pour lesquelles il a été condamné ne servent qu’à l’empêcher de participer aux prochaines élections. La principale revendication des manifestant est la libération de leur leader et des personnes illégalement détenus.

    Face aux manifestations le gouvernement a opté pour la répression. En effet les autorités considèrent qu’elles font face à des actes de défiance de l’Etat et ont appelé les forces de sécurité à faire usage de la force.

    La répression s’est soldée par la mort de plus de 30 personnes et de plus 600 blessés depuis mars 2021, quand les premières repressions ont commencé. En plus de ces pertes en vies humaines et de blessés on dénombre aujourd’hui plus de 700 personnes arrêtées et croupissent dans les prisons du Sénégal. Nous avons aussi noté l’arrestation de journalistes mais aussi de coupure de signal de chaines de télévisions et de restriction de certaines d’internet.

    Comment la société civile sénégalaise, y compris la RADDHO, travaille-t-elle à la défense des droits humains ?

    La RADDHO travaille au niveau national en aidant les victimes de violations de droits humains, et mène des activités de sensibilisation, d’éducation aux droits humains et de renforcement de capacités.

    La RADDHO collabore avec les mécanismes régionaux et internationaux, notamment la Commission africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples, le Comité Africain des Experts sur les Droits et le Bien-être de l’Enfant, la Cour Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples et le Conseil des Droits de l’Homme des Nations Unies. A cet effet elle mène plusieurs activités de vulgarisations des Instruments juridiques de protection et de promotion des droits humains. En tant que membre observateur de la Commission Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples, elle participe régulièrement aux forums de la société civile lors des sessions de celle-ci. Également la RADDHO coordonne la coalition des OSC pour le suivi et la mise en œuvre des recommandations de l’Examen Périodique Universel des Nations unies pour le Sénégal.

    Quel soutien international la société civile sénégalaise reçoit-elle et de quel soutien supplémentaire aurait-elle besoin ?

    Dans le cadre de leurs missions, les OSC sénégalaise reçoivent des appuis de la part d’institutions internationales telles que l’Union Européenne, les agences de coopération bilatérale des États-Unis et de la Suède, USAID et SIDA, et des organisations et fondations tels qu’Oxfam NOVIB des Pays Bays, le NED des États-Unis, la NID de l’Inde et la Fondation Ford, entre autres. Cependant, du fait que le Sénégal a longtemps été considéré comme un pays stable, l’appui reste insuffisant.

    Compte tenu des restrictions de l’espace civique constatées depuis quelques années et de la crise politique, la société civile a besoin d’être soutenue pour mieux assister les victimes de violations de droits humains, pour contribuer à l’avènement d’une véritable culture des droits humains, et pour travailler à l’élargissement de l’espace civique et le renforcement de l’Etat de droit, de la démocratie et de la bonne gouvernance.


    L’espace civique au Sénégal est classé « entravé » par leCIVICUS Monitor.

    Contactez la RADDHOsur sonsite web ou sa pageFacebook, et suivez@Raddho_Africa sur Twitter.

  • SENEGAL: ‘The restriction of civic space remains civil society’s greatest concern’

    MalickNdomeCIVICUS speaks with Malick Ndome, senior policy adviser and board member at the Council of Non-Governmental Organisations in Support of Development (CONGAD), about the recent election in Senegal.

    CONGAD was founded in 1982 by civil society organisations (CSOs) working in Senegal to coordinate relations with the state and other partners. CONGAD provides training for CSOs, local authorities and the media. It also advocates for a stronger civil society capable of influencing public policy.

    What was the significance of the victory of opposition candidate Bassirou Diomaye Faye in the recent presidential election?

    Faye’s first-round victory was difficult to predict. However, it is important to recognise the impact of his release from prison, as well as that of Ousmane Sonko, the leader of his party, Senegal’s Patriots (PASTEF), just 10 days before the election.

    Sonko had been barred from standing following a controversial conviction for youth corruption and defamation in 2023. Faye was nominated as a candidate in his place, but was also sent to prison for criticising the court’s decision in the Sonko case. Their release galvanised the support of PASTEF supporters and activists, and young people in general, who appreciated their message of change and their anti-corruption aura. In contrast, there seems to have been a noticeable lack of enthusiasm for the government coalition.

    In addition, there was much speculation and a lot of rumours about President Macky Sall’s lack of support for his party’s presidential candidate, which undoubtedly influenced the electoral landscape.

    Given the circumstances, the clear victory of an opposition candidate has profound implications for the strength of Senegalese democracy. First, it signifies a strengthened commitment to the rule of law, guaranteeing every Senegalese citizen a fair chance of access to the highest office. It also demonstrates the resilience of Senegal’s electoral institutions in the face of challenges. Further, despite persistent concerns about voter turnout, Senegalese citizens demonstrated a commendable level of confidence in electoral processes, underlining their commitment to democratic principles. Voter turnout was 61 per cent.

    This provides an opportunity for a comprehensive review of the electoral law and the electoral code, with a focus on correcting the main shortcomings identified by political stakeholders and civil society. It is imperative to review the role and effectiveness of institutions such as the National Autonomous Electoral Commission in overseeing elections, ensuring that it has the resources and capacity to fulfil its mandate impartially and effectively.

    In sum, while Faye’s victory may have been unexpected, it marks a crucial moment in Senegal’s democratic journey, highlighting both strengths and areas for improvement in its political system.

    Was civic space restricted before the election? What challenges did this pose and what can be expected in the future?

    Significant restrictions were observed in February, when Sall’s announcement of the postponement of the election led to violent demonstrations and deaths. The Constitutional Council’s positive response in favour of holding the election helped ease tensions, leading to the lifting of the suspension of TikTok and the restriction of Facebook, which had an impact on digital industries and small-scale workers in the informal sector.

    The restriction of civic space has been strongly criticised by various groups and people. Under the new government, we expect to see restrictions on civic space lifted, but I can’t prejudge that. It remains a strong demand from civil society and the political arena.

    How did civil society contribute to a free and fair election?

    Civil society’s actions were analysed and perceived differently depending on whether you were in the opposition or the presidential camp. There were many citizens’ initiatives to ensure that the electoral timetable was respected and free and transparent elections were held.

    Civil society initiatives included the setting up of digital platforms to facilitate communication and citizen mobilisation. Civil society formed groups to voice citizens’ concerns and influence political decisions. It organised forums to raise awareness and mobilise the population to ensure the electoral timetable was respected and the election was transparent.

    In addition, civil society organised meetings with presidential candidates to ask them questions and hear their proposals. It also helped to inform the public by publishing press articles and sharing information on electoral issues.

    In addition, civil society interacted with stakeholders in sensitive spheres such as religious leaders to promote a climate of peace and stability during the election period. It also facilitated the hosting and coordination of the local, regional and sub-regional structures responsible for overseeing the election, thus ensuring effective and transparent monitoring of the electoral process.

    What are civil society’s expectations of the new government?

    Civil society has a number of expectations and is advocating several policy measures to protect civic space and human rights and promote good governance.

    According to the information available to me, there has not yet been any formal request from civil society. However, it is clear that the restriction of civic space remains civil society’s greatest concern.

    Among the political measures advocated are the passing of a press code to provide a better framework for the exercise of journalism and the publication of implementing decrees, as well as the revision of article 80 of the Constitution concerning offences against the head of state. Civil society is also calling for the adoption of a law to protect whistleblowers and human rights defenders, as well as the publication of reports by the Court of Audit and the prosecution of offenders.

    Civil society calls for institutional change in the governance of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, and for the establishment of a financial prosecutor’s office with broad responsibilities.

    Finally, the fight against corruption and for better governance is a major concern for civil society, which hopes that the new government will take effective measures in this direction.


    Civic space in Senegal is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with CONGAD through itswebsite.

  • SENEGAL: ‘The situation is becoming more tense as we approach the 2024 elections’

    SadikhNiass IbaSarrCIVICUS speaks about the deterioration of civic space in the run-up to next year’s elections in Senegal with Sadikh Niass, Secretary General of the African Meeting for the Defence of Human Rights (Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme,RADDHO), andIba Sarr, Director of Programmes at RADDHO.

    RADDHO is a national civil society organisation (CSO) based in Dakar, Senegal. It works for the protection and promotion of human rights at the national, regional and international levels through research, analysis and advocacy aimed at providing early warning and preventing conflict.

    What are the conditions for civil society in Senegal?

    Senegalese civil society remains very active but faces a number of difficulties linked to the restriction of civic space. It is subjected to many verbal attacks by lobbies close to the government, which consider them to be opponents or promoters of ‘counter-values’ such as homosexuality. It is also confronted with restrictions on freedom of assembly. Civil society works in difficult conditions with few financial and material resources. Human rights organisations receive no financial support from the state.

    The situation is becoming more tense as we approach the February 2024 elections. Since March 2021, the most radical opposition and the government have opted for confrontation. The government is trying to weaken the opposition by reducing it to a minimum. It is particularly targeting the most dynamic opposition group, the Yewi Askan Wi (‘Liberate the People’) coalition, whose main leader, Ousmane Sonko, is currently in detention.

    All opposition demonstrations are systematically banned. Spontaneous demonstrations are violently repressed and result in arrests. The judiciary was instrumentalised to prevent the candidacy of the main opponent to the regime, Sonko, and the main leaders of his party have been arrested.

    In recent years, we have also seen an upsurge in verbal, physical and legal threats against journalists, which is a real setback for the right to freedom of information.

    What will be at stake in the 2024 presidential election?

    With the discovery of oil and gas, Senegal is becoming an attractive destination for investors. Transparent management of these resources remains a challenge in a context marked by an upsurge in terrorist acts. Poverty-stricken populations see this discovery as a means of improving their standard of living. With the breakthrough of the opposition in the 2022 local and legislative elections, we sense that the electorate is increasingly expressing its desire for transparency, justice and improved socio-economic conditions.

    On 3 July 2023, the incumbent president declared that he would not compete in the next elections. This declaration could offer a glimmer of hope for a free and transparent election. But the fact that the state is being tempted to prevent leading opposition figures from running poses a major risk of the country descending into turbulence.

    Civil society remains alert and is working to ensure that the 2024 elections are inclusive, free and transparent. To this end, it has stepped up its efforts to promote dialogue among political players. CSOs are also working through several platforms to support the authorities in organising peaceful elections by monitoring the process before, during and after the poll.

    What triggered the recent demonstrations? What are the protesters’ demands and how has the government responded?

    The recent protests were triggered by Sonko’s sentencing to two years in prison on 1 June 2023. On that day, a court ruled on the so-called ‘Sweet Beauty’ case, in which a young woman working in a massage parlour accused Sonko of raping her and making death threats against her. Sonko was acquitted of the death threats, but the rape charges were reclassified as ‘corruption of youth’.

    This conviction was compounded by Sonko’s arrest on 31 July 2023 and the dissolution of his political party, PASTEF – short for ‘Senegalese African patriots for work, ethics and fraternity’ in French.

    Protesters are driven by the feeling that their leader is being persecuted and that the cases for which he has been convicted only serve to prevent him taking part in the forthcoming elections. Their main demand is the release of their leader and those illegally detained.

    Faced with these demonstrations, the government has opted for repression. The authorities consider that they are facing acts of defiance towards the state and have called on the security forces to use force.

    Repression has resulted in the deaths of more than 30 people and more than 600 injured since March 2021, when the repression first began. In addition to the loss of life and injuries, more than 700 people have been arrested and are languishing in Senegal’s prisons. We have also noted the arrest of journalists, as well as the interruption of television signals and the restriction of some internet services.

    How is Senegalese civil society, including RADDHO, working to defend human rights?

    RADDHO works at the national level to help victims of human rights violations and carries out awareness-raising, human rights education and capacity-building activities.

    RADDHO collaborates with regional and international mechanisms, notably the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Council. To this end, we carry out a number of activities to raise awareness of legal instruments for the protection and promotion of human rights. As an observer member of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, we regularly participate in civil society forums during the Commission’s sessions. RADDHO also coordinates the CSO coalition for the follow-up and implementation of the recommendations of the United Nations Universal Periodic Review for Senegal.

    What international support is Senegalese civil society receiving and what additional support would it need?

    To fulfil their missions, Senegalese CSOs receive support from international institutions such as the European Union, the bilateral cooperation agencies of the USA and Sweden, USAID and SIDA, and organisations and foundations such as Oxfam NOVIB in the Netherlands, NED in the United States, NID in India and the Ford Foundation, among others. However, because Senegal has long been considered a stable country, support remains insufficient.

    Given the growing restrictions on civic space of recent years and the political crisis, civil society needs support to better assist victims of human rights violations, to contribute to the emergence of a genuine human rights culture and to work towards widening civic space and strengthening the rule of law, democracy and good governance.


    Civic space in Senegal is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with RADDHOthrough itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@Raddho_Africa on Twitter.

  • VENEZUELA: ‘The government seeks to stoke nationalist sentiment to try to hold on to power’

    Mariano_de_Alba.pngCIVICUS speaks with Mariano de Alba, Senior Adviser at the International Crisis Group, about the recent referendum called by the Venezuelan government on the status of the Essequibo territory, disputed with neighbouring Guyana, and its possible implications for democracy in Venezuela and peace in the region.

    The International Crisis Group is an independent organisation that works to prevent wars and design policies to build a more peaceful world.

     

    Why did the Venezuelan government decide to submit the Essequibo issue to a referendum?

    The announcement of the referendum came first as a reaction by the Venezuelan government to the recent oil bidding rounds conducted by Guyana in maritime areas that Venezuela considers as pending delimitation. As the referendum was being organised, it became clear that the Venezuelan government was attaching additional value to it as a tool to test its capacity for electoral mobilisation a few months in advance of the presidential election due to take place later this year.

    In addition, by placing the dispute with Guyana on the public agenda, the Venezuelan government seeks to stoke nationalist sentiment in the Venezuelan population, and most particularly among the armed forces, a key group in its strategy to retain power.

    What’s the legal value of the referendum?

    According to jurisprudence by the Supreme Court of Justice, Venezuela’s highest judicial body, consultative referendums, a mechanism established in the Venezuelan constitution, are not binding. This view was publicly ratified by the chief lawyer who was appointed by the government to prepare the referendum questions.

    But for political reasons, since before the referendum and particularly in view of its results, the government has insisted that it does have a binding character in order to justify a series of actions it has announced in relation to the territory in dispute. These, however, have been no more than symbolic announcements, since Venezuelan armed forces have not effectively entered the disputed territory, which has been under Guyanese administration for many, many years.

    How did the opposition react to the referendum, and how will this impact on the 2024 elections?

    There were differences among various opposition groups on how to position themselves in relation to the referendum. First of all, it should be noted that on 17 October, when the government and the opposition met in Barbados to sign an agreement on the conditions to hold elections, they also signed another agreement in which they committed themselves to ‘ratify the historical rights’ of Venezuela and to ‘uphold the full validity of the 1966 Geneva Agreement’, the treaty that reignited the dispute, in which Guyana, Venezuela and the UK agreed to seek a solution to the conflict. As a result, at least part of the opposition leadership found it difficult to oppose the referendum.

    However, María Corina Machado, the main opposition leader, elected as a unity candidate in primaries held in late October 2023, did criticise the referendum, arguing that ‘sovereignty must be exercised, submitted to consultation’. The most important difference within the opposition is that some opposition leaders believe that one should participate in all electoral processes, regardless of the conditions, while others do not. Some voted in the referendum, while others didn’t.

    Ahead of the presidential elections, a key element of the government’s strategy is to foster division among the opposition, so that one part ends up calling for non-participation due to lack of sufficient guarantees and another part decides to participate. In the face of a divided opposition the government has a real chance of winning the election, since under the current electoral system whoever gets the most votes, even if short of 50 per cent, is elected. The election will take place in an authoritarian context in which the conditions for the competition will be poor and there is a high risk of government repression.

    What has been Guyana’s reaction?

    Guyana is focused on seeking a favourable decision at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where in 2018 it filed a lawsuit seeking ratification of the validity of the 1899 arbitral award that gave it the territory it now controls and administers, and which Venezuela ignores, arguing that the award was the product of procedural fraud.

    However, recent tensions complicate the picture for Guyana. First, because, at least on paper, the Venezuelan armed forces have substantially superior capabilities compared to Guyana’s. Hence Guyana’s intention to seek to strengthen its military alliances and obtain guarantees from allied states. Second, the uncertainty resulting from these tensions could affect the remarkable recent economic growth of Guyana, a country with a small population but high income due to the recent discovery and exploitation of oil resources. Already in mid-December 2023, London’s Lloyd’s insurance market rated the Guyanese exclusive economic zone as risky, which could increase the cost of shipping oil from there.

    What are the risks of an escalation into armed conflict?

    The referendum has substantially increased tensions between Guyana and Venezuela. Guyana saw the referendum and the subsequent actions of the Venezuelan government as a threat. But Guyana has also taken advantage of the tensions to try to strengthen its diplomatic and military alliances with states such as the UK and the USA.

    In the short to medium term, the risk of these tensions escalating into armed conflict is low, partly because the international reaction would be so critical of it. Moreover, while the Venezuelan government has announced and gone through with actions such as appointing an authority for the territory in dispute, it has been careful to ensure that the implementation of these actions has remained on Venezuelan territory for the time being.

    But escalation is not out of the question. Tension could lead to a limited confrontation, following which it could become difficult for one or both of the countries to de-escalate.

    From the Venezuelan perspective, escalation is a risky gamble because it could generate greater discontent among the Venezuelan armed forces, which would have to risk their lives, particularly if Guyana receives the support of a key ally such as the USA. Moreover, the Venezuelan government is striving to reintegrate itself into the international community, and initiating a conflict with Guyana would derail those efforts.

    On the Guyanese side, it is uncertain whether military support would actually come in the event of a substantial military conflict. Such a conflict could also make it very risky for some companies operating in Guyana to continue doing business there. Therefore, at least in the short and medium term, barring any surprises, attempts to keep tensions on the public agenda will predominate, but without resulting in any real escalation.

    At the end of the day, both countries, as the neighbours they are, will be obliged to try to negotiate. Even if Guyana obtains a favourable ICJ decision, that will hardly be the end of it, as without Venezuela’s cooperation it will be very difficult to enforce the judgment. Moreover, the maritime area will still be pending delimitation, so sooner or later negotiations will have to take place in any case.

    What is the status of diplomatic negotiations?

    Serious diplomatic efforts have been undertaken by various countries to try to convince both governments of the importance of lowering tensions and avoiding armed conflict. These efforts resulted in an agreement signed in St Vincent and the Grenadines on 14 December. There, it was agreed to de-escalate tensions and hold a new meeting in Brazil before the end of March.

    However, distrust between the two governments remains deep. The visit of a British warship to Guyana in late December, which Venezuela interpreted as a threat to which it responded by conducting military exercises on its territory, did not help a bit.

    The outlook is complicated by the fact that both governments believe they can make political gains out of these tensions, Venezuela for predominantly domestic political reasons, and Guyana first and foremost to strengthen its military alliances, and secondarily because, if it manages the situation well, the ruling party’s prospects could improve ahead of elections in 2025.

    Behind the scenes, diplomatic efforts continue because in the face of the war in Ukraine and the conflict in Gaza, the idea prevails that there is no international space for another armed conflict, and even less so in Latin America and the Caribbean, which for so many years has been a zone of peace, at least as far as inter-state conflicts are concerned.


    Civic space in Venezuela is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with the International Crisis Group through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram accounts, and follow@CrisisGroup and@marianodealba on Twitter.

  • VENEZUELA: ‘With the new NGO law, the government aims to take control of the entire associational fabric’

    RigobertoLoboPuentesCIVICUS speaks with Rigoberto Lobo Puentes, founder of Promotion, Education and Defence of Human Rights (Promoción, Educación y Defensa en Derechos Humanos, PROMEDEHUM), about Venezuela’s NGO bill which, if passed, will further hinder civil society’s work.

    PROMEDEHUM brings together people whose common goal is education about and the promotion and defence of human rights.

    How has civic space in Venezuela changed recently?

    Civic space has experienced tensions for more than a decade. In 2010 the government implemented the Law of National Sovereignty and Self-Determination to restrict access to funding by human rights organisations, citing alleged external threats against the Venezuelan government. This law was only the first step. Starting in 2016, when the ruling party lost control of the National Assembly, the government began to issue emergency decrees granting powers to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to audit any agreement signed with international bodies by organisations or individuals to implement projects in Venezuela. This was part of a strategy to suffocate human rights organisations financially until they were forced to shut down.

    In 2020 the government body that regulates the banking system ordered banks to monitor the financial operations of civil society organisations (CSOs), supposedly to prevent money laundering and terrorism financing. Following criticism from international human rights protection bodies, in 2021 the provisions of the National Office against Organised Crime and Terrorist Financing in relation to CSOs were slightly amended. However, they continue to violate international human rights standards. Among other things, they provided for the creation of a new body in charge of authorising the registration and operation of CSOs and obliged CSOs to provide sensitive information.

    This attack caused fissures in civil society, as many thought that since the focus was on human rights organisations, other CSOs, including humanitarian organisations, were out of harm’s way, even if they also in one way or another defended human rights. Many CSOs said they had no problem with the obligation to register. The situation was very confusing. It was never clear where the registry was or would be, and in each city, organisations were given different information.

    In 2021, the ruling party-controlled National Assembly unanimously approved a national legislative plan that included a Law on International Cooperation, which also established a mandatory registry for CSOs. The aim again was to limit access to funding for CSOs.

    In 2022, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force refuted the idea that all these regulations were needed. Its assessment of Venezuela concluded that there was no evidence the proposed or implemented CSO registries could prevent potential abuses linked to terrorism financing.

    Finally, in January 2024 the National Assembly approved in first reading of the draft Law on Control, Regularisation, Operations and Financing of Non-Governmental and Related Organisations, better known as the NGO law. If passed, this law will allow the government to further restrict the functioning of civil society, as it broadly prohibits ‘political activities’ without clearly defining what this refers to, and could result in the imposition of sanctions or the closure of CSOs deemed to be engaging in ‘political activities’. In the session where the bill was approved, more than 60 CSOs were singled out as enemies and traitors to the homeland.

    The continued threats to and vilification and persecution of CSOs and human rights defenders, and restrictions and attacks on media and journalists, raids on offices and jailing of humanitarian workers, have created a climate of great fear. Many CSOs have lost members, some have closed, and many human rights defenders have migrated for various reasons, including because they have been persecuted or fear persecution in the near future. Some organisations, including media outlets, have adopted self-censorship or changed the nature of their activities to prevent reprisals.

    What impacts would the NGO law have in this context?

    The NGO law seeks to limit citizen participation and human rights advocacy. It would turn the freedom of association into a matter of public order, exposing organisations to surveillance and police control. Organisations that fail to register or disclose their sources of funding could face fines, deregistration and criminal prosecution. They could be criminalised under charges of terrorism, money laundering, destabilisation, conspiracy and foreign interference.

    Although the draft law may appear to target only human rights organisations, its impacts will be much broader, as it aims to take control of the entire associational fabric. All organisational forms, including political parties and education and academic organisations, are potential targets. Victims of human rights violations could lose all legal support. People affected by Venezuela’s humanitarian emergency could lose access to civil society humanitarian programmes, which could be replaced by government programmes with restrictive access conditions.

    In short, the government seeks a tailor-made civil society. It has an interest in the continuity of humanitarian organisations, as they relieve it of a burden and help it maintain an image of openness with the international community. But it wants humanitarian organisations to play a purely welfare role, with no connection to human rights, and to refrain from publishing any information that might project a negative image of Venezuela.

    The government has already made progress in this area. To some extent it already controls the activities of humanitarian organisations and obtains constant information on their activities throughout Venezuela.

    Why has the NGO law been revived after it was put on hold last year?

    The government has moved forward with this law as prospects increase of an election in the near future. The law can be used not just against human rights CSOs. It can be used against any organisational form that is considered a space for critical thought or dissent. This particularly applies to CSOs working on civil and political rights issues, demanding electoral transparency, monitoring campaigns and observing elections.

    From the government’s perspective, civil society jeopardises its prospects of staying in power. Under fair electoral conditions, civil society’s monitoring, documentation and denunciation of human rights violations perpetrated by an already unpopular government could harm its electoral standing. For years the government has sought to subdue, suffocate or nullify CSOs, and this will intensify as it faces the need to ensure its continuity in power.

    The NGO law had been suspended but not forgotten. The government simply waited for the right time to resume its attacks. Recently, there have been accusations against and arrests of members of the military, political parties and journalists in connection with an alleged assassination plot that has been classed as terrorism. This is part of a situation created by the government to justify actions to neutralise those who might become obstacles in the face of an election. In this context, the possibility of the NGO law being passed should not be ruled out.

    How have civil society and the public reacted to these attacks?

    Despite the seriousness of the law, there is a lot of misinformation and a high level of ignorance among Venezuelan citizens. Even some CSOs are unaware of its existence or its importance.

    However, civil society has issued numerous criticisms. Between 2022 and 2024, national and international CSOs have published at least 15 statements and analyses of the NGO law and the law on international cooperation. Numerous forums, talks and awareness campaigns have been held, inside and outside Venezuela.

    Many organisations and human rights defenders have participated in interactive sessions at the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council and in side events at the UN, the Organization of American States and the Summit of the Americas, and have submitted reports to human rights bodies. As a result of this advocacy, between 2021 and 2023, 11 statements and reports about these laws were published by international bodies.

    Those of us outside Venezuela have also advocated with the governments of our host countries. In Argentina, where I am at the moment, politicians and civil society have publicly condemned the NGO law.

    The Venezuelan government doubled down and on 12 January launched a public consultation on the law, without making the official text of the draft law public or inviting human rights CSOs to participate. According to the information that has come to light, most of the participants in the consultation have been state officials, including police officers. From what we have been able to observe in consultation events, which take place relatively spontaneously in various places and without an established format, and in the discussions on the issue in the National Assembly, the prevailing discourse has delegitimised CSOs, which are referred to as enemies of the state.

    What guarantees does Venezuelan civil society need to keep doing its work?

    To continue our advocacy work in defence of civic space we need more international organisations and people to come on board to help report on the deteriorating situation. CSOs need access to more accurate and reliable information to help build alliances more quickly and effectively.

    Venezuelan CSOs continue to work to communicate any changes that occur and to raise the alarm when attacks on rights take place. We continue to advocate with other states, especially when there are changes of government that could affect international policies of states. One imminent risk is of the non-renewal of the mandate of the International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela, established by the UN Human Rights Council in 2019. This would be a serious blow to Venezuelan civil society.

    Venezuelan organisations should also evaluate and rethink strategies in terms of the impact of the information we produce. We should better showcase the strengths of the Venezuelan human rights movement. Perhaps proactive transparency, to the extent that it does not put organisations and their members at greater risk, could serve to influence both the international community and the public. It is crucial that people in Venezuela understand the dimensions of the losses that the deterioration of civic space and the extinction of CSOs pose to our country.


    Civic space in Venezuela is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with PROMEDEHUM through itswebsite orFacebook account, and follow it onInstagram and Twitter.

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