justice

BANGLADESH: ‘The legal vulnerability of LGBTQI+ people leads to harassment and discrimination’
CIVICUS speaks about the state of civic space and the rights of excluded groups in Bangladesh with Shahanur Islam, founder secretary general of JusticeMakers Bangladesh (JMBD) and founder president of JMBD in France.

JMBD isa human rights organisation working against all forms of discrimination and impunity for violence against ethnic, religious, social and sexual minorities and victims of torture, extrajudicial killings, forced disappearance and organised violence, including women and children. It provides legal support to victims and advocates for justice and human rights through research, awareness-raising campaigns and collaboration with various stakeholders,including other civil society groups, government agencies and international organisations.
Bangladesh: No accountability for killing of Mushtaq Ahmed 100 days on

🇧🇩#Bangladesh: Over 100 days since dissident writer, Mushtaq Ahmed, was killed in prison. The facts:
🟠Nobody brought to justice
🟠Mushtaq in prison for criticising govt's #COVID19 response
🟠Digital Security Act used to stifle dissent
📝Our statement https://t.co/Su7nkEhngp pic.twitter.com/jJSv5fIDyR
— CIVICUS (@CIVICUSalliance) June 5, 2021

100 days on since the death in custody of writer and critic Mushtaq Ahmed, no one has been held accountable for his killing. Global civil society alliance CIVICUS calls on the Bangladesh authorities to immediately establish an independent investigation into his death and to bring the perpetrators to justice.
Brazil: Ensure justice for Bruno Pereira and Dom Phillips and act to protect Indigenous rights defenders
Portuguese

Authorities in Brazil must thoroughly investigate the brutal murders of Indigenous expert Bruno Pereira and journalist Dom Phillips in the Javari Valley (Amazonas state) and act to protect Indigenous territories and defenders, global civil society alliance, CIVICUS said today.

Pereira and Phillips went missing on 5th June as they returned from a reporting trip on the Itaquaí River, in the northern Amazonas state. The response of the Brazilian authorities to their disappearance was slow, and initial search efforts were largely led by Indigenous defenders of the União dos Povos Indígenas do Vale do Javari (UNIJAVA). Late last week, authorities confirmed that Pereira and Phillips’ bodies were found after a suspect confessed his involvement in the crime. The pair were ambushed by members of an illegal fishing operation in protected areas of the Javari Valley, which Phillips had reportedly photographed a day earlier.

These devastating killings are not an isolated event as Brazil is one of the most dangerous countries for land and environmental defenders. At least 20 environmental defenders were killed in 2020, according to Global Witness. These attacks reflect the Bolsonaro government neglect toward Indigenous territories and his administration’s active effort to dismantle Brazil’s environmental governance institutions. Shortly before his killing, Pereira had spoken to a journalist about Bolsonaro’s efforts to undermine Brazil’s Indigenous affairs agency (FUNAI), of which he had taken unpaid leave after being sidelined for leading a successful operation against illegal mining inside Yanomami territory. Maxciel dos Santos, another Indigenous protection agent, was shot and killed in the Amazonas state in September 2019. The murder remains unsolved three years on.

Bruno Pereira was a civil servant who formerly headed the effort to protect Indigenous peoples who live in voluntary isolation. He had recently been working directly with Indigenous peoples of the Javari Valley on the protection of their territories through UNIVAJA. Dom Phillips was a British journalist who lived in Brazil for over a decade, and whose reporting increasingly focused on the Amazon rainforest and environmental issues. He was conducting interviews and research for a book about the rainforest’s protection.

We stand in solidarity with Indigenous rights defenders and the families of Pereira and Phillips as they demand justice. Today, environmental groups, Indigenous organisations and civil servants have scheduled protests in front of FUNAI buildings. CIVICUS joins their calls for a thorough investigation to hold all perpetrators accountable. Inquiries must also be made into the role of the Brazilian State in allowing criminal networks to operate with impunity, enabling attacks on Indigenous territories and human rights defenders. We call on the international community to express their support for environmental and Indigenous rights defenders in Brazil, and the journalists’ whose important work shines a light on the risks they face.

The CIVICUS Monitor, an online platform that tracks threats to civil society in countries across the globe, rates civic space – the space for civil society – in Brazil as obstructed.

Background

In his electoral campaign, President Jair Bolsonaro vowed to “end all activism in Brazil.” Since he took office in 2019, Indigenous communities and environmental and land rights defenders have become increasingly vulnerable to attacks, as the government emboldens criminal groups that engage in illegal logging, mining, land grabbing and other activities. Other widely documented attacks include public vilification of CSOs, criminalisation of activists and attempts to monitor critics and discredit the media.
BURKINA FASO : ‘Pour une grande partie de la société civile, la sécurité est une préoccupation plus urgente que la démocratie’
CIVICUS échange sur lecoup d’État militaire récent au Burkina Faso avec Kop’ep Dabugat, coordinateur du Réseau de Solidarité pour la Démocratie en Afrique de l’Ouest (WADEMOS).

WADEMOS est une coalition d’organisations de la société civile (OSC) d’Afrique de l’Ouest qui mobilise la société civile afin de défendre la démocratie et de promouvoir des normes démocratiques dans la région.

Qu’est-ce qui a conduit aucoup d’État récent au Burkina Faso, et que faut-il faire pour que la démocratie soit restaurée ?

Le capitaine Ibrahim Traoré,actuel chef de la junte militaire au pouvoir au Burkina Faso, a invoqué la dégradation continue de la situation sécuritaire pour justifier la prise de pouvoir par les militaires, tout comme l'avait fait son prédécesseur, le lieutenant-colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba. Or il semblerait que les attaques de groupes armés ont fortement augmenté dans les mois qui ont suivile premier coup d’État mené par Damiba, en janvier 2022. Les analystes affirment que le Burkina Faso constitue le nouvel épicentre du conflit au Sahel. Depuis 2015, les violences perpétrées par des insurgés djihadistes liés à Al-Qaïda et à l’État islamique ont entraîné la mort de milliers de personnes et déplacé deux millions d’autres.

Le coup d’État a également révélé la présence d’un schisme au sein de la junte dirigée par Damiba. Le nouveau coup a été orchestré en partie par les mêmes officiers militaires qui avaient participé au coup d’État pour porter Damiba à la tête de l’État. Désormais, ces officiers affirment queDamiba n’a pas cherché à réorganiser l’armée pour mieux faire face aux menaces sécuritaires comme ils s’y attendaient. Au lieu de cela, il est resté fidèle à la structure militaire qui a conduit à la chute du gouvernement du président Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, et a commencé à révéler des ambitions politiques.

La question de la sécurité reste le premier défi à relever pour faire du Burkina Faso un État démocratique. La fonction principale d’un Etat, et plus encore d’un Etat démocratique, est de garantir la sécurité de ses citoyens. Une armée burkinabè unie sera nécessaire pour atteindre cet objectif.

Il reste aussi à mener à bien l’actuel programme de transition accepté par la nouvelle junte, qui vise à mettre en place un régime civil d’ici juillet 2024.

Au-delà de la transition, la nécessité de construire un État et des institutions politiques solides doit être soulignée. Il convient de s’attaquer sérieusement aux problèmes de corruption et de marginalisation économique. La nécessité de renforcer les institutions n’est pas propre au Burkina Faso : elle est essentielle pour toute la région, et en particulier pour les pays qui ont récemment été soumis à un régime militaire, notammentla Guinée etle Mali.

Quelle a été la réaction de la société civile face à ce dernier coup d’État militaire ?

À l’image de la désunion qui caractérise la société civile au Burkina Faso, la réaction de la société civile au coup d’État a été mitigée. Mais une partie notable de la société civile a semblé accueillir favorablement le dernier coup d’État parce qu’elle considérait la junte dirigée parDamiba non seulement comme autoritaire mais aussi comme s'alignant avec les politiciens du régime du président au pouvoir de 1987 à 2014, Blaise Compaoré. Ils craignaient ainsi que ces politiciens reprennent le pouvoir et ferment toutes les portes à la justice pour les victimes du régime Compaoré, ce qui constituait bien entendu un scénario plausible.

Par conséquent, ce dernier coup d'État n'est en aucun cas perçu unanimement par la société civile comme constituant un pas en arrière pour l’agenda de la transition démocratique. De plus, pour une grande partie de la société civile, la sécurité semble être une préoccupation plus urgente et prioritaire que la démocratie, de sorte que l’élément qui a prévalu est l’incapacité apparente de la junte dirigée par Damiba à faire face à la situation sécuritaire.

L’effort des groupes traditionnels et religieux qui ont négocié un accord à sept conditions entre les factions militaires de Damiba et de Traoré, mettant fin à la violence et prévenant le carnage, mérite toutefois d’être salué. Cet effort semble avoir créé une base pour l'engagement constructif entre la junte dirigée par Traoré et la société civile, qui s'est poursuivi avec la participation notable de la société civile à la Conférence nationale du 14 octobre 2022. Celle-ci a approuvé une nouvelle Charte de transition pour le Burkina Faso et a officiellement nommé Traoré comme président de transition.

Quelle est la situation des OSC de défense des droits humains ?

Les OSC burkinabè actives dans le domaine des droits humains et civils sont de plus en plus préoccupées par les représailles contre les politiciens et les civils perçus comme étant pro-français, ainsi que par la recrudescence marquée des groupes pro-russes qui demandent que la France et tous ses intérêts soient chassés du pays.

De plus, les OSC de défense des droits humains et des droits civils s'inquiètent de la stigmatisation et des représailles contre la communité peule, ce qui vient s'ajouter aux préoccupations concernant l’insurrection djihadiste qui sévit dans le pays. Cette stigmatisation découle du fait que de nombreux groupes terroristes recrutent des combattants burkinabés d’origine peule. Des arrestations arbitraires et des exécutions extrajudiciaires de Peuls en raison de présomptions sur leur complicité dans des actes de violence terroriste ont été signalées. En dehors de ceux-là, aucun autre cas notable de violation des droits humains menaçant les civils n’a été identifié. Par conséquent, même si on n'est qu'au début du mandat de Traoré, on peut du moins déjà affirmer qu'il ne s'agit pas d'une situation d’augmentation des violations systématiques des droits humains.

Comment la Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO) a-t-elle réagi au coup d’État militaire ?

Conformément à son Protocole additionnel de 2001 sur la démocratie et la bonne gouvernance, la réponse initiale de la CEDEAO a été de condamner fermement et sans réserve le coup d’État, le trouvant inopportun à un moment où des progrès avaient été réalisés par la junte dirigée par Damiba pour préparer le terrain aux élections et à la démocratie. La CEDEAO a également demandé à la junte de garantir les droits humains et d’assurer la stabilité.

Malgré les sanctions en cours contre le pays, à la suite de sa rencontre avec M. Traoré, Mahamadou Issoufou, ancien président du Niger et médiateur envoyé au Burkina Faso par la CEDEAO, s’est déclaré satisfait et a déclaré que la CEDEAO resterait aux côtés du peuple burkinabé. La CEDEAO, comme elle a tendance à le faire, travaillera en étroite collaboration avec la junte militaire pour rétablir l’ordre démocratique. Le calendrier est maintenu et l’échéance reste juillet 2024.

Comment les autres institutions internationales ont-elles réagi, et que devraient-elles faire pour soutenir la société civile au Burkina Faso ?

Les autres institutions internationales ont réagi de la même manière que la CEDEAO. L’Union africaine a condamné le coup d’Etat, le considérant un pas en arrière suite aux progrès déjà réalisés vers la restauration de la démocratie. Le coup d’Etat a également été condamné par les Nations Unies et le Parlement européen.

Si la communauté internationale veut aider les OSC au Burkina Faso, elle doit avant tout soutenir les efforts de la junte pour éradiquer l’insurrection djihadiste qui continue de sévir dans le pays. Elle doit également aider les autorités à faire face non seulement à la crise actuelle des réfugiés, accentuée par les défis liés au changement climatique, mais aussi justement à la crise climatique qui contribue à la propagation de la violence terroriste.

La communauté internationale doit également continuer à faire pression sur la junte pour qu’elle tienne son engagement et qu'elle adhère aux accords conclus par l’ancienne junte avec la CEDEAO, afin de mettre fin à la répression des personnes en raison de leur appartenance politique et ethnique et de libérer toute personne emprisonnée pour des motifs politiques.

L’espace civique au Burkina Faso est classé « obstrué » par leCIVICUS Monitor.

Entrez en contact avec WADEMOS via sonsite web ou sa pageFacebook, et suivez@WADEMOSnetwork sur Twitter.
BURKINA FASO: ‘For a major segment of civil society security is a more urgent concern than democracy’
CIVICUS speaks about therecent military coup in Burkina Faso with Kop'ep Dabugat, Network Coordinator of the West Africa Democracy Solidarity Network (WADEMOS).

WADEMOS is a coalition of West African civil society organisations (CSOs) that mobilises civil society around the defence of democracy and the promotion of democratic norms in the region.

What led to the recent coup in Burkina Faso, and what needs to be done for democracy to be restored?

The current head of Burkina Faso’s ruling junta, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, cited persistent insecurity as a reason for the military takeover – as did his predecessor, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba. Attacks by armed groups are said to have greatly increased in the months following the first coup led by Damiba, in January 2022. According to analysts, Burkina Faso is the new epicentre of conflict in the Sahel. Since 2015, jihadist violence by insurgents with links to al-Qaeda and Islamic State has resulted in the death of thousands of people and displaced a further two million.

The coup also revealed the presence of a schism in the Damiba-led junta. It was orchestrated by military officers who were part of the coup that installed Damiba as head of state, but who now claimed that Damiba did not focus on reorganising the army to better face security threats, as they had expected. Instead, he stuck with the military structure that led to the fall of the government under President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, and began to display political ambitions.

The security question remains the first challenge that needs to be addressed to make Burkina Faso a democratic state. The foremost role of a state, and more so of a democratic one, is to guarantee the safety of its citizens. A united Burkina Faso army will be necessary to achieve this.

The other thing that must be done is to see through the existing transition programme for the country to return to civilian rule by July 2024, to which the new junta has agreed.

Beyond the transition, the need to build a strong state and political institutions cannot be overemphasised. The challenges of corruption and economic marginalisation should be tackled in earnest. The need for stronger institutions is not peculiar to Burkina Faso: it is familiar to all the region, and particularly to those countries that have recently come under military rule, notably Guinea and Mali.

What was civil society’s reaction to the recent military coup?

In line with the disunity that characterises civil society in Burkina Faso, the civil society response to the coup has been mixed. But a notable section of civil society seemed to welcome the most recent coup because they saw the Damiba-led junta not only as authoritarian but also as aligned with politicians from the regime of President Blaise Compaoré, in power from 1987 to 2014. They saw the real possibility that those politicians could regain power and shut all doors on victims of the Compaoré regime ever seeing justice.

As a result, the view of the recent coup as a significant setback for the democratic transition agenda is not unanimously held among civil society. Additionally, for a major segment of civil society security appears to be a more urgent and priority concern than democracy, so the element that prevailed was the seeming incapacity of the Damiba-led junta to address the security situation.

The effort of the traditional and religious groups that negotiated a seven-point agreement between the Damiba and Traoré factions of the military, ending violence and forestalling further bloodshed, however, deserves commendation. That effort seems to have established a baseline of engagement between the Traoré-led junta and civil society. Such constructive engagement with the new government seems to have continued, with the notable participation of civil society in the 14 October 2022 National Conference that approved a new Transitional Charter for Burkina Faso and officially appointed Traoré as transitional president.

What is the situation of human right CSOs?

Burkinabe CSOs in the human and civil rights space have grown increasingly concerned about the victimisation of politicians and members of the public perceived to be pro-France as well as by the marked upsurge of pro-Russian groups demanding that France and all its interests be kicked out of the country.

On top of their concern about the raging jihadist insurgency, human and civil rights CSOs are also concerned about the stigmatisation and victimisation of citizens of Fulani ethnicity. This victimisation stems from the fact that many terrorist cells recruit Burkinabe people of Fulani extraction. There have been reports of arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings of Fulani people due to their alleged complicity in terrorist violence. Besides these two, no other notable cases of human rights abuses threatening civilians have been identified besides the ones already mentioned. Hence, even though it is still early in the Traoré-led government, it may be safe to rule out any consistent pattern of heightened human rights abuses under its watch.

How has the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) responded to the military coup?

In accordance with the letter of its 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, the initial response of ECOWAS was to condemn the coup strongly and unequivocally, calling it an unfortunate and retrogressive development, especially in light of the progress made with the Damiba-led junta in preparing the ground for elections and democracy. ECOWAS also called for the junta to guarantee human rights and ensure stability.

Despite the ongoing sanctions against the country, following his meeting with Traoré, Mahamadou Issoufou, the former president of Niger and mediator sent to Burkina Faso by ECOWAS, said he was satisfied and that ECOWAS would remain by the side of the people of Burkina Faso. In what is the ECOWAS way to respond to military governments, ECOWAS will work closely with the junta to restore democratic order. The timeline stands and the deadline remains July 2024.

How have other international institutions reacted, and what should they do to support civil society in Burkina Faso?

Other international institutions have reacted similarly to ECOWAS. The African Union condemned the coup and said it was unfortunate in light of the progress already made towards the restoration of democracy. The coup was similarly condemned by the United Nations and the European Parliament.

If the international community wants to assist CSOs in Burkina Faso, what it first and foremost needs to do is support the junta’s efforts to stamp out the jihadist insurgency that continues to hold the country hostage. It should also assist the authorities in tackling not only the current refugee crisis but also the challenge of climate change, which is a contributing factor not just to the refugee crisis but also to the spread of terrorist violence.

The international community must also continue to mount pressure on the junta to deliver on its promise to adhere to the agreements the former junta reached with ECOWAS, to put an end to the victimisation of people on account of their political affiliations and ethnicity, and to set free anyone who has been imprisoned for political reasons.

Civic space inBurkina Faso is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch withWADEMOS through itswebsite or its Facebook page, and follow @WADEMOSnetwork on Twitter.
CIVICUS calls for Restoration of Democracy and Justice in Guinea

08 October 2009, Johannesburg, South Africa

CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation expresses deepest condemnation at the killing of at least 157 protestors and the wounding of over a thousand people during a military crackdown upon a large scale public protest in Guinea on 28 September. The protest was sparked by indications given by the leader of the military regime, Captain Moussa "Dadis" Camara that he may stand for the national presidential election scheduled in January 2010, reneging on a previous promise not to contest the election. A number of female protestors were raped and sexually assaulted with guns by soldiers in the streets of the capital city, Conakry in what clearly are repugnant criminal acts against citizens exercising their right of democratic dissent.

Guinea has a long history of military dictatorships. The present military regime headed by Captain Camara seized power in a coup in December 2008 following the death of President Lasana Conté who controlled Guinea from 1984-2008 by means of another military dictatorship. Although, the regime has promised to hold elections, no indications of any substantive commitment to a free and fair democratic process have emerged, as evidenced by indications given by Captain Camara to stand for elections while being in control of all state institutions.

"As a condition precedent to the restoration of democracy in the country, it is essential that an independent, impartial investigation by international experts is conducted into the tragic events of 28 September and those responsible are brought to justice," said Ingrid Srinath, Secretary General of CIVICUS. "For there to be a peaceful transition, the military in Guinea must commit itself to not interfering with or contesting future elections. If the situation is left unaddressed, it could have grave geo-political implications for the politically fragile West African region which has a history of civil war and conflict fuelled by military regimes."

Civil society members, journalists and political activists were severely harassed following the 28 September massacre. The present climate of fear and insecurity in the country has seriously affected exercise of the freedoms of expression and assembly, raising concerns amongst civil society about the sincerity of the regime's commitment to ushering in democratic rule.

CIVICUS supports the collective demands of NGOs, trade unions and political groups which include release of all persons detained during and after the demonstrations including a number of women who have been sexually assaulted; return of bodies of slain civilians to their families; fair and adequate compensation to victims and prosecution of the offenders; the establishment of an international commission of inquiry to investigate the events; measures to protect civil society members, the independent media and opposition political activists; and complete restructuring of the security apparatus to enable respect for Guinea's commitments to its people under domestic and international human rights and humanitarian law.

CIVICUS calls upon the United Nations, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States and other members of the international community involved in deliberations with the military regime to take into account the demands of civil society and the aspirations of the people of Guinea. In crafting a solution to the current crisis, political considerations must not be allowed to subsume the course of justice for the victims.

CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation is a global movement of civil society with members and partners in over a hundred countries. The Civil Society Watch (CSW) programme of CIVICUS tracks threats to civil society freedoms of expression, association and assembly across the world. In 2008, CSW tracked threats in 61 countries across the globe.

For more information visit: www.civicus.org or contact Jessica Hume (), Communications Officer or Mandeep S.Tiwana (),

Civil Society Watch Programme Officer

Tel: +27- 11 -833 5959 mob: +27 714698121
CIVICUS: #WhyWeMarch
On Saturday, 21 January 2017, millions will gather in Washington D.C. and in hundreds of other cities around the world to take part in the Women’s March. CIVICUS stands in solidarity with the demonstrators who in the spirit of democracy, seek to honour the champions of human rights, dignity, and justice, and reject the sexist and bigoted rhetoric used during the US election against minorities and excluded groups.

Globally, the sister marches carry a message of solidarity in celebration of our multiple, diverse and intersecting identities and reject all forms of patriarchy and the discriminatory systems that support them worldwide. We will not rest until women have parity and equity at all levels of leadership in society.
COP27: ‘Climate justice requires debt cancellation, reparations and non-debt climate finance for small island developing states’
CIVICUS speaks with Bahraini social entrepreneur Tariq Al-Olaimy about the upcoming COP27 summit on climate change.

Tariq is Managing Director of 3BL Associates, an ecosystem of social and planetary enterprises working towards regenerative, inclusive and wellbeing-centred economies.

What was the purpose of the Greenpeace United for Climate Justice ship tour you recently took part in?

Greenpeace is sailing throughout Egypt together with climate leaders from the Middle East and North Africa to put climate justice high on the agenda in the lead-up to COP27, which will take place in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. The ship tour is a platform for climate leaders living in some of the world’s most affected regions to promote systemic change around climate adaptation, justice, access to energy and response to the loss and damage associated with the disproportionate impacts of the climate crisis. They are representing the voices of people from across the region, focusing on both climate impacts and the many solutions already at hand.

It's important to spread these leaders’ messages around the world and to make sure their voices are not forgotten during COP27, especially in highlighting the need for climate justice for the global south. For these leaders, this is a collective fight for justice for their countries and communities.

Young people from the across the global south in particular are among the most affected and most marginalised, but also among the most powerful voices. They are not victims, but collectives of solidarity and hope working for a brighter future for all.

What issues should be prioritised at COP27?

COP27 must raise the call of climate justice for the most vulnerable, and also the least responsible for climate change: the people in Africa, in the South-west Asia and North Africa region, and on small islands, among others.

I am from Bahrain, which makes me one of 65 million people who live in small island developing states, representing roughly one per cent of the world’s population. Climate justice, mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage strategies require consistent and regular resources. Small islands typically lack those resources and, being particularly vulnerable to extreme climate events, often face reconstruction costs that lead to more borrowing and debt, which in turn increases their vulnerability.

All small island states together only received US$1.5 billion in climate finance between 2016 and 2020. In the same period, 22 small island developing states paid more than US$26 billion to their external creditors – almost 18 times as much. Climate justice requires debt cancellation, reparations and non-debt climate finance for small island developing states.

COP 27 is framed as an ‘implementation COP’, and the climate finance gap and unequal distribution of finance between countries are critical barriers to implementation.

Are you hopeful meaningful commitments will be made at COP27?

The window of opportunity to act is closing. The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s6th Assessment Report offers an even clearer picture of the remaining carbon budget available to stay within a 1.5°C temperature rise and therefore avoid the worst impacts of climate change. While enhanced mitigation ambition is critical, the urgency of implementation is a key concern. Taking into account the pledges fully implemented as of 31 December 2021, total greenhouse gas emission levels are still projected to be 10 per cent higher than 2012 levels.

To truly scale mitigation ambition, it is important that governments don’t just negotiate the text and numbers of pledges but negotiate the very system within which we implement climate action. We need degrowth of the most ecologically harmful sectors of our economy, a global and just transition and transformation towards a post-growth economy.

In a context characterised by short-term political calculations we are completely missing the need for urgent and radical change. I do not expect COP27 to address all this. But there are still some issues that could be meaningfully advanced – in particular, the establishment of the basis for the operationalisation of a Loss and Damage Finance Facility, the details of which could be finalised at COP28 next year.

This is an issue of climate justice towards the many countries in the global south that are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change yet have done little to contribute to the crisis. At the same time, these countries do not have the financial or technological capacity to address these impacts, adapt and pursue a post-extractivist and low-carbon transition. Loss and damage financing can force a rethink around financial commitments and contributions, and pressure for both debt and tax reform as well as renewed financial commitments for mitigation and adaptation.

How concerned are you about the conditions for civil society participation at a COP held in a country with highly restricted civil space?

Civil society participation is always a critical concern at COPs. It’s clear that we can’t have a green and peaceful future without justice, equity, civil rights and empowered communities. That includes the full inclusion of independent civil society as a key stakeholder in climate negotiations. This is why business and civil society organisations have stressed the crucial importance of a rights-based approach to climate action.

As the world transitions toward net zero, protecting the human rights of civil society, workers and communities is key to achieving a just transition. There is significant danger of pledges being made to close the emissions gap while irresponsible implementation strips the rights of civil society. Green transitions in rich countries and ‘green growth’ require significant mineral resources, supplied from the global south, so there is a risk of a neo-colonial mineral rush and a regression of labour rights. It is essential to develop norms, standards and safeguards so that the transition strategies implemented by governments and businesses comply with international human rights and labour standards.

In the context of the COP, this starts with the United Nations taking a much stronger stance regarding the enabling of safe, inclusive and meaningful civil society participation throughout the negotiation process. The COP agenda is largely dominated by global north governments and interests, and civil society perspectives, especially those from the global south, need to find their way into the mix, bringing forward alternative pathways, experience and knowledge.

Get in touch with the 3BL Associates through itswebsite and follow@tariqal on Twitter.
DRC: ‘Civil society action is needed more than ever, but the space in which it can undertake it is getting smaller’
CIVICUS speaks with Bahati Rubango, country coordinator at the Women’s International Peace Centre (WIPC), about conflict in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

WIPC is a feminist organisation seeking to catalyse women’s leadership, amplify their voices and deepen their role in peacebuilding. It started out in 1974 as Isis-Women’s International Cross-Cultural Exchange, and in 1994 it moved from Geneva to Uganda and deepened its focus on the women, peace and security agenda.

What’s the security situation in the DRC, and how is civil society working to address it?

In the DRC, and particularly in Kivu and other parts of eastern DRC, including Beni, Bunagana, Masisi and Rutshuru territories and Ituri and South Kivu provinces, the situation is dire due to ongoing conflict. The prominence of the M23 rebel group exacerbates the crisis. The DRC’s government has accused Rwanda of supporting M23, with these claims substantiated by United Nations (UN) reports. The region is also plagued by the presence of over 120 other armed factions, foreign and local, some of which receive backing from Uganda, further complicating the situation.

This has precipitated a humanitarian catastrophe, characterised by widespread displacement, killings, rape, plundering of natural resources, instances of sexual violence and severe limitations on access to education and healthcare, worsening the suffering and vulnerability of millions of civilians.

Despite the deployment of various regional and international peacekeeping missions, the violence persists. The peacekeeping efforts of MONUSCO, the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC, have fallen short. The conflict has regional and global dimensions beyond the DRC’s borders, impacting on peace and security across multiple countries.

There is a complex interplay of local and international dynamics, including economic interests that perpetuate the conflict. The conflict’s economic dimension has been illustrated by the fact that rebel groups are mainly located where there are strategic natural resources.

Efforts to quell the insurgency by national militia groups such as the Wazalendo movement find obstacles in the challenging terrain and the firm grip of rebel groups on strategic areas. As a result, access to Goma and other conflict-affected regions is primarily limited to air travel and boats across Lake Kivu, which impedes humanitarian aid and peacekeeping efforts.

Civil society organisations play a crucial role in peacebuilding, monitoring human rights violations and advocating for justice and security sector reforms. Civil society highlights the need for justice for victims and the involvement of women and young people in peace processes. Despite challenges, including threats to human rights defenders, civil society strives to raise awareness, combat hate speech and protect vulnerable populations.

How much space is there for civil society action in the DRC?

The situation has been tumultuous since May 2021, with the declaration of a state of siege in conflict areas that has subsequently been renewed. Under the ongoing state of siege, the military displaced civilian authorities and assumed control. This shift resulted in a significant curtailment of civic freedoms, particularly for public demonstrations and speech. Military justice has taken precedence over civilian law, raising ethical concerns and contributing to lack of accountability.

Problems have been compounded by the questionable level of training and education in the army. There have been reports of inadequately trained people being integrated, including former rebel fighters with no regard for human rights principles, approaches or values. This has led to a rise in criminal activities and violations committed by security forces, further restricting civic space.

Human rights defenders and journalists critical of the government have faced persecution. Arrests and criminalisation under baseless charges have become commonplace. Despite legislative efforts to protect activists, implementation has been lacking, exacerbating the erosion of civic space. An example is Lucha (Lutte pour le changement – Fight for Change), an organisation of young activists, several of whom spent four days under arrest simply for signing a declaration urging the state to stop war.

Advocacy at national, regional and global levels is needed to address the challenges of conflict. However, entrenched power dynamics in the DRC, including the dominance of the ruling party, pose significant obstacles to meaningful reform. Urgent action is needed to reverse the trend of declining civic space, because civil society action is needed more than ever, but the space in which it can undertake it is getting smaller.

What’s the likelihood of tensions between the DRC and Rwanda escalating into a regional conflict?

Rwanda’s involvement in destabilising the DRC is concerning, especially considering its history of aggression in the region, but it won’t necessarily lead to a regional conflict. Despite Rwanda’s attempts to exert influence, the DRC has demonstrated significant military strength in defending its territory against its aggression in the past.

Rwanda’s diplomatic prowess and hidden support from foreign countries – often driven by economic interests around mineral resources – contribute to its ability to manipulate regional dynamics. Rebel groups such as the M23 and the Allied Democratic Forces exploit the porous borders between Rwanda and the DRC, seeking refuge in and support from Rwanda to evade accountability for their actions. This exacerbates tensions between the two countries.

But the likelihood of the conflict escalating into a full-blown regional war is mitigated by mutual interests and dependencies. Both countries rely on resources derived from the DRC, which acts as a deterrent to all-out warfare. Regional initiatives like the Nairobi Process, brokered by the East African Community in November 2022, seek to address underlying tensions and promote peacebuilding efforts. However, the effectiveness of such initiatives is undermined by external influences dictating the terms of engagement and providing support to conflicting parties.

Civil society plays a crucial role in advocating for peace and stability, but its efforts are hindered by external interference and power dynamics that dictate the trajectory of the conflict. While regional organisations, notably the African Union, are theoretically focused on addressing conflict in the continent, external influences and interests often compromise their effectiveness.

Ultimately, it will require a concerted effort from regional and global players committed to peace and stability in the Great Lakes region to prevent the escalation of the conflict and resolve it for good.

How can the international community support peacebuilding efforts in the DRC?

There is a pressing need for support from the international community to assist internally displaced people in desperate need of essentials such as food and shelter. Efforts are also needed to document atrocities to ensure accountability further along the road. This includes highlighting the responsibilities of perpetrators and using this information to ensure justice is served, even if it takes years. Support for civil society groups involved in peacebuilding processes is crucial, particularly since the state lacks adequate resources.

Although it may not generate enthusiasm in all quarters of the international community, security sector reform requires attention. Fortunately, there are promising initiatives funded by international donors.

Another critical need is justice reform, which should include mechanisms for transitional justice. This will be vital to address the immediate effects of conflict and the long-standing grievances and cycles of violence that have plagued the region for decades. Access to justice for victims is paramount to break the cycle of impunity and prevent further atrocities. There’s a need for collective and individual reparations for victims, as well as guarantees that such violence will not be repeated. This includes addressing psychological trauma and providing survivors the support they need to rebuild their lives.

Both local and international engagement will be needed to ensure that peacebuilding agreements are fully respected and implemented, including by holding all parties responsible and accountable. Civil society activists, academics and journalists will have a crucial role in monitoring and advocating for these agreements to be fulfilled.

Finally, it’s essential to recognise that the conflict in the DRC is not isolated but has regional and global implications. Efforts to address the crisis must consider its broader context and involve stakeholders at all levels, from local communities to international organisations. Only through a holistic and inclusive approach can lasting peace and stability be achieved in the region.

Civic space in the DRC is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with the Women’s International Peace Centre through itswebsite and follow @TheWIPCentre and@BRubango on Twitter.
ECUADOR: ‘Democracy has allowed room for organised crime and narco-politics to grow’
CIVICUS speaks with Mauricio Alarcón Salvador, executive director of Fundación Ciudadanía y Desarrollo (Citizenship and Development Foundation, FCD), about the elections that will be held in Ecuador on 20 August, the eruption of political violence and organised crime and the implications for civil society and the future of the country.

FCD is an Ecuadorian civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes and defends the rule of law, democratic principles and individual freedoms and encourages citizen participation, social control, transparency, open government and public innovation.

Why is Ecuador facing general elections only two years after the inauguration of a new president?

We will have new elections because the current president resorted to the mechanism known as ‘mutual death’, established in the constitution since 2008. This allows the president to dissolve the National Assembly on various grounds. It is known colloquially as ‘mutual death’ because ‘killing’ the legislature also causes the ‘death’ of the executive. In May this year, President Guillermo Lasso dissolved the National Assembly because, in his opinion, it had caused a serious political crisis, in the context of an impeachment trial against him based on accusations of corruption in his close entourage. The use of this mechanism allows the president to continue governing briefly without Congress but requires both legislative and presidential elections to be called within a short period of time to elect those who will complete the ongoing term. That is why the National Electoral Council called for presidential and legislative elections to be held on 20 August. Those elected in this vote will stay in power for approximately 18 months, the length of the current term remaining, which will end in May 2025.

How has civic space evolved under this government, and what are the prospects for the future?

For the little more than two years that this government has been in office, the situation of civic space has not changed much from the previous period. While it is true that the Organic Law on Communications was reformed to provide greater guarantees for freedom of expression and press freedom, the hostile environment against the media and journalists remains unchanged. The main aggressor may no longer be the president, but the notion persists that some people have the right to silence others just because they think differently. The climate of censorship and self-censorship hasn’t changed.

Nor have the regulatory conditions under which CSOs operate. Although the authorities no longer persecute or intimidate them, the regulations that enable them to do so remain in place. No progress has been made towards the adoption of an NGO law fully guaranteeing freedom of association.

Finally, as regards freedom of peaceful assembly, protests in June 2022 highlighted the weak character of the procedures available to authorities for guaranteeing it. There is still much work to be done in this regard and the challenge ahead is enormous.

CIVICUS, an organisation of which we are members, has been key in making the situation of civic space in Ecuador and its evolution visible in recent years.

Are the conditions for clean and transparent elections in place?

At FCD we believe that general conditions exist for a clean and transparent electoral process. The National Electoral Council that is in charge of this process is the same that organised the presidential vote in 2021 and local elections a few months ago. These were processes that, generally speaking, have been commended by electoral observation missions. There are some pending issues to be resolved, mainly regarding the financing of politics, but in terms of the organisation of the process we are confident that everything will go well.

As civil society, we would have liked to collaborate much more in supporting these elections, but this process came about unexpectedly and the organisations that usually take part have not been in a position to implement all our initiatives. Nevertheless, national election observation will be carried out and we have conducted campaigns to promote informed voting: we have published background information about the candidates and their government plans, and we have even monitored, albeit in a limited way, issues related to political financing. The challenge is enormous, but we are confident that we are doing our part to strengthen an extraordinary electoral process that we never saw coming.

What are the key campaign issues?

What we’ve seen these past few weeks is an apathetic campaign, very weak on proposals. Candidates seem to be fully aware that what is being elected is a transitional government that will last a few months, and they are not giving it due importance. Little has been said about fundamental rights and freedoms in a context where security is the main focus of public attention. This is of great concern to us, because in the face of the critical situation of insecurity at the national level, people demand quick solutions regardless of whether their implementation violates rights and freedoms. Regarding security, for example, several candidates have referred to the use of force outside of what is established by basic rights and international standards in force in Ecuador and the region.

Unfortunately, it is difficult for a situation as serious as the one Ecuador is going through to be resolved in such a short period of time as the one that will be afforded to the future president. The main concerns of Ecuadorians are centred on insecurity, the economic crisis and corruption. It is hoped that the new government will act on these issues by listening to people and putting an end to the arrogance that has characterised the outgoing government. Although time is short, the transitional government should establish basic lines of action, either for continuity through the next period or so that whoever comes to power in 2025 will have a basis for doing so.

How does the assassination of Fernando Villavicencio change the political scenario?

Political violence is nothing new in Ecuador: in recent elections there have been candidates who experienced threats and attacks, which in some cases have cost them their lives.

However, this is the first instance in a long time that a presidential candidate has been the victim of an assassination. The conditions under which the attack on Fernando Villavicencio occurred are revealing. He was a candidate with a risk assessment of over 95 per cent, who had police protection and had been denouncing constant threats against him.

This affects not only the electoral landscape but also Ecuador’s democracy itself, which has allowed room for organised crime and narco-politics to grow. If the proper institutions act in a timely manner and not only prevent events like this from happening again, but also manage to put an end to the prevailing impunity, we will end up strengthening a weak democracy that has been crying out for help. For this to happen, there is much work ahead, focused on coordinating efforts between public institutions, civil society, the private sector and political actors in ways that put the country ahead of any particular interest.

What international support does Ecuadorian civil society need to continue doing its work?

After what has happened in recent years, the starting point would be to ensure that international cooperation does not abandon Ecuadorian civil society. Cooperation institutions must also understand that although it is more profitable – at least in terms of communication – to save the environment, protect species or support community development, it is key to maintain support for organisations and initiatives working for democracy and civic space, because no other initiative would be viable without these.

The international community must keep its eyes on Ecuador and look for local allies to fight back against the democratic setbacks we are experiencing. A joint effort is needed to strengthen civil society as a fundamental pillar of democracy.

Civic space in Ecuador is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with FCD through itswebsite orFacebook account, subscribe to itsYouTube channel and followfcd_ecuador on Instagram and@FCD_Ecuador and@aiarconsalvador on Twitter.
ECUADOR: ‘The election provided a temporary escape valve, but instability is not over’
CIVICUS discusses the results of the 15 October runoff vote in Ecuador’s presidential election with Humberto Salazar, executive director of Fundación Esquel.

Esquel is a civil society organisation that seeks to contribute to sustainable human development, the improvement of the quality of life of the most excluded parts of the population and the construction of a democratic, responsible and supportive society in Ecuador.

How did violence as a result of organised crime affect the election?

The electoral process was deeply affected by violence. This was not limited to the death of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio. In the context of these and the previous local elections, elected representatives to local governments were also assassinated. The most notorious case was that of Agustín Intriago, mayor of the city of Manta. A candidate for the National Assembly was also assassinated, and many other candidates for different positions received threats. The list of fatal victims of violence expands if we include the seven suspects captured for the Villavicencio assassination who were killed in the prisons where they were being held.

In this context, voting preferences were surely affected. From the shadows, groups representing local and transnational mafias sent intimidating messages through violent acts that influenced people’s votes. This was very evident in the first round, when following Villavicencio’s assassination, most voters opted for candidates who until then had had no chance of reaching the runoff. This was the case with Jan Topic and Daniel Noboa, the president-elect. Both saw their numbers rebound after the assassination.

Was violence a campaign issue in the runoff?

The influence of violence on the elections went beyond being a campaign issue strategically chosen by the candidates. For voters, security became a central issue on the agenda, even surpassing in priority other key issues such as unemployment and poverty.

It is not that unemployment and poverty lost relevance, but rather that the three issues became an integrated trio of aspirations that is at the basis of current demands. The electorate is looking for quick and effective, but not isolated, answers. Security, unemployment and poverty are all elements of the same equation that citizens demand from the political system.

Although the candidates’ proposals on the issue were very general, there is a consensus in political circles that security is a key issue in Ecuador’s current situation. Consequently, in the coming days the president-elect will have to develop his security proposals in greater detail. At the polls, voters didn’t evaluate whether the proposals of either candidate on the issue were the best, nor did they have the tools to do so, but now they hope that, regardless of the policies chosen, the result of their implementation will be greater peace.

Do you see the result as indicating a rightward turn by the electorate, or do you think the vote wasn’t ideologically motivated?

The analysis of electoral preferences is not a game of addition and subtraction in which one side, in this case the right, wins, while the other side loses. Nor are we dealing with a naïve or uninformed electorate that has been tricked by a renewed right-wing alternative and has leaned towards right-wing values, principles and narratives as a result.

In the current circumstances, the vote is far from ideological. Other considerations weigh in the assessment of available options. In this case, the search for novelty prevailed, allowing for the victory of an ‘outsider’. In Ecuador, outsiders have a long track record of success.

While the winning candidate represents the right in terms of his values and models, discursively he presents himself as a renovator, much more pragmatic than ideological. This blurring of ideological content is not a unique feature of this particular candidate, but expresses a deeper process of transformation of representation in a context in which rhetoric has been emptied of content as a result of practices blatantly contradicting discourse.

People voted overwhelmingly for a candidate who managed to inspire their trust, whose traits set him apart from the polarised competition proposed by more ideological candidates. They looked for someone who offered alternatives not only to address security issues but also to tackle issues of economic recovery and welfare.

The result was also influenced by the expectations of specific audiences such as young people, who make up a major part of the electoral roll. This part of the electorate sought options for the future detached from the conflicts between those who are ultimately responsible for the crisis in which we are now immersed. In this sense, right-wing and left-wing ideological narratives were equally punished, as evidenced by the fact that all traditional parties lagged behind in the election results.

Why did defeated candidate Luisa González lose, despite having a stronger party structure?

A key factor in Luisa González’s defeat in the runoff was the weight of the figure of former president Rafael Correa as the symbol and leader of the Citizen Revolution movement. This leadership, which offers the movement a captive electorate of around 25 per cent, also creates a ceiling that, in a polarised competition between Correism and anti-Correism, does not allow the candidate to surpass the 50 per cent required to win in the runoff. The same polarisation strategy that gave Correa’s government the strength to push its agendas has reduced her chances of attracting an electorate that is not part of the party’s hardcore vote.

The revanchist narratives of Correism, expressed in the motto ‘neither forgive nor forget’, also undermined González’s support. The appeal to a return to the past reaffirmed the party’s base, but prevented it winning the votes of a broader electorate that distrusts the authoritarian tendencies of Correism and feared that the triumph of his candidate would translate into restrictions on civic space, particularly on freedom of association.

What are civil society’s expectations of the new administration?

While the president-elect does not have a history of resistance to civil society participation, during the campaign he was not particularly open to receiving proposals from and meeting with civil society groups. This creates uncertainty about how broad and effective spaces for civil society participation in public policy design and implementation will be. In principle, there are no clear threats to civic space, but there is uncertainty regarding the new government’s position on the promotion and strengthening of civil society.

It is worth noting that the two second-round competitors had a conservative bias beyond their ideological leanings to the right or left. Hence the uncertainty as to how the new president will respond to social demands from the gender equality agendas of feminist groups and the LGBTQI+ community, the demands of the Indigenous movement regarding plurinationality and interculturality, and the concerns of the human rights movement regarding the search for policies to tackle crime that do not sacrifice rights.

What is certain is that there is a huge number of problems that the new government will have to address. To sustain its initiatives beyond the one and a half years of his term in office, the new president will need to make a broad call for action and produce a basic agenda endorsed by national multi-stakeholder agreements. Policies on security, labour – with an emphasis on youth employment under a model of intergenerational inclusion – and combating chronic child malnutrition will be indispensable. The so-called Democracy Code, the 2009 law that establishes the electoral system, the management of elections and the requirements for the functioning and financing of political parties and movements, must also be reformed.

Do you think this election put an end to political instability?

The instability is not over, but the election provided a temporary and short-lived escape valve for the tensions of the multi-dimensional crisis affecting Ecuador. The government’s grace period, however, will be very limited: it will have to produce measures in the short term that show it’s on the way to resolving major problems.

Two things could work against it: the slowness of the bureaucratic apparatus to develop transformative projects and the power struggle that could block its initiatives in the National Assembly. The relationship between the executive and legislative branches will be key. If the executive once again finds itself blocked by a multitude of special interests demanding perks to enable the approval of its initiatives, the crisis will again deepen.

Civic space in Ecuador is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Fundación Esquel through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow @FundacionEsquel onInstagram andTwitter.
ECUADOR: ‘The new government must dialogue and seek political agreements that are public, not under the table’
CIVICUS discusses the results of the 15 October runoff vote in Ecuador’s presidential election with Ruth Hidalgo, executive director of Participación Ciudadana (Citizen Participation).

Participación Ciudadana is a non-partisan and pluralist civil society organisation (CSO) that works to strengthen democracy in Ecuador.

How did organised crime violence affect the electoral process?

The electoral process that just ended has been marked by political violence: a presidential candidate, a mayor and a prefect were assassinated. There has also been a climate of violence on the streets due to the actions of drug gangs, who extort protection money known as ‘vaccines’ from the public and uses it to finance organised crime groups.

This made the issue of security one of the central topics in the debate between the second round candidates, and one that has generated the highest expectations.

The two candidates’ proposals, however, were broadly similar, although with some differences in tone and characteristics of their own. Both aimed to strengthen the presence of the armed forces as co-executors alongside the police of anti-crime policies.

How do you interpret the triumph of a centre-right alternative?

This was not necessarily an ideological vote. The weakness of political parties in Ecuador means that ideology is losing strength. For some time now, the country has been debating not between right and left but between Correism and anti-Correism: it is the controversial legacy of former president Rafael Correa, in power for a decade between 2007 and 2017, which continues to polarise Ecuadorian society.

The winning candidate, business leader Daniel Noboa, represents at least by his origins a centre-right option. But if he has won, it is because he has managed to capture the votes of a young electorate that is not on either side of the polarisation and has rather opted for a new vision, a young candidate with no political baggage who offers a form of politics that, unlike that of his predecessors, is not confrontational.

What factors worked against the candidacy of Luisa González?

Correa’s candidate, Luisa González, was hurt by the constant presence of Correa during most of the campaign, which ended up overshadowing her candidacy. Although in the end she tried to distance herself from that influence, she did not manage to position herself as a renewed Correist option, which is what she should have conveyed in order to have a chance of winning. She remained stuck to the worn-out and questioned political image of the former president.

I believe that the element of Correa’s legacy that leads to the greatest rejection is his confrontational and threatening way of dealing with those he views as political enemies. This seems to be eliciting more and more discontent and disapproval. While the amount of support González received was not small, this set a ceiling for her that she was unable to break through. This was precisely the reason her opponent was able to prevail.

How has the space for civil society evolved in recent years, and what can be expected under the new government?

Civil society, in my opinion, has recovered its presence and freedom of action after Correa’s time in power, during which it was restricted and in some cases persecuted. Let’s not forget that an important environmental CSO, which confronted the government because of its extractivist policies, was arbitrarily shut down and then legislation was passed to regulate the registration, operations and closure of CSOs at the government’s discretion, with the aim of removing those that bothered the government. Many civil society activists and journalists were criminalised for their work.

The expectation of civil society under the new government is the same as always: to have an enabling environment that allows it to carry out its activities freely. We expect a government that protects and promotes freedom of association.

What should be the priorities of the new president?

It’s worth remembering that these were early elections called to elect President Guillermo Lasso’s successor after he used the ‘cross-death’ mechanism, dissolving congress to prevent it impeaching him, but simultaneously cutting his mandate short. This means Noboa will only serve as president for the rest of Lasso’s term: a mere 18 months, too little time for the many challenges he will face.

The new president takes over a country plagued by insecurity and violence, with a high fiscal deficit, almost zero growth, very high unemployment rates and on top of that, one that is once again experiencing the El Niño climate phenomenon, with warming water currents that produce extreme weather events and record temperatures. These are all issues he will have to prioritise, with public policies aimed at mitigating the most important problems in the areas of the economy, climate change and public security. To do so, he will need to build a strong team and create spaces for dialogue and reconciliation. He will need to demonstrate openness to civil society and seek political agreements that are public, not under the table.

Every election presents an opportunity. As always in a country with so many needs, expectations are high. The main task ahead for the new government is to strengthen Ecuador’s democracy, which will demand an enormous amount of work.

Civic space in Ecuador is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Participación Ciudadana through itswebsite orFacebook account, subscribe to itsYouTube channel and follow@participacionpc on Instagram and@ParticipacionPC and@RhidalgoPC on Twitter.
EL SALVADOR: ‘The election is only a formality to give the green light to a dictatorship’
CIVICUS speaks about El Salvador’s general election with Carolina Amaya, a Salvadoran freelance journalist specialising in climate crises and socio-environmental conflicts.

What’s at stake in this election?

Eighty years after the end of the Maximiliano Martínez dictatorship, El Salvador is approaching a new dictatorship. On 4 February, once President Nayib Bukele is unconstitutionally re-elected, Salvadorans will lose guarantees for our basic human rights.

Bukele's first administration was characterised by widespread human rights violations: excessive militarisation, a prolonged state of emergency, stigmatisation and criminalisation of poverty as synonymous with involvement in gangs, attacks on independent press, land dispossession, environmental destruction, persecution of environmental defenders – the list goes on. This reality is disguised by propaganda disseminated by media and content creators aligned with the government. Their narrative is that gangs will be back on the streets if Bukele or his party, Nuevas Ideas, lose power.

Bukele is seeking re-election after ignoring the Salvadoran constitution, which does not allow it. Therefore, his new administration will be unconstitutional, as will all the decisions he makes. It is to be feared that all the rights enshrined in that same constitution will be violated. And we will no longer know how long Bukele and his circle will remain in power.

In short, what is at stake in the election is our dying democracy. Salvadoran citizens will get to have their say at the ballot box now, but it is uncertain whether they will be able to do so freely again in the future.

What are the chances of this election being truly free and fair?

The election will be free, but completely irregular given that the front-runner’s candidacy is unconstitutional. The process has been flawed from the moment the Supreme Electoral Tribunal allowed the registration of Bukele’s candidacy, despite him being ineligible for re-election.

As for fairness, there are other parties running on different platforms, but competition is unequal. The ruling party has made use of official funds for its electoral campaign, while the rest had to use their own funds to compete against a lavishly funded apparatus with a strong presence on both social and traditional media. This annihilates any alternative, so the election is only a formality to give the green light to a dictatorship.

The democracy that was born in 1992 has been eroded over the years. Every political party that has held power has been embroiled in corruption scandals. Corruption, the arrogance of elites, the inefficiency of the state and the lack of transparency have resulted in widespread distrust. Impoverished communities have become strongholds of Bukelism because they depend on government welfare to satisfy immediate needs; it is clear to them that they cannot expect long-term solutions.

The government has campaigned intensely by handing out food boxes and cutting the ribbon on construction projects, all of which is prohibited by the Electoral Code. But there is no authority that can put a stop to these illegal acts because the entire state structure is co-opted by Bukelism, including the judiciary and watchdog bodies.

What has the climate of opinion been ahead of the election?

Social media such as YouTube and TikTok are dominated by disinformation and the manipulation of information, while a campaign of fear has taken hold on television. This is nothing new in El Salvador: political parties have long campaigned on the fear that El Salvador could become another Cuba or Venezuela. Now the threat is focused on insecurity and the preservation of life.

It is very concerning that this messaging has permeated Salvadoran society to the point of not only normalising Bukele's unconstitutional candidacy but also giving him the certainty of a comfortable win.

What’s the position of civil society, the political opposition and public opinion regarding the government's security policy?

Bukele’s government has been authoritarian throughout all these years and in many ways, not just in the area of security. During the pandemic it locked up thousands of people who did not comply with isolation directions. When the quarantine was over, it established the state of emergency that continues to allow it to spy on us, persecute us and lock us up. Bukele has militarised the streets, and this has intensified in January 2024, on the eve of the election. The military has been patrolling every neighbourhood of San Salvador, the capital, to demonstrate its presence and power.

The public is grateful that the gangs lost much of their grip over the country. That is the main achievement of the Bukele administration. The problem is that most people are unaware of the reality of Bukele’s negotiations with gangs, so they think that he managed to clear the streets of gang members just by subjecting them to his state of emergency.

The media’s handling of images of imprisoned gang members has been very effective, to the point that it has had international repercussions. In several Latin American countries experiencing the scourge of organised crime, people are calling for an authoritarian figure just like Bukele to put an end to it. Even the president of Honduras, ideologically far removed from Bukele, has opted for militarisation and the use of repression to deal with gangs.

How has civic space been restricted under Bukele?

As a journalist, I can attest to the fact that many people shy away from the cameras because they dare not make public statements. Sources that spoke to me for years have increasingly stopped responding to my calls, starting from 2019, when Bukele came to power. The situation has worsened as this administration has progressed. Freedom of expression is increasingly limited, as is freedom of assembly. For example, when marches are called in the capital, police blockades are set up to hold back buses coming from the interior.

Harassment of dissenting voices is also apparent on social media. Day after day, journalists and human rights defenders are denigrated by armies of trolls. I am among the 10 female journalists most attacked on Twitter. Attacks against us women are often misogynistic in nature.

Some organisations, such as Acción Ciudadana, the Association of Journalists of El Salvador and Cristosal, continue to denounce the lack of a free environment for the expression of opinions, but their complaints have had little effect. Freedom of expression has continued to erode. And a country without freedom of expression, where human rights are violated and human rights defenders are persecuted, is nothing short of a dictatorship.

Civic space in El Salvador is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Follow@sharkgirl_sv on Twitter.
EUROPE: ‘The Energy Charter Treaty is having a chilling effect on climate legislation’
CIVICUS speaks with Paul de Clerck,Economic Justice Coordinator at Friends of the Earth Europe, about the implications for climate action of the Energy Charter Treaty.

Friends of the Earth International was founded in 1971 by four civil society organisations (CSOs) from France, Sweden, the UK and the USA to campaign together on key issues such as nuclear energy and whaling. Over time it grew to become a federation of 73 groups across the world. Its European arm, Friends of the Earth Europe, is the continent’s largest grassroots environmental network, bringing together more than 30 national CSOs with thousands of local groups. In coordinationwith other European CSOs, it currently advocates for European Union states to withdraw from the Energy Charter Treaty, which is preventing them from adopting and implementing effective policies to address climate change.

What is the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)?

The ECT is a trade agreement that was established in 1994, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. A large part of the 15 former Soviet countries had huge oil and gas reserves and western oil and gas companies wanted to ensure for themselves unrestricted access to invest in and extract those resources. So they agreed that the European Union (EU) and all its member states would grant these companies an investor-state dispute settlement system: a mechanism that allows companies to sue governments when they adopt new policies or laws that affect their financial interests.

For example, if a state introduces a new environmental or labour law that could jeopardise current or future profits, a company can file a lawsuit. This is especially relevant when it comes to oil and gas projects because oil-extraction facilities are usually operational for about 40 to 50 years, and the expected profit over such a long time can be enormous.

Such lawsuits are presented before investment tribunals, which are completely industry-biased as they don’t take human rights, labour rights, environmental rights or other public interest issues into consideration. As lawsuit processes are usually negotiated in secrecy, there is very little information available regarding the amounts of the settlements.

These lawsuits have become increasingly frequent in Europe as states have adopted climate transition policies. Companies are resorting to the ECT to claim massive compensation, ranging from hundreds of million to billions of euros. This mechanism not only forces governments to pay for compensation, but also stops them introducing new sustainable energy policies. That is what we call the ‘chilling effect’: governments anticipate they will be sued so they either weaken their legislative proposals, delay them or discard them altogether.

The ECT is an old treaty that is out of line. Its main purpose is to protect fossil fuel companies, and it’s completely at odds with the Paris Agreement on climate change and the EU’s climate and sustainability agenda.

Several EU states have recently announced they will withdraw. What happens after a state quits the ECT?

France, Spain and the Netherlands have recently made such announcements, but the only state that has withdrawn so far has been Italy. Following the announcement, it takes one year for withdrawal to become effective. However, the treaty’s so-called ‘sunset clause’ states that if a country leaves the ECT, investors can continue to sue it for another 20 years. This gives an almost unlimited right to companies and investors and is one of the reasons why we are urging EU states to leave the treaty all together, in a coordinated way. If they did so, they could agree on passing EU-level legislation preventing further investor-state dispute settlement cases. About 90 per cent of current cases involve EU states, so they would gain much better protection this way.

Over the past two and a half years the ECT has been renegotiated, and in June 2022 member states reached an agreement to reform it. But from the civil society perspective, this is not good enough. First, because it extends protection for fossil fuels for another 10 years. And second, because it would extend its reach to other energy sources such as hydrogen production from biomass with carbon capture and storage, which would result in increasing rather than decreasing risk.

This is going to be decided within the next month, first by EU member states, and then by all ECT member states. The European Commission, the EU’s executive body, wants EU states to remain parties to the ECT, and it is pushing for the EU as a whole to adopt the modernised agreement. Several states are in favour of adopting the reform as they assess this new treaty as a better protection than the old. Of course, these are states that have been less exposed to the legal risks posed by international investors. On the other hand, there are the states that have been sued, such as France, Italy, Poland and Spain. Earlier this year, Italy lost a case against an English oil company that cost it several hundreds of million euros.

Has the war in Ukraine and Europe’s current energy crisis affected the negotiation process?

Even though Russia is not an ECT state party, there are possible implications to the fact that the EU has taken several measures to restrict the operations of Russian companies. These are partly based in other European countries, which means they could sue European states.

There could also be other impacts. Most European countries are persistently trying to find new sources of gas and hydrogen and are looking at African markets. Several African countries such as Nigeria are in the process of becoming ECT members, and it is suddenly in the interest of European states to bring them on board. This is having an impact on the negotiation process, although I am not sure it is a decisive one.

What should we expect to happen now?

The European Council, which brings together the heads of the 27 EU member states, needs to decide whether the reform will be adopted. It was supposed to decide by 25 October, but because of all the withdrawal announcements it has been unable to do so. Now a decision is expected by mid-November. If the European Council approves the reform, then the European Commission and its members will go to the annual ECT meeting, which will be held in Mongolia on 27 November. That meeting is the second step to move forward on the reform’s approval. The third and final step will be a vote by the European Parliament.

We are campaigning for the EU and its member states to reject the reform. If we lose, then we will shift our focus towards the European Parliament. For the past two years, its representatives have been completely left out of negotiations and several parliamentary blocs have been very critical about the treaty. So we are still hoping we will be able to stop the agreement in the European Parliament.

Along with other European CSOs, we have been doing a lot of joint advocacy with European institutions and coordinating actions, messages and strategies across Europe. We must put pressure on governments. The next few weeks will probably be decisive.

Get in touch with Friends of the Earth Europethrough itsFacebook page and follow@foeeurope on Twitter.
GUATEMALA: ‘Our democracy is at risk in the hands of political-criminal networks’
CIVICUS speaks with Evelyn Recinos Contreras about Guatemala’s general elections – where a candidate promising reform has surprisingly made the second round of the presidential race – and the prospects for democratic change and opening up civic space.

Evelyn is a former investigator for the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) and former advisor to the Attorney General of Guatemala. She is currently living in exile because of her human rights activism.

What is the state of civic space in Guatemala?

Civic space in Guatemala is under serious threat. To understand this better, one must understand that, as a consequence of armed conflict, the social fabric is broken. There is hardly any grassroots citizen engagement to speak of. The sectors that for decades served as an engine of social change, such as teachers, trade unionists and high school and public university students, have been irreparably affected by the violence.

Of these, probably the only grassroots sector that remains organised is Indigenous Mayan peoples, who fight for the defence of their territory and natural resources. In addition, in urban areas, civil society human rights and pro-democracy organisations have organised their work around strengthening democratic institutions, with much emphasis on the issue of justice.

It is precisely these sectors that are once again being hit by authoritarianism and state violence. In the interior of the country, thousands of community leaders are being criminalised and entire communities are subject to arrest warrants and threatened with criminal prosecution. A similar situation is experienced in urban areas, where the justice system has been captured by political-criminal networks that use state platforms to fund their criminal endeavours and intimidate justice operators, human rights defenders and activists who fight for human rights and the strengthening of civic space and democracy.

Networks of corruption and impunity affect the democratic space, as evidenced by the fact that people such as Thelma Cabrera of the People’s Liberation Movement were prevented from registering as candidates and participating in the elections.

What are the causes of Guatemala’s democratic erosion?

Democracy in Guatemala is being eroded by political-criminal networks that have taken over institutions and use them for their own benefit rather than the wellbeing of the public and the strengthening of democracy. But it has been a gradual and almost imperceptible process. Several key institutions have been weakened, such as the National Civil Police, which is in charge of two main tasks: crime prevention and the maintenance of citizen security, and collaboration in criminal investigations. For years, civil society worked with police commanders to build an institution at the service of democratic security, so that its work would serve to produce a civic space in which citizens could enjoy their fundamental rights and live a dignified life free of violence. But since 2017 we have seen the institution weakened, with commanders being dismissed and resources being misused.

Similar problems can be found in the judiciary. High courts have not followed their normal process of renewal: they have not held elections for new magistrates. In addition, the last two elections they held were denounced and investigated for acts of corruption. The Public Prosecutor’s Office has also been weakened by a policy of criminal prosecution and criminalisation of justice operators, which has also meant the sidelining of investigation of crimes against life, violence against women and property crimes, which hit citizens hard. Rates of violence and insecurity in Guatemala are almost as high as in countries undergoing internal armed conflicts.

Do you think that the anti-corruption struggle has failed in Guatemala?

It is very difficult to provide an absolute answer to the question of the success or failure of the fight against corruption in Guatemala. I think the cases that were brought to trial were supported by evidence and due process was respected. In that sense they were successful. But this was only part of the fight against corruption, because the law provides a limited platform. The damage to society had already been done and resources had already been lost.

The fight against corruption is only truly successful when there is a level of social involvement that leads to scrutiny of public officials and a sustained demand of accountability. Sadly, we are not there yet.

For those who have been involved in the fight against corruption, the negative consequences have been obvious. Prosecutors, judges, human rights defenders, activists and community leaders are being persecuted on unfounded charges and pushed towards exile. This sends a strong message of fear to Guatemalan society. But I am convinced that the struggle does not end here. We deserve a country where we can all live in freedom and dignity. The Mayan people have been resisting for more than 500 years, so I think they are our best example to follow.

Do you think a positive change could come out of this election?

I believe there is hope. People have shown they are tired of the same murky forces that for years have embodied voracious economic interests that exploit peoples and territories and are characterised by discrimination, double standards and structural violence.

The fact that one of the contenders in the runoff is the Semilla party, born out of the anti-corruption protests of 2015 and bringing together many people who have never participated in political parties before, is evidence of a desire for change. People rejected the usual political actors who represent archaic economic interests and embody authoritarian and corrupt forms of politics.

For change to really materialise, we need the international community to turn its eyes to Guatemala. The risk to our democracy at the hands of political-criminal networks must not go unnoticed. We need the international community to draw attention to and speak out about the situation in our country, because the violation of the human rights of Guatemalans affects our shared humanity.

Civic space in Guatemala is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
GUATEMALA: ‘These elections are key because they give us a chance to take a different path’
CIVICUS speaks with Jordán Rodas Andrade about Guatemala’s general elections – where a candidate promising reform has surprisingly made the second round of the presidential race – and the prospects for democratic change and opening up civic space.

Jordán Rodas is a lawyer specialising in constitutional guarantees and fundamental rights, transparency and anti-corruption. In addition to being a university professor, in 2015 he was elected vice-president of the Guatemalan Bar Association and between 2017 and 2022 he was Guatemala’s Human Rights Ombudsman. In exercising this role he was repeatedly criminalised and threatened, as a result of which he had to go into exile.

How have civic space conditions changed in Guatemala in recent years?

In recent years there has been a very worrying deterioration of civic space in Guatemala, which has worsened under the current president, Alejandro Giammattei. His predecessor, Jimmy Morales, a comedian-turned-president, left very bad practices in place, but these reached extreme levels under Giammattei.

In recent years, many human rights defenders, land rights defenders, journalists and justice defenders have had to leave our country, forced by a hostile climate of persecution and criminalisation. This closure of spaces and the absence of an independent press have produced fertile ground for the advance of an authoritarian regime. These elections are key because they give us Guatemalans a chance to take a different path for the good of our country.

What drove you into exile?

In my five years as prosecutor, I was criminalised with 18 pretrial proceedings, all of which were rejected. It is exhausting to have to constantly defend yourself against such a succession of spurious accusations. Then I had eight requests for removal from office by members of congress, in addition to a crippling financial suffocation.

Above all, I have witnessed the weakening of justice. Many had to take the difficult decision to leave the country to save their lives, their freedom or their integrity. Among them are Juan Francisco Sandoval, former head of the Special Prosecutor’s Office against Impunity (FECI), Erika Aifán, an independent judge, Judge Miguel Ángel Gálvez and many others who in one way or another touched the heartstrings of political and economic power.

It is no coincidence that behind the persecution of justice operators and journalists is often the Foundation Against Terrorism, directed by business leader Ricardo Méndez Ruiz, who has been accused by the US government of acts of corruption and acts against democratic institutions. This organisation was a plaintiff in the criminal proceedings against Virginia Laparra, former FECI prosecutor in Quetzaltenango, who has been in prison for more than a year and who should never have been detained for denouncing cases of corruption of a judge. Whistleblowing is not a crime anywhere in the world.

The same organisation criminally prosecuted José Rubén Zamora, the founder of newspaper elPeriódico, one of the government’s main critics who for years has denounced corruption. Zamora was recently sentenced to six years in prison for several alleged crimes, including money laundering. This sent a very serious message against press freedom. The independent press has had to self-censor and yet it continues to fight this battle.

I was still in Guatemala when Zamora was captured, and so I decided to distance myself. I left in August but returned in December, by land, to participate in the assembly of the People’s Liberation Movement (MLP), which proclaimed Thelma Cabrera, an Indigenous Maya Mam woman, as its presidential candidate and myself as its vice-presidential candidate. Four years ago, the MLP came in fourth place, but in a context of social malaise in the face of corruption and thanks to its opening up to mestizo people – people of mixed European and Indigenous heritage – I thought it had a good chance of entering the second-round race.

But my successor in the prosecutor’s office filed a spurious complaint against me, as a result of which our presidential ticket was blocked. I was systematically refused information about the content of the complaint. In other words, this was used to take us out of the race. Since then, I have continued the struggle from exile. This may not be what you want, but it is what you have to do.

Under what conditions would you decide to return to Guatemala permanently?

I was just talking about this last week following a work meeting with the Guatemalan state mediated by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). I have been the beneficiary of a precautionary measure from the IACHR since 2017. These measures establish that the state has the obligation to ensure and guarantee a person’s life, integrity, security and liberty, and in my case the state of Guatemala has not complied with it. In order to return, I would need as the minimum that the state does not persecute or criminalise me.

There are currently two accusations against me, one filed by the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office and another by the Comptroller General’s Office. I have no official knowledge of what the accusations are because I don’t have access to the documents; I have requested them through access to information requests. But it seems to me they are related to the fact that in my declaration of assets I said that I had handed over on 20 August, which is when my constitutionally established term ended, but I left the country on 18 August, leaving the deputy attorney general in charge, as the law dictates. In other words, there was no falsehood or crime. This case is under reserve, and I have asked the state, as a sign of goodwill, not to extend this reserve but to hand over a copy of the complaint so I can defend myself, and to guarantee my life and safety, and that of my family in Guatemala.

Has the fight against corruption in Guatemala failed?

The fight against corruption has not failed, but it has stalled as a result of a well-thought-out strategy of a corrupt alliance of political officials and private sector actors.

However, today more than ever I hope that we will learn the painful but positive lessons from the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), which I believe has more lights than shadows. I hope that from that learning we can, sooner rather than later, take up the fight against corruption again.

International support will continue to be indispensable because our justice system is very porous, permeated by organised crime and lacking institutionality. Three of the nine magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice and several other judges and judicial officials are on the US State Department’s Engel List of people who have committed acts of corruption or have participated in actions to undermine democracy in their countries. Members of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal have been accused of falsifying their doctoral degrees to get elected and the Human Rights Ombudsman was Giammattei’s human rights officer in the prison system at the time he launched ‘Operation Peacock’, a police operation that resulted in a massacre and eventually cost Giammattei 10 months in prison, but also launched its presidential bid. Hence the trust that exists between these two officials.

But it is clear that people are tired of all this and they showed it at the ballot box on 25 June, when they said no to a return to the past and yes to a proposal that sends a message of hope for the fight against corruption. This was clearly put by the candidate who represents this hope, Bernardo Arévalo, who made it to the second round against all odds.

Do you consider these elections to have been free and competitive?

The presidential election was not free and competitive, because a fair election requires not only that there be no fraud on voting day, but also that a series of elements are present throughout the process, from the moment the elections are called. The election was called on 20 January, and on 27 January the state closed the door on us and prevented our participation. Not only did this violate our right to stand for election, but it also restricted citizens’ right to have a full range of options.

In reaction to this exclusion, Thelma Cabrera called for a null vote, and numbers don’t lie. The null vote actually won, with 17 per cent, a higher share than that received by the candidate who came first, Sandra Torres, who got around 15 per cent. People are clearly fed up.

The unfairness of the competition also manifested itself in the official party’s handling of public resources and the government’s extremely close relationship with some Supreme Electoral Tribunal magistrates.

But the fact that Bernardo Arévalo managed to enter the second round is, alongside the mass of null votes, blank votes and abstentions, a sign of enormous rejection of the system. I have high expectations for the second round, in which I hope that the Guatemalan people will participate massively and take advantage of this opportunity to choose a better future.

What would Guatemala’s new government need to do to put the country back on the road to democracy?

Above all, the anti-corruption message must be accompanied by real action. Revenge against justice operators must stop, the rule of law must be restored and the freedom of the independent press must be guaranteed.

The new president should form a cabinet inclusive of progressive sectors. He should convene political parties, social forces and Indigenous peoples’ movements to jointly make a proposal that ensures public policies benefit those most in need.

The new government should totally dissociate itself from the malpractices of the past and be very careful about power’s temptations. Its responsibility to those who have placed their trust in it must prevail. There will be temptations along the way, so it is essential that it place its bets on people who are ethical, capable and consistent with the values projected in the electoral campaign, as people voted for them because they recognised them first and foremost as an honest party. Bernardo is surely the most interested in honouring the legacy of his father, former president Juan José Arévalo. His government could become a third government of the revolution, taking up and improving on the great achievements of that democratic springtime that took place between 1944 and 1955.

Civic space in Guatemala is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Jordán Rodas through his Facebook or Instagram pages, and follow him on TikTok and Twitter.
HAÏTI : « Les gangs contrôlent le pays en lieu et place des autorités »
CIVICUS échange sur l’augmentation de la violence des gangs et la situation politique en Haïti avec Nancy Roc, journaliste indépendante.

Avec 38 ans d’expérience, Nancy est une journaliste originaire d’Haïti, reconnue pour son travail en faveur de la liberté de la presse. Elle est récipiendaire de nombreux prix, dont le prix Jean Dominique pour la liberté de la presse décerné par l’UNESCO, entre autres.

Quelle est la situation actuelle d’Haïti en matière de sécurité ?

La situation est intenable, pour reprendre le terme exact du Haut-Commissaire des Nations Unies (ONU) aux droits de l’homme, Volker Türk. Malgré l’état d’urgence et la succession de couvre-feu déclarés par le gouvernement depuis le 4 mars pour regagner le contrôle de la capitale, Port-au-Prince, il n’y a pas une semaine qui ne s’écoule sans que des kidnappings aient lieu. La violence est quotidienne.

La population est cloitrée chez elle, la plupart des écoles sont fermées et les activités économiques sont gravement affectées. Il en est de même sur les routes où depuis plus de trois mois les gangs imposent leur loi et de nombreux chauffeurs sont au chômage. Pratiquement toutes les infrastructures de la capitale ont été ou détruites ou gravement affectées par les attaques des gangs.

L’attaque du Pénitencier national, le 2 mars, a été un grand choc pour les Haïtiens, même s’ils sont habitués à vivre sous la menace constante de la violence. Plus de 4.500 détenus se seraient évadés, parmi lesquels des membres éminents de gangs et des personnes arrêtées dans le cadre de l’assassinat du Président Jovenel Moïse en juillet 2021. Les pillages et les attaques ont été nombreux, notamment contre la Bibliothèque nationale, qui a été prise d’assaut le 3 avril.

La veille, dans la soirée du 2 avril, des bandits lourdement armés ont pillé des dizaines de maisons et emporté plusieurs véhicules privés aux villages Tecina et Théodat, dans la municipalité de Tabarre, au nord-est de Port-au-Prince. La grande majorité de la population, qui vivait déjà dans une misère extrême, est aujourd’hui plongée dans un véritable enfer et laissée pour compte.

Quant à la police, malgré certains efforts, elle n’est pas outillée ni assez nombreuse pour faire face à une telle situation de guérilla urbaine face à des gangs surarmés. Actuellement, environ 23 gangs opèrent dans la zone métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince, divisés en deux grandes coalitions : le G-Pèp, dirigé par Gabriel Jean Pierre, dit Ti Gabriel, et le G9 Famille et Alliés, dirigé par Jimmy Chérizier, alias Barbecue. Mais les experts de l’ONU estiment qu’il y en a entre 150 et 200 dans l’ensemble du pays.

Selon l’ONU, depuis le début de l’année, 1.193 personnes ont été tuées et 692 blessées à cause de la violence des gangs. Le système de santé est au bord de l’effondrement et les hôpitaux n’ont souvent pas la capacité de traiter les personnes blessées. L’économie est asphyxiée car les gangs imposent des restrictions aux mouvements de la population. Le principal fournisseur d’eau potable a cessé ses livraisons. Cette situation a entraîné une crise alimentaire majeure : près de la moitié des 11 millions d’habitants d’Haïti ont besoin d’une forme d’assistance alimentaire.

Comment les gangs sont-ils devenus si puissants ?

Les gangs disposent de puissants financeurs au sein du gouvernement et du secteur privé. Sous l’ancien premier ministre de facto Ariel Henry, qui a démissionné en mars, le gouvernement finançait 30% des membres du G9. Il ne serait pas étonnant que certaines personnalités tant du secteur privé que d’anciens hauts dignitaires de l’État continuent à les financer, en particulier ceux qui ont été sanctionnés par la communauté internationale.

Un rapport d’experts de l’ONU publié en 2023 a également pointé du doigt l’ancien président Michel Martelly, au pouvoir entre 2011 et 2016, ainsi que plusieurs hommes d’affaires et législateurs de premier plan, comme fournissant des ressources aux gangs armés, que ce soit en nature ou en espèces.

La prolifération des gangs a commencé sous Martelly et s’est accentuée après l’assassinat de Moïse. Déjà en 2019, environ 162 groupes armés avaient été répertoriés sur le territoire national dont plus de la moitié opérait dans l’aire métropolitaine. Au total, ils auraient un potentiel supérieur à 3.000 soldats armés d’armes à feu, dont des adolescents et même des enfants.

Sous Moïse, de nombreux massacres ont eu lieu, tels que le massacre de La Saline en 2018, le massacre du Bel Air en 2019 et le massacre de Cité Soleil en 2020. Tous ont eu lieu dans des quartiers à fort poids électoral et où résidaient des membres de l’opposition, et ces crimes sont tous restés impunis.

En 2020, la situation s’est aggravée lorsque Chérizier, ancien policier, a fédéré les gangs avec la « famille G9 » alliée aux neuf bandes les plus puissantes de la région. Cela lui a permis de contrôler une bonne partie de la capitale – tout en étant financé en sous-main par de hauts fonctionnaires de l’appareil d’État.

La fédération des gangs a même été saluée par la Représentante spécial du Secrétaire Général de l’ONU en Haïti, qui a affirmé que fédérer les gangs avait fait baisser le nombre d’homicides de 12% en trois mois. Cela a provoqué un tel scandale qu’elle a dû revenir sur ses propos en les qualifiant de « mésinterprétation ».

Un an après l’assassinat du président Moïse, alors que la situation s’aggravait, le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU a adopté, à l’unanimité, une résolution établissant un régime de sanctions qui ciblait les chefs de gangs et ceux qui les finançaient. Chérizier était le seul chef de gang dont le nom figurait dans une annexe de la résolution mais, à ce jour, aucune mesure n’a été prise à son encontre.

Le 29 février 2024, la situation dans la capitale a pris un tournant décisif et pour le pire lorsque Chérizier a annoncé, à travers une vidéo sur les réseaux sociaux, la reconstitution de la coalition des groupes armés dénommée « Viv Ansanm » (Vivre ensemble). Il y revendiquait la responsabilité des tensions qui ont secoué Port-au-Prince et a déclaré que l’objectif premier des gangs était de renverser le gouvernement. Il a précisé aussi qu’une chasse aux ministres, au directeur général de la Police Nationale, était désormais ouverte. Il voulait les arrêter et empêcher Ariel Henry, qui se trouvait à Porto Rico, de rentrer au pays. Des policiers ont été tués, des commissariats attaqués, plusieurs vols annulés suite à un assaut des gangs à l’aéroport international Toussaint Louverture qui, depuis, est fermé.

Chérizier prétend lancer une révolution afin de libérer le peuple haïtien des autorités et des oligarques pourtant, ces gangs ont ciblé toutes les couches de la société, autant que les quartiers pauvres de la capitale et de nombreuses structures étatiques qui servaient aux pauvres comme le principal hôpital public. La destruction est telle que l’ONU parle d’Haïti comme « un État au bord de l’effondrement ».

En décembre 2023 plus de 310.000 personnes étaient déplacées à l’intérieur du pays. Selon l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations, plus de 50.000 personnes ont quitté la capitale en trois semaines au mois de mars 2024. L’ampleur du désastre est stupéfiante et tous les pays qui avaient promis une aide policière ou militaire sont absents. Haïti est abandonnée à son triste sort et les gangs contrôlent le pays en lieu et place des autorités.

Pourquoi le gouvernement n’a-t-il pas réagi à la menace croissante des gangs ?

Il y a quatre ans, la Police Nationale d’Haïti disposait officiellement d’une force de 15.498 officiers de police (dont seulement 1.711 femmes), bien que le nombre d’officiers effectifs était estimé à beaucoup moins. En outre, le programme humanitaire mis en place par l’administration Biden-Harris pour faciliter le séjour des Haïtiens aux États-Unis a fait courir à la police le risque de perdre jusqu’à un tiers de ses effectifs en raison de l’émigration.

Dans un tel contexte, le chaos et la violence ont atteint un niveau sans précédent. Depuis l’assassinat du président Moïse, le gouvernement a été incapable d’instaurer l’ordre avec la police, et l’armée ne comptait qu’environ 2.000 soldats. De plus, aucune élection législative ou générale n’a été organisée depuis 2016. Il n’y a donc plus d’élus, le mandat des précédents étant expiré. Les critiques d’Henry, très impopulaire, considéraient son règne comme illégitime.

En octobre 2022, Henry a fait appel à la communauté internationale, sollicitant l’intervention d’une force étrangère. Vu son impopularité, cela a suscité la méfiance parmi la population qui redoutait que cette intervention vienne renforcer un gouvernement illégitime et accusé de connivence avec les gangs. De plus, la composition de cette mission a viré au casse-tête.

Près d’un an plus tard, le Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU a adopté une résolution autorisant le recours à la force par une mission internationale d’assistance à la sécurité en Haïti. Ni le Canada ni les États-Unis n’ont voulu intervenir directement en Haïti, soulignant que la solution devait venir des Haïtiens. Mais ces derniers n’ont jamais pu s’entendre et, de plus, ils redoutent une intervention étrangère, compte tenu des interventions catastrophiques de l’ONU, depuis 2004. Le Canada, qui avait été sollicité par Washington pour prendre le leadership de l’intervention, s’est retiré en mars 2023, pour laisser la direction au Kenya.

Le déploiement de la force d’intervention multinationale devait commencer le 1er janvier 2024. En juillet dernier, le Kenya avait proposé de diriger la mission avec un millier de policiers. Antigua et Barbuda, les Bahamas et la Jamaïque s’étaient engagés à envoyer du personnel de sécurité, et plus récemment le Belize et la Guyane. Le Canada s’était également engagé à participer à la mission. Pour sa part, le gouvernement américain s’était engagé à financer la mission à hauteur d’au moins 100 millions de dollars.

Alors que les gangs étendaient leur emprise sur Port-au-Prince et formaient une alliance dans le but déclaré de renverser le Premier ministre, Henry prévoyait de se rendre au Kenya pour signer un accord de réciprocité. Pendant son absence, les bandes criminelles de Chérizier ont attaqué des commissariats de police, l’aéroport de la capitale et des prisons. Ils ont brandi la menace d’une guerre civile si Henry revenait en Haïti. Il a démissionné le 11 mars 2024. Le lendemain, le Kenya a suspendu l’envoi de ses policiers en Haïti.

Qui est aux commandes aujourd’hui, et quelles sont les chances que la démocratie soit rétablie ?

Dans la foulée de la démission d’Henry, le gouvernement a déclaré l’état d’urgence. Le même jour, la formation d’un Conseil Présidentiel de Transition (CPT) chargé de rétablir l’ordre a été annoncée. Le conseil est constitué de neuf membres, soit sept votants et deux observateurs. Il intègre des représentants des principaux partis politiques, ainsi que du secteur privé et de la société civile. Son mandat de 22 mois prendra fin le 7 février 2026 après avoir organisé des « élections démocratiques, libres et crédibles ».

De nombreux obstacles se dressent déjà pour atteindre cette finalité. En premier lieu, comment rétablir la sécurité alors que les gangs continuent de recevoir des armes des États-Unis ? Dernier coup de théâtre : lorsque Ariel Henry a sorti le décret annonçant la formation du CPT, aucun nom des membres n’y figurait. Depuis, les organisations des représentants désignés du CPT ont exprimé leur désaccord avec le décret du Gouvernement publié dans le journal officiel le 12 avril 2024. Finalement, l’arrêté officialisant la nomination des membres du CPT a été publié le 16 avril.

De plus, le Conseil souhaite prêter serment au Palais National devant la nation alors même que le Palais a été la cible des gangs à plusieurs reprises. Qui assurera sa sécurité ? Comment rétablir la paix en Haïti dans un contexte d’incertitude politique et de fragilité économique ? Est-ce que les membres du Conseil, dont certains sont des frères ennemis, pourront dépasser leurs propres intérêts au profit de la nation ? D’autre part, qui reconstruira le pays après le départ de tant de jeunes ? Le pays fera-t-il enfin appel à sa diaspora ?

Par ailleurs, la possibilité d’une famine se dessine à l’horizon et le Programme Alimentaire Mondial craint que ses stocks alimentaires ne s’épuisent d’ici la fin du mois d’avril.

Enfin, comment convaincre les gangs de déposer leurs armes alors qu’ils accumulent des millions à travers les kidnappings et la vente des armes ? Il s’agit d’une activité très lucrative, tant pour les gangs que pour de simples citoyens qui font face à une grande pauvreté.

Comment aussi rétablir la justice et punir les criminels qui ont commis tant de crimes contre l’humanité ? L’adage ne dit-il pas qu’il n’y a pas de paix sans justice ? Enfin, que dire des ambitions politiques des gangs ? Le 11 mars, Chérizier a déclaré qu’il serait « l’alliance Viv Ansanm, avec le peuple haïtien, qui élira celui qui dirigera le pays ». Le CPT devra-t-il négocier avec les gangs ?

Les défis qui se dressent devant le CPT ne sont donc pas des moindres et l’un des plus ardus sera de trouver le moyen d’articuler une demande d’aide externe sans perdre la souveraineté d’Haïti.

L’espace civique en Haïti est classé « réprimé » par leCIVICUS Monitor.

Contactez Nancy Roc sur sa pageFacebook et suivez@TheNancyRoc sur Twitter.
HAITI: ‘Gangs control the country instead of the authorities’
CIVICUS speaks with freelance journalist Nancy Roc about the increase in gang violence and the political situation in Haiti.

With 38 years of experience, Nancy is a Haitian-born journalist renowned for her work for press freedom. She is the recipient of numerous awards, including UNESCO’s Jean Dominique Prize for Press Freedom.

What’s the current security situation in Haiti?

The situation is untenable, to use the exact words of Volker Türk, the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights. Despite a state of emergency and a succession of curfews the government has declared since 4 March to try to regain control of the capital, Port-au-Prince, not a week goes by without kidnappings. Violence is a daily occurrence.

People are holed up in their homes, most schools are closed and economic activity is severely affected. The same goes for roads, where gangs have been imposing their law for more than three months and many drivers are out of work. Virtually all the capital’s infrastructure has been destroyed or seriously affected by gang attacks.

An attack on the National Penitentiary on 2 March came as a great shock to Haitians, even though they are used to living under the constant threat of violence. More than 4,500 inmates are believed to have escaped, including prominent gang members and people arrested in connection with the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021. There have been widespread looting and attacks, particularly against the National Library, which was stormed on 3 April.

On the evening of 2 April, heavily armed bandits looted dozens of homes and seized private vehicles in the villages of Tecina and Théodat, in Tabarre municipality, northeast of Port-au-Prince. The vast majority of the population, already living in extreme poverty, have now been plunged into hell and left to fend for themselves.

As for the police, despite some efforts, they are neither equipped nor numerous enough to deal with such a situation of urban guerrilla warfare against heavily armed gangs. There are currently around 23 gangs operating in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, divided into two major coalitions: G-Pèp, led by Gabriel Jean Pierre, known as Ti Gabriel, and G9 Family and Allies, led by Jimmy Chérizier, alias Barbecue. However, UN experts estimate there are between 150 and 200 gangs throughout Haiti.

According to the UN, since the start of the year, 1,193 people have been killed and 692 injured as a result of gang violence. The health system is on the verge of collapse, and hospitals often lack the capacity to treat the injured. The economy is suffocating as the gangs impose restrictions on people’s movements. The main supplier of drinking water has stopped deliveries. The situation has led to a major food crisis: almost half of Haiti’s 11 million inhabitants need some form of food assistance.

How did the gangs become so powerful?

The gangs have powerful backers in government and the private sector. Under former de facto Prime Minister Ariel Henry, who resigned in March, the government funded 30 per cent of the members of the G9. It wouldn’t be surprising if some people, both in the private sector and former senior government officials, have continued to fund them, particularly those who have been sanctioned by the international community.

A UN expert report published in 2023 also singled out former president Michel Martelly, in power between 2011 and 2016, as well as several prominent business leaders and legislators, as providing resources to armed gangs, whether in kind or in cash.

The proliferation of gangs began under Martelly and intensified after Moïse’s assassination. By 2019, some 162 armed groups had been identified, more than half of them operating in the metropolitan area. In total, they are said to potentially have over 3,000 soldiers armed with firearms, including adolescents and children.

Under Moïse, numerous massacres took place, such as the La Saline massacre in 2018, the Bel Air massacre in 2019 and the Cité Soleil massacre in 2020. All took place in neighbourhoods with significant electoral power where members of the opposition lived, and these crimes all went unpunished.

In 2020, the situation worsened when Chérizier, a former police officer, federated the gangs with the G9 Family, allied to the nine most powerful gangs in the region. This enabled him to control a large part of Port-au-Prince – all while being covertly financed by high-ranking government officials.

The federation of gangs was even hailed by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Haiti, who claimed that federating the gangs had reduced the number of homicides by 12 per cent in three months. This caused such a scandal that she was forced to retract her statement, describing it as a ‘misinterpretation‘.

A year after the assassination of Moïse, as the situation worsened, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution establishing a sanctions regime that targeted gang leaders and those who financed them. Chérizier was the only gang leader named in an annex to the resolution, but to date no action has been taken against him.

On 29 February 2024, the situation in the capital took a decisive turn for the worse when Chérizier announced, in a video posted on social media, the reconstitution of the coalition of armed groups known as Viv Ansanm (Living Together). In the video, he claimed responsibility for the tensions that have shaken Port-au-Prince and declared that the gangs’ primary objective was to overthrow the government. He also stated that a hunt was now on for ministers and the Director General of the National Police. He wanted to arrest them and prevent Henry, who was in Puerto Rico, returning to the country. Police officers were killed, police stations were attacked and several flights were cancelled following an assault by gangs at Toussaint Louverture international airport, which has since been closed.

Chérizier claims to be launching a revolution to liberate the Haitian people from the authorities and the oligarchs. But the gangs have targeted every stratum of society, as well as the poor districts of Port-au-Prince and many state structures that serve the poor, such as the main public hospital. The destruction is such that the UN refers to Haiti as ‘a state on the brink of collapse’.

By December 2023, more than 310,000 people had been displaced within Haiti. According to the International Organization for Migration, more than 50,000 people left Port-au-Prince in three weeks in March 2024. The scale of the disaster is staggering, and all the countries that had promised police or military aid are absent. Haiti has been abandoned to its sad fate and gangs are controlling the country instead of the authorities.

Why hasn’t the government reacted to the growing gang threat?

Four years ago, the Haitian National Police officially had a force of 15,498 police officers, among them only 1,711 women, although the actual number of officers was estimated to be much lower. Moreover, the humanitarian programme put in place by the Biden-Harris administration to make it easier for Haitians to live in the USA has put the police at risk of losing up to a third of its workforce to emigration.

Against this backdrop, chaos and violence have reached unprecedented levels. Since Moïse’s assassination, the government has been unable to establish order with the police, and the army has only had around 2,000 soldiers. No legislative or general elections have been held since 2016. As a result, there are no longer any elected representatives, as the terms in office of the previously elected ones have expired. Critics of Henry, who was very unpopular, considered his government illegitimate.

In October 2022, Henry appealed to the international community, requesting the intervention of a foreign force. Given his unpopularity, this aroused public mistrust, as people feared this intervention would strengthen an illegitimate government accused of colluding with gangs. What’s more, the composition of this mission turned into a headache.

Almost a year later, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution authorising the use of force by an international security assistance mission in Haiti. Neither Canada nor the USA wanted to intervene directly, stressing that the solution had to come from Haitians themselves. But Haitians have been unable to reach agreement, and what’s more, they fear foreign intervention, given the catastrophic interventions led by the UN since 2004. Canada, which had been asked by the USA to take the lead in the intervention, withdrew in March 2023, passing the leadership on to Kenya.

Deployment of a multinational intervention force was due to begin on 1 January 2024. Last July, Kenya offered to lead the mission with a thousand police officers. Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas and Jamaica had pledged to send security personnel, and more recently Belize and Guyana did as well. Canada has also pledged to participate in the mission. For its part, the US government pledged to fund the mission to the tune of at least US$100 million.

As the gangs extended their hold over Port-au-Prince and formed an alliance with the declared aim of overthrowing Henry, he planned to travel to Kenya to sign a reciprocity agreement. While he was away, Chérizier’s criminal gangs launched their attacks on police stations, the airport and prisons. They threatened civil war if Henry returned to Haiti. He resigned on 11 March 2024. The next day, Kenya suspended the dispatch of police to Haiti.

Who is in charge today, and what are the chances of democracy being restored?

In the wake of Henry’s resignation, the government declared a state of emergency. On the same day, it was announced that a Presidential Transitional Council (PTC) had been formed to restore order. The Council is made up of nine members: seven voting members and two observers. It includes representatives of the main political parties, civil society and the private sector. Its 22-month mandate is due to end on 7 February 2026 after it has organised ‘democratic, free and credible elections’.

There are already a number of obstacles to achieving this goal. First, how can security be re-established when the gangs are still receiving weapons from the USA? The latest twist is that when Henry issued the decree announcing the formation of the PTC, it didn’t include any of the members’ names. Since then, the organisations of the PTC’s appointed representatives have expressed their disagreement with the government decree published in the official gazette on 12 April 2024. Finally, the decree formalising the appointment of PTC members was published on 16 April.

In addition, the Council wishes to be sworn in at the National Palace before the nation, even though the Palace has been targeted by gangs on several occasions. Who will provide security? How can peace be restored to Haiti in a context of such political uncertainty and economic fragility? Will the members of the Council, some of whom are frenemies, be able to look beyond their own interests for the benefit of the nation? And who will rebuild the country after so many young people have left? Will the diaspora finally be called upon?

Further, the possibility of famine looms on the horizon and the World Food Programme fears that its food stocks will run out by the end of April.

Finally, how can gangs be persuaded to lay down their arms when they are making millions from kidnappings and arms sales? Crime is a very lucrative business for gangs and for citizens facing great poverty.

How can we restore justice and punish those who have committed so many crimes against humanity? As the saying goes, no justice, no peace. Finally, what about the gangs’ political ambitions? On 11 March, Chérizier declared that it would be ‘the Viv Ansanm alliance, along with the Haitian people, who will elect the person who will lead the country’. Will the PTC have to negotiate with the gangs?

The challenges facing the PTC are therefore significant, and one of the most arduous will be to find a way of articulating a request for external aid without losing Haiti’s sovereignty.

Civic space in Haiti is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Nancy Roc on herFacebook page and follow@TheNancyRoc on Twitter.
INTELLIGENCE ARTIFICIELLE : « Il doit y avoir un équilibre entre la promotion de l’innovation et la protection des droits »
CIVICUS parle avec Nadia Benaissa, conseillère en politique juridique chez Bits of Freedom, sur les risques que l’intelligence artificielle (IA) fait peser sur les droits humains et sur le rôle que joue la société civile dans l’élaboration d’un cadre juridique pour la gouvernance de l’IA.

Fondée en 2000, Bits of Freedom est une organisation de la société civile (OSC) néerlandaise qui vise à protéger les droits à la vie privée et à la liberté de communication en influençant la législation et la politique en matière de technologies, en donnant des conseils politiques, en sensibilisant et en entreprenant des actions en justice. Bits of Freedom a également participé aux négociations de la loi de l’Union européenne sur l’IA.

Quels risques l’IA fait-elle peser sur les droits humains ?

L’IA présente des risques importants car elle peut exacerber des inégalités sociales préexistantes et profondément ancrées. Les droits à l’égalité, à la liberté religieuse, à la liberté d’expression et à la présomption d’innocence figurent parmi les droits touchés.

Aux Pays-Bas, nous avons recensé plusieurs cas de systèmes algorithmiques violant les droits humains. L’un de ces cas est le scandale des allocations familiales, dans lequel les parents recevant des allocations pour la garde de leurs enfants ont été injustement ciblés et profilés. Le profilage a surtout touché les personnes racisées, les personnes à faible revenu et les musulmans, que l’administration fiscale a faussement accusés de fraude. Cette situation a entraîné la suspension des allocations pour certains parents et prestataires de soins, ainsi que des enquêtes hostiles sur leurs cas, ce qui a eu de graves répercussions financières.

Un autre exemple est le programme de prévention de la criminalité ‘Top400' mis en œuvre dans la municipalité d’Amsterdam, qui profile des mineurs et des jeunes afin d’identifier les 400 personnes les plus susceptibles de commettre des délits. Cette pratique affecte de manière disproportionnée les enfants des classes populaires et les enfants non-blancs, car le système se concentre géographiquement sur les quartiers à faibles revenus et les quartiers de migrants.

Dans ces cas, le manque d’éthique dans l’utilisation d’outils d’intelligence artificielle a entraîné une immense détresse pour les personnes concernées. Le manque de transparence dans la manière dont les décisions automatisées ont été prises n’a fait qu’accroître les difficultés dans la quête de justice et de redevabilité. De nombreuses victimes ont eu du mal à prouver les préjugés et les erreurs du système.

Existe-t-il des tentatives en cours pour réglementer l’IA ?

Un processus est en cours au niveau européen. En 2021, la Commission européenne (CE) a proposé un cadre législatif, la loi sur l’IA de l’Union européenne (UE), pour répondre aux défis éthiques et juridiques associés aux technologies de l’IA. L’objectif principal de la loi sur l’IA de l’UE est de créer un ensemble complet de règles régissant le développement, le déploiement et l’utilisation de l’IA dans les États membres de l’UE. Elle cherche à maintenir un équilibre entre la promotion de l’innovation et la protection des valeurs et des droits fondamentaux.

Il s’agit d’une occasion unique pour l’Europe de se distinguer en donnant la priorité à la protection des droits humains dans la gouvernance de l’IA. Cependant, la loi n’a pas encore été approuvée. Une version a été adoptée par le Parlement européen en juin, mais il reste encore un débat final - un « trilogue » - à mener entre la Commission européenne, le Conseil européen et le Parlement européen. La Commission européenne s’efforce d’achever le processus d’ici la fin de l’année afin qu’il puisse être soumis à un vote avant les élections européennes de 2024.

Ce trilogue a des défis considérables à relever pour parvenir à une loi sur l’IA complète et efficace. Les questions controversées abondent, y compris les définitions de l’IA et les catégories à haut risque, ainsi que les mécanismes de mise en œuvre et d’application.

Qu’est-ce que la société civile, y compris Bits of Freedom, apporte à la table des négociations ?

Alors que les négociations sur la loi se poursuivent, une coalition de 150 OSC, dont Bits of Freedom, demande instamment à la CE, au Conseil et au Parlement d’accorder la priorité aux personnes et à leurs droits fondamentaux.

Aux côtés d’autres groupes de la société civile, nous avons activement collaboré à la rédaction d’amendements et participé à de nombreuses discussions avec des membres des parlements européen et néerlandais, des décideurs politiques et diverses parties prenantes. Nous avons fermement insisté sur des interdictions concrètes et solides, telles que celles concernant l’identification biométrique et la police prédictive. En outre, nous avons souligné l’importance de la transparence, de la redevabilité et d’un mécanisme de réparation efficace dans le contexte de l’utilisation des systèmes d’IA.

Nous avons obtenu des résultats significatifs en matière de plaidoyer, notamment l’interdiction de l’identification biométrique en temps réel et a posteriori, une meilleure formulation des interdictions, des évaluations obligatoires de l’impact sur les droits fondamentaux, la reconnaissance de droits supplémentaires en matière de transparence, de redevabilité et de réparation, et la création d’une base de données obligatoire sur l’IA.

Mais nous reconnaissons qu’il y a encore du travail à faire. Nous continuerons à faire pression pour obtenir la meilleure protection possible des droits humains et à nous concentrer sur les demandes formulées dans notre déclaration au trilogue de l’UE. Celles-ci tendent vers l’établissement d’un cadre de redevabilité, de transparence, d’accessibilité et de réparation pour les personnes touchées par ces enjeux, et à la fixation des limites à la surveillance préjudiciable et discriminatoire exercée par les autorités nationales chargées de la sécurité, de l’application de la loi et de l’immigration. Elles s’opposent ainsi au lobbying des grandes entreprises technologiques en supprimant les lacunes qui sapent la réglementation.

Le chemin vers une réglementation complète et efficace de l’IA est en cours, et nous restons déterminés à poursuivre nos efforts pour faire en sorte que le cadre législatif final englobe nos demandes essentielles. Ensemble, nous visons à créer un environnement réglementaire en matière d’IA qui donne la priorité aux droits humains et protège les personnes.

Contactez Bits of Freedom sur sonsite web ou sa pageFacebook, et suivez@bitsoffreedom sur Twitter.
LIBERIA: ‘Anyone who committed crimes during the civil wars should be prosecuted, wherever they are’

CIVICUS speaks about the current war crime trial against former Liberian rebel commander Kunti Kamara with Adama Dempster, Secretary General of Civil Society Human Rights Advocacy Platform of Liberia.

Civil Society Human Rights Advocacy Platform of Liberia is a civil society network that brings together human rights civil society organisations (CSOs) across Liberia to advocate for human rights and bring justice and redress to the victims of human rights violations.

What is the significance of the ongoing trial of Kunti Kamara?

Kuinti Kamara’s trial is significant because it offers hope to the victims and survivors of Liberia’s civil wars, and especially to the direct victims of the atrocities he committed. It is also an indication that no one is above the law regardless of the position of power they occupy.

Kamara is the former commander of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy. a rebel group active in the early 1990s. He stands accused of imposing a state of terror on the population of Lofa, a county in north-western Liberia, during the first civil war from 1989 to 1996, which left a quarter million people dead.

Widespread atrocities – unspeakable crimes – were committed in Liberia. Kamara is charged with crimes against humanity, torture and acts of barbarism. He appears to have been involved or complicit with the forced recruitment of child soldiers, gang rapes, sexual slavery, looting, extrajudicial executions and even cannibalism. Nobody who commits such crimes should be able to avoid judgment.

Kamara is among the second group of people to be prosecuted for their role in the civil wars. His trial has recently begun at a French Court of Appeals in Paris, where he is being prosecuted under the legal principle of universal jurisdiction, according to which crimes against humanity know no borders.

This means that no matter where the perpetrators find themselves, whether in the country where they committed their crimes or anywhere else, they can still be held accountable, and justice can be served. CSOs on the ground have had the opportunity to speak in trials involving Liberians abroad and victims and survivors have had their say. The international community is helping us seek justice by bringing the accused to trial. That makes it unique and important to the quest for justice in Liberia.

How does civil society in general, and your organisation in particular, work for justice and accountability?

Since the civil wars ended in Liberia in 2003, civil society has played a leading role in seeking justice by investigating and documenting human rights abuses committed during the time of the conflict, advocating against the culture of impunity and helping victims, including by raising their voices.

To live in an environment that recognises human rights, we must first deal with unaddressed human rights violations that happened in the past. While we advocate for improving the current human rights situation, we also advocate for past human rights violations to be addressed so we can move forward.

Civil Society Human Rights Advocacy Platform of Liberia is a coalition of human rights CSOs. Along with the Global Justice Resource Project, a global digital platform that connects local CSOs seeking justice around the world, we document war-related atrocities committed in Liberia and work to make sure those responsible are prosecuted.

We understand that our society is still traumatised by the civil war, so we work to create awareness, educate and sensitise local communities on human rights issues. We train local human rights community-based CSOs across Liberia so they can also carry out advocacy work and help victims and survivors.

Advocacy is one of the strong elements of our work, which we use to shift the understanding of human rights issues at the national and regional levels so violations can be addressed. Our advocacy involves engaging with stakeholders from relevant institutions, the government and the international community. We specifically work with foreign governments so that any individual who committed crimes in Liberia during the civil wars can be prosecuted regardless of where they are in the world. Diaspora advocacy is also part of our work.

Over the years we have engaged in the follow up of the recommendations of the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), issued in 2009 and not yet implemented. We also conduct workshops with university students so they can learn about the importance of the TRC’s recommendations and measures the government should adopt to implement them.

We have had the opportunity to engage with the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review process by submitting a shadow report on the human rights situation in Liberia, and with the UN Human Rights Committee, where we participated in the review of the implementation of the TRC’s report.

Have you faced any challenges in the course of your work?

We have faced several challenges in doing our work. As human rights defenders we face continuous risk and are threatened by the very fact that we live among the people who committed the unspeakable crimes we work to bring justice over.

We have been placed under surveillance, followed and monitored by various groups that feel targeted by our work. People working on war crime cases have been threatened directly or indirectly through text messages and on social media. There is no law or policy to protect human rights defenders in Liberia. But because we want to see human rights recognised and respected, we continue to take the risk and carry on our work regardless of the threats.

Following up on the recommendations of the TRC report for more than a decade has also been challenging due to lack of political will and technical and funding support for advocacy around their implementation. Most organisations involved urgently need technical capacity to be able to continue their work.

What are the chances that Kamara’s trial will bring justice?

The Kamara trial has given Liberians hope that when crimes are committed, there is a possibility of justice being done. The fact that charges were brought and Kamara was put on trial made us believe justice will be served. It is also an opportunity for the accused to prove his innocence.

The trial also made us more hopeful that the Liberian government will realise it must urgently implement a mechanism capable of bringing justice in the country. We understand this might take time due to lack of resources and capacity, but a plan should be put in place towards that end. Kamara’s trial highlights the importance of establishing a mechanism in Liberia so that other people who stand accused can be brought to justice and victims and survivors can receive justice no matter the time or place.

The recent visit to Liberia by the US Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice, Beth Van Schaack, was a strong signal of support for our efforts to bring accountability and has given us a sense of hope and of being on the right path to challenging the culture of impunity.

What kind of support does Liberian civil society need from the international community?

We need the international community to encourage our government to live up to its responsibility to bring accountability and justice to its citizens when their human rights are violated. Our government has not shown the required political will so far, but we believe pressure from the international community will make it see the urgent need to hold perpetrators of war crimes accountable. The government should request support from the international community, including technical and financial support to establish a court to that end.

Funding is also needed to set up programmes to support victims and survivors. Most people who were sexually exploited during the wars have not even had the opportunity to seek medical help. So we also need the international community to help us put together and fund programmes bringing trauma counselling for victims, survivors and their families.

Read more here.

Civic space in Liberiais rated‘obstructed’by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with the Civil Society Human Rights Advocacy Platform of Liberia through itsFacebook page.

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