SOCS2024

• AI REGULATION: ‘There must be a balance between promoting innovation and protecting rights’

  CIVICUS speaks withNadia Benaissa, legal policy advisor at Bits of Freedom, about the risks artificial intelligence (AI) poses to human rights and the role civil society is playing in developing a legal framework for AI governance.

  Founded in 2000, Bits of Freedom is a Dutch civil society organisation (CSO) that aims to protect the rights to privacy and freedom of communication by influencing legislation and policy on technologies, giving policy advice, raising awareness and undertaking legal action. Bits of Freedom also took part in the negotiations of the European Union AI Act.

  What risks does AI pose to human rights?

  AI poses significant risks because it can exacerbate preexisting, deeply ingrained social inequalities. Among the rights impacted on are the rights to equality, freedom of religion, freedom of speech and the presumption of innocence.

  In the Netherlands we have recorded several instances of algorithmic systems violating human rights. One such case was the Childcare Benefit scandal, in which parents receiving benefits for childcare were unfairly targeted and profiled. Profiling predominantly affected people of colour, people with low incomes and Muslims, whom the tax authority falsely accused of committing fraud. This resulted in suspension of benefits for selected parents and caregivers and hostile investigations of their cases, leading to severe financial repercussions.

  Another example is the ‘Top400’ crime prevention programme implemented in the municipality of Amsterdam, which profiles minors and young people to identify the 400 who are most likely to commit offences. This practice disproportionally affects children from lower classes and children of colour, since the system’s geographic focus is skewed towards low-income and migrant neighbourhoods.

  In these cases, the unethical use of AI tools resulted in immense distress for the people affected. The lack of transparency in how automated decisions were made only added more difficulties in the search for justice and accountability. Many of the victims found it challenging to prove the system’s biases and errors.

  Are there any ongoing attempts to regulate AI?

  There is an ongoing process at the European level. In 2021, the European Commission (EC) proposed a legislative framework, the European Union (EU) AI Act, to address the ethical and legal challenges associated with AI technologies. The EU AI Act’s main goal is to create a comprehensive set of rules to govern the development, deployment and use of AI across EU member states. It seeks to keep a balance between promoting innovation and ensuring the protection of fundamental rights and values.

  This holds significant importance: it is a unique opportunity for Europe to distinguish itself by prioritising the protection of human rights in AI governance. However, the Act hasn’t yet been approved. A version of it was passed by the European Parliament in June, but there is still a final debate – a so-called ‘trilogue’ – to be had between the EC, the European Council and the European Parliament. The EC is pushing to finish the process by the end of the year so it can be submitted to a vote before the 2024 European Parliament elections.

  This trilogue has considerable challenges to overcome to achieve a comprehensive and effective AI Act. Contentious issues abound, including AI definitions and high-risk categories, as well as implementation and enforcement mechanisms.

  What is civil society, including Bits of Freedom, bringing to the table of negotiations?

  As negotiations of the Act proceed, a coalition of 150 CSOs, including Bits of Freedom, is urging the EC, the Council and Parliament to prioritise people and their fundamental rights.

  Alongside other civil society groups, we have actively collaborated to draft amendments and engage in numerous discussions with members of the European and Dutch Parliaments, policymakers and various stakeholders. We firmly pushed for concrete and robust prohibitions, such as those concerning biometric identification and predictive policing. Additionally, we emphasised the significance of transparency, accountability and effective redress in the use of AI systems.

  We have made significant advocacy achievements, which include the prohibition of real-time and post-biometric identification, a better formulation of prohibitions, mandatory Fundamental Rights Impact Assessments, the recognition of more rights regarding transparency, accountability and redress, and the establishment of a mandatory AI database.

  But we recognise that there is still work to be done. We’ll keep pushing for the best possible protection of human rights and we’ll continue to focus on the demands made in our statement to the EU trilogue, which boil down to empowering affected people with a framework of accountability, transparency, accessibility and redress, drawing limits on harmful and discriminatory surveillance by national security, law enforcement and migration authorities, and pushing back on Big Tech lobbying by removing loopholes that undermine regulation.

  The journey towards comprehensive and impactful AI regulation is ongoing, and we remain dedicated to continuing our efforts to ensure that the final legislative framework encompasses our critical asks. Together, we aim to create an AI regulatory environment that prioritises human rights and protects people.

  ---

  Get in touch with Bits of Freedom through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@bitsoffreedom on Twitter.

  
  

   

• AI: ‘The biggest challenges are the biases and lack of transparency of algorithms’

  

  CIVICUS speaks about the potential of artificial intelligence (AI) for civil society’s work with Omran Najjar, Kshitij Sharma, Leen D’hondt, Nasilele Amatende and Petya Kangalova of Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team (HOT).

  HOT is an international civil society group dedicated to humanitarian action and community development through open mapping. It supports communities to undertake their own mapping and provides map data that is applied to disaster management, risk reduction and development work.

  What does HOT do?

  HOT is an international team dedicated to humanitarian action and community development through open mapping. We develop open-source apps and tools for collaborative mapping and geospatial data collection. We enable communities, civil society organisations (CSOs), international organisations and government partners to use and contribute to OpenStreetMap for locally relevant challenges by providing training, equipment, knowledge exchange and field projects. Our tools are free for all to use and employed by partners such as Red Cross societies, Médecins Sans Frontières, United Nations agencies and programmes, government agencies and local CSOs and communities.

  Each year, disasters around the world affect, displace or kill millions of people. Missing maps can result in aid not reaching communities affected by disasters. Humanitarian mapping ensures that decision-makers are able to rely on maps and geodata to better allocate resources to respond to disasters and to better reach target communities. When major disaster strikes, thousands of HOT volunteers come together online and on the ground to create open map data that enables disaster responders to reach those in need. Through the Missing Maps project, the HOT global community creates maps of high vulnerability areas where data is scarce, putting an area home to millions of people onto the world map in OpenStreetMap (OSM), a community-driven free and editable map of the world.

  How do you use AI in your work?

  AI systems are computer software capable of behaving in ways that mimic and even surpass human capabilities. AI therefore refers to the ability of computers to emulate human thought and perform tasks that are usually performed by humans. Some people call it machine learning, but strictly speaking machine learning is a pathway to AI: it refers to the technologies and algorithms that enable systems to identify patterns, make decisions and improve through repetition and the accumulation of data.

  AI systems are created with a variety of tools including machine learning, natural language processing – the ability to use human language, computer vision – the ability to interpret images – and neural networks, which function like a human brain to analyse data logically, learn complex patterns and make predictions.

  AI-enabled programmes can analyse and contextualise data, accelerate decision-making and automate tasks, triggering actions without human intervention. However, we are looking into keeping the human in the loop in the humanitarian mapping movement in all HOT programmes. This aligns with the HOT core value of putting people first.

  AI is not in the future – it is embedded in many technologies we use on a daily basis, such as ‘smart’ devices, and is used in the production of goods and the delivery of services, from customer service to healthcare. And it is used in volunteer mapping.

  Map With AI uses a subfield of AI called computer vision, in which machines learn to spot complex patterns in images so they can analyse the same type of satellite and drone imagery that OSM volunteers have used for years. For instance, an AI system is trained to process images to identify possible roads, or buildings such as hospitals or schools, and highlight them on a map. Humans then review and confirm or modify the AI system’s suggestions. There is still a lot of human work involved, but it is believed that AI-assisted mapping makes mapping much more efficient.

  Many people fear that AI will replace humans, but rather than replacing humans, what we try to do is facilitate and amplify human actions using AI assistance. That’s why we always include humans in the loop and gather feedback. This feedback is essential to assess the performance of an AI and increase the intelligence of an algorithm. AI models will always be learning as we use them. The more data we feed into an algorithm, the more intelligent it becomes.

  AI does imply threats, but also opportunities that we can take advantage of for human rights and humanitarian work to support humanitarian and emergency responders on the ground as map users.

  What threats does AI pose, and how do you tackle them?

  The biggest challenges are the biases and the lack of transparency of the algorithms embedded in existing AI solutions.

  Most current AI models are closed. It’s not clear how they were trained. They are like a black box in which you provide input, then magic happens and you obtain a certain output. The more you train it, the better it becomes, but the output will always depend on your input. And those bringing in the input are often biased.

  The problem with existing models is you cannot even know if they are biased, or how they are biased because they are black boxes. You cannot know what’s inside and training data and processes are not traceable.

  We seek to tackle biases by localising models, meaning we are not looking at the general model that works everywhere. And we counter the lack of transparency by using fully open-source AI models. In our case, it’s clear how our AI systems are trained and who is training them. The training data is available, so anyone could check how we get a certain output. And those bringing in the input are local people doing the mapping of their own space for their own purposes. The input is relevant in their context.

  In our work, map data features like buildings or roads are extracted automatically from satellite or drone imagery and validated by humans – local humans who train the AI models by applying them in their own regions. HOT adds this local knowledge to the extracted data. For instance, if I am working in the health sector in Zimbabwe and the imagery shows a building that appears to be a hospital, locals will not only confirm whether this is the case but will also note whether this is a facility where pregnant women can get certain services – the kind of data that is not easily extractable from imagery with current technologies.

  It is the local community who defines what they want to map and why. We don’t give directions. We have regional hubs that provide support, but the actual ask comes from communities. This could be mapping fishponds in India, water points in Niger, or buildings in Brazil. It’s very often about mapping certain buildings so that people know where to go in an emergency, but it very much depends on whether the maps are going to be used for development work or in the event of a disaster.

  HOT grew and became known as a result of its mapping of buildings and roads, which was very useful in responding to earthquakes such as those in Haiti and Nepal. But we then expanded our focus to enable not only post-disaster action but also anticipatory action, which is increasingly related to climate change-related challenges such as flooding or drought. At the end of the day, it’s about what each community wants to take action on – we basically enable them to do it. We’re more of a catalyser; we don’t want to do everything ourselves, and that’s why all our software is free and open source.

  How do you support communities so they can do their mapping?

  We make sure that the software is in place and we provide training. We try to partner local organisations with our partners to get them funding, and we sometimes deliver grants to communities so they can do their mapping.

  There is a technology aspect to it, but it is a lot more than that. A community, for instance in Brazil, may approach us because they face the challenge that the government doesn’t recognise them as living where they live and want our support to map their area. We enable them to use the software, help them visualise things on maps, train them to fly drones and help them do peer-to-peer training.

  We are really an enablement organisation – our mission is to enable others so ideally the movement would start moving on its own and we wouldn’t need to exist anymore.

  There seems to be a lot of human work involved, so what’s the part that’s done by AI?

  AI assists mappers so that they can create the map data faster, more accurately and more efficiently. A person cannot map an area that is a hundred square kilometres, and here is where AI comes in. AI extracts features from available satellite imagery, identifies them as, say, a building, and then mappers validate this with local knowledge. For road mapping, there is also the option of going on a drive with a software that uses a GPS tracker to collect data with coordinates, which is then uploaded to the map.

  The data mappers feed in to train the AI so it gets better and better at making predictions when used to map other parts of the same city or region. We work with local models that get to know a specific area and can perform very well in that area.

  Now the volunteers who will be mapping, they don’t need to be in the same location, although we would love to have people from the same community doing it. There are always some, because the person leading the project is from the area, and they work with what we call civic volunteers. They will be doing the first mapping – what we call the base map – with roads, rivers and major buildings, without going into further details. Then it’s the turn of locals, who will know if a building is a hospital, a school or something else, because they live there.

  We have a new product coming soon, the field mapping task manager, which helps complete the mapping of a certain area by adding more local knowledge.

  Do you think AI should be regulated?

  This probably depends on the kind of AI and the risk it poses. The European Union has recently started developing a regulatory framework, the EU Artificial Intelligence Act, to regulate AI systems on a sliding scale of risk. For instance, AI systems that carry unacceptable risk – such as social scoring systems and AI applications that remotely monitor people in real time in public spaces – would be prohibited. High-risk AI systems – such as AI deployed in medical devices, the management of critical infrastructure, employment recruitment tools, credit scoring applications and so on – would have to comply with very strict requirements to ensure transparency, data governance and record-keeping, and human oversight, among other things.

  ---

  Get in touch with HOT through itswebsite or itsFacebook orInstagram accounts, and follow@hotosm on Twitter.

• ALGERIA: ‘Civil society aspires to a more democratic and rights-centred environment’

  CIVICUS speaksabout the ongoing repression of dissent in Algeriawith Rachid Aouine,Director for SHOAA for Human Rights.

  SHOAA for Human Rights is an independent civil society organisation (CSO) aimed at supporting and protecting human rights in Algeria. Founded in 2020 and based in London, UK, it raises awareness of human rights and monitors, documents and denounces state abuses of rights.

  What’s the current situation for civil society in Algeria?

  Algeria’s seen an unprecedented increase in repression, particularly targeting freedoms of peaceful assembly and association. The authorities are employing a range of tactics to silence dissent, including legal amendments and new laws that broaden the scope of offences related to public order disturbances and activities deemed to threaten national security.

  Activists and journalists face criminal charges for the ‘dissemination of false information’ and ‘incitement to unarmed gatherings’. Concerns arise with the introduction of terrorism charges under article 87 bis of the Penal Code, which could target peaceful activists advocating for governance changes. Widespread abuse of pretrial detention contrary to the presumption of innocence has become the norm.

  The suppression of critical associations, restrictions on political parties and limitations of academic freedom contribute to widespread repression and further reflect that Algeria doesn’t comply with the provisions of the international human rights treaties and conventions it’s ratified. In summary, Algerian authorities are using legislative measures to curb dissent, restrict fundamental rights and limit the activities of civil society, political parties and academics.

  Is it still possible for independent CSOs to work in Algeria?

  Independent CSOs face significant challenges due to legal restrictions and government actions. Associations Law No. 12-06 imposes stringent regulations, requiring official authorisation for CSOs to operate and penalties for unregistered or suspended associations up to imprisonment. The dissolution of associations and political parties further narrows the space for independent civil society. State restrictions on foreign funding further endanger the financial sustainability of CSOs.

  Activists encounter arrest, detention and conviction, fostering a climate of fear and self-censorship. This has led to a more cautious approach that has affected the vibrancy of civil society.

  Despite these challenges, some CSOs continue to operate in Algeria and persist in advocating for causes under government scrutiny. Most, however, have had to move abroad to evade direct pressure and legal constraints.

  Overall, the environment poses difficulties, if not making it impossible, for independent CSOs to operate.

  How does SHOAA for Human Rights help Algerian activists under threat?

  Our multifaceted support system encompasses an array of strategies. We collaborate with international human rights organisations, United Nations (UN) treaty bodies and other international institutions to draw attention to rights violations in Algeria and ensure activists are protected under international standards. We also collaborate with Algerian diaspora organisations and activists both inside and outside Algeria to meticulously document human rights abuses, including arrests and unfair trials. This documentation serves as a foundation for robust advocacy and awareness campaigns.

  Cooperation with Algerian human rights lawyers and international legal experts is key to ensuring that activists have proper legal representation when prosecuted. The establishment of safe havens and support networks is critical for activists facing immediate threats in Algeria. To that end, we collaborate with international organisations and governments willing to provide political refuge. We also engage in capacity development to empower activists with the knowledge and skills to navigate legal challenges effectively.

  How has Algerian civil society reacted to the pressure?

  In response to increased repression, Algerian civil society has demonstrated resilience by mobilising and presenting a unified front. We have engaged in collective advocacy, as evidenced by the detailed recommendations submitted to two UN Special Rapporteurs during their country visits to Algeria.

  Civil society has taken a coordinated approach to improve legal frameworks. Our unified set of demands includes calls for legal reforms, the release of detainees, investigations into human rights abuses and the protection of fundamental freedoms such as the rights to assembly and association. This cohesive agenda indicates alignment among different segments of civil society.

  To foster international solidarity, we’ve built alliances with the Algerian diaspora and global activist communities. Through joint campaigns, initiatives and collaborative efforts, we amplify our collective voice and exert pressure on the Algerian government to uphold human rights. This reflects a strategic collaboration in search of international support and intervention in response to the challenges faced domestically.

  These efforts convey a strong sense of solidarity among the Algerian people, emphasising their collective desire for the respect of constitutional provisions and international treaties and conventions. This unity underscores a shared commitment to human rights and democratic values, despite the challenges posed by governmental repression. Our endeavours depict a narrative of resilience and concerted action toward positive change.

  What are your most urgent demands to the Algerian government?

  Algerian civil society, operating in and outside Algeria, aspires to a series of legal, institutional and procedural changes to foster a more democratic and rights-centred environment.

  We urge the government to align the Penal Code with the international human rights standards set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that Algeria has ratified. We urge a revision of Associations Law No. 12-06 to safeguard the rights to freedoms of assembly and association. It is imperative to stop attacks on civil society and political parties and rehabilitate bodies that have been suspended or dissolved. In seeking revisions to Law No. 23-02 and Law No. 23-08, we aim to ensure the protection of trade union rights and the right to strike. We also advocate for an amendment to Article 87 bis in the Anti-Terrorism Law to define acts of terrorism, in compliance with international human rights law.

  Other pressing demands include the immediate and unconditional release of detainees held under laws conflicting with international human rights standards and the investigation of detention conditions, including in military prisons. To ensure transparency and justice, civil society calls for the public release of findings of investigations into incidents during peaceful assemblies, along with financial compensation for affected families. We demand accountability. Those responsible for torture, violence and deaths of protesters must be brought to justice to prevent the recurrence of abuses. We also call for the implementation of robust human rights monitoring practices by human rights CSOs.

  What international support does Algerian civil society need?

  Algerian civil society actively seeks international support to achieve compliance with constitutional and treaty obligations, advocate for legal reforms and ensure the release of political prisoners, as well as accountability for perpetrators.

  The international community must exert diplomatic pressure on Algerian authorities to foster constitutional adherence and respect for fundamental rights. Support is necessary to align the Penal Code with international human rights standards and reform laws related to freedoms of assembly and association and trade union rights. International advocacy for the release of detainees subjected to arbitrary arrests, unfair trials and other forms of repression is crucial, along with accountability for human rights violations. This could be achieved through joint submissions to the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review process and cooperation with UN special mandate holders.

  Algerian civil society, particularly human rights CSOs, also needs international financial aid to sustain its activities, while ensuring that national legislation doesn’t incriminate organisations receiving support.

  In sum, international solidarity should encompass diplomatic pressure, advocacy efforts, financial assistance, collaboration with local civil society activists, media coverage and public awareness campaigns.

  ---

  Civic space in Algeria is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with SHOAA for Human Rights through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@shoaa_org onTwitter.

• ALGERIA: ‘The state must respect the freedoms of those calling for truth and justice on enforced disappearances’

  

  CIVICUS speaks about the repression of civil society in Algeria with Nassera Dutour, a Franco-Algerian human rights activist and president of the Collective of Families of People Disappeared in Algeria (CFDA) and the Euro-Mediterranean Federation against Enforced Disappearances.

  The CFDA was founded in Paris in May 1998 by Algerian mothers living in France who had relatives who had disappeared in Algeria. It defends the right to truth and justice of the families of the disappeared and has worked from the outset to raise national and international public awareness of the scale of human rights violations in Algeria.

   

  What’s the reason for the recent increase in repression in Algeria?

  In February 2019, the people of Algeria mobilised spontaneously and peacefully to demand democratic change. They took to the streets of Algiers and other cities to protest against incumbent President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s bid for a fifth term. Even after his resignation, the protest movement, known as the Hirak, lost none of its momentum, broadening its demands to call for a radical overhaul of the regime, a civilian government and a ‘free and democratic Algeria’.

  Although the COVID-19 pandemic put the demonstrations on hold from March 2020 onwards, mobilisation resumed in February 2021 before experiencing a definitive decline, partly due to concerted pressure from the authorities to suppress the movement. Human rights activists, particularly those who dare to criticise the government’s rhetoric and policies, are constantly harassed and intimidated. The security forces monitor and threaten them, creating a climate of fear that is gradually becoming fatal to human rights activism. In some extreme cases, activists face physical violence, which compromises their safety and their ability to continue their essential work.

  Algerian courts have used numerous provisions of the Penal Code to silence critical voices online and offline. Journalists such as Mustapha Bendjama, Khaled Drareni, Ihsane El-Kadi and Rabah Karèche have been targeted with long prison sentences for exposing corruption and abuse. The authorities have also arbitrarily restricted or blocked access to independent news websites, further undermining access to diverse information.

  Among other tactics, the authorities have often invoked the ‘national interest’ to restrict the freedom of action of human rights defenders. For example, Nacer Meghnine, president of the SOS Bab El Oued association, was sentenced in 2021 for publications found at his association’s headquarters denouncing repression, arbitrary arrests and torture. The judges considered that these writings tarnished Algeria’s international image, and that by criticising Algeria for failing to apply the United Nations (UN) Convention against Torture, he was inciting foreign interference. Nacer Meghnine was also convicted of direct incitement to unarmed assembly for leaflets displaying portraits of prisoners of conscience. One of the most formidable tools used by the authorities to repress dissent is anti-terrorism legislation, which has broadened the definition of terrorism.

  Are independent civil society organisations able to operate in Algeria?

  The CFDA remains a clandestine association despite numerous attempts to legalise it with the Ministry of the Interior and the prefecture. There has never been any justification from the government for refusing to authorise its registration.

  From 2001 to 2013, the CFDA had to move its offices in Algeria every year, due to intimidation of the owners by the Algerian authorities. In France, there were two particularly violent intrusions into our offices, which were completely ransacked. The Algerian government puts a great deal of psychological pressure on the members of the organisation both in Algeria and France.

  In 2023, police officers came to the Algiers offices and threatened members of the association. No action was taken, although the association’s lawyer tried to find out whether there was an investigation file on the CFDA or on the owner of the premises.

  When we were organising a conference in Algiers, the authorities came to the hotel and ‘suggested’ that we should not hold the conference. CFDA staff and partners tried for hours to stand up to the police and gendarmerie, but they forced us to leave. This international seminar, which was to have been held over two days on the theme of ‘Truth, Justice and Conciliation’, was simply banned.

  Our telephone and internet have been regularly cut off without any explanation, and our website and social media accounts have been hacked twice. The CFDA radio station that we set up in 2016 was immediately censored and made inaccessible in Algeria. Six years later, the site was hacked and the CFDA was forced to create another site under a different name.

  CFDA members have been subjected to psychological harassment, including repeated death threats. In 2002, the French authorities warned me that Algeria had given the order to kill me.

  In addition, recourse to foreign funding is drastically limited, while it is virtually impossible to gain access to state funding, which is only available to organisations affiliated with the Algerian state.

  Since the Hirak, the dissolution of associations has increased exponentially. An association can be suspended if it ‘interferes in the country’s internal affairs or undermines national sovereignty’. The Youth Action Gathering and the Algerian League for the Defence of Human Rights have been dissolved.

  Demonstrations organised in Algeria to defend human rights are often repressed by the police, with numerous arbitrary arrests and detentions, cases of short and long-term enforced disappearances and incidences of torture.

  As a result of this repression, many human rights defenders, lawyers and journalists have had to leave Algeria for France or other European countries. But the diaspora continues to present a united front through joint actions such as demonstrations in Paris every Sunday, advocacy missions to national, European and international institutions, documentation and the drafting of reports for decision-making and investigative and judicial bodies, the publication of press articles and official press releases, conferences and round tables, and social media campaigns.

  How does the CFDA work to protect and promote human rights in Algeria?

  The CFDA advocates with international bodies and invites human rights activists and members of civil society in Algeria to take part.

  The CFDA immediately informs the public as soon as it becomes aware of a human rights violation in Algeria. However, we don’t stop at denunciations: we make calls on states in writing and urge international bodies to take action through urgent appeals to various UN special procedures and to the commissioners of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

  The CFDA has produced several reports on human rights in Algeria, the non-independence of the judiciary, women’s rights, arbitrary detentions and enforced disappearances.

  In 2014 in the city or Oran, we inaugurated the Centre for the Preservation of Memory and the Study of Human Rights. This is a space open to the public for documentation, meetings and reflection on human rights issues. It has a wide range of publications on enforced disappearances and transitional justice.

  The CFDA trains and informs people. It provides information through its social networks and website, as well as through its online radio station, Radio of the Voiceless. Since 2016, the radio station has covered human rights issues through regular podcasts and interviews. It is an integral part of our memorialisation work because it offers a space for expression to people who have been silenced. Since 2019, the radio station has also been following up and commenting on the Hirak and the authoritarian excesses of the Algerian regime.

  The CFDA trains human rights activists in international and African human rights protection mechanisms, internal and external communication and conflict management. It invests heavily in the independence of the judiciary because it believes that the rule of law and democracy cannot exist without an independent judiciary, and that without the rule of law, the truth about enforced disappearances in Algeria will never be established.

  What are your demands to the Algerian government?

  With regard to the search for the truth, we demand an exhaustive and impartial investigation into all cases of disappearance so that the victim, if alive, is placed under the protection of the law, and if not, their remains are returned to their family. All those concerned by the disappearance must have access to the final results of the investigation.

  The authorities must use all technical and legal means available to locate mass graves and unmarked graves, identify bodies, clarify the circumstances in which they were buried and return the remains to the families. They must set up a DNA database for identification purposes.

  To put an end to impunity, the authorities must carry out immediate and impartial investigations into each alleged case of disappearance in which the instigator, perpetrator or accomplice is a public official. Any criminal complaint against an unknown person or public official must be declared admissible and investigated immediately. The state must also take urgent measures to guarantee the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.

  In addition, appropriate and adequate reparations must be made to the victims, including adequate financial compensation, moral and psychological rehabilitation, and the fullest and most visible remembrance possible.

  To ensure that the crimes of the past are not repeated, the state must respect, protect, guarantee and promote freedoms of opinion, expression, association and peaceful assembly for those who demand truth and justice. It must protect all the victims and their families against potential attacks on their physical and moral integrity that they may suffer as a result of their demands.

  What support does Algerian civil society receive from international allies, and what other international support do you need?

  International civil society organisations such as Amnesty International and the International Federation for Human Rights are constantly alert to the Algerian government’s repression.

  In addition, these organisations, along with the CFDA and other Algerian organisations, have led and taken part in advocacy missions to international bodies, particularly in Europe, for the release of prisoners of conscience. We have obtained three resolutions from the European Parliament on human rights violations in Algeria.

  Despite these actions, to our knowledge and great despair, no state has spoken out or denounced the repression in Algeria.

  In this context, it is necessary to strengthen international solidarity to show a united front in order to create a balance of power that leads states to urge the state of Algeria to respect its international obligations regarding collective and individual freedoms and the establishment of the rule of law in Algeria, starting with judicial independence.

  As for enforced disappearances, it is necessary to raise international awareness of the fact that this practice can occur under any repressive government and concerns all societies, all the more so in a globalised world where intergenerational traumas and practices are particularly mobile. This tactic first surfaced in the Latin American dictatorships of the 1970s and 80s, and is now used on every continent by authoritarian regimes of all political persuasions. Yet decision-makers and various stakeholders have shown themselves to be disengaged. We absolutely must mobilise a broad public and organise internationally to combat and prevent this crime.

  ---

  Civic space in Algeria is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with CFDA through itswebsite, Instagram account orFacebook page, and follow@SOS_Disparus on Twitter.

• ANGOLA: ‘The new NGO Law is just a way of legalising the government’s arrogance and excesses’

  PORTUGUESE

  CIVICUS discusses the state of civic space and the new restrictions being imposed on the work of Angolan civil society with Godinho Cristóvão, a jurist, human rights defender and executive director of the association Movimento de Defensores de Direitos Humanos de Angola (Movement of Human Rights Defenders of Angola, KUTAKESA).

  KUTAKESA is a civil society organisation (CSO) working for the rights and protection of human rights defenders (HRDs) in Angola, particularly those active in more vulnerable areas, working on more sensitive issues and from historically excluded groups.

  What are the current conditions for civil society in Angola?

  Angolan CSOs work in a climate of suspicion and uncertainty, despite the fact that the Constitution of the Republic of Angola enshrines a catalogue of citizens’ fundamental rights, freedoms and guarantees.

  The Angolan authorities should have aligned themselves with the democratic rule of law and respected the work of CSOs and HRDs. Instead, there has been an increase in threats, harassment and illegal arrests of HRDs who denounce or hold peaceful demonstrations against acts of bad governance and violations of citizens’ rights and freedoms. There have been clear setbacks with regard to the guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the constitution, as well as the rights set out in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other human rights treaties Angola has ratified.

  How is the government targeting civil society with restrictive legislation?

  The attacks on civil society are totally uncalled for. On 25 May, the Angolan National Assembly passed a draft NGO Statute, despite severe criticism from CSOs, which have stated that it limits freedom of association and gives the state excessive powers to interfere with CSO activities.

  The government targets civil society with legislation that is meant for terrorists and money launderers, though it has never been proven in any court that a CSO has committed an act of terrorism in Angola. On the contrary, the rationale of this legislation constitutes institutional terrorism, the target of which are CSOs.

  In Angola we all know who the corrupt are, and which party feeds corruption and money laundering. And as far as we know, CSOs are not part of that group. Funders of Angolan CSOs are all clearly identified, and the transfer of funds goes through national banking institutions and a rigorous compliance process. It is also worth remembering that many CSO funders are the same ones that fund government projects.

  How does the new restrictive law compare with the 2015 decree that was declared unconstitutional?

  In general, the content and spirit of Presidential Decree 74/15 on the Regulation of NGOs are the same as those of the new NGO Statute Law. By way of example, the rights and duties chapter of the previous regulation, later declared unconstitutional, was retained with only minimal changes in wording that in no way alter its content and its controlling and repressive spirit.

  Additionally, the decree that was found unconstitutional provided for an administrative body under the tutelage of the Angolan executive – called IMPROCAC – with the power to monitor and control CSO actions. The recently approved draft NGO Statute Law provides for a similar body with the same attributions as the old IMPROCAC.

  In other words, this is a new attempt to impose similar restrictions, but it is more serious since its instrument is no longer a presidential decree but a law. This means that it is no longer only the executive that is attacking the principles of autonomy and freedom of association provided for in article 48 of the constitution, but Congress as well, in which the president’s party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), has a majority. It is worth remembering that it was the MPLA majority that approved the 2010 constitution which it is now violating by passing the NGO Statute Law.

  How is civil society, including KUTAKESA, reacting to the proposed law?

  CSOs, at least the most active ones, are not looking favourably on the approval of this law, given the threats it represents in terms of closing off civic space in Angola.

  We are taking joint action to prevent the final approval of this law and its entry into force. From the point of view of legal certainty and security, the courts should be aligned with the principle of jurisprudential precedent. Since they submitted the presidential decree to a review of unconstitutionality and declared it unconstitutional, they should now follow suit, given that the new law contains the same irregularities.

  All national organisations took a joint position to call on parliament to take off the agenda the law now approved. This was done through information exchange meetings with opposition parties represented in parliament. At the same time we made public statements alerting the public about the dangers for freedom of association if the law was approved, and we made urgent appeals to the special rapporteurs of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the United Nations (UN) who have a mandate on freedom of association and HRDs to alert the Angolan government about the consequences the law will have on respect for human rights.

  On KUTAKESA’s part, urgent appeals were made to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in Africa, Remy Ngoy Lumbu, and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, Mary Lawlor.

  Do you see the new law as part of a wider trend to restrict civic space?

  Yes of course, but it is also important to note that the repression of peaceful and legal demonstrations predates the approval of this law. Government mismanagement and endemic corruption have been some of the main causes of the deteriorating social, economic and family conditions for the majority of the population, leading to growing protests and mass demonstrations, which have often been repressed. The approval of this law is just another means of repression and of legalising the arrogance and excesses of the government and its agents, particularly the national police.

  While the law is not necessarily intended as a response to the ongoing protests, given that the attempt to get it passed dates back to 2015, it is likely to be used as another tool to crack down on the protests.

  Now, if the government has good sense and makes a strategic reading of the current political and social context of Angola, it could stop the process of approval of the law or, if it is too late for that, the president could refuse to promulgate it, taking the appeals of civil society into consideration. The law’s approval would certainly increase the number of protests and demonstrations.

  Civic space in Angola is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with KUTAKESA through theirwebsite.

• ANGOLA: ‘The untrue government narrative reveals an aversion to civil society denouncing malpractice’

   PORTUGUESE

  

  CIVICUS discusses the state of civic space and the new restrictions being imposed on civil society in Angola with Emilio José Manuel, focal point for Angola of the Lusophone Platform for Human Rights and founding member of the Working Group for Human Rights Monitoring in Angola (GTMDH).

  The GTMDH is a platform of civil society organisations (CSOs) that works to promote and defend human rights and strives for social justice within the framework of the Angolan constitution and other current laws, as well as international conventions and treaties.

  What are the conditions for civil society in Angola?

  Although there is currently no direct or indirect interference in the work of civil society in Angola, the authorities’ discourse is that, because they receive funding from international institutions, CSOs defend and represent foreign interests.

  Meanwhile there are many joint actions between public institutions and CSOs. For example, once a year the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights organises a forum with CSOs where the GTMDH presents its public position on human rights and provides information on the granting of registration certificates, the legal documents that the Angolan state gives to each CSO attesting that it is legally registered and can operate in the country.

  Why is the government targeting CSOs with legislation aimed at terrorists and money launderers?

  According to the report supporting the draft law, the president considers that he has ‘encountered constraints and difficulties in ensuring compliance with international obligations assumed by the Angolan Government in the area of money laundering and the financing of terrorism’. Hence the need to control the sources and destination of CSO funds.

  This narrative of the Angolan government is untrue and clearly demonstrates its aversion to the role of CSOs in monitoring and denouncing government malpractice. Financial support for the projects of CSOs and human rights defenders comes from well-identified organisations and goes through banking institutions with strict compliance rules – and some of these funders are the same ones that support government projects.

  On 26 May, the draft NGO Statute Law was passed in general by the Angolan National Assembly, ignoring severe criticism from civil society, which has made clear that it limits the right of association and gives the executive excessive powers to interfere in CSO activities.

  The situation is very alarming because the draft law imposes a 120-day period for existing CSOs to make their statutes conform with the law, otherwise they will be outlawed outright without a judicial decision. Article 2 of the draft law requires existing CSOs to conform with the new provisions, under penalty of having their statutes and registrations revoked. This is a violation of the principle of legality and access to justice guaranteed by the Angolan constitution. The principle of legality requires that the law should be clearly articulated and known in advance and should not be applied retroactively.

  How has civil society reacted to the draft law?

  Civil society analysed the draft law and reacted against it. In collaboration with the GTMDH coordinator, my role as legal officer was to prepare petitions, public position papers and communications with the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, and to engage with regional and international partners to amplify the voices of Angolan civil society.

  We requested a technical opinion from UN Special Rapporteur Clément Voule and drafted a public civil society position on the bill explaining why it violates freedoms of association, which we presented publicly at a press conference.

  We advocated with opposition parties represented in parliament and made contacts with the Angolan Bar Association to file, within the scope of our constitutional prerogatives, the appropriate action for an assessment of the unconstitutionality of the draft law. The day before the general approval of the draft law, we sent a public petition to the National Assembly demanding that it not approve it.

  Our next action will be to send a letter to the presidents of some key countries about the closure of civic space in Angola and increasing controls over CSOs, including international CSOs.

  Protests are also taking place against the proposed NGO Statute Law, which have converged with protests against measures that have increased fuel prices and a crackdown on street vendors.

  Do you see this bill as part of a wider trend of restricting civic space?

  The recent repression of demonstrations, arrests of activists and attacks on protesters, including women, is an indicator that civic space is being severely restricted. The use of force by the national police has resulted in deaths without any appropriate process to hold to account and punish police officers involved in cases of violence, torture and killings.

  Our country depends on importing food staples and other goods from abroad. Right now the prices of food, other goods and services have increased. Street vendors are a group that some CSOs work with, particularly those dedicated to empowering women to establish small businesses. Some organisations provide micro credits to street vendors. Although the street vendors’ movement has a life of its own, it is CSOs and their lawyers who have provided them with free legal aid.

  There is a current of national solidarity, taking into account that the law does not explicitly say it will regulate all initiatives by citizens who wish to create an association. My personal opinion is that everyone feels that control will go further. The draft NGO Statute Law lacks a clear definition of what a ‘non-governmental organisation’ is. It also includes vague provisions that need to be better fleshed out to enable the proper interpretation of the law. For example, it is difficult to understand the meaning and normative scope of article 19(1)(d), which imposes a ‘duty on NGOs to refrain from practices and actions that are subversive or liable to be confused with them’. The unanswered question here is how subversive actions are to be defined in the context of the law.

  How does the new draft law compare with the 2015 decree that was deemed unconstitutional?

  According to the analysis we’ve made, the arguments and contents are the same as in Decree 74/15 on the Regulation of NGOs. We have the new role of counselling judges in the Constitutional Court. The situation in the Supreme Court indicates that we have a crisis in the judiciary. So it is uncertain whether this time the judicial decision will be in favour of CSOs. The present draft law establishes rules to control, restrict, approve, authorise and suspend the activities of CSOs, including CSO extinction by an administrative entity to be determined by the president as holder of the executive power, which violates the principle of freedom of association as provided in article 48 of the constitution.

  Do you view the draft NGO Statute Law as part of a regional or global trend?

  After having participated in sessions of the NGO Forum and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, I noted a tendency to restrict civic space throughout Africa. As part of the civil society strategy, we held meetings with activists from Mozambique to share experiences and assemble regional, continental and international strategies. It is worth remembering that various activists, whether linked to CSOs or not, are directly involved in campaigns and waves of protest to try to ensure that the draft law is not given final approval by parliament and promulgated by the president.

  Civic space in Angola is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Contact GTMDH through itswebsite.

• ARGENTINA: ‘Milei’s victory expresses the rejection of the previous governments’

  CIVICUS speaks with Yanina Welp, researcher at the Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy, about the results of Argentina’s runoff presidential election, won by a far-right outsider.

  How do you explain the victory of Javier Milei, an outsider with no party structure?

  Milei’s victory, like that of any other candidate, cannot be explained by a single reason. There are at least three main explanations for his victory.

  First, there’s the economic situation. On top of a high level of poverty – 40 per cent and growing – Argentina has very high inflation, and the economy hasn’t grown for many years. And the same goes for formal employment. There are a lot of informal workers and many people experience high levels of uncertainty.

  Second is the inability of the political class to respond to these demands. Most recently, those in power have acted arrogantly. Insecurity, corruption scandals and the passivity of the authorities in the face of all these have increased. Milei’s leadership came to embody people’s rejection of the situation. Many people voted for him because he expresses well the rejection of recent administrations, and not necessarily because they approve of or adhere to the policies he has proposed to implement.

  Third, there’s the role of political leadership, and specifically of the incumbent, for doing nothing in the face of this threat and even encouraging Milei’s candidacy with the aim of dividing the opposition’s vote and therefore having a better chance at winning. This was done first by Peronists, in the run-up to the first round, and by former president Mauricio Macri ahead of the runoff, which put his Together for Change coalition in crisis.

  Do you think the electorate has leaned to the right?

  Unlike almost all the other candidates, who only had vague and general proposals, Milei ran on a strongly ideological platform, which he kept putting forward throughout the campaign.

  However, when analysing people’s attitudes, there are contradictions, first and foremost because there is no universal notion of what is supposed to be ‘right-wing’ or ‘left-wing’. For instance, polls show growing concern about rising insecurity, and it would be very elitist to think that having this concern makes you right-wing. The rise in crime shows that it is a real concern.

  It is true that in this election campaign positive perceptions of the private sector have increased compared to perceptions of the public administration, possibly as a result of Milei’s discourse but also because the image of the state has deteriorated considerably under recent administrations. In this sense, it could be said that voters have indeed moved towards the right. But Milei’s victory with almost 56 per cent of the vote shouldn’t lead to the conclusion that more than half of the electorate have ideologically leaned rightwards, or even embraced the radical right, because many voted for him because he embodies the reaction to the status quo rather than because of his ideological proposals.

  During the campaign it was argued that democracy was at stake. Is Argentina’s democracy in danger?

  Democracy is not in imminent danger, as was the case with military coups, which wiped democracy away overnight. There are signs of democratic erosion – but these have been there for years. There has been both progress and setbacks, including attempts to co-opt the judiciary, the misuse of state resources and clientelistic practices.

  Generally speaking, Argentina’s democratic institutions work. Despite the opposition’s complaints about the electoral system, the elections took place normally and the results were out very quickly.

  However, we have seen a huge setback in terms of public debate. Intolerance and verbal violence have increased. Supporters of different parties can hardly talk to each other. There is a lot of aggression on social media. These are all medium-intensity warning signs that, if not addressed, will only pave the way for more violence and authoritarianism.

  How will Argentina’s political scene change following this election?

  Since 2003, with Néstor Kirchner’s election to the presidency, a system of two broad coalitions formed, which since 2007, under Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, has been maintained by the introduction of open, simultaneous and compulsory primary elections. These served to avoid party fragmentation but had the negative effect of eroding programmatic or ideological differences. The two coalitions that formed as a result included their own right and left wings, blurring the ideological debate and replacing it with a divide between Peronism and anti-Peronism. This ended up encouraging affective polarisation with very watertight alignments where it is increasingly difficult to find common ground.

  The fact that the presidential elections were won by a party that until a couple of years ago did not exist will force the two big coalitions of recent decades, the Peronist ruling party and the opposition Together for Change, to profoundly reconfigure themselves.

  Within Peronism, former president and current vice-president Cristina Kirchner was the big loser of this election. In recent times she has been absent from the political scene, leaving Peronism without clear leadership. Peronism has strong roots in trade unions and social organisations that are highly dependent on the state. These organisations have incentives to negotiate, should the new government open up that space. However, Milei’s initial discourse has pointed in a completely different direction, insisting that he will take shock measures.

  What are the main challenges the new government will face?

  The new government should tackle three major challenges. The first is to stabilise the economy by stopping inflation and putting the exchange rate in order. The second is to introduce reforms to increase productivity and solve the crisis in formal employment. And the third is governance. Argentina has very strong social organisations, which has both positive and negative aspects, but in any case, it is a strongly organised society that is very predisposed to conflict.

  These three challenges must be tackled in a coordinated and consistent way, which is quite difficult.

  Do you think Milei’s government will be able to tackle them?

  I have serious doubts that the new government will be able to meet these challenges, not only in the area of stabilisation and structural reforms, but also and above all in the area of governance. Many of the proposed measures, such as adopting the US dollar as the currency, could be found unconstitutional. Other measures require legislative majorities that the new government won’t have. Its only prospect of obtaining substantial legislative support was through Together for Change, but the division of the opposition coalition leaves Milei without even a congressional quorum.

  Milei has not one provincial governorship and almost no mayorships. However, Argentina’s sub-national powerholders have always been accommodating and pragmatic. Still, some key measures would go directly against the interests of the provinces, such as the elimination of co-participation, the system through which the federal state distributes public resources from national taxes to the provinces. And then there is the potential confrontation with the province of Buenos Aires.

  Milei could try to rule by decree, but this would cause an instant crisis, and in case of an impeachment trial the vice-president, Victoria Villarruel, would take over. This would not ensure any positive change but would rather imply some additional negative elements.

  Milei was elected with a very large majority, so he has great popular legitimacy. But this majority could be inflated, as is often the case in runoffs, and is compounded by the volatility and impatience of a large part of Argentina’s electorate. If he succeeds in implementing his ultra-liberal programme, a global rarity, the social costs will be extremely high. And if he fails to do so, people’s disenchantment with politics could increase and their support for democracy could be called into question.

  ---

   Civic space in Argentina is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Yanina Welp via herwebsite and follow@Welpita on Twitter.

• ARMENIA: ‘As people leave their homes in search of safety, humanitarian organisations must support their basic needs’

  CIVICUS speaks about the civil society humanitarian response to the Azerbaijani blockade and military offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh – the disputed territory within Azerbaijan that until recently was governed by ethnic Armenians – withShushanik Nersesyan,Media and Communication Manager at People in Need (PIN) Armenia.

  Founded in 1992 bya group of journalists involved in the 1989 Czechoslovak ‘Velvet Revolution’, PIN is a civil society organisation (CSO) working in the fields of humanitarian aid, human rights, education and social work. Since it was established in 2003, its permanent office in Armenia has worked to strengthen Armenian people’s abilities to improve their lives and the communities they live in.

  How did the Azerbaijani blockade affect people in Nagorno-Karabakh?

  It all started in December 2022, when Azerbaijani civilians identifying themselves as environmental activists began obstructing the Lachin corridor, which links Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. In April 2023 Azerbaijan set up an official checkpoint that largely cut off the passage of people and goods between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Once it was under Azeri control, it was possible to use the corridor only in exceptionally urgent cases, through the intermediation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or Russian peacekeepers.

  On 29 July Azerbaijani authorities abducted V Khachatryan, a 68-year-old Nagorno-Karabakh resident who was being evacuated by the ICRC for urgent medical treatment through the Lachin corridor. Khachatryan remains in captivity. Another incident occurred in late August when three Nagorno-Karabakh students were captured by Azerbaijani border guards while travelling to Armenia via the corridor. They were only released 10 days later. Free movement of people to Armenia became impossible.

  The prolonged blockade led to a humanitarian crisis due to shortages of essential goods – including electricity, fuel and water – and the closure of basic services. People in Need, along with Action Against Hunger and Médecins du Monde France, condemned it but, regrettably, our efforts to open to road for the trucks with food to Nagorno-Karabakh were thwarted.

  The situation changed with the shelling that caused the deaths of hundreds of innocent people on 19 and 20 September. Since 24 September, over 100,000 people have fled Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenian regions, where they are also facing an emergency situation due to food and hygiene needs, plus longer-term issues of housing, education and jobs.

  How has Armenian civil society responded to the humanitarian crisis?

  CSOs including PIN deployed humanitarian projects to help blockade-affected people. CSOs conducted visits and issued statements. In Kornidzor, on the border, representatives from dozens of Armenian CSOs gathered during the blockade, urging the international community to uphold human rights and ensure the passage of humanitarian aid for civilians in Nagorno-Karabakh. The unimpeded delivery of essential goods, including food, hygiene items, medicine and fuel, as well as the unrestricted movement of people, including critically ill patients, are fundamental tenets of international humanitarian law.

  What work is PIN doing in this context?

  Since 1992, as a newly established organisation, PIN has been there to help people affected by the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, which lasted from February 1988 to May 1994. We have actively contributed to the growth of Armenian civil society, which has remained resilient throughout this crisis. We coordinate our efforts with the government and local authorities to closely monitor the situation on the ground and carry out numerous humanitarian projects.

  We continue assisting the most vulnerable populations. Since September 2020, we have provided essential humanitarian aid and long-term efforts for the social and economic integration of thousands of people.

  As a humanitarian organisation, we advocate for rights and a peaceful resolution of conflicts in adherence with international law. Along with our partners, we have expressed our concerns, called for measures to prevent the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe and continuously raised internal and donor funds to help people in need.

  When people started fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh, we immediately mobilised PIN funds to support the first recipient centre in the Syunik border region to deliver aid such as food, clothes and blankets to forcibly displaced people and create a special space for children’s activities while their parents dealt with registration and searching for accommodation. Additionally, we launched the SOS Armenia appeal and new humanitarian assistance projects funded by the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the European Union, the Netherlands Refugee Foundation, Start Network and USAID.

  As people continue to leave their homes in search of safety without being able to take their belongings, humanitarian organisations must continue providing assistance to support their basic needs.

  Civic space in Armenia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with People in Need Armenia through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@PIN_Armenia on Twitter.

• ARMENIA: ‘Lack of compelling international action allowed the attack on Nagorno-Karabakh to occur’

  CIVICUS speaks about the humanitarian crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh– the disputed territory within Azerbaijan that until recently was governed by ethnic Armenians –withLida Minasyan, a feminist peace activist and Resource Mobilisation Consultant at theCentral Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central and North Asia (CEECCNA) Collaborative Fund.

  Founded in 2022, the CEECCNA Collaborative Fund is a feminist fund that mobilises sustainable resources for social justice movements across the CEECCNA region.

  What is the current security and human rights situation in Nagorno-Karabakh?

  The ethnic Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh was forcibly displaced within days of the Azerbaijani government launching a full-scale attack on 19 September. A week later, 100,632 people had arrived in Armenia, having left behind their homes, their belongings and the lives they had built.

  Several actions deliberately targeted against civilians occurred before the start of the ethnic cleansing of the Armenian population from Nagorno-Karabakh. In December 2022, Azerbaijan blocked the Lachin corridor, the only road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, leaving the 120,000 Armenians who lived there completely isolated. People endured nine months of severe food insecurity, fuel shortages, electricity outages, communications breakdowns and medical supply shortages. This resulted in a humanitarian crisis that put people, particularly those with vulnerabilities, at risk. Many pregnant women had miscarriages and stillbirths, people with chronic illnesses couldn’t receive their medication and treatment, and risk of infection increased due to the lack of hygiene products. These were just a few of the severe challenges people faced during the blockade.

  The Lachin road was reopened several days after the Azerbaijani offensive, when people, already traumatised and starving, experienced a direct threat to their lives. They had no choice but to leave their homes in search of safety in Armenia.

  Why did Azerbaijan initiate the blockade and military offensive?

  The nine-month blockade and the offensive were meant to achieve the ethnic cleansing of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh. The intentional deprivation of essential resources for survival followed by the direct attack to take over Nagorno-Karabakh, along with the creation of conditions for the Armenian population to leave, indicate that Azerbaijan is not contemplating any peaceful end to the conflict or human rights guarantees for Armenian people to feel safe in their homes and continue living in Nagorno-Karabakh.

  By leveraging additional threats against Armenians and Armenian sovereign territories, demonstrating its military power, and consistently introducing new conditions in the negotiation process with Armenia, Azerbaijan intends to assert its dominance. This approach reinforces a policy of hatred towards Armenians spanning decades and undermines the peacebuilding process between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

  How has Armenian civil society responded to the humanitarian crisis?

  Displaced people endured a journey of over 20 hours to reach Armenia, during which they had no access to food, water or sanitation facilities. As a result, most of them arrived thirsty, hungry and in need of medical attention. When they began arriving, local organisations, activists and volunteers were among the first to give them food, hygiene products and assistance to register for the state support system.

  Local civil society organisations engage in continuous needs assessments of displaced people, using dynamic data collection approaches, as the situation is changing rapidly. In addition to the immediate provision of goods, there are medium and long-term needs to address. Displaced people need psychological assistance to overcome trauma, sustainable medical support, permanent housing, access to education and employment and services to prevent and address gender-based violence.

  As part of the CEECCNA Collaborative Fund, we provide timely updates about the situation to our international partners and mobilise and direct resources to local organisations. Due to limited resources, Armenian civil society activists worked under a lot of pressure because they had to initiate fundraising efforts while simultaneously providing emergency response.

  The Armenian government has provided displaced people with one-time financial support, essential products and access to temporary accommodation. For all its good intentions, however, the government also lacks resources and capacity to provide adequate long-term assistance to displaced people.

  Has the international community’s response been adequate?

  The response has been slow and inadequate. A few months into the blockade, the international community refused to call the situation a humanitarian crisis and many turned a blind eye to the deteriorating conditions of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population.

  After numerous appeals and demands from civil society, some international agencies began releasing statements urging the Azerbaijani government to open the Lachin corridor. They mainly referred to the International Court of Justice’s orders of 22 February and 6 July 2023, which unequivocally mandated Azerbaijan to ensure unrestricted movement of people, vehicles and cargo along the corridor in both directions.

  Despite these decisions, the road remained blocked. A group of four United Nations experts also expressed their concern about the continued closure of the Lachin corridor and called on the Azerbaijani authorities to promptly reinstate unimpeded and safe movement along the road, as stipulated by the November 2020 ceasefire agreement.

  The lack of more compelling action by the international community created an unhindered environment for the attack to occur. Many organisations are currently responding by issuing new alerts and appeals, along with providing much-needed humanitarian support. However, the people of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia require sustainable peace and human security, which will only be achievable through a negotiation that is inclusive of the voices of those most profoundly affected by the conflict. We advocate specifically for the inclusion of women in formal negotiations, in order to pave the way to sustainable peace.

  The international community’s crisis-response support is highly appreciated, but it should be complemented by long-term funding for dialogue, peacebuilding and the reestablishment of human security. Armenian civil society working to alert about potential risks of conflict escalation on the borders of Armenia could also benefit from their support.

  Civic space in Armenia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Learn more aboutCEECCNA Collaborative Fund in thisblog.

• ASEAN: ‘There is a lack of a consistent approach and political will to address the Myanmar crisis’

  CIVICUS speaks with Mary Aileen Diez-Bacalso, a globally recognised human rights advocate and the new Executive Director of the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), on the state of civic space in the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the regional body’s response to the human rights situation in Myanmar.

  In March 2023, Myanmar’s civic space was downgraded by theCIVICUS Monitor to the worst category, closed, in response to developments including the detention of thousands of activists and protesters, many of them convicted by secret military tribunals in unfair trials and given harsh sentences including thedeath penalty. Some have been tortured or killed. The ruling military junta has also systematically targeted journalists andforced civil society organisations (CSOs) to shut down and their leaders to go into hiding or flee the country. The junta has committed war crimes and possible crimes against humanity, including unlawful attacks, killing and injuring civilians through the use of extrajudicial executions, artillery shelling and banned landmines and cluster munitions.

  What is the state of civic freedoms in ASEAN member states?

  In recent years, there has been a discernible trend in ASEAN toward democratic regression and shrinking civic space.

  In Cambodia, as an election draws near, there is an ongoing assault on civic space and an increasingly violent campaign of repression and harassment against union activists, environmental campaigners, opposition politicians and media workers.

  In Myanmar, the path toward democracy, which began in 2011, was dismantled and civic space has closed. The junta’s nationwide crackdown has spread beyond cities into rural and ethnic minority areas, where resistance has grown. There is a climate of fear and insecurity, characterised by extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, sexual violence and other atrocities amounting to crimes against humanity. But ASEAN leaders have been unable to respond uniformly, and the Five-Point Consensus (5PC) they reached in April 2021 has miserably failed to address Myanmar’s crisis.

  In Singapore, civil liberties are curbed through the prosecution of journalists, protesters and harassment of activists. Civil space has been further limited by repressive laws such as the 2019 Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act and the 2021 Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act, which include vague provisions that allow for executive discretion in interpretation and implementation.

  Overall, civic space in ASEAN countries has deteriorated. But in the midst of this darkness, the results of recent elections have cast a ray of hope that could have an impact at the regional level. Election results in Malaysia in November 2022 and Thailand in May 2023 have brought hope and a breath of fresh air after years of regression of fundamental freedoms. ASEAN’s youngest member state, Timor-Leste, is unique in that it has committed to consolidating democracy and held a free, fair and transparent election on 21 May 2023, allowing voters to cast their ballots peacefully, thus making their voices heard.

  As the current ASEAN chair, has Indonesia made any efforts to engage with civil society and protect human rights?

  Indonesia became ASEAN chair amid a lot of expectations regarding its potentials to address the Myanmar crisis, following the lack of progress under its two predecessors, Brunei Darussalam and Cambodia – and possibly on the assumption that no further progress will happen under its successor, Laos.

  Led by Indonesia, ASEAN managed to adopt several Leaders’ Declarations related to human rights, including one on combating trafficking in persons caused by the abuse of technology and one on the protection of migrant workers and family members in crisis situations, adopted at the 42nd ASEAN Summit in May 2023. These represented a crucial step toward protecting rights. However, questions of implementation and domestication have long plagued the ASEAN region.

  Progress made at the regional level is not necessarily reflected by domestic developments. For example, ahead of the 2023 ASEAN summit, held in Labuhan Bajo, the Indonesian police summoned two residents, Viktor Frumentius and Dominikus Safio, over a planned protest regarding compensation for houses and land clearing for a road project. The criminalisation attempt happened a few days after the police issued a warning letter for local people not to conduct actions that could ‘create incitement’ during the summit. This incident came on top of ongoing attacks on civil liberties in Indonesia.

  Regarding engagement with civil society, unfortunately the Indonesian government failed to respond to civil society’s request to conduct an interface meeting during the summit. Taken together, this and the attempted criminalisation of protesters reveal the government’s exclusionary approach to critical voices.

  Did the summit’s outcomes include any commitment on human rights?

  The summit’s outcome document highlighted the commitment to strengthen efforts to combat human trafficking and protect migrant workers. Human trafficking is indeed a serious and systemic violation of human rights in Southeast Asia, with the pandemic exacerbating the already precarious situation of marginalised people who might end up in hands of human traffickers.

  Regarding Myanmar, however, disappointment continues. On 11 May, despite expressing concerns over the continuing violence in Myanmar, specifically in light of the recent attack against a convoy carrying ASEAN diplomats in Myanmar on the eve of the summit, Indonesia released a statement that said that ‘the 5PC remains our main reference’. It basically ignored the calls from civil society groups and the wider international community to move beyond the 5PC.

  Unfortunately the issue of shrinking civic space was not discussed at the summit, which reveals continued neglect by ASEAN member states and a lack of consensus about the importance of the fact that civic space is deteriorating across the region.

  Has there been progress in strengthening the role of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR)?

  Since its inception, the AICHR has been criticised as nothing more than a front for ASEAN member states to comply with their duty to put human rights on the regional agenda. It is not surprising that ASEAN finds it difficult to promote human rights at the regional level, given that its membership includes several authoritarian regimes and illiberal democracies.

  Civil society groups have done what we could to strengthen the AICHR, leading to incremental progress in its institutional strength and its relations with civil society. In 2019, FORUM-ASIA and its partners called for a review of the AICHR’s Terms of Reference to make it more independent and give it a protection mandate, among other things. ASEAN foreign ministers agreed to this, but the process hasn’t kicked off. Still, other positive changes happened, such as the inclusion of civil society in various AICHR activities and growing opportunities for the AICHR to meet with civil society in a variety of settings.

  For example, recently and for the first time ever, FORUM-ASIA and other CSOs with AICHR consultative status were invited to meet with AICHR representatives at the 37th AICHR Meeting. The question remains whether this practice can be sustained and institutionalised. The AICHR has also recently demonstrated increased engagement with national human rights institutions, its natural national partners. This also needs to be maintained and strengthened.

  Additionally, the current AICHR mechanism for handling human rights complaints needs to be assessed for it to become more transparent and responsive to rapidly deteriorating civic space conditions. But because the issue of shrinking civic space has not been met with consensus among AICHR member states, progress has been minimal. However, FORUM-ASIA keeps engaging with the AICHR in the knowledge that it will take years of effort to build a mechanism that lives up to our aspiration of holding states accountable for human rights violations. We are willing to engage in discussions with the AICHR about how to strengthen its complaint mechanism to contribute to enforcing states’ human rights obligations at the national level.

  Why hasn’t there been any progress in implementing the 5PC to address the situation in Myanmar?

  The 5PC has failed due to the fact that ASEAN has engaged with the military junta – the perpetrator of grave human rights violations with no commitment whatsoever to human rights – rather than with the legitimate representatives of Myanmar’s people, the civilian National Unity Government (NUG).

  As of today, the junta has not only failed to implement any of the plan’s provisions but has also increased its brutality against the civilian population. The deadly airstrike conducted in April was a glaring manifestation of the junta’s refusal to engage in meaningful dialogue and cooperation.

  Another issue is ASEAN members’ lack of a consistent approach and political will to address the Myanmar crisis. Only a few ASEAN countries openly condemned the junta’s human rights violations, while others, such as Cambodia, the ASEAN chair in 2022, even met with the junta chief and allowed the international community to interpret this approach to the crisis as recognition of the military regime.

  Finally, ASEAN’s principle of non-interference has been a major obstacle to effectively addressing the Myanmar crisis. ASEAN has moved away from this principle by becoming more assertive in certain cases, such as on economic and humanitarian cooperation, but this has not been mainstreamed. 

  How has civil society responded to ASEAN’s failure to address the situation in Myanmar?

  Despite numerous challenges, civil society has remained active. It is working to ensure that Myanmar does not fall off the radar or is forgotten as a result of conflicts and emergencies erupting in other parts of the world.

  Along with reputable Myanmar CSOs and other regional and international organisations, FORUM-ASIA recently released a position paper calling for a review and reframing of the 5PC. This paper provides five counterpoints of action that ASEAN leaders must immediately take to prove the bloc’s commitment and capability to resolve the Myanmar crisis effectively.

  The first point calls for the immediate adoption of an action plan for civilian protection and cessation of violence. The second emphasises the need to convene inclusive and meaningful consultations with legitimate Myanmar stakeholders, including the NUG, its advisory body the National Unity Consultative Council, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw – a group of ousted parliamentarians – and ethnic resistance organisations. The third stresses the need to amend the mandate of the ASEAN Special Envoy’s term to three years with authority, independence and resources to take effective action. The fourth calls for the provision of direct support to frontline humanitarian responders in Myanmar and along ethnic borderlands, including Myanmar’s western borders. And the fifth point calls on the Special Envoy to immediately open formal communications and engage with civil society and other key stakeholders from Myanmar’s Spring Revolution.

  What should the international community do to push ASEAN to protect human rights and address the situation in Myanmar?

  International civil society and the international community must push ASEAN to immediately move away from the 5PC and embrace more robust and tangible actions to stop the military junta’s violence and atrocity crimes. They must refrain from legitimising the junta and must recognise the NUG as the democratically elected government and enter into dialogue with all relevant stakeholders, cut bilateral ties, including economic ties, and impose a full arms embargo on the Myanmar armed forces, and call for suspension of the export and transport of aviation fuel to Myanmar.

  They should also work closely with the United Nations, particularly the Security Council and Secretary-General, to resolve the crisis in Myanmar. They should set up a clear mandate for the Special Envoy, grounded in human rights principles, justice and accountability. The role must be full-time, lasting more than a year, and the appointed Special Envoy must engage with all relevant stakeholders, not just the military junta.

  ---

   Civic space inMyanmaris rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with FORUM-ASIA through itswebpage or itsFacebook page, and follow@forum_asia on Twitter.

• AUSTRALIA: ‘People deeply understand that rights and liberties are won through protest’

  CIVICUS speaks with David Mejia-Canales, senior lawyer at theHuman Rights Law Centre (HRLC), about anti-protest legislation being introduced in states across Australia and its impact on civil society activism.

  The HRLC is an independent civil society organisation (CSO) that advances strategic legal action, policy solutions and advocacy to support people and communities to eliminate inequality and injustice in Australia.

  What is the situation of civic freedoms in Australia following last year’s change of government?

  Australia doesn’t have a national charter of human rights that legally protects people’s human rights. We are the only western democracy without a national charter or similar document. There are, however, three charters of rights operating successfully at the state and territory levels. This means that the protection of your civic freedoms in Australia is at least partly dependent on the jurisdiction you are in.

  Following last year’s election, we have a new federal government that is willing to consider ambitious reforms on how civic freedoms are protected in Australia. The new government has initiated a parliamentary inquiry to make improvements to our human rights frameworks, including considering whether Australia should have a national charter of human rights. Later this year, Australians will vote on a referendum to alter the constitution to establish a permanent, constitutionally enshrined, First Nations advisory body to the legislative and executive branches of government. We are heartened by these steps in the right direction. However, the proof will be in the implementation of all these measures.

  What is driving the increase of anti-protest legislation at the state level?

  As environmental activism increased in response to the worsening climate crisis, state governments have increasingly sought to introduce laws explicitly criminalising protest. These laws are often so broad and vague that it could be argued that they are introduced more for the benefit of newspaper front pages than for a genuine, legitimate purpose.

  It is also important to note that other laws and powers are being increasingly used to criminalise protest, even where not originally intended for this purpose. For example, move-on orders, surveillance and bail conditions are all regularly used in attempts to silence protesters.

  Due to Australia’s incredibly lax lobbying regulations, it is impossible to know in what measure state governments around the country have introduced these laws as a result of pressure from oil, gas and mining corporations. Fossil fuel companies donate millions to the major parties to discourage politicians from regulating them properly. Overall, corporations spend billions hiring lobbyists to cosy up to politicians.

  They can do all this because Australia lacks basic transparency and integrity safeguards, and our outdated laws leave money in politics woefully underregulated. We need to address the power of harmful industries to skew democratic processes to win political outcomes that put their profits ahead of our wellbeing.

  Which groups are being targeted by anti-protest laws?

  These laws are almost exclusively targeting environmental activists. However, many of these laws are so vague and broad that they often end up criminalising other types of conduct occurring in the public realm, like blocking a road or obstructing a public passageway. While their intent is to criminalise protesters, these laws are so broad that they could be used against anybody. In some jurisdictions penalties consist of steep fines or two years in prison. Often the penalties are grossly disproportionate to the offences.

  In the state of New South Wales, a police taskforce was established with the express purpose of breaking up environmental protest groups. A taskforce is a concentration of police resources usually reserved for very serious crimes like murder or to deal with organised criminal groups. In Western Australia, anti-terrorism police have been involved in seizing devices like phones and memory cards of journalists covering protests.

  What are the recent amendments to the protest law in South Australia?

  South Australia is the latest jurisdiction to have imposed severe penalties on people for engaging in peaceful protest, joining New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria. South Australia’s anti-protest laws carry the harshest financial penalties in Australia.

  The Summary Offences (Obstruction of Public Places) Amendment was rushed through the South Australian Legislative Assembly without any public consultation: it was introduced and passed on 18 May 2023. It was a response to protest activity in the city of Adelaide, which briefly closed traffic on a bridge.

  The bill dramatically increases the maximum fine for obstructing a public place from AU$750 (approx. US$500) to AU$50,000 (approx. US$33,300) and introduces prison penalties of up to three months. It will surely have a chilling effect on protest in South Australia, undermining people’s ability to exercise this right.

  How has civil society responded to the amendment?

  There has been an incredible response. South Australia is rightly proud of its history of protest and dissent. It was the first place in Australia, and the second in the world, to grant women the right to vote, and the first place in the world to grant women the right to stand for election to parliament. South Australians deeply understand that these, and many other rights and liberties, were won through protest.

  It is incredibly heartening to see such a strong reaction from civil society, including unions, climate defenders, women’s rights organisations, LGBTQI+ organisations, charities, legal assistance services and the legal profession. Civil society deeply resisted these laws not just in parliament but also in the streets, through rallies and other forms of protest. It was because of this incredible response that at least one of the worst elements of the bill was removed through an amendment in the upper house.

  The amendment involved a single word – ‘recklessly’. In the original definition, the offence applied to ‘a person who intentionally or recklessly engages in conduct that obstructs the free passage of a public place’. This would have disproportionately criminalised very peaceful protest activity like handing out flyers on a sidewalk, because it would apply even to people unintentionally committing an offence.

  What can the international community do to support civil society’s response to restrictions?

  The right to protest is a fundamental human right that, together with the right to vote, has been instrumental in advancing other human rights and civil liberties. It is critical that the international community join civil society in Australia and anywhere to fight back against any interference in the right to protest. This could be as simple as amplifying the calls of activists on the ground and supporting their movements.

  As the climate crisis intensifies it is crucial that we all protect the right of those fighting for climate justice to continue to gather and demand better from our governments.

  ---

  Civic space inAustraliais rated ‘narrowed’by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the HRLC through itswebsite and follow@davidHRLC on Twitter.

• AUSTRALIA: ‘Repressive laws have been introduced to limit people’s ability to protest against climate injustice’

  CIVICUS speaks about the challenges faced by climate activists in Australia with Nelli Stevenson, head of communications and investigations at Greenpeace Australia Pacific.

  Greenpeace is a global environment campaigning network that comprises 26 independent national and regional organisations in over 55 countries across all continents as well as a co-ordinating body, Greenpeace International, based in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

• AUSTRALIA: ‘There will be little change on First Nations people’s recognition, representation and rights’

  CIVICUS speaks with Peter Lewis, president of Australians for Native Title and Reconciliation (ANTaR), about the recent defeat in areferendum of a proposal to recognise Indigenous Australians in the constitution and create a permanent institution so they can speak directly to government and parliament on matters relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.

  ANTaR is a civil society organisation (CSO) that works in solidarity with and advocates for the rights of Indigenous peoples in Australia,conducting independent research and analysis and providing Australians with quality information on priorities concerning First Nations rights.

  What was the process leading to the referendum?

  In December 2010, an Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous Australians was established and started discussing how to constitutionally recognise First Nations peoples. In January 2012, the panel suggested a new section be added to the Constitution – ‘Section 51A’ – to recognise First Peoples as the original inhabitants of the nation now known as Australia. The federal government later announced that a referendum on the matter would be delayed by two to three years due to an absence of widespread public support.

  In December 2015, a Referendum Council was established and began consultations on how best to establish constitutional recognition of First Nations peoples. A discussion paper was released in October 2016 and articulated the central suggestions for constitutional reform to include a declaration of recognition, a ban on racial discrimination and a First Nations Voice to Parliament, with the right to be consulted on legislation relevant to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.

  In May 2017, a convention at Uluru heard the outcomes from the First Nations Dialogues, with 250 First Nations leaders and representatives in attendance. Despite the generosity of spirit embodied by the Uluru statement, in October 2017 the government of then Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull outrightly rejected its proposals, breaking is promise of ‘doing things with’ Aboriginal people instead of to them. Turnbull made this decision unilaterally, without any consultation with or regard for the National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples, a national representative body, or members of the Referendum Council.

  In March 2018 the government established another Joint Select Committee that was tasked to again inquire into and report on constitutional change. Its final report endorsed a constitutionally enshrined Voice to Parliament. By the end of 2018, the Labor opposition had promised to establish a Voice for First Nations people and vowed to take the issue of constitutional recognition to referendum if elected to government in 2019.

  On 29 September 2022, the inaugural meeting of the Referendum Working Group and the Referendum Engagement Group discussed the steps to a 2023 referendum on a First Nations Voice to Parliament. The Constitutional Alteration (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Voice) 2023 Bill was introduced to parliament on 30 March 2023. On the same day, a Joint Select Committee was formed to analyse and report on the bill.

  The committee heard from witnesses and published submissions, and recommended that parliament pass the bill without amendment. The House of Representatives passed it on 31 May and the Senate did so on 19 June. This meant a referendum would be called within the next six months.

  A constitutionally enshrined First Nations Voice to Parliament would offer a first step toward structural and symbolic reform, ensuring that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders peoples can have a say about the laws and policies that impact on their lives and communities.

  Who sided for and against?

  The federal leadership of conservative parties – the Liberal and National parties – did not support the referendum. However, there was some support for the Voice within the conservative parties federally and in some states and territories.

  There was also some opposition by a minority of First Nations leaders on the basis that the Voice did not represent an adequate transfer of power and that a treaty should come before any changes to the constitution. But a vast majority of First Nations leaders and organisations supported recognition and voice, as did most civil society organisations and some business organisations.

  ANTaR was active in the Yes campaign and worked with others to establish Allies for Uluru. In October 2022 we initiated a Yes to Voice, Truth and Treaty Campaign.

  The Yes campaign also received support from international CSOs such as Amnesty International and Oxfam, and its measures were supported by United Nations (UN) experts, and specifically by successive Special Rapporteurs on the rights of Indigenous Peoples.

  But the referendum was used by neo-Nazi and QAnon adherents to stoke fear about First Nations peoples’ aspirations.

  What kind of disinformation was circulated?

  The No side of the debate made a number of false claims ranging from the misleading to clear lies. There were claims that the Voice would be a third chamber of parliament and that it would delay all decision making. There were claims that Australians would lose their homes as a result, and that it would enable First Nations people to establish their own military, and even that it would allow the UN to take over Australia. There were claims that the move was legally risky and that it would divide the nation – although currently the federal government can legislate for First Nations people through the ‘race powers’, a constitutional clause that says the government can make special laws for people of any particular race. So the nation is clearly already divided.

  Why do you think the initiative failed, and what will the consequences be?

  In Australia referendums rarely succeed, and in fact have never succeeded without support from all major parties.

  The No case included much disinformation and fearmongering and a majority of the electorate responded negatively. It should however be noted that many inner-city and inner suburban areas, as well as First Nations-dominated remote areas, voted yes.

  Because of this result, there will be little change and First Nations people’s recognition, representation and rights will depend on whoever is in government at the time. First Nations organisations will renew their calls for justice and recognition of their sovereignty and press on issues such as treaty-making, truth-telling and reducing disadvantage by providing greater agency for First Nations communities.

  Civic space in Australia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with ANTaR through itswebsite orFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@ANTaR_National on Twitter.

• AZERBAIJAN: ‘Operating on the ground has become increasingly difficult due to security concerns’

  CIVICUS speaks about the links between the exploitation of fossil fuels and human rights violations in Azerbaijan with Kate Watters, Executive Director of Crude Accountability.

  Founded in 2003, Crude Accountability is a civil society organisation that works to protect the environmental and human rights of people in the Caspian and Black Sea regions and in areas of Eurasia affected by oil and gas development.

  How do extractive industries fuel human rights violations in Azerbaijan?

  The key problem is corruption, which results from the close relationship between the executive branch of government and the oil industry. The use of the state oil company by the regime led by president Ilham Aliyev is a key feature of Azerbaijan’s kleptocracy.

  Corporations operating in Azerbaijan handle vast sums of money and oversee massive projects. For example, British Petroleum (BP), the largest foreign investor, is involved in many of the key fossil fuel projects and is the majority shareholder and operator of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, through which around 80 per cent of Azerbaijan’s oil is exported. BP has a monopoly in the industry that dominates the national economy, with oil and gas accounting for 95 per cent of all exports, 75 per cent of government revenue and 42 per cent of national GDP.

  Those in charge of the oil and gas sector control the financial and economic dynamics of the whole country. The vast revenues generated by the hydrocarbon industry make it difficult for smaller environmentally sustainable alternatives to gain traction and create fertile ground for corruption and secrecy. International mechanisms that promote transparency in the industry rely on a level of adherence to the rule of law that Azerbaijan lacks.

  That’s why Crude Accountability’s advocacy efforts focus on advancing transparency and accountability. We aim for the adoption of cleaner technologies that ensure the wellbeing of local communities and call for international financial institutions to cease financing fossil fuels and redirect their investments toward sustainable green energy projects. We urge companies to be transparent about the social and environmental impacts of their operations and strive for continuous improvement.

  What work do you do in Azerbaijan?

  Crude Accountability’s involvement in Azerbaijan dates back to the early 2000s. We work with communities, organisations and people affected by oil and gas developments. Our efforts encompass extensive research, educational and advocacy activities that address the specific impacts of the hydrocarbon industry, such as gas flaring from the BP’s Sangachal Terminal, which is causing villagers health problems and sleep disruption, along with  the broader impacts of onshore and offshore oil and gas development in Azerbaijan.

  As an organisation, we’ve shed light on previously undisclosed areas. One of our achievements is the collaborative report ‘Flames of Toxicity‘, produced in partnership with Omanos Analytics. Using satellite imagery and other technologies, we proved that oil spills and flaring were happening during extraction and refining processes in several locations. By doing this we reminded industry stakeholders that, even when it’s unsafe for activists to conduct extensive on-site verification, there are technologies we can use to gain insight into environmental and human rights violations.

  For the past few years, operating on the ground in Azerbaijan has become increasingly difficult due to security concerns for our partners. Since mid-2023, our primary focus in Azerbaijan has shifted to advocating for the release of Gubad Ibadoghlu, a prominent economist and anti-corruption activist. He was arbitrarily detained in July 2023 and is currently held in miserable conditions in a pretrial detention centre outside the capital, Baku, facing mistreatment and denial of medical attention. During his arrest, both he and his wife were severely beaten after the car they were driving was surrounded and forced to stop. The physical violence perpetrated against Ibadoghlu and his wife during arrest is extremely concerning.

  We are part of an international coalition of activists, academics, policymakers and journalists that works for the release of Gubad Ibadoghlu and other Azerbaijani political prisoners, including independent journalists affected by the recent crackdown on civil society.

  Is the level of repression in Azerbaijan increasing?

  Repression has intensified over the last five years, and particularly in the past couple of years, as President Ilham Aliyev and the presidential apparatus have sought to solidify their position and power. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, authoritarianism and the repression of civil society have escalated across Eurasia. This is certainly the case in Azerbaijan.

  Azerbaijani people are afraid to speak out about the Azerbaijani offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh. Even those who refrain from criticising the offensive and work to address other related issues risk being labelled as ‘pro-Armenian’, a smear used by authorities against activists and dissenters.

  The snap presidential election scheduled for 7 February will serve to further consolidate Aliyev’s rule amidst regional turmoil. In this context, independent journalists face a heightened risk of repression. In June 2023, protests erupted in the village of Soyudlu, already threatened by environmental degradation, against the construction of an artificial lake to contain waste from the nearby Gadabay goldmine. Police severely beat community activists and journalists who came to cover the story. The village remains under lockdown, and although it appears that the goldmine’s activity has been limited or halted, it remains a challenge to obtain verified information. The community has been under stress since the incident.

  Environmental activists are also at risk. People with information about issues such as flaring or emissions are often afraid to speak out. Sometimes they have family members employed by the oil company or refinery and fear that they may lose their jobs, jeopardising the family’s livelihood. Fear of repercussions silences environmental activists and others who are aware of environmental violations. Still, some environmental and human rights defenders continue to operate discreetly in Azerbaijan.

  What forms of international support does Azerbaijani civil society currently need?

  Azerbaijan’s selection as the host for this year’s United Nations climate change conference, COP29, poses significant challenges from both a human rights and an environmental perspective. Azerbaijan has fallen short of its climate commitments. It hasn’t signed the Global Methane Pledge, a step taken even by countries like Turkmenistan. There are also serious concerns about civil society’s ability to participate in COP29 due to ongoing repression and severe human rights violations taking place in the host country. The imprisonment of a prominent Azerbaijani economist investigating corruption in the oil and gas sector raises further concerns.

  The international community should demand transparency and accountability from the Azerbaijani authorities in the run-up to COP29 and throughout the conference. A legitimate discussion on climate change in the framework of sustainability and human rights can only occur with the active participation of civil society.

  It is also very important to building international coalitions to confront authoritarianism, repression and closed civic space. Autocratic governance seeks to make people feel isolated and disunited, so collaborative efforts are vital. By working together, sharing resources and leveraging each organisation’s expertise for knowledge exchange, we can enhance our impact.

  Azerbaijani civil society requires financial resources, solidarity and support from the international community. The more we can offer to activists on the ground, the more successful our collective efforts will be.

  ---

  Civic space in Azerbaijan is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Crude Accountability through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow it onLinkedIn andTwitter.

• BAHRAIN: ‘Had there been civic freedoms, the authorities would have known of the deep suffering at Jau Prison’

  CIVICUS speaks about the situation of political prisoners on hunger strike in Bahrain withJawad Fairooz, founder and director of Salam for Democracy and Human Rights (Salam DHR).

  Founded in 2012, Salam DHR is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) registered in France, Switzerland and the UK. It undertakes research and advocacy for the advancement of democracy and human rights, mainly in relation to Bahrain, but also in the wider Gulf and Middle East and North Africa regions.

  Maryam al-Khawaja, daughter of imprisoned human rights defender Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, intends to return to Bahrain imminently to ensure her father gets medical treatment and press for his immediate and unconditional release. Yet she, too, faces possible arrest. What’s your assessment of the situation?

  Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, 62, a dual Danish-Bahraini citizen, is the co-founder of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights and has a long history of activism. He was arrested by the government of Bahrain in 2004, 2007 and again amid mass unrest in April 2011. After this he faced a grossly unfair trial before a military court, including on charges of ‘seeking to overthrow the government’. He was tortured in pretrial custody and since his arbitrary imprisonment he has been repeatedly denied access to adequate healthcare.

  On 9 August he joined some 800 other hunger strikers. They called for an end to lockdown policies that require them to spend up to 23 hours of the day in their cells, the suspension of solitary confinement, the opportunity for collective or congregational prayer in Jau Prison’s mosque, face-to-face meeting rights with family members without a glass screen and access to healthcare commensurate with that available to the public, among other improvements in prison conditions.

  On 13 September the mass hunger strike ended with the authorities reportedly meeting many of these demands. This came as Bahrain’s Crown Prince visited Washington, DC, where he met with senior members of the Biden administration: the problem had to go away.

  Maryam nevertheless intends to travel and she has our full support. We continue to call for Abdulhadi’s immediate and unconditional release. The Danish and European Union (EU) authorities must do more.

  What is at the core of this problem is the absence of civic space in Bahrain. If there was space for independent civil society, then CSOs would have effectively alerted the authorities to prison conditions and they could have addressed the situation. An independent civic space makes it possible to find a balance in government conduct.

  What does this mean for Maryam al-Khawaja and our courageous colleagues travelling with her? It means they should be allowed to enter Bahrain and make their demands. The government should engage with them in a spirit of transparency. The absolute worst that could happen is for dissent to be tolerated just a little bit more. While this seems unlikely to happen, it is what the government should do. We wish them all Godspeed.

  How is it possible to conduct human rights activism in such a closed environment? How does Salam DHR do it?

  Bahrain has closed civic space. Government officials decide which CSOs can be registered and who can stand for their boards. They prevent people from engaging in public life who have no criminal records or public complaints but rather perhaps a past association with a political movement or party that was unfairly banned years ago.

  The Bahraini constitution provides for freedoms and safeguards similar to many other states, but the reality is that the government continues to carry out arbitrary arrests and stage unfair trials for acts that are not internationally recognised as crimes. The authorities torture detainees and use the death penalty, despite domestic opposition and international condemnation. They have stripped hundreds, including myself, of citizenship, depriving us of even the right to have rights in our homeland. They use the digital space to monitor and punish dissent and to foment religious and sectarian strife.

  Activists linked with Salam DHR cannot, in effect, exercise their right to peaceful assembly, let alone openly campaign for freedoms of association and expression, the release of prisoners unfairly tried and imprisoned or a moratorium on the death penalty. They would risk arrest if they did that.

  Yet engaging in civic activism is not totally impossible, only very challenging. Alongside CIVICUS and other partners, Salam DHR engages with allies and like-minded activists as well as the few CSOs that openly but cautiously raise human rights concerns so that the wider Bahraini society hears our message. We echo and amplify their appeals.

  We are a catalyst: we help Bahraini activists access platforms to reach domestic and international audiences and provide training and development opportunities such as internships. Alone and in partnership with others, we research, document and publicise developments, grounding our message in article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states that every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity to take part in the conduct of public affairs.

  How useful for advocacy purposes was theglobal event held by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in Bahrain’s capital, Manama, in March 2023?

  It was mixed: Danish parliamentarians and those from other countries addressed human rights issues and the absence of an independent civic space. The IPU’s human rights team raised concerns about freedom of expression and violations against Bahraini parliamentarians. But despite the IPU’s affiliated status with the United Nations (UN), the government still denied access to independent observers and human rights organisations, denying them either visas or access and turning at least one around at the airport. This was the authorities once again restricting civic space.

  A few days before the IPU meeting officially began, Bahraini lawyer and activist Ebrahim Al-Mannai called for parliamentary reforms on social media. He and three others who shared his post were arrested for publishing material that could ‘disturb public order’.

  At the event itself, the government appeared uninterested in seriously engaging with visiting parliamentarians on human rights issues, despite attempts from the Danish delegation and representatives from Finland, Iceland and Ireland. Our message is clear: open up civic space, free up CSOs and political parties and liberate discourse, otherwise the cycle of political unrest will continue.

  Reports indicate that the mass hunger strike in Jau Prison has ended. What’s your assessment of this episode?

  The painful August 2023 mass hunger strike was wholly avoidable. It happened mainly due to the government’s stubborn and short-sighted refusal to allow civic space to exist even to a minimum degree. Had there been freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, they would have known of the deep suffering at Jau Prison. If you don’t let people say what they think, then public life can only lurch from crisis to crisis.

  The hunger strike was the expression of the accumulation of a number of factors that have been present in Bahraini prisons for years and it was based on grievances that have been repeatedly expressed: prison conditions and ill treatment of prisoners amounting to torture. The abuses worsened and conditions deteriorated during the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, medical neglect resulted in the deaths of two prisoners, Hussein Barakat and Abbas Mallalah.

  We appeal once more to the authorities to allow for the opening of civic space and provide a social vent to end the cycle of human rights crises we face.

  Is the international community doing all it can to support the struggle for democracy and human rights in Bahrain?

  International human rights organisations, UN treaty bodies and Special Procedures and partner states, for instance in the context of the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review process of Bahrain, have all joined us in calling on the government of Bahrain to abide by its international human rights obligations, starting with the basic step of letting people have a voice in public life.

  Today, 15 September, is International Day of Democracy, and we are joining the UN in calling on the government of Bahrain to empower the next generation by ensuring that their voices are included in the decisions that will have a profound impact on their world. In his address, UN Secretary-General António Guterres has warned that ‘walls are closing in on civic spaces’. Those walls are also the walls of Jau Prison, where it took 800 detainees’ unjust suffering for the government to even take notice.

  But the UN has also let neighbouring United Arab Emirates, which is as closed as Bahrain, host the forthcoming COP28 climate change summit. Lack of civic space means there can be no activism for climate justice in Bahrain – for instance, no public demands for accountability can be expressed over costly and environmentally damaging land reclamation in Bahrain’s northeast, which has already eroded the livelihood of fishing communities. We need to be able to address these challenges openly, with a rights-based approach, to avoid a future calamity.

  And powerful states that could be putting some pressure for change are avoiding the issue. Right now, Bahrain’s Crown Prince is wrapping up meetings with senior Biden administration officials, none of whom appear to have raised civic space concerns or addressed the needless suffering of 800 Bahraini prisoners. The UK has removed Bahrain from its list of ‘countries of concern’ at the same time as it trumpeted a billion-dollar Bahraini investment in the UK. In October the EU will recommence its cycle of so-called human rights dialogues.

  The international community’s inexplicable complacency over the festering human rights quagmire in Bahrain will further embolden the government in crushing civic space. Many leaders miss the point when it comes to Bahrain and its Gulf neighbours: they appear to accept the facade of what is presented as pragmatic autocracy and appear to accept regional rulers’ colonial-mindset contention that democracy will destabilise the region.

  Democracies have in fact produced the most stable, enduring and dynamic systems in the world. Human rights and democracy are essential for Bahrain and its neighbours because their deficits continue to be the primary cause of resentment and unrest. A security-based approach does not remedy these problems. Bahrain’s history has shown these methods to be a failure, as it has endured continuous waves of mass unrest followed by violent crackdowns.

  Authoritarianism and the forms of violence it fosters are the real destabilising forces, a cycle that can only be broken through the recognition and enactment of democratic rights. The first step towards this goal is simply letting civic space exist.

  ---

  Civic space in Bahrain is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Salam for Democracy and Human Rights through itswebsite and follow @SALAM_DHR and@JawadFairooz on Twitter.

• BAHRAIN: ‘The government uses public relations to mask human rights violations’

  CIVICUS speaks withDrewery Dyke of Salam for Democracy and Human Rights (Salam DHR) about closed civic and democratic space in Bahrain as the state prepares to host the Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). The IPU Assembly takes place in the capital, Manama,from 11 to 15 March 2023.

  Salam DHR is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) founded in 2012 to undertake research and advocacy for the advancement of democracy and human rights, mainly in relation to Bahrain, and also in the wider Gulf and Middle East and North Africa regions.

  We last spoke on the eve of the parliamentary election held in November 2022. How has civic space in Bahrain evolved since?

  The government of Bahrain held the November 2022 parliamentary election under the same, highly restrictive, 2018 Political Rights Law used in the 2018 elections. It banned scores of people from being able to vote or stand for election on spurious grounds such as affiliation to a banned political party or having a criminal record.

  Bahrain’s international partners, United Nations (UN) human rights bodies and civil society all decried the banning of political parties, as it flew in the face of international standards and simply deprived many people of having a voice. The court cases, too, dating from the 2011 unrest, were grossly unfair. In November 2018, the UN Human Rights Committee denounced both the Political Isolation Law and the Law on Associations

  And yet there seems to be a small opening for civil society and greater freedoms. The regional mood music appears to be changing, with the governments of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates normalising relations with Qatar, and the Bahraini government having set out a 2022-2026 National Human Rights Plan.

  Bahrain’s government appears to have signalled that it is minded to undertake some reform but civil society remains highly sceptical. Many of us are concerned that the government is once again using public relations initiatives to project an image of the country that masks longstanding, unresolved human rights violations for which there has been no accountability.

  Is change possible? Yes, to some degree, it appears so. But civil society needs to remain vigilant and sceptical. Action will speak louder than words. An amendment of existing laws on political and civil society organisations is now a must.

  How does Salam DHR manage to work in such a restrictive environment?

  Current legislation makes it impossible for our organisation to register and openly carry out any research or advocacy in Bahrain. That has been the case since 2013. And yet at least one woman human rights defender who is linked to Salam DHR and other human rights CSOs has remained active inside Bahrain. She walks a tightrope on a daily basis, taking action to support individuals, notably prisoners of conscience. Lawyers, political and civil society activists and others from all walks of life continue to contact us but we cannot discuss their identities to protect their safety. It is a challenge.

  In November 2022, however, the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights obtained accreditation to the UN’s Economic and Social Council, which means it can now formally participate in UN meetings and events. This important step could help prise open the space for civil society just that little bit more. We will see.

  Why do you think the Bahraini government offered to host the IPU Assembly?

  The Bahraini government invited the IPU to hold its 146th Assembly in order to project an image of a democratic country and boost its international standing. The IPU’s catchphrase on its website is ‘For democracy. For everyone’. The government seeks to own this message in a situation where democracy does not exist.

  The theme of the 146th Assembly is ‘Promoting peaceful coexistence and inclusive societies: Fighting intolerance’. Yet by limiting freedoms of association and assembly and the right to peaceful religious expression, Bahrain’s government promotes exclusion and intolerance.

  Possibly to foster its mission, the IPU accepted the Bahraini government’s offer to hold its meeting in Manama. Is that problematic? In some ways, yes. But it is upon us to promote – peacefully – democratic change that advances adherence to international human rights standards. And parliamentarians from around the world attending the IPU Assembly could help chip away at deeply rooted discrimination and the fact that so many in civil society are deprived of having a voice or are afraid to use it.

  Links between Bahraini parliamentarians and civil society are uneven. Some have few if any links while others have better connections and communication with their electorate, including civil society. Some seek to hold government action to account, albeit timidly.

  The IPU Assembly may be an opportunity for Bahraini members of parliament to learn how their counterparts in other parts of the world engage with their electors and effectively represent their concerns. Parliamentarians are a building block of a free civil society. We need them to step up during the Assembly to make that a reality in Bahrain.

  How could this whitewashing attempt become an advocacy opportunity?

  The IPU Assembly will be a pivotal opportunity for advocacy. Visiting parliamentarians must make it so. They must reject baseless hype and propaganda depicting Bahrain as a land of freedom and democracy.

  In a recently published brief, Salam DHR is urging attending parliamentarians to join with other parliamentarians from across the globe to call on the government of Bahrain to rescind all provisions that restrict parliamentary life and freedom of expression and association of Bahraini members of parliament. We want them to call for the government to resolve two outstanding cases the IPU’s Committee on the Human Rights of Parliamentarianshas lodged with the government of Bahrain, and examine the cases of 15 former parliamentarians targeted with arbitrary arrest and detention, unfair trial and imprisonment and arbitrary stripping of citizenship. We’re also asking parliamentarians to urge the government to implement all recommendations arising from human rights treaty obligations and as many as possible of those made by UN Special Procedures and arising from Bahrain’s 2022 UN Universal Periodic Review.

  We urge visiting parliamentarians to inform themselves of other widely shared human rights concerns in relation to Bahrain, including the denial of political rights and women’s rights, the use of the death penalty and the tactic of revoking citizenship as punishment, and to meet with human rights activists and others in civil society while in Bahrain.

  How can the international community better support Bahraini civil society and activism for democracy?

  Civil society in and engaged with Bahrain needs the international community to listen and speak with us, to hear our experiences and work with us. There is a narrative and experience that differs from the public relations whitewashing by the government.

  We are saying that there are longstanding problems that need to be addressed, in terms of law, practice and accountability. But we are also saying that we believe that Bahrain’s international partners – from varying states, including European Union member states, the UK and USA, and the UN and its human rights bodies – and now parliamentarians can all work together, in unison, to erode the climate of repression that denies respect for human dignity, in order to empower Bahraini civil society and gradually build a more open and rights-respecting country.

  Civic space in Bahrain is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Salam DHR through itswebsite and follow @SALAM_DHR and@drewerydyke on Twitter.

• BANGLADESH: ‘The government is banishing the opposition in the run-up to the election’

  CIVICUS speaks with Zaman Ashraf about the current pre-election crackdown in Bangladesh.

  Zaman is a Bangladeshi human rights defender who advocates for the rights of survivors of torture and victims of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and seeks stronger legal protections for human rights in compliance with international law. He currently lives in exile in Hong Kong, since human rights activism has become increasingly risky in Bangladesh.

• BANGLADESH: ‘The legal vulnerability of LGBTQI+ people leads to harassment and discrimination’

  CIVICUS speaks about the state of civic space and the rights of excluded groups in Bangladesh with Shahanur Islam, founder secretary general of JusticeMakers Bangladesh (JMBD) and founder president of JMBD in France.

  JMBD isa human rights organisation working against all forms of discrimination and impunity for violence against ethnic, religious, social and sexual minorities and victims of torture, extrajudicial killings, forced disappearance and organised violence, including women and children. It provides legal support to victims and advocates for justice and human rights through research, awareness-raising campaigns and collaboration with various stakeholders,including other civil society groups, government agencies and international organisations.

• BANGLADESH: ‘This is a one-sided election in which we already know who the winner will be’

  

  CIVICUS speaks with Dr Mubashar Hasan about the ongoing crackdown on dissent in Bangladesh ahead of 7 January general elections.

  Mubashar is a Bangladesh-born academic and social justice activist. He is a post-doctoral researcher at the Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages, University of Oslo, Norway.

   

  What’s the current political climate in Bangladesh?

  The political climate in Bangladesh is tense. The election is being organised under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, the world’s longest-serving female head of government. The main opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), has said it’s not going to participate in an election held under this administration, arguing that there isn’t a level playing field for parties to compete freely and fairly.

  Judicial harassment is rife. In September, the New York Times reported that 2.5 million opposition activists faced judicial cases, with each facing multiple cases and some up to 400. Journalists have found that many cases against the opposition were fabricated. The police have even reportedly filed cases against BNP activists who were long dead or living abroad.

  On 28 October 2023, the opposition organised a massive rally. To stop this becoming a full-blown people-led movement, the government aggressively repressed it. A few opposition activists retaliated and then the government blamed the violence on the opposition. At least 15 people were killed, including two police officers. More than 20,000 opposition activists have been incarcerated since late October.

  This election-related violence is largely the result of state violence. Human Rights Watch recently described the ongoing developments as an autocratic crackdown. Freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly are being restricted and forcefully violated, affecting the legitimacy of the election process. Extremely politicised state institutions are being used as an extension of the ruling party, a trend many argue could lead to the materialisation of a totalitarian state.

  Is there any space for civil society to operate in Bangladesh?

  The space for civil society in Bangladesh is closed. Civil society organisations are free to operate only as long as they don’t challenge the ruling system.

  Just as in any autocratic country, there is an increasing activism going on in the diaspora. There are many Bangladeshi activists living in Australia, as well as in Malaysia, Sweden, the USA and elsewhere. BNP leader Tarique Rahman lives in exile in London.

  People in the diaspora are using the leverage that comes with living under democratic governments to spread information about what happens in Bangladesh. Those diaspora activists argue that it is their duty to expose what is going on back home.

  There are also key investigative journalists working from exile. A site called Netra News runs out of Malmö in Sweden, and it is still quite influential in exposing serious illegal acts by the government. There are several emerging YouTube commentators and analysts who have been very courageous. They have millions of followers.

  How big a problem is disinformation in Bangladeshi politics?

  Disinformation has always been a problem. Authoritarian governments don’t like the free flow of information. They want to control information and seek to discredit independent voices, just as Trump did in the USA, trashing fact as fiction and making fiction fact. And he was the authoritarian leader of a democratic country, which Bangladesh is not.

  Partisan elements within the government of Bangladesh and ruling party members treat those who dare challenge the official narrative as enemies. As I mentioned in one of my recent articles for the Diplomat Magazine, the government is the dominant force promoting political disinformation. The main opposition party has also promoted disinformation in some instances but independent factcheckers have concluded that the volume of political disinformation promoted by the opposition is miniscule compared to the government.

  There has been recent reporting by the Financial Times focused on how the Bangladeshi ruling party is using AI-driven disinformation to disrupt the upcoming election. But this is a one-sided election in which we already know who the winner will be. In this election voters do not have real choice. Why the ruling party is promoting AI-driven disinformation is therefore a mystery.

  What are your expectations for election day and its aftermath?

  Many things will unfold in the coming days. Voter turnout will most likely be low. The government will deploy military forces nationwide, perhaps even putting them in charge of distributing ballot boxes and election materials.

  There will be some violence, probably by the opposition, followed by arrests. The opposition will persist in demanding a free and fair election and the resignation of the government. Some loss of life is sadly to be expected.

  This election is also taking place within a wider geopolitical context. China, India and Russia are strongly supportive of the Bangladeshi government, whereas the USA keeps talking about free and fair elections, which puts it on the side of Bangladeshi people.

  At this point, not much is in the hands of Bangladeshi people. Without effective external pressure towards democracy, change is unlikely. Civil society’s work will only become more challenging in Bangladesh as the government steps up its repression. 

  ---

  Civic space in Bangladesh is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Mubashar through hiswebpage and follow@mh23rights on Twitter.

• BELARUS: ‘Despite the repression, we haven’t halted our work for a single day’

  

  CIVICUS speaks with Marina Kostylianchenko of Viasna about the closure of civic space and criminalisation of activism in Belarus.

  Viasna (‘Spring’) is a Belarusian human rights civil society organisation (CSO) that provides assistance to political prisoners and their families. It was founded in 1996 in response to large-scale repression of protests by the regime of President Alexander Lukashenko. In 2003 it was shut down by the government and subsequently persecuted for operating as anunregistered organisation. Repression increased in reaction to 2020 protests that followed a presidential electionwidely seen as stolen. Viasna founder Ales Bialiatski was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2022. In 2023 he wassentenced to 10 years in prison and Viasna was declared an ‘extremist group’.

   

  What tactics of repression have the authorities used against Viasna?

  Ever since it was established in 1996, Viasna has been under scrutiny. It was able to operate officially for only a very short period, as the Supreme Court dissolved it as early as 2003. Successive attempts to secure legal status have been unsuccessful so we have continued working without official approval. Just like other people in Belarus, we have faced repression, including detentions, fines and imprisonment for our human rights activism.

  A big shock came in 2011 when Viasna founder and leader Ales Bialiatski was arrested and sentenced to four years in prison on fabricated charges of tax evasion. He was unexpectedly released under an amnesty nearly three years later.

  An unprecedented peak in repression followed the 2020 mass protests. This had a profound impact on the operation of human rights organisations. For example, Viasna expanded its scope to include a hotline for people to seek advice and report detentions and other human rights violations. We also started collecting information about politically motivated criminal prosecutions and recognising detainees as political prisoners, documenting instances of torture and other forms of ill-treatment, and ultimately launching the #FreeViasna campaign for the release of imprisoned human rights defenders.

  In 2021 the government focused on dismantling civil society. Security forces conducted home and office searches and issued arrest orders targeting Viasna staff and staff of other CSOs and independent media. On 14 July, 15 Viasna members and volunteers were detained nationwide, including Ales Bialiatski, his deputy Valentin Stefanovich and lawyer Vladimir Labkovich, who are still in custody. In 2023 they were sentenced to 10, nine and seven years in jail respectively, along with substantial fines, for allegedly smuggling money and financing protests. The coordinator of the Viasna volunteer service, Marfa Rabkova, and volunteer Andrei Chepyuk, also remain in prison, with sentences of almost 15 and six years respectively.

  In August 2023, Viasna was declared an extremist organisation, which in line with recent amendments to the Criminal Code means that any staff member could be criminally prosecuted and sentenced in absentia. Anyone might also face criminal liability for providing information or contributing to Viasna’s work in any way.

  The authorities are trying to erect a barrier between us and the people we help. But despite the repression, we haven’t halted our work for a single day.

  In what conditions does Viasna currently work?

  We operate in exile. Most members of Viasna had to leave Belarus in 2021 to avoid prison and be able to continue their human rights work.

  Forced relocation has implications, as over time a gap inevitably emerges between those who left and those who remain in Belarus.

  Moreover, new challenges and areas of work have arisen. For instance, an increasing number of people are being released after completing their sentences and require medical care, rehabilitation and help with adjusting back into society. Those who left Belarus face difficulties in adapting to a new environment and struggle with getting legal status, employment, housing and everyday matters.

  Even though the coordinator of the Viasna volunteer service has been imprisoned for over three years, our work with volunteers both inside Belarus and among the diaspora has never ceased. Volunteers are mainly engaged in research and data collection, translation of texts into multiple languages and the creation of illustrations and designs. They also assist at events we organise or participate in.

   

  Do imprisoned activists face further pressure while in jail?

  In 2023, all our colleagues were transferred to reformation colonies to serve their sentences. The conditions there are particularly harsh, primarily due to severe restriction of communication with the outside world. Unlike in pretrial detention facilities, where human rights activists could receive letters, parcels and money transfers from sympathisers, now only close relatives, usually only one or two people, are allowed to call or send mail and parcels. Even then, calls are limited to a maximum of 10 minutes a week and parcels to one or two per season.

  Another form of pressure exerted on political prisoners is confinement for 10 or more consecutive days in cold punishment cells where they are not allowed to have warm clothes or other belongings, including books and pens. Inmates are punished for any reason, such as not adhering to the prescribed greeting procedure, failing to fasten a button or neglecting to shave. If a political prisoner commits several such violations, they are classed as a ‘persistent violator of internal regulations’, which justifies further pressure.

  All prisoners, except older ones and those with disabilities, are required to work, usually in hazardous industries or cold rooms for eight or more hours a day. Wages are symbolic: after subtracting various payments for their maintenance in prison, only tiny amounts are transferred to prisoners’ personal accounts, which are then used to pay off fines.

  We practically have no information about our imprisoned colleagues’ health conditions, but we know barely any medical care is provided in prison facilities.

   

  How have you organised to support your imprisoned colleagues?

  In 2021, in collaboration with Amnesty International, Front Line Defenders, Human Rights Watch, the International Federation for Human Rights, Libereco, Ostgruppen and other partners, we initiated a solidarity campaign to advocate for the immediate release of our imprisoned colleagues.

  We’re continually exploring new modes of engagement with Belarusian civil society and other communities to advance our cause. For instance, on 8 December 2023 we unveiled an art installation, ‘Unbreakable’, in the heart of Vilnius, depicting the faces of five Viasna political prisoners and featuring descriptions in three languages – Belarusian, Lithuanian and English. We participate in any event available to speak about the plight of our colleagues criminalised for their commitment to human rights.

  Several international awards have significantly bolstered attention for our cause. In 2022 Viasna was honoured with the Tulip of Human Rights award from the Dutch government, and Ales Bialiatski became a Nobel Peace Prize laureate alongside the Ukrainian Center for Civil Liberties and the Russian organisation Memorial. As a result of the Nobel Prize people in other countries found out who Ales is and why he is in prison, and expressions of support and solidarity increased.

  What support do you receive from the international community, and what further support do you need?

  A coalition of international human rights organisations has repeatedly issued joint statements urging the immediate release of Viasna’s political prisoners. Representatives of the United Nations, the European Parliament and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe have also been vocal about the more than 1,500 political prisoners in Belarus.

  Unfortunately, we haven’t yet identified the leverage that would foster the immediate release of Viasna activists. At the same time, the authorities are doing everything to isolate our colleagues and make them believe they’ve been forgotten. That’s why it’s so important to show support by sending them letters and postcards, helping their families and friends, signing petitions and holding solidarity actions around the world. For example, Libereco activists stage monthly rallies in Berlin and Zurich and organise solidarity races to raise awareness.

  Every show of support matters. We urge people to join our initiatives, spread information as widely as possible and come up with new forms of solidarity actions. To this end, we have created free-of-charge designs for printing on T-shirts, posters, leaflets, stickers and postcards. We would also appreciate support for our activities and our incarcerated colleagues through a subscription on Patreon or a one-time donation via Stripe.

   

  ---

  Civic space in Belarus is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Viasna through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@Viasna onTwitter. Contact the#FreeViasna campaign through itswebsite and follow@FreeViasna onTwitter.

  The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.